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to EC Standards and Objectives. by 
Anna Papaioannou. Journal of Energy  & 
Natural Resources Law. Vol.  14. N  1. 
February  1996 
Offentliche Unternehmen und die 
Beihilfeaufsicht der EU, Wie 
Suhventionen von der Europaischen 
Kommission beurtcilt verden, by  Karl 
Soukup, MANZ, ISBN 3-214-08235-3 
Coming up .... 
The following publications are 
under preparation by DG IV; 
however, a budget has been 
allocated only for publications 
marked with an *: 
EC Competition Policy 
Newsletter: autumn/Winter 1996 
Competition law in the European 
Communities -volume lB 
Explanation of roles applicable to 
undertakings. 
Dealing with the Commission -
notifications, complaints, 
inspections and fact-finding 
11owers. 
Competition law in the Eunlpean 
Communities -volume JA: 
International aspects of 
competition policy* 
Competition law in the European 
Communities -Addendum to 
volume 2A: Rules applicable to 
State aid. 
Competition Policy Newsletter 
L.___:o____, 
Actes Forum Europeen de Ia 
Concurrence.(co-edition with J. 
Wiley) Catalog munber:  CV-88-95-
985-EN-C* 
L' application des articles 85/86 
par les juridictions nationales* 
Recueil des decisions sur les aides 
d'Etat* 
Brochure sur Ia politique de Ia 
concurrence dans le Marche 
unique (concernant les 
art.85,86,90 et le reglement sur les 
concentrations) 
Brochure sur Ia politique 
concernant les aides d'Etat 
Brochure concernant des sujets 
presentant un interet pratique 
pour l'industrie de Ia 
Communaute et plus 
particulierement les PMEs 
Video: Introduction to 
competition policy 
Video: Dealing with the 
Commission - Notifications, 
complaints, inspections and fact-
fmding powers 
Exchange of confidential 
Information Agreements and 
Treaties between the US and 
certain Member States 
• 
DG IV on the World 
Wide Web 
Since the 25th of June 1996, DG IV 
has a home page on the Europa 
setver available on the World Wide 
Web. Our address is 
http://europa.eu.intlen/commldg04/ 
dg4home.htm. 
On the new homepage the following 
information can be found: 
DG IV'.f Mission & Directory : 
Under this heading the user can find 
a brief description of  the main areas 
of DG IV's activity and some 
introductmy articles on European 
competition policy. DG IV's staff list 
is also available. 
What is New: Most recent 
developments. 
DG IV's areas of  activity : for the 
main DG IV's areas of activity we 
already introduce (or plan to 
introduce in the near future) data for 
the following sub-headings: 
Press releases issued during the past 
month: These documents are 
downloaded daily from the RAPID 
database; because of the updating 
procedure data is introduced with a 
delay of 2-3 working days. 
Published in the Official Joumal 
during the last 6 months: We plan to 
introduce the full text of important 
documents published in the Official 
Journal. Only the published version 
will be legally binding and data will 








be 1introduced some days after 
~tication 
Legislation in force : A full list by 
subject will be introduced. This sub-
heading will in term contain an 
updated version of the legislation 
published in Vol lA: Rules 
applicable to undertakings; -vol IIA: 
Rules applicable to state aid; Vol 
IliA: International dimension. 
Commission Decisions on individual 
cases : A full lis~ by year is already 
available for the antitrust and merger 
headings. A list of  the most 
important decisions by subject year 
is also under prepamtion We also 
- plan at a later stage to introduce the 
text of the most important acts of the 
· latest week, after their publication in 
the Official Journal. 
Judgements of  the European Court 
of  Justice an_d the Court of  First 
instance : According to preliminary 
infonnation, the Court of  Justice will 
inaugurate its own World Wide Web 
site later this year. By using 
extensive links we hope we will be 
able to provide: a) the schedule of 
the Court and the Court of First 
Instance; b) a full list of cases 
introduced; c) a full list of 
Judgments of the Court and the CFI 
by year and by subject; and d) the 
text of the most important acts of  the 
latest week. Interested users can 
already find several comments and 
analyses drafted by DO IV officials 
and already published in the EC 
Competition Policy Newsletter. 
Communications and Important 
documents : this heading will 
eventually contain miscelanoous 
information of some importance 
(e.g. under the State Aid heading the 
reference rates used by the 
Commission to measure the aid 
element of state subsidies; under the 
Mergers heading the monthly and 
annual equivalences between the 
ECU and national currencies 
necessary for the calculation of the 
yearly turnover in ECU s) 
Documentation, publications 
speeches and articles : This heading 
already contains all speecJtes of the 
Commissionner for ComPetition and 
ofDG IV officials since 1993, as 
well as the Newsletter, the Annual 
Competition Report, the list of 
Community publications on 
Competition available to the public 
and what is coming up etc. 
Special features : under the heading 
International Dimension the user 
will find links to the most important 
sites of national competition 
authorities. DO IV's publications are 
available in a portable document 
format (pdf) produced with the 
Adobe Acrobat® software. 
Interested users can download the 
documents but they will also need 
the Acrobat Readet® software to 
read them This software is available 
free of  charge and enables the user 
to read and print pdf  documents on 
his/her printer without changing the 
initial fonnat. In a certain way an 
exact facsimile "paper copy" of the 
original can be reproduced locally. 
Finally, interested users should note 
that DO IV's pages are under 
construction Members of DO IV's 
Cellule Infonnation do their best .. 
view the extremely limited resources 
available - to introduce data for each 
heading and we expect to cover all 
headings systematically as from 
September onwards. It goes without 
saying that your comments, ideas 
and corrections - even your positive 
feedback - are always welcome, 
preferably by e-mail  · 
(info4@dg4.cec.be). The site was set 
up since Janwuy 1996 by Gerald 
Messiaen, official at DO IV  -0 I. 
More Information ... 
The Directorate General for Competition 
(DG IV) receives many requests with 
specific questions. It is in fact 
impossible, given the  resources 
available, to investigate and reply 
individually to each one of  them., so in 
the future we williiiiSWel' only requests 
for the tiiUUUil report ad  the 
Newsktter.  In order to better infonn the 
public .on Competition Policy, DG IV 
produces several publications, available 
through the Offtce for Official 
Publications of  the European Union (see 
catalog under the heading Community 
Publications on Competition). We also 
publish three times a year the "EC 
Compelititm Pollq Newslder", 
available free of charge. Speeches by the 
Competition Commissioner and by 
officials from the Directorate General as 
well as general documentation will be 
systematically available through our 
WWW home pages. Please address yoUr 
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COMMISSION  DIRECTIVE  95151/EC 
of  18  October l99S 
amending Directive .90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the restrictions 
on the use of cable television networks for the provision of already liberalized 
telecommunications services 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNmBS, 
Having regard  to  the Treat'f establishing  the  European 
Commun~ty, and in  particular Article  90  (3)  thereof, 
Whereas: 
(1)  Under  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  of  28 
June 1990 on competition in the markets for  tele-
communications services (1), as  amended by Direc-
tive  94/46/E.C (1),  certain  telecommunications· 
services  were  opened  to  competition,  and  the 
Member States were requested to take the measures 
necessary  to  ensure  that any operator was  entitled 
to  supply such services ; as  far  as  voice  telephony 
services  to  the general  public  are  concerned,  the 
Council  Resolution  of  22  July  1993 (3)  acknow-
ledges that -this  exception can be  terminated by 1 
January 1998, with a  transitional  period  for  some 
Member States ; the telex service, mobile communi-
cations and radio ·and television broadcasting to  the 
public were specifically excluded from the scope of 
the  Directive ;  satellite  communications  were 
included  in  the  scope  of  the  Directive  through 
Directive  94/46/EC.  · 
During  th.e  public  consultation  organized  by  the 
Commission in 1992 on the situation in  the  tele-
communications sector, following the Communica-
tion  of the  Commission of  21  October  1992,  the 
effectiveness  of the measures  liberalizing the  tele-
communications sector and in particular the libera-
lization  of  data  communications,  value  added 
services and the provision of data and voice services 
to corporate users and closed user groups, was ques· 
tioned by many service providers and users of such 
services. 
(2)  The  regulatory  restrictions  preventing  the  use  of 
alternative infrastructure for the provision of libera-
lized services, and in particular the restrictions on 
the use of cable TV networks, are the main cause of 
this  continuing  bottleneck  · situa~on.  Potential 
service  providers  must  now  rely  on  transmission 
capacity - 'leased  lines' - provided  by the tele· 
communications organizations, which are often also 
(')  OJ  No  L 192.  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
(l) OJ  No  L 268,  19.  10.  1994,  p.  IS. 
(')  OJ  No  C  213,  6.  8.  1993,  p.  1. 
competitors  in the  area  of liberalized services. To 
remedy this problem, the European Parliament, in 
its Resolution of 20  April 1993 (4~ called upon the 
Commission to adopt as soon as possible the neces-
sary measures to take full advantage of the pote_ntial 
of the existing infrastructure of cable  networks for 
telecommunications services and to abolish without 
delay the existing restrictions in the Member States 
on  the  use  of  cable  networks  fqr  non-reserved 
services. 
(3)  Following  that  resolution  the  Commission 
completed  two  studies  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks and alternative infrastructures for the deli-
very  of  those  telecommunications  services  which 
have  already· been  opened  to  competition  under 
Community  law : 'The  effects  of  liberalization  of 
satellite  infrastructure on the  corporate  and closed 
user group market', Analysis, 1994 and 'L'impact de 
l'autorisation  de  Ia  fourniture  de  services  de  tele-
·communications  liberalises  par  les  cibl.o-
. operateurs' .by  ldate,  1994. The  basic  f.inclings  of 
.  those  studies  emphasize  the  potential  role  for, 
amongst  other  things,  cable  TV  networks,  in 
meeting  the  concerns  raised  about  the  relatively 
slow  pace  of  innovation and delayed  development 
of liberalized services in the European Community. 
Opening such  networks. woul_d  Jtelp  to  overcome 
the  problems  of high  piicing  levels  and  lack  of 
suitable  capacity, which ~  largely due  to  current 
exclusive  provision  of  infrastructure  in  most 
Member States.  The  networks  operated  by autho-
rized cable TV providers indeed offer opportunities 
for the supply of an increasing number of services, 
apart from TV broadcasts, if additional investment 
is  forthcoming.  The  example  of  the  US  market 
shows that new services combining image and tele-
communications  emerge  when  certain  regulatory 
barriers  are  removed. 
(4)  Some  Member  States  have  therefore  abolished 
previous  restrictions on the provision of some data 
services  and/or non-reserved telephone services on 
cable  TV  networks.  One  Member  State  permits 
voice  telephony.  Other  Member  States  have, 
however,  maintained  severe  restrictions  on  the 
provision of services other than the distribution of 
TV  broadcasts  on  those  netwOrks. 
(•)  OJ No  C  150,  31.  S.  1993,  p.  39. 
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(5)  The current restrictions imposed by Member States 
on the  use  of cable TV networks for  the provision 
of  services  other  than  the  distribution  of  TV 
broadcasts  aim  to  prevent  the  provision  of  public 
voice  telephony by  means of  networks  other than 
the  public switched  telephone network,  to  protect 
the main source of revenue of the telecommunica-
tions  organizations. 
Exclusive  rights  to  provide public voice  telephony 
were  granted  to  most  of  the  telecommunications 
organizations  of  the  Community,  to  guarantee 
them  the  financial  resources  necessary  for  the 
provision  and exploitation  of  a universal  network, 
that  is  .to  say,  one  having  general  geographical 
coverage  and  provided  to  any  service  provider  or 
user  upon  request  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time.  · 
(6)  Since  those  restncuons  on  the  use  of  cable  lV 
networks are  brought about by State  measures and 
seek,  in each  of  the  national  markets  where  they 
exist,  to  favour  telecommunications  organization\~, 
which  the  Member  States  own  or  to  which  they 
have granted special or exclusive rights, the ·restric-
tions  must be  assessed  under Article  90  (1)  of  the 
EC Treaty. This Article requires Member States not 
to  enact or maintain in force  any measures  regar-
ding such undertakings which defeaf the  object of 
Treaty provisions, and in particular of the competi-
tion rules. It includes a prohibition on maintaining 
measures  regarding  telecommunications  organiza-
tions which result in limiting, the free  provision of 
services within the Community or lead to abuses of 
a dominant position to  the detriment of the users 
of  a given . service.  · 
(1}  The granting of exclusive rights to  the telecommu-
nications  organizations  to  provide  transmission 
capacity  for  the  provision  of  telecommunications 
services  to· the· public  and the  consequent regula-
tory  restrictions  on the use  of  cable  TV  networks 
for  purposes  other  tb,an  the  distribution  of  radio 
and  television  broadcasting programmes,  in  parti-
cular, for new services such as  interactive television 
and  video  on  demand  as  well  as  multimedia-
services  in  the  Community,  which  otherwise 
cannot be  provided, necessarily limits  the freedom 
to  provide  such services to  or from  other Member 
States. Such  regulatory restrictions cannot be  justi-
fied  for  public policy reasons or in  terms of essen-
tial requirementS, since the latter, and in particulu 
the essential requirement of interworking networks 
wherever  cable  TV networks  and  telecommunica-
tions  networks  are  interconnected, can  be guaran-
teed by less  restrictive measures, such as  objective 
non-discriminatory  and  transparent  declaration  o; 
licensing  ~onditions.  . 
(8)  The measures granting exclusive rights to the tele-
communications organizations for  the provision of 
transmission  capacity and  the  consequent  regula-
tory restrictions on the use of cable TV infrastruc-
ture for  the proVision of other telecommunications 
services already open to competition are  therefore a 
breach  ·Of  .Article  90,  read  in  conjunction  with 
Article  59  of  the Treaty. The fact  that the  restric-
tions  apply  without  distinction  to  all  companies 
other than the relevant telecommunications organi-
zations  is  not sufficient to remove  the preferential 
treatment of the latter from the scope 'of Article 59 
of· the Treaty. Indeed it is  not necessary fot all  the 
companies  of  a  Member  State  to  be  favoured  in 
relation  to  the  foreign  companies.  It  is  sufficient 
that  the  preferential  treatment  should  benefit 
certain  national  operators. 
(9)  Article  86  of the Treaty prohibits  as  incompatible 
with  the common market any condqct by one or 
more  undertakings  holding  dominant  positions 
that  constitutes  an  abuse  of  a  dominant  position 
within the common market or a substantial part of 
it. 
(1 0) ·  In each relevant national market the telecommuni-
cations organizations hold a dominant position for 
the provision of  trans~ission capacity for  telecom-
munications services because they are the only ones 
with  a  public  telecommunications  network 
covering  the  whole  tenitory- of  those  States. 
Another factor in this dominant position concerns 
the  peculiar  characteristiCs· of  the  market and  in 
particular its highly capital-intensive nature. Taking 
account  of  the  amount  of  investment  needed  to 
duplicate a network, there is a high relian~e on use 
of  existing networks. This enhances  the  ~tructural 
dominance  of  the  relevant  telecommunications 
organizations and  cons~tutes a potential &arrier  to 
entry. Thirdly, as a result of their market share, the 
telecommunications  organizations  further  benefit 
from  detailed  information  on ·telecommunications 
flows  which  is  not  available  to  new  entrants.  It 
includes information on subscribers' usage  patterns, 
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necessary to  target specific groups of users,  and on 
price  elasticities  of  demand  in  each  market 
segment and region of the country. Finally, the fact 
that the relevant telecommunications organizations 
enjoy  exclusive  rights  for  the  provision  of  voice 
telephony  also  contributes  to  their  dominance  in 
the neighbouring, but distinct, market for telecom-
munications  capacity. 
(11)  The mere creation of a dominant position within a 
given  market  through  the  grant  of  an  exclusive 
right is  not, as  such, incompatible with Article  86. 
A Member State is,  however,  not allowed  to  main-
tain  a legal  monopoly where  the  relevant underta-
king is compelled (:)r induced to abuse its dominant 
position  in  a  way  that  is  liable  to  affect  trade 
between  Member States. 
(12)  The prohibition  of  the  use  of  other infrastructure, 
and in  particular CATV networks, for the provision 
of  telecommunications services  has  encouraged the 
telecommunications  organizations  to  charge  high 
prices in comparison with prices in other countries, 
whereas  innovation  in  European corporate networ-
king and competitive  service  provision  as  well  as 
the implementation of applications proposed in the 
'Report  on  Europe  and  the  global  information 
society', are  critically dependent on the availability 
of  infrastructure,  in  particular of  leased  circuits at 
decreasing  costs.  Tariffs  for  such  high-capacity 
infrastructure are on average  10 times higher in the 
Community than equivalent capacity  o.ver  equiva-
lent distances in North America. In  the absence of 
a justification, in the form  of (for example)  higher 
costs,  these  tariffs  must  be  considered  abusive 
within the meaning of point (a) of the second para-
graph  of  Article  86. 
Those  high  prices  in  the Community are  a direct 
consequence  of  the  restrictions  imposed  by 
Member States  on the  use  of  infrastructures  other 
than  those  of  the·  telecommunications  organiza-
tions,  and  in  particular  of  those  of  the  cable  TV 
operators, for  the  provision  of telecommunications 
services. Such high prices cannot only be 'explained 
by the underlying costs, given the substantial diffe-
rences  in  tariffs  between  Member  States  where 
similar cost  structures  could  be  expected. 
(13)  Moreover, the State measures preventing the  CATV 
operators  from  offering  transmission  capacity  in 
competition  with  the  telecommunications  organi-
zations  for  the  provision  of  liberalized  services 
restrict the overall supply of capacity in the market 
and  eliminate  incentives  for  telecommunications 
organizations  to  quickly  increase  the  capacity  of 
their networks, to reduce average costs and to lower 
tariffs.  The  resulting  high  tariffs  charged  by  the 
telecommunications  organizations  for,  and  the 
shortage  of,  the  basic  infrastructure  provided  by 
these  organizations  over  which  liberalized  services 
might  be  offered  by  third  parties  have  delayed 
widespread  development  of  high-speed  corporate 
netwOrks,  remote  accessing  of  databases  by  both 
business  and residential  users  and  the  deployment 
of innovative services such as  telebanking, distance 
learning,  computer-aided  marketing,  etc.  (See 
communication  to  the  European  Parli~ent and 
the  Council  of  25 October  1994  'Green Paper on 
the liberalization of telecommunications infrastruc-
ture and cable television networks: Part One'). The 
networks  of  the  telecommunications  organizations 
currendy fail  to  meet all  potential  market demand 
for  transmission capacity for  the provision  of these 
telecommunications  services,  as  emphasized  by 
users  and suppliers of such services (Communica-
tion  to  the  Council  and the  European  Parliament 
on  the  consultation on  the  review  of  the situation 
in the telecommunications sector' of 28 April 1993, 
page  5,  point  2 ;  the  findings  made  during  the 
review  thus  showed  that  the  mere  obligation  to 
provide  leased  lines  on demand was  not sufficient 
to  avoid  restrictions  on  access  to  the  markets  in 
telecommunications  services  and  limits  on  user's 
freedom  of  choice). 
The  current  restncttons  on  the  use  of  CATV 
networks  for  the  provision  of  such  services  there-
fore  create  a situation  in  which  the  mere  exercise 
by  the  telecommunications  organization  of  their 
exclusive  right to  provide transmission capacity for 
public  telecommunications  services  limits,  within 
the  meaning of  point (b)  of  the second  paragraph 
of Article 86 of the Treacy, the emergence of,  inttr 
alia, new  applications such  as  pay  per view,  inte-
ractive  television  and video  on  demand  as  well  as 
multimedia-services in the Community, combining 
both  audio-visual  and  telecommunications,  which 
often  cannot  adequately  be  provided  on  the 
networks  of  the  telecommunications organizations. 
On  the  other  hand,  given  the  restrictions  on  the 
number of services which they may offer, cable TV 
operators  often  postpone  investments  in  their 
networks and in particular the introduction of opti-
cal-fibre which could be  profitable  if  they were  to 
be spread over a larger number of services provided. 
Consequendy,  restrictions  on the  use  of cable  TV 
networks  to  provide  services  other than  broadcas-
ting  also  have  the  effect  of  delaying  the  develop-
. ment of  new  telecommunications and  multimedia 
services,  and  thus  holding back  technical  progress 
in  this  area. 
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(14)  Lasdy, as was recalled by the Court of Justice of the 
European  Communities  in  its  Judgment  of  19 
March  1991  in Case  C-202/88,  Frane~ v.  Commis· 
sion (1), a system of undistorted competition, as laid 
down in the Treaty, can be guaranteed only if equa-
lity of opportunity is  secured between  the various· 
economic operators.  Reservi~g to  one  undertaking 
which  markets  telecommunications  services  the· 
task of supplying the indispensable raw material -:-
transmission  capacity - to  all  companies offering 
telecommunicatiQns  services  proved,  however, 
tantamount  to  conferring  upon  it  the  power  to 
determine at will which service could be offered by 
its  competitors, at which  costs  and in which  time 
periods, and to monitor their clients and the traffic 
generated  by its  competitors, thereby  putting that 
undertaking  at  an  obvious  advantage  over  its 
competitors. 
(15)  The exclusive rights granted to the telecommunica-
tions organization to  provide transmission capacity 
for  telecommunications services  to  the  public and 
the  resulting  restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
netwOrks  for  ·the  provision  of  liberalized  services 
are  therefore  incompatible  with  Article  90  (1)  in 
conjunction with  Article  86  of  the Treaty. Article 
90  (2)  of  the  Treaty  provides  for  an  exception  to 
Article  86  in  cases  where  the  application  of  ~ 
latter would obstruct the performance, in law or ib 
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to the telecom-
munications  organizations.  Pursuant to  that provi-
sion,  the  Commission  investigated  the  impact  of 
liberalizing  the  use  of  the  cable  networks  for  the 
provision  of  telecommunications  and  multimedia 
services. 
Pursuant to  Directive  90/388/EEC, Member States 
may  until  a  certain  date  continue  to  reserve  the 
provision of voice  telephony to their national tele-
communications  organization  so  as  to  guarantee 
sufficient  revenues  for  the  establishment  of  a 
universal  telephone  network.  Voice  telephony  is 
defined in Article 1 of Directive 90/388/EBC as the 
commercial  provision  for  the  public  of  the. direct 
transport  and  ~witching of  speech  in  real  time 
between  public  switched  network  termination 
points,  enabling  any  user  to  use  equipment 
connected .to  such a network termination point in 
order  to  communicate  with  another  termination 
point.  Where  cable  TV  networks  are  transformed 
into  switched  networks  providing voice  telephony 
to any subscriber, such networks should likewise be 
considered  to  be  public  switched  networks  and 
their  termination  points  as  termination  points  of 
such  networks.  The  relevant  voice  service  would 
(1)  ["91} ECR  1-1211.  paragraph  51. 
then become voice  telephony, which according to 
Article 2 of Directive 90/388/EEC could further be 
prohibited on  cable  TV  netwOrks  by the  Member 
States.  · 
It appears  that such  temporary  prohibition  of  the 
provision  of  voice  telephony  on  the  cable  TV 
network can be justified on the same grounds as for 
telecommunications  networks.  Conversely  where 
switched  voice  services  for  closed  user  groups, 
and/or  transparent  transmission  capacity  in  the 
form  of  leased  lines,  are  provided  on  cable  TV 
networks,  those  networks  do  not represent  public 
switched  networks  and Member States  should not 
restrict  the  relevant  services,  even  when  they 
involve  the  use  of  one connection  point with  the 
public switched  telephone  network. 
Besides  the  case  .  of  voice  telephony,  no  other 
restrictions for  the provision  of liberalized services 
is  justified  under  Article  90  (2),  particularly  if 
regard is had to the small contribution made to the 
turnover of  the  telecommunications  organizations 
by those services, currendy provided on their own 
networks,  which  could  be  diverted  towards  the 
cable TV netwOrks.  It is  recalled  that the measures 
liberalizing the provision of voice telephony should 
take  into account  the  need  to  finance  a  universal 
service including any development in the concept, 
see  point  V  .2  in  the  Communication  from  the 
Commission  to  the  Council  and, the  European 
Parliament of  3  May  1995. 
(16)  Notwithstanding  the  abolition  of  the  current 
restrictions on the use of cable TV networks, where 
the  provision  of  services  is  concerned,  the  same 
licensing or declaration  procedures  could  be  laid 
down  as  for  the  provision  of the  same services on 
the  public  telecommunications  networks. 
{17)  In  addition,  the  distribution  of  audiovisual 
programmes  intended  for  the  general  public  via 
those  networks,  and  the  content  of  such 
programmes, will continue to be subject to specific 
rules adopted by Member States in accordance with 
Community law and is not; therefore, subject to the 
provisions  of  this  Directive. 
{18)  Where Member States  grant to  the  same  underta-
king the right to establish both cable TV and tele-
communications  networks,  they  put the  underta-
king in a situation whereby it has  no  incentive to 
attract users to the network best suited to the provi- . 
sion of  the relevant service,  as  long as  it has spare 
capacity  on  the  other  network.  In  that  case,  the 
undertaking  has,  on  the  contrary,  an  interest  for 
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overcharging for  use  of the cable  infrastructure for 
the provision  of  non-reserved  services,  in  order  to 
increase  the  traffic  on  their  telecommunications 
networks. The introduction of fair competition will 
often  require, specific  measures  that  take  into 
account the specific  circumstances of  the  relevant 
markets.  Given  the  disparities  between  Member 
States,  the  national  authorities  are  best  able  to 
assess  which  measures  are  the  most  appropriate, 
and in  particular to judge whether a separation  of 
the  activities  is  indispensable.  In  early  stages  of 
liberalization,  detailed  control  of  cross-subsidies 
and accounting transparency are  essential. To allow 
the  monitoring  of  any  improper  behaviour, 
Member States  should  therefore  at  least  impose  a 
clear  separation  of  financial  n;cords  between  the 
twO·  activities,  though  full  structural  separation  is 
preferable. 
(19)  In  order to  allow  the  monitoring of  any improper 
cross-subsidies  between  the  broadcasting  tasks  of 
cable  TV  operators  which  are  provided  under 
exclusive  rights  in a given franchise  area  and  their 
business  as  providers of capacity for  telecommuni-
cations  services,  Member  States  should  guarantee 
transparency  as  regards  the  use  of  resources  from 
one  activity  which  could  be  used  to  extend  the 
dominant position  to  the other market. Given  the 
complexity  of  the  financial  records  of  network 
providers,  it  is.  extremely difficult  to  detect cross-
subsidies  within  it  between  the  reserved  activities 
and the services provided under competitive condi-
tions. It is  thus necessary to  require those cable TV 
operators to keep separate financial  records, and  in 
particular to  identify separately costs  and revenues 
associated  with  the  provision  of  the  services 
supplied  under  their  exclusive  rights  and  those 
provided  under competitive  conditions  once  they 
achieve  a  significant  turnover  in  telecommunica-
tions  activities  in  the  licensed  area.  For  the  time 
being,  a  turnover  of  more  than  ECU  50  million 
should be considered a significant turnover. Where 
such  a  requirement would  constitute  an  excessive 
burden on the relevant undertaking, Member States 
may grant deferments  for  limited  periods,  subject 
to  prior  notification  to  the  Commission  of  the 
underlying  justifications. 
The operators concerned should use an appropriate 
cost  accounting  system  which  can  be  verified  by 
accounting experts  and which  ensures  the  produc-
tion  of  recorded  figures. 
The above  separation  of  accounts  should,  for  chis 
purpose  at  least,  apply  the  principles  set  out  in 
Article 10  (2)  of Council Directive 92/44/EEC of  5 
June  1992  on  the  application  of  open  network 
prov1s1on  to  leased  lines (1),  as  amended  by 
Commission  Decision  94/439/EC (2).  Hybrid 
services,  made  up  of  elements  falling  variously 
within  the  reserved  and  the  competitive  services, 
should  distinguish  belWeen  the  costs  of  each 
element. 
(20)  In  the  event that,  in  the  meantime, no  competing 
home-delivery system is  authorized by  the  relevant 
Member  State,  the  Commission  will  reconsider 
whether separation of accounts is sufficient to avoid 
improper  practices  and  will  assess  whether  such 
joint provision does not result in a limitation of the 
potential  supply  of  transmission  capacity  at  the 
expense  of  the  services  providers  in  the  relevant 
area,  or  whether  further  measures  are  warranted. 
(21)  Member States should refrain from introducing new 
measures with the purpose or effect of jeopardizing 
the  aim  of  this  Directive, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECI1VE : 
Article  1 
Directive  90/388/EEC  is  hereby  amended  as  follows : 
1.  Article  (1)  ·is  amended  as  follows : 
(a)  the  fifth  indent  is  replaced  by  the  following : 
'- "telecommunications  services"  means  services 
whose  provision  consists  wholly  or  partly  in 
the transmission and/or routing of signals on a 
telecommunications  network.' 
(b)  the  following  is  added  after  the  last  indent: 
'- "cable  TV  network"  means  any  wire-based 
infrastructure approved  by  a Member State  for 
the  delivery  or distribution  of  radio  or  televi-
sion  signals  to  the  public. 
This  Directive  shall  be  without  prejudice  to  the 
specific  rules  adopted  by  the  Member  States  in 
accordance  with  Community  law,  governing  the 
distribution  of  audiovisual  programmes  intended 
for  the  general  public,  and  the  content  of  such 
programmes.' 
(!)  OJ  No  L  165,  19.  6.  !992,  p.  27. 
(l)  OJ  No  L  181,  15.  7.  !994,  p.  40. 
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2.  In Article  4,  the following  is  inserted after the second 
paragraph: 
'Member  States  shall : 
- abolish  all  restrictions  on  the  supply of  transmis-
sion  capacity by  cable  TV  networks  and allow the 
use  of cable networks for  the  provision of telecom-
munications services, other than voice telephony ; 
- ensure  that  interconnection  of  cable  TV networks 
with  the  public  telecommunications  network  is 
authorized for such purpose, in  particular intercon-
nection with  leased  lines,  and  that the restrictions 
on the direct interconnection of cable TV networks 
by  cable  TV  operators  are  abolished.' 
Article  2 
When  abolishing  restnctlons  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks,  Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary 
·measures  to  ensure  accounting  transparency  and  to 
prevent  discriminatory  behaviour,  where  an  operator 
having an  exclusive right to  provide  public telecommuni-
cations  network  infrastructure  also  provides  cable  TV 
network  infrastructure ;  and  in  particular  to  ensure  the 
separation of financial accounts as  concerns the provision 
of each network and ics activity as  provider of telecommu-
nication  services. 
Where an  operator has an exclusive right to provide cable 
television  network infrastructure  in  a given  area  Member 
States shall also  ensure that the operator concerned keeps 
separate  financial  accounts  regarding  its  activity  as 
network  capacity  provider  for  telecommunications 
purposes  as  soon  as  it  achieves  a turnover  of  more  than 
ECU  50  million  _in  the  market  for  telecommunications 
services other than the distribution of radio and broadcas-
ting services  in the relevant geographic area. Where such 
requirement would constitute an  excessive  burden on the 
relevant  undertaking,  Member  States  may  grant  defer-
ments for  limited periods, subject to  prior notification to 
the  Commission  of  the  underlying  justification. 
Where a single operator provides  both  networks  or both' 
services as  referred to  in the first  paragraph, the Commis-
sion  shall,  before  1  January  1998,  carry  out an  overall 
assessment of the imapct of  such  joint provision  in  rela-
tion  to  the  aims  of  this  Directive. 
Article 3 
Member States shall supply to  the  Commission, not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  has  entered  into 
force,  such information  as  will  allow  the  Commission to 
confirm that Articles 1 and 2 have  been complied with. 
Article  4 
This Directive shall enter into force  on 1 January 1996. 
Article  5 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  18  October  199 5. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member  of the  Commission 
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CORRIGENDA 
Corrigendum to Commission Direc:tive 95/St/EC of 18  Octo_ber 199S amending Directive 
·· · 90/388/EEC with regard to ·the abolition of the restrictioas on the use of cable television 
netWOrks  for  the provision  of already liberalized telecommunications services 
.  (Offkial Journal of tht  Euro~an Communitits  No  L  256  of 26  Oaobtr  1995) 
Paae  SJ,  Artide  1 (1)  point  (b~ 
for.  '- •cable TV network• means any wire-based infrastructure approved by a Member State for 
delivery  or distribution  of  ndio or  television  sipals  to the  public.', 
rtad:  '- •cable 1V network'"  means any mainly wire-based infnstructure approved  by a Member 
State  for  delivery  or  distribution  of  radio  or television  sipals to  the  public.' 
No  L 308/S~ 
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~OMM~SSION DIRECI'IVE 96/2/EC 
of 16 January 1.996 
amending  Directive  .90/388/EEC  with  regard  to  mobile  and  personal 
communications 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNmES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community,  and  in  particular Article  90  (3)  thereof, 
Wher~as: 
(1)  In its  communication  on  the  consultatio.n  on  the 
Green Paper on mobile and  personal  co~munica­
tions  of 23  November  1994,  the  Commission  set 
out the major ~ctio.ns required for the fu~re regula-
tory environment necessary to exploit the potential 
of this means of communication. It emphasized the 
need  for  the  abolition,  as  soon  as  possible,  of all 
remaining exclusive and special rights "in  the sector 
through fl:Ill  applicatiQn of CommunitY on compe-
tition  rules  and with the amendment of Commis-
. sion  Directive  90/388/EEC  of  28  June  1990 
competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services r).  as  last  amended  by  Directive 
95/51/EC (21  where  required.  Moreover,  the 
communication  considered  removing.  restrictions 
on the free  choice· of underlying facilities .used  by 
mobile  network  operators  for  the  operation  and 
development of  their  networks  for  those  activities 
which are allowed by the licences or authorizations. 
Such a step was  seen as  essential in order to over  .. 
come current distortions of fair competition and, in 
particular; to allow suCh operators control over their 
cost  base. 
(2)  The  Council  Resolution  of  29  June  1995  on  the 
further  development  of  mobile  and  personal 
communications  in  the  European  Union (l)  gave 
general support to  the  actions  required,  as  set out 
in  the  Commission's  communication  of  23 
November  1994,  and  considered  as  one  of  the 
major  goals  the  abolition  of  exclusive  or  special 
rights  in  this  area. 
(3)  The  European  Parliament,  in  its  Resolution  of  14 
December 1995 concerning the  draft Commission 
Directive  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with 
~ 
OJ  No  L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10. 
OJ  No  L 256,  26.  10.  1995,  p.  49. 
) OJ  No  C  188,  22.  7.  1995,  p.  3.  ' 
regard  to  mobile and personal communications (41 
welcomed this Directive in both its principles and 
its  objectives  .. 
(4)  Seve~  Me~ber States . ha~e  already  opened  up 
certain qtobde commumcattons services to compe-
tition  and  introduced  licensing schemes  for  such 
services. · Nevertheless,  the  number  of  licences 
pnted is  stil~ restricted in many Member States on 
the  basis  of discretion  or,  i~ the case  of operaton  · 
c~peting with  telecommunications  organizatiQns 
subject  to  technical  restrictions  such  as  a ·  ban  on 
using  i~~truchire other than  thos~ provided  by 
the  ~elecommunica~ons  organization.  Many 
Member States, for example, have still not granted 
licences  for  DCS  1800  mobile  telephony. 
In addition, some Member States have  maintained 
exclusive  rights for the. provision of certain mobile 
~d personal  commu.nications  services  granted  to 
the  national  telecommunications  organization. 
(S)  Directive 90/388/EEC provides for the abolition of 
special  or  exclusive  rights  granted  by  Member 
States  in respect of the  provision of telecommuni-
cations services. However, the Directive does not as 
yet  apply  to  mobile  services. 
(6)  Where  the  number of  undertaki~gs authorized  to 
provide  mobile  and  personal '  communications 
services. is  limited  by  Member  S~tes through  the 
existence of special rights and a fortiori exclusive 
rights, these constitute restrictions· which would be 
incompatible  with  Article  90  iil conjunction  with 
. Article 59 of the Treaty whenever such limitation is 
not justified under specific Treaty provisions or the 
essential  requirements,  since  these  rights  prevent 
other  undertakings  from  supplying  the  services 
concerned,  to  and  from  other Member  States.  In 
the  case  of  mobile  and  pe~onal communication 
networks  and  services.  the  applicable  essen'tial 
requiremen_ts  encompass  the  effective  use  of the 
frequency  spectrum and the avoidance  of  harmful 
interference  between  radio-based,  space-based  or 
terrestrial  technical  systems.  Consequendy, 
provided  that  the  equipment  used  to  offer  the 
services  also  ~tisfies these  essential  requirements. 
the  current special  rights  and  a fortiori exclusi:ve. 
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(7) 
rights  on  the  provision  of  mobile  services  are  not 
justified  ar:td  therefore  should  be  treated  in  the 
same way as  the other telecommunications services 
already  covered  by  Directive  90/388/EEC.  The 
scope of application of that Directive should accor-
dingly  be  extended  so  as  to  include  mobile  and 
personal  communications  services. 
When  opening  the  markets  for  mobile  and 
personal  communications  to  competition  Member 
States  should  give  preference  to  the  use  of  Pan-
European standards in the area, such as  GSM, 'DCS 
1800,  D ECf and  ERMES,  in order to  allow deve-
lopment and  transborder  provision  of  mobile  and 
personal  communications services. 
(8)  Certain  Member  States  have  currently  granted 
licences  for  digital  mobile  radio-based  services 
making use  of  frequencies  in  the  1 700  to  1 900 
Mhz  band,  according  to  the  DCS  1800  standard. 
The Commission communication of 23  November 
1994  established  that  DCS  1800  is  to  be  seen  as 
part of the GSM system family. The other Member 
States have not authorized such se.pcices even where 
frequencies  are  available  in  this  band,  thereby 
preventing  the.  cross-border  provision  of  such 
services. This is  also  incompatible with  Article  90 
in  conjunction  with  Article  59.  To  remedy  this 
s.ituation,  Member States  which  have  not yet esta-
blished  a  procedure  for·  granting  such  licenceS"' 
should  do  so  within  a  reasonable  time-frame.  In 
this  context,  due  account should  be  taken  of  the 
requirement  to  promote  investments  by  new 
entrants  in  these  areas.  Member  States  should  be 
able  to  refrain  from  granting a licence  to  existing 
operators; for example to  ope~ators of GSM systems 
already present on their territory, if it can be shown 
that this would  eliminate effective  competition  in 
particular by the extension of a dominant position. 
In  particular, where  a Member State grants or has 
already granted· DCS 1800 licences, the granting of 
new or supplementary licences for existing GSM or 
DCS  1800  operators  may  take  place  only  under 
conditions  ensuring effective  competition. 
(9)  Digital  European  cordless  telecommunications 
(DEC!) services  are  also  an  essential  element for 
the  development  towards  persOnal  communica-
tions. D ECf provides  an alternative to the current 
local loop access  to  the  public switched  t~lephone 
network. On 3 June  1991,  the Council, by Direc-
tive 91/287/EEC, designated coordinated frequency 
bands  for  the  introduction  of  DECf  into  the 
Community(') to be implemented not later than 31 
( 1)  OJ  No  L  144,  8.  6.  1991,  p  ..  45. 
December  1991.  Certain  Member  States  are, 
however,  preventing  the  use  of  these  frequencies 
for  such  services  by  refusing  to  grant  licences  to 
companies  which  intend  to  start  offering  DEer 
services.  Where  telecommunications  organizations 
were granted exclusive rights for  the establishment 
of  the  public  switched  telephone  network,  the 
effect of  such refusals  is  to  strengthen their domi-
nant  position  and  also  to  delay  the  emergence of 
personal  communications  services  and  therefore 
restricts  technical  progress  at  the  expense  of  the 
users  contrary  to  Article  90  of  the  Treaty  in 
conjunction with point (b) of Article 86. To remedy 
this  situation  Member  States  which  have  not  yet 
established  a  procedure  for  granting such  licences 
should also do so within a reasonable time-frame. 
(Ht)  Even  where  licences  were  granted  to  competing 
mobile  operators,  Member  States  have  in  certain 
cases  granted  to  one  of  them,  in  a  discretionary 
manner,  special  legal  advantages  which  were  not 
granted to others: In such a situation, these advan-
tages  may  be  counterbalanced  by  special  obliga-
tions  and  do  not,  necessarily,  preclude  the  latter 
from  entering .and  competing in  the  market. The 
compatibility of  these  advantages  with  the  Treaty 
must therefore  be  assessed  on  a case-by-case  basis 
taking  into  account  their  impact  on  the  effective 
freedom of other entities to  provide, in an efficient 
manner,  the same  telecommunications service  and 
their  possible  justifications  regarding  the  activity 
concerned. 
{11}  The  exclusive·  rights  that  currently  exist  in  the 
mobile  communications  field  were  generally 
granted  to  organizations  which  already  enjoyed  a 
~ominant  position  in  creating  the  terrestrial 
networks, or to  one of their subsidiaries. In such a 
situation,  these  rights  have  the effect of extending 
the dominant position  enjoyed  by those  organiza-
tions  and  therefore  strengtheping  that  position, 
which,  according  to  the  case-.law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice, constitutes an abuse of a dominant position 
contrary to Article 86  of  the Treaty. The exclusive 
rights granted in the mobile and personal commu-
nications field  are  consequently incompatible with 
Article  90  read  in  conjunction  with  Article  86. 
These  exclusive  rights  should  consequently  be 
abolished. 
{12)  Moreover, as regards new mobile services, given the 
difficulty  of  ensuring  that  telecommunications 
organizations  in  those  Member  States  with  less 
developed ·networks which would qualify for a tran-
sitional time period for  the abolition of  the exclu-
sive  rights for  the establishment and use  of  infras-
tructures required for a given mobile service, would 
I  9 '  I 
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not use  this  position  to  extend it to the market of 
the  relevant  mobile  service,  the  Member  States 
should,  in  order  to  prevent  abuses  of  dominant 
positions contrary  ~o the Treaty, abstain from gran-
ting such telecommunications organization, or any 
associated  organization,  a  licence  for  this  mobile 
service.  Where  telecommunications  organization, 
do  not or no longer en joy exclusive  rights  for  the 
establishment  and  the  provision  of  the  public 
network infrastructure, they should, however, not a 
priori be  excluded from such licensing procedures. 
(13)  Exclusive rights not only limit access to the market, 
but  they  also  have  the  effect  of  restricting  or 
preventing, to the disadvantage of users,  the. use  of 
mobile  and  personal  communications  on  offer, 
thereby  holding  back  technical  progress  in  this 
area.  The  telecommunications  organizations  have, 
in  particular,  maintained  higher tariffs  for  mobile 
radiophony  in  comparison  with  fixed  voice  tele-
phony which  hinders  competition  at  the  expense 
of  their  main  source  of  revenues. 
Where  investment  decisions  are  taken  by  under-
takings  in areas  where  they enjoy  exclusive  rights, 
these  undertakings are  in  a position  whereby they 
can decide to give  priority to fixed network techno-
logies,  whereas  new  entrants  may  exploit  mobile 
and  personal  technology  even  to  compete  with 
fixed  services,  in  particular  as  regards  the  local 
loop. Thus, the exclusive rights imply that there  is 
a  restriction  on  the  development  of  mobile  and 
personal communications and this is  incompatible 
with  Article  90,  read  in  conjunction  with  Article 
86. 
(14)  In  order  to  establish  the  conditions  under  which 
mobile  and  personal  communications systems  are 
to be  provided, Member States may introduce licen-
sing  or  declaration  procedures  to  ensure  compli-
ance with the applicable essential requirements and 
public  service  specifications  in  the  form  of  trade 
regulations, subject to the proportionality principle. 
Public  service  specifications  in  the  form  of  trade 
regulations  relate  to  conditions  of  permanence, 
availability, and quality of the service. Such condi-
tions  may  include  the  obligation  to  give  service 
providers  access  to  airtime  on  terms  at  least  as 
favourable  as  those  available  to  a service  provision 
business  owned  by,  or with  ownership  links  to,  a 
mobile  network. This framework  is  without preju-
dice  to  the  harmonization  of  the  framework  for 
licensing  in  the  Community. 
The number of licences may be  limited only in the 
case  of scarcity of the frequency resources. Conver-
sely,  licensing is  not justified when a mere declara-
tion  procedure  would  suffice  to  attain  the  relevant 
objective. 
As  regards airtime resale  and other mere provision 
of  services  by  independent  service  providers  or 
directly  by  mobile  network  operators  on  already 
authorized  mobile  sytems,  none  of  the  applicable 
essential  requirements  would  justify  the  introduc-
tion or maintenance of licensing procedures, given 
that such services do not consist of the provision of 
telecommunications services  or  the  operation  of a 
mobile  communications network,  but of  the  retail 
of  authorized  services,  the  provision  of  which  is 
likely to be subject to conditions ensuring compli-
ance  with  essential  requirements or  public  service 
specifications  in  the  form  of  trade  regulations. 
They  could  therefore,  besides  the  application  of 
national fair trade rules concerning all similar retail 
activities,  only  be  subject  to  a  requirement  of  a 
declaration of their activities to the National Regu-
latory Authority of  the  Member States  where  they 
choose  to  operate. Mobile  network operators could 
on the other hand refuse  to  allow service  providers 
to distribute their services, in particular where these 
service  providers  did  not  adhere  to  ~  code  of 
conduct  for  service  providers  in  conformity  with 
the  competition rules  of  the Treaty,  as  far  as  such 
code  exists. 
(15)  In the context of mobile and personal communica-
tions  systems  radiofrequencies are  a crucial bottle-
neck  resource.  The  allocation  of  radiofrequencies 
for mobile and personal communications system by 
Member  States  according  to  criteria  other  than 
those which are  objective, transparent and non-dis-
criminatory  constitutes  a  restriction  incompatible 
with  Article  90  in conjunction with  Article  59  of 
the  Treaty to  the extent that operators  from  other 
Member States are disadvantaged in these allocation 
procedures. The development of effective competi-
tion  in  the  telecommunications sector may  be  an 
objective  justification  to  refuse  the  allocation  of 
.frequencies  to  operators  already  dominant  ~n  the 
geographical  market. 
I  10 No  L 20/62  -Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities  . 26.  1.  96  . 
Member States should ensure that the· procedure for  , 
allocation of radiofrequencies is based on objective 
criteria and without discriminatory effects.  In this 
context Member States should, with regard to future 
designation of frequencies for specific communica-
tions seiVices,  publish  the "frequency  plans  as  well 
as  the  procedures  to  be  followed  by  operators  to 
obtain frequencies within the designated frequency 
bands.  Current frequency  allocation  should be  re-
viewed by the Member States at regular intervals. In 
cases where the number of licences was  limited on 
the  basis  of  spectrum  scarcity,  Member  States 
should also  review whether advances in technology 
would  allow  spectrum  to  be  made  available  for · 
t" additional  licences.  Possible  fees  for  the·  use  of 
frequencies  should  be  proportional  and  levied 
according  to  the  number  of  channels  effectively 
granted. 
(16)  Most Member States currently oblige mobile opera-
tors to use the leased line capacity of  telecommun~­
cations  organizations  for  both  internal  network 
connections  and  for  the . routing  of  long  distance 
portions  of  calls.  As  the  charges  for  leased  line 
rental  represent  a  substantial  (r"oportion  of  the 
mobile operator's cost base,  this requriement gives 
the supplying telecommunications organization, i.e. 
in many cases its direct competitor, a considerable 
influence  on  the · commercial  viability  and  cost 
strucrure  of mobile  operators.  In  addition.  restri~?"' 
tions on the self-provision of ·infrastructure and the 
use  o(  third  party  infrastructure  is  slowing  down 
the  development  of. mobile  services,  in  particular 
because  effective  pan-European  roaming  for  GSM 
relies  on  the  widespread  availability  of  addressed 
signalling systems,  a: technology which  is  not yet 
universally offered  by  telecommunicatio~s organi-
zations .  ~oughout the  Community. 
Such restrictions on the. provision and use of infra-
structures  constrain  the  provision  of  mobile  and 
personal  communications  services  by  operators 
from  Qther  Member States  and  are  thus· incompa-
tible with Article  ~~ in. conjunction with· Article S9 
of  the  Treaty. To ·~e extent that the  competitive 
provision  of  mobile  voice  services  is  prevented 
beca~e. the  telecommunications  organization  is· 
unable  to  meet the  mo~ile operator's  demand  for 
. infristrucrures  or will  only do  so  on  the  basis  of 
tariffs which  are  not oriented towards  the costs of 
the  .  .l~ased line  capacity  concerned,  these· restric-
tions J·inevitably ..  favoQr  the  telecommunications 
organization's offering .of. fixed  telephony services, 
for which most Member States still maintain exclu-
sive rights. The reatrictio_n on the provision and use 
of  infnstructure  thus • infringes  Article  90,  in 
conjunction with  Article  86  of  the Treaty. Accor-
dingly,  Member  States  must  lift  these  restrictions 
and grant, if  requested, the  relevant  mobile opera-
tors  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  access  to  the 
necessary  scarce  resources  to  set  up  their.  own 
infrastructure  including  radiofrequencies. 
(17)  Currently,  the  direct  interconnection  between 
mobile communications systems as well as between 
mobile  communications  systems  and  fixed  tele-
communications networks within a single Member 
State  or  between  systems  located  in  different 
Member  States  is  restricted· "in  mobile  ·licences 
granted by many Member States without any  t~h­
nical  justification.  Funhermore,  restrictions  exist 
for  the  interconnection  of  such  networks  via 
networks  other  than  the  public  telecommunica-
tions  networks. ·In  the  Member  States  concerned, 
mobile operators are  required  to  interconne~t with 
other mobile operators via  the telecommunications 
organization's  fixed  network.' Such  requirements 
result in additional costs and thus impede, in parti-
cular, the development of  transborder provision  of 
mobile communication services in the Community 
and  therefore  infringe  Article  90,  in  conjunction 
with  Article  59. 
As in most Member States  exclusive  rights for  the 
provision  of  voice  telephony  and  public  fixed -
network  infrastrucrure  are  maintained,  potential 
abuses  of  the  relevant  telecommunications  organ-
ization's dominant position  can  be  prevented only 
if  Member  States  ensure  that  interconnection  of 
public  mobile  communications  systems  is  made 
possible at defined  interfa<:es  with the public tele-
communications network of  those telecommunica-
tions  organizations  and  that  the  interconnection 
conditions are  based  on objecpve  criteria, justified 
by  the · cost  of  providing  the  interconnection 
service,  are  transparent.  ·  non-discriminatory, 
published in advance and allow the necessary tariff 
flexibility,  including  the  application  of  off-peak 
rates.  In  particular,  transparency  is  required  in 
respect  of  cost-accounting  of  operators  providing 
both  fixed  networks  and  mobile  telecommunica-
tions  networks.  Special  and  exclusiVe  rights  in 
respect of the  establishment of cross-border infras-
trucrure for voice telephony are not affected by this 
Directive..  · 
In order to be able to ensure the full application of 
this  Directive  as  regards  interconnection, informa-
tion  · on  interconnection  agreements  must  be 
available  to  the  Commission  on  request. 
I  11 I 
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The  drawing  up ·of  such  national  procedures  for 
licensing and interconnection, is  without prejudice 
to  the  harmonization  of  the  latter at  Community 
level  by  European  Parliament and  Council  Direc-
tives,  in particular within the framework  of  Direc-
tives  on  open  network  provision  (0  NP). 
(18)  Article 90  (2)  of  the Treaty provides  for  an  excep-
tion to the Treaty rules, and in  particular to Article 
86,  in  cases  where  the  application  of  the  latter 
would obstruct the  perf.ormance,  in  law  or in  fact, 
of the  particular tasks  assigned  to  the  telecommu-
nications organizations. Pursuant to that provision, 
Directive 90/388/EEC allows  exclusive  rights  to  be 
maintained  for  a  transitional  period  in  respect  of 
voice  telephony. 
Voice telephony is defined in Article 1 of Directive 
90/388/EEC  as  the  commercial  provision  for  the 
public  of  the  direct  transport  and  switching  of 
speech  in  real  ti~e  between  public  switched 
network  termination  points,  enabling  any  user  to 
use equipment connected to such a network termi-
nation point in order to communicate with another 
termination  point. The direct  transport""and  swit-
ching of speech via mobile and personal communi-
cations networks  is  not implemented between  two 
public switched termination points and is  therefore 
not voice  telephony within  the  meaning of  Direc-
tive  90/388/EEC. 
On the basis of Article 90 (2)  of the Treaty,  public 
service  specifications  in  the  form  of  trade· regula-
tions  applicable  to  all  authorized  operators  of 
mobile  telecommunications  services  provided  to 
the  public,  are,  however,  justified  to  ensure  the 
fulfilment  of  objectives  of general  economic  inte-
rest, such as  ensuring geographical coverage or the 
implementation  of  Community-wide -standards. 
(19)  In its assessment of current restrictions imposed on 
mobile operators concerning the establishment and 
use  of  their own  infrastructure  and/or  the  use  of 
third  party  infrastructures,  the  Commission · will 
further consider the  need  for  additional  transition 
periods  for  Member  States  with  less  developed 
networks  u  called for  in  the Council's Resolution 
of  22  July 1993  on the  review  of  the  situation  in. 
the  telecommunications  sector  and  the  nee~ for 
further .development- ·in  that market (1)  in  addition 
to  the  Council's Resolution of  22  December 1994 
on  the  principles and timetable  for  the  liberaliza-
tion  of  telecommunications  infrastructures (1). 
(')  OJ  No  C 213,  &.  8.  1993,1..  2.  .-
(1)  OJ  No  C 379,  31.  12.  199  • p.  4. 
Although  not  covered  by  these  resolutions  there 
.should. be  the  possibility  of  requesting  an  addi-
tional  transition  period as  regards  the direct inter-
connection of mobile networks. The Member States 
which  may  request  such  an  exception  are  Spain, 
Ireland, Greece and Portugal. However, only certain 
of these  Member States do  not allow  GSM  mobile 
operators to use  o-wn  and/or third party infrastruc-
tures.  A specific  procedure  should  be  provided  in 
order  to  assess  the  possible  justification  for  the 
maintenance  of  that  regime  for  the  provision  of 
mobile and personal communications services for· a 
transitional  time  period  as.  set  out  in  the  said 
Council  resolutions. 
(20)  This  Directive  does  not  prevent  measures  being 
adopted  in  accordance  with  Community  law  and 
existing  international  obligations  so  as  to  ensure 
that nationals 'of  Member States  are  afforded  equi-
valent  treatment  in  third  countries, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRECI'IVE : 
Article  1 
Directive  90/388/EEC  is  amended  as  follows : 
1. Article  1 (I)  is  amended  as  follows : 
(a)  the  following  indents  are  inserted  after  the  ninth 
indent: 
'- •mobile  and  personal  communications 
services•  means  services  other  than  satellite 
services  whose  provision  consists,  wholly  or 
partly,  in  the establishment of  radi~communi­
cations to a mobile user, and makes use wholly 
or  partly of mobile and  personal communica-
tions  systems; 
- •mobile  and  personal  communications 
systems" means systems consisting of the esta-
blishment and operation of a mobile  network 
infrastructure  whether  connected  or  not  to 
public network termination  points,  to  support 
the  transmission  and  ~rovision of  radiocom-
munications  services  to  mobile  users,' ; 
(b)  the thirteenth indent is  replaced by the following: 
'- •essential  requirements•  means  the  non-
. economic reasons in the public interest which 
may  cause  a  Member State  to  impose  condi-
tions on the establishment and/or operation of 
telecommunications networks' or the provision 
of  telecommunications services. These reuons 
are  the security of network operations, mainte-
nance of network integrity, and where justified, 
• 
• 
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interoperability of servi~es, data protection, the 
protection  of the  environm.ent  and  town  and 
country planning objectives as well as  the. effi· 
cient use  of  the  frequency  spectrum and the 
awidance  of  harmful  interference  between 
·radio-ba.sed  telecommunications  systems  and 
other  space-based  or  terrestrial  technical 
systems. 
Data  protection  may  include  protection  of 
personal  data,  the  confidentiality  of  informa-
tion transmitted or stored as well as the protec· 
tion  of  privacy.' 
2.  Article . 1 (2)  is  replaced  by  the  following : 
'2.  This  I?irective  shall' not apply to  telex.' 
3.  The  following  Articles  3a  to  3d  are  inserted : 
'Article  Ja 
In addition to the. requirements set o_.Y.t  in the second 
paragraph  of  Article  2  Member States  shall,  in  atta-
c;hing conditions to licences or general authorizations 
for  mobile  .  and  personal  comm.unications  systems, 
ensure  the  following : 
(i)  licensing conditions must not contain conditions 
other than -those · jlistified  on  the grounds· of  the 
essential requirements and,· in the case  of systems 
for use by the general public, public service requi-
rements in the form of trade regulation within the 
meaning of Article. 3 ; 
(ii)  licensing conditions for mobile network operators 
must  ensure  transparent  and  non-discriminatory 
behaviour  between  fixed  and · mobile  network 
operators  in common ownership ; 
~~ 
(iii)  licensing conditions should not include unjustified 
technical  re~trictions. Member States may not, in . 
particular,  prevent  combination  of  licences.  or 
restrict the offer of different technologies making 
use  of  distin~t frequencies,  where  multistandard 
equipment is  available. 
As far u  frequencies are available, member States shall 
award licences according to open, non-discriminatory, 
and transparent  procedures. 
Member States  may limit the  number of licences for 
mobile. and  personal · communications  systems  to  be 
issued only on the basis of essential requirements and 
only  where  related  to  the  lack  of  availability  of 
frequency spectrum and justified under the  principle 
of  proportionality.  • 
Licence· award  procedures may consider public service 
requirements in the form of trade regulation within the 
meaning of Article 3, provided the solution which least 
restricts competition is chosen. The relevant conditions 
related  to  trade  regulations  may  be  attached  to  the 
licences  granted. 
Member States which are granted  ~n additional imple-
.  mentation period to abolish the restrictions with regard 
to infrastructure as  provided for in Article 3c, shall not 
during that period grant any further mobile or personal 
communications  licence  to  telecommunications  or-
gani~ations in such Member States d.o not or no longer 
enjoy exclusive or special rights, within the meaning of 
points (b) and (c).of the first paragraph of Article 2, for 
the  establi~hment  and  the  provision  of  the  public 
network  infrastructure,  they  shall  not  a  priori  be 
excluded  from  such  licensing  procedures. 
Article Jb 
The  designation  of  radiofrequencies  for  specific 
communication  services  must  be  based  on  objective 
crit~ria. Procedures must be transparent and published 
in an  appropriate  manner. 
Member  States  shall  publish  every  year  or  make 
available on request, the allocation scheme of frequen-
cies reserved for mobile and personal communications 
services, according to the scheme set out in the Annex, 
including  the  plans  for  future  extension  -of  such 
frequencies. 
This designation  must be  reviewed  by Member States 
at regular  appropriate  intervals. 
Article Jc 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that  all  restrictions . on 
operators  of  mobile  and  personll  communications 
systems with regard to the establishment of th.eir own· 
infrastructure,  ~e use  of  infrastructures  provided  by 
third and the sharing of infrastructure, other facilities 
and sites, subject to limiting the use of such inftastruc-
. tures to those activities provided for in their licence or 
authorization,  are  lifted. 
Artitle Jd 
Without  prejudice  to  the  future  harmonization  of 
national interconnection rules  in the context of ONP, 
Member States shall ensure that direct interconnection 
between  mobile  communications  syste~ as  well  as 
between  mobile  communications  systems  and  fixed 
telecommunications  netwOrks,  is  allowed.  In order to 
achieve  this, .restrictions  on  interconnection  shall  be 
lifted. 
I  13 ,. 
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Member  States  shall  ensure  that. operators  of  mobile 
communications systems for  the public have  the right 
io interconnect their systems with the public telecom-
munications network. To this end, Member States shall 
guarantee. access  to  the  necessary number of points of 
interconnection  to  the  public  telecommunications 
network  in  the  licences  for  mobile  services.  Member 
States shall ensure that the technical interfaces offered 
at such  points of interconnection are  the least  restric-
tive  interfaces  available  as  regards  the  features  of  the 
mobile  services. 
Member States shall ensure that interconnection condi-
tions  with  t~e public  telecommunications  network  of 
the  telecommunications  organizations  are  set  on  the 
basis  of objective criteria, are  transparent and non-dis-
criminatory,  and  compatible  with  the  principle  of 
proprotionality.  They  shall  ensure  that,  in  case  of 
· appeal,  full  access  to  interconnection  agreements  is 
given to  National Regulatory Authorities and that such 
information  is  made available  to  the  Commission  on 
request.' 
4.  In  the  first  sentence  of  Article  4  the  word  'fixed'  is 
inserted  before  the  words  'public telecommunications 
networks'. 
Articlt 2 · 
1.  Without  prejudice  to  Article  2  of'  Directive 
90/388/EEC, and subject to  the provision set out· in  para-
..  . pph 4 of this Article, Member States shall not refuse  to 
allocate  licences  for  operating mobile  systems  according 
to the DCS  1800 standard at the latest after adoption of a 
decision  of  the  European  . Radiocommunications 
Committee  on  the  allocation  of pes  1800 .  frequencies 
and  in  any  case  by  1 January  1998. 
2  Member States shall, subject to the provision set out 
in  paragraph  4,  not refuse  to  allocate  licences  for  public 
access/Telepoint  applicaitons,  including  systems  opera-
tion on the basis of the DEer standard as from  the entry 
into force  of  this  Directive. 
3.  Member States shall not restrict the combination of 
mobile  technologies  or  systems,  in  particular  where 
multistandard  equipment  is  available.  When  eXtending 
existing  licences  to  cover  such  combinations  Member 
States  shall  ensure  that  such  extension  is  justified  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  paragraph  4. 
4.  Member States shall adopt, where required, measures 
to  ensu~  the  implementation  of  this  Article  taking 
account  of  the requirement to  ensure  effective  competi-
tion between operators competing in· the relevant markets. 
Articlt J  . 
Member States  s~all supply to  the  Commission, not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  has  entered  into 
force,  such information  as  will  allow  the Commission to 
confirm  that Article  I  as  well as  Article  2 (2)  have  been 
complied  with. 
Member States  shall supply to  the Commission, not later 
than  1 january 1998, such information  as  will  allow  the 
Commission  to  confirm  that  Article  2  (1)  has  been 
complied  with. 
Article 4 
Member States with less developed networks may request 
at the latest three mon~s  from the entry into force of this 
Directive  an  additional  implementation  period  of  up  to 
five  years,  in  which  to  implement  all  or  some  of  the 
conditions set out in  Article  3c and in Article  3d (1)  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC,  to  the  extent  justifiable  by  the 
need to. achieve the necessary structural adjustments. Such 
a  request  must  include  a  detailed  description  of  the 
planned  adjustments  and  a  precise  assessment  of  the 
timetable envisaged  for  their implementation. The infor-
mation provided shall be made available  to any interested 
patty on  deniand. 
The  Commission  will  assess  such  requests  and  take  a 
.  reasoned  decision  within  a time  period  of  three  months 
on the principle, implications and maximum duration of 
the  additional  period  to  be  granted.  ,. 
Article  5 
This  Directive  shall  enter  into  force  on  the  20th  day 
following  its  publication  in  the  Official journal of the 
European  Communities. 
Article 6 
This  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member  States. 
Done  at  Brussels,  16  Januacy  1996. 
For  tht Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIBRT 
Membtr of tiN Commission 
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.ANNEX 
1.  frequency  bands  allocated  to  mobile  systems. 
(speclfying the number nf channels, the service to which it is  allocated and the review date of the 
allocation) 
2.  freq~ency bands  which  will  be  made  available  for  mobile- systems  during  the  next year. 
3.  Procedures  envisaged  to  assign  these  frequencies  to existing  or riew  operators  • 
.. -
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CORRIGENDA 
Corrigendum to Commission Regulation1 (BC)  No 252196  of 9  Feb~ary.·l996 temporarily 
altering the export refunds on ~f  ..  ·· · 
(Official journal of the  European  Commun~'.~e,r··No L 32  of 10  February  1996) 
Pase  18,  Article  2: 
for: 
read: 
-ntis Regulation  shall enter-into force  on the day  following  its  publication in  the  Official 
journal of th4  European  CommunitU.r.! 
nis Regulation shall enter into force  on the day follo,.-ing  its  publication  in  the  Official 
journal of th4  European  Communities. 
It shall apply from  10 Febnwy until31 March 1.996 except in the case of amendment within 
.  thiS  period.' 
Corrigendum to Commission Directive 96/2/BC of 16 January 1.996  amending Directive 
90/388/BBC with  regard to mobile and penonal communications 
(Official journal of the .European Commlmiliu No L  20 of 26 january 1996) 
On page  64,  in  the  last  paragraph  of  the  new  Article  3a.  fifth  line: 
for.  '. . . telecommunications  organizations  in  such  Member States  ..  .'; 
read:  '  .•. telecommunications organizations. or any usociated organization. Where telecommuni-
cations  organizations  in  such  Member States  ..  .'. 
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COMMISSION DIRECTIVE Jti/19/EC 
of 13  March  19J6 
amending  Directive  .90/388/EEC · with  regard  tO  the  implementation  of  full 
competition in  telecommuni~tions markets  · 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  CO~NMES, 
'  ' 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty establishing  the  European . 
Community;  and in particular  ~cle  90  (3)  thereof,  . 
·Whereas: 
(1) 
.  (2) 
According  to  Commission  Di.rective  90/388/EEC 
of 28 June 1990 on competition in .dle markets for 
telecommunications services r); as  l~t  :amended ·by 
Directive 96/2/BC .f),  telecommunications services, 
with  the  ezc~ption  of  voice  telephony  to  the 
geneml  public  and  those  ~rvices  specifically 
excluded· &om the .scope of that Directive, must be 
open to competition. These services were the telex 
service, mobile communications and radio and tele-
vision broadcasting to t4e public. Satellite commu- · 
nications were included in the scope of the Direc-
tive ·through  Commission  Directive  94/46/BG (3). 
Cable  television  networks  were  included  in  the 
scope of the Directive through Commission Direc-
tive 95/51/EC (4), .and mobile and personal commu-
nications were included in the scope of the Direc-
tive  through  Direetive  96/2/EC.  qnder  Directive 
90/388/SEC,  Member  States  must  ta~e  the 
measures  necessary to ensure  that any .operator is 
entided to  supply such  services.  · 
Sub•equent to the public co~sultation organized by 
the  Commission· in·  1992  on the  situation  in. the 
telecommunications sector (the  1992  Review).  the 
Council, in its resolution of 22 July 1993 (~ unani-
.  mo\lsly  called  for  the  liberalization  of all  public 
voice telephony ~rvices by 1 January 1998, subject 
to additional trans'itional 'periods' of up to five years 
to  allow  Member  States . with  less  developed 
networks,  i.e •. Spain,  Ireland, Greece and Portupl, 
to  achieve  the necesauy adjustments, in  particular 
tariff  adjUstments.  .Moreover,  very  small  networks 
should, according to the Council also be granted· an 
· adjUstment period of up· to two years where so. justi-:-
fied. 'J'he Council subsequendy unanimously recQg  .. · 
nized,  in  its  resolution  of  22  December  1994  {'), 
that ·the  provision · of  telecommunications  infras-
tructure  should  also  be  liberalized  by  1  January 
1998,  subject  to  the  same  transitional  pe~ods as 
I 
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agreed  for  ·the  liberalization  of  voice  telephony. 
Furthermore,  in  its  resolution  of  18  September 
199 5 ('), . the  Council  established  basic  guidelines 
for · the  future  regulatory  environment. 
(3)  · Directjve 90/388/EEC establishes that the granting 
of special or exclusive rights to ~lecommunications 
services  tO' telecommunications organizati?ilS  is  in 
breach of Article 9() ·of the Treaty, in conjunction 
with Article 59  of the Tr~,  since they limit the 
provision  of cross-border serVices.  As far  as  tele-
communications  services  and  ~networks  are 
concerned such special rights were defineq in  that 
Directive.  · 
According  to  Directive  90/388/EEC  exclusive 
rights pnted for the provision· of telecommunica-
tions services are also incompatible with Article 90 
(1) of the Treaty, in conjunction with Article 86 of 
the Treaty, where they are granted to telecommuni-
cations organizations which also enjoy exclusive or 
special rights for  the establishment and the  provi-
·sion  of 'telecommunications  networks  since  their 
grant amounts  to  the  reinforcement or the  exten-
sion of a dominant position or ~ecessarily leads  to 
other abuses  of such  position. 
(4)  In  1990,  the  Commission,  however,  granted  a 
· temporary exception under Article 90 (2) in respect 
of exclusive and special rights for the provision of 
voice  telephony,  since  the  financial  resources  for 
the  development  of  the . network  still  derive~ 
mainly from tlie operation of th~ telephony service 
and  the opening..:up  o,f. that iervice  coul~, at  that 
time, threaten the financial stability· of the telecom-
munications orpnizations and obstruct the  perfor  .. 
·  mmee  of  the  task  of  general  economic  interest·· 
assiped to them, consistin&. in the  provision  and 
exploitation of a univenal network, i.e. one  having 
general  geosn.phic  coverage,  and  that  connection 
to  it is  being  p~vided to  any service  provider or 
U:Ser  upon  request  within  a  reasonable  period  of 
time. 
Moreover,  at the time of the adoption of Directive 
90/388/BBC, all telecommunications organizations 
.  were also in the course of digitalizing their network 
to  incre.ase  the  range  of  services  which  could .be 
· (')  OJ No  C  258,  3.  10.  1995,  p.  1. 
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(5) 
provided  to  the  final  customers.  '.I'oday,  coverage 
and digitalization are already achieved in a number 
of Member States. Taking into account the progress 
in radio  frequency· applications  and  the on  ... going 
heavy investuient programmes, optic fibreeeoverage 
and network  ~netration are  ejepected  to  improve 
significantly  in  the  other  Member  States  in  the 
coming years. 
In  1990,  concerns  were  also  expressed  against 
immediate  intrOduction  of  -competition  in  voice 
telephony while price stnlctures of the telecommu-· 
nications  organizations  wer,e  substantially  out· of 
line with costs, becaQse competing. operators could 
target ·highly  profitable  services  .such  as  interna-
tional telephony and gain market share merely on 
the  basis  of  e~sting .  substantially  distorted .  tariff 
· structures. In the meantime efforts have been made 
to balance differences in pricing and cost stnsctures 
in  preparation  for  ·liberalization  .. 1be  European 
Parliament and the Council have  in the meantime 
·recognized· that there are less restrictive means than 
the pnting of special or exclusive rights to ensure 
this  taitk  of geneml ·economic  interest. 
For  these  reasons,  and  in  accordance  with  the 
Council  resolutions  of  22  July '1993  and ·of  22 
December 1994,. the continuation of the exception 
granted  with  respect  of  voice  telephony  is  .  no 
longer justified. The exception granted by Directive 
90/38·8/EEC · should  be  ended  and  the  Directive, 
including  the  definitions  used,  amended  accor-
dingly. In order to allow telecommunicatio~ orga-
nizati~ns to complete their preparation for compe-
tition  and  in  particular  to  pursue  the  necessary 
rebalancing .of  tariffs, Member States may continue 
the current spegal and exclusive  rights  regarding 
'the  provision  of voice  telephony until  1 January 
1998. Member States with less developed· netwOrks 
or with very small networks must' be eligible for a 
temporary exception where this is warranted by the 
need to ·carry out atr\actural adjustments and stri~dy 
only .to the extent necessary for those adjustments. 
Such  Member  States  should  be  .  granted,  ·upon 
request.  an 'additional  transitional  period  respect-
ively of up to  five and of up to two yearst provided 
it is necessary to complete the necessary structural 
adjustments.  The  Member  States  which  may 
request  such  an  .  exception  are·  Spain,  Ireland, 
Greece and  ~ortugal with regard  to  less  developed 
networks  and  Luxembourg  with  regard  to  very 
small networks. The. possibility of such transitional 
periods  has  also  been  called  for  in  the  Council 




The  abolition  of  exclusive  and  special  rights  u 
regards  the  provision  of voice  telephony will  in 
particular  allow  the  current  telecommunications 
organizations  from  one  Member State  to  directly 
provide·  their  service  in  ~ther Member States  as 
from 1 January 1998. These orpnizations cUrrently 
possess  the skills  and  the  experience  required  to 
enter ·into· the  markets  opened  to  competition. 
However,  in  almost all  Member  States,  they will 
compete  with  the  national  telecommunications 
organizations  which  are  granted  the  exclusive  or 
special  right  to  provide  not only voice  telephony 
but .also  to  establish ' .and  provide  the  underlying 
infrastructUre, i.ncluding ,the acquisition of indefea- . 
·sible .  'rights  of  use  in  internation_.  circuits.  The 
flexibility and the economies of ~ope  ~hich this 
allows  will  prevent  this  dOminant  position  being 
chall.enged  in  the  normal  course ·of  competition 
once  the  liberalization ·  of  voice·  telephony  takes 
place. This will  make it. possible  for·  the telecom-
munications organizations to maintain their domi-
n~t  positio~ on  their ,home  markets  unless  the 
new entrants in the voice  telephony market were 
entitled to the same rights and obligations. In parti-
cular, if new. entrants are not granted free choice as 
regards  the  underlYing  infrastructure  to  provide 
their services  in  competition  with  tl:le  dominant 
operator,  this  restriction  would  de.  faao  prevent 
·them &om entering the market ·for voic~ telephony, 
including for the provision of cross-border services. 
The  maintenance  of  special  rights  limiting  the 
'number of undertakings authorized to establish-and 
provide  infrastnJcture  would  therefore  limit  the 
freedol).l  to provide services  contrary to Article  59 
of the Treaty. The fact that the restriction on .esta-
blishing own i.nfrastntcture viould apparendy apply 
in the Member State concerned without distinction 
to .Ill companies  providing voice  telephony other 
thin  the  national  telecommunications  organiza-
tions 'would  not be sufficient to remove the prefe-
rential  treatment  of  the  latter  f~m the scope  of 
Article  59  of the Treaty. Given  the fact  that it is 
likely  ~at most  new entrants will  originate  from 
other Member States such a measure would in prac-
tice affect foreign companies to a larger extent than 
national undertakings. On the other hand, while no 
justification  for  these  restrictions· appe~ to exist, 
less restrictive  means· such u  licensing procedures 
would in any eveqt. be  available  t6 ensure general 
.  interes~ of a  non~economic nature. 
In addition,  the  abolition  of exclusive  and special 
rights  on  the  provision  of voice  telephony would 
·  have  litde or no  effect, 'if  new entrants would be 
obliged  to  use  the  public  telecommunications 
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network  of  the  incumbent  telecommunications 
of;anizations,  with  whom  they  compete  in  the 
voice  telephony market. Reserving  to  one under-
taking which  markets telecommunications services 
the task of supplying the indispensable raw  mate-
rial, i.e. the transmission capacity, to all its compe-
titors would  be tantamount to  conferring upon  it . 
the  power  to  determine  at will  whe~ t.:1d  when 
services can be  offered by its competitors, at what 
cost;  and to  monitor  their clients  and  the  traffic 
· generated by its competitors, placing that underta-
king in  a 'position  .. where  it would  be  induced to 
abuse its dominant position. Directive 90/388/EEC 
did  not  elq)licidy  address  the  establishment  and 
provision  of  telecommunications :'networks,  as . it 
granted a temporary exception under Article 90 (2) 
of the Treaty in  ~espect of exclusive  and special 
rights  for  the  by  far  most  important  service  in 
economic terms provided over telec~m~unications 
networb, i.e  •. voice telephony. However, the Direc-
tive provided for an overall review by the Commis-
sion of the situation in the whole telecommunica-
tions  sector in  1992. 
It is  true  that Council  Directive  92/44/EEC of  5 
June  1992  on  the  application  of  open  network 
provision to leased lines, amended by Commission 
Decision 94/439/EC  (
1~ harmonizes the basic prin-
cipl~ regaiding the provision of leased lines, but it 
only harmonizes the conditions of access  and use 
of leased lines. The aim of that Directive ,  is  not to 
remedy the conflict of interest of the telecommuni-
.  capons  organizations  as  infrastructure  and semce 
providers. It d_oes not impose a structural separation 
between  the  telecommunications  organizations  as 
providers ·of leased lines  and  as  service  providers. 
Complaints  illustrate  that even  in Member States 
which  have  implemented  that  D~ctive, ·telecom-
municati~ns or,pnizations still .~  their control of 
the access conditions. to the ~etwork at the expense 
of  their  competitors  in  the  seivices  ltW'~et. 
Complaints ihow t:hat  telecomm~nicati.ons organi-
utions.still apply excessive tariffs and that they use 
information  acquired  u  infrutnsCNre  providers 
reprding the services planned by their competitors, 
to  taqet clients  in  the  services  market.  Directive 
92/44/BBC only provides for the principle of cost-
orientation  and doea  not  prevent .  telecommunica-
tions organizations to use the information acquired 
as  capacity  provider  u  regards  subscneers'  usage 
patterns, necessary to target specific groups· of users, 
and on price eluticities of demand in each service 
market sepent and  re3ion  of  the  country.  The 
. cuaent regulatory framework  does  not resolve  the 
conflict  of  interest  mentioned  above.  The  most 
(') OJ  No  L u;s,  19.  &.  1992.  p.  21. 
appropriate  rem~y to  this  conllict of interest  is 
. therefore to allow service  prOviders  to use  own or 
third  ·party  telecommunications  infrastructure  to 
provide their services to the ·final customers instead 
of the infrastructure of their main competitor. In its 
resolution  of 22  December 1994  the Council also 
approved the principle that infrastructure provision 
sho~d be  liberalized. 
Member States should therefore abOlish the current 
exclusive rights on the  provision and use  of infn-
sttucturc: which infringe Article 90 (1) of the Treaty, 
in  combination  with  Articles  59  and  86  of  the 
Treaty, 'and allow wice telephony providers to use 
· own and/or any alternative  infrastructure  of their 
choice. 
(8)  Directive  90/388/B.EC  states  that the rules  of the 
Treaty,  including  those  on  competiqon,  apply to· 
telex $ervices. At the same time it establishes that 
the granting of special or exclusive rights for tele-
communications  service•  to  telecommunicatioJ:~s 
organizations is  in breach of Article 90 (1)  of the 
Treaty,  in·  conjunction  wjth  Article  59.  of  the 
Treaty,  since  they  Hmit  the  provision  of  cross-
border· services.  However,  it wu considered in the 
Directive  that  an  individual ·approach  was  appro-
priate,  as  a  rapid  -decline  of  the  service  was 
expected. It the meantime it has become clear that 
the telex service will  continue  .. to coexist with new 
services  like  facsimile  in  the  forseeable  future, 
given that the telex netWork. is still  the only stan-
dardized  network  with  worldwide  coverage  and 
providing legal  proof  in ·  Court.  It is  therefore  no 
longer  justified  to  maintain  the  initial  approach. 
(9)  AS  regards  the  access  of  new competitors  to  the 
telecommunications  markets,  only _ mandatory 
requirements can justify restrictions  to  the funda-
mental freedoms  provided for in tbe Treaty. These 
restrictions should be limited to what is  necessay 
to 'Khieve the ob~ve  of a non.economic nature 
pursued. Member States. may therefore only bltro-
'  · duce licensing or declaration procedpres where it is 
indispensable to ensure compliance with the appli-
cabl~ essential requirements and, with regard to ~e 
provision  of  voice  telephony and  the  underl~ng 
· infrucructure, ·introduce requirements· in  the form 
of trade replations where it is n«essary in order to 
ensure,  in  accordance  with  Article  90  (2)  of  the 
Treaty, the performance in a competitiVe environ-
ment  of  th~  particular  tasks  of  public  service 
assigned  to  the  relevant undertakings in  the  tele-
communications field and/or to ensure a contribu-
tion  to  tlle  financing  of  univenal  service. · Other 
public  service  requirements  can  be  included  ~ 
Member States in certain categories of licences. 1n 
line  with  the  principle  of  proportionality  and  in 
conformity with Articles 56 and 66 of the Treaty. 
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The provisions of Directive 90/388/BBC are  there-
fore  not to  prejudice the applicability of provisions 
laid  down  by  law,  regulation  .or · administrative 
action  providing  for·  the  protectiQn  of  public 
security and in particular the lawful interception of 
communications.· 
In 'the framework of the adoption of authorization· 
requirements  under  Directive  .90/388/BEC,  it 
.  appeared that certain Member States were imposing 
· obligations  on  new  entrants  which  where  not  in 
proportion  with  the  aims  of  general  interest 
.  pursued.  To  avoid  such  measures· being  used  tO 
prevent .the. dominant position of the telecemmu- .. 
nications  organizations  being  challenpd ·  by 
competition  once  the  liberalization  of  voice  tele-
phony takes  place, thus making  i~ posst1lle  for .the 
telecommunications organizations to maintain ~eir 
dominant.  position  in'  the  voice·  telepho~y  and 
. public .telecommunications  networks  markets  and 
thereby strenpeiling  th~ dominant position of the 
incumbent operator,  it is  necessary  that Member 
States  should  noti,fy  any  licensing  or  declaration 
requirements  to  the  Commission,  before  they are 
introduced,  to  enable  the  latter  to  assess  their 
compat11lility with the Treaty and in particular the 
proportionality of the  obligations . imposed. 
(10)  According to  the  principle  of  proportionality,  the 
number of licences may only be limited where this 
is unavoidable  to ensure complianCe: with essential 
requirements  conceming  the  use  of  scarce  · · 
resources. As the Co~ission  sqted in its commu-
nication  on  the  consultation .  on the· Green  Paf,er 
on the  liberalization  of telecommunications infra-
structure  and ·cable  television  networks,  the  sole 
reason ·  in this  respect  should be  the existence  of  · 
physical limitations, imposed by the lack of neces-
sary  frequency  spectnJm. 
As 'regards the provision of voice  telephony, public 
fixed telecommunications networks and other tele-
..  c~mmunications  networks  uivolving  the  use  of 
radio frequencies, the essential requirements would 
justify the introduction or maintenance of an indi-
vidual  licensing  .procedure.  In· all  other  cases,  a  · 
general  authorization  or a  declaration  procedure 
suffices  to  ensure  compliance  with  th~  esaential 
requirements.  Licensing  is  not  justified  when  a 
mere declaration procedure would suffice  to  attain 
the  relevant  objective. 
As  regards  the  provision  of  packet- or  circuit-
switched  data  services,  Directive  90/388/EBC. 
allowed  the Member States under Article. 90  (2)  of 
' the .  Treaty to  adopt specific  sets  of  public service 
specifications in the form of trade reJUlations with 
a  view  to  preserving  the  relevant  public  service 
requirements. The Commission· has  in  the  course 
of  1994  assessed  the  eff~cts  of  the  measures 
adopted  under this  provision. The results . of  this 
review were made. public in its  ~mmunication  on 
. the  status. and  the.  implemen~tion of  Directive 
90/388/BBC.  On  the  basis  of  that  review,  which 
also  took  account  of  the  experience  in  most 
.Member  States  where  the  rele'VIIlt  public  service 
objectives  were  achieved without the  implementa- · 
tion  of  such  schemes,  there  is  no  justification  to 
continue  ':his  specific  regime  and  the  current 
schemes sh~uld be abolished accordingly. However, 
Member  State.s  may  replace  these  schemes  by· a 
.  ~claration or a  se~eral authorization  procedure. 
(11)  Newly. authorized voice telephony provide~ will be 
able  to  compete  effectively· with the  current tele-
communications  orpnizations.  only  if  they  are 
granted  adequate  ~umbers  to  allocate  tb  their 
custom  en. Moreover,· where  numbers are  lllocated 
.  by  the  current  telecormnunications  organizations, 
the  latter  will·  be  induced  to  reserve  the  best 
numbers for themselves and to give  their competi-
tors  insilfficient  numbers ·or  numbers  which  are 
commercially less  attractive,  for' example,  hecause 
of· their length. By maintaining such power in the 
· lwids  of  their  telecommunications  organizations 
,  Member States would therefore induce the former 
to abuse their power on the market for voice  tele-
phony and  infringe .  Article  .90  of  the  T~eaty,  in 
conjunction with  Article  86  of  the  Treaty. 
Consequently,  the  establishment  and  administra-
tion·  of  the. ·national  n'Wnbering  plan  should  be 
entrusted to a body independent from the telecom-
munications organization, and a procedure  for  the 
allocation  of  num~rs should, where  required,  be 
drafted,  which  is  based  on  objective  criteria,  is 
~sparent  and  without  discriminatory  effects. 
. Where a subscn1ler changes service providers, tele-
communications  organizations  should  communi-
cate,  in  the  way  and  to  the  extent  required  by 
. Article  86  of  the  Treaty,  the  information  on  his 
new  number  for  a  sufficient  period  of  time  to 
parties  seeking  to  contact  him  under  his  old 
number.  Subscribers  changing  service  providers 
should  also  have  the · possibility  of  keeping  their 
.  numbers in retum for a reasonable contribution to 
the .cost  of  transferring  the  numbers. 
(12)  "As  Member States are  obliged by this  Directive  to 
withdraw special and exclusive rights for the proVi-
sion and operation of fixed public telecommunica-
tions  networks,  the obligation set out in  Directive 
90/388/EBC:  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to 
ensure objective,  no~-discriminatory and published 
access  conditions  should  be adapted  accordingly. 
(13)  Subject  to  reasonable  compensation,  the  right  of 
new  providers  of  voice  telephony  to  interconnect 
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their service  fQr call completion  purpose~ with  the 
emdng pubUc  telecoaunuaication• network at the 
aeceaary interconnecdoa  points,  includfns access 
to ~mer  databases aec::essary for the p~ion  of 
directo'Y information, is  of crucial  importance  in 
the initial period after the abolition of the special 
and exclusive rights regarding voice telephon! and 
telecommunications i.nliastructure  provisio~/  Inter-
connection  should  in  principle  be  a  matter  for 
negotiation  between  the  parties, . ·subject  to  the 
application  of.  the competition  rules  addressed  to 
undertakings. Given  the imbalance.  in negotiating 
po,;,er of ·new entrants compared with the telecom-
munications  orpnizations whose  monopoly posi-· 
tion results .from their special and exclusive rights, 
it·  is likely that,·  as long Is a harmonized regulatory · 
· ~ework  has not been  es~blished by  the  Euro-
pean Parliament ~d  the. Council, interconnection 
·would  be  delayed  by  disputes  as  to . terms  and 
conditi9ns to .be applied. Such delays would jeop.r- , 
dize  the muket entry of  new entrants and hence 
prevent the. abolition of special and exclusive rights 
.  to become effective. The failure  by Member States 
to adopt dle necessary safeguards to prevent·  suCh a 
situation would lead to a. continuation tk faao of 
the current  sp~cial and exclusive  rights,  which  as 
set out  above. are  considered  to  be  incompatible 
with .Article  90. (1)  of the·  Treaty,. in  conjunctio~ 
with  Articles  59  a~d 86  of  the Treaty. 
In order to  allow for effective market" entry and·  to 
. prevent  the  d1  f~t:to continuation  of  special  and 
exclusive  rights  contrary  to  Article  90  (1)  of  the 
Treaty,  in· conjunction with Articles  59  and 86 of 
the  Treaty,  Member  States  should  ensure  that, 
during the time period necessa'Y for such entry by 
competitors,  telecommunicati.ons  organizations 
.publish standard terms and conditions for intercon-
ne~tion  to  the  voice  telephony  networks·  which 
they  offer  to  the·  public,  including  interconnect 
price  lists  and· access  points,  no  later  than· ~ix 
months  b~fore the actual  date  of liberalization  of 
voice  telephony and telecommunications transmis-
sion capacity. Such sundud offers should be  non-
discriminatory and sufficiently unbundled to allow 
the new entrants to  purchase only those elements 
·of  the  interconnection  offer  they  actually  need. 
Furthermore,  they  may  not · discriminate  on  the 
basis of the oriain of the calls and/or the networks. 
, 
fl4)  Moreover in order to allow the monitoring of inter-
connection obUptions under competition law,  the 
cost accountins system implemented with reprd to 
the  provision  of voice  telephony and  public  tele· 
communications networks should, during the time 
(16) 
period neceuary to allow for effective market entry, 
clearly  ideatify  the  cost  eleqaents  relevant  for 
pddaJ interconnection· offerings and, in particular 
for.  each  element  of the  iDtercomiection  offered, 
identify the basis for that cost element, in order to 
enswe in particular that this pricing includes only 
elements  which  are · relevant,  namely  the  initial 
connection charge,· conveyance  charges,  the  share  . 
of the costs incurred in providing equil accesS and 
number-portability  and  of  ensuring  essential  re-
quirements  and,  where  applicable,  supplementary 
charges  aimed  to  share  the net cost  of  universal 
.service, .and provisionally, imbalances in voice tele-
p~ony  tariffs~. Such  cost  accounting  should  also 
make it possible  to identify when a telecommuni-
. cations  organization  chaises  its  major  users  less 
.  than  providers  of  ~ice telephony  ~etworks  •. 
The absence. of a quick, che~p and effective  proce~ 
dure  to·  solve  interconnection . disputes,  and  one 
w~ich would prevent the telec:Ommunications orga-
nizations  causing  delays·  or using · their  financial 
resources to increase the cost of available remedies 
under applicable  national  law or Community law, 
WQ\4d make it possible for the telecommunications 
organizati.ons to maintain their dominant position. 
M~ber  States should· therefore establish a specific 
recourse  procedure · for  interconnection  disputes  . 
. ' 
Th~ obligation  to  publish  standard  charges  and 
interconnection  conditions is ·without prejudice to 
the  requirement  on  undertakinss  in  a  dominant 
position,  under Article  86 of the Treaty,  to  nego-
tiate  speci~·  or tailor-made agreements for a  pa.cti-
cular  combination  or  use  of  unbundled  public 
switched  telephony  network ·components  and/or · 
the  granting  of.  discounts  for  particular  service · 
providers  or large ·  users  where  these  are  justified 
and  non-disaiminatory.  Any · .  interconnection 
discounts should be  justified on all objective  basis 
and be transparent. 
The requ~ment to  publish standard interco.nnec-
tion ·  conditions  is  also  without  prejudice  to · the 
obligation of dominant undertakings· un~er Article 
86 of the ·Treaty to allow interconneCted operators 
on  whose  network  a  call  origiriates  to·  remain 
.  responsible  for  setting the tariff for  .the  customer 
'between  the  C.Wng  and the called  party and for 
routiq its ·clients~ traffic up to the interconnection 
· point .. of its. choice. 
(17)  A  number  of  ~ember States  are  currently  still 
maintaining  exclusive  rights  with  regard  to  the 
establishment aud provision of telephone directory  · 
and  enquhy services.  These  exclusive  rights  are 
genetally granted either to organizations which are 
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already enjoyins a dominant position in providing 
voice  telephony, or ~  one of their NbaicUaries.  In 
such  a  situation,  these.  rights  have  the  effect  of 
extending the dominant position enjoyed by those 
organizations  and  therefore · strengthening  that 
position,. which,  according  to  the  case-law  of  the 
Court  of Justice .  of  the  European  COmmunities, 
constitutes  an  abuse  of  a  domiti •  .rit  position 
contrary to Article 86. The exclusive rights granted 
in  the  area  of  telephone  directory  services  are 
.consequently  incompatible  with  Article  90  (1)  of 
the Treaty,  in  conjunction with  Article  8~. These 
exclusive  rights consequently have to be abolished. 
· (18)  Directory · info~;m~tion  ·constitutes  an ·  ·. essential 
access  tool  for  telephony  ..  services.  In  order  to. 
ensure  the  availability  of .  directory  information  ~o . 
subscn"bers  to all  -voice  telephony services, Member 
States  may include obligations for  the .  provision of 
directory inform•tion to  the general  public within 
individual  licences  and general  authorizations. 
.  .  . 
Such an .obligation should not, however, restr1ct the 
provision of .such information by new technological 
means,· nor the  provision  of specialized and/or re-
gional  and local  directories contrary to  Article  90 
(1)  of  the Treaty,  in  conjunction with  point (b)  of 
the second paragtaph of Article 86 of the Treaty. 
(19)  In the cas.• where universal  servic~ can be  provided 
only  at  a  loss  or  provided  urider  costs  falling 
outside  normal  commercial  staridards,  different 
financing  schemes  can  be  envisaged  to  ensure 
universal  service.  The  emergence  ~f  effective 
competition by the dates established for full libera-
•  lization  would,  however,  be  seriously  delayed  if 
Member  States  were  to  implement  a  financing 
scheme allocating too heavy a share of ·any burden 
to new entrants or were to determine the size of the 
burden  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  finance  the 
universal  service. 
. Financing  schemes  disproportionately  burdening 
new entrants and accordingly preventing the domi-
nant  positio~  .  of  the  telecommunications organiza-
~ons being  challenged  by  coQ?.petition.  once  the 
liberalization  of  voice  telephony  takes  place,  thus 
· making . it  possible  for  the.  telecommunications 
organizations to  entrench their dQminant position, 
would  be  in breach of Article· 90  of .the  Treaty,  in 
conjunction  with  Article  86  of  the  Treaty. 
Whichever financing scheme they decide to  imple-
ment,  Member  States  should  ensure 
1 that  only 
providers  of  public  telecommunications  networks 
contribute  to  the  provision  and/or  financing  of 
univenal  service  obligations  harmonized  in  the 
framework of ONP and that the method of alloca-
don amonpt them is  based on objective and non.-
discriminatory  criteria  and  is  in  accordance  with 
. the prindple of proportionality. This principle does 
not prevent. Member  States  fro~ exempting  new 
entrants whtch  have  not yet achteved  any signifi-
cant market  presence. 
Moreover,  ~e  funding mechanisms adopted should 
seek only to ensure that market participants contri-
bute  to the fi.nancing  of universal service,  and not 
to other ·activities  not directly linked to the  provi-
-sion  of  the  u.niversaJ.  service.  -
(20)  As  regards  the cost structure of voice telephony, a 
d:istinction  must  be  made  between  the  initial 
connecti~n, the  ~onthly  ·rental, loeal calls, regional 
calls and long distance calls. The tariff structure of 
voice  telepho~y provided  by  the  te1ecommunica-
tions,  organizations  in  certain  Member ·  States  is 
currently still out. of line with cost. Certain catego-
ries  of  calls  are  provided  at a  loss  and ·are  cross-
subsidized out of the profits  from  other categories. 
Artificially  low  prices,  however,  impede  competi-
tion since  potential competiton have  no incentive 
to enter into the relevant segment of the voice tele-
phony market and are contraty to Article 86 of the 
Treaty,  as  long  as  they  are  not  justified  under 
Article 90 (2) of the Treaty as  regards specific iden- · 
tified 'end-users  or groups  of  end-users.  Member 
States  should. phase  out as  rapidly  as  possible  all 
unjustified restrictions on tariff rebalancing by the 
telecommunications  organizati~.ns and in particular 
those  preventing the .adaptation of rates which are 
not in  line with  costs  and  increase  the  burden  of 
1  universal  service  provision.  Where  this  is  justified, 
the proportion of net costs insufficiently covered by 
the tariff  suuctur~ may be reapportioned among all 
parties  concerned  in  a  non-discriminatory  and 
transparent  manner. 
· (21)'  &  re-balancing  could  make  certain  telephone 
service  less  affordable  in the short term for certain 
groups  of  users,. Member States  may  adopt special 
provisions to  soften the impact of  re-balancing. In 
this way,  the  affordability of  the  telephone service 
during the transitional period would be guaranteed 
while  telecommunicati~ns operators would  still be 
able  to continue their re-balancing process. This is 
in  line  with  the  statement  of  the  Commission 
concerning  the  Council  resolution  on  universal 
service (11 which  states  that  there  should  be  rea-
sonable and affordable  prices throughout the  terri-
tory  for  initial.  connection,  subscription,  periodic 
rental,  access  and  the  use  of  the  service. 
(1)  OJ  No  C  48.  115.  2.  1994.  p.  8. 
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(22)  Where Member States entrust the application of the 
financing scheme of universal· service obligations to 
their  telecommunications  orpnization  with  the 
right to recoup a share of it from  competitors, the 
former will  be. induced to  charge a higher amount 
than  justified,  if Member ·States  would  not· ensure 
tha.t  the  amount  charged · to  finance  universal 
service is made sepatate and explicit ;,Nit~ .respect to  · 
interconnection  (connection  and  conveyance) 
charges.  In  addition",  the  mechanism  should  ·be 
clo5ely  monitored  and  efficient  procedures  for · 
timely  appeal  to  an  independent  body  to  settle 
disputes  as  to  the  amount·  to  be _paid  must  be 
provided, without prej\ldiCC to  O~er  available. reme-
dies  under  national· law  or Community  Ia~  ... 
(23) 
The  Commission  should  review  the  situation  in 
Member .States ·five  years  after  the  intiOduction  of 
full  competition,  to  ascertain  whether  this  finan-
cing scheme does  not lead  to  situations which  are 
incompatible  with  Co~munity law. 
Providers  of  public  telecommunications  networks 
require access to pathways across' public and private 
property tO  place facilities  needed to reach the end 
users.  The  telecommunications  organizations.  in 
many  Member  States  enjoy  legal  privileges  to 
install  their  network  on  public  and  private  land, 
without charge or at charges set simply to  recover 
incurred  costs •. If Member  States  1 do  not  grattt 
siinilar  possibilities  to  new  licensed  operators  to 
enable  them  to  roll  out their network,  this  'Would 
delay them and  in  certain  areas  be  tantainount  to 
maintaining exclusive  rights  in  favour  of the  tele-
communications  organization.  · 
Moreover Article  90· of  the  Treaty, _in  conjunction 
with  Articl~ 59 of the Treaty, requires. tb'at Member 
States should not· discriminate against new entrants, 
who  generally  will  oriJinate  from  other  Member 
States,  in  comparison  with  their national  telecom~ 
munications  orpnizatioas  and  other  national 
undertakings,  which  have  been  pnted rights  of 
way  facilitating the roll  out of  their telecommuni-
cations  networks. 
Where  essential  requirements,  in  particular  with 
-reptd to the protection of the environment or with 
reprd  to  town  and  country  planning  objectives, 
· would oppose the granting of similar rights of -w:ay 
to new  entrants  which  do  not· already  have  their 
own  infrastructure,  Member  States  should  at  leut 
ensure  that the  latter have,  where  it  is  technically 
feasible, access, on reasonable terms, to ~e  existing 
ducts or poles, established under rights  of way by 
the  telecommunications  organization,  where  these 
facilities are necessary to roll out  ~eir network. In 
the  absence  of such  requirements  the  telecommu-
nications  organizations would  be  induced  to  limit 
access by their competitors to these essential facili-
ties  and  thus  abuse  their  dominant  position.  A 
failure  to adopt such requirements would therefore 
be  contrary  to  Article  90  (1)  of  the  Tre~ty,  in 
conjuncti~n with _Article  86  of  the  Treaty. 
In  addition, pursuant to Article· 86, all public tele-
communications network operators having essentitl 
resources  (or  which  competitors  do  not  have 
economic  altematives  are  to  provide  open  and 
non-cliscriminatory  access  to  those  resources. 
(24)  The abolition  ~f special and exclusive rights in  the 
telecoinmunications  markets  will  allow  underta-
kinss . enjoying  special  and  exclusive  rights  in 
secto~ other than. telecommunications to enter the 
telecommunications markets. In  order to  allow  for 
monitoring under the  appl~cable rules of the Treaty 
o_f  possible- anti-competitive  ·  Cross-subsidies 
between,  on  the  one  hand, areas  for  which  provi-
ders of telecommunications services or telecommu-
nications  infraStructures  enjoy special  or exclusive 
·rights aria, on  the other, their business as telecom-
munications  provideri, Member States should  take 
the appropriate measures to achieve transparency as 
regards  the  use  of  resources  from  such  protected 
activities to enter in the liberalized telecommunica-
tions market. Member States ·should at least require 
such  undertakings  once .they achieve  a  signif~cant 
tumo~r  in  the  relevant  telecommunications 
service  and/or infristructure  provision  market,  to 
keep  separate  financial  records,  distinguishing 
between  in11r alia,  costs  and  revenues  •sociated 
. with  the  proVision  of  services  under their special 
and  exdusive  rights  ·and  those  provi.ded  under 
competitive  conditions.  For  the  time  being,  a 
tumover  of  more  than  BCU  SO  million  could  be 
contidered  as  a sipificant tumover. 
(25)  Most Member Statel· ~  currendy maintain exclu-
sive  righ~ for the provision of telecommunications 
. infrastrUcture for the supply of telecommunications 
services  other than  voice ·telephony. 
Under  Directive  92/44/BBC,  Member  States  must 
ensure .  that  the  telecommunications  organizations 
make  available  certain  types  of  leased  lines  to all 
providers  of  telecommunications servies.  However, 
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the  Directive  provides  only  for  such  offer  of  a 
harmonized set of leued lines up to a certain band-
width. Companies needing a higher bandwidth to 
provide  services baed on new high-speed techno-
logies such u  SOH (synchronous· digital hierarchy) 
have  complained  that  the  telecommunications 
o~ganizations concerned are  unable  to  meet their 
demand whilst it could be  met by. the ·optic fibre 
networks  of other potential  providers  of  tel~com­
munications  infrastrUctUre,  in  the  absence  of the 
current exclusive rights. Consequently, the mainte-
nance of-these rights delays the emergence of new  . 
· advanced  telecommunications  services  and  there-
. fore  restricts  technical  progress  at the expense  of 
the users contrary to Article 90 (1) of the :rreat)r, in 
conjunction with point. (b) of the second paiagraph 
of Article  86 of the Treaty.  · 
(26)  Given  that the  li~g  of such  rights  will  concern 
mainly  services .which  are  not yet  provided  and 
does not concern voice telephony, which is still the 
z:nain  source  of  revenue  of  those .  organizations,  it 
will  not. destabilize  the  financial  situation  of  the 
telecommunications  organi~tion. There  is  CC?nse-
.  quendy no justification to maintain exc~us~ve -rights 
· .on the establishment and use of network irifrastruc-
ture  for  services  other  than  voice  telephony.  In 
particular,  Member  States  should  ensure  that  all 
restrictions on the provision of telecommunications 
services  other than voice  telephony over networks 
·  e~tablished by the provider of the telecommunica-
tions service,. the use of infrastructures provided by 
third  parties  arid  the  sharing  of  networks,  other 
· facilities and ~ites are ijfted as froqt  1 July 1996. · 
In order to take account qf the specific situation in 
Member States with less-developed networks and in 
Member  States  with  very'  small  networks, . the 
Commission  will  grant,  upon  request,  additional 
· transitional  periods. 
(27)  Whilst  Directive  95/51/EC  lifted  all  restrictions 
with regard to the provision of liberalized telecom-
munications servicts over cable television netWorks, 
some Member States still  m.aintain  ·restrictions  on 
the use of ·public. telecommunications networks for 
the  provision  of  cable  television  capacity. ·ne · 
.Commission should assess the situation with regard 
to such restrictions in the light of the objectives of 
that  Directive  once  the  telecommunications 
markets  approach  full  liberalization. 
(28)  The  abolition  of  all- special  and  exclusive  rights 
· which restrict the provision of telecommunications 
services  and  underlying networks  by  undertakings 
established in the Community is without regard to 
the destination  or the  origin  of  the  communica-
tions  ~ncerned.  · 
HOwever,  Directive  90/~88/EEC does  not prevent 
mesures  re~ng  . undertakings,  which  are  not 
·established  in the  Communicy,  being adopted  in 
accordance  with  Community  law  and  existing 
international  ..oblipdohs  so  as  to  ensure  that 
nationals of Member States are afforded comparable 
and effective treatment in third countries. Commu-
nity undeitakinp should benefit from effective and 
comparable  access  to  third  country  markets  and 
enjoy a similar treatment ift a  third country as  is 
offered. by· the COmmunity framework to un4erta-
kinp owned, or effectiv~ly.  controlled, by nationals 
of the third country concerned. World Trade Orga-
nization  telecommunications  nesotiations  should 
re~t in  a  balance<:f  and ·  mul~lateral  agreement, 
ensuring  effective  a~d  comparable  access  for 
C~aim.unity operators  in·  third countries. 
(29)  The process  of implementing full  competition  in 
telecommuni~tions markets raises important issues 
in  the .  social  and  employment  fields.  These  are 
referred to in the Commission's communication on 
the· consultation on the Green Paper on the libera-
lizatioQ  of  telecommunicatio~s infrastructure  and 
·cable  television  networks  of  3  May  1995. 
Always  remaining in line with a horizontal  policy 
approach,  efforts  should  now  be  undertaken  to 
support the transition process to a fully liberalized 
telecommunications environment; responsibility for 
such measures rests  mainly at Member State  level, 
although Community structures, such as  the Euro-
pean Social Fund, may also play a part. In line with 
existing initiatives,  the Community should play a 
role in facilitating the adaptation and retraining of 
those whose traditional activities are likely to disap-
pear during the process of industrial restructuring. 
(30)  The .  establishment of  procedures  at national  level 
concerning  licensing,  interconnection,  universal 
service,  numbering  and  rights  of  way  is  without 
prejudice  to  the  harmonization  of  the  latter  by 
appropriate  European  Parliament  and  Council 
legislative  instruments, in  particular in  the  frame-
work  of  open  network  provision  (ONP).  The 
Commission  should  take  whatever  measures  it 
considers appropriate  to ensure the consistency of 
these  instruments  and  Directive  90/388/EEC,. 
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HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DIRBCI1VE: 
Article 1 
Directive  90/388/EEC is  amended  as  follows: 
1.  ~cle 1 is  amended as  follows: 
(a)  Paragraph  1 is  amended as  follows: 
(i)  The fourth indent is replaced by the fo~owing: 
;.  - •public  teleCOatmUn:ication~  network• 
means a telecomtnunications network used 
inter alta for the provision of p,ublic tele-
communi~tions services;  ·  · 
- •public telecommunications service• means 
a  telecommunications service  available  to . ·  · 
the  public,'.  · 
(ii)  The 1  Sth indent is replaced by the following: 
.·- •essential  requirements•  means  the  non-
·economic  reasons  in  the general  interest 
which·  may  cause  a  Member  State  to 
impose  condi.tions  on  the  establishmen.t 
and/or  operation  of  telecommunications 
networks or the provision of telecommuni-
cations services. The~ reasons are security 
of  network  operations,  maiiltenan~e  of 
network  inteSrlty,  and,  in  juStified  cases, 
interoperabillty of services, ;data protection, 
the  protection  of  the  environment  and 
town  and  country  planning objectives  as 
well  as  the effective  uSe  of  the  f~quency 
specuum  and  the  avoidance  of  harmful 
interference between radio  based telecom-
munications  systems  and  other,  spice-
based  or terrestrial,  technical  systems. 
Data protection may include protection of 
personal data,  the confidentiality of infor-
mation. transmitted or stored 4lS  weJl as  the 
pro~eetiori of privacy.' 
(ii11  The following  ind~ts are .added: 
·- •telecommunications  network•  means  the 
transmission equipment and, where appli:. 
cable,  sWitching  equipment  and  other 
resources which pennit the conveyance of 
sisnala  betweeen  defined  termination 
points by wire, by radio,  by optical  or by 
other electromagnetic  means;  · 
- •interconnection• means  the physical  and 
logical linking of the teleCommunications 
facilities  of  organizations  providing  tele-
communications networks and/or telecom-
munications services, in order to ·a11ow  the 
users  of one organization to communicate 
. with the users of the same or another orp-
. nization or to .  access  services  provided by 
third organizations.' 
(b)  Paragraph  2  is  deleted. 
2.  Article 2  is  replaced  by the  following: 
.  ~rti&le 2 
1.  Member States shall withdraw all  those measures 
which. grant:  · 
(a)  exclusive rights for  the provision of telecommuni-
cations  services,  includinj' the  es.tablishment  and 
the.  .  provision  of  telecommunications  networks 
required  for  the  provision  of such services;  or 
.  . 
(b)  special  ripts which  limit  to  two  or  more  the 
ttumber of undertakinp authorized to provide such 
teleCQDUnunicatioris  services  or  to  establish  or 
.  pro~de such networks, otherwise than according to 
objective,  proportional·  and  non-discriminatory 
criteria; or 
(c)· spec:W  rights  which  designate,  otherwise  than 
according  to  objective, ·proportional  and  non-dis-
criminatory  several  competing  undertakings  to 
provide  such  telecommun~cations services  or  to 
·establish .  or provide  such  networks. 
· ·  2~  Member Sta~ shall take !he measures necessary 
to  ensure  that any undertaking is  entided. to  provide 
the  telecommunications  services  referred  to  in  para-
graph 1 or to establish or provide the networkS referred 
to  in paragraph  I. 
Without .prejudice  to  Article  3c  and  the  third  para-
graph  of  Article  4,  Member  States  may  maintain 
special  and exclusive  rights  until  1 January  1998  for 
voice  telephony and for the establishment ~d  provi-
sion  of  public  telecommunications  networks. 
Member States  shall,  however,  ensure  that all  remai-
ning restrictions  on the  provision  of telecommunica-
tions servi~ other than voice telepl\ony over networks 
established· by the provider of the telecommunications 
services, .  over infrastnlctures  provided by third parties 
and  by.  mean• of sharing of networks,  other facilities· 
and sites are  lifted and the relevant meuures notified 
to  the  Commission  no  later than  I  July 1996.  · 
As  regards  the dates  set  out in the second and third 
subparagraphs  of this  paragraph,  in Article  3  and  in 
Article  4a  (21  Member  States  with  less  developed 
networks shall  be  granted upon request an additional 
implementation period of up to five years and Member 
States with very small networks shall be  gra~ted upon 
request an additional ·implementation period of up to 
two years,  provided it is  needed to achieve the neces-
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sary  structural  adjustments.  Such  a  request  ..  must 
include  a  detailed desciiption of  the ·planned adjust-
ments and a precise assessment of the timetable envi-
saged  for  their  implementation.  The  information 
provided  shall  be  made  available  to  any  in~rested 
party on·  demand having regard to the legitimate inte-
rest of undertakings in the protection of their business 
secrets. 
I 
3.  Member States  which  make  the  supply of tele-
communications  services  or · the  establishment  or · 
provision of telecommunications networks subject to a 
licensing, general  authorization  or declaration  proce-
dure aimed  at compliance with  the essential reqUire-
ments  shall · ensure  that  the  relevant  conditions  are 
objective, non-discrinUnatory, proportionate ·and trans.;. 
parent, that reasons are given_ for any refusal, and. that 
there is a procedure {or appe~ng  against any refusal. 
The  provision  of  telecommunications  services  other 
than voice telephony, the establishment and proviSion 
.of public telecommunications networks and other tele-
. communications  n~tworlcs.. involving  .. the ~  of radio 
frequencies,  may  be  subjected  only  to  a  general 
authorization  or a  declaration  procedure. 
4.  Member  States  ·shall  commutticate  to  the 
Commission  the  criteria  on  which  licences,  general 
authorizations  and .  declaration  procedures  ire  based 
together with  the  conditi~ns attached  thereto. 
Member States shall continue to  inform the Commis-
sion of any plans to  introduce new licensing, general 
authorization and declaration  procedures or to change 
existing procedures.' 
3. Article  3  is  replaced  by the  following: 
'Article  J 
As regards voice telephony and the provision of public 
telecommunications networks, Member States shall, no 
later than  1 January 1997,  notify to  the Commission, 
bef.ore  implementation,  any licensin·g  or  deClaration 
proc~dure which  is  aime~ at  compliance  with: 
- essential  requirements,  or 
- trade  regulations  relating to  conditions  of perma-
nence,  availability  and  quality .  of  the  service,  or 
- financial  obligations  with  regard  to  universal 
service,  according  to  the  principles  set  out  in 
Article  4c. 
Conditions relating u, 'availability can  include. require-
ments to ensure access to customer databases necessaiy 
for  .. the .  p~ion of  universal  directory  information. 
The  whole  of -these  conditions  shall  form  a  set  of 
public-service  specifications  and  shail . be  objective, 
non-discrimi~tory, proportionate  and  transp~t. 
Member States ~y.limit the number of licences to' be 
issued  only where  related  to  the  lack  of  availability 
spectrum  an~ justifi~d un~er the principle of propor-
tionality. 
Member States .shall ensure, no later than 1 July 1997, 
that such licensing or declaration  procedures  for  the 
provision of voice telephQny and of public telecommu-
nications  networb ·are  published.  Before  they  are 
implemented, the  Commission ·shall  verify  the com-
patibility of these  drafts  with  the Treacy:.  · 
As  regards  packet-· or circuit-switched  data. services, 
.  Member States shall abolish the adopted set of public-
service  specifications. They may replace  these  by·  the 
declaration  proced~  or  generat  authorizations 
· referred  to  in Article  2.' 
4.  In Article  3~, the . following  paragraph  is  added: 
'Member States shill ensure, before  1 July 1997,  that 
adequate numbers are available for all telecomniunica-· 
. .tions services. They shall ensure that numbers are allo-
cated  .  in  'In  objective,  non-discriminatory,  propor-
tionate  and transparent manner,  in ·  particular on  the 
basis  of  indivi~ual application  procedures.'  · 
5.  In  Article  4,  the  first  paragraph  is  replaced  by  the 
following: 
'As  long as  Member States maintain special or exclu-
sive  rights  for  the  provision  and  operation  of  fixed 
public  telecomn;1unications  networks  they  shall  take 
the necessary measures to  make the conditions gover-
ning  access  to  the  networks  objective  and  non-dis-
. criminatory and shall  publish  them.' 
6.  The following Articles  4a  to  4d  are  inserted: 
1.  Without prejudice to future harmonization of the 
national  interconttection  regimes  by  the  European 
Parliament and the Council in the framework of ONP, 
Membe~ States  shall  ensure  that  the  telecommunica-
tions  organizations  provide  interconnection  to  their 
voice telephony service and their public switched tele-
communications network to other undertakings autho-
rized to provide such services or networks, on non-dis-
criminatory,· proportional and transparent terms, which 
are  based  on objective  criteria. 
• 
I  26 22. 3. 96  Official )0u~  of' the Burop.n CO~unities·  No  L 74/XJ· 
2.  Member ·states shall ensure in particular that the . 
telecommunicatioDJ  ~orpnizadons  publish,  no  later  · 
than 1 July 1997,  the terms and conditions for inter-
connection to the basic functional components o, their 
voice telephony·semce and their public switched tele-
communications networks, including the  interconnec-
tion  poiDts  and  the  interfaces  offered  according  to 
market needs.  v/·J 
3.  Furthennore,  Member  States  shall  not  prevent· 
that  organizations  providing  telecommunications 
. networks and/or services who so request can  nesotiate 
interConnection  apements with  telecommunications 
orpnizations  for  access  to  the  public ·mtched'.tele-
communications  network  regarding  special  network 
access ind/or conditions meeting th~ir specific needs~ 
H commercial  negotiations·'  ~o not lead  to · an  agree-
ment within a reasonable time period,. Member· States . 
shall  upon  request  from  either  party  _and  ~thin a 
reasonable  time  period,  adopt· a ·  reasoned  decisio~ 
which establishes the necessary operational  ~d  finan-
cial cQnditions and requirements for such interconnec-
tion  without  prejudice  to  other  remedies  available 
under the  applicable  national  law or under Commu-
nity law. 
4.  Member States shall ensure that the cost accoun-
ting system  implemented by telecommunications or-
pnizations with tegard. to the provision  of. voice  tele-
phony and public telecommunications networks 'iden-
tifies  the cost elements relevant for  pricing intercon-
nection  offerings.  · 
S.  The measures  provided for  in  paragraphs  1 to  4 
shall apply for a period of five  yean from  the date  of 
the effective  abolition  of special and  exclusive  rights 
for  the  provision  of vaice  telephony pnted to  the 
telecommunications  organization.  ~e Co~ission. 
shall,. however,  review  this  A;fticle  if .  the  European 
Parliament and ·the Council adopt a directive bannon-
izinJ interconnection conditions before tlie end of this 
period. 
Member  States  shall  ensure  that all  exclusive  rights 
with  regard  to  the  establishment  and  provision  of 
directory  services,  including both  the · publication  of 
directories  and  directory  enquiry  services,  on  their 
territory ate lifted. 
.-
Without prejudice  to the harmonization by the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council in the framework of 
ONP, any national scheme which is necessary to share 
~e  net cost of the provision of universal service oblip-
tiona  entrusted  to.  the  telecommunications  orpniza-
tions, with other orpnizations.whether it consists of a 
system of supplementary ch~  or a. universal service· 
fund,  shall:  ·  ·  · 
.  \ 
(a)  apply only to  underta.k:inss  providi~g public  tele-
communications  networks; 
.(b)  allocate the respective bufcten  to each u.ndertaking 
.  according  to  objective  and  non-discriminatory 
criteria  and  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
proportionality  . 
Member States .shall commuziicate any such scheme to 
the  Commission .-so  that  it can  verify  the  scheme's 
compatibility  wi~ the  Treaty. 
Member  States  shali  allow  their  telecommunications 
oqanizations  to  re-:balance  tariffs  taking· account  of 
specific  m*rket conditions .and of the need to ensure 
the  affo~bility of a  univet:W  service,  and,  in parti-
cular, _Member States shall allow. them to adapt current 
rates  which  are  not  in ·line  with  costs  and  which 
increase" the  burden of universal  service  provision. ·in 
order to achieve tariffs based on real costs. Where such 
rebalanciC~g cannot ·be  completed  before  1  January 
f9~1Ui~'  ·Member States concemed shall-report to  th.e 
Commission on the future  phasin1 out of the remai-
ni~g tariff  imbalances.  This. shall  include  a  detailed 
timetable  for  implementation.  .  ,,  . 
In any case, .. within  three  months after the European 
· · · Parliament and the· .Council adopt a  Dir~tive harmo-
nizinJ  interconnection  conditions,  the  Com~issio~ 
will  assess  whether further initiatives are  necessary to 
ensure the ~onsistency of both Directives and take the 
- .  appropriate  measures. 
In  addition,  the  Commission  shall,  no · later  than  1 
January  2003,  review  the  situation  in  die  Member 
. States ind assess  in  particular whether the  financing 
schep~es in place  do  not limit access  to  the relevant 
markets.  In  this  case,  the  Commission  will  examine 
whether there are· other methods and make any appm-
priatep(C)~ 
Member  States  shall·  not  discriminate .between  pro-
viden  of  public.  telecommunications  netwOrks  with 
re~-·to.the pnting of  rightS  of way  for  the  pro-
vision.  of 5¥ch  networks.  · 
'Where  the  pnting of· additional  rights  of  way  to 
undertakinss ~ing  to  provide  public ·telecommuni-
cations  networks  is· not  possible  due  to  applicable 
essential  requirements,  Member  Sta~ shall  ensure 
access  to existial. facilities established un.der rights. of 
way which may not be d!Jplicated,. at  -~uonable tenns.' 
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· ·1.  ID the fust paragraph of ~cle.  ·7; the. wonts 'n~mbe~ 
as  well.  as  the' are  inserted  before  the .  word  surveal-
lance'.  · 
8. ·Article  8 is  replaced  by the  following: 
'Artide 8 
•  Member States shall, in  ·the authorization-.. ~emes  for 
the  provision  of voice  telephony and puolic  telecom-
munications. networlc:s. at least ensure  that -where such 
authorization is Pted  to undertakings to which  th~y 
also  grant  special .  or exclusive  .rights · in  areai  other 
than  telecommunications,  such  undertakings  keep 
separa~ financial  accounts  as  concerns  activities  as 
providers  of  voi<:e  telephony  and/or  networks  and 
other activities,  as  soon as  they achieve a tumo\'er oi 
more than BCU SO milUon in the relevant telec:ommu-
nieations. market.' 
9.  Article  9 is'  replaced  by  the  following: ·  · 
'Article  9 
By 1 January 19.98,  the CommiSsion will cirry out an 
overall  ·asseSsment  of  the  situation  with  regard  to 
remaining  restrictions  on  the  use  of  public  telecom-




Member States shall supply· to the Commission, not later 
than  nine  months  after  this  Directive  has  entered· into 
force, such  information  as. will' allow the Commission  to 
confirm that pOints 1 to 8 of Article 1 are complied· with. 
ThiS Directive is without preju~ce to existing obligations 
of. the Member ·States  to communicate,  no  later than· 31 
December  19.90,  8 August  1.99$. and.lS November·1.9.96 
respec:dvely,  measures · taken  to  comply  with ·Directives 
.90/388/BBC,  ')4/~6/EC and  96/2/EC.  · 
Articll J 
This  Directive  shall  enter into  force  on  the  20th  day 
fqllowing  its  publication  in the  Official ]oumal of thl. 
EurojJian Communi#4:  · 
ArtiCle. 4 
ThiS  Directive  is  addressed  to  the  Member States. 
Done  at  Brussels,. 13  March  1996. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIBRT 
Member of the  Commissitm 
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~as whose publication  is ·not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION  DECISION 
of 4 October 1995 
concerning  the  conditions  imposed  on  the  second  operator  of  GSM 
radiotelephony services  in Italy 
(Only the Italian  text is  authentic) 
(95/489/EC) 
niB COMMISSION  OP  THE  EUROPBAN  COMMUNUIES, 
I 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  Buropean 
Community,  and  in particular Article  90  (3)  thereof, 
Having given the Italian authorities, by letter of 3 January 
1995,  and  Telecom  ltalia  SpA.  by  letter  of  30  January 
1995,  notice to  submit their comments on  the  Commis-
sion'  s  objections  to  the  intitial  payment ·  imposed  on 
Omnitel  Pronto  ltalia, 
Whereas: 
THE  FACI'S 
The national measure in question 
(1)  The  Italian  G~ent  has  imposed  an  initial 
payment for  the  pant of a second  concession  for 
the establishment and operation on Italian territory 
of a network for  the  p~on  of a public mobile 
radiotelephony  senice  usiq  the  pan-Biuopean 
diJital  system.  GSM  (Blobal  system  for  mobile 
communications~ This requirement wu laid down 
in  the  specifications  and  does  not  apply  to  the 
public  operator,  Telecom  I.~ia. 
The undertaking and services  concemed 
(2)  Telecom  ltalia ·SpA  is  controlled  by  the  Societl. 
Torinese  BSercizi  Telefoni  (STBT).  which  owns 
SS% of  its capital. STBT  is  in  its  turn controlled 
by the lstituto per Ia Ricostruzione lndustriale (IRI) 
and thus by the Italian Government. Telecom ltalia 
thus  constitutes  a 'public  undertaking'  within  the 
meaning  of  Article  90  (1).  · 
In  terms  of  its  tumover,  Lit  26 700  billion, 
Telecom  ltalia  is  the sixth  largest telecommunica-
tions. operator in  the  world. It has  a workforce  of 
101 000 employees  an~ over 2S million subscribers. 
When Tel~com Italia was set up in August 1994, it 
took· over the exclusive rights to operate the public 
telecommunications  network  and  the  voice  tele· 
phony service granted to Societi ltaliana per l'Eser-
cizio  Telefonico  (SIP)  in  1984  for  a period  of  20 
years. 
(3)  Cellular digital  mobile  telephony complying with.· 
the  GSM standard has  been developed  recently in 
Burope and enables subsal"bers both to send an,d to 
receive  calls  anywhere  in the Community, as  well 
as in some other Buropean countries. This· system, 
which  used  digital  technology,  a  compact  tele· 
phone and a subscn"ber  identity module  card,  has 
pater potential than traditional analoaue  radiote-
lephony  systems.  Digital  technology  provides 
higher  quality,  high-speed  data  transmission  and 
encryption  enhancing  the  confidentiality  of 
communications, and is more economical in its use 
of frequencies· than. analoaue systems. Furthermore, 
the  GSM system is based on common Community 
standards  regarding  common  frequency  bands 
approved at Community level and, unlike analogue 
systems  which  are  often. incompatible  .from  one 
Member State .to  another, has  the  makings  of  one 
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(4) 
of the  pan-European  services,  whose ·  promotiO!J· is 
one  of  the  main  objectives  of  the  Community's 
policy on telecommunications (').  Lasdy,  the emer-
ging  market  for  GSM  services  is  particularly 
dynamic : according to some studies, the number of 
users  in western  Europe  c~uld grow from  a little 
over  1 million in 1993  to  1  5 to 20  million. in the 
year  2000 (i). 
The Council  has  adopted a directive  reserving the 
890  to  915  and 935  to  960  MHz  frequency bands 
for the introduction of ~ common system of digital . 
GSM  radiotelephony (3).  These  common' frequency 
bands allow several competing operators to coexist. 
·The GSM service began operating commerc:iaUy in 
the Community in late 1992: since which time the 
great  majority  of  the  Member  States  (Belgium, 
Spain,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Finland, ,  Denmark, 
Germany, France, Greece, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom) have each granted licences to two opera.:. 
tors,  while  the  other Member States  (Austria  and· 
Ireland) have  announced  that they will  follow  the 
same  path or have  already  initiated  the  necessary 
procedures to that effect. Sweden has granted ·three 
GSM  licences.:_  Germany,  France,  the  Netherlands' 
and  the  United  Kingdom  have  authorized  or 
decided  to  authorize  a  third  operator .  to  offer 
cellular digital radiotelephony services, on a higher 
frequency  band,  on  the ·.basis  of  the  DCS  1800 
~pecifications. 
The European  Conference  of Postal and Telecom-
munications Administrations (CEPT), the forum for 
the  national  regulatory  authorities  of  36 countries 
(including  Italy~ has  recommended  that competi-
tion between operators of GSM services be actively 
encouraged  and  the  regulatory  barriers . which  are 
restricting such  competition  be  abolished ('4). 
Background 
(.5)  By  letter  of  29  July  1993,  the  Commission 
requested  the  Italian  Government either to  tenni-
nate  the  monopoly ·enjoyed  by Telecom  Italia  (at 
(1)  Council  recommendation 87/371/BEC of 25 June 1987 (OJ 
No  L  196.  17.  7.  1987,  p.  81~  . 
(1)  'Scenario  Mobile  Communications  up  to  2010  - study  on 
forecast developments and future trends in technical develop-
ment and commercial provision  up  to  the year 2010'. Eutelis 
Consult,  October  1993. 
(S)  CouncU  Directive  87/372/BBC of  2S  June 1987  on  the  fre-
quency bands to be reserved  for  the coordinated introduction 
of  public  pan-European  cellular. digital  land·bued  · mobile 
communications  in  the  Community  OJ  No  L  19"  17.  7. 
1987,  p.  85). 
(4)  'Review  of  the  Requirements  for  the  Puture  Harmonization 
of  Re~atory Policy Reprding Mobile Communications Ser-
vices'.  CEPT/ECTRA  (92)  57,  p.  17. 
that time, SIP) in GSM radiotelephony or to present 
arguments meeting the Commission's objections to 
that  monopoly.  In response,  the  Italian  Govern-
ment decided to put out to tender a second conces-
sion  for  15  years  for  the  operation  of  a  GSM 
network. A notice  to  that effect  was  published in 
the  Gaz111a  UffkiaU dtlla Rtpubb!ica  Italiana, 
No  2.94  of  16  December  1993.  No  provision  was 
made  for  an  initial  payment. 
On 29  January 1994, the Italian  Government sent 
the  specifications  to  the  businesses  which  had 
responded. They  state  that  tenders  must  indicate 
· 'the  lump  sum,  in  billions  of  lire,  which  the 
tenderer will pay when  the  concession  is  granted' 
(Article 4.9.1, page 44). The specifications also indi-
cate  that  that  amount  will  constitute  one  of  the 
selection  criteria  (p.  51~ without  mentioning  the 
weighting  to  be  attached  to it.  The  deadline·  for 
submitting tenders  was  1 March  1994  (Artic:le  3.9, 
page  19). 
The  specifications  were  sent  to  the  Commission 
only on 2 March 1994, after the expiry of the dead-
line.  By  letter  of  1 April  1994,  the  Commission 
expressed its regret that the specifications for selec-
ting a second operator imposed on  the  firm  to  be 
selected  conditions  less  favourable  than  those 
enjoyed by SIP, in particular the requirement of an 
initial  payment (the  bid)  and  a  minimum  annual 
charge to  be  paid by the operator for  the first  five 
years  irrespective  of  turnover,  while  for  SIP  this 
charge  is  only 3,5 %  on the  amount .  of  its  actual 
income .. 
The  Commission  then  suggested  to  the  Italian 
Government that these two requirements should be 
deleted and the bids of the two remaining consortia 
be  considered  solely  in  the  light  of  the  other 
criteria  mentioned in the specifications - that  is 
to  say,  qualitative  criteria. 
On 18  April  1994,  the  Italian  Government offici-
ally  announced  the  consortium selected,  Omnitel 
Pronto  Italia,  together with  the weighting used  in 
making the selection. The tenderers did not know 
the  weighting.  The  consortium  selected  obtained 
the  better~ score  on  every  one  of  th~  selection 
criteria. 
In  its  letter  of  11  May  19_94,  the  Commission 
replied  that  it  continued  to  have  reservations 
,  concerning the initial payment. Since Omnitel had 
been successful  on  all  the  other selection  criteria, 
the  Commission  requested  that  the  httitial 
payment  be  reconsidered  but  without  calling  in 
question  or  delaying  the  start  ·of  the  operator's 
service. 
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(6). 
Since there W.S no reply to this letter, the Commis-
sion sent a reminder on ·  27 July 1994 pointing out 
that it could not terminate the infringement proce-
dure  before  the licence had been  formally granted 
and again  inquired what the  Italian  Government's 
current  intentions  were  concerning  the  initial 
payment. Given the lesser impact of the minimum 
annual  charge  imposed  solely  on  the  second 
. operator  as  compared  to  the  initial  payment,  the 
Commission decided  to  concentrate solely on  this 
latter  aspect,  without,  however,  accepting  the 
former. 
By  letter of 8 August  1994; the  Italian  authorities 
replied  to  this  last  point  to  the  effect  that  the 
tenderers,.  and  therefore  the  consortium  selected, 
were  well  aware  of  that  obligation  since  it  was 
expressly included in the specifications, adding that 
in the course  of meetings ·between  officials  of  the 
Ministry  of  Posts  and  Telecommunications  and 
senior  management  of  Omnitel  Pronto  Italia,  the 
problem  appeared  to  have  been  resolved.  On  31 
October  1.994,  the  Commission  replied  that  the 
acceptance by the applicant second operator of the 
conditions for obtaining the  licence  had no  e~ect 
·on whether these  condi~ons were discriminatory or 
not,  and  it continued  to  press· its  request  for  the 
views  of  the  I~  GoverruJ.?,ent. 
On 3 January. 199 5,  the  Commission  gave  formal 
notice  to  the  Italian  Government  either to  annul 
the second operator's obligation to  make an  initial · 
payment  or  to  submit  its  comments  on  the 
Commission's  arguments.  The  Italian  authorities 
replied  on  28  February,  17  May  and  10  August 
1995. 
THE COMMISSIONS ASSESSMENT 
Article 90  (1) 
Article  90  (1)  of  the Treaty  provides  that,  in the 
cue  of  public  undertakings  to  which  Member 
States  grant  special  or  exclusive  rights,  Member 
States must neither enact nor maintain· in force any 
measure  contrary  to  the  rules  contained  in  the 
Treaty, in particular those relating to  competition~ 
Telecom  Italia  is  a public  undertaking which  has 
been granted exclusive  rights  to  operate  the fixed 
telecommunications  network  and  offer voice  tele-
phony  (within  the  meaning  of  Article  1  of 
Commission  Directive .90/388/BEC r)) and  mobile 
analogue  radio  telephony  services.  On  22 
r>  Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the 
markets for telecommunications  a~rvices (OJ No L 192. 24. 7. 
1.9~. p.  10~ 
(7) 
'  (8) 
(.9) 
(10) 
December  199:4,  the  Italian  Government  also 
granted  it the  right  to  operate  a  GSM .  radiotele-
phony network,  which  qualifies  as  a special  right, 
since  the  operator had  been  designated  otherwise 
than according to objective and non-disailninatory 
criteriL 
In accordance  with  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice (2),  the compatibility of this monopoly with 
the Treaty must be  asseSsed in the  light of Article 
90 and  the  provisions  to which  it refers - in this 
instance,  Article  86. 
Article  86 
Tht  rtl111an1  marktt 
The  relevant  market  is  the  market  for  cellular 
digital mobile radiotelephony services. This should 
be  distinguished  from  the  market  in  voice  tele-
phony  and  that  (or  those)  in  other  mobile  tele-
phone  communications services. 
The  Commission  has  defined the  market in voice 
telephony in Directive 90/388/EBC. The Directive 
draVIS  a distinction between  'services  wh~e provi-
sion  consists  wholly  or  partly  in  the  transmission 
and routing of signals on the public telecommuni-
cations  network'  and · mobile . radio  telephony 
services,  which  are  excluded  from  its  scope. 
Voice telephony within the meaning of that Direc-
tive  is  the  principal  service  provided  on  the  fixed 
public  network, .  m~~~g  ·be~n given  network 
termination  points.  These  termination  points  are 
defined  as 'all physical connections and their tech-
nical  access specifications'. In mobile communica-
tions,  on the other hand,  the  termination point is 
located  at  the  radio  interface  between  the  base 
station  of  the  mobile  network  and  the  mobile 
station,  which  means  that  there  is  no  physical 
termination·  point.  The  definition  of  voice·  tele-
phony services in Article  1 of the Directive  there-
fore does not apply to mobile telephony services. 
According to the  case-law of the  Court of Justice, 
for  a· product to  be  regarded  as  forming a market 
which  .  is  sufficiently  differentiated  from  other· 
markets, it mast be possible for it to be singled out 
by  such  special . features  distinguishing  it  from 
other  products · that it is  only· to  a limited extent 
interchangeable with  them and is only exposed to 
their competition  in a· way  that· is  hardly  percep-
tible (1). 
(1)  See, for example, the judpent of  1.9  May  1.9.93 in Cue-320/ 
.91,  Corbeau, ~parapJ!h 12. 
(3)  Cue  27/76.  United  Brands  v.  Commission.  [1.978]  BCR,  p. 
207,  parapph 22. 
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Clearly,  there  is  very  little  interchangeability 
between  mobile  iadiotelephony ' and  telephony 
using  the  fixed  network :  users  taking  out  a 
· subscription for  a  earphone or portable  telephone 
do not norinally cancel their previous subscription 
for  a  telephone  installed  at  their home or work-
place. Therefore, mobile radiotelephony is indeed a 
new,  additional service,  not a· substitute  for  tradi-
tional  telephony. 
This  distinction is  also  reflected in a very  signifi-
cant  price  differential :  according  to  a  study 
conducted  by  the  Organization  for  Economic · 
Cooperation and Development (OBCD) and based 
on a  basket  of  services,  the  cost· of  mobile  tele-
phony to the user is, on average in the OBCD area, 
four times that of the same services offered 04 the 
fixed  network ~). 
Admittedly,  wider dissemination  of  mobile  radio-
telephony might ultimately lead  to  a  single  tele-
communi~tions System· catering for  markets  that 
are  for  the  time  being  separate.  However,  the 
conditions on which Article 86 is  to apply must be 
assessed on the. basis of present demand and not of. 
developments that could take  place at some unspe-
cified  time  in  the future. 
·(11)  It having been  established,  for  the above  reasons, 
that mobile radiotelephony should not be regarded 
as  forming  part  of  the  market  voice-telephony 
services offered using the fixed network, it remains 
to be seen whether, and to what extent, there might 
be grounds for distinguishing between the cellular 
mobile radiotelephony services  based on the GSM 
standard which are the subject of this Decision and 
cellular  · radiotelephony  services·  using  analogue 
technology. 
The GSM system of cellular mobile radio telephony 
is  more  than  just  a  technical  refinement  of  the 
earlier  analosue  technology.  In  addition  to  the 
advan.tages  offered by GSM in terms of the  qu~lity 
of voice reproduction and more efficient use of the 
a'Yiilable  spectrum (thus accommodating substanti-
ally  more  users  on a  given  frequency  allocation~ 
this service provides new facilities that cater for the 
needs  of  only  some  users  of  mobile  radiotele-
phony:  · 
(i)  based as  it is  on a Community standard, GSM 
can  become  a  pan-European  service.  Under 
(1)  OBCD  study,  published  24  February  1993. 
'roaming' agreements  between  network opera-
tors, the system permits any user to make calls 
from his phone outside the national territory of 
the · operator  with  which  he  has  taken  out a 
subscription ;  this  facility  is  available 
throughout  the  territory of  the  parties  to  the 
GSM  Memorandum  of  Understanding  in  . 
Europe  and  other  puts  of  the  world.  Some 
users  who,  for  business  purposes,  use  mobile 
radiotelephony  services  only  within  the 
country or within  a  particular region, are  not 
interested  in  this  new  feature.  Por  others, 
however,  this may be a reason for deciding to 
subscribe ;  . 
(h}  in  addition  to  voice  transmission,  the  GSM 
service can be used to transmit large quantities 
of data ; again,  this  feature  meets  the specific 
needs of only some of the existing or potential 
customers for mobile radiotelephony services ; 
(ili}  the digital coding of messages means that a far 
greater degree of security can be achieved than 
via  the analogue system - again an advantage 
of interest to only some uiers (particularly busi-
ness  customers) ; 
(iv)  digital  technology makes it possible to offer a 
whole  range  of advanced  telecommunications 
services  which are  not available (or which can 
be  made  so  only at considerably higher cost) 
via  an  analogue  network ; 
(v)  in ·the majority of the Member States, the tariffs 
applicable  to  GSM  services  currently  remain 
higher  than  those  for  analogue  mobile  tele-
phony. 
In  view  of  th.e  above,  the  simple  replacement of 
analogue radiotelephony by the GSM system is not· 
generally  envisaged,  in  the  short  tenn.  On  the 
contrary, it is  likely that, even if there is  a discer-
nible drift of customers from one to the other, the 
two  systems  will  continue  to  exist  in  parallel  for 
several  years  to  conie,  meeting  largely  different 
needs.  It has  been  found  that,  even  in  countries 
where  the  GSM  system  is  fully  operational, some 
operators are  continuing to invest in  the .  analogue 
network. 
(12)  On the basis of the abovementioned considerations 
and  the  current  circumstances,  and  taking  into 
account the possible evolution of the market, GSM 
radiotelephony  services  should· therefore  probably 
be  regarded  as  also  constituting a  market separate 
from  the  market  for  analogue  mobile  telephony. 
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In any event,  the  conclusions of the legal analysis 
would  not  be  different,  even  if  analogue  mobile 
telephony  and  GSM  constituted  two  segments  of 
·the  same  market. 
(13)  In  accordance  with  judgments  of  the  Court  of 
Justice  this  market,  which  currently extends  over 
the  whole  of  ·Italy,  is  ·a  substantial  part  of  the 
common  market. 
(15) 
Tht dominant position. 
The Court of Justice has  held that an·  u~dertaking 
which  has  a  legal  monopoly  in·  the  provision  of 
certain. services  may  occupy  a dominant 'position 
within the  meaning of Article  86 of the Treaty r~ 
This  applies  in  the  case  of Telecom  ltalia and  its 
subsidiary,  Telecom  ltalia  Mobile,  created  in July 
199 5,  which  together  are  the  only  undertakinp 
permitted by law  to  offer  the  telecommunications 
networks  for  tPe  public,  voice  telephony  and 
analogue  radiotelephony in  Italy,  three m.arkets  in 
wh~ch they  therefore  enjoy  a dominant .position. 
Tht abust  of a  dominant posit-ion 
The. Court of Justice  has  ruled  that 'a  system  of 
undistorted  competition,  as  laid  down  in  the 
Treaty,  can  be  guaranteed  only  if  equality  of  op-
porrunity  is  secured  as  between  the.  various 
economic. operators' (Z). 
· Such equality of opportunity is  particularly im por-
tant for new entrants to a market in which a domi-
nant operator on a related but separate market iS in 
the course of establishing itself, like Telecom Italia 
and  its  subsidiary,  Telecom  ltalia  Mobile. 
(16)  Telecom Italia Mobile already 'enjoys the follOwing 
major advantages for acquiring a dominant share of 
the  market· in ·G~  radiotelephony: 
- a  head  start :  it  is  already  in  a  position  to 
market  its  ~rvice while  the  second  operator 
will not be ready until the second half of 1995, 
- potential  customers :  Telecom  ltalia  Mobile's 
analogue  radiotelephony  service,  TACS,  had 
more  than  2,2  .million  subscribers  (February 
· ~)Cue 311/84- Centre  belp d'itucl• de  marche- Telemar-
ketina CCBBM) SA v. Compapie luxembo~iae  cle  ~liclif­
fusion $A and Informacion pUblicid Benelux SA. [198S) BCR. 
~· 3261.  .  .  (  e.e.  ] I  .  (I)  Case C-202/88, Prance v. CommtsSton,  t..,..,.l  • p. 1223, para-
pph 51,  p.  1271. 
1995) and is acquiring 100 000  new subsc:riben 
each  month. 
However, this service will become less attractive 
in future in view of GSM's superior facilities. In 
addition, TACS  operates in wavebands: reserved 
to GSM radiotelephony. With time some TACS 
subsc:n'bers  will  therefore  change  to  GSM. 
Accordingly, Telecom ltalia Mobile  already has 
potential  customers  for  its  GSM  service, 
~  an existing distribution network.: the network is 
known  to  the  public,  since  Telecom  ltalia 
Mobile  can  market its  GSM service  through its 
·  TACS  distributors, 
- specific  information:  through  its  experience 
with  TACS,  it.  has  specific  information  on  the 
calling  habits  of  Italian  subscribers,  by 
consumer  categories  and  region.  Moreover, 
since it also enjoys a monopoly in the supply of 
fixed  links  for  the  networks  of  GSM  opera-
tors (3),  it  will  continue  to  obtain  important 
information  ~n 'traffic  flows, 
· - economies of scale for infrasaucture : since it is 
at  preSent  the  sole · operator  of  fixed  and 
analogue mobile  telephoz:~y, it has available sites. 
and  aerials  for  establishing  its  GSM  network 
which  are  not available  to  its  competitor. 
Telecom Italia would be unable to. extend· its domi-
nant position  on  the  market in wire  telephony or 
analogue  mobile·· telephony  into  the  market  in 
·  GSM  radiotelephony by  increasing the costs  of its 
rival,  for  example  by  imposing  interconnection 
charges  which  were  n:ot  justified  by  the  costs 
.  involved, .without  infringing :Article  86  of the  BC 
Treaty. 
(11)  Puauant to  Article  90 (1)  of the  BC  Treaty,  Italy 
must  at  the  same  time  refrain  from  enacting 
m~  .which  would,  by  increasing the  costs  of 
accels of the sole· rival of a public undertaking on a 
market newly opened  to  competition, sisnificandy 
. distort  'this  competition~  Given  the  additional 
·financial  burden  imposed  on  its  only competitor, 
TelecOm  Italia Mobile will  indeed have  the choice 
between. two cOmmercial  strategieS;  of which  each 
would- be  in  breach . of  Article  90  (1)  read  in 
conjunction  with  Article  86  of  the  Treaty  . 
(I)  Telecom.  Italia  and  its  subsidiary·  Telecom  ltalia  Mobile 
operate the fixed  network and  mobile services. On the other 
hand. Omnitel Pronto ltalia can only establish radio links if it 
can show that Telecom ltalia cannot provide it with the leased 
lines  requested  within  a reasonable  time. 
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(i)  Extensi.on  of  the ·dominant  position(') 
of  the  public undertaking 
The initial payment of Lit 7  SO  billion made by 
the second operator on this market will  neces-
sarily  have  to  be- ·covered  by  income.  The 
second operator will  therefore  have  difficulties 
in.  competing  with  the  first  operator  through 
lower tariffs.  The first  operator, Telecom  ltalia 
Mobile,.  which  must  not  depredate  the.  same 
payment and  which  moreover  is  aware  of  the 
second.  operator's  cost  structure  through  its 
monopoly  of  the  infrastructure (2},  could  be 
encouraged by reducing its tariffs,  to extend its 
current dominant position on the fixed  infras-
tructure  market and the  analogue  mobile tele-
phony market  U,.to  the  market in -GSM  radio- · 
telephony. It is. a question of the extension C?f  a 
dominant  position  thanks  to  the  competitive 
advantange  provided  by  ~e distortion  of  the 
cost  structure  due  to  the  intitial  payment. 
rendering the State  measure contrary to  Article 
90,  read  in  conjunction  with  ~cle 86. 
(ii}  Limitation of production, ~arkets or of 
technical  · development  within  the 
meaning of Article  86 (b) 
Moreover,  the  need  to  finance  Lit 750  billion 
will  also  delay  the  investments  of  the  new 
entrant. which will have to use part· of its initial 
capital to  cover the initial payment. which wiU 
therefore not be available  for  investment in the 
development  of  its  network,  quite  apart  from 
the capital needed for establishing its service in 
compliance  wiht  the  minimum  requirements 
set  out  in  the  licence.  This · will  delay  the 
development  of  the  network  and  could  also 
encourage  .Telecom  Italia  Mobile  to  delay 
marketing its GSM service (3). The TACS system 
is  more attractive in that it guarantees Telecom 
(')  See,  for  example,  juclpent of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  17 
November  1992,~oined Cases  C-271/90,  C-281/90  and  C- · 
289/90, The ·Kin  om of Spain, the Kin  om of Belsium and 
the  Italian  Repu  lie  v.  Commissio~  [1~2) ECR  I,  p.  5833, 
p~,mph 36.  .  . 
(1)  The  specification~  provide  for  a  reduction  of  SO %  of  the 
public  rariff  for  lines  leased  by  SIP  to  the  second  operator. 
Despire this reduction,  th~ cost of leued lines  for the second 
GSM  operator  in  Italy  remains  three  times  higher than  that 
applied  by. BT in  the  United  Kingdom  to  cell~lar telephony 
operators. 
(3)  h  the Commission h11already emphasized in  ita letter of 29 
June 1993, •since the public undertaking holds a monopoly in 
the supply of mobile  radiotelephony services,  it has  no  great 
interest in introducing an alternative, the GSM service, quick-
ly'. 
ltilia  Mobile  a  definite  income  since  the 
·services· are operated u  a monopoly and more-
over  the  bulk of  the  investments  have  already 
been  amortized. · 
The Telecom  Italia group, whia: as  has  been 
pointed out,  is  aware  of  the  second  operator's 
cost structure  through its .  infrastructure  mono-
poly,  would  therefore  be  encouraged  to  retain 
hiaher tariffs for its G~  services than it would 
otherwise  do,  in  the  absence  of  the  State 
measure in question. In so doing, it would limit 
production, output or technical development at 
the expense of the users within the meaning of 
Article 86 (b) as  regards GSM, which involves a 
more advanced technology, so  as  to benefit the 
older analogue  service. 
In addition, this would delay. the move  towards 
personal  communication  combining  mobile 
and fixed  networks, which will· only be possible 
if the  tariffs  for  mobile  communications  fall 
substantially. 
As  the Court of Justice has  held ("),  Article 90 
(1)  precludes  Member  States  from  enacting 
measures  likely  to  cause  an  undertaking  to 
infringe  the  provisions to  which it refers - in 
particular, in the case in point. those contained 
in Article  86. 
In  conclusion,  on  either  hypothesis,  the  State 
measure concerned is  therefore  contrary to  Article 
90 (1~ read in conjunction with Article 86 (b) of the 
Treaty. 
(18)  The  responsibility  of  Member  States  pursuant  to 
Articles  86  and  90  (1)  of  the  Treaty  only  arises 
where  the improper behaviour of  the  company in· 
·  q~estion  is  capable  of  affecting  trade  between 
Member States. Such a potential effect exists in this 
instance  because  the . commercial  activity  of  the 
Italian· GSM  operators  may affect  the  residents  of 
other Member States,  who  may acquire  the •siM' 
cards  in Italy just. as  in the territories of  the other 
Member States,  thanks  to  the  roaming agreement 
with  the~ operators covering those Member States. 
(4)  See,  for  example,  Case  C-41/90,  Hafner v.  Macrotron [1991) 
ECR  I.  p.  1.979  as  well  as  the  judgments  of  18  June  19.91, 
Caie  C-260/89,  Dimotiki  Etairia  Pliroforiuis  v.  gPT,  [1.991] 
ECR  I,  p. 2925, and of -5 October 1994, Case C-323/93, Soci- 'te civile agricole d'inseminacion de Ia Ctespelle v. Cooperati-
ve d'elevap et d'inseminacion artificlelle du departement de la 
Mayenne  [1.994]  ECR  I,  p.  5077. 
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The reply of the  Italian authorities  . 
(1.9)  In  its  letter  of  28  February  ·  1995,  the  Italian 
(20) 
. Government emphasized  that the  initial  payment 
had  been  one  factor  in  selecting  the  second 
operator. The sum proposed by the -second operator 
would  therefore  be  determined as  part of its  stra-
tegic  choice,  since  the  specifications  do  not 
mention either a minimum or a maximum figure. 
Moreover,  the  specifications  allow  the  tenderer to 
propose·  _further  conditions,  such  as  waiving . the 
initial  payment or spreading it over a  number of 
years. In addition, the tenderers knew that Telecom 
Italia  Mobile  was  not required  to  make an  initial 
paymen~. 
It was  impossible  to oblige Telecom Italia Mobile 
to. make  the  same  payment  since. it had  already 
made  its investments and thereore relied·  on amor-
tizing them by operating the service as a monopoly. 
By determining the amount of the initial payment 
which  it would  be prepared  to  make,  the  second 
operator  of  necessity  took  into  account  positive 
factors  such  u  the  investments  already  made  by 
Telecom Italia Mobile and iti right to use Telecom 
· Italia  Mobile  network  through  nati~nal  roaming. 
It therefore denies  that the dominant positions of 
Telecom  Italia  and  its  subsidiary  Telecom  ltalia 
Mobile have been strengthened. It also denies that 
the initial payment· produced a negative impact on 
investments or on the level  of  tariffs,  in so  far  as 
the second operator's concessi9n fixes specific obli-
gations  on  this  point 
Lastly,  it refuses  to abolish the initial payment In 
its  view,  relinquisliment  of  this  criterion  would 
mean that the selection procedure would haw to be 
begun  again if the principles  of  transparency and 
non-discrimination were to be respected. According· 
to  the  Italian  Government,  the  removal  of  an 
element such u  the offer to pay a sum in order to 
enter ~e  GSM market would necessarily lead to  ~e 
opening  of  a  new  bidding  process.  Without  the 
requirement of the initial payment, the competitors 
might well  have  made  different  bids.  This  argu-
mentation was  confirmed by the Italian authorities 
by  letter of  10  Aupt 1995. 
In  its  letter of  17  May  1995,  the  Italian  Govern-
ment  distinguished  between  the  question  of  the 
(21) 
ini.tial payment and the risk of extending the domi-
~t  position  . 
&  far  as  the  initial  payment  is  concerned,  the. 
Italian  Government  maintains  that,  in  the  past, 
Telecom Italia Mobile has spent larger sums than 
that  on  developing  the  new  service  and  that 
furthennore the opening up of the GSM service to 
competition  has  had  a  negative  effect  on  the 
expected  profits·  of  Telecom  Italia  Mobile  for 
running  the  service.  Moreover,  to  reimburse  the 
initiaL payment would allow the candidate who was 
not chosen  to. attrack  Omnitel's  concession,  and 
the selection  procedure would have  to  start again. 
On  this  point,  the  Italian  Government reaffirmed 
that the abolition ·of the obligatory initial payment 
on .the  part of the second operator would necessi-
tate  the  opening .  of · a  new selection  process. 
&  .  for the risk of extending the dominant position 
of Telecom Italia and its- subsidiary, Telecom Italia 
Mobile,  the  Italian  Government emphasized  that, 
following  its  intervention,  agreements  had  been 
.  concluded  between  Telecom  Italia  and  Omnitel 
reiating to the. interconnection of Omnitel'  s  GSM 
network to the fixed telephone network of Telecom 
ltalia, to experimental roaming of Omnitel'  s service 
via  Telecom  Italia  Mobile's  GSM  network,  to  the 
distribution system of Telecom Italia Mobile's GSM 
and to  the  keeping of separate  accounts  for  GSM 
and Telecom  Italia'  s  other activities. 
The Commission's rebuttal 
The  Commission  has  not  challenged  the  Italian 
Government's  decision· to  use  two  distinct  proce:-
dures in awarding the GSM concessions. Neverthe-
less, it has repeatedly urged the Italian Government 
to ensure that the procedures used and the  c~teria 
adopted in granting the second licence should not 
have  the effeCt of increasing the costs of access by 
the new entrant to the GSM  market, as  co~pared 
with  those  of  the  public opemtor. 
The  initial  mvestment  for  establishing  a  GSM 
network in Italy amounts to about Lit 2 000 billion. 
The  initial  payment,  when  added  to  the  initial 
investment,  therefore  ·in~es the second  opera-
tor's · need  for  financing  by more  than  one-third. 
Since Telecom ltalia mobile does not have to make 
the same payment, it is wrong to say that the initial 
payment hu not stengthened  its  position.  It can 
use the money thereby saved to extend its distribu-
tion  network  or  make  special  offers  to  potential 
subscribers. 
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Moreover,  Telecom  ltalia  Mobile  possesses  a 
temporal  advantage . to  recoup  the  major  sums 
invested  for  the  development  of  GSM.  When  it 
puts  irs  network  at  the  disposal  of  the  second 
national  operator,  in  the  context  of  national . 
roaming, the latter will  not benefit freely from  this 
investment but will have to  participate in financing 
it. 
(22)  The fact that applicants for·the second licence were 
aware of the future distortion of competition on the 
GSM  market  in  Italy  in  favour  of  Telecom  ltalia 
Mobile  does  not mean that there  is  any less  of an 
·imbalance here. Moreover, firms which did wish to 
enter  the  market  had  no  choice  but  to  take  this 
handicap  into  account  in  their  business -plan. 
It is therefore wrong to say that the initial payment 
will  have  no  impact  on  prices  charged  or  the 
coverage  offered. The second  opera~r·  s concession 
adopts the objectives which it has itself undertaken 
to  attain  after  making  allowance  for  the  initial 
payment. The  Italian  Government itself  concedes 
that,  without  the  initial  payment,  tenderers  'could 
have modified their economic objectiv,s for each of 
the valuation  parameters'. Moreover,  the mere  fact 
that the  specifications make  provision  for  national 
roaming  is  certainly  not  sufficient  compensation 
for  the  second operator's disadvantage. The Italian 
Government has  not as yet informed the Commis-
sion  of  an  agreement  on  this  matter  with  the 
second  operator. 
(23)  Lasdy,  the  argument  that,  if  the  initial  payment 
· were  waived,  the  tendering  procedure  would  have 
to  be  repeated in order to  comply with .the  princi-
ples of transparency and .non-discrimination is  not 
convincing.  · 
Bearing  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  consortium 
chosen  submitted  the  better  tender  on  all  other 
selection  criteria,  the  Commission,  in its  letter of 
11  May  1994,  determined that it was  poaaible  and 
necessary to reconsider this initial payment without 
calling in question or delaying the commencement 
of  the  second  operator's  service. 
Moreover,  the  weighting  of  the  various  selection 
criteria was not communicated to the various appli-
cants. The candidates  could  not therefore  say  that 
they would  have  made  a better offer  it they  had . 
known  that  the  initial  payment  would  be  aban-
doned.  The  weighting  attached  to  the  initial 
payment  could,  in  fact,  have  been  very  slight  or 
zero.  · 
In  any case, in order not to  interfere in a question 
which relates in part to the internal law of Italy, the 
Commission .leaves  to the Italian Government the 
choice  of  the  means  of  remedying  the  breach, 
without expressly envisaging the reimbursement of 
the initial payment. Such reimbursement is not the 
only  conceivable  means  of  redressing  the  imba-
lance that it creates. The Italian Government could 
either  impose  an  identical. payment  on  Telecom 
ltalia Mobile, or it could adopt corrective measures 
such~  those mentioned in the context of contacts 
between  the  Commission  and the  Italian  authori-
ties,  for  example : 
- a pt  without  delay  to  any  operator  of  an 
unconditional right to establish  its own  infras-
tructure (the  provi~ion of the radio frequencies 
necessary  for  microware  links)  or  to  use  the 
existing  infrastructUre  .  of  other  undertakings 
such as  the national railways. the motorways or 
BNEL (the  national  electricity agency), 
- the effective  application  of  the roaming agree-
ment  between  the  two  GSM-radiotelephony 
operators,  which  from  a  technical .. and  tariff 
standpoint  would  compensate  for  the  second 
operator's  delay, 
- the  grant  of  access  to  Telecom  ltalia'  s  TACS 
900  customer database,  while  maintaining the 
confidentiality  of  personal  data, 
- the  revision  of  the  tariff  conditions  for  inter-
connection with Telecom Italia's switched tele-
phone  network, 
- the grant to  any operator of the ·  right  to  apply 
alternative  technologies  such  u  DCS-1800  or 
OBcr to  provide  its  service. 
The  revocation  of  the  concession  already  granted 
can  in  no  circumstances  be  considered  to  be  an 
appropriate remedy for the breach, bearing in mind 
that that would eliminate the only existing comep-
. titor to  the public company Telecom Italia Mobile 
on the GSM  market, and also  bearing in mind the 
current  monopoly  of  Telecom  Italia  as  regards 
fix~d telephony and GSM during the whole  period 
necessary for  the  opening of a new call  for  offers, 
thus  rendering  competition  even  more  difficult 
because  of  the  additional  time-lead. 
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(24}  The  CoiDIDis$ion's  objections  to  the  initial 
. payment imposed  on the second operator but not 
on Telecom Italia Mobile are  not based on Article 
6 of the Treaty. In this  procedure the issue  is  not 
the  discrimination  in  itself ·but· the  effect of the 
State measure which is, as has been shown at points 
17 and 18, to lead the telecommunications agency 
to extend its dominant position or to limit produc-
tion,  markets  or technical  development. 
The aim  of thii  procedure  is  to  cause  the Italian 
Government to take the necessary steps to preclude 
that effect ; the  most obvious would· be a require- · 
ment· that Telecom ltalia Mobile make an identical 
payment. 
(25)  Likewise, if the Italian Government so requests, the 
Commission  would  be  prepared  to  examine 
whether the  infrittpment could· be  terminated by 
adopting other measures,  provided that they offset 
properly the  second. operator's  disadvantage. 
It is incumbent upon  the Italian  Government to 
make propoSals in thii matter. The Italian Govem-
ment should in any case  provide figures  for these  · 
proposals, showing that they properly offset the Lit 
7  SO  billion  paid  by c;>mnitel. 
Article ·go  (2) 
(26)  Article 90  (2)  of  the Treaty  provides  that under-
takings  entrusted with the operation of services  of 
general economic interest ·are  subject to  the ·  tules 
on com!:ptition, in so far as  the application of such 
rules does not obstruct the performance, in  ·law or 
in fact, of the particular tasks assigned .to' them. The 
Italian Government has not relied on this provision 
to  justify  imposing  the  initial  payment  on  the 
second  operator alone. 
(27)  The Commission considers for its part, that in this 
case Article 90 (2) does not apply, because there are 
no factors which would permit the conclusion that 
the initial payment is justified by the performance 
in law or in fact of a service  of general economic 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
(28)  In  view  of  the  above  the  Commission  considers 
that  the competitive  disadvantage  in  the  form  of 
the  initial  paymen~  imposed  on  the  second 
operator alone for its concession to operate a GSM 
network  in  Italy  constitutes . an  infringement  of 
Ardde 90  (l) of  the  Treaty,  fead  in  conjunction 
with  Article  86,  · 
HAS  ADOPTBD  THIS  DECISION : 
Artkle 1 
Italy shall  take  the steps  necessary to  abolish  the distor-
tion· of  competition  resultiDg  frOm  the  initial  payment 
imposed  on Omnitel  Pronto  Italia  and  to  secure  equal 
conditions  for· operators  of  GSM  radiotelephony  on  the 
Italian market at the latest by 1 January 1996, by means 
of  the  following : 
~  a  requirement  that  Telecom  Italia  Mobile  make  an 
identical  payment,  or 
- the  adoption, ·after  receiving  the  agreement  of the 
Commission,  of  Cf?rrective  measures  equivalent  in 
economic terms to the  payment made by the second 
operator. 
The measures  definitively  adopted  may  not impair  the 
competition created by the licensing of the second GSM 
operator on 2· December  1.994. 
Artidl 2 
Italy shall intorm the  Commission within  three months 
of notification of this Decision of the steps it has taken to 
comply therewith. 
Artkl1 J 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Italian  Republic. 
Done at  Brussels,  4  October  1.99 S. 
For  th1  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MID.T  : 
M~mb~r ofthl Commission 
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II 
~as  whose publ·ication  is  nttt  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION: DECISlON 
of 27. November 19.96 
concerning the additional implementation periods requested by Ireland for the 
implementation of Commission Pirectives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as regards 
full  competition in the telecomntunications. markets 
(Only the  English  text is  authentic) 
(Text with EEA  relnance) 
(97  /114/EC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
C~mmunity, 
Having  regard  to  the Agreement establishing the  Euro-
pean ·Economic Area,  · 
Having regard  to  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  of 
28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecom-
munications  services (11 as  l~t  amended  by  Directive 
96/19/EC (2),  and  in  particular Article  2  (2)  thereof, 
Having  regard  to  Commission  Directive  96/2/EC of  16 
January  1996  amending  Directive  90/388/EBC  with 
regard .to mobile and personal communications (3),  and in 
particulu Article  4  thereof, 
Having  given  notice (4)  to  interested  parties  to  submit 
their comments in accordance with Article 2 (2) of Direc-
tive  90/388/BBC  and Article  .4  of  Directive  96/2/BC, 
~
OJ No  L  1.92,  24.  7.  1.9.90,  p.  10. 
OJ  No  L 74,  22.  3.  1996,  p.  13. 
.OJ  No  L  20,  26.  1.  19.96,  p.  59. 
OJ  No  C  16.9,  13.  6.  1.9.96,  p.  S. 
Whereas: 
A. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I. The  Irish request 
(1)  The  Irish  Government  has,  by  letter  of  1  S May 
1996, requested additional implementation periods: 
- unti.l  1 January 2000, regarding the abolition of 
the  exclusive  rights  cunendy  granted  to 
Telecom  Eireann  as  regards  the  provision  of 
voice  telephony  and  the  underlying  network 
infrastructure,  instead  of  1  january  1.9.98  as 
provided  in  Article  2  (2)  of  Di~ctive 
· 90/388/EBC, 
- until  1  July  19.99,  regarding  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on  the  provision  of  already  liber-
alized  telecommunications  services  on: 
(a)  networks established by the provider of the 
telecommunications  service, 
(b)  infrastructures provided by third parties, and 
(c)  the sharing of networks, other facilities  and 
sites, 
instead of 1 July 1.996  as  provided in Article 2 
(2)  of  Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC, 
I 
- until 1 January 2000, regarding the direct inter-
con~ection  of  mobile  telecommunications 
networks, instead of immediately as provided in 
Article  3d of  Directive  90/388/EBC. 
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This  request  is  in  line  with  Council  resolutions 
93/C213/01  of 22 July 1993 (1)  and 94/C379/03  of 
22 December  1994 (Z). 
(2)  The  Irish  Government  considers  these  additional 
implementation periods necessary for the following 
reasons: 
2.1.  Ireland has  been  carrying out major develop-
ment  of  the  telecommunications  networks; 
this  has  ~equired  significant  capital  invest-
ment, involving high levels  of debt; Telecom 
Eireann has been constrained in its  ability to 
achieve  the  necessary  structural  adjustments, 
particularly  of  tariffs,  because  of  those  high 
debt levels,  the  high  cost  of  delivering  tele-
communications  services  in  Ireland  and 
Telecom  Eireann's  high  cost-structure. 
2.2.  Further structural adjustments are  required  in. · 
order to enable Telecom Eireann  to  function 
effectiVely  in a  fully  competitive  market,  but 
in  a  way  that  ensures  the  maintenance  of 
universal  service,  an  increase·  in  telephone 
density and reductions  in 'Telecom  Eireann'  s 
debt  and  cost  structure;  these  adjustments 
involve: 
(1)  further development of  Ireland's  telecom-
munications  networks, 
(2)  further  adjustment  of  Telecom  Bireann's 
tariff  structure, 
(3)  transformation  of  Telecom  Eireann,  in 
particular,  further  development  of  its 
products  and  services  for  the  home  and 
international  sectors,  restructuring its  cost 
base  and  completion  of  the  management 
of  its  change  into  a  market-driven  and 
customer-focused  organization. ' 
With the assistance  of a strategic partner this 
transformation  which  woulq ' otherwise  take 
more time could be achieved before 1 January 
2000.· 
2.3.  Liberalization of infrastructure significandy in 
advance  of  the  liberalization  of  voice  tele-
phony  would  enable  providers  of  liberalized 
services  to  erode Telecom Eireann's customer 
base. 
2.4.  In relation to mobile interconnection, freedom 
of interconnection by mobile operators would 
enable  them  to  bypass  the  Public  Switched 
Telephone  Network  (PSTN)  for  txunk  and 
r>  OJ No  C  213,  6.  8.  1.9.93,  p.  1.· 
(1)  OJ No  C  379,  31.  12.  1.9.94,  p.  4. 
international  traffic  and  furthennore  enable 
them to capture a significant share of Telecom 
Bireann's  international  call  traffic,  as  a  result 
of  which  Telecom  Bireann's  revenues  would 
be seriously reduced and the structural adjust-
ment programme  disrupted. 
2..5.  The  derogation  sought  will  not  impede  the 
development of competition in other areas  of 
the  telecommunications sector  in  Ireland. 
(3)  The Irish Government provided a detailed descrip-
tion regarding the capital investments required for 
the  develop~ent of the  network,  the  tariff  rebal-
ancing  planned,  as  well  as  the  restructuring  of 
Telecom  Bireann  in · the annex to  its  letter of  1  S 
May  1996. 
(4)  T!,e  Irish Government announced that, if this de-
rogation  was  granted, it would in any case  imple-
ment  the  amendments  made  to  Directive 
90/388/EEC by Directive 96/19/BC in national law 
according  to  the  following  time ·table: 
(S) 
- fourth  quarter  1996:  establishment  on  a  fully 
stand-alone basis of a telecommunications regu-
latory authority with  appropriate  arrangements 
for  industry funding, 
- first  quarter  1998:  publication  of  proposed 
legislative  changes  to  implement full  competi-
tion  and  remove  all  restrictions  by  1 january 
2000, including proposals for  funding universal 
services, 
- third  quarter  1998:  target  for  achievement  of 
legislative  changes, 
- fourth  quarter  1998:  communication  to  the 
Commission  of  draft  licences  for  voice  tele-
phony and/or underlying network  providers, 
- first  quarter  1999:  publication  of  licensing 
conditions for  aU  services  and of interconnec-
tion  charges  as  appropriate  in  accordance  in 
both  cases  with  relevant  BU  Directives, 
-July-December  1999:  award  ·of  licences  and 
amendment  of  existing  licences  to  enable 
competitive  provision  of  voice  telephony  and 
unrestricted  interconnection  of  mobile 
networks  from  1 January 2000. 
The  request  wu  delivered  to . the  Commission 
services  on  Wednesday 1  S May  1996. 
II.  The comments received 
Fourteen undertakings as well as the Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions provided comments following the 
notice  published by the Commission on  13  June 
1996. 
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(6)  According  to  these  comments: 
- the  Irish  authorities  have  not established  that 
the existing network is, in fact,  so undeveloped 
that they require any derogation period before 
full liberalization. They have failed to satisfy the 
criteria established in Directive 90/388/EEC as 
amended,  and  in Article  2  (2)  thereof in  par-
ticular. A modem basic network is now in place 
and Telecom  Eireann'  s  real  concern  is  not to 
shorten  waiting  lists  but rather  to  'encourage' 
demand,  , 
- although  ·  Ireland's  telecommunications 
networks  have  been  less  developed than  those 
of  some  other  EU  Member  States,  much 
progress  has been made in recent years. Some 
of this progress has been thanks to EU funding 
(in  the order of ECU 65  to  70  million for the 
period  1989  to  1999).  Telecom  Eireann  has 
been·  successfully  increasing  penetration: 
between  1 April  1994 and 31  March  1995 line 
connections increased by 6 % which represents 
a  growth  of  new line  connections  of 22%, 
- Telecom  Eireann's call  tariffs  have  reduced.'by 
34 % in real terms between  1986 to  1994; total 
traffic has increased by 7,4 % in 1994 to 1995, 
- the commitments to  tariff restructuring and to 
improving Telecom Eireann'  s cost structure are 
. so vague and general that they lack credibility, 
- the  arguments  put  forward  in  the  application 
relating  to  Telecom  Eireann,  particularly  its 
indebtness, are gready exaggerated and seriously 
misleading. The latest annual accounts for  that 
company reveal  that its financial  position is  in 
many respects  surprisingly  he~lthy, 
- as regards the high cost of delivering services in 
Ireland,  any  competing  operator  would  be 
affected  by such  costs, 
- the  projected  investments of Telecom  Eireann 
to  complete  universal  telephone  c~verage (i.e. 
an  increase  of  investment  by  approximately 
43 %)  are  over  estimated.  These  investments 
cannot be considered as  necessary before liber-
alization, since Ireland concedes it already has a 
modem network, including Integrated Services 
Digital Network (ISDN) capabilities, which is as 
developed  as  the  networks  of  other  telecom-
munications  organizations  in  Europe.  These 
investments would aim at the establishment of 
nationwide  fibre-optic  Synchronous  Digital 
Hierarchy (SOH)  networks,  implementation  of 
non-hierarchical networks and establishment of 
low and high bandwidth copper access systems. 
To date  none of the other EU countries  have 
networks meeting such requirements. Moreover, 
some  doubts  were  cast  on  the  extent  of  the 
universal  service  .  obligation  entrusted  to 
Telecom Eireann. According to  the Irish Tele-
communications Act,- Telecom Eireann is only 
obliged  to  satisfy  user  needs  subject  to  its 
appreciation  that such requests  are  'reasonably 
practicable'.  The  fact  that  Telecom  Eireann 
would  want  to  improve  the  level  of  the  tele-
communications  services  it  provides  results 
from  management  decisions  and  not  from  a 
State  measUre, 
- the  introduction  of a  new partner,  PTT Tele-
comtrelia, for Telecom Eireann, announced. in 
June, should not be allowed to  delay the intro-
duction  of competition, 
- derogations  would sanction Telecom  Eireann's 
continuing  dominance  in  the  Irish  telecom-
munications  market,  inereasing  the  danger  of 
abuse  of  such  dominance.  Telecom  Eireann 
would actually discriminate against providers of 
liberalized  services  as  regards  for  example 
volume  discounts  that  are  granted  to  other 
customers with a comparable volume of traffic; 
it  would,  moreover,  underinvest  in  street 
payphones  and  delay  the .provision  of  com-
peting companies, 
- a  market  in  which  operators  are  able  to 
construct  alternative  networks  and  provide 
value-added and data transmission services, will 
create  a  stable  environment ·which  will  give 
incentive to Telecom Eireann to restructure its 
operations  and  complete  its  transition  ~to  a 
market-driven  and  customer-focused  orginiza-
tion  quickly and effectively. This environment 
will  ensure  that Telecom  Bireann's voice  tele-
phony  revenue  s~ama  are  protected,  and 
consequendy that it can service its debt require-
ments  fully.  When  full  liberalization  takes 
place, operators will be able to respond quickly 
to consumer needs as competing infrastructures 
will  already have  been developed, 
- the  derogation  on  the  use  of alternative  infra-
structure  requested  would  in  particular  hurt 
cross-border  traffic  between  Northern  Ireland 
and  Ireland.  The  derogation  sought  would 
prevent  operators  in  Northern  Ireland  from 
being able to maintain margins on cross-border 
data  services  and  closed  user groups  calls, 
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- the Irish Congress of Trade Unions fears  that if 
Telecom  Bireann  is  not ensured sufficient rev-
enues  to  sustain  the  unavoidable · increasing 
level of investments, the reducing of tariffs and 
remuneration of shareholders, the Irish Govern-
ment  will  be  faced  with  huge  onsoing addi-
tional costs. This Would damage the prospect of 
a new social  partnership agreement coming up 
for  nesotiation  in  December  and  could,  as  i 
consequence, lead to  the Union's withdrawal of 
cooperation  with  the  liberalization  process  in 
this  crucial  strategic  industry. 
(7)  By  letter  dated  2.9  July  1.9.96,  the  Commission 
transmitted  to  the  Irish  authorities  the  1  S 
comments  of  these  third  parties,  received  on  the 
occasion  of  the  publication  of  the  <;:ommission's 
notice  of  13  June  1.9.9~ opening the  procedure. 
In  response  to  the abovementioned comments the 
Irish  authorities  by  letter  of  1.9  September  1.9.96 
stated  in11r alia that:  - · 
- Telecom  Bireann  iS  and  will  continue  to  be 
subject  to  all  the  normal  European  and  Irish 
competition  rules  and  any aggrieved  party  has 
available  the  normal  remedies·  which  apply. 
Any  suggestion  that a  derogation  would  alter 
this  is  incorrect, 
- Telecom  Bireann's  debt  position,  while  it  has 
~proved, is still a serious constraint. The ratio 
of total debt to  total equity (Searing) at the .end 
of  the  fiscal  year  1.9951.96  was  139,.9  for 
Telecom Eireann compared to, for example 8,9 
for  British  Telecom,  124,3  for  Telef6nica  de 
Espafia,  65,0  for  Portugal  Telecom,  39,4  for. 
OTE,  59  for  France  Telecom,  242,5  for 
Belgacom,  and  405,9  for  Deutsche  Telekom, 
- BSA  T  Digifone  would  be  at  a  particular  ad-
.  vantage if it could run services other than GSM 
over  its  own  infrastructure, 
- telephone  penetration  rates  are  a  simple 
measure of network development and universal 
service  and  these  are  clearly  well  behind  BU 
averqes. This gap cannot be  completely elim-
inated before the year 2000. The gap is  p$tticu-
larly  evident  outside  the  main  urban  areas 
where  penetration  rates  remain . low  and  the 
. local  access  network,  traditionally  the  most 
costly  part  of  the  network  to  develop,  will 
require significant upgrading to enable connec-· 
tion  and  adequate  quility of  service, 
(8) 
- in the year ended 4 April  1996, total  operating 
costs  represented  SS %  of  total  revenue.  Staff 
cOsts  in  tum  represented  well  over  50 %  of 
operating costs. The main focus  of cost  reduc-
tion  is  on  reducing  the  numbers  of  staff 
employed  by  the  company.  These  staff 
. severance schemes must be voluntary in nature 
and  accordingly . can  only  be  implemented 
successfully  over  · a  period  of  years.  The 
company is also  actively examining the  possib-
ility  of  outsourcing  in  a number of  areas  but 
this  must be  managed carefully in  conjunction 
with  staff  reduction  programmes.  For  that 
reuon a  period  of  thre~ years  is  required  to 
. make  the  necessary  changes  in  the  cost  struc-
ture, 
- connection  and  rental  are  loss-making  for 
Telecom Eireann. This  needs  to  be  tackled on 
. two fronts: revenue increase and cost reduction, 
- apart  from  the  average  price  levels  for  rentals 
and  calls,  the  structure  of  prices  needs  to  be 
revised. Two examples of possible change are: 
(i) rental  reductions  for  low-income  or  low-
calling-rate  users, 
(ii) introduction  of  duration-based  charges  with 
no  minimum  fee,  or  low  initial  charge.  · 
In both cases  time is needed to alter structures  .... 
to  a more  market-oriented  system. 
III.  Application of the Article .90 (2) exception 
Article  90  (2)  provides  that undertakings entrusted 
with  the operation of services of general economic 
interest are  to  be  subject  to  the rules· on  competi-
tion in  so  far as the· applicition of such Nles does 
not obstruct the performance, in law or in  fact,  of 
. the  p&rPcular tasks assigned to  them. The applica-
tion  of  this  provision  in  the  telecommunications 
sector has been specified ·in Directive 90/388/EEC. 
Under  this  Directive,  u  amended  by  Directives 
96/2/BC  and  96/19/BC,  the  Commission  shall 
pnt, on  request,  to  a number of  Member States 
the  right.  to  maintain  during  additional  time 
periods the exclusive rights granted to undertakinBS 
to which they entrust the provision of a public tele-
communications  network  and  telecommunications 
services,  as  well  as  restrictions  on competition,  in 
so far as these measures are necessary to ensure the 
perfonnance of the  particular tasks assigned to  the 
undertakings  benefiting  from  exclusive  rights. 
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(9)  As regards the provision of public telecommunica-
tions  services  and  netwOrks,  it  appears  that 
Telecom Bireann is· a telecommunication organiza-
tion within  the meaning of Article  1 of  Directi~e 
90/388/EEC, since it is entrusted with a seivice of 
general  economic interest pursuant to  Section  14 
(1)  of  the  Irish  Postal  and  Teleco.mmunications 
Services  Act of  1983,  requiring it: 
(a)  to  provide  a  national  telecommunications 
service within the State and between  the State 
and  places  outside  the  State, 
(b)  to  meet the  industrial,· commercial,  social  and 
household needs of the State for comprehensive 
and efficient  telecommunications  servi~es and, 
so  far  as  the  company  considers  reason~:bly 
practicable, to satisfy all reasonable demands for 
such  services  throughout  the  State, .and 
(c)  to  provide  such consultancy, advisory,  training 
and contract service inside and outside· the State 
as  the  company thinks  fit. 
(10)  This provision in fact  permits Telecom  Bireann  to 
refuse  to  provide  telecommunications  services 
where it is not reasonably practicable i.e. where it is 
not reasonably ·capable  of being done  or put into 
effect.  According .  to  the  Irish  Government,  this 
exception  to  the general duty imposed by Section 
14  (1)  would  have  nevertheless  been  interpreted 
narrowly. Also  relev!lnt  is Section  IS (1)  (a)  of the . 
Act which imposes an  obligation on  the company 
to  provide  these  services  at  minimal  charges. 
(11)  Telecom Bireann operates on the basis that it shall 
meet all  reasonable  requests  for  telephone  service 
'within standard delivery terms, irrespective of loca-
tion. In addition, the charges for connection to  the 
telephone network, rental charges and call  charges 
are  levied  on  the  same  basis  nationally.  Telecom 
Eireann  also  provides  and  maintains  uneconomic 
public  pay  phones  and  provides  access  to  emer-
gency services  without charge  to  the caller. These 
tasks  must  be  implemented  irrespective  of  the 
specific situations or the degree of economic prof-
itability of  each  individual  operation. 
(12)  The question which falls  to be considered is there-
fore  the  extent to  which  the requested  temporary 
exclusion  of all  competition from  other economic 
operators is  necessary in order to  allow  the holder 
of  the  exclusive  right  to  continue  performing  its 
task of general interest and in particular to have the 
bene~t of  economically  acceptable  conditions. 
(13)  The  main  starting point for  such  an  examination 
must be the premise that the obligation on the part 
of  the  undertaking  entrusted  with  that  task  to 
perform  its  services  in  conditions  of  economic 
equilibrium presupposes that it will  be  possible  to 
offset  less  profitable  sectors  against  the  profitable 
sectors and hence justifies a restriction of competi-
tion  from  individual  undertakings  where  the 
economically  profitable  sectors  are  concerned. 
(14)  Indeed,  to  authorize  individual  undertakings  to 
compete with  the holder of the exclusive rights in 
the sectors  of their choice corresponding to  those 
rights would make it possible for them to concen-
trate on the economically profitable operations and 
to  offer  more  advantageous  tariffs  than  those 
adopted by the holders of the exclusive rights since, 
unlike the latter, they are not bound for economic 
reasons  to  offset  losses  in the unprofitable sectors 
against  profits  in  the  more  profitable  sectors. 
(15)  However,  the  restrictions ·on  competition  are  not 
justified as regards specific services dissociable from 
the  service  of  general  interest  - i.e.  voice  tele-
phony - which  meet special  needs  of  economic 
operators in so far as such specific services, by their 
nature  and  the  conditions  in  which  they  are 
offered, such as the· geographical area in which they 
are  provided,  do  not  compromise  the  economic 
equilibrium  of  the  service  of  general  economic 
interest  performed  by ·the  holder of  the  exclusive 
right. 
(16)  Some  comments  mention  that  in  practice  new 
entrants could also  contribute to  the relevant tasks 
of  general  economic  interest.  In  the  short  term, 
however, Telecom  Eireann will  continue to  be the 
only  undertaking  able  to  deliver  a  universal  tele~ 
phone service  to residential users in scarcely popu-
lated  areas.  For  this  reason,  the  Commission 
examined, regarding each of the additional imple-
mentation  periods  requested,. whether their grant-
ing  is  necessary  to  allow  Telecom  Eireann  to 
perform its  task  of general interest and to have  the 
benefit  of  economically  acceptable  conditions. 
B.  LEGAL  ASSESSMENT 
I.  Request for an additional implementation 
period  regarding  voice  telephony  and 
underlying network infrastructure 
Assessment  of the  impaa of the  removal  of the 
exclusiw  rights  currently  granted  to  Telecom 
Eireann 
(17)  Voice telephony is defined in Article 1 of Directive 
90/388/EEC. The extent of  this  service  has  been 
specified  in  the  Commission's  communication 
95/C27S/02  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
Council  on  the  status  and  implementation  of 
Directive  90/388/EBC  on  competition  in  the 
I  42 • 
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mark~ts for telecommunications serviees (1)  and in 
correspondence between  the Commission and the 
Member States. Since the reservation  of voice  tele-
phony services  is  an exception to  the general ·  Nle 
of  competition, it must be  interpreted  nattOwly  . 
(18)  Pursuant to the general principle of proportionality, 
any additional implementation period granted must 
be  strictly  proportional  to  what  is  necessary  to 
achieve  the  necessary  structural  adjustment, 
mentioned by the Irish Government, with a view to 
the introduction  of full  competition,  i.e.: 
(i)  further development of Telecom Eireann's tele-
communications  networks;  ·  · 
(ii)  further adjustment of Telecom Eireann's tariff 
structure; 
(iii)  transformation  of Telecom  Eireann,  in  patti-. 
cular,  further  development  of  its  products, 
restructuring of its cost base and completion of 
the management of its change into a market-
driven  and customer-focused  organization. 
{lSI)  The  purpose  of  the  exclusive.  rights  granted  to 
Telecom  Eireann  was  to  ensure  the  provision  of 
universal voice  telephony and the establishment of 
a  public  telecommunications  network.  It  allowed 
the  latter not only to  finance  more cheaply - it 
could borrow under State guarantee and 2% of its 
fiscal  assetS were financed by grants from the Euro-
pean  Regional  Development  Fund  - important 
investment in the digitalization of its network, but 
also  to  maintain  higher tariffs  and a less  efficient 
cost structure - in particular due to overstaffing -
than  it would  in  a  competitive  environment.  & 
one of the  comments f) points out, •the  legacy of 
over-staffing specifically in the flagged  age  group 
35  to  44  was  created  by  Telecom  Bireann  in 
carrying out their modernization propmme in the 
early  1980s  employing  in-house  staff  as  apinst 
having  the  work  done  by  private  contractors'. 
(20)  This  shows  that  exclusive  rights  are  not  an 
adequate means to further the development of the 
telecommunications  network.  In  its  resolution  of 
22 july 1993,  the Council in this regard acknow-
ledged  that  the  maintenance  of  these  exclusive 
rights  should  be  terminated· by  1  January  1998, 
(') OJ No  C  215,  20.  10.  1995, ..2:. 2. 
M  COin  and  card  technoloJY  (CCI).  p.  4. 
with  a transitional  period for  those Member States 
requiring additional  time  to  implement structural 
adjuttments.  · ·  . 
(21)  "I?e  required  structural  adjustments  must  be 
examined  in  the  light  of  the  foll~wing circum-
stances: 
-·  the  need  to  further  rebalance  tariffs, 
- the  low  telephone  density, 
- the  high  debt  and  cost  structure  of  Telecom 
Eireann. 
(a)  Rebalancing of  tariffs 
(22)  Ireland states that since 1.990 all charges (excluding 
VAT  and  discounts)  including  rentals  and  local 
calls have fallen significandy in real  tenns. Despite 
this  achievement,  -Ireland  claims  that  Telecom 
Eifeann still has a relatively high level of telephone 
prices and that certain prices are still out of align-
ment with costs. Telecom Eireann has Set an objec-
tive of achieving price levels in the lowest quartile 
of  OECD countries  by 2000.  Rebalancing  by  ad-
justing charges to bring prices closer still to under-
lying  costs· is  still  required  also  to  achieve  this 
objective. Ireland is  proceeding with a gradual and 
flexible  approach to tariff rebalancing, while main-
taining safeguards for  consumers in terms of price 
and  quality  of  service.  Due  to  the  limits  of  the 
proposed price-cap regime, Telecom Eireann needs 
about  five  years  to  implement  the  increases  of 
reduced-rate local calls, i.e. from  1996 to 2000. On 
the  basis  of the  most likely  forecasts,  Ireland  be-
lieves  that Telecom Eireann would be in  a strong 
enough position to .survive liberalization in 2000. 
(23)  The following  table,  bued on information  in the 
Commission's  possession (3),  comparing  certain 
telephone tariffs of Telecom ~ireann and the equi-
valent  figures  for  an  operator which  has  already 
rebalanced its tariffs (
4~ supports the arguments of 
the  Irish  Government: 
p)  Tarifica scudy implemen~  for European Commission - DG 
XUI. 
(4)  A direct  comparison  of  the  telephony  tariffs  of  Telecom 
Bimnn with the Community avetate (which  is  noc a weight-
ed  average)  would  noc  be  apE»ro~nate, given  thac  the  cariff 
smactures  of  the  1  S Commwucy TO's  are  still  widely  diver-
gent and in addition, given  that they are currendy in  the  pro-
cess  of  rebalancing  tariffs. 
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Tariffs  in  ecu  on  1 January  1996 
Bi-monthly rental 
Local  calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes 
(Peale  hours) 
Trunk calls,  resp.  3/10  minutes 
Inua  EC,  resp.  3/10  minutes 
(j Social  payments  are  provided  to  low-income  customers 
(24)  Given  that  due  to  technical  progress  in  the 
network,  cost  is  increasingly  less  dependent  on 
distance,  cost  orientation  of  tariffs  means  as  a 
general  rule  that  prices  are  adjusted  such  that 
revenues  are  rebalanced  with  costs,  i.e.: 
- connection  and  rental  revenues  cover  fixed 
costs  (plus  a standard  margin), 
· - local call  revenues cover local call  costs (plus a 
standard  margin), 
- trunk  call  revenues  cover  ~nk calls  (plus  a 
standard  margin), 
- international  call  revenues  cover  international 
call  costs  (plus  a  standard  margin). 
Consequently  · telecommunications  organizations 
must raise  bi-monthly rental  and local  calls  (or at 
least not decrease  these charges) and reduce  tariffs 
for  long distance calls. Telecom Eireann  has  made 
some  progress  on  rebalancing  local  charges,  but 
needs additional  time to  decrease  tnlflk and  inter-
national  charges. 
(2S)  According to  one comment (1),  the overall  level  of 
the  tariffs  for  the  provision  of telecommunications 
services  is  not relevant  in  assessing  the  extent  to 
which  tariff  rebalanCing  has  been  achieved.  But 
even  using  the  methodology  proposed  in  this 
comment, it still appears that in Denmark and the 
Netherlands, which decided to liberalize voice  tele-
phony  in  advance  of  1 January  1998,  imbalance 
between,  on  the  one  hand,  rental  and  local  call 
tariffs  and,  on  the  other hand,  long distance  and 
international calls  is  much further reduced than  in 
Ireland. 




Telecom  British  OiHerence 
Eimnn  Telecom 
TE/BT 
•'  (BT•lOO) 
13,s7(j  1.9.53  151,4 
0,14- 0,14  0,06- 0,1.9  233.3.- 73,7 
0,14- O.S6  0,14- 0,47  100  -=.  11.9,1 
1,12- 3,37  0,35- 1,16  320  - 290,5 
1,80- 6,00  1.13  -:- 4,31  139,5  - 139,2 
It is argued in the same comment that a high level 
of  tariffs  may indeed result from  specific  circum-
stances,  such  as  a very. low  density  of  population 
· which renders the provision of telecommunications 
services  proportionately  more  expensive,  when 
calculated  pro  capita.  This  might  be  the  case. 
However,  BT  and  MCL  provide  voice  telephony 
from  the UK to  Ireland at prices which can be less 
than hill those  of Telecom  Eireann (1).  It is  there-
fore  reasonable  to  expect  that  if  voice  telephony 
. were  liberalized immediately; amongst others these 
companies  would  - at  least  in  certain  areas  of 
Ireland - provide voice  telephony at tariffs which 
are significantly lower (at least as  regards  trunk and 
international c8lls)  than those  of Telecom  Eireann 
and thus  either force  the  latter  to  reduce  dramat-
ically  its  tariffs  in  the  relevant  market  segments 
which are the most profitable, or lose subscribers to 
the  new  entrants. 
The  continuation  of  the  gradual  approach  en-
visaged  by · Ireland  for  further  tariff  rebalancing 
seems therefore justified, in view of the rebalancing 
(bi-monthly  rental  and  local  charges)  already 
achieved  in  1.993  and  the  firm  comrnitmeq,ts  to 
complete the process  by reducing trunk and  inter-
national  tariffs  by  the  year  2000.  Moreover,  to 
accelerate  the  process  of rebalancing  tariffs  would 
pose  related  political  problems since,  in  this case, 
an  increase  in  local  communication  tariffs  would 
be  necessary:. 
(b)  Telephone density 
Telecom  Eireann  has  achieved  one  of  the  fastest 
telephone  penetration growths .  in  the  EU  over the 
last five years. Toc:fay, Ireland nevertheless still has a 
(Z)  m., P·  8. 
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relatively low telephone penetration in comparison 
with  most  of  the  EU  Member  States.  Some 
comments are  rightly emphasizing that telephone 
penetration would improve as  a result of  competi-
tion. It may nevertheless be assumed that in a first 
stage  new entrants in  the  market will  concentrate 
ma:nly en  high  users  to  acquire  sufficient profit-
ability before foc:using on new users. The argument 
of  the  Irish  Government  that  enabling  Telecom 
Eireann to  pursue its development programmes to 
further improve telephone  density will  benefit the 
public  se>!ms  therefore  acceptable,  even  if  the 
additional  time  given  to  Telecom  Eireann  will 
enabl!! it to strengthen its  position by improving its 
efficiency.  This  improvement  will  to  a  certain 
extent  also  benefit  future  new  entrants  since  the 
more users  connected to  the public telecommuni-
cations networks,  the more calls  will  be generated 
both for  the incumbent and for the new entrants. 
(29)  In  fact,  the  figures  provided by the  Irish  Govern-
ment also  show  that although telephone  penetra-
tion  is  still  low  in  Ireland,  remaining demand is 
also  limited.  It appears  in  particular  that waiting 
lists have dramatically decreased and this, notwith-
standing  State  social  welfare  payments  involving 
financial  support  for  telephone  rental  and  call 
charges for qualifying pensioners. Currently one in 
eight of all customers is already on such a scheme. 
(30)  The  development  programmes  with  a  view  to 
increasing penetration can therefore  justify a  con-
tinuation  of  the  current  exclusive  privilege  of 
Telecom  Eireann  for  a  limited  duration.  Taking 
into  account  a  continuation  of  the  past  yearly 
increase  of  Telecom  Eireann's  density  of  2% 
during the coming years in 1999, Telecom Eireann 
would reach the  penetration currently achieved in 
Member States, such as  Italy or Belgium, which do 
not qualify for  additional implementation periods. 
A  longer additional  implementation period would 
not be  justified,  even  if  the  increase  of  Telecom 
Eireann's  density  slows  down  during  the  coming 
years. As  mentioned, it is indeed possible  that, due 
to  a  combination  of  amongst  others  demo-
graphic (1)  and economic factors specific to  ~reland, 
there is  actually  no demand for  further  telephone 
lines by households. Further market growth would 
{1)  Household size  in  Ireland  is,  according to  the  Irish  request, 
3,2 people, e.g.  larger  than in  most other EU  Member States. 
This  reduces  the  potential  for  additional  residential  penetra-
tion.  · 
then depend on the offer of new services, and the 
growth  of business  customers,  which can  best be 
accelerated by the introduction of competition and 
therefore  would  not  justify  any  additional  imple-
mentation  period. 
(c)  Debt and  cost structure 
(31)  Ireland  emphasizes  two  liabilities  of  Telecom 
Eireann  in  a  future  competitive  environment:  its 
low productivity (one employee for 99 lines) and its 
level  of  debt (£  Irl  862 million  at  end  of  March 
1995  giving  a  debt/equity  ratio  of  1,9).  Between 
1985 and 1995, Telecom Eireann had already signi-
ficantly  improved  productivity,  which  is  reflected 
in the reduction of its staff costs from 42% of its 
turnover to 30 %. Staff numbers have been reduced 
from  18  000  to  under  12 000. A  low  number of 
lines per employee seems, nevertheless, a necessary 
result  of  the  low  population  density  in  Ireland. 
International  comparisons  show that  operators  in 
countries  with  low  population  density  retain  a 
smaller  number of  lines  per employee  even  after 
competition is  introduced and where digitalization 
is  very  advanced.  The  planned  increase  of  tele-: 
phone  density  over  the  next  years  will  increase 
productivity  expressed  in  numbers  of  lines  per 
employee  before  1999  up  to  the  level  currently 
achieved in  Finland. Overstaffing is  nevertheless a 
common  feature  of  telecommunications  organiza-
tions at the eve of their privatization. The Commis-
sion,  however,  considers  that  it  could  not  justify 
any  additional  implementation  period  extending 
after  1  January  1999. 
(32}  As  regards  the debt structure, the  figures  provided 
by the Irish Government show that, since 1993, the 
financial  situation  of  Telecom  Eireann  has 
improved  significantly.  The  submission  states 
Telecom Eireann's debt at the end of the financial 
year 1995/1996 as £ Irl 700  million giving a debt/ 
equity ratio of 1,4. Moreover, Telecom Eireann will 
receive a total of £ Irl 220  million of the proceeds 
of  the  sale.  £  Irl  150  million  will  be  injected on 
closing  and  the  balance  (£  Irl  70  million)  in 
approximately three years'  time on exercise  of the 
option by  the strategic  partners or public offering. 
The balance of the funds over and above  this £ Irl 
220  million will be used by the State  to  reduce its 
liability  to  the  pension  fund.  This  will  enable 
Telecom Eireann to use its own resources to further 
reduce  its debt until the end of  1998. At this date 
the  debt/equity ratio of Telecom Eireann will thus 
not be out of line with those of operators in coun-
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tries which. will  open their market to  competition, 
for  example  the  debt/equity  ratios  of  Deutsche 
Telekom  and Belgacom  .in  1995  were (1)  respecti-
vely  45  and  1  ,4.  Consequently,  the  debt  of 
Telecom  Eireann  could  not  justify  an  additional 
implementation  period  extending over  1998. 
Effect  on  trade 
(33)  The aim of the postponement of the liberalization 
of voice  telephony is  to  delay  the  entry  of  com-
.Peting  carriers  in  the  voice  telephony  market. 
Mor~over, as pointed out by a comment  (2), this will 
affect  trade  since  large  international  players 
including  AT&T,  BT,  C&.W,  Global  One/Sprint 
and  France  Telecom  are  already  present  or  in·-
terested  in  Ireland. The  emergence  of  alternative 
Irish carriers will  also  be delayed, which will  even-
tually  reduce  its  possibilities  to  expand  outside 
Ireland, given  that in the mean time new entrants 
will  enjoy  a  two-year  head  start  in  the  other 
Member States  which  will  liperalize  their  markets 
by  1 January  1998. · 
(34)  Although  the granting of  a  derogation  to  Ireland 
would foreclose  the telecommunications market in 
Ireland for two years, the negative effect on trade in 
the  Community will  be  reduced  due  to: 
- the  limited  size  of  the  Irish  telecommunica-
tions market in  comparison to the Community 
market.  One· could  expect  indeed  that  on  1 
January 1998, massive  investments will  mainly 
occur  in  the  m·ore  developed  Member  States, 
such  as  Germany,  the  Netherlands and France 
where  a higher return on investment might be 
expected, 
- the  duration  of  the .derogation  requested:  the 
establishment of  new  public  telephony  opera-
tors  requires  a  preparation  of  many  months. 
The  harm  done  to  potential  investors  by  an 
additional implementation period of 24 months 
will  be  limited if,  in  the  mean  time,  they can 
already plan· investments, so as to be ready to be 
operational  ~n advance  of  1  Janu~ry 2000. 
(35)  Such effect will further be  reduced in the following 
circumstances: 
- Telecom Eireann is  not expanding its operation 
in  Member States  which  have  liberalized  their 
markets.  If  this  were  the  case,  the  derogation 
enabling Telecom  Eireann  to  maintain  higher 
prices on its domestic market ·could be used not 
only  to  achieve  the  necessary  adjustments  but 
also  to  cross-subsidize  operations  in  foreign 
(')  Cable  &  Wireless,  p.  4. 
(~)  Esat  Telecom,  p.  13. 
markets. This would obviously distort competi-
tion  at  the  expense  of the incumbents and of· 
· other  new  entrants  in  the  relevant  Member 
States  and  would  be  against  the  Community 
interest.  In  this  regard,  any  involvement  of 
Telecom Eireann alongside its strategic partners 
P1T  Telecom  and  Telia,  or  Unisource,  in 
investments outside Ireland should, during the 
additional  time  period,  be  achieved  in a  fully 
transparent way and at market conditions. This 
should be reviewed by an independent auditor, 
- the  Irish  Government  publishes  the  licensing 
conditions one year in advance  of full  liberali-
zation and ensures that Telecom Eireann publi-
shes in  parallel  the interconnection conditions 
to  be  applied  to  new  entrants, 
- the additional implementation period regarding 
the  use  of  own/alternative  infrastructures  is 
reduced as  mentioned below. This would allow 
potential  new entrants  to  operate  and  provide 
already liberalized  telecommunications services 
on  such  networks  in  preparation  for  full 
competition, and in particular to  provide voice 
services  to  corporate  networks  and closed  user 
groups  via  such  networks, 
- the Irish Government takes all measures neces-
sary  to  ensure  that Telecom  Eireann  does  not 
I:Qake  use  of  its  additional  statutory  protection 
to  extend  its  dominant  position  in  neighbou-
ring· or  ancillary  markets  such  as  the  public 
payphone  market  or  the  cable  TV industry, 
- without  prejudice  to  ·the  impact  assessment 
provided for in the third paragraph of Article 2 
of .Commission Directive 95/51/EC (l), the Irish 
Government  ensures,  in  the  short  term,  that 
Cablelink  is  managed  at  arm's  length  of 
Telecom  Eireann  as  long as  Telecom  Eireann 
remains  the  controlling shareholder. 
Conclusion 
(36)  On the basis of the above assessment, the Commis-
sion  considers  that  the  negative  effects  on  trade 
which would result from  the .granting to  Ireland of 
an  additional  implementation  period  until  1 
January 2000 as  regards the abolition of the exclu-
.  sive  rights  currently  granted  to  Telecom  Eireann 
for  the  provision  of  voice  telephony  and  public 
network  infrastructure  instead of  1 January  1998, 
pursuant to  Article  2 (2)  of  Directive 90/388/EEC, 
are  not  incompatible  with  the  interest  of  the 
Community, in so  far  as  the circumstances set out 
above  are  fulfilled. 
(l)  OJ  No  L 256,  26.  10.  1995,  p.  49. l 
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II.  Request for an additional implementation 
period ~egarding the lifting of restrictions\ 
on the provision of already liberalized tele-
communications  services  on  own  and 
alternative infrastructure 
Assessment of the impact of the immediate lifting 
of restrictions 
(31)  Ireland states  that the lifting of  restrictions on the 
use  of altel'llative infrastructure before  1 July 1999 
would  enable  providers  of  liberalized  services  to 
offer customers speech calls and connect such calls 
with  the  public  network  in  both  directions. This 
practice would be indistinguishable from the provi-
sion  of  voice  telephony,  apart  from  minor  dif-
ferences  such  as  numbering  and  interconnection 
charges. As  a result  Irelan~ fe~ that there would 
be  effective  competition  for  voice  telephony, . 
despite  the  voice  telephony derogation. 
(38)  Ireland  adds  that such  Ufting  of  constraints  may 
also  cause  Telecom  Eireann  losses  of  revenue 
contribution from  leased lines. While not all  such 
revenue would be lost, there would be a substantial 
impact  in  that  those  consumers  remaining  as 
Telecom  Eireann's  customers  would  expect  lower 
prices. Ireland nevertheless acknowledges the need 
to  advance  the lifting of restrictions on alternative 
networks in order to ensure that future competitors 
can  build and  fund  networks  in sufficient time  to 
allow for  full  competition  by  the  time  voice  tele-
phony is liberalized. Given the small size of Ireland 
and  the  concentrated  nature  of  most  profitable 
customers,  Ireland considers  that the  liberalization 
of  alternative  infrastructures  six  months  before 
voice  telephony would not compromise the· ability 
of  new entrants  to  compete  fully  from  1 January 
2000. 
(39)  Comments  state  that  service-providers  would  be 
particularly affected if they were not allowed, as the 
second mobile operator is,  to  use  alternative  infra-
structures  to  save  significant  leased-lines  costs  for 
the  provision  of  their  services.  Conversely,  the 
second GSM operator mentions that, given that it is 
not  allowed  to  convey  third-party  traffic,  the  de-
cision  to  establish  a  fully  separate  backbone 
network  fnvolves  high  sunk  costs  and  substantial 
risks given that excess  capacity cannot be  leased to 
other  providers  of  already  liberalized  services.  If 
Ireland  was  granted  the  right  to  postpone  the 
liberalization  of  alternative  infrastructures,  this 
would  therefore  also  affect  competition  on  the 
GSM  markets. 
(40)  The argument that restrictions must be maintained 
on  ~e  provision of alternative network capacity for 
the  provision  of  alternative  infrastructures  to 
prevent authorized  providers of liberalized services 
to  circumvent  the  voice  telephony  monopoly 
cannot  be  accepted.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  as  the 
Commission  stated  in  its  Communication  on  the 
status  and  the  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC  on  competition  in  the  markets  for 
telecommunications  services,  such  'unofficial'  by 
pass will not occur to any significant extent without 
~eing noticed  by  the  relevant  Member  State.  A 
service which is offered to  the public must be,  ipso 
facto,  public  knowledge. 
In  particular,  given  that  any  commercial  offer 
would  normally involve  advertising (of  the services 
available)  or,  at  the  very  least.  issuing  price  lists, 
contracts  and  invoices,  such  by  pass  should  be 
evident  from  an  early  stage. 
New operators generally have shown that they will 
respect  the  voice  telephony  monopoly.  Service-
providers  do  not  want  to  take  the  risk  of  having 
their authorization  revoked  and not being able  to 
fulfil  their obligations  towards  their clients.  Many 
service-provider$ did therefore, before starting their 
services,  investigate  first  the  matter  with  the 
national regulatory authorities or with the Commis-
sion  services. 
(41)  The use of alternative networks for the provision of 
already  liberalized  services  will  not alter this  state 
of  affairs.  Alternative  networks  must  indeed  be 
considered  to  be  public  switched  telecommunica-
tions  networks  within  the  meaning  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC, where  they are  upgraded  to  switched 
networks  providing  voice  to  any  interested 
subscriber and  are  interconnected with  the  public 
switched telephone network of the telecommunica-
tions organizations. The termination points of such 
-alternative  networks should likewise be  considered 
as  tennination  points of public switched networks 
and voice  provided  to. the  public from  or to  such 
points would then become voice  telephony, which 
according to Article 2 of  that Directive can further 
be  reserved  to  the  telecommunications  organiza-
tion,  in  this  case  Telecom  Eireann. 
(42)  Moreover,  Ireland  itself  recognizes  that  by  pass 
would  be  distinguishable  from  legal  voice  tele-
phony,  due  to  differences  as  regards  numbering 
and interconnection charges. Since the amendment 
of Ireland's regulatory framework, and in  particular 
the new independent regulatory authority, will  only 
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be operational early next year,  one could, however, 
not exclude  that in  the  mean  time,  Ireland could 
face certain difficulties in the effective enforcement 
of  the voice  telephony monopoly. For this reason,. 
an  additional  implementation  period  until  the 
entry into force  of this  new regulatory framework, 
provided  it  is  clearly  delimited  in  time,  could  be 
justified. 
(43)  The second  argument  put  forward  by  Ireland,  i.e. 
tha.t  such  lifting  of  constraints  may  also  cause 
Telecom  Eireann  losses  of  revenue  contribution 
from leased lines can also not be accepted.· It is true 
that,  under  its  exclusive  privilege  to  . provide 
network  infrastructure,  Telecom  Eireann  is 
enjoying guaranteed revenues from the provision of 
leased  lines  to  end-users  and providers ·of  liberal-
ized  telecommunications  services·  (except  GSM 
mobile  telephony,  where ·  the  second  operator 
prefers to establish  its own  links).  However,  as  the 
Commission  stated  in  its  Green  Paper  on  the 
liberalization  of  telecommunications  infrastructure 
and cable television networks- part one- prin-
ciples  and  timetable  (COM(94)  440  final, 
25.10.1994),  Directive  92/44/EEC C)  requires  in 
particular  that  leased  lines  must  be  offered  on  a 
cost-oriented basis. Given this obligation and given 
that  Member  States  must  comply  with  it,  the 
opening  of  alternative  supply  is  not  expected  to 
alter  the  market  position  of  TO's  in  this  area 
substantially. 
(44)  Although allowed  in  Directive 92/44/EEC, Ireland 
did  not  request  any  deferment  in  favour  of 
Telecom  Eireann  for  the  implementation  of  the 
obligation  of  cost-orientation  of  leased  lines.  On 
the  contrary,  on  8  March  1996,  Ireland  informed 
the Commission pursuant to Article 4 of  Directive 
90/388/EEC  that  it  had  authorized  Telecom 
Eireann to increase its leased lines tariffs as from  1 
February  1996  as  regards  new  circuits  and  to  ex-
isting  circuits  at  the  next  billing  date  after  31 
March  1996.  The  justification  given  for  this 
increase was  that leased lines charges had not been 
adjusted for  many years  and that Telecom Eireann 
had been  recording significant losses  on  its  leased 
lines service.  International  comparisons  show  that 
Telecom  Eireann's  tariffs  are,  even  · after  the 
increases,  still  less  than  the  EU  average  (e.g.  on  1 
January  1996  monthly rental  SO  km circuit:  ECU 
265 (EU average: ECU 380) and connection charge: 
ECU 489  in comparison with  EU  average  of  ECU 
596 (2)).  One can  for  this  reason  hardly expect that 
(')  OJ  No  L 165,  19.  6.  1992,  p.  27. 
(l)  Data computed by Tarifica for the Commission- DG XIII. 
altem~tive  network  providers · could  offer  much 
better tariffs,  at  least  to  the· vast  majority  of  cus-
tomers  of  Telecom  Eireann  and  that  the  latter 
would  be  forced  to  lower  its  prices  substantially. 
(45)  It is  true that charges for leased lines in Ireland are 
not  yet  fully  rebalanced.  A  cost-based  tUiff 
proposal  is  being implemented on  a phased  basis 
and this business is loss-making overall. If an alter-
native  infrastructure  is  available,  Telecom  Eireann 
would lose reveriue  to that. alternative as  customers 
would  wish  to  diversify  suppliers,  thus  increasing 
the  loss  on  the  business. 
(46)  ·  Finally  Ireland,  while  acknowledging  the  need  to 
advance·  the  lifting  of  restrictions  on. alternative 
networks in order to ensure that future competitors 
can  build and fund  networks  in sufficient  time  to 
allow for  full  competition  by  the  time  voice  tele-
phony is  liberalized,  states  that six  months would 
suffice for  this purpose. This argument is  based on 
the  small  size  of  Ireland  and  the  concentrated 
nature  of  the  most  profitable  customers.  As  a 
·matter of fact, since the main cable TV network in 
Ireland  is  controlled  by  Telecom  Eireann,  the 
ability  of  new  entrants  to  compete  fully  from  1 
January  2000  would  be  compromised  in  the 
absence of  sufficient time to extend  their network 
also  in  the  'local  loop'. 
Effect  on  trade 
(47)  As a consequence of its monopoly on the provision 
of  public  telecommunications  infrastru~tures, 
Telecom Eireann is the sole supplier of leased lines 
and  interconnection  to  providers  of  liberalized 
services.  It  therefore  determines  to  a large  extent 
the  costs  of  its  competitors  in  the  liberalized 
services  sector.  This  was  illustrated  inter alia by 
the abovementioned increase in leased lines tariffs 
in  early  1996,  which  rendered  the  provision  of 
certain  liberalized  services  uneconomic.  This 
potential  knowledge  by  Telecom  Eireann  of  the 
costs  of  its  competitors  will  increasingly  affect 
trade,  since  the  Irish  public  operator will  develop 
even  further  its  own  offer  of  liberalized  services 
with  the  technical  support,  expert and  managerial 
assistance,  software  and  systems  improvements 
provided by its strategic partners PTI' Telecom and 
Telia,  backed  by  their  Unisource  global  partner-
ship, which  are  among the world  leaders  in  terms 
of  quality  and  efficiency.  Whereas  Telecom 
Eireann could use its own  infrastructure to  provide 
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such  services,  competitors  providing  global  liber-
alized  services,  such .:as  VPN  or voice  services  to 
closed  user groups, viould  thus  be obliged  to  rely 
only on circuits leased from the operator they want 
to  compete  with. This  situation  would  be  aggra-
vated  by the  fact  that  according  to  comments (1), 
although .  Telecom  Eireann  complies  fully  with 
current regulations under both EU and Irish law on 
this matter, currently it does  not produce accounts 
to  a sufficient degree  of  transparency to  allow for 
adequate  separation  of  its  activities  in  the  mono-
poly sector from those in the liberalized sector and 
there is  no structural separation to  prevent staff .  in 
~e infrastructure side of Telecom Eireann  passing 
mformation  to  colleagues  selling  liberalized 
services. 
Conclusion 
{48)  There  are  less  restrictive  regulatory  means  to 
prevent  bypass  of  the  ~oice telephony  monopoly 
until  1  January  2000  and  such  means ·could  be 
implemented  by  the  telecommunic.ations  regula-
tory  authority  which  Ireland  will  set  up, -'with 
appropriate  arrangements  for  industry  funding, 
during the first quarter of 1997. The granting of an 
additional  implementation  period  which  would 
extend after that date does not therefore seem justi-
fied.  · 
(4.9)  Moreover,  since  Telecom  Eireann  will  be  able  to 
provide on its own network worldwide interconnec-
tion  to  Irish  industry and business,  backed by the 
~esources of . its  s~tegi~ partners  and  their global 
1nterconnecaon Vla  Umsource and  Uniworld, such  · 
additional  implementation  period  would  distort 
competition in global services from  and to  Ireland 
at  the  expense  of  the  other global  alliances. 
(SO)  For  these  reasons,  the  Commission  considers  that 
the  negative  effects  on  trade  which  would  result 
from  the  granting. to  Ireland  of  an  additional 
implementation period regarding the liberalization 
of  alternative  infrastructure  will  be  incompatible 
with the interest of the Community once the new 
regulatory framework is in force and at the latest on 
1 July 1997. 
III.  Request for an additional implementation 
period regarding the lifting of restrictions 
on  the  direct interconnection  of mobile 
telecommunications networks  · 
Assessment of the  impact of the  immediat.e J;jting 
of restrictions 
(Sl)  Ireland  considers  an.  additional  implementation 
period as  regards  the direct international intercon-
(1)  See  in  particular,  Cable  &:  Wireless,  p.  2. 
nection  of  mobile  networks  necessary  to  avoid 
undermining the provision of national and interna-
tional  voice  telephony. 
(52)  Ireland  states  that  il  mobile  networks  were 
permitted  to  interconnect  freely,  it  would  be ' 
possible  for  a GSM  operator in  Irel11nd  to connect 
to  a fixed  network  or mobile  network  in  another 
State and to obtain delivery prices for international 
calls  close  to  the  local  interconnection  rates 
applying in that country. Similarly, the Irish GSM 
operator  could  offer  to  deliver  incoming  inter-
national traffic at prices closely related  to  national 
interconnect  rates  in  Ireland.  The  GSM  operator 
could  therefore  offer very  low  tariffs  to  customers 
and  could  expect  to  obtain  a substantial  share  of 
incoming international traffic. The public network 
would,  as  a  result,  lose  a  substantial  part  of  the 
customer revenue and a large part of the incoming 
settlements,  offset  only  partially  by  increased 
national  interconnect income.  · 
(53)  Ireland acknowledges  that. to  a certain  extent,  this 
situation  already  exists  for· medium  and  large 
companies,  as  resellers  active  in  the  Irish  market 
already  bypass  the  settlement.  regime.  Ireland 
expects that the grant of full interconnection rights 
to  mobile  operators  would  immediately  expose 
another large  segment of  international  revenue  to 
competition. 
(54)  Comments  emphasize  that  the  mobile  telephone 
market  is  a  new  growing  market  and  that  the 
restrictions on international connection will  there-
fore  affect. additional  mobile  traffic,  generated  by 
the mobile operators, from which Telecom Eireann 
already  derives  additional  revenues  from  call-
completion of calls originated from mobile phones. 
Moreover, the second GSM operator argued  that in 
the  absence  of  the  right  to  interconnect  directly 
with  foreign  networks,  it  is  unrealistic  to  suggest 
that Telecom Eireann could offer acceptable inter-
national interconnect rates without recourse  to  the 
available  judicial  remedies. 
(SS)  In  practice,  two  issues  must  be  considered: {i)  the 
level  of  substitutability  between  mobile  and  fixed 
telephone services and (ii)  the risk of bypass of the 
voice  telephony  monopoly  via  services  consisting 
in  calling  a  mobile  number  to  be  switched  to  a 
foreign  fixed-voice  telephony  network. 
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(56)  As  regards  the latter risk,  the  argument cannot be 
taken into account, since there are other regulatory 
means to deal with such by pass of the legal  privi-
lege  of  Telecom  Eireann  (see  Commission  com-
munication  9S/C27S/02). · 
(57)  As  regards  the  substitutability  between  fixed  and 
mobile telephone services, the Commission has, in 
recent cases, discovered that such substitutability is 
not substantial, given  that these services respond to 
different categories of demand, which are  reflected 
inter alia in the higher tariffs of GSM-mobile tele-
phony in  comparison  with  voice  telephony. 
(58)  In  Ireland,  the  main  market-segment  for  GSM-
operators  is  the  segment  of  domestic  calls.  More-
over it appears that at least half the costs of mobile 
operators  in  handling  calls  are  traffic-insensitive 
costs.  It  can  ·therefore  not  be  excluded  that  a 
mobile  operator,  in  order  to  increase  overall 
turnover,  usage  of  its  network  and  market  share 
would  allot  a  higher  share  of  these  traffic-
insensitive  costs  to  domestic  calls  and  offer  inter-
national  tariffs ·which  are  at  the  same  level  as  the , 
current international tariffs of Telecom Eireann. As 
stressed in one comment ('),  BT and  ~CL  provide 
voice  telephony from  the  UK to  Ireland  at  prices 
which  can  be  less  than  half  those  of  Telecom 
Eireann.  By  directly  interconnecting  with  the 
networks  of  those  British  public  telecommunica-
tions  operators,  Irish  GSM  operators  could  offer 
similar  rates  to  Telecom  Eireann  without  selling 
below  cost.  Moreover,  the  offer  of  international 
mobile calls at the fixed-network tariffs would be  a 
powerful  marketing  tool  to  convince  new  sub-
scribers to  acquire and  use  GSM  mobile telephony. 
(59)  On  the  basis  of  the  current  differences  between 
tariffs for calls from Ireland to  the UK and for calls 
from  the  UK to  Ireland, the risk of substitution of 
fixed  international  ·telepho~e calls  by  GSM  calls 
can thus not be ruled. out. This would affect one of 
two  voice-telephony  market  segments  which  are 
currently the  most  profitable  for  Telecom  Eireann 
and could reduce its overall  profitability tq such an 
extent  that  it  was  no  longer  able  to  provide  a 
universal  service  under  economically  acceptable 
conditions. 
(60)  This risk will however decrease as Telecom Eireann 
reduces its  international tariffs. Although  the  argu-
ment  of  the  Irish  Government  can  thus  be 
<'>  rn. p.  a. 
accepted,  the  additional  implementation  period 
requested  is  too  long in  view  of  the  justifications 
provided.  Taking  into  account  the  planned  tariff 
rebalancing,  the  threat of substitution  of fixed  by 
GSM  calls  might only justify a derogation  until at 
the  latest  the  end ·of  1998,  which  is  the  date  at 
which  international  tariffs  of  Telecom  Eireann 
must be sufficiently reduced to rule out substitution 
by  GSM-mobile  calls.  A  liberalization  of  inter-
national  interconnection  of  mobile  networks  at 
least one year in advance  of  the full  liberalization 
of  voice  telephony  will  furthermore  provide  a 
strong incentive  in  favour  of  timely  implementa-
tion  of  the  gradual  rebalancing envisaged. 
Effect  on  trade 
(61)  The  effects  of  the  delayed  liberalization  of  direct 
international  interconnection  of  mobile  operators 
will  fall  on the second GSM-operator and provided 
they  are  licensed  in  time,  the ·future  DCS-1800-
operators.  The  possibility  to  interconnect  directly 
With  other operators would  be  a significant factor 
in facilitating their establishment and development 
in the Irish market. Moreover, the additional i~ple­
mentation  period  will  also  affect  foreign  carriers, 
since it will make more cumbersome and cosdy the 
handing-over of  traffic  for  call  termination by the 
Irish  mobile  operators. 
(62)  This  negative  effect  on  trade  between  Member 
States  would  nevertheless  be  reduced  if  the  Irish 
Government were  to  ensure  that Telecom Eireann 
provides  specific  and  volume  discounts,  to  be 
applied  to  mobile  operators,  which  would,  as  in 
other Member States, take into account the fact that 
contrary to volume discounts granted to large users, 
mobile  operators  are  generating new  traffic. 
Conclusion 
(63)  The immediate lifting of restrictions on the direct 
interconnection  of  mobile  telecommunications 
networks  pursuant  to  Article  3d  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC as  inserted by Directive 96/2/EC with 
regud  to  mobile  and  personal  communications 
would  put  at  risk  the  substantial  international 
traffic  revenues  of  Telecom  Eirearin  and  threaten 
its  ability to  further ensure the universal  provision 
of  voice  telephony  in  Ireland  in  economically 
acceptable  conditions. The effect  on  trade  could, 
moreover be  limited if tariff reductions,  similar to 
those in other Member States, are provided in inter-
connect aareements entered into between Telecom 
Bire~n and  the  mobile  operators.  The  Commis-
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sion  therefore  considers  that the  limited  negative 
effects  on  trade  which  would · result  from  the 
granting to  Ireland of an  additional  implementa-
tion period until 31  December 1998 at the latest as 
regards the lifting of restrictions on direct intercon-
nection of mobile networks ·with foreign  networks, 
is  balanced by the certainty that universal  service 
will not be affected and it is  therefore for the time 
being  not  incompatible  with  the  interest  of  the 
Community, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
Ireland may postpone until 1 January 2000  the abolition 
of  the  exclusive  rights  currently  granted  to  Telecom 
Eireann as regards  the provision  of voice  telephony and 
the establishment and provision of public  telecommuni~ 
cations networks  provided that the. conditions set out in 
Article 4 are implemented according to the timetable laid 
down  therein. 
Article  2 
Ireland may postpone until 1 January 1999 the lifting of 
restrictions on the direct interconnection of mobile tele-
communications networks with foreign networks provided 
that the conditions set  ~out in Article 4 are  implemented 
according  to  the  timetable  laid  down ·therein. 
Article J 
Ireland  may  postpone  until  1  July  1997  the  lifting  of 
restrictions  on· the  provision  of  already  liberalized  tele-
communications  services  on: 
(a)  networks established by the. provider of the  telecom-
munications  service, 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by third  parties,  and 
(c)  the  sharing of networks,  other facilities .and sites. 
Article 4 
By way of. derogation from  the deadlines set out for this 
purpose in  Directive 90/388/EEC, as  amended by Direc-
tive  96/19/EC,  the  Irish  Government  shall  inform  the 
Commission of the implementation in national law of the 
following  obligations  according  to  the  following  time-
table: 
- no  later  than  1 April  1997  instead  of  1 July  1996: 
publication  of  all  measures  necessary  to  lift  restric-
tions on the provision of already liberalized  tel~com­
munications  services  on: 
(a)  networks  established  by  the  provider of  the  tele-
communications  service, 
(b)  infrastructures  provided  by  third  parties,  and 
(c)  the sharing of networks, other facilities and sites, 
- before  1  April  1998:  publication  of  proposed  legis-
lative  ·changes  to  implement  full  competition  and 
remove  all  restrictions  by  1·  January 2000,  including 
proposals  for  the  funding  of 'universal  services, 
- before  1 November 1998: adoption of those legislative 
changes, 
- no  later  than  1 January  199.9  instead  of  1 January 
1997: notification to  the Commission of draft licences 
for  voice  telephony and/or underlying  network  pro-
viders, 
- no  later  than  1 April  1999  instead  of  1 July  1997: 
publication of licensing conditions for all services and 
of interconnection  charges  as  appropriate  in  accord-
ance  in both cases  with  relevant  EU  Directives, 
- no later than 1 November 1999: award of licences and 
amendment of existing licences to enable competitive 
provision  of voice  telephony  and  unrestricted  inter-
connection of mobile networks from  1 January 2000 
instead  of  1 January  1998. 
The  Irish  Government  shall  moreover  inform  the 
Commission at the latest  three  months after notification 
of  this  Decision  of  the  measures  taken  to: 
- achieve  transparency  as  regards  any  involvement  of 
Telecom Eireann alongside  its strategic  partners P'IT 
Telecom  and  Telia;  or  Unisource,  in  investments 
outside  Ireland  during  the  additional  time  period 
granted  pursuant  to  Article  1, 
- ensure that Telecom Eireann does not make use of its 
·  additional statutory protection to extend its  dominant 
position in the .Public  payphone market or the cable 
TV industry and in the short tenn ensure that Cable-
link is  managed at arm's length of Telecom  Eireann 
as  long as  Telecom  Eireann  remains  the controlling 
shareholder. 
Article  5 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  Ireland. 
Done  at  Brussels,  27 November  1996. 
For  th1  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member  of the  Commission 
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II 
(Acts  whose publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION DECISION 
of 18  December 1996 
concerning  the  conditions  imposed  on  the  second  operator  of  GSM 
radiotelephony services  in Spain 
. (Only  the Spanish text  is  authentic) 
(97 /181 /EC) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having  I~gard to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, and  in  particular Article  90  (3)  thereof, 
Having  'given the Spanish authorities, by letter of 23 April 
1996, and Telef6nica de  Espana  SA.  by  letter of  30  May 
1996, notice to  submit their comments on  the Commis-
sion's objections to the initial payment imposed on Airtel 
M6vil  SA. 
Whereas: 
THE FACI'S 
Th~ national  ~easure in question 
(1)  The Spanish  Government  has  imposed  an  initial 
payment for  the grant of a second  concession  for 
the establishment and operation on  Spanish tenit-
ory  of  a  network  for  the  provision  of  a  public 
mobile  radiotelephony  service  using  the  pan-
Burope~n digital  system,  GSM  (global  system  for 
mobile  communications) ('GSM  service'). 
That requirement is laid down  in Articles 9 (4) and 
Article  16  of  the  tendering  criteria  which  were 
approved  by  Ministerial  Decision  (Orden)  of  26  · 
September  1994 (').  That  requirement  does  not 
apply to the public operator, Telef6nica de  Espana. 
The undertaking and services concerned 
(2)  Telef6nica. de  ESpana is a Spanish public undertak-
ing as  defined in Article 2 of Commission  Direct-
ive  80/723/EEC of 25 June  1980  concerning the 
transparency of financial  rel~tions between Member 
States  and  public  undertakings (2). 
The  Spanish  Government  has.  decisive  influence 
over  Telef6nica  de  Espana  for  three  reasons: 
(i) The Spanish· State  is  the single  largest  share-
holder  in  Telef6nica  de  Espana~ When  the 
Commission  opened  this  case,  the  Spanish 
State held 31,8% of the issued share capital. It 
currently  holds  21,16 %  of  the  issued  share 
capital.  The  remaining  shares  are  divided 
between  approximately  300 000  shareholders. 
(ii)  The  Spanish  Government  has  the . right  to 
appoint a representative with  the right of veto 
over the decisions of the board of directors of 
Telef6nica  de  Espana.  Under Article  2 (9)  of  · 
Royal Decree Law (Real Decreto·LeiJ 611996 of 
7 June 1996 (3), this post will only be abolished 
from  1 January  1998. 
( 1)  Boletfn  Oficial  del  Estado  (BOB)  No  231,  27.  9.  1994,  p. 
29778. 
(1)  OJ  No  L 195,  29.  7.  1980,  p.  35. 
(l)  BOB  No  139,  8.  6.  1996,  p.  18 975. 
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(iii)  By  virtue  of  the  concession  contract  of  26 · 
December 19.91  (Concession  Contract) (1), the 
Spanish  Government has  the  right directly  to 
appoint 25 % of the members of the board of 
directors of Telef6nica de  Espafta. As a result of 
this and the fact  that the Spanish  State  is  the 
largest  shareholder,· the  Spanish  Government 
appointed 18 out of the 25 current members of 
the board of directors including the president.  · 
The shares  of Telef6nica  de  Espana  are  listed  on 
the  Spanis~ stock  exchanges  as  well  as  in  New  · 
York, London, Frankfurt and Tokyo. lri terms of its 
turnover (PTA  1 740 500  million  in  1995)  and  its 
reults (PTA 133 200 million in  1995), Telef6nica de 
Espana  is  among  the  ten  largest  telecommunica-
tions  operators in the world.  It  has· a workforce  of 
69 570 employees and over 16 million subscribers. 
Telef6nica  de  Espaii.a  thus  constitutes  a  public 
undertaking  or an  undertaking  to  which  Member 
States  grant  special  or exclusive  rights  within  the 
meaning of Article  90  {1)  of  the  EC  Treaty. 
(3)  Telef6nica de Bspaiia provides 
4transmission', 
4final' 
and  -value  added'  telecommunications  services 
throughout Spain by virtue of Telecommunications 
Act (Ley de Ordenadon de las  Telecomunicadones) 
31/1.987  of  18  December  1987 (2)  (LOTj and  the 
Concession  Contra~ Telef6nica  de  Espada  has 
been  the  monopoly  provider  of  some  of  these 
services  (such  as  voice  telephony  services  falling 
within  the  meaning  ~f Article  1  of  Commission 
Directive  .90/388/EEC  of  28  June  1.9.90  on  com-
petition  in  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
s~rvices  (3)~  whereas  there  is  limited  competition 
for other services (such as GSM  services)~ Telef6nica 
de Espada ha5  been also granted special rights to-
gether with  Ente  Publico  Retevisi6n  (Retevisi6n 1 
and the Organismo .Aut6nomo de Corre.os y Tele-. 
grafos, both public undertakings, to  provide trans-
mission  capacity  for  telecommunication  services. 
On 7 June 19.96, by Royal  Decree Law 6/1.9.96  the 
monopoly on voice telephony and the oligopoly on 
corresponding  infrastructures  were  formally  abol-
ished.  The  Spanish  Government  is  now  able  to 
grant  ·concessions  to  new  national  or  regional 
operators. Rete7isi6n will  transfer its  telecommun-
ication  assets  to  a  new  entity  which  has  been 
licensed  to  provide  full  telecommunications 
( 1)  BOB  No  20,  23.  1.  1992.  p.  2 132. 
(1)  BOB  No 303, 19.  12. 1987, amended,  inter alia, by Act 3]/ 
1992 of 3  December  1992. 
(')  OJ No  L  192,  24.  7.  1990,  p.  10 . 
services and has been mandated to sell  80 % of its 
shares  in  a  restricted  tender.  However,  it  is  not 
expected  that  the  new  entity  will  be  operational 
before  mid-1997. 
Under the LOT and its Concession Contract, Tele-
f6nica  de  Espana  has  been  able  to  provide  GS.M 
services without having taken part in any tendering 
procedure. This is  more  fully  described  in  point 7 
below.  Telef6nica  de  Espana  has  been  authorized 
by the Spanish  Government to  transfer its  licence 
for  the · provision  of  mobile  telephone  services  -
analogue  and  GSM  - to  Telef6nica  Servicios 
M6viles,  S.A.  ('Telef6nica  Servicios  M6viles'),  a 
wholly owned  subsidiary of  Telef6nica  de  Espana. 
All references in this Decision are  to Telef6nica de 
Espana  because  the licence  to  operate  GSM  radio-
telephony  services  was  originally  granted  to  this 
company.· 
{4)  Cellular digital  mobile  telephony  complying  wirh 
the  GSM  standad  has  been  developed  recently  in 
Europe  and enables  subscribers  both  to  send  and 
receive  calls  anywhere  in  the  Community, as  well 
as  in some other European countries. This system, 
which  uses  digital  technology,  a  code  and  a 
sub~criber identity module card, has greater poten-
tial  than  traditional  analogue  radiotelephony 
systems. Digital technology provides higher quality, 
high-~peed  data  trans_mission  and  encryption 
enhancing the  confidentiality  of  communications 
and is  more  economical  in  its  use  of  frequencies 
than  analogue  systems.  Furthermore,  the  GSM 
system is based on common Community standards 
regarding  common  frequency  bands  approved  at 
Community  level  and,  unlike  analogue  systems 
which  ~  often  incompatible  from  one  Member 
State  to  another,  has  the  makings  of  one  of  the 
pan-European services,  whose  promotion is  under 
Council Recommendation 87/371/EEC of 25 June 
1.987 ("), one of the main objectives of the European 
Union's policy on telecommunications. Lastly,  the 
emerging market for  GSM  services  is  particularly 
dynamic: according to some studies, the number of 
users  in Western Europe could grow from  a little 
over 1 million in 1.993 to 15-20 million in the year 
2000 (S). 
(5)  The Council has adopted Directive 87/37UEEC of 
25  June  1987  on  the  frequency  bands  to  be 
reselVed for the coordinated introduction of public 
(4)  OJ  No ·L  196,  17.  7.  1987,  p.  81. 
(S) 
4Scenario  Mobile  Communications  up  to  20 1  0 - study  on 
forecast developments and future trends in techn'ical develop-
ment and commercial provision up  to the year 2010',  Butelis 
Consult.  October 1993.  ' 
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pan-European  cellular  digital  land-based  mobile 
communications  in  the  Community (1)·  which 
reserves  the 890-91 5 and 935-960  MHz  frequency 
bands for the introduction of a common system of 
digital  GSM  radiotelephony.  These  common 
frequency bands allow _several  competing operators 
to  coexist.  The  GSM  service  began  operating 
commercially  in  the  Community  in  late  1992; 
since then, every Member State except Luxembourg 
has  granted  licences  to  two  operators,  while 
Luxembourg has announced that it will  follow the 
same path. Sweden has granted three GSM licences. 
The European  Conference of Postal· and Telecom-
munications Administratio~s (CEP'I), the forum for 
the . national  regulatory authorities  of  36 countries 
(including Spain), has recommended that competi-
tion between operators of GSM  services be actively 
encouraged  and  the  regulatory  barriers  which  are 
restricting  such  competition  be  abolished (2). 
(6)  Germany, Greece, France, the  Netherlands and the 
United  Kingdom  have  authorized  or  decided  to 
authorize  a  third  operator  to  offer  cellular digital 
radiotelephony  ·services,  on  a  higher  frequency 
band, on the basis of the  DCS  1800 specifications. 
Under Article 2 of Commission Directive 96/2/EC 
of  16  January  1996  amending  Directive 
90/388/EEC  with  regard  to  mobile  and  personal 
communications  (3~  Member  States  must  grant 
licences for operating mobile systems according to 
the DCS 1800 standard by  1 January 1998  at the 
latest. Further, Member States  may not restrict the 
combination of mobile technologies or systems and 
in  all  circumstances  must  take  account  .of  the 
requirement  to  ensure  effective  competition 





Following amendments to the LOT by Act 32/1992 
of 3  December 1992,  the  market for  the provision 
of  GSM  services  was  liberalized  as  from  31 
December 1993. Therefore,  the  provision  of GSM 
services is  no longer regarded as a 'final' service for 
which special and exclusive  rights can be granted. 
GSM  services are  now considered as  'value  added' 
services which should be provided in competition. 
(')  OJ No  L 196,  17.  7.  1987,  ~· 85. 
(1)  Rwiftll of the  Rttjuimnmts for  the  future  Ha"!'on_i%ation 
of Rll!l_liuory Policy Regartlmg Mob•le Commun.cat•on Ser-
M4 CBPT/BCI'RA (92)  57,  p.  17. 
(') OJ  No L 20;  26.  1.  1996,  p.  59. 
Following  this  amendment  to  the  LOT,  the 
Spanish Government adopted Royal  Decree  1486/ 
1994 of 1 July 1994 (")  (the Royal  Decree1, which 
approves  the  technical  regulation  (Reg/amento 
Tlcnico)  for  the provision  of 'value  added'  mobile 
automatic telecommunication services. Article 2 of 
the  ~echnical  regulation  (Annex  to  the  Royal 
Decree) states that GSM services are to be provided 
in competition. Article 4 of the technical regulation 
states that GSM services are to be provided by Tele-
f6nica de Espana and one competing licensee. The 
first Transitional Provision  of the technical regula-
tion·  indicates  the  procedure  for  Telef6nica  de 
Espana to obtain a licence without going through a 
tendering procedure. 
The Royal Decree does not expressly provide for an 
initial  payment  for  the  GSM  licence.  However, 
Article 4, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (a), of the 
technical regulation states that one of the factors  to 
be  taken into account when  assessing  the applica-
tion  of  the  second  operator  for  a  licence  is  the 
'maximization  of  financial  contributions'. 
(8)  By  Ministerial  Decision  of  26  September  1994 (5) 
the  Spanish  Government  a1opted  the  tendering 
criteria and opened the tendering procedure  for  a 
second operator's licence for the provision of GSM 
services. The second operator's concession is for 1  5 
years -with  an ·extension  envisaged  for  five  years 
thereafter. The other terms  of the  concession  are 
listed  in the  tendering criteria. 
Articles 9 and 16 of the tendering criteria provided 
for a minimum initial payment to the Treasury of 
PTA SO 09S billion. Some indication of the relative 
weight  that  would  be  attached  to  the  different 
tendering criteria was  given. The effect of the last 
paragraph of Article 16 was  that o~rs  of less than 
PTA SO 000  million would automatically be elim-
inated. 
The Ministry of Public Works, Transport and En-
vironment awarded  the  second  operator's  conces-
sion  by  Ministerial  Decision  of  29  December 
.1994 (') to Airtel M6vil  SA (at that time known  as 
cAlianza Intemacional de Redes Telef6nicas, SA  1 in 
spite  of the fact  that the  initial  payment of PTA 
8S 000 million was  not the highest initial payment 
offered  (the  highest  initial  payment  offer  being 
PTA  89 000  million). 
!~ 
BOB  No  168,  15.  7. ·1994,  p.  22 672. 
BOB  No  231,  27.  9.  19.94,  p.  29 779. 
BOB  No 4,  S.  1.  1995,  p.  464. 
; 
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In  accordance  with  Arti~e  9  of  the  tendering 
criteria,  Airtel  M6vil  had  to  make  the  initial 
•  payment when it formally obtained the licence by 
signing  the  concession  contract . on  3  February 
1995. On the same day Telef6nica de Espafia was 
simultaneously  granted  a  corresponding  GSM 
licence  without  making any  such  payment. 
(9)  By  letter  of  6  Februacy  1995  the  Commission 
expressed its resevations about the procedure which 
had  been  adopted  for  the  selection  of  a  second 
operator which had included less favourable condi-
tions for the second operator than for Telef6nica de 
Espana. 
By letter of 20 April 1995 the Spanish Government 
replied to the Commission setting out the circum-
stances of the licensing process which according to 
the  Spanish  Government  compensated  for  the 
initial  payment  made  by  Airtel  M6vil. 
On  1 July 1995 Telef6nica  de  Espana  began  op-
erating its  GSM  services  commercially. 
By its-letter-of 18 July 1995 the Commission asked 
the  Spanish  Government  for  clarification  on  the 
right  to·  use  alternative  telecommunication 
networks, o~ the right to interconnect directly with 
leased line networks ·and on the methodolo8Y that 
would be used to revise  the interconnection tariffs 
with  the  fixed  network.  This  was  so  that  the 
Commission  could  ·assess  whether  those  factors 
would  give  the  second  operator  ~nefits which 
would  OtJtweigh  the  competitive  disadvantage  es-
tablished by the ~position of the initial.payment. 
On 3  October 1995,  ~rtel M6vil  began its opera-
tions. 
By ·its  letter of 27  November  1995  the  Spanish 
G)vemment  replied  to  the  Commission  stating 
that  the .  second  operator could  establish  its  own 
infrastructure; and also use Retevisi6n and Correos 
y Telepfos infrastructure  a5  an  alte~ative to the 
Telef6nica de Bspalla network, that no request for 
direct  interconnection  had  been  .received  by the 
Spanish  Government  and  that the  issue  of  tariff 
reductions  would  be  examined  in  199_6. 
At  a  meeting  on  16  Januacy  1996  betwec;n  the 
Spanish  Government  and  the  Commission,  the 
Spanish Government stated that it would. be impos-
sible  to redress  the imbalance  between Telef6nica 
de Bspaiia and the second operator by imposing a 
similar initial payment fee  of PTA 8SOOO  million 
on Telef6nica de Espana. The Spanish Government 
propOsed  that  a  po5sible  solution  would  be  to· 
reduce the interconnection tariffs  over the  15-year 
period  of  the  concession.  The  reduction  would 
apply  to  both  Telef6nica  de  Espana  and  to  the 
second operator. It stated that this would be final-
ized  in September 1996  arid  would  amount to  a 
25% reduction  in ·these  tariffs. 
The  Commission  remained  of  the  view  that  this 
proposal  would  not affect  the  imbalance  between 
. the  two  operators. 
By  letter of  23  April  1996  the  Commission gave 
formal  notice  to  the  Spanish  Government  either: 
(i)  to  reimburse the initial  payment to  the second 
operator or adopt other corrective measures; or 
(ii)  to  submit its  comments  on  the  Commission's 
·  arguments. 
By  le.tter  of  30  May  1996  the  Commission  asked 
Telef6nica de  Espana  for  observations on its letter 
of 23  April  1996  to  the  Spanish  Government. A 
copy of the letter of formal notice of 23 April 1996 
was  enclosed.  · 
.At  a  meeting  on  28  April  1996  between  the 
Spanish  Government  and  the  Commission,  the 
Spanish Government proposed that the imbalance 
between  Telef6nica  de  Espana  and  the  second 
operator could be corrected if Telef6nica de Espafta 
transferred the cost of operating the TRAC' project 
('Tecnologia  Rural  de  Acceso  Celular'  or. Cellular 
Rural Access Technology) to  its  mobile telephone 
branch,  Telef6nica  Servidos  M6viles.  Under  that 
service, Telef6nica de. Espalla charges customers in 
sparsely populated upland regions fixed  telepho~y 
rates for connections to the public fixed telephone 
network  using.  mobile  analog  technology  and 
infrastructure.  The  Commission  investipted  that 
proposal  further and,  by le~rs of 1!J  April  1996 
and 10 _May  1996 requested further information to 
complete  its ·~ent  of  the  pro~.  Having 
received  no  reply  to  either  of  its  letters,  the 
Commission sent a reminder on 3 June 1996. By 
its letter of 7 June 1996, the Spanish Government 
provided  some  of . the  information  requested. 
However, the information provided did not contain 
sufficient data on the real cost of. the TRAC system 
to Telef6nica Servicios M6vileS.  Consequently, the 
Commission could not assess  the· extent to which: 
that proposal  would  redress  the  balance  between 
the  two  GSM  operators. 
At a meeting with  the Spanish Govemptent on 9 
July  1996,  the  Commission  emphasized· that the 
matter had. not been resolved and that the Spanish 
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Government should put forward a new proposal. To 
date,  no reply has  been  received  by the Commis-
sion to its t;tter of formal  notice of 23 .April  1996, 
no observations have been submitted by Telef6nica 
de Espana on the letter of formal notice of 23 April 
1996 and no  fu~er proposals have  been made by 
the  Spanish  Government. 
THE COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT 
Article  .90  (1) 
{1 0)  Article  90  (1)  provides  that,  in  the  case  of public 
undertakings  and  undertakings  to  which  Member 
States  grant  special  or  exclusive  rights,  Member 
States must neither enact nor maintain in force any 
measure  contrary  to  the  rules  contained  in  the 
·Treaty, in particular those relating to  competi~on. 
Telef6nica de Espana is a public undertaking which 
has  been  ~ted exclusive  rights  to  operate  the 
fixed  telecommunications network  and offer voice 
telephony  a~d  mobile  analog  radiotelephony 
services. The Concession Contract also grants Tele-
f6nica de Espana the right to operate a GSM radio-
telephony  network,  which  qualifies  as  a  special 
right to the. extent that this operator was designated 
otherwise than according to objective and non-dis-
criminatory criteria. 
The  imposition  of  the  initial  payment  on  the 
second  operator  is  a  State  measure  within  the 
meaning of Article  90  (1). 
Article 86 
The  relwant market 
.(11)  'fl!e  relevant  market  is  that  for  cellular  digital 
mobile radiotelephony services. It should be distin-
fJished from  th~ market in fixed  voice  telephony 
./and from the market for all other mobile telephone 
communications services. 
(12)  The Commission has defined the market in voice 
telephony in Directive 90/388/EEC. The Directive · 
draws  a distinction between 'services whose  provi-
sion  consists wholly or partly in  the transmission 
and routing of signals on the public telecommun-
ications  network'  and  mobile  radiotelephony 
services,  which  are  excluded  from  its  scope. 
(13)  Voice telephony within the meaning of that Direct-
ive  is  the  principal service  provided  on the  fixed 
public  network,  that  is  between  given  network 
termination  points.  These  termination  points  are 
defined as can  physical connections artd their tech-
nical access specifications'. In mobile ·  communiCa-
tions, on the other hand, the termination  point is 
located  at  the  radio  interface  between  the  base 
station  of  the  mobile  network  and  the  mobile 
station,  which  means  that  there  is  no  physical 
termination  point.  The  definition  of  voice  tele-
phony services in Article  1 of the Directive there-
fore does not apply to ~obile telephony services. 
(14)  According to the case-law of ':he  C~urt of Justice of 
the European Communities r~ for a product to be 
r~garded. as  forming a market which is sufficiently 
dtfferenttated  from  other  markets,  it  must  be 
possible  for  it to  be  singled  out by such  special 
·features  distinguishing it from  other products that 
it is only to  a limited extent interchangeable with 
them and is only exposed to their competition in a 
way  that is  not significant. 
Clearly,  there  is  very  little  interchangeabilitv 
be~een  mo~ile  radiotelephony  and  telephon)· 
usmg  the  ftxed  network:  users  taking  out  a 
subscription for  a earphone or portable  telephone 
do not normally cancel their previous subscription 
for  a  telephone  installed at  their  home  or work-
place. Therefore, mobile radiotelephony is  indeed a 
new,  additional service,  not a .subAtitute  for  tradi-
tional  telephony. This distinction  is  also  reflected 
in a  significant price  differential. 
Admittedly, wider  dissemi~tion of  mobile  radio-
. telephony might ultimately lead  to  a  single 'tele-
communications  system  serving  markets  that  are 
for  the  time  being  ~parate. How~er, the  condi-
. tions  on  ~hich Article  86  is  to  apply  must  be 
assessed on th~ basis of present demand and not on 
developments  that could  take  place  at some  un-
specified time in the  future. 
(1 S)  ,  It having been established, for  the  above  reasons, 
that mobile radiotelephony should not be regarded 
as  f~nning part of ~e market in voice ·telephony 
semces offered using the fixed  netwo~k, it remains 
to be seen whether, and to what extent. there might 
be. grounds for distinpishing between the. cellular 
mobile radiotelephony services based on the GSM 
sta~d~  which are the subject of  th~s Decision (in 
Spun  gtve~ the brandname Moflistar by Telef6nica 
de.  Espana)  and  cellular · radiotelephony  services 
usmg  analogue  technology  (in  Spain  given  the 
brandname Moviline by .Telef6nica  de  Bspaiia). 
The  Commission  notes  that  the  GSM  system  of 
cellular mobile radiotelephony is  more than just a 
technical  refinement of the earlier analog techno-
(1)  Case  27/~6. Unittd Brands u Commislion, (1978] ECR 207. 
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logy. In addition to the advantages offered by GSM 
in  terms of the quality of voice  reproduction  and 
more  efficient use  of the  available  spectrum (thus 
accommodating substantially more users on a given 
frequency  allocation),  this  service  provides  new 
facilities that cater for the needs of only some users 
of  mobile  radiotelephony: 
(i)  based as  it is  on a Community standard, GSM 
can  become  a  pan-European  service.  Under 
'roaming'  agreements  between  network  oper-
ators, the system permits any user to make calls 
from his phone outside the national territory of 
the.  operator  with  which  he  has  taken  out  a 
subscription;  this  facility  is  available 
throughout  the . territory  of  the  parties  to  the 
GSM  Memorandum  of  Understanding  in 
Europe  and  other  parts  of  the  world.  ·Some 
users  who,  for  business  purposes,  use  mobile 
radiotelephony  services  only  within  the 
country or within  a  particular  region,  are  not 
interested  in  this  new  feature.  For  others, 
· however,  this may  be  a reason  for  deciding to 
subscribe, 
(ii)  in  addition  to  voice  transmission,  the  GSM 
service can be used to  transmit large quantities 
of  data;  again,  this  feature  meets  the  spec.ific 
needs of only some of the existing or potential 
customers  for  mobile  radiotelephony  services, 
(iii)  the digital coding of messages means' that a far 
greater degree of security can be achieved than 
via  the analop system; again an advantage of 
interest to only some  us~rs (particularly  busi-
ness  customers), 
(iv)  digital technology makes it possible  to offer a 
whole  range  of  advanced  telecommunications 
services which are  not available (or which can 
be  made  so only at considerably higher cost) 
· via  an analogue network. These indude soph-
iSticated  call-line  identification,  voice  mail 
(including short message  services  (SMS)) and 
call-seeurity Services. 
In view  of the above,  the  simple  replacement  of 
analogue radiotelephony by the GSM system is not 
envisased. in the short term. Qri the contrary, it is 
likely  that.  even  if  there  is  a  discernible  drift  of 
customers from one to  the  other,  the  two systems 
will continue to exist in parallel for several years to 
come { 1),  meeting  largely  different  needs.  It  has 
been found that. even in countries where the GSM 
system  is  fully  operational,  some  operators  are 
continuing  to  invest  in  the  analogue  network  . 
These factors draw a distinction  between the GSM 
and analogue  markets.  · 
(1)  Ministerial  Decision of 13  March  1995,  BOB  No 101, 28. 4. 
.1995,  p.  12 573 • . 
(16)  On the basis of the abovementioned considerations 
and  the  current  circumstances,  and  taking  into 
account the pQSSible  evolution of the market, GSM 
radiotelephony services  should  therefore  probably 
be regarded  as  also  constituting a separate  market 
from  the  market  for  analogue  mobile  telephony. 
In any event,  the conclusions  of the legal  analysis 
would  not  be  different,  even  if  analogue  mobile 
telephony  and  GSM  constituted  two  segments  of 
the same market. As will  be seen below (paragraph 
21),  this  would  only  imply  a  slightly  different 
formulation  of  the  first  hypothesis  of  abuse. 
(17)  . In  accordance  with  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice,  this  market,  which  currently extends. over 
the  whole  of  Spain,  is  a  substantial  part  of  the 
common  market. 
The  dominant position 
(18)  In  accordance  with  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of 
Justice,  an  undertaking  which  has  a  legal  mono-
poly  in  the  provision  ·of  certain  services  may · 
occupy a dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 86 of the Treaty (2). This applies in the case 
of  Telef6nica  de  Espana  and  its  wholly  owned 
subsidiary,  Telef6nica  SeiVicios  M6viles,  which 
until  recently  were  the  only  undertakings  legally 
able  to offer the telecommunications  networks  for 
the  public,  voice  telephony  and  analog  radiotele-
phony in Spain. These are  therefore three markets 
·in· which they enjoy a dominant position. As stated 
above,  the  recent  authorization  granted  to  Rete-
visi6n to operate in the market for voice telephony 
and  underlying  infrastructures  will  not  have  any 
significant impact on the market share enjoyed by 
· Telef6nica  de  Espana  for  some  time. 
The  abuse  of a  dominant position 
(19)  The Court of Justice  has  ruled  that  'a system  of 
undistorted  competition,  as  laid  down  in  the 
Tzeaty. can be guaranteed only if equality of oppor-
.  tunity is secured as  between  the various economic 
operators' ('). 
Such equality of opportunity is particularly import-
ant for new entrants to a market in which a domi-
nant operator on a related but separate market is in 
the course of establishing itself, like Telef6nica de 
Espana  and  its  subsidiary,  Telef6nica  Servicios 
M6viles. 
(2)  Case"311/84, Centre beige d'ltudes de march!- Telemarketing 
(CBEM)  ~ Comp_aP!ie luxemhourgeoise de tllldiffusion anii 
Infomuuion publtcitl Bmelux, (1985]  BCR  32ifi.  · 
(")  CUe  C202/88,  France  It Commission,  [1991)  ECR  1-1223, 
p~ph  51,  p.-1271. 
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(20)  Telef6nica de  Espafia already enjoys  the following 
major advantanges for acquiring a dominant .share 
of  the  market  in  GSM  radiotelephony: 
·  (i)  a  head start: it began developing its network 
before  the second operator and can therefore 
offer  better geographical  cover;  it .  began  its 
service  on  1  July  1995  :while  th~  second 
operator began its services on 3 October 1995; 
. ·  (ii)  potential  customers:  Telef6nica  de  Espana's 
analog  radiotelephony  service,  Moviline,  had 
1 235 690  subscribers· in  October 1996 and is 
acquiring  I 0 000  to  20 000  new  subscribers 
each  month; 
existing  subscribers  to  Moviline,  the  analog 
service,  may be  seen  as  a .potential  ~stomer 
base  for  Movistar,  the  GSM  service; 
(iii)  an· existing distribution  network:  fhe  network 
is  known  to  the  public,  since  Telef6nica  de 
Espana  can  market  its  GSM  service  on  a 
shared  basis  with  its  Moviline  distributors; 
(iv)  specific  information:  through  its  experience 
with  Moviline,  it has  specific  infonnatin  on 
the  calling  habits  of Spanish  subscribers,  by 
consumer  categories  and  region.  Moreover, 
since it also enjoys a dominant position in the 
supply of fixed links. for the networks of GSM 
operators, it will continue to obtain important 
infonnatiC)n on traffic  flows~ In reality there is 
currently no realistic alternative for the ·second 
operator other than the Telef6nica de Espana 
network; 
(v)  economies  of  scale  for  infrastructure:  Tele-
f6nica de Espana was until June 1996 the. sole 
licensee of fi~ed voice telephony services and 
is  currently  the  sole  operator  active  in  that 
market. Telef6nica de· Espana was  also until 3 
Oc~ber  1995 the sole operator of mobile tele-
phony. ·As  a  result  of  this,  Telef6nica  de 
Espada has  h.ad  sites and aerials available for 
establishing its  GSM. network  which  are  ·not 
available to its competitor. In addition, certain 
autonomous·  communities  subsidise  the  de-
velopment  of  the  1.nalog  radiotelephony 
network in those areas where there is an insuf-
ficient  ~re network  (via  the  TRAC.project). 
Contrastingly, the second operator is,  as described, 
operating  under  more  onerous  constraints  than 
Telef6nica  de  Espada  as  a  result  of  the  initial 
payment mentioned above. 
If Telef6nica  de  Espana  extended  its  dominant 
position on the market in wire telephony or analog 
mobile  telephony into the  market in GSM  radio-
telephony by increasing the  costs  of its  rival  (for 
example  by  imposing  interconnection  charges 
which were not justified by the costs involved~ that 
would infringe Article 86. Th_e same analysis would 
apply if· there is  one market for all  mobile radio-
telephony  services  and  Telef6nica  de  Espana 
strengthened  its  position  in  that  market  in  the 
same  way. 
(21)  Under Article 90 (I) of the BC Treaty, Spain  mus~ 
refrain  from  enacting  measures  which  would,  by 
increasing the costs of access of the sole  rival  of a 
public undertaking on a  market newly  opened to 
competition, significantly distort  this  competition. 
Given  the additional financial  burden imposed on 
its only competitor, Telef6nica de Espana will have 
the  choice  between  two  commercial  strategies  of 
which each would  be  a violation  of Article 90  (1) 
read  in  conjunction  with  Article  86.  Those 
commercial  strategies  are:  either  (i)  to  extend  or 
strengthen  its  dominant  position;  or (ii)  to  limit 
production,  markets  or  technical  development 
within .the  meaning of Article  86  (b). 
{i)  Extension (1)  or  strengthening  of  the 
dominant position of the public under-
taking 
The  inifial  payment  of  PTA .85 000  million 
made  by the  second  operator on  this  market 
will  necessarily  have  to  be  covered  from 
income.  The  second  operator  will  therefore 
have  difficulties  in  competing  with  the  first 
operator  through  lower  tariffs.  The  first 
operator, Telef6nica de  Espana, which does not 
have  to  make  the same  payment  and  which, 
moreover, is aware of the. second operator's cost 
~cture through its current dominance in the 
market for infrastructure, could be  encouraged 
to extend its current dominant position on the 
fixed  infras,tructure  market  and  the  analogue 
mobile  telephony  market "into  the  market  in 
GSM  radiotelephony by  reducing its  tariffs.  If 
there  is  only  one  market  for  radiotelephony 
services, instead of an extension there would be 
a strenathening of Telef6nica de BsP&Aa's dom-
inant position  in this  market. 
Moreover, Telef6nica de  Espaiia  could use  the 
PTA 85 000 million saving made to extend its 
distribution network, to price its services aggres-
(')  See,  for  example,  the Judgment of  the  Court of Justice  in 
Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C289/90, Kingdom of 
Spain,  Kingdom  of Btlgium and Italian Rtpuhlic u  Com-
mirfsion,  [1992)  ECR  1-5833,  paragraph  36.  · 
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sively in the GSM market where it faces compe-
tition from the second operator, to make special 
offers to potential subscribers and/or to conduc;t 
intensive  advertising  campaigns  for  eXample. 
The choice of this strategy induced by the State 
measure could threaten · the economic viability 
of the second  operator. 
Thus,  Telef6nica  de  Espana  1s  m  a  position 
where  it could extend  or strengthen  its  dom-
inant  position  thanks  to  the  competitive  ad-
vantage provided by the distortion of the costs 
structure  resulting  from  the  initial  payment. 
This  renders  the  State  measure  contrary  to 
Article 90 read in conjunction with .Article 86. 
(ii)  Limitation of production, mark.ets or of 
technical  development  within  the 
meaning  <;>f  Article  8 6  (b) 
The need to  finance  PTA  85 000  million will 
delay the investments .of the new entrant, which 
will  have  to  use  part  of  its  initial  capital  to 
cover the initial  payment, which will  therefore 
not be  available  either for  appropriate  invest-
ment in the development of its network or for 
tariff  reductions.  The  second  operator  was 
indeed obliged to increase  its capital by some 
PTA 40 000 million in February 1996 .in order 
to be able  to follow  its  investment  plan. 
That·  might  81so  encourage  Telef6nica · -de 
- Espana to delay the development of the GSM 
radiotelephony network and to  concentrate its 
efforts  on  the  Moviline  analog  system.  The 
Moviline  system  is  more  attractive  since  the 
'· bulk: ·of  the  investments  have  already  been 
amortized· and it has  better coverage. 
The initial irivestment for  establishing a  GSM 
network  in  Spain  amounts  to  about  PTA 
250 000  million.  The  initial  payment,  when 
added  to.  the  initial  investment,  therefore 
increase$  the  second  operator's  need  for  fin-
ancing by  more than  one-third. The fact  that 
applicants  for  the  second  col)cession  :were 
aware of the future distortion of competitiort on 
the GSM  market in Spain  in  favour. of Tele-
f6nica  de  Bspaila does  not affect the existence 
of an imbalance. Undertakings which .wished to 
enter the market had no choice but to take this 
handicap  into account in their business  plan. 
In the second· hypothesis, Telef6nica de Espana 
which, as has been pointed out, is aware of the 
second  operator's  ·cost  structure· through  its 
dominant position in the infrastructure  ma~ket, 
might be encouraged to retain higher tariffs for 
its GSM  services  than it would in the absence 
of the State measure in question. It could limit 
production, markets  or technical  development 
wi~in the meaning of Article_ 86 (b) as  regards 
GSM, which involyes a more advanced techno-
logy,  to  the  benefit  of  the  older  analogue 
service.  'this  would  delay  the  move  towards 
perso.nal  communications  combining  mobile 
and fixed networks, which will only be  possible 
if  the  tariffs  for  mobile  communications  fall 
substantially. 
The  fact  that  Telef6nica  de  Espana  could 
behave in this way would  be  a consequence of 
the fact that, on the one hand, it benefits from 
a favourable position as a result of its monopoly 
over the Moviline  system  and is  granted suffi-
cient wavebands  to  continue  this  service,  and, 
on  the  other,  the  Spanish  Government  has 
financially  penalized  the  only  undertaking 
authorized  to  establish  a  competing  GSM 
service.  The delayed  roll-out  of  the  GSM  and 
the resulting limitation of technical progress to 
the detriment of consumers would therefore be 
caused by the State measure in question, that is 
the imposition of the  PTA  85 000  million  fee 
on  the second operator alone. 
The Commission has adopted a similar analysis in 
a case involving an initial payment in Italy. Having 
demanded corrective  measures  without  result,  the 
Commission  adopted  Decision  95/489/EC 
a4d~  to  Italy under Article  90 (3)  of the  EC 
T~aty  (1).  The  Commission  has  since  been 
informed that such corrective measures  have  been 
taken  or are  in the  process  of being taken. 
In accordance .  with  the  ase-law of  the Court of 
Justice (21  Article 90 (1)  precludes  M:ember  States 
from .  enacting measUres  likely to cause an under-
taking to infrinse the provisi9ns to wi_lich  it refers, 
in ·particular, in the case in point, those contained 
in Article  86.  · 
In cc)nclqsion.  under either  hypothesis,  the  State 
measure concerned· is contrarY ·to Article 90 (1) read 
in Conjunction  with Article  86  of  the Treaty. 
(1)  OJ No  L.  280,  23.  11.  1995,  p.  49. 
(2)  See. for example, Case  C-41/90, H6fntr. ~ Maaotron, (1991] 
BCR  1-1.979~ Case C260/89, Ellinili1' Radiophonia Tiltorassi 
Anonimi u Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis and Others, (1991] 
BCR 1·2925, and Case C323/93, Sot:iltl civile a:.ricolt il'insl-
mination tk Ia Crup_eiWCooplratiw d'lltvagt tt•d'inslmina-
tiora •rtifkilllt ·au lllpartnnmt tk Ia Maymnt, [1994)  ECR 
1-5077.  . 
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(22)  Member States are liable pursuant to Article 90 (I) 
and Article 86 of the Treaty. only where the beha-
viour  of  the  company  in  question .  is  capable  of 
affecting  trade  between  Member  States.  Trade 
between  Member States  could be affected  here for 
the  following  reasons: 
Any  extension · or  strengthening  of  Telef6nica  de 
Espana's  dominant position  as  well.as any limita-
tion  of production,  markets  or  technical  develop-
ment  in  relation  to  GSM  is  likely  to  delay  the 
process  of progressive  reduction of tariffs  for GSM 
telephony.  In  fact,  in  the  absence  of  the  initial 
payment  of  PTA  85 000  million  imposed  on  the 
second  operator,  price  competition  would  have 
been  stronger  ·since  the  introduction  of  GSM 
services in Spain and GSM tariffs would have fallen 
more  quickly: 
- if  GSM  tariffs  do  not  fall  as  quickly  as  they 
would  have  done  in  the  absence  of  the State 
measure in question, residents in other Member 
States  will  be .less  likely  to  take  out subscrip-
tions with Spanish operators as an alternative to 
other national  or· foreign  operators.  By  way  of 
illustration,  a  business  or  individual  based  in 
France  will  not be  encouraged  to  purchase  a 
Spanish SIM card and to  make  calls using the 
card  under  the  roaming  agreements  between . 
operators, because Spanish tariffs are not as low 
as  they  would  have  been  had  the  second 
operator been able to use the initial. payment of 
PTA  85 000  million  to  reduce  its  tariffs, 
- any  delay  in  the  process  of  reducing  tariffs 
would in tum delay the development of mobile 
telephony services  such  8$  improved subscrip-
tion terms  and conditions and more advanced 
technical services described above. This would 
discourase new investments in the Spanish tele-
,/  communication  .  services  markets  by  under-
talqnss , established  in  other  Member  States 
where there is effective competition and where 
new services  have  emerged, 
- any  delay  in  the  process  of  steadily  reducing 
tariffs may reduce generally the level of interna-
tional  telephone  traffic  from  Spain.  Under-
takings and individuals with large  mobile tele-
communications needs will tend to subscribe to 
foreip operators or to use •can back' systems in 
order to take advantage of lower tariffs in other 
Member States, 
(~) 
- any  limitation  of  production,  markets  or  of 
technical  development. within  the meaning ·of 
Article 86 (b)  may reduce  the level  of .imports 
from  oU1er  Member States  of 
0 technical equip-
ment  required  for  investment  in  the  mobile 
telephony  market  and  for  development of  an 
effective  and efficient  infrastructure. 
The reply of the Spanish authorities 
The Spanish  Government has  made  the  followin£ 
submissions  to  the  CommisSion:  ... 
- under the  terms  of  the  concession  granted  by 
the  Spanish  Government  to  Telef6nica  de 
Espana in 1991, Telef6nica de  Espana obtains a 
GSM  concession without any further payment. 
Therefore,  the  Spanish  Government  cannot 
impose  an  initial  payment  of·  PTA  85 000 
million  on  Telef6nica  de  Espana.  Further  the 
Spanish  Government  argued,  whilst  rejecting 
the principle of  compensation, that the relevant 
figure  for  the  initial  payment  was  PTA 
SO 095 000  million  rather·  than  PTA  85 000 
million. It argued  that Airtel  M6vil  had  raised 
the original fee requested from PTA 50 095 000 
million to PTA 8S 000 million itself without an 
obligation  to  do  so.  The  minimum  initial 
payment imposed by law was  PTA  SO 09S 000 
million and that was the figure to be taken into 
account,  . 
- the  Spanish  Government  considered- that  a 
possible  solution would  be a  reduction in  the 
'interconnection tariffs  for  the  duration  of  the 
1  5-year licence, 
- finally, the Spanish Government also  proposed 
to .transfer  ~  Telef6nica Servicios  M6viles  the 
cost of  the TRAC  project. 
The Commission's assessment 
(24)  Although the secOnd operator its4;lf offered a fee of 
PTA  85 000  .million,  the  Commission  disagrees 
with  the  argument  that  the  i~itial  payment  was 
voluntary since it was one of the selection criteria 
in the tendering procedure (1). Bach tenderer had to 
offer the highest initial payment possible under its 
. business  plan  to  have  a  chance  of  winning  the 
(1)  Case C-272/91,  Commissio~  fJ.i
1
1talJ, (1994] BCR 1-1409, para-
graph  11.· 
I  60 • 
No  L  76/28  Official Journal of  the  European  Communities  18.  3.  97 
concession. Only some indication as to the .  relative 
weight  that  would  be  attached  to  the  different 
selection criteria was given. The most clear indica-
tion was given with respect to the minimum initial 
payment. The initial  payment was  thus one of the 
selection  criteria  under  the  tendering  procedure 
and it was  payable on the ~ate that the concession 
· was signed. It is, therefore, clearly a State measure. 
The  selection  procedure  for  the  second · GSM 
operator was not in reality a tendering procedure as 
such.  The  selection  procedure  in  Spain  was  a 
hybrid  combining  the  characteristics  of  compar,. 
ative  bids  and  a  tender.  One  of  th~  criteria 
compared was ·the initial payment which the appli-
cant  offered  to  pay  on  obtaining  the  second 
concession. It Wa.s  therefore difficult to know which 
of  the  criteria  were  essential.  The  fact  that  the 
concession was awarded in the absence of any clear 
indication  implies 'that  any  of  them  could  have 
-been  of importance. 
(25)  The Commission does  not accept  that the reduc-
tion  in  interconnection  tariffs  proposed  by  th~ 
Spanish  Government  would  restore  the  level 
playing  field,  because  the  Spanish  Government 
refused to consider an asymmetric tariff reduction 
in  favo1:1r  of the second operator alone. 
(26)  The solution  offered  by the Spanish Government 
whereby inv.estments  in the TRAC project would 
offset the second operator's initial payment cannot 
be  accepted in the  present circumstances. 
Apart from  the fact  that the information proVided 
by the Spanish authorities· does not allow a proper 
evaluation of the teal impact of such investments, 
and that it is not possible to ensure that this solu-
tion  is  anything  more. than  a  pure  accounting 
operation, the solution cannot be  accepted at this 
stage since the provision of a universal service  by 
·  Telef6nica  de  Bspaila,  including  the  service  in 
remote  areas,  is  in  the  current  circumstances 
balanced  out  by  the  exclUsive  or  special  rights 
granted  to  Telefonica  de  Espana.  Moreover,  in 
'implementing  the  TRAC  system,  Telefonica  de 
Espana  has  benefited  from  public  subsidies  in-
cluding ERDF aids. 
(27)  The  Commission  considers  that  in  this  case  the . 
obligation imposed on the second Spanish operator 
alone to make the initial  payment of PTA 85 000 
million is incompatible with Article 90 (1) together 
with  Article  86. 
(28)  The aim of this procedure is to cause the Spanish 
Government to  take the necessary steps to remove 
the  distortion  of  competition;  the  most  obvious 
step  would  be  to  reimburse  sum  paid  by  Ainel 
M6vil. 
If  the  Spanish  Government  so  requests,  the 
Commission  would  be  prepared  to  examine 
whether the infringement could be terminated  by 
adopting other corrective  measures,  provided  that 
they properly balance out the disadvantage suffered 
by  th_e  second  operator. 
It is  incumbent upon the Spanish  Government .to 
make  proposals  in  this  respect.  The  Spanish 
Government should in any case  provide figures  !or 
such  proposals,  showing  that  they  properly  offset 
the  PTA  85 000  million  paid  by  the  second 
opetator. 
However, imposing on Telef6nica Servicios M6vi!es 
an  identical  payment would  not be  considered  an 
adequate  compensatory  measure  in  the  present 
circumstances,  in  particular  as  long  as  no  cost 
accounting is  implemented serving  to  ensure  that 
the  burden  of  such  payment  is  allocated  to 
Movistar only. 
(29)  Certain  corrective  measures  have  already  been 
mentioned during bilateral  talks  with  the  Spanish 
Government: 
(i)  granting Airtel  M6vil  access  to  Telef6nica  de 
Espana's  TACS  900  customer database,  while 
maintaining  the  confidentiality  of  personal 
data; 
(ii)  revision  of the  tariff conditions  on an  asym-
metrical  basis  for  interconnection with  Tele-
fonica de Espana's switched telephone network; 
(iii)  non-discriminatory accesS  by both Telef6nica 
Servicios M6viles GSM service and Airtel Movil 
to the same  number of GSM  frequencies  in-
cluding the acceleration of the liberalization of 
the GSM  frequencies  currently used  by  Tele-
f6nica  de  Espana  for  its  analog service; 
(iv)  extending  the  duratio.n  of  Airtel  M6vil'  s 
concession  in  line  with  the  recent  Spanish 
decision regarding the cable television licences. 
Moreover, the revocation of the concession already 
granted to Airtel M6vil can in no circumstances be 
considered  to  be  an  appropriate  remedy  for  the 
breach.  It  would  eliminate  the  only  existing 
competitor to Telef6nica Servicios  Moviles  on  the 
GSM  market and the. monopoly enjoyed by  Tele-
f6nica de Espana for analog mobile telephony and 
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GSM services during the pei:iod necessary for a new 
ten~ering  procedure  would  render  competition 
even  more  difficult  as  a  result  of  the  extra  time 
advantage. 
Article 90  (2), 
(30)  Article  90  (2)  of  the  Treaty  provides  that under-
takings entrusted with  the operation  of services  of 
general  economic  interest are  subject  to  the  rules 
on competition, in so far as the application of such 
rules does not obstruct the  performance, in law  or 
in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The 
Spanish Government has  not relied  on this  provi-
sion to. justify imposing the initial  payment on the 
second  operator  alone. 
The .Commission considers, for its part, that in this 
case  a  derogation  under  Article  90  (2)  is  not 
warranted,  because  there  are  no  factors  to  support 
the conclusion that th.e  initial  payment is  justified 
by the performance in  law or in  fact of a service of 
general  economic  interest. 
CONCLUSION 
(31)  In view of the foregoing, the Commission considers 
that  the  competitive  disadvantage  in  the  form  of 
the  initial  p~yment  imposed  on  the  second 
operator alone for its concession  to operate a GSM 
network  in  Spain  constitutes  an  infringement  of 
Article  90  (1)  of  the  Treaty  read  in  conjunction 
with  Article  86, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION:  .. 
Article 1 
Spain shall take the steps necessary to remove the distor-
tion. of competition  resulting  from  the  initial  payment 
imposed on Ainet· M6vil  SA  and  to secure equal condi-
tions for operators of GSM radiotelephony on the Spanish 
market. by  24 April  1997  at· the  latest  by: 
(i)  reimbursing  the  initial  payment  imposed  on  Airtel 
M6vil,  or 
(ii)  adopting,  after  receiving  the  agreement  of  the 
Commission,  corrective  measures  equivalent  in 
economic terms  to  the obligation imposed  upon  the 
second  GSM  operator. 
The  measures  finally  adopted  shall  not  undermine  the 
competition  resulting  from  the  authorization  of  the 
sec-ond  GSM  operator on  29  December  1994. 
Article  2 
Spain shall inform the Commission within three months 
following notification of this Decision of the steps  it  has 
taken  to  comply with  it. 
Article J 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to  the  Kingdom  of  Spain. 
Done  at  Brussels,  18  December  1996. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIBRT 
Member  of the  Commission 
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Communication by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the status 
and implementation of Directive 90/388/EEC o'n competition in the markets for telccomm.uni-
c:ations  services 
(95/C 275/02) 
(Tat with EEA relmaocc) 
I.  INTRODUCnON 
The purpose 
Commission Directive 90/388/EEC was published on 28 
June  1'990  (hereafter referred  to  as  either 'the Services 
Directive' or 'the Directive). It has come to be identified 
as  a  cornerstone of the  EU framework  for  liberalizing 
the European telecommunications market. The Council, 
in  its  resolution  of  22  July  1993 (')  emphasized  the 
importance  of  rapid  implementation.  The  resolution 
noted  that  'there  is  a  need  for  rapid  and  effective 
implementation of the current regulatory environment, in 
particular Directive 90/388/EEC'. 
It is within this context that the Commission submits this 
COmmunication  On  the StatUS  and implementation of the 
Directive (2). 
The communication has  three related purposes ('): 
(i)  description  and  explanation  of the  current State  of 
implementation; 
(ii)  identification and clarification of central issues; 
(iii)  placing the Directive in  the conteXt of the package 
of reforms focused on the 1998 deadline, according 
to the  1993  Council resolution whiah  'supportS the 
Commission's intention to prepare, before 1 January 
1996, the necessary amendmentS  to the Community 
regulatory  framework  in  order to  achi~e liberal-
ization of all  public  voice  telephony services  by  1 
January 1998'. 
(')  Council resolution 93/C231/01. 
(1)  This communications does not cover related subjecu of EU 
telecommunication  poli'cy  such  as  the  application  of open 
network provision to leased lines. These subjecu are covered 
extensively  in  other  recent  communications.  See  Green 
Paper  on  the  Liberalization  of  telecommunications  infra-
structUre and cable television networks, Part 1/ll, COM(94) 
440;  COM(94)  682  and  communication  on  Present  status 
and future approach for open access  to telecommunications 
networks  and services  (open  network provision),  COM(94) 
513. 
(')  It should be noted that this communication does not replace 
in any way the formal procedures foreseen under the Treaty 
to ensure the full implementation of Community Law. 
The context 
The  Services  Directive  set  down  four  dates  by  which 
specific provisions had to be  implemented: 
- 31  December  1990,  for  the  opening  up  to 
competition  of  telecommunications  services  other 
than  voice  telephony  a11:d  the  simple  resale  of 
capacity, 
- 1 July 1991, for putting in place an in dependant body 
responsible  for  the  granting  of  licences  and  the 
surveillance of usage conditions, 
·~ 
- 30 June 1992, for .the  no~ification of any licensing or 
declaration procedures for the provision of packet or 
circuit-switched data services for the public, 
- 31  December  1992,  for  the  opening  up  to 
competition of the simple resale of capacity('). 
Parliament  resolution  AJ-0113/93  of  20  April  1993 
c~lled on the Commission· to prepare the liberalization of 
both  intra-Community  as  well  as  domestic  voice 
telephony and to adopt as soon as  possible the necessary 
m~res  to  take  full  advantage  of the  potential  of the 
existing  infrastructUre  of cable  networks  for  telecom-
munications  services  and  to.  abolish  without  delay  the 
existing  restrictions  on  the  use  of cable  networks  for 
non-reserved  services  as  well  as  to  adopt  measures  to 
obtain optimum utilization of the cross-border telecom-
munications  networks  of railway·  operators  and  elec-
tricity producers ('). 
Council resolution 93/C 213/01  set out a  timetable  for 
the  development  of telecommunications  and  confirmed 
the date of 
- 1 · January  1998  for  the  liberalization  of  voice 
telephony services for the general public('). 
(
4
)  The  Directive  also  foresaw  the  possibility  of  ~nting 
deferment, until  1 January 1996, of ihe date for prohibition 
on the simple  resale  of capacity in  those  Member States in 
which the network for the provision of the packet or circuit 
switehed services was not yet sufficiendy developed. 
('}  OJ No C 150, 31. 5.  1993, p.  42. 
(')  Although some Member States with less developed networks 
(i.e.  Spain,  Ireland,  Greece  and  Ponugal)  are  granted  an 
additional  transition  period  of up  to fiVe  years.  V  cry small 
networks· (Luxembourg) can also, where justified, be granted 
a period of up to two years. 
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On  17  November  1994  the  Council  adopted  a  further 
resolution confirming the date of 
- 1 January 1998 also for the liberalization of telecom-
munications infrastructUre (1). 
Following the Commission's action plan of 19 July 1994, 
published  under  the  title  'Europe's  way  to  the 
information society, an action plan'('), the Union is now 
profoundly engaged in  the  policy  of implementing  the 
information  society.  These  resolutions,  the  conclusions 
of the  Eu~pean Council  at  Corfu (')  as  well  as  the 
communication by the  Commission on the consultation 
on the Green Paper on Mobile and personal communi-
cations ("')  ·and  the  results  of the  ongoing consultation 
on the Green Papers on Infrastructure (part 1/II) (I') will 
·set  a  framework  for  carrying  forward  the  further 
·amendments  to  the  services  Directive  towards  the  full 
liberalization  of the  telecommunications  sector.  In this 
context,  ongoing  review  of the  aauaJ  situation  in  the 
Member  States  will  be  intreasingly  important  in  the 
years leading up to the deadline. 
ll. CURRENT STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION 
(a)  General comment 
Member  States  were  required  to  .r  implement  the 
provisions  of the  Directive  and  to communicate  to  the 
Commission  the  relevant  measures  ·adopted,  by  31 
December 1990, 1 July 1991  and 31  December 1992 (12). 
All  Member States,  but two,  complied  with  the  notifi-
cation  .requirements ('.s).  In  order  to  assess  effective 
implementation of Oirective 90/388/EEC in the·various 
Member  States  however,  a  checklist  identifying  the 
essential constituent elements  was  established.  ~though 
(')  With  derogations  as  above,  see  Council  reselution  of 22 
December  1994  on  the  principles  and  timetable  for  the 
liberalization  of  telecommunications  infrasuucwres, 
(94/C 379/03); OJ No C 379, 31. 12. 1994, p. 4. 
(')  COM(94) 347. 
n· Conclusions  of the  European  Council,  Corfu,  24-25  June 
1994. 
('') Towards the J>ersonal communications environment: Green 
Paper on  a Common  approach  in  the  field  of mobile  and 
penonal  communications  in  the.  European  Union 
(COM(94) 145 fmal). 
( 11)  Op. ciL 
( 11)  AJ  mentioned,  the  exceptions  to  the  31.  12.  1990 deadline 
relate  to  (a)  specifications  regarding  simple  resale  of data 
services,  31.  12.  1992;  and  (b)  the  seuing  up  of an  inde-
pendent regulator, 1. 7.  1991. 
(u) Italy  (provisions  only  included  in  the  uggt Comunitaria 
1994  are  incomplete),  and  Greece  (measures  necessary  to 
render  the  independent  rqulatory  authority  operational 
have still not been notified). 
this  docs  not represent  an  exhaustive  list,  progress  in 
.  effective  implementation  can  best  be  measured  against 
the following issues (14): 
- defini~on of  'voi~  tel~phony' for. which  currendy 
exclusive  and  spec1al  nghts  can  snll  be  maintained 
according to the provisions of the DireCtive ('1), 
- continuation of any other exclusive rights; 
access  by service  providers  to  transmission/  routing 
on PSTN and leased lines; 
conditions  imposed via  any licensing  or declaration 
scheme in existence; 
transp~en7>" and ope~ness ?f  pr~ccdure for granti~g 
authonzaaon, 
·-
- conditions  for  simple· resale ·of leased  eapacity  for 
data communications; 
notification (within deadline) of any special licensing 
regime regarding such resale;  . 
justification of any special regime ("), 
- conditio~·  of open access to public networks (formal 
· ·  and effective);  . 
av~ilability of leased lines within a reasonable time; 
justification for  usage  restrictions  (if any)  on leased 
lines, 
- justification for any restrictions on the processing of 
data (before or after public network transmission ('1); 
ensurance  by  the  Member  States  of non-discrimi-
nation  in  usage  conditions  and  charges  between 
service providers (including the TO), 
- separateness and independence of effective and oper-
ational regulatory body; 
inclusion  within · its  tasks  o~:  granting  .licences, 
surveying  usage  conditions;  control  of  type  ap-
('•)  For the issues listed see in particular Aniclcs  1, 2,  3, 4,  S, 6 
and 1 of the Directive. 
(u) Subject to the  time  deadlines set by the  Council resolution 
of 22 July 1993.  · 
(") i.e. by the.pro'Visions set down in Articles 2 and 3. 
('') They  must  be  demonstrated  as  necessary  for  essential 
requiremenu or public policy. 
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proval  and  mandatory specifications,  and allocation 
of frequencies. 
On the basis of .these points the Commission has· found 
that  the  extent  to  which  the  Directive  has  been 
effectively ·implemented (
11
)  throughout  the  Union  still 
varies significantly between the Member ·States. Various 
Member States will  need to undenake further measures 
before  the  Commission  may  consider  the  Directive 
correctly implemented ("). 
(b)  formal procedures 
AJ  far as  is  poss~ble the Commission has sought to deal 
with  remaining  implementation  issues  via  bilateril 
communication and negotiation with the Member States 
concerned.  This  has  proved  particularly  efficient  (for 
both parties) where information requested is prompt and 
transparent,  and  where  the  will  to  find  a  workable 
solution rapidly is evident.  · 
Where  implementation  problems  cannot  be  solved  by 
informal negotiation within a  reasonable timeframe,  the 
Commission  is  obliged  tO  commence  with  the  formal 
procedure  for  non-implementation  of  a  Directive,  as 
provided  for by Article  169 of the Treaty (ID). 
..  Currently, a nu.mber of formal procedures are underway. 
Two  concern  Member  States'  failure .r  to  notify  all 
requited national implementing legislation(''). A further 




( 11)  Offici:Ll  notification  does  not  necessarily  mean  effective 
implementation.  ·  · 
('1 Section  III of this  communication  goes  into  this  in more 
deWI. Comments on the individual Member States' progress 
is provided in the Annex.  · 
M Article 169 of the EC Treaty de:1ls with failure to fulfil  an 
obliption  under  the  rules  of the  Treaty,  including  the 
.implementation of Directives. 
Under  Article  169  of  t', ~  Treaty,  ·the  procedure  is  :u 
follows:  · 
(i)  The Commission seu out the points at issue by letter of 
'formal notice'  arid  invites  the  relevant  Member State 
to submit iu observations. 
(ii)  If  the  Member  State  does  not  put  an  end  tO  the 
infringement,  the  Commission  gives. a  (non-:binding) 
reasoned opinion explaining iu views  and  inviting  die 
Member States to take the appropriate measures within 
a faed period. 
(iii} If  the  Member  State  does  not  comply  with  the 
reasoned  opinion  within  the  given  period,  the 
Commission may bring the matter l>efore the European 
Court of Justice. 
(") Italy and Greece. 
(I') Germany and Spain. 
(c)· Exteasioa.  to  the  European  Economic  Area  aad 
cetltral~:J~d  ·  eastem Europ~  States 
. In  accordance  with  the  EE.A  Agreement,  the  Services 
Directive  (including  amendments)  also  applies  to  the 
EEA Member States as of 1 July 1994 (~). 
Since the Services Directive only specifics the application 
of Article  90 in  conjunction with Articles  59  and 86  of 
the  Treaty  and  the  Europe  Agreements  and  Interim 
Agreements which the Union has signed with six central 
and  eastern  European  .countries  contain  similar 
provision,  the general  principles  of  this  Directive  (and 
any  amendments)  are  also  of  relevance  to  these 
countries. 
ill. SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
Five main areas have emerged during the implementation 
of the DirectiYe as requiring specific attention: 
(a). general issues related tO voice services; 
(b)  enforcement_of the voice telephony monopoly; 
(c)· corporate Q.etworks and closed user groups (GUGs); 
(d)  d~ta services for the public; 
(c)  the sep~tion of operation and regulation. 
(a)  General issues related to voice services 
Although  the Directive defines  in detail  the  concept of 
'voice telephony' (2'), various  is~es have  arisen (
25
)  over 
just what  is  considered  tO  be  'voice  telephony'  in .  the 
(") Under the  Competition  Annex  (XIV)  of the  Agreement, 
Article 90 (3) Directives in the telecommunications field i.e. 
the  Services  Direccive  and  the  Terminals  Directive 
(88/30 1/EEC)  became  applicable  tO  the  EE.A  Member 
States  on  t' July  1994,  :u  well  as  subsequent  amending 
Direccives,  e. J·  amendi~g  _DireCtive  94/46/EEC  with 
regard to satelbte commu01caaons.  · 
(u)  According  to  Article  1  of the  Directive  'voice  telephony 
means the commercial provision for the public of the direct 
transport  and  switching  of speech  in  real-time  betWeen 
public  switched  network  tennination  points,  enabling 
any  user  to  use  equipment  connected  to  such  a  network 




)  See  also  European Court decision  ECR-1  5833  which  has 
guided the Commission in the elaboration of the definition 
·  of exclusive and special rights (see below) .. 
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individual  Member  States  and,  hence,  the ·degree  to 
which  special  or exclusive  rights (26
}  on voice  services 
had to be abolished (
2
'). 
According to the  Servi~ Directive, the Member States 
ensure  the  abolition of special  and exclusive  rights  for 
the  provision  of telecommunication  services  other than 
the voice  telephony service.  In  each  case  it has  to  be 
examined  on  the  basis  of ·the  criteria  set  out  below 
whether a  given service. is  a voice  telephony service.  In· 
order  to  allow  the  relevant  national  regulatory  auth-
.  orities  to  assess  the  envisaged  service,  the  service 
providers  may be required to provide  all  the necessary 
information (2
1
).  .  . 
A regulatory approach that identifies  only a  limited set 
of permissible,  non-reserved services  qoes  not conform 
to the requirements of the Directive. · 
A  voice  service  may  be  reserved  under  national  legis-
lation  only  if.  it  includes  all  of  the  elements  of  the 
Conimunity voice  telephony definition,  i. e.  it must  be 
provided  on  a  commercial  basis  to  the  public  for  the 
purpose of direct transport and switching  of speech  in 
real  time  between public Switched. network termination . 
points.  · 
(•) According  to  Article  2  of amending  Directive  94/46/EC 
(see Section IV):  ·  · 
'exclusive  rights'  means  the  ri~hts that  are  granted  by  a 
Member State to one undertaking through any legislative, 
rcgulatoty  or  administrative  instrUment,  reserving  it  the 
right to provide a. telecommunications service or undertake 
an activity within a given geographical area, 
'special  rights'  means  the  rights  that  are  granted  by  a 
Member State to a limited number of undertakinr through 
any  l~lative,  regulatoty  or  adminisuacive  UlSU'Ument 
which, within a given geographical area: 
- limits to two or more the number of undertakings auth-
orized  to  provide  a  service  or undertake  an  activity, 
otherwise than  accoz:din~ to objective, proportional and 
non-discriminatoty critcna, or  · 
- designateS,  otherwise  than· according  to  such  criteria, 
·  sevetal competing undenakings  as  being  authorized  to 
provide a senice or undenake an activity, or 
- confers on any undertakiftg(s), otherwise than according 
to such  criteria,  legal  or re~ty  advanuges  which 
· substantially affect me ability of any other undertaking. 
to provide  the  same  telecommunications  senice or to 
undenake  the  same  activity  in  the  same  geographical 
area under substantially· equivalent conditions. 
(II) According  to  Article  2 of the  Directive,  'Member States 
shall widldraw all special or exclusive rights for the supply 
of telecommunications services. other thin voice  telepnony 
J 
( 11)  This will  in particular be  the case concerning the provision 
of voice  services  to · closed  user  groups  on  leased  lines 
networks connected at different endS  to die public switched 
necwork..  In this  case  some  national  regulatory authorities 
request deuiled information, such as  clients ~.  draft 
advertisements, envisaged tariffs .•.  , to assess me naaare of 
the envisaged service.  · 
It is  useful to consider the significance of each of these 
elements: 
This requires  that the simple  technical  non-commercial 
provision  of a telephone connection between  two  users 
should  be  authorized.  'Commercial'  should  be 
understood  in  the  common  sense  of  the  word,  i. e. 
provided  against  payment  and  with  the  intention  of 
making a profit (or at least of covering all variable costS 
and  making  a  contrib~tion to  existing  fixed  costS).  A 
leased  line,  for  example,  made  aVailable  on  a  cost-
sharing basis between one or more users  wo~ld only be 
considered  a  commercial  activity ·if  additional  capacity 
were leased specifically to allow resale. 
It  also  me~s  .  that  companies  sho"!ld  be  free  to  po9l 
resources,  1. e.  to rent leased lines  arid benefit from  the 
flat rate rental. This pennits a more efficient use of the 
telephone network and, in  particular, benefits small and 
medium-sized enterprises  (SMEs) (2'). 
'for the public' 
· The term 'for the public'· is  not defined in  the Directive 
and mUst  be  understood in its common sense: a service 
for the public is  a service available to all members of  'the 
public on the same basis. 
Particular  examples  of  services  which  should  not  be 
considered •for the public'  t  and thus should not be made 
subject to special or exclusive ·rights, are those provided 
over corporate networks  and/  or to closed  user groups. 
Corporate  networks  and  closed  user  groups  (CUGs) 
cover  a  number  of telecommunications  services,  both 
voice  and  data.  They are  fundamental. to the  Services 
Directive ·particularly because they fall outside the scope 
of the voice service which Member StateS may reserve to 
their telecommunications organizations. 
The  particular  issues  associated  with  liberalization  of 
these  serVices  are discussed  in  more detail  below (lllc). 
(2')  A disadvantage  for  SMEs  existed  previously  because  they 
do . not  generally  use  the  switched  telephone  service 
sufficiendy  intensiVely  to  make  it worthwhile  for  them  to 
pay the {liigb)  flat rate rentals for leased lines. &  a c:onse-· 
quence,  leased  lines .  were,  in  practice;  resel"'ed  to  larger 
companies. 
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:ftom  and to  public switched network  termination points' 
'From  and  to  public  switched  netw"ork  termination 
points' ineans  ~at, to be reserved, the voice service has 
not only to be offered commercially and  to the public, 
but :Uso  to connect ·two network termination points pf 
the switched  network ('
0
)  at the same  time.  As  long as 
each customer of the service provider is  connected via a 
dedicated leased line, it is  possible to offer a commercial 
service which terminates on the public network("). The 
aim is,  again, to ease technical restrictions on the use of 
leased  lines.  In  this  way lines  may  be  ~sed for voice 
telephony offered to non-CUGs, as  long .  as  there is  no 
commercial  offer  of  'simple  resale'  'of  the  switChed 
telephone service, (
32
}. On the other hand, 'simple resale' 
may be legitimate when the service is  not offered to the 
public,.  but,  for  instance,  is  provided  to  a  closed  user 
. group ('"). 
. 
'direct transport and switching of  speech  in  real time' 
This  part  of  the  definition  excludes  any  store  aad 
forward or voice mail  applications from  being  reserve~. 
Least cost routing of telephone calls by a se.tVice provider 
on the public switched network or credit: card telephony, 
whereby access is  given to the vo~ce telephony service of 
a TO in the framework of a financia:l transaction service, 
are further examples of liberalized voice services as these 
do not constitute 'direct transport'. 
(H)  The public switched network is not formally defined in the 
Directive.  It must  be  given  its  common  meaning, i. c.,  the 
.  public  switched  tcl~hone network  (PSTN)  whiCh. is  the 
coUection  of switchang  and  transmission  facilities  used  by 
the telecommuniutions organization to provide the normal 
telephony service. 
( 11)  i.e.  as  Ions  as  they  are  conneCted  via  a dedicated  leased 
line,  CUStOmers  of a liberalized voice  service do  not neces· 
sarily need  to demonstrate a pre-existing leral or economic: 
relationship  with  the  recipients of their calfs.  This  is  often 
referred to as 'dial-out' service or 'one-ended' service. 
(,.) 'Sim_Pie  male" refers  to the situation where the call  is  both 
orit:mated  and  terminated on  the  public switched  network. 
It  as,  in  this  sense,  offered  to the  general  public since  the 
local  call  may  originate  from  any  user  of  the  public 
switched  network and  the  customer iuelf is  not connected 
by the service provider via a dedicated leased line.  '  . 
(I»)  Such  a  service  mav,  indeed,  include  feawrcs  requiring 
~ass such  as  teleworking,  out  of  office  hours  calls 
d1version,  paging,  Cenuex services  or when  small  business 
units, whose Call volume does not justify use of leased lines, 
need to communicate with each other. 
Since the reservation of voice services is  an exception to 
the general  rule of competition,  it must  be  interpreted 
narrowly.  When  new  voice  services  and  features  are 
introduced and meet demand which  is ·not satisfied  by 
the current telephone service,  they should  normally be 
considered non-reserved. H they are defjned as  reserved, · 
the burden of proof, as always should fall to the Member 
State to justify such a restriction (H). 
Calling card services offer a specific example of services, 
which  can,  from  the  point  of view  of the  users,  be 
considered  to  be  different  from  the  reserved  voice 
telephony service. They fall  outside the definition in as 
much as the calling .card service matches important needs 
. which ·th~ (normal) voice telephony does not meet,  for 
example  as  a  result  of  additional  features.  such  as 
payment via credit or· debit card,' least cost routing, desti-· 
nation $peed dialling etc. Where additional features such 
as these, rather thari possible lower-tariffs, are decisive in 
prompting users to tJSe  the calling·card service instead of 
voice  telephony,  the  service.  should  be  .  considered 
liberalized.  The  fact  that  a  calling  card  market  is 
emerging, although tariffs are in most· cases higher than 
those of voice telephony (u), is  eviden~ that there is  a 
calling  card  market  which  is  distinct  from  the  voice 
telephony  one.  Calling  card  providers  have  developed 
this  zteW  market tailoring the services  to the customers 
and billing them accordingly. This evolution creates new 
opportunities for the users in the Union and should not 
be delayed by· restrictions aimed at preserving the tradi-
..  tiona! voice telephony market. 
.The prohibition of leased line routing for the provision 
of calling  cat:d  services  would put providers  of calling 
card services at a competitive disadvantage in this market 
relative  to calling card providers with own facilities.  In 
the  absence  of  the  routing  facility  they  are  merely 
rescUers  of  voice  telephony  and  would  have  no 
('') To  aUow  the  relevant  national  regulatory  authorities  to 
usest the  ~nvisqed service, the applicants may be required 
.  tO  provide  them  with  all  the  necessary  information, 




)  'c:onuarv io widespread  belief,  cost saving  is  not the  main 
driver  (for  the  development  of  calling  card  services). 
Indeed,  calling  card  and  intemation:U  direct  dial  (100) 
tariff comparisons for calls  originating from  the  EC  reveal 
that  convenience  is  the  main  C:lrivin'  faetor  for  a  service 
essentially  targeted  at business  users.  See:  New  fonns  of . 
competinon  in  voice  telephony  services  in  the  European 
Community,  BIS Strategic Decisions,  Oetob~r 1993, study 
carried out for the European Commission. 
Additional  features,  such  as  billing  and  usage  convenience 
(no  local  currency ·required,  operator  speaking  the  same 
language)  seem  to  be  the  main  driving  factor  for  this. 
service  . 
l  67 10.10.95  Official Journal .of the European Communities  No C 275/7 
conuol  over  their  main  costS.  They  'could  therefore 
hardly compete with  the.  telecommunications  operators 
(TOs). TOs have  a  further advantage in that they can 
offer theii- customers  both voice  telephony and  calling 
card  services  and develop their card  service by building 
C?n  their database of high volume users.  \ 
Such a state of aff~irs would promote possible scenarios 
whereby  national  TO's  offering  calling  card  services 
would  limit  their  offer  to  residents  of  their  national 
territory  without.  entering  neighbouring  geographic 
markets. 
An  individual  assessment'· of the  envisaged  calling  card 
service  may,  however, be  necessary, in  particular of the 
additional  features  offe,red,  in  order to  determine  the 
nawre of the service  and upon which market it will be 
offered. The criteria used should be the degree of func-. 
tional  interchangeability  between  the  services  and  the 
possible  barriers  to  substitution.  Such  assessment  muSt 
take  into  account  the  specific  circumstances  of  the 
markets concerned. 
(b)  Enforcement of the voice  telephony ·monopoly in a 
h"beralized environment 
Since  certain  categories  of  voice  services·  have  been 
opened up to competition, and since such categories may 
not  be  defined  in  a  rigidly  technical  sense,  certain 
Member States feared that service providep would offer 
what is  in  effect 'voice  telephony'  and thereby by-pass 
the monopoly.  In fact,  experience  has  shown that such 
fears  were  not founded.  The main  reason  is  that such 
'unofficial'  by-pass  will' not  occur  to  any  significant 
extent  without  being  noticed  by  the  relevant  Member 
State. A service 'which is  offered to the public mUSt  be, 
ipso facto,  public knowledge. 
In  particular,  given  that  any  commercial  offer  would 
normally  involve  advertising  (of the  services  availa~le) 
or,  at the very. least,  iSsuing  price  lists,  contractS  and 
invoices,  s.uch  by-pass  should be  evident from  an early 
~~age. Furthermore, any breach leading to a  substantial 
diversion  of  traffic  on  to  a  competitor's  network  .is 
rapidly  detected  by  the ·public  operator  providing  the 
competitor's leased line capacity. The TO would clearly 
have an interest in bringing the situation to the attention 
of the appropriate national regulatory authority.  . 
In  the  framework  of  the  licensing  or  .declaration 
procedures,  various  Member  States,  however,  Still 
requeSt  the  applicant  to  provide  a  description  of the 
intended service. Where networks· are  connected to the 
public switched telephony network (PSTN), for example 
·  in  the  case  of voice  services  provided  on  leased  lines, 
Member  States  often  require  evidence  of  how  the 
applicant will prevent dial-in and dial-out facilities being 
available at the same time. It should be noted that, under 
Article  ~ of the Directive, technical resuictions may not 
be imposed  on the service  provider. It suffices  that the 
service provider clearly sets out in  the contracts, signed 
with its clients, the extent of services authorized. 
New  operators  generally  have  shown  that  they  will 
respect the voice telephony monopoly. Service providers 
do  not want to  take  the  risk  of having  their  author-
ization  revoked  or  having  the  ·national  regulatory 
authority  requesting  the  disconnection  of the  relevant 
leased lines  and ll()t being able. to fulfil  their obligations 
towards  their  clients.  Many  service  providers  did 
therefore,  before starting their services,  investigate  first 
the  matter with  the  national  regulatory  authorities  or 
with the Commission services.  . 
·-
(c)  Corporate networks ·and. closed user groups 
As  mentioned,  the  special  iss~e of corporate  networks 
and/  or closed user groups (CUGs) has been of parti_cular 
importance amongst the issues encountered in the course 
of implementation. of the Directive. 
Effective  liberalization .  of corporate networks and CUG 
services is, without doubt, critical for the development of 
advanced  business  communications  and  therefore  the 
competitiveness  of EU industry ois-a-tJis  its  conterpans 
.  in Japan &nd the United States. It is, thus, a central goal 
of  the  Directive.  The  economies  'of  competition,  and 
markets  themselves  are  becoming.  increasingly  global. 
Where business is denied the clear benefits of lower cost, 
and  increased  quality  and ·choice  which  competition 
ensures,  it  will  ultimately  either  suffer  from  the 
competitive disadvantage this implies, or, where possible, 
will seek to relocate to a less  restrictive environment. 
In this  context, the goals of the  Directive have  still  not 
been  achieved  in  a  number  of  Member  States.  Two 
reasons for this .  are:  . 
(i)  disputes as  to the extent of allowed •membership' of 
CUGs,  which  are  broader  than  ·strict  corporate · 
networks. This  has  led  to  lack of full  or effective 
implementation of the Directive;. 
(ii)  bottlenecks  in  the  supply  of capacity  of  the  new 
service  providers  caused  by  resuictions  on  use  of 
alternative  infrastructure  (this  will  addressed  more 
fully in Section V). 
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The  Commission  has  considered  the  cases  where 
Member  States  have  issued  provisions  under  the 
Directive  for  authorizing  the  provision  .of  voice  to 
CUGs.  Various  definitions  have  emerged (").  On  the 
basis of experience gained, tJte  Commission will  use  the 
following definitions (S'). 
'corporate  nettJJor!ts' 
those networks generally established by a single  organ-
ization  encompassing  distinct  legal  entities,  such  as  a 
company  and  its  subsidiaries  or its  branches  in  other 
Member States incorporated under the relevant domestic 
company law,  · 
'closed user groups': 
those entities,  not necessarily bound by economic links, 
but which can be identified as  being part of a group on 
the  basis  of a  lasti.ng  professional  relationship  among 
themselves,  or with  another  entity  of the  group,  and 
whose  internal  communications  needs  result  from  the 
common interest underlying this relationship. In general, 
the link between the members of the group is a  com~J\On 
business activity.  ~ 
Examples of activities likely to fall  into this category are 
fund  transfers  for  the  banking  industry,  reservation 
systems  for·  airlines,  information  transfer$  between 
universities  involved  in  a  common  research  project, 
re-insurance  for  the  insurance  indUStry,  inter-library 
activities,  common  design  projects,  and  different  insti-
tutions or services  of inte~ovem:mental or international 
organizations. 
Services  provided  concerning  such  categories·  of 
networks or entities are fully liberalized according to the 
definition  of  'voice  telephony'  in  Article  1  of  the 
Directive.  Some · Member  States  did,  however,  only 
authorize such services after further discussions with the 
Commission.  · 
e•>  For counuy by counuy information, see Annex. 
( 11)  The Commission has  ackno~cdJed these  definitio~s  i~ its 
•Green  Paper on the  liberahzauon  of telecommurucauons 
infrastNc:tUI'e  and cable  television  networks,  Part I;  Prin-
ciples and Timetable',  COM(94) 440 fmal, Brussels, 25.  10. 
1994, p. 27. 
·  (d)  Data services. for the public (I') 
Article  10  of the  Services  Directive  provides  that  the 
Commission  shall  assess  the  effects  of  the  measures 
adopted by· the Member States regarding simple  packet 
or circuit-switched data services  under Article  3 of the 
· Directive in  1994, to sec whether any amendments need 
to be made to the provisions of that Article, particularly 
. in  the  light  of technological  evolution  and  the  devel-
opment of trade within the Community. 
During  the  consultation  on  the.  1987  Green  Paper, 
various  Member States  stressed  the  need  for a -special 
regime for basic switched data network services such as 
X.25 e'). No justification could be  found  for the main-
tenance  of exclusiVe  rights  as  regards  the  provision. of . 
such  serVices  per  se.  The.  Commission,  however, 
acknowledged  that developed  data switchipg  networks 
might · have  a  StrUctUral  effect ·  · on  investments  and 
regional  planning,  and  could  .~erefore  qualify  for  a 
specific regime, -set· out in Article 3 of the Directive,  in 
particular  th~ application  o~ public service specifications 
in the form of trade regulations relating to conditions of 
permanence, availability,  and permanence of service. 
Moreover,  given  the  substantial·  difference  between 
charges  for use of the  data transmission  service  on the 
switched. network and charges for use  of leased  lines  at 
the time of 'adoption of the Directive, Article 3 allowed 
that exclusive rights for data services which represented 
'simple resale of capacity' ('0
)  could be  maintained  until 
31  December 1992, with possible  additional  deferments 
until  1  January  1996  for .  those  countries  where  the 
relevant  network  for  the  provision  of  the  packet  or 
circuit  switched  services  were  not  yet  sufficiently 
developed (•1). The aim  was  to  allow that equilibrium in 
such charges would be achieved gradually. Two Member 
States c•a)  initially  requested  such  an  extension  of 
deadline, although in neither case the request was  main-
tained. 
(,.) Article  1 defines 'packet and circuit-switChed data  se~ces' 
u  'the  commeraal  provision  for  .the  public  of  dare~. 
transport of data between  public  SWitche~ network termi-
nation points, enabling any us~r  t~ use  eq~npm~nt connected 
to  such  a  network  termanauon  poant  m  order  to 
communicate with another termination point'. 
('') X-25  is  a standard protocol for packet switched networks. 
Anomer advanced protocol for l:iigh  speed data transfer is 
frame-relay. 
(., The Directive defines the latte~ as 'the commerci~l provision 
on  leased  lines  for  the  pubhc  of data  transmtssaon  ~ a 
separate service, including only such switching, processmg, 
data storage or protocol conversion as  is  necessary  fc;>r  tl:ie 
tranSmission  in  real  time  to and  from  the  public  SWitched 
network'. 
(  .. ) Recital11  of the Directive. 
(ca)  Greece and Spain. 
I  69 20. 10.95  (]H]·  Official Journal of the European Communities  NoC27S/9 
Al  regards  the  special  regime,  only  three  Member 
StateS c•s)  notified draft specifications to the Commission 
before  the  deadline  provided  in  the  Directive,  i.e. 
30  June  1992.  The CommiSsion  has  assessed  with  the 
Member States concerned, whether the planned specifi-
cations  were. objective,  non-discriminatory,  tranSparent 
and  proponionate  to  the  aim  ,pursued.  These  bilateral 
discussions  were  very  useful  and  p~vided  a  basic 
experience of how a liberalized service  can be  regulated 
to. guarantee  certain  public  service  objectives,  without 
restricting  c9mpetition.  It appeared  in  particular  that, 
given.  the  different  starting  positions  of  incumbent 
operators  and  potential  new  entrants,  special  attention 
should be  given  to  avoid  burdening the  latter in  a way 
which  could ·constitute  a  barrier  to  entry  and  which 
would  confirm  ~e market  power  of  the  dominant 
operator. In such cases Member States should not neces-
sarily  impose  the  same  conditions  on  new  entrants  as 
imposed on the dominant public operator. 
Over the last years~ rapid technological evolution and, in 
particular,  the  development  alongside  the  traditional 
X-25 of ATM (••),  has undermined the traditional justifi-
cations  for  the  current  specific  regime  for  basic  data 
services.  One can  assume  that in  the  near future  X.25 
public backbone networks will continue to co-exist with 
frame-relay-networks  and  the  new  emerging 
ATM-backbones.  Applying  the  same  service-specific 
regulation  to  such  different  technologies  will  prove 
difficult.  It  could  delay  new  offers  of vinual  private 
networks  and  value-added  services  and  thus  limit 
teChnical  progress  in  the  area.  Moreover  the  rationale 
behind quality. or coverage obligations decreases with the 
increasing differentiation of the offer. The emergence of 
new services requires a degree of flexibility which cannot 
be steered  by regulation. 
c•') Three  Member  States  (Belgium,  France  and  Spain)  have 
·  adopted additional licensing conditions for the p.rovision of 
sim~le  resale  for  packet  or  circuit-switched  services.  In 
Spam,  for  example,  there  is  a  scheme  regulating  the 
FMting  of  concessions  for  the  provision  ol  pac:kCt  or 
circuit  switched  data  services  which  does  not  tie · in 
completely  with  the  Commission's  comments  concerning 
chis  ateL The  scope  of the  Spanish  scheme  is  too  broad, 
since  it  applies  to  dau services  between  'necwork  termi· 
nation  poanu'  instead  of 'termination  pointS  of the  public 
switched necwork'. 
Italy  was  also  considering  the  adoption  of  additional 
conditions, but failed  tO implement the  Directive within an 
appropriate timescale.  Given that under the direct effect of 
Anicles  2 and  3 of the  Directive  simple  resale  of capacity 
was liberalized in Italy without any .fUrther restrictions,  the 
Italian government shall have to provide appropriate jwtifi· 
cations  for the reintroduction of any addiuona.t restrictions 
in that respect.  · 
(M)·ATM: 'Asynchronous Transfer Mode', advanced high speed 
communications. See also Green Paper on the Liber&liz&tion 
of telecommunications . infrasuuccure · and  cable  television 
networks,  op.  cit. 
The current specific  schemes  in  force  in  three  Member 
States  also  have  an  impact  on  trade  between  Member 
States.  The  limited·  number  of applicants  for·  author-
izations under the current schemes in the three Member 
States can,  in part, be explained  by the fact  that many 
providers of the relevant service prefer to limit their offer 
to CUG's instead of having to apply for a licence under 
these circumstances. 
On the  basis  of its  lSsessment,  given  that most  of the 
Member States  have  not deemed  it necessary to  adopt 
specific  schemes  for  data  services~  without  noticeable 
negative  effect  as  regards  the  public  interest objectives 
pursued  by  these  schemes, .  the  .Commission  considers, 
that the requirement for applying specific public service 
specifications  with  regard  to  data  services  should .  be 
reviewed in the framework of the general adjustment of 
the  telecommunications ·  ~egul~tory··  frameWork  to  be 
presented  before  1 January 1996 ·according to  Council 
Resolution 93/C 213/01, and that ·the termination of the 
current  specific  schemes  for  data  services  should  be 
considered c••). 
·(e)  The separation of operation and regulation 
The  sep~tion of the  regulation  of the  telecommuni-
cations  sector from  the  operation  of the  national  tele· 
communications  oganization  was,  without  doubt,  the 
most  fundamental  condition  for  achieving  reform  and 
libera.litation  of  the  EU  telecommunications  markets. 
WhateVer institutional, legal or suuetural means may be 
'used to achieve it, Article 7 e') of the Directive requires 
that  the  Member  States  must  separate  telecommuni-
cations regulatorY and operational functions. 
(
41
)  However,  such  schemes  may  be  required  as  renrds the 
provision of voice telephony for the public, once liberalized. 
See  licensing  criteria  proposed 'for  licensing  mobile  and 
personal  communications  networks,  as  well  as  for  fixed 
networks (Green Paper for Mobile and personal communi· 
cations, Green Paper on the Liberalization of telecommuni-
cations infrastrUcture and cable television networks,  op. cit.). 
e•>  Article 7 requires Member States co ensure that 'from  1 July 
1991  the  pnt of  operating  licences,  the  conuol  of ~ 
approval  and  mandatory  specifications,  the  allocation  of 
frequencies  and surveillance of usage conditions are carried 
out  by  a  body  independent  of  the  telecommunications 
orgamzation.S'. 
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Whilst  National  Regulatory  Authorities  (NRAs)  now 
formally exist  in  mo~  Member States,  the Commission 
considers  that the  degree  of separation  between  these 
and those of the operator functions is still not sufficiendy 
clear in  at lean five  Member States e').  . 
This issue of the independence of the national regulatory 
authorities  was  raised  in  a  number  of  preliminary 
referrals to the Court of Justice· relating to Article  6 of 
Dir~aive 88/301/EEC (the 'Terminals Directive'), which 
required  Member States,  as  of 1 July  198.9,  to  ensure 
that ~e fixing  of technical  standards  as  well  as  super-
vision of type approval, were carried out by bodies inde-
pendent from public or private undertakings· involved in 
·the  marketing  of telecommunications  equipment.  In  itS 
judgmentS of 27 October 1993 ("),the Court found that 
this requirement had been infringe4 in  France where, at 
that  time,  departments  in  the  same  Ministry  were 
responsible for the commercial exploitation of the public 
network,  and  the  f~ing  of  technical · standards,  the 
supervision  of conformity and  the  approval  of terminal 
equipment. 
I 
Article  7  of the  Services  Directive  to  a  large  extent 
mirrors  the  wording  of  Article  6  of  the  Tenninals 
Directive. The implementation by the  Member States of· 
the  former  must  be  considered  in  view  of  this  past 
judgment.  A  mere  legal  or  administrative  separ~tion 
between  the  functions  ~  such  as  that  between · (wo 
services  of a  Ministry  - would  only  be  sufficient  to 
comply  with  Article  7  under the  following  conditions: 
f 
- it must be shown .that there is a 'real' separatio~, 
(41)  For example,  in  the  Netherlands, the regulation is  carried 
out  by  the ~  for  Trans~rt and  Public  Works 
through  the  Directorate-General  for  Post  and  Telecom· 
munications.  The Ministry is,  however,  also  the  majority · 
shareholder of KPN whiCh  has still  the  exclusive  ~ht  to 
insuJl, maintain  and operate the telecommunications mfra· 
suucture,  and  providea  the  mandatory  services  co  each 
applicam. 
Some questions have also been raised  about how distinct a 
separauon of  _powers exists between regulator and operator 
in  Belgium,  Spain  and  Greece.  The  Belgian  Government 
has,  however,  stated  its  intention  to  respect  the  complete 
autonomy of the public operator Belgacom  in  the area of 
non-reserved services in  response to Commission concerns. 
In  Spain,  the  Director-General  for  Telecommunications 
(responsible for regulation) is also the Government Delegate 
on the Board of Clirectors  of Telef6nica,  although  such  a 
delegate could legally come from another Minisuy. 
In Greece, while functions have been fomally separated, the 
continuous  movement  of  personnel  from  the  operational 
body to the regulatory body makes  the practical separation 
of these bodies unclear. 
( 41)  The  cases  Decoster  et  al  (C-69/91)  and  Taillandier 
(C-~/90).: 
- in particular, there must be financial independence of 
one from the other, 
~  any movement of personnel from the ~gulatory body 
tO  the.  ~perational· body should be  subject to special 
supems1on.  •, 
Forms  of  strUctural  separation  offering  a  reasonable 
guarantee that such conditions would be upheld, include: 
(i)  the  granting  ·  of  the  regulatory  functions  to  ·  a 
depanment of the relevant Ministry when the  tele-
communications  undertaking  is  itSelf  conuolled  by 
private shareholders; or  I 
(ii)  the ·granting of the rel~t  regulatory functions to a 
body,  which  is  independent  from  the  relevant 
Ministry (except for the  contol of its  accountS  and 
the legality of itS  decisions)  when  the  latter is  also 
aaing  as  sole  or  dominant  shareholder  of  the 
ope.r,ator or where a considerable State shareholding 
in the pperator remains. 
Alongside the legal guarantees and ge.neral  rules implied 
by  the  Directive,  actual  practice  and  spirit  are  ~ 
important  test  of  compatibility  with  Article  7.  How 
'independence'  is  actually  achieved  institutionally  Will 
therefore vary,.to a certain degree, according to the legal 
tradition and experience in each Member State. 
IV.  INCLUSION  OF  SATELLITE  NETWORKS  AND 
SERVICES DIRECTIVE 94/46/EC 
On 13 October 1994, the Commission adopted Directive 
94/46/EC.  This  Directive  extends  the  Terminal 
Directive (~') to include satellite eanh station equipment 
and  extends  the  Services  Directive  to  include  satellite 
communiCations services ('~. 
<-'>  Commission  Directive of 16  May 1988  on competition on 
the  markets  in  telecommunications  terminal  equipment 
88/301/EEC (OJ No L 131, 27. 5.  1988, p. 73). 
(") Directive  94/46/EC  constitutes  the  central  measure  for 
implementing  the  liberalization  objectives  for  the  satellite 
sector, set foi:th by Council resolution 92/C 8/01 (based on 
the·  ·  Green  Paper  on  Satellite  communications, 
COM(90) 490). 
Other  measures  in  this  field  are  Council  Directive 
93/97/EEC of29 October 1993,  relating to mutual recog-
nition  of  type  approval  for  satellite · terminals  and  die 
proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive 
on a policy for the mutual recognition of licences and other 
national authorizations for the provision of sateUite network 
services  and/  or  sateUite  communications  services, 
COM(93) 652, 4.  t. 1994. 
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(a)  Tiae significance of the ~ending  Directive 
The aim  of the ,'Union's  polic:f  in  the  area  ~f satellite 
communications,  shared  by  the  Council  and  the 
Commission, is  to stimulate without delay greater use of 
satellite communications in  the  EU. This  is  particularly 
imponant given  the widening gap between the  delay in 
development  of  EU  business  satellite  communications 
compared to that which its  major competitors enjoy. 
The  Directive  requires  the  abolition  of. all  exclusive · 
rights  gran~d for the provision of satellite  services~ and 
the abolition of all special rights (
11
)  to provide any tele-
communic.ations service  covered by the Directive. 
(b)  Voice telephony 
The  amended  Directive  docs  not affect  restrictions  on 
offering  voice  telephony  fot:  the  public  via  satellite 
network.  However,  this  must  not  lead  to  technical 
restrictions.  While  recital  1  ~ states  that 'in the  case  of 
direct  transport  and  switChing  of speech  via  satellite 
earth  station  networks,  commercial  provision · for  the 
public in  general cari take place only when the satellite 
earth station network is connected to the public switched 
· network',· this  is  merely a guide  as  to what is  normally 
the  case.  It  should  not  be  understood  as  allo~ng 
technical  restrictions  to  protect  the  voice  telephony 
monopoly.  The  burden  of proof that  the  new  service 
actually  constitutes  'voice  telephony~  rests  with  the 
regulator. 
In faa, the provision of voice for closed user groups will 
often involve  such  connections with  the  public switched 
network, since some members of such groups will not be 
connected to the network via satellite stations (u). 
(c)  Broadcasting services 
The status of broadcasting services are also unaffected by 
DireCtive  94/46/EC. One has,  however,  to  distinguish 
(11)  Special  rights  is  defined  in  the  Directive  as  'limiting  the 
number  of undertakings  authorized  to  provide  telecom-
munications services otherwise than according to objective, 
proportional and non-discriminatory criteria or designating 
otherwise  than  to  such  criteria  several  competing  under-
takings to provide such services'.  . 
('I) According  to the  definition  given,  closed  user  groups  are 
indeed  not  to  be  defined  technically,  by  the  network  to 
which  their memben are connected  and  which  should not 
be  accessible  br.  third  panies,  but  sociologically  by  the 
economic or professional relationship a.m<?ng their memben. 
between  the  content· and  the  technical  provision  of 
broadcasting  services.  As  mentioned  in  recital  17,  the 
provision of satellite network services for the conveyance 
of radio and television programmes is, _by its very nature, 
also a telecommunications service and there is  therefore 
no justification for treating it differendy from any other 
telecommunications service. The Directive,' thus, makes a 
distinction between:· 
- the  services  provided  hy  the  carrier  (transmission, 
switching  and  other  activities)  necessary  for  the 
conveyance  of the  signals,  which  arc  telecommuni--
cations services liberalized under the Directive, and 
- the  actiV1t1es  of  those  bodies  which  control  the 
contents  of the  messages  to  be  broadcasted,  which 
are broadcasting activities falling outside the scOpe of 
thi$ Directive.  •. 
Satellite  broadcasting  services  wich  should  now  be 
liberalized under this Directive therefore include ·services 
provided over telecommunications operator's feeder links 
from  studi!Jsl  events  to  uplink  sites,  as  well  as  uplink 
services  for,  point  to  point,  point to  multipoint,  direct-
to-home (DTH) satellite broadcast services  and services 
to cable-heafl ends.  · 
(d)  Access to space segment 
..  Member States  arc required by the  Directive  to  abolish 
all restrictions on the offer of space-segment capacity on 
their territory. 
This  means  that  the  Member States  now  must  ensure 
that: 
- any regulatory prohibition or restrictions on the offer 
of sp_ace segment capacity to any authorized satellite 
earth station network operator are abolished, 
- any  space  segment  supplier  is  authorized  to  verify 
within  its  territory  that  the  satellite  earth  station 
network  for  use  in  connection  with  the  space 
segment of the supplier in  question,  is  in  conformity 
with the published conditions for access  to his  space 
segment capacity. 
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In  its  communication  of  10  June  199-i- on  satellite 
communications  relating  to  the  provision  of -.- and 
access to - space segment capacity (u), the Commission 
announced its  intention to use  the  comp~tion rules  to 
remove  all  national  restrictions  within  the  European 
Union. on  access  to  space  segment.  The  discovery 
procedures set out in Article 3 of the .  Directive will, ·in 
particular,  be  implemented  to  gather  the  necessary 
information to achieve  this purpose. 
(e)  International satellite orpnizatioas 
The new -obligations  related  to space  segment  do  not 
directly  affect  the  position  of the  telecommunications 
organizations as sign·atory of international organizations. 
However,  Member  States  are  obliged  to  ensure  that 
there are no  r~ctive provisions in their national regu-
lations  which  would  have ·  the  effect  of preventing  the 
offer  of .  space  segment  capacity  in  their  territory  by 
either another signatory of the relevant organizations or 
by  independent  systems.  Similarly  M~mber States  are 
obliged  to  ensure  that  there  are  no  regulatory  or 
npn-regulatory  restrictions  preventing  space  segment 
capacity  already  leased  by  a  licensed  operator .in  one 
Member State from being freely accessed from any other 
Member State. Such restrictions include those preventing 
parties other than the signatory in  the  Member State(s) 
concerned  from  verifying  the  technical  and · operations 
specifications of satellite earth stations. 
Article 3 of Directive 94/46/EC requires Member States 
to  communicate  to the Commission,  a~ its  request,  the 
information  relating  to  international  satellite  organ-
izations  they  possess  on  any  measure  that  could 
prejudice in  particular compliance with  the  competition 
rules  of the  EC  Trca:ty.  Recital  21  ·explains  that  this 
provision  aims  amongst  others  to.  monitor  the  review 
which  is  .  underway  within  these  international  organ-
izations to improve access. 
Article 3 of Directive 94/  46/EC docs therefore also not 
directly affect the position of the signatories. However, if 
it ·appeared that signatories continue to maintain mech-
anisms  dissuading  multiple  access  and  thus  favouring 
market sharing for the provision of space  segment,  the 
Commission would have to assess whether action should 
be  taken  under  the  competition  rules  of  the  Treaty 
against _the  relevant signatories. 
The  coupling  of investment  obligations  and  utilization 
could  constitute such  a  dissuasive  mechanism,  where  it 
dissuades  signatories  to  market  space  segment  by  the 
threat of having to bear an  increased investment share. 
Which  international  organizations,  and  in  particular 
Eutelsat,  operating in  increasingly  competitive  marketS, 
(") COM(94) 210 final. 
the  current  investment  requirements  will  therefore,  if 
they  are  not amended,  have  to  be  thoroughly assessed 
under the Competition rules. 
(f)  Tune table for implementation 
The  Directive  gives  Member  States  nine  months  to 
inform  the  Commission  of  the  measures  taken  to 
transpose  the Directive into  national law.  The Member 
States  .thould  thus  communicate  to  the  Commission 
before 8 August 1995,  a copy of the measures  taken  to 
abolish · the  current  restrictions  c;>n  the  provision  of 
satellite  services,  and  of any  licensing  or  delcaration 
procedure which is currendy in force or is  being drafted 
for  the  operation  of satellite  networks.  The aim  is  to 
allow 'the Commission to assess whether these conditions 
are  necessary  with  a  view  to  satisfying  essential 
requirements.  · The  informati~n  provided  to  the 
Commission should include possible fees  imposed as part 
of these  authorization procedures as  well as  the criteria 
upon which these fees  are based  .. 
Recital 22 which mentions that the Commission will also 
take into account the .situation  of those  Member States 
in  which .the  terrestrial  network  is  not yet  sufficiendy 
developed must be seen in  ~the framework of this  notifi-
cation  requirement.  Member States which  would  deem 
necessary a deferment of the  date of full  application of 
the  abovementioned  provisions ('')  should  request  it 
fo.nnally  and with the  necessary justification within  the 
time  period  provided  for  the  communication  of  the 
· ' implementation  measures  of the  Directive,  i.e.  before 
8 August 1995. The Commission will then assess whether 
it should refrain from insisting on the immediate liberal-
ization  of  the  relevant  satellite  services.  This  would, 
however,  not prevent possible actions in  national couns 
brought by third parties  in  these Member States. 
Given  the  wide  variety  of satellite  services,  the  moti-
vation given should, in the first place, include the list of 
satellite  network  services  for  which  the  deferment  is 
requested,  accompanied  by  estimates  of  the  markets 
concerned. 
It should funher explain which  services  of the national 
telecommunications  organizations  would  be  affected, 
· and  on  the  basis  of the  turnover of these  services  and 
their contribution to the financing of the public network, 
a potential negative impact on the future development of 
the public network should' be  demonstrated. 
The  Gommission  will  apply  to  the  proportionality 
principle. The Commission will  in any case insist on, for 
example,  the  liberalization  of services  which  are  econ-
omically insignificant. 
(,.) This  derogation  can  apply  up  to  1 January  1966  at  the 
lateSt. 
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V.  ·  FUrURE  EVOLUTION  IN  THE  CONTEXT  OF 
SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE LIBERALIZATION 
While major attention will have to continue to be paid to 
the  full  effective  implementation  of  the · Services 
Directive,  the futtire  development of the Directive must 
be  considered  within  the  overall  context,  which· was 
determined  by the  review  carried  out according  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Directive  during  1992,  leading 
to Council  resolution 93/C 213/01  of 22  July  1993  on 
full  service  liberalization  by  1  January  1998,  now 
supplemented  by  Council  resolution  94/C 379/03  of 
22  December  1994,  integrating  infrastrUcture  liberal-
ization into this time schedule. 
According  to  Council  resolution  93/C 213/01  the 
Commission should 
prepare,  before  1  January  1996,  the  necessary 
amendments to the Community regulatory framework in 
order  to  achieve  liberalization  of  all  public  voice 
telephony services  by  1 January 1998! 
Given  its  central  role  in  lifting  the  restrictions  to 
competition  and  ensuring  fair  market  conditions, 
amendments  to  the  Services  Directive  will  represent  a 
focal  point of these  measures. 
As set forth in the Green Paper (Part I) on telecommuni-
cations infrastructure liberalization (
15
)  : 
under the  Directive 90/388/EEC on  competition in  the 
markets for telecommunications services, the provision of 
all  telecommunications  services·  was  opened  to 
competition, subject tO  four significant exceptions: 
- satellite services, 
- mobile telephony and paging services, 
~  radio. and TV broadcasting services to the public, and 
- ~oice telephony services to the general public. 
Directive  90/388/EEC  in  itS  original  form  did  not 
address  the  use  of alternative  infrastructures  and  cable 
(") Op. cit. 
TV netWorks  for  the  provision  of liberalized  services. 
Directive  90/388/EEC  only  required  the  removal  of 
restrictions  on. the  use  of  a  single  source  of  infra-
StrUcture,  namely •teased lines provided by the TOs, for 
the provision of liberalized services.  . 
As  regards  the  exceptions  set  out above,  the  following 
applies:  · 
- Commission · Directive  94/46/EC ("),  amending 
Directive 88/301/EEC (telecommunications terminal 
equipment)  and  90/388/EEC  (telecommunications 
services)  in  particular  with  regard  to  satellite 
communications,  adopted  on  13  October  1994  has 
lifted  the  exception with regard to satellite services. 
As set out under IV,  Member States  are  given  pine 
months  to  communicate  implementation  measures 
taken. 
.. 
- On 21  December 1994, the Commission adopted, for 
consultation,  a draft ame'nding  Directive concerning 
the liberalization of the use of cable TV networks for 
the  services  already  liberalized  according  to  the 
Services  Directive,  providing for substantial opening 
of  the  further  development  of  these  networks, 
particularly with regard to multi-media. 
· ·- The Commission communication on the consultations 
following  the  Green  Paper on Mobile  and  personal 
communications  was  published  on  23  November 
1994 (f').  It proposed  the  lifting  of all  special  and 
exclusive  rightS  with  regard  to  mobile  services  by 
1 January 1996.  The corresponding  amendments  to 
the Services Directive will have to be considered. 
Finally, a major issue will be  the adjustment of the tele-
communications regulatory &:amework  to the objectives 
of  the·  Council  resolutions  of  22  July  1993  and 
22  December  1994,  integrating  the  date  of 1 January 
1998  for  full  liberalization·  (with  additional  transition 
periods  for  certain  Member  States),  to  be  proposed 
before  1 January 1996. As set forth in the Infrastructure 
Green Paper (Part II) (
51
), such an approach must aim at 
creating  the  optimal  environment for  the  future  devel-
opment  of  the  European  Union's  telecommunications 
sector by  combination  of both  competition  policy  and 
sector specific regulation. 
(") See Section IV. 
(") COM(94)  492  final:  communication  to  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  Consultation  on  the 
Green Paper on Mobile :lnd personal communications. 
(II) Op, cit. 
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Besides  the  adjUStment  of the  eXIsting  harmonization 
Directives  in  the  telecommunications  sector  (such  as 
ONP Directives)  and the working out_ of proposals for 
maintaining·  universal  service  and  ensuring  intercon-
nection,  as  well  as  the  review  of  the  institutional 
~gements for  regulating  the  sector,  this  will  in 
particular  require  further  adjustment  of  the  Services 
Directive.  ·  -
At  the Council  of 17  November,  the  Commission  has 
·weltomed  the  agreement  on  the  date  of  1998  as  the 
deadline  for  the  liberalization  of infrastructure  for  all 
telecommunication services. It has also taken note of the 
coneems of a number of Member States expressed at this 
Council,  to  undertake  early  measures  for  the  liberal-
ization of alternative infrastructures for services  already 
liberalized  according  tO  the  Services  Oirective.  This 
aspect will  need further consideration. 
. VI. CONCLUSION 
Commission  Directive 90/388/EEC represents  the  most 
significant  legislative  measure  for  liberalizing  EU tele-
communications  to  date.  The  Commission  will  ensure 
that maximum effort and resources are direeted towards 
solving identified problems and filling gaps in implemen-
tation. 
The 1992  Review  revealed  that the  effectiveness  of cl;te 
measures  liberalizing  the  telecommunications  sector 
(concerning at that stage, in particular the liberalization 
of data  communications,  value  .. added  services  and  the 
provision  of data and  voice  serVices  to  corporate users 
and closed user groups) was questioned by m~y  service 
providers  and  users  of such  services.  It  has  also  been 
understood that implementation of the Services Directive 
is  hampered  by  the  non-availability  of  infrastructure 
under reasonable conditions. 
In  particular,  high  tariffs for and lack of availability of 
the  basic  infrastrUcture  over  which  liberalized  services 
are  operated  or provided  to third parties  have  delayed 
the .  widespread  developm,ent  of high  speed  corporate 
networks  in  Europe,  remote  accessing  of databases  by 
both business  and  residential  users  and··the  deployment 
of innovative  services  such  as  telebanking  and distance 
learning.  Additionally,  the  regulatory  restrictions  in 
many Member States still prevent the  use  of alternative 
infrastructure  operated  by  third  parties,  such  as  cable 
TV  -networks and networks owned by energy companies, 
rail~ays, or motorways to meet their internal communi-
cations  needs.  Many  user  associations  and  companies 
have stressed that European business  is  less  competitive, 
that innovative  services  are  more  slowly  deployed  and 
that  the  creation  and  development  of  pan-European 
networks and services  is  being delayed  as  a result. 
The importance of effective and 'affordable infrastructure 
is  increasingly recognized  in  political  debate  within  the 
Member States themselves. The European Parliament has 
called on the  Commissi~n to adopt,. as soon as  possible, 
the necessary measures. 
The continued bottleneck situation has been emphasized 
as  a key obstacle  to  the  development  of the  European 
information  infrastructure in  the  report on Europe and 
the global information society. The action  plan towards 
the  European  informatioQ  society  adopted  by  the 
Commission  ~~  response  has  set  a  general  framework. 
Further emphasis on effective implementation of the tele-
communications  Services  Directive  and  its  future 
evolution will take account of these general objectives. It 
is  with  this  intention  in  mind,  that  the  Commission 
transmits ·  this  communication  to  the  European 
Parliament and to the Council. 
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ANNEX I 
MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION OP DIREC11VE 90/311/EEC 
The following  represents  a  short overview of the  Sta~ of implementation of the Directive in  individual 
Member StateS. Given the rapid development in this field, reference should be made to national regulatory 
authorities for more detailed information.  · 
The overview  docs  not include  information with  regard  to implementation  in  the  European  Economic 
Au~  ' 
BELGIUM 
The Directive is  implemented in  Belgium by the lay.r of 21  March  1991 (1'). With regard to telecommuni-
cations it transforms the Regit des  TelegrapMs tt dts Tlliphonts/Rtgit wn Ttlegraaf m Telefoon (RTn into 
the public autonomous company Belgacom.  · 
· As  regards  the defmition  of the  reserved  service  in  the  Belgi.an  law,  Article  68  defines  th~ 'Telephone 
Service' as the telecommunications service intended fQr the direct careying and real time switChing of vocal 
signals at the start and at the destination of the connect!on points, including the services  necesi~  for its 
operation. In letterS of July 1991  and June 1993 the Belgian Government confirmed .that it interprets the 
law in  the way intended by the Directive.  -
Where a provider wishes tO supply liberalized services, a list of non-reserved services can be eStablished by 
Royal  Deaee which,  by  derogation,  would  automatically  be  authorized  providing  that  the  applicant 
informs  the IBPT of the service.  Thus far,  however,  the Commission  is  not aware of such  a  list.  In its 
absence, the applicant must give the IBPT two months prior notice of its intention during which time the 
IBPT can oppose the provision of the service if it deems it contrary tO the  1991  law. Article 89  (S)  states 
that the IBPT mu'st  provide a reasoned decision if it refuses  to authorize the provisipn of a service. 
Belgium is one of three Member States to have adopted- additional licensing conditions for the provision of 
.  packet or circuit-switChed data,. services for the public. This is allowed under Article 3 of the Directive as 
long as the Commission approves the conditions, which  it did in July 1993. 
Under Article 85  of the 1991  Belgian Law, Belgacom  c~n only refuse a user access to a leased line on the 
basis of the essential requirements recognized by Community Law.  Further, as defined in the management 
contract (Article 21(3)), Belgacom must satisfy at least 90  Ofo  of the registered applications for ONP-leased 
. ~es within three months unless otherwise agreed with the  custa~er. 
With respect to tht issue of the independence of Belgacom from  the regulatory authority as  required by 
Article 7 of the Directive, under the 1991  law regulatory powers are assigned to the Minister.. responsible 
(assisted by the national regulatory authority, Institut Btlgt des  ~ruicts Postaux et des  Tillcommun.ications, 
IBP'I). The Belgian Government has Stated that it will. respect the complete autonomy of Belgacom in the 
area of non-reserved services. 
DENMARK 
The Directive has been implemented in Denmark by Law No 743 of 14 November 1990  and the Consoli-
dating Order No 398  of 13  May 1992.  · 
Under the Act,  the  Minister of Communications can grant a concession to TeleDanmark on the estab-
lishment and operation in relation to public radio and fixed services as weU  as of voice telephony, teXt and 
data communication, provision  of leased  lines,  mobile  communications  and satellite services,  and  trans-
mission of radio and TV programmes. 
('9)  Moflitnr BtU..  27  March  1991,  p.  6155  and  corrigendum  in  Mo,.ilt•r  'BtiJt  20  July  1991.  The  same  law  ~lso 
implements  die- Directive  on  compecidon  in  me  markcu  for  celecommunicauons  cemunal  equipmenc,  Commis11on 
Directive 88/301/EEC. 
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An  area of concern, and indeed the issue which  led  to the commencement of infringement proceedings 
against Denmark, was the definition of 'voice telephony' which is teServed to TeleDanmuk. The initial law 
reserved  all of the  non-public transmission of traffic to TeleDanmark with  the sole  exception of voice 
telephony  ov~ leased  lines .between cliHerent  1~.  entities  (i.e.  shared use). This  clearly left too many 
restrictions on the usage conditions of leased lines in place, in contravention of the· Directive. 
The Commission closed its proceedings after the adoption by the Danish Government of Order No 9os· of 
2 November 1994 which allows anyone to provide domestic public voice telephony without requiring any 
form of authorization or declaration. As regards international calls,  a license is  required where· calls orig-
inating from the PSTN are carried via leased lines and then returned back to the PSTN. Such licence is 
only granted for traffic to countries which have liberalized voice telephony. 
The· Ot4er was  adopted under Article  3  of the  1990  Danish  Act,  which  entides  the  Minister to issue 
regulations  for the  establishment  and operation  of services  which  are  not covered  by  TeleDanmark's 
concession or special rights.  ·  _  .  · 
The rules to 'be applied to packet and circ:Wt-switched data. services after 31  December 1992  w~re stated in 
the Danish Order of December 1992. There is  a slight discrepancy between the scope of these rules,  and 
chat intended by Article 3 of. the Directive _since  the Order coven all data communications services . 
. GERMANY 
Two German laws adopted on 8 June 1989 define the legal framework for the provision of telecommuni-
cations services: the Postwr/assungsgesetz (PVG), which delimits the organization and wks. of the Ministry 
for Post and Telecommunications and of Deutsche Buntkspost Tekltom; and an amendment of the Fernme/-
Jeanl.gegesetz  (FAG),  defining  among  other  things,  the  m<?nopoly  retained  by  the  State.  The  legal 
framework  was  substantially  amended  by  the  Law  of  14  September  1994  (Postneuordnungsgaetz  -
PTNftiOGl which came into force on 1 January 1995. 
The new Act did not however aJter the definition of the 'voice telephony' reserved to the DBP Telekom, 
although the Commission had in April  1994 ~n  the attention of the German Government to the fa.ct 
that it is  broader than that in  the Directive. Essentially three issues  a.Ne .. Firstly,  the definition uses  the 
wording 'for third  parties'  as  opposed to 'for the public'. &  a consequence,  the switChing  of voice  for 
closed user groups is part of th~  monopoly. Secondly, the terms 'switching of voice' in the Law are inter-
preted in practice as including also mixed  tclecomm~nications (v.oice combined With data or images) in the 
monopoly, when the exchange of speech can technically be dissociated from data communication as  is the 
case as regards videophony on ISDN. Finally, the definition covers all switching of voice, without distin-
guishing whether the voice both originateS in and is switched to the public switched network. According to 
the Directive the switching of voice originating in  a.  leased line ·network or switched to such a.  leased line 
netWork should not be reserved.  ' 
Following bilateral contacts, the first issue was  provisionally settled  to a large extent. The German Law 
(FAG)  reserves voice telephony for third  panicS, which  is  more  than voice  telephony 'for the public:'  as 
a.llowed  according to the Directive. To teStore  conformity between  German and Community· Law,  the 
German Miqisay for Post and Telecommunications, instead of changing the La.w, used its licensing powers 
to allow by_ order (Vtrfilgung)  No 1/1993, of 6 January 1993  and 8/1993 of 13  January 1993,  private 
companies to provide telephony to closed user groups. The order established a class license (A.Ogemtinge-
Mhmipng) for. the provision of the service to entities which are economically integrated. 
A3  regards  Article  6 of the  Directive,  Section  29  TK.V  provides  that a  connection licence  (Anschalteer-
t.ulmis) is requited for terminal equipment for connection to the network termination of uansmissi.on lines. 
The Commission -views such a restriction as conua.ry to Article 6 of the Directive·  since it delays the use of 
equipment, already type approved, used in the switching and processing of signals (such as concenuawrs) 
to connect leased lines networks with the public switched telecommunications network. The issue has been 
raised with the German authorities which will abolish the relevant provision. In the meantime, the Ministry 
has granted a class  connection licence (Vfg 269/1994).  · 
The powers  referred  tO  in  Article  7  of the  Directive  were  until  31  December  1994  exercised  by The 
Minister for Posts  and Telecommunications. Under the  new  regime,  the  Ministry will be  assisted  by  a 
Regulation Council (Regu/ierungsrat),  including representatives of the  Linder and the Federal Parliament 
· (Buntlellllg).  On the other hand,  the government share  in  DBP Telekom, which was  transformed  into a 
joint StOCk  c;ompany, will  now be managed by a distinct office: the Bundesanstalt for Post  unJ Te/eltom-
,..,iJt.tion (  B.Anst P1). 
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GREECE 
Greece implemented the Directive by ineans of Law No 2075/92 of 21  July ·1992, which bas never been 
brought fully into effect as  ~e  Greek government failed to adopt the order setting out the internal working 
rules of the independent regulatory body set up. by the Act. O.n 20 October 1994, this law was replaced by 
Law  No  2246/94.  The  legislation  does .  also  not provide  a  complete  regulatory  framework  and  '!'ill 
necessitate further secondary legislation which has not yet been adopted.  . 
'  . 
Given  the  failure  of the  Greek  Government  to adopt timely  implementation  measures  of the  Services 
Directive  the Commission  has  Started  proceedings  before the Court of Justice  under Article  169  of the 
Treaty. 
Article  2  (15)  of Law  No 2246/94 defines  'voice  telephony'  using  the same  wording as  the Directive. 
However, Article 3 (2)  of the Law states as  principle that voice telephony is. reserved and acknowledges 
only in a secand nage that all  other services are h'beralized. Consequendy, there is a threat of a broader 
definition  of the reserved  voice  telephony in  Greece.  Moreover, this  Article  makes  the liberalization of 
these. services subject to the condition that their provision is compatible with· the proper fulfilment of the 
mission assigned to the public operatOr OTE. 
Liberalized  services  are,  according  to  this  Article  3 (2),  subject to either an  individual  licence. or to a 
declaration, depending on the limit of the capacity of leased lines  used. The threshold bas riot yet been 
established.  · 
As regards simple resale of packet - and circuit - switched data uansmission, Greece applied by leuer of 
7  February  1992  for the  derogation  until  1 January. 1996  under Recital  11  of the  Directive.  After the 
adoption of Law No 2075/92, which  did  not distinguish  packet and cric:uit-switched  data uansmission 
from other liberalized telecommunications services, Greece confirmed by leuer of 27 May 1993, that it did 
no longer seek such a derogation and that pac~  and circuit-switched data transmission Was  liberalized. 
According  to  Law  No  2246/94,  the  i~dependent regulatory  authority 'referred  to  in  Article  7  of the 
Directive, is  the National Telecommunications Commission (EET), under the supervision of the Minister 
of Transport and Communications. The EET is the relevant authority for frequency allocation, numbering, 
licensing and type approval, as well as for ensuring compliance with national and EEC Treaty competition 
rules. It is  not yet operational. In the mean time, the Minisuy exercises iu competence. 
SPAIN 
The Ley de  Ortlenad6n de las  Tt;lecomunicadones,  Law No 3111987 of 18  December 1987, CLOT') is  the 
legislation in force relating to telecommunications activities in Spain. In light of the Directive, the LOT has 
. been amended by Law No 32/1992 of 3 December 1992, which limited the reserved services to the basic 
telephone service, telex and telegrams, and a Royal Decree 80<4./1993 of 28 May 1993 implementing Article 
3 of the Directive as  regards basic data switching services. 
As hu been the case in some other Member StateS, the major issue in the Directive's implementation has 
concerned the definition of voice  telephony and, hence,  the reserved area. The LOT defines 'basic voice 
telephony',  in  paragraph  15  of its  Annex, in terms identical to the definition of "voice  telephony' in the 
Directive. However, following a complaint to the Commission, it seeais that the Spanish authorities' under-
standing of this definition was not so clear and that, although defined in the Law, an administrative order 
would be required to define funher Telef6nica's basic voice telephony monopoly. This definition is not yet 
adopted. 
Spain  originally  requested  an  extension  period  for  exclusive  rights  for  simple  resale,  as  allowed  under 
Recital  11  of the  Directive,  although  such  a  request  was  not  maintained.  As  regards  the  grant  of 
concessions for the provision of packet or circuit switched data services,  a scheme for its  regulation was 
crelltcd by the Royal Decree of 28  May 1993. The draft had been notified to the Commission, but the text 
adopted  did  not  take  account  of all  th~  Commissio~'s  remar~. Issues  ~levant to •  ~is,  particularly 
regarding the scope of the scheme,  are be1ng  further d1scussed  wtth the Sparush  authonues. 
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The regulawry powers  referred  to in Article 7 of me  DitectiTe  are me  respo~ibility of me DirectOrate-
General for Telecommunications  (DGI'). The DGT was  created  by  Ro}'31  Decree  of  19 June .1985.  It 
granu concessions,  authorizations and administrative  licences for equipment and services. The DirectOr-
General for telecommunications is, however, also the Government Delegate on the Board of· DirectOrs of 
Telef6nica. He has me right 'to veto decisions of the Board on grounds of public policy. Moreover, Anicle 
15  of the LOT allows  for me  appointment by the Government of.fivc other members of the Board. 
FRANCE 
The French government has  implemen~d the Directive mainly through the adoption of Law No 90-1170 
of 29 December 1990 on the regulation of telecommunications. This Law is a modification of the  Cotk tks 
Postts tt Tlllcommunications (the. Code) which  gives  France Telecom an exclusive  right to establish tele-
. communications  n~rk  infrastructures open  to the general public. 
Article L3-i- specifies that only s~rvices provided to the public are covered by the Law. Anicle L.32-7 of the 
Code defines  ~erved  voice  telcph~ny as the commercial provision of a system of direct,  real-time voice 
transmissions betWeen  users connected to termination poinu of a telecommunications  network. All other 
~rvices provided  to the  public  arc  b"beralized  subject  to  a .declaration  procedure  or,  for  services  of 5 
mbiu/seCQnd or more,  to a licensing procedure (M). 
According  tO Article  L.34-2.~ France Telecom  is  authorized to supply any bearer service  (this  is  how the 
French  .regulation  qualifies  the  provision  of ·simple  resale  of packet or circuit-switehed  services).  Other 
providers  need  a  licence.  France  has  adopted  additional  licensing  conditions  for  the  provision  of such 
bearer-service. A final  draft Decree  for the  application  of Article  L.34.2  relating to bearer-services  was 
transmitted to the Commission which decided, on 26 Nov:ember 1992, not tO object to iu entry into force. 
The Decree was fonnally adopted on  30 December 1993 and published in the French Official Journal of 
·31  Decemb~r 1993  (p.  18276). This decree seu out a number of eonditions  relating~: 
- the essential requirementS, 
- the  measurement  and  the  publication  of the  characteristicS  and  the  area  of coverage  of the  service 
(Article 2),  -
·,  . 
. - the respect of technical  ~onstrainu conccmirig access tO the service ~clc  3), 
- the interconnection with other bearer services (Article 4), 
- national defence and public security as regards the encryption of c;lata (Article 5), 
- fair competition. 
The authorization  of F~ce  Telecom  to  provide  this  service,  cannot  be  transferred  to its  subsidiaries. 
Transpac,  which  is  a subsidiary  of the  Compagnie  G~nerale des  Communications  (Cogecom),  itself  a 
100 Ofo  subsidi~  of France Telecom, had therefore to request a licence which was granted by order of 15 
July 1993  (French  Official Journal of 8 August  1993, p.  1122 .. ). 
As  regards  the  separation of regulation  and  operation  (Anicle  7), the  Minister for  IndUSU'y,  Posu  and 
Telecommunications and Foreign Trade ensures that the· regulations are respected by the public operators 
and, furthermore, that the regulation of the telecommunications sector on the one hand, and the operation 
of netWorks  and  the  provision  of telecommunications  services  on the other hand,  are  perfonned  indc-
pendendy.  He  exercises  his  righu  through  the  'Direction  G6n6rale  des  Posr.es  et Telkommunications' 
(DGP'I). 
IRELAND 
Ireland has  adopted specific regulations to give effect to the Directive. These arc contained in 'Statutory 
Instrument S.L  No 45 of 1992, European Communities (Telecommunications Services)  Regulations  1992' 
which  have amended the  Postal and Telecommunications Services Act,  1983. 
(  ..  )The followins companies were granced a licence: SITA, BT, Sprint, Slisos, GSI, EDT and Esprit Telecom. 
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In the area of voice telephony, the definition of cpublic voice telephony' expressed in S.L  No 45  mirrors 
that in the Directive. The exclusive· right granted to Telecom Eireann under Section 87 of the 1983 Act is 
restric:ted  to offering,  provi~ing and  maintaining  the  public  telecommunications  nmvork. and offering, 
providing and maintaining voice  telephony semces under Regulation 3 (1)  of S.L  No 45. Value-added 
licences can be obtained under Article 111 of the Aa of 1983 for provision of any other service, including 
voice for closed user groups or voice services making use of only one coMection point betWeen leased lines 
and the public switched netWork.  By end ·1994, 20  such licences were granted. 
Statutory Insuument No 45 of 1992 sets out the rights of these licensees as regards access tO and use o( the 
public  telecommunications  netwOrk.  The conditions  applied  must  be· objective,  non-discriminatory  and 
published. Similarly, under Regulation 4 (3)  of the S.I.,  requcsu for leased lines  have to be  met within a 
reasonable period, and there should be no restrictions on their use other than to ensure non-provision of 
telephone  services,  the  security  of network operations,  the  maintenance  of netwOrk  integrity  and,  in 
justified cases, the interoperability of services and data protection. 
With respect to ;Article 7 of the Services Directive, -The  M~r  for Transport, Energy and Communi-
cations is responsible for surveillance of Telecom Eireann according to Regulation 5 of S.I.  No 45. 
ITALY 
The .Directive has  been included in  Law No H2 of 19  February 1992,  Legge  Comunitaria for 1991  (LC 
1991), which delegated to the Government the power to issue, within one year after iu cOming into force 
(i.e. by 5 ~ch  1993), a number of legislative decress -for the implementation of the EEC ,Directives listed 
in Annexes A  and  B,  including  the Services  Directive.  The legislative  decree  implementing the Services 
Directive was,  however,  not adopted within this deadline. Subsequently, the Italian Government included 
the Services Directive in Article 54 of Law No 146  of 22  February 1994 (Legge  Comunitari4  19~3). 
This Article repeats the specific principles and criteria to be  followed in the preparation of the legislative 
decree implementing the Directive, which were mentioned in LC  1991. e-onsequently it still provides for a 
specific licensing procedure for the supply of packet or Circuit.·switched data services although the deadline 
set out in Article 3 of the  Servi~ Directive for the Introduction of such scheme had already elapsed. Given 
that under the direct effect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive simple resale of capacity was liberalized in 
Italy without any further restrictions, the Italian government shall have u) provide appropriate justifications 
for the reintroduction of any additional restrictions in  that ft:spect. 
The legislative decrees have not been adopted yet,. and the Commission is  conSidering taking Italy to the 
Court of Justice for failure  to notify the implementation measures of the Services  Directive. 
In the meantime, Article t of the Italian Postal Code of 1973, seating that 'telecommunication services .•• 
exclusively pertain  co  the State' remains  applicable  although Article  2 of the Directive  implies  that this 
Article,  as  well  as  all  other provisions  setting out the  state monopoly for telecommunications  services, 
should be changed to allow private operators the right to provide aU telecommunications services excluding 
well  defined  areas  reserved  to  the  State. According  to the  Italian  legal  framework,  only value  added 
services listed in Article 3 (paragraph 2) of the National Regulatory Plan for Telecommunications, enac:ted 
by  a.  Ministerial Decree of 6 April  1990, may be  provided. 
However, in a decision of 10 January 1995, the Italian AntitrUSt Authority (Autorita Garante) stated, disre-
garding ·the  mentioned  Italian  regulation,  that  a.  refusal  of Telecom  Italia  to provide  leased  lines  to  ~ 
private company wanting to offer voice services liberalized  under the Directive  is  an abuse of dominant 
position and requested Telecom Italia. r•> t0 present, within 90 days, the actions taken in order ta remove 
the restrictions to competition in the market· for voice services for corporate networks/  closed user groups, 
including  virtual  private  networks.  The Antitrust Authority  bases  this  decision  on the  direct effect  of 
Anicles  1 and 2 of the Services  Directive in  Italy. Telecom Italia has appealed against the decision. 
r•) Telecom Italia wu creaced on  18 Aupn 1994 ou' of a meraer benteen SIP, Italcable, IR.rrel, Telespazio and SIR.M. 
I  RO 
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With the implementation of Act 58/92 on che reorganization of the telecommunications seaor, regulatory 
and operational functions were, in principle, separated by uansfcrrinc the operating bodies of the Ministry, 
namely ASST, to Iritel, a company of the IRl Group. A bill on 'Public Utility Services Regulatory Auth-
oriticr (No 359)  is currendy pending at che Italian Parliament, which will,· if  adopted, create, illter alia, a 
regulatory body for post ~d  telecommunications. However, no date is yet anticipated for iu .adoption. 
LUXEMBOURG 
Two legislative aas were adopted in  1990 in order to implement. the Directive, the Regulation (Riglement 
grand-ducal)  of 3  August  1990  establishing  the  general  rules  applicable  to  public:  telecommunications 
services  and the regulations of 8 Oaober 1990  concerning public telephone service,  telecommunications 
leased  lines,  public  'luxpac:'  service,  public  alarm  transmission  service  and public  automatic:  telephone 
service - Serriphone. 
The Luxexpbourg  authorities  have, by letter of 22  Oaober 1991,  declared their intention to amend  the 
definition of 'basic telephonic service' in the Regulation and add che  term 'to the public:'. 
The Law ·of 20  February 1992  tranSformed the former Administration des P& T into a public ·.undertaking 
with  a separate legal  identity,  to comply with  ~e  requirement of Article  7 of the Directive to separate 
regulatory and operational functions. The Minister for PostS  and Telecommunications exercises all  regu-
latory re~nsibility in  resp~.·  o~ the eStablishment and operation of the telecommunications ne~orks. 
NETHERlANDS 
The basic  telecommunications  legislation  in  the  Netherlands  (Act  No 520  on  the  telecommunications 
facilities  (Wet op de  Telecommunicatitworzimingm) ('WTV') of 26 Oaober 1988, whic:h came into force 
on  1 January  1989,  was  drafted  before  the  publication  of the  Commission  Green  Paper of 1987.  It 
therefore uses  a  terminology which is  subStantially different from  the terminology used in  the Directive. 
·• 
! 
Reserved voice telephony is  defmed in  AJ:ticle  2 of Deffee No 551  of f December 1988  which lists  the 
mandatory services  of KPN '(Koninklijke P1T Netherlands). According to  the  definition,  the  reserved 
service is  not limited to a service which is provided on a commercial basis. Secondly, it does not Jimit the 
monopoly to voice telephony 'for the public'. Thirdly, it does  no~ take into· account whether the provision 
of the service implies the use of two connection points of the. relevant leased lines. These issues have been 
discuss~d in  bilateral  contacts  between  the  Dutch  authorities  and  the  Commission  services.  The Dutch 
authorities have subsequendy published  a notice on 30  May 1994  allowing voice services  to closed  user 
groups. However, the issue of voice services provided on leased lines and using only one connection with 
the public switched network is still under discussion.  · 
The Ministry for Transport and Public Works (Verkeer m  Watmtaat) is  the body entrusted with  regu-
latory responsibilities for telecommunications and it may give detailed instructions to K.PN concerning the 
execution ·of the general Directives (BAR1) and the  obligations relating to mandatory services. This minis-
terial  responsibility  includes  general  tariff  policy  for  public  telecommunications  services  (which,  in 
application, is similar to 'price capping' in the UK). 
AUSTRIA 
Austria  implemented  the  Directive  mainly  through  itS  Telecommunications  Act  (Femmeldegtsttz)  Nr 
908/1993, which entered into force on 1 April1994. Austria has however not yet notified the implementing 
decrees of this  law,  nor the general usage conditions of the public netWOrk. 
The reserved  telephone service  is  defined  in Articles 44{2)  and 2(6)  of the Act. This definition does  not 
fully correspond to the definition in  the Directive. However, no licenses are required for the provision of 
liberalized services. Conditions for access to the public network and use of leased lines will,  under Article 
44(6) of the Aet be laid down in  the general usage conditions  (Gtschifisbedingungm). 
The public telecommunications operator is the Post und TelegraphtnfltJ"'lllaitung (PTV). The law enuusts the 
regulatory tasks to the Ministry of Public :Economy and Communications. 
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PORTUGAL 
&  in. the case of the Netherlands, the regulatory framework for telecommunications in Porwgal predates 
the adoption of the Directive. The 'Basic Law on the Establishment, the Management and the Exploitation 
of Telecommunications  InfrastrUctUreS· and  Services',  Law  88/89,  CBasic  Law')  was  adopted  on  11 
September 1989 before the adoption of the Directive. This explains in part why the terminology used often 
differs markedly from  that of the Directive. This explains  in part why the terminology used often differs 
markedly from  that of the  Directive. The Basic  Law,  and  in  particular the distinction  betw-een .comple-
mentary and value  added services,  is  technology-based rather than services-based.  .  . 
On the issue of reserved  services,  the Porwguese legislation does  not defme services whose provision  is 
reserved to public carriers as narrowly as the Commission Directive. Fustly, Article 2 (2) of the Basic Law 
defines 'telecommunications for public use' as all services which are designed to meet the generic collective 
requirements for transmitting .and receiving messages and information. This is a broader definition than the 
concept of public in the Directive. It is uue that the Basic Law lists telecommunications for private use in 
Anicle  2 (3)  and that this  list  encompasses  at point (h)  'other communications reserved  for  the use  of 
specific public or private entities by means of an authorization granted by the government under the terms 
of treaties or international agreements or special legislation'.  However, since the entry into force  of the 
law, the Porwguese government has not adopted the necessary legislation to liberalize voice  ~lephony or 
telex services provided for closed user groups. In September 1991, the PortUguese government announced 
the  adoption· of a  ministerial  order (diploma)  on private  netWorks  to resolve  this  issue.  By  letter of 18 
November  1993,  the  Portuguese  authorities  conf~nned that they were still  studying  the  issue  and,  in  a 
subsequent bilateral  meeting on  31  January 1994, no more precise undertaking  ~n tim.ing could be given. 
Secondly, under Portuguese legislation voice telephony is defined more broadly than in the Directive. The 
Basic Law does not define voice telephony. The ~efinition is included in Article 1 of the former Regulation 
. of the Public Telephone Service  annexed. to the Decree (Demto-Lii) 199/87 of 30 April  1987. The Basic 
Law refers  to the technical operation of a fixed  subscriber access  system  (which  it defines as  the set of 
transmission  means  located  between  a  termination  ·point  and  the  first  concentration,  switching  or 
processing node) without distinguishing between the situation, whe~  this 'access system' is a leased line or 
the PSTN  ;. nor does it take into consideration the number of connections to the leased line which may be 
·used.  · 
t 
A third  issue is  the licensing conditions. According to the Directive,  Member States may make the supply 
of telecommunications  services  subject to  a  licensing  scheme,  but  only to warrant compliance  with  the 
essential requirements listed in the Directive. However, the Portuguese licensing scheme encompasses other 
obligations. 
The liberalized services  are  divided  in  two  categories: 'complementary telecommunications  s~rvices' and 
'value added services' according to a technical criterion! the use  of own infrastruCture,  and in particular, 
concentration, processing and switching nodes. Therefore, most liberalized services come within the fixed 
complementary services category. The two types of services  each  have their own licensing conditions. 
Article 4 (2) of the Directive require Member States to ensure that there are no restrictions on the use of 
leased  lines  except  those  justified  by  essential  requirements  or the  existence  of the  voice  telephony 
monopoly. Anicle  l4 of the  Basic  Law appears  more  restrictive  as  it allows  only the use of leased  lines 
voice traffic to the suscriber's own use or to the provision of complementary and value added services, and 
even requires a licence f?r the shared use  of leased circuits. 
Portugal claims that its complementary services  sche~e (Portarill 930/92) is in accordance with Article 3 of 
the Directive. This issue  is  however not settled. 
Portugal separated regulatory and operational functions in  1989. According to the Basic Law, the Ministry 
is  responsible for supervising and monitoring telecommunications. This includes the planning and coordi-
nation of the national public infrastrUcture and _services_ which  are considered essential. 
In practice the regulatory functions are delegated to the Instiwtc for Communications of Portugal (ICP), 
leaving the Ministry to supervise  the ICP and approve directives  proposed by the  ICP. 
• 
I  82 • 
.. 
.  .. 
No C 275/22  []KJ.  Official Journal of the European Communities 
The basic: regulatory framework of telecommuaicacions is the Telcc:ominunicacions Aa 87/183 (Teletoimin-
IIJJti), which was ·amended in  1988,  1990 and 1992.  ·  . 
Under this  framework,  there are no more special  or exclusive  righu for the provision of telecommu'rii-
cations  services,  including voice  telephony,  in  Finland. The whole  telecommunications  sector has  been 
opened  to  competition.  Public  telecommunications  networks  are  operated  by  organizations  with  an 
operating licence granted by the GovemmenL 
Article 10 of the Aa sets out the rights and duties of subscribers. and in particular the right to lease lines as 
well as to use  them to provide  telecommunica~ons serviC?Cs  or to sub-lease them  to others.  . 
Public: switched data communications are subject to notification only (Article S (2)  of the Act)  .. In  199-4, 
there  were  ~3 organizations  with  operating  licences  and  13  notified  organizations  operating  public 
switched data communications. 
Articles  18  to  23  of the Aa entrust the  Ministry of Transport and Communications  with  the  general 
supervision and promotion of telecommunications. The day to day enforcement of the Telecommunications 
Aa is, however, entrusted to the Telecommunications Administration Centre, which is an agency under the 
Minisuy of Transport and Communications. In, principle the cosu of die centre are covered by licence and 
inspection  fe~.  ·  .  . .  · · 
Telecom Finland is  100 o/o  state-owned but operates at arms  length from  the Minisuy of Transport and 




There has never been. a legal telecommunications monopoly in Sweden. The de /acto  monopoly of T elia 
('Televerk.et' at the time) was  th~ result of a commercial process.  .  . 
The  current  regulatory  fram~ork of telecommunications  is  set  out in  the  Telecommunications  Act 
(Tclclagen)  of 1993. Under this  Act there arc no  exclusive  rights  to provide telecommunication services 
(Article  2.1  and 4).  Any  operator has  the  right  to obtain  a  licence  and  to supply  telecommunications 
services.  Reasons are given  in  case of refusals  and Article  37  of the Act states thai appeals  against such 
refusals may .be lodged with the administrative court of Appeal.  · 
Licences are required only for the operation of public networks and the provision of leased lines.  Other 
services are subject only to a registration procedure.  . 
There are no restrictions on the processing of signals before or after transmission via the public network 
(Article 6.1), nor is there any discrimination in the conditions of use or in the charges payable (Article 6.2). 
As reprds the separation of regulation and operation (Article 7 of the Directive), the Ttltstyrtlsm (telecom 
agency)  is  responsible for ensuring that regulations are respcaed by all operators. The agency was set up 
on 1 July  1992.  Its  functioning  is  laid  down in  F6rording  1992:895. The agency may  adopt sanctions, 
including the revocation of licences, against operators which do not comply with their obligation. 
The .agency is  headed by a Director-General, under the supervision of a board, which is appointed by the 
GovemmenL  Ttlestyrtlsen has responsibilities also in the defence area. The agency is  financed through fees 
levied on the basis  of gross turnover of licencees and parties which registered  . 
The main  telecommunication  operator in Sweden  is  Telia, which  was  incorporated  as  a  private  limited 
liability company on 1 January 1993 according to Law  1992:100. It is  a 100% publicly owned company, 
supervised by the Minisuy of Transport and Communications  . 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
The legislation in force applying to telecommunications services is the 1984 Telecommunications Act which 
predates  the  Commission's  Green  Paper  and  Directive.  The  Act  has  been  extended  by  a  new  policy 
building on the 1991 White Paper comprising amendments to existing licences, extensions of'cable licenses 
to include the provision of voice  telephony services and the issuing of new licences. 
UK. legislation has generally preceded the Commission's Directive. Por example, the exclusive rights of BT 
to provide the telecommunications services covered by Article 2 of the Directive were abolished in the UK 
by Section 2 of the Telecommunications Act of 1984. Section 5 requires all persons who run telecofiUDuni-
cations systems  to have  a licence (which  may be  an  individual or class  licence).  ·  · 
.  As regards the provisions of Article 4 of the Directive, no precise definition qJ. infrasuucture, such as exists 
in Germany or the  Netherlands has  been  sec down.  Section 4 of theTA instead defines a 'telecommuni-
cations system' as: a system for the conveyance,• through the agency of electric. magnetic. electro-magnetic, 
· electro-chemical or electromechanical energy, of  ·  · 
- speech, music and other sounds, 
- visual images, 
..:.._  signals  serving  for  the  impanation  (whether  as  between  persons  and  persons,  things  an!i  things  or 
persons and things) of any matter otherwise than in the form of sounds or visual images, or 
-: signals serving for the actuation or control of machinery or apparat1,15. 
'  . 
The  Secretary  of  State  designates  certain  of  these  systems  as  'public  telecommunications  systems'. 
Operators of public:  telecommunications  systems  are  authorized  by  individual licences  and  are generally 
granted PTO Status. Around twent}' public fiXed  link operators have been granted such lic:cnc:es, as well as 
126 cable TV franchisees.  · 
The 1984 Telecommunications Act, in conjunction with the  W'~teless Telegraphy Act 1949 also ensures that 
the  regulatory functions  specified  in  Article 7 are  carried  out independently of the Telecommunications 
Operators. This is largely through the work of Ohel, a non-ministerial government department under the 
Direetor General  of Telecommunications  who,  for  the  du~tion of his  appointment,  is  independent  of 
ministerial conuol.  · 
ANNEX II 
UST OF  NATIONAL  REGULATORY  AUTHORITIES  IN THE FIELD  OF  TELECOMMUNI· 
CATIONS 
The survey of the national regulatory framework of the Member States in Annex I has been drafted on the 
basis of the information officially notified to the, Commission.  · 
For  more  detailed  information,  interested  persons  should  contact  directly the  national·regulatory auth-
orities of the Member States. The full address of these authorities were published in the  OffidtA/fourPUII of 
tin Euro~ara Communitits No C 277/9 of 15  Oetober 1993.  · 
Belgii!/Belgique 
Dan mark 
Belgisch  Instiwut voor  Pondiensten  en  Telecommunicatie  (BIPI)/ 
Institut beige des services posuux et des  t6l~communications (IBP'I) 
Astronomielaan/  Avenue de I' Astronomic  14 
B-1 000  Brussei/Brux'elles 
Telenyrelsen 
Holsteingade  63 
DK-2100  Kopenhagen 0 
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Bundesministerium fUr Post und Telekommunikation 
Postfach 80 01 
D-53005  Bonn 
Ministry of Transport 
Sygrou  49 
GR-Atben 
Direcci6n General  de Telecomunicaciones 
Sa.  planta  ·  , 
Plaza de Cibeles SIN 
E-28701  Madrid 
Direction  ~n~rale des postes et ~~~communications 
20, avenue de  S~gur 
F-75700  Paris 




Ispeuorato generate delle telecomunicuioni 
Viale Europa  190 
1-00144 Roma 
Ministb-e  des  communications 
18,  mon~e de  Ia P!uusse 
L-2945  Luxembourg  · 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Watcrstaat 
Hoofddirectie telecommunicatie en Post 
Postbus 20901 
NL-2500 EX 's-Gravenhage 




Av. Jos6 Malhoa,  Lote  1683 
P-1000  Lisboa 
Telehallintokeskus 
Vanuniemenkatu 8 A 
PL 53 
FIN-00211  Helsinki 




15 l  Buckingham Palace Road 
UK-London SWt  9SS 
20.10.95 
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REQUEST  FOR  TRANSmON PERIOD 
Greece 
(96/C  257/03) 
(Text with E£A relevance) 
(Article  90 (2)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community) 
Commission  notice  to  Member  States  and  other interested  parties  concerning  the  additional 
implementation period requested  by  Greece 
Pursuant  to  Anicle  2  (2)  of  Directive  90/388/EEC  as 
modified  by  Directive  96/19/EC,  the  Greek 
Government,  by  letter  of 25  June  1996,  has  requested 
transition  periods: 
- until  1 January 2003  as  regards  the  abolition  of the 
exclusive  rights  currently granted  to  OTE as  regards 
the  provision  of voice  telephony  and  th~ underlying 
network  infrastrUcture  which  under Anicle  2  (2)  of 
Directive  90/388/EEC  as  modified  by  Directive 
96/19/EC had  to  be  implemented  before  1 January 
1998, 
• 
- until  1 July 2001  as  regards  the lifting  of restrictions 
on  the  provision  of already  liberalized  telecommuni-
·cations strvices on: 
(a) networks  established  by  the  provider of the  tele-
communications  service; 
(b) infrastrUctures provided by third panies; and 
(c) the sharing of networks, other facilities  and sites, 
which  under  Anicle  2  (2)  of  Commission  Directive 
90/388/EEC on  competition  in  the  markets for telecom-
. munications  services  as  modified  by  Anicle  ·1  (2)  of 
Directive 96/19/EC regarding the implementation of full 
competition  in  telecommunications  markets  had  to  be 
implemented  before  1 July  1996. 
The  Greek  Government  considers  the  above  five  year 
transition  periods  to  be  indispensable  for  the  following 
reasons: 
1.  Greece  is  currently  carrying  out  a  programme  for 
digitalization  and  general  modernization  of  OTE's 
infrastrUcture  which  requires  significant  capital 
investment.  The  conStraints  on  Greece's  financial 
resources,  the  high  cost  and  the  size  of  OTE's 
modernization  programme,  aggravated  by  the 
considerable  expense  of  delivering  telecommuni-
cations services  throughout the  Greek  territory (given 
its  particular  topography),  necessitate  a  gradual  pace 
of modernization.  Even  though  advanced  services  are 
gradually  being  introduced  over  the  already  digi-
talized  pans of the  network,  OTE's  revenue  will  for 
several.  years  continue  to  depend  heavily  on  voice 
telephony. 
OTE'  s  substantial  investment  programme  (exceeding 
Dr 1,1  trillion  in  the  years  to  2003)  for digitalization 
and  modernization  would  be  prejudiced  if  full 
competition  was  introduced  in  1998;  this  would 
deprive  OTE of revenue  needed  both  to  finance  the 
modernization  of Greece's  telecommunications  infra-
structure and to provide  universal  service  to  dispersed 
customers in remote areas of Greece. 
The process  of digitalization did not  begin  in  Greece 
until  1990  due  to  the . lack  of  necessary  financial 
resources.  The  size  of  the  investment  required  for 
digitalization  of  the  network  dictates  the  pace  of 
modernization  of OTE's  services.  Of the  abovemen-
tioned  total  expenditure  approximately  29 %  will  be 
spent  on  the  modernization · of  the  urban  networks 
and  14 % on the  digitalization  of the  exchanges. 
2.  In  1993  Greece  staned  to  implement·  a  policy  of 
adjusting  tariffs  to  costs,  which  has  resulted  in 
increases  in  local  call  rates  and  reductions  (in  real 
terms)  in  long  distance  rates.  However,  despite  the 
progress  achieved,  the  current  tariff  structure  is  still 
marked by a considerable gap between tariffs for local 
and  long-distance  calls.  Further rebalancing  of tariffs 
in  the  transition  period  will  need  to  ensure  OTE's 
financial  stability  and  revenues.  (which  are  indis-
pensable  to  the  completion  of  digitalization  and 
modernization).  The  pace  of adjustment  of tariffs  to 
costS  will  depend,  inter  alia,  upon  further  modern-
ization  of  OTE's  networks,  the  introduction  of 
analytical  cost-accounting  systems  and  customer's 
acceptance of tariff increases. 
3.  StrUctural  adjustments  are  carried  out  in  order  to 
transform  OTE  into  a  commercial  organization, 
including  the  adaptation  of  its  personnel  in  the 
environment  of  modem  telecommunications  tech-
nology,,  services,  management  and  marketing 
methods. 
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4.  Liberalization of alternative  infrastrUcture  canriot take 
place in  Greece significantly in .advance of the liberal-
ization  of voice  telephony  and  public  telecommuni-
cations  networks.  Were  this  to  happen,  providers  of 
telecommunications  services  over  such  infrastructure 
would be  able  to  circumvent the derogation for voice 
telephony  and  consequently  deprive  OTE  of 
significant  revenue  which  is  crucial  for  the  modern-
ization  of  the  public  teleco~munications  networks 
and services  in  Greece. 
The  Greek  Government  will,  if  this  derogation  is 
granted,  implement  Directive  96/19/EC  in  national  law 
according  to  the  following  calendar: 
- first  half  of  1997:  proposals  for  the  introduction  of 
appropriate  legislation  in  order  to  introduce  full 
competition, 
- second  half  of  1997:  publication  of proposed  legis-
lative  changes  to  implement  full  competition  and 
remove  all  restrictions  on  the  provision  of  voice 
telephony.  and  public ·telecommunications  networks, 
and  alternative  infrastrUcture  by  1 Janu~2003 and 
1  July  2001  respectively,  and  consultation  ·with 
interested  parties, 
- 1999: target for achievement of legislative  cha~ges, 
- second  half  of  1999:  publication  of  licensing 
conditions  for  all  services  and  of  interconnection 
charges  as  appropriate  in  accordance  in  both  cases 
with  relevant European Union directives, 
- end  2000:  target  for  the  award  of. new  licences  and 
amendment  of existing  licences  to enable  competitive 
provision  of  voice  telephony  and  for  the  eStab-
lishment  of telecommunications  networks. 
The  Commission  will  assess  this  request  in  the  light 
of  the  detailed  description  provided  by  the  Greek 
Government  regarding  the  capital  investments  required 
for  the  development  of  the  network,  the  tariff  rebal-
ancing  plaMcd  as  well  as  the  restructuring  of  OTE 
together  with  the  timetable  envisaged  for  implemen-
tation.  These  elements  arc  attached  to  the  letter  of the 
Greek Government of 25  June  1996. 
The  Commission  hereby  gives  the  other Member  States 
and  other  panics  concerned  notice  to  submit  their 
comments on the measures  in  question within  orie  month 
of the publication of this  notice. The Commission,  when 
taking  its  decision  on  the  request  of  the  Greek 
Government,  will  take  into  account  any  information 
provided  within  this  time  limit. 
The comments  will  be  communicated  to  Greece. 
In this  context, under the  Directive mentioned above,  the 
infonnation provided  by  the  Greek  Government shall  be 
made  available  to  any  intereSted  pany  on  demand, 
except  data  which  should  be  withheld  due  to  the  need 
for  business  secrecy. 
Member States  or other interested  panics seeking  access 
to the  file,  should  request  this  in  writing  to  the  address 
below· within  three  weeks  of the  publication  date  of this 
notice.  In  the  case  of  requests  from  panics  other  than 
Member States,  this  request should  contain  a  description 
of the  interest  involved.  Access  shall  only  be  granted  on 
the  premises  of DG IV. 
European  Commission, 
DG IV- C.t, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
C-158  3/48, 
B-1049  Brussels. 
Fax:  (32-2)  296 98  19. 
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REQUEST FOR TRANSITION PERIOD 
Luxembourg 
(96/C 257 /04) 
(Text with EEA rele-vu.ce) 
(Article  90  (2). of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community) 
Commission  notice  to  Member States  and other interested  parties  concerning  the  additional 
implementation period requested by  Luxembourg 
Pursuant to Article  2 (2)  of Directive  90/388/EEC on 
competition  in  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
seiYices,  as  amended  by  Directive  96/19/EC, · the 
Luxembourg Government, by letter.of 28 June 1996, has 
requested transition periods: 
-. until 1 January 2000  in respect of the exclusive rights 
currently granted  to  Luxembourg's  postal  and  tele-
communications  seiYice  provider  Entreprise  des 
Postes  et  Telecommunications  (EP'l)  for  the 
provision  of  voice  telephony  and  the  underlfing 
network infrastructure, which - in  accordance with 
Article  2 (2)  of Directive  90/388/EEC, as  amended 
by Directive 96/19  /EC - are due to be abolished by 
1 January 1998, 
- until  1 ·July  1998  in  respect  of  restrictions  on  the 
provision  of already  liberalized  telecommunications 
seiYices on: 
(a)  networks established by the provider of the tele-
communic~tions seiYice; 
(b)  infrastructures provided by third parties; and 
(c)  shared networks, other facilities and sites, 
which  - under  Article  2  (2)  of  Commission 
Directive 90/388/EEC on competition in the markets 
for  telecommunications  services,  as  amended  by 
Anicle  1 (2)  of Directive 96/19/EC -were due  to 
be lifted by 1 July 1996. 
The Luxembourg Government considers these additional 
transition  periods  to  be  necessary  for  the  following 
reasons: 
1.  Liberalization  of · the  telecommunications  market 
(consequen.t  upon  the  immediate  transposal  of  the 
Directive) before a suitable regulatory framework has 
been put in place and the necessary structural changes 
made  would  expose  Luxembourg  to  the  risks  of an 
unregulated  market.  The  derogation  requested  will 
not  impede  the  development  of competition  in  the 
other  areas  of  the  telecommunications  sector  in 
Luxembourg.  Once  the  new  law  on  telecommuni-
cations  enters  into  force,  firms  will  be  invited· to  bid 
for  a  licence  to  operate  the  second  national  GSM 
network.  The selection  procedure  will  be  open  and 
objective,  and the licence will  be  granted· to  the firm 
that best meets the published qualitative criteria. 
2.  EPT currently charges its customers a single, standard 
rate,  but a  reform  of the  tariff structure  is  planned. 
The considerable  imbalance between  current charges 
is  a  major  factor  hampering  liberalization  in 
Luxembourg. The new independent supeiYisory  body 
now being set up  (the ICL)  will  oversee the  ongoing 
process of adjusting charges in Luxembourg. 
3.  The ICL will  also  be  responsible for laying down the 
accounting rules and the rules for cost-based charging 
that will apply to EPT  .. 
In  Luxembourg  the  liberalization  process  entails 
disproportionate  commitments,  particularly  in  terms 
of human. resources,  for the  ministry  responsible,  the 
ICL and EPT. 
4.  In  1995  international calls accounted for  71  %  of the 
overall telephony turnover of Lfrs  6 346 million.  Over 
50 %  of  those  calls  were  made  by  960  business 
customers based in the city of Luxembourg. Outgoing 
calls  accounted  for  62 °/o  of  international  calls. 
Opening up  the Luxembourg market before a suitable 
regulatory framework  has  been  put in  place  and  the 
necessary  structural  changes  made  would  leave  tele-
communications  companies  based  in  other  countries 
free  to  offer  international  telephony  services  to 
Luxembourg  firms  and  to  divert  business  away  from 
EPT's  network.  This  could  pose  a  serious  threat  to 
the  viability  of the  national  operator's  infrastructure 
and to its future development in a competitive market. 
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The  regulatory framework  needed  to  avert  such  a 
threat is  currently being  a~opted, and the  transition 
period requested would enable it to be put in place. 
5.  Luxembourg  recently  placed  its  postal  and  telecom-
munications  administration  on a  commercial footing. 
EPT devotes an annual budget of Lfrs  32  million  to 
equipping its staff with the skills. they need in order to 
work in a commercial environment. At the beginning 
of 1995,  EPT commissioned  an  independent firm  of 
consultants  to  undertake  a  thorough  review  of  its 
organizational  structure.  The  restructuring  process, 
whi.ch  entails  introducing  business  accounting 
methods and adjusting the ·tariff structure, will not be 
completed before 1 January 1998. 
The Commission will  assess  this  request  in  the  light of 
the  detailed  description  provided · by  the  Luxembourg 
Governm~nt in  the annex to  its  letter of 28  June  1996. 
The Commission hereby gives  the other Member States 
and interested parties notice to submit their comments on 
the measures in question within one month of the publi-
cation  of this  notice.  When  taking  its  decisioe  on  the 
request  by  the  Luxembourg  Governmerlt,  the 
Commission  will  take  into  account  any  information 
provided before  that qeadline. 
Any  comments  submitted  will  be  passed  on  to 
Luxembourg. 
In  accordance with  the  Directive  mentioned  above,  the 
information  provided  by  the  Luxembourg  Government 
will be made available to any interested party on request, 
with  the  exception  of  material  that  is  commercially 
sensitive. 
Member  States  or  other  interested  parties  wishing  to 
have  access  to this  information should submit a.  written 
request to  the  address below within  three weeks  of the 
publication  date  of this  notice.  Interested  parties  other 
than  Member  States  must  explain  why  they  require 
access. The information will be available for consultation 
only on DG IV's  premises.  Any additional  information 
that  the  Commission  might  request  from  the 
Luxembourg  Government  will  likewise  be  made 
available,  as  soon  as  it  is  received,  to  parties  which 
express an interest within the deadline mentioned abdve. 
European Commission, 
DG IV- C  1, 
Rue de  Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
C-158, 3/48, 
B-1049  Brussels. 
Fax:  (32-2)  296 98  19 . 
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REQUEST  FOR IMPLEMENTATION  PERIODS 
Spain 
(97/C 4/03) 
(Tezt with  EEA  relmmce) 
(Article  90  (2)  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community) 
Commission  notice  to  Member States  and  other  interested  parties  concerning  the  additional 
implementation periods  requested  by  Spain 
Pursuant  to  Commission  Directive -90/388/EEC,  as  last 
amended  by  Directive  96/19/EC,  and  in  particular 
Article  2  (2)  thereof,  the  Spanish  Government,  in  a 
bilateral  meeting  of  9  Oaobcr  1996  · and  funhcr 
confirmed  by  letters  of 8  and  26  November · 1996,  has. 
requested  the  following  additional  implementation 
periods  concerning  Articles  3  and  4a  (2)  of  this 
Directive: 
- until  1 January 1998  (instead of 1 January 1997),  as 
regards  the  notification  to  the  Commission  of 
licensing schemes for the provision of voice telephony 
and  the  establishment  of public  telecommunications 
networks,  and  of the  details  of the  natioqal  scheme 
envisaged  to  share  the  net  cost  of the  provision  of 
universal  service  obligations, 
- until  1  August  1998  ·(instead  of  1  July  1997),  as 
· regards  the  publication  and·  entry  into  force  of 
declaration and licensing procedures for the provision 
of  voice  telephony  and  public  telecommunications 
networks, including  the scheme  to share the ·net  cost 
of the provision of universal service obligations, 
- until  30  November  1998  (instead of 1 July  1997)  to 
ensure  that  adequate  numbers  arc  available  for  all 
operators  of telecommunications  services  in  order to 
give  full  effect  to  the  liberalization  of  the  Spanish 
market. 
The  Spanish  Government  considers  these  additional 
implementation  periods  necessary  for  the  following 
reasons: 
1.  the  introduction  of  compettuon  on  1  January  1998 
will  oblige  Telef6nica  to speed  up  the  rebalancing  of 
its  tariffs  which  will  affect  significantly  its  profit · 
margin up to end 1998; 
2.  the  introduction  of competition  also  requires  further 
capital  investment  in  Telef6nica's  network,  in 
particular  to  implement  the  new  numbering  plan 
allowing _the  granting of adequate numbers  to all  new 
entrants.  In  order to  allow  Telef6nica  to spread  the 
required· effortS  in  time,  it  is  necessary ·  to  grant it  a 
time  period of at least ·t 0  months  between  the  inter-
connection  of  the  first · operators  which  will  be 
licensed  early January  1998  and  the  interconnection 
of  all  other  new  operators  in  the  voice  telephony 
market. 
As  conf1m1cd  in  its  letter  of  8  November  1996,  the 
Spanish  Government  will  nevertheless: 
- grant early January 1998  a  third nation-wide  licence 
to  operate  voice  telephony  and  public  telecommuni-
cations  networks,  in  addition  to  the  license  which 
will  be  grantc~ in  the  course  of  1997  to  a  second 
operator, 
- authorize  cable  operators,  who  apply  for  it  in 
compliance  with  the  conditions  set  out  in  the 
applicable  law  and  regulations,  to  providr  voice 
telephony  from  the  beginning  of  January  1998 
onwards,  including  the  possibility  to  interconnect 
their networks for this purpose. 
The Spanish  Government  docs  not seek  any  derogation 
for the lifting  of restrictions  on the provision  of alrca:dy 
liberalized  telecommunications  services  on: 
(a)  networks established. by  the provider of the  telecom-
munications  service; 
(b)  infrastrUctures provided by third parties; 
(c)  the sharing of networks, other facilities  and sites; 
on 1 July  1996  as  provided  in  Article  2 (2)  of Directive 
90/388/EEC.  Consequently  such  networks  can  be 
provided  without  restrictions. 
In  addition  Spain  will  abolish  foreign  ownership 
requ~mcnts  in  the  conditions  for  licensing  telecom-
munications  operators,  in  line  with  the  Community 
position  in  the wro.  -
Finally,  the Spanish Government confirmed that it would 
ensure  that on  30  November  1998,  licenses  are  granted 
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effectively,  without further  conditions,  for  the  provision 
of  voice  telephony  and  public  telecommunications 
netWorks  to all undertakings which applied  in  the course 
of August  1998,  in  compliance  with  the  conditions  set 
out in  the  law  and its  implementing  regulations. 
The  Commission  will  assess  the  request  for  additional 
implementation periods  in  the light o£  the  argumentation 
provided  by  the  Spanish  Government  regarding  the 
investment  requirements  of Telef6nica. 
The  Commission  hereby  gives  the  Member  States  and 
other interested  parties  notice  to submit  their comments 
on the  measures  in  question  within  one  month  of the 
publication  of this  notice. 
The.  comments  will  be  communicated  to Spain. 
In  this  conte~ under the abovementioned Directive,  the 
infonnation  provided  by  the  Spaliish  G~vemment shall 
be  made  avail~ble to  any  interested  pany on  demand, 
except  data which  should  be  withheld  due  to  the  need 
for  business  secrecy. 
Member States.  or other interested  parties seeking  access 
to the  file,  should  request  this  in  writing to  the  address 
below within  three weeks  of the· publication ·date of this 
notice.  Interested parties other than Member States  must 
.  explain why they require access. The file  will  be available 
for  consultation only  in  DG IV's  premises. 
European  Commission, 
DG IV- C.l, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/W  etstraat 200, 
C·158  3/48, 
:S.1049  Brussels, . 
Fax:  (32 2)  296 98 19. 
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Communication  from  the  Commission  on·  the  application  of the  competition  rules  to  access 
agreements  in  the  telecommunications  sector - frame-trl&;  rclcvants  markets  and  principles 
I 
(97/C 76/06) 
(Text with  EEA  relevance) 
iThe  Commission approved a draft notice on the  application of the competition  rules  to access 
agreements  in  the  telecommunications  sector  .  . 
·The Commission intends to  ~dopt the. notice after having heard any comments from interested 
parties. 
~·The- Co~s~on  invites  interested parties  to  submi~ their possible  obse~ations they  may have 
. on  the draft notice  published  hereunder. 
Observations must. reach the Commission not later than two months following  the  dat~. of this 
publication.  Observations may be sent to the Commission by fax  (No (32:.2)  296 98 J  9) or by 
mail  to  the following  address: 
·European · CommiSsion, 
DireCtorate-General  for Competition  (DG IV), 
Direetorate  c~···  . 
Office  3/48, 
Avenue .  de  Cor:tenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
. B-1 040  Brussels.  · 
e-mail:  access.noticc@dg4.cec.be 
PREFACE 
In  the  telecommunications  industry,  access  agreements  ~e  ·  central  m  allowing  market 
participants  the  benefits  of liberalization. 
The purpose ·of this  notice  is  mx:eefold: 
'  ' 
- to set out access principles stemming from  EU competiti~n law as  shown in a large number 
of  Commission  decisions  ·in  order  to  cre~te  greater  market  certainty  and  more  stable 
conditions  for  investment  and  commercial  initiative  in  the  telecommunications  and 
multimedia  sectors, 
- to deftne and clarify the relationship between competition law and seetor specific legislation 
under  the  Article  1  OOA  framework  (in  particular  this  relates  to  the  relationship  between 
competition rules and open network provision  <<?NP)  legislation), 
- to explain  how competition rules will  be  applied  in  a consistent way across  the converging 
sectors  involved  in  the  provision  of new  multimedia  services,  and  in. particular  to  access 
issues  and gateWay$  in this ·context.  · 
This draft notice  is  now published  for public consultation only. The final  ve~ion of the notice 
will  be  adopted  only  once  the  ONP interconnection  Directive  has  been  finally  approved  by 
Parliament  and CounciL This will  guarantee compleie .  coherence  between  the ONP intercon-
nection  framework and the  application  of the  competition rules  as  set out in  this  draft notice, 
and the taking into ac~ount of the· final  v~rsion of the· ONP interConnection Directive, in  order 
to  create market certainty before  the  1  ·  fanuary  1998  liberalization  deadline. 
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1.  The timetable  for full  liberalization  in  the  ~lecom­
munications  seaor has  now  been  established,  and  . 
Member  StateS  are  to  remove  the  last  barriers  to 
the  provision . of telecommunications  services  in  a 
competitive environment to consumers by  1 January 
1998 e>.  A3  a  result  of this  liberalization  a sec:Ond 
set  of  related  products  or 'services  will  emerge  as 
well  as· the  need ·for access  to facilities  necessary to 
provide  these  services.  In  this  sector,  intercon-
nection  to  the  public  switched  telecommunications 
netwOrk  is  a  typical  example  of such  ~ccess. The 
Commission  has  Statea  that  it  will  define  the 
treatment·  of  access  agreemenu  under  the 
compennon  rules f).  This  nouce,  therefore; 
addresses  the  issue  of how  com~tition rules  and 
procedures  apply  to  access  agn;ement5 . in  the 
context of hannonized  EU and  national  regulation 
in  the  telecommunication$  sector.  ' 
2.  The regulatory framework  for  the  liberaliza~on of 
telecommunications·  consisu  of  the  liberalization 
directives  issued  under Anicle 90 of the EC Treaty 
and the open network provision (ONP) framework. 
The  ONP  framework  provides  harmonized  rules 
for  access  and interconnection  to  the  telecommuni-
cations  networks ·and  the  voice  ·telephony  services. 
"fh.e  legal  frameworJt  provided  by  the  liberalization 
and  harmonization legislation  is  the  background  to 
any  action  taken  by  the · Commission  in  its 
application  of  the  ·competition  rules.  Both  the 
liberalization  legislation (')  and  the  harmonization 
legislation (")  are  aimed  at ensuring  the  attainment 
of the  objectives  of the  Community  as  laid  out  in 
Article  J  of the . EC  Treaty,  and  specifically,  the 
establishment  of .  'a  system  .. ensuring  that 
· competition  in  the internal  market  is  not distorted' 
and  'an  internal  market  characterised  by  the 
abolition,  as  between  Member  States,  of  obStacles 
to  the  free  movement  of  goods~ persons;  services 
and capital'. 
3.  The  Commission  has  published  guidelines  on  the 
application  Qf  EEC  competition  rules  in  the  tele-
communications  sector (OJ No C 233,  6.  9.  1991, 
p.  2).  The  present  notice·  is  intended  to  build  on 
those  guidelines,  which  do  not  deal  explicitly  with 
access  issues. 
4.  In  the  telecommunications  sector,  liberalization  and 
harmonization  legislation  permit  and  simplify  the 
·!"2-~ 
task  of· Community  £inns  in  embarking  on  new 
activities  in  new  markets  and  consequently  allow 
users  to benefit  from  increased  competition.  These 
advantages  must  not  be  jeopardized  by  restrictive 
or  abusive  practi~  of  undenakings:  the 
Community's  · -competition  rules  are  therefore 
essential  to  ensure  the  completion  ·of  this  devel-
opment.  New eptrants  must  in  the  initial  stages  be 
ensured  the  right to have access  to  the  networks of 
incumbent  telecommunications  operators  (TOs). 
Several  authorities,  at  regional,  national  and 
, Community  levels,  have  a  role  in  regulating  this 
sector. H the· competition proceSs  is to work well  in 
the. internal  market,  effective  coordination  between 
these institutions must be  ensured. 
5.  P~  I  of· the  notice  sets  out  the  legal  framework 
and details  how the  Commission  intends  to achieve 
its  intention  of avoiding  unnecessary duplication  of 
procedures  while  safeguarding  the  righu of under-
takings  and  users  under  the -competition  rules.  In 
this  conteXt,  the  Commission's  efforts to encourage 
decentralized  application  of  the  competition  rules 
by .  national  courts  and  national  authorities  aim  at 
achieving.  remedies  at  a  national  level,  unless  a 
significant .. Community  interest  is  involved  in  a 
particular  ca~. In  the  telecommunications  sector, 
specific procedures in  the ONP framework  likewise 
aim at r~olving access problems in the first place at 
a decentralized,  national level,  with a further possi-
bility  for  conciliation  at  Community  level.  Part  II 
defines  the  Commission's  approach  to  market  defi-
nition  in  this  sector.  Part III  details  the  principles 
that the  Commission  will  follow  in  the  application 
of  the  competition  rules:  it  aims  to  help  telecom-
munications  market  panicipants  shape  their  access 
agreements  by  explaining  the  competition  law 
requirements. 
6.  The notice  is  based  on the  Commission's experience 
in  several  cases (
1
),  and  certain  studies  in  this  ar~a 
carried out on behalf of the Commission('). 
7.  This  notice  does  not in  any  way restrict  the  rights 
conferred  on  individuals  or  undertakings  by 
Community  law,  and  is  without  prejudice  to  any. 
interpretation  of  the  Community  competition  rules 
that may be given  by the Court of First Instance or 
the  European Court of Justice. 
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PART I 
FRAMEWORK 
1.  Competition ._rules  and sector specific  regulation 
8.  Access  problems  in  the  broadest sense  of the word 
(e.g.  provision  of  leased  lines,  interconnection  to 
networks,  access  to  data conceming subscribers  to 
voice  telephone  services)  can  be  dealt  with  at 
different levels  and on the basis of a range -of legis-
lative  provisions,  of both  national  and  Community 
origin.  A  service·  provider  faced  with  an  access 
problem such as a TO's unjustified  ~efusal to supply 
(or  on  reasonable  terms)  a  leased  line  needed  by 
the  applicant  to  provide  services  to  itS  customers 
could therefore  contef!lplate  a  number of routeS  to 
seek  a  remedy.  Generally  ~caking,  aggrieved 
parties will experience a number of benefits, at least 
in. an  initial  stage,  in  seeking redress  at a  national 
level.  At  a  national  level,  the.  applicant  has  two 
main choices  namely,  firstly,  specific  national regu-
latory  procedures  now  e$tabUshed  in·  accordance 
with  Community law  and  harmonized  under open 
network  provision  (see  footnote  4)  a:nd,  secondly, 
an  action  under  national  and/  or Community  law 




Complaints  made  to  the  Cohunission  under  the 
competition  rules  in  the place  of or in  addition  to 
national  courts,  national  competition  authorities 
and/  or  to  national  regulatory  authorities  under 
ONP  procedures  will  be  dealt  with  according  to 
the  priority  which  they  deserve  in  view  of  the 
urgency,  novelty  and  transnational  nature  of  the 
problem  involved  and taking into  account the need 
to avoid  duplicate proceeding (see  below, points  13 
et seq.). 
9.  The  Commission  recognizes  that  national  regu-
latory  authorities  (NRAs) (
1
)  have  different  tasks, 
and operate  in  a  different  legal  framework  to  the 
Commission.  FirSt,  the  NRAs  ope~te  under 
national  law,  albeit  often  implementing· European 
law.  Secondly,  that · law,  based  as  it  is  on 
considerations  of  telecommunications  policy  has 
objectives  different  to,  but  consistent  with,  the 
objectives  of  Community  competition  policy.  The 
Commission  cooperates  as  far  as  possible  with  the 
national  regulatory  authorities,  and  invites  the 
national  regulatory  authorities  to  cooperate  as  far 
as  possible  between  themselves.  Under Community 
law,  national  authorities, including regulatory auth-
orities and  compe~tion authorities, have  a duty not 
to  approve  a  practice  or  agreement  contrary  to 
Comrn~ty  competition law. 
10.  Community competition  rules  are  not sufficient  to 
remedy  the  various  problems  in  the  telecommuni-
~tions sector.  NRAs  therefore  have· a  significantly 
wider ambit and a significant· and far-reaching role 
in  the  regulation  of the  sectOr.  It. should  also  be 
·noted  that  as  a  matter  of  Community  law,  the 
. NRAs must be independent ('). 
11.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  the  ONP 
framework  imposes  certain  obligations  on  national 
telecommunications operators that go beyond those 
that would  ~onnally be  imposed  by Article  86  of. 
the  EC Treaty. ~  may require strict standards 
relating  to  transparency,  obligations  to  supply  and 
pricing practices. These obligations can be  enforced 
by  the  national  regulatory  authorities,  which  .also 




· 12.  This  notice  is  written,  for  convenience,  in· moSt 
~pects as if the  law was  conceived with  only one 
telecommunications  operator  controlling  the  only 
nationwide  public  switched  telecom.r;nunications 
network  in  each  Member  States.  This  will  not 
necessarily  be  the  case:  new. telecommunications 
networks. offering  increasingly  wide  coverage .  will 
develop  progressively.  These  alternative  telecom-
munications  ne~orks may ultimately  be  large  and 
extensive  enough  to  be  p~  or  e-Ven·  wholly 
substitutable for ~e  existing national networks,  and 
this should be kept in mind. 
13.  Given  the  Commission's  responsability  for  the 
Community's  competition  policy,  the  Commission 
mUst  serve  the  Community's  general  interest.  The 
administrative  resources  at  the  Commission's 
dispo~al to perform  its  task  are necessarily  limited 
and  cannot  be  used  to  deal  with  .  all  the  cases 
brought  to  its  attentio~.  The  Commission  is 
therefore · obliged,  in  general,  to  take  all  organiz-
ational  measures  necessary  for the  performance  of 
itS  task and, in particular, to establish priorities e'>· 
t  4,  The  Commission  has  therefore  indicated·  that  it 
intends,  in  using  its · decision-making  powers,  to 
concentrate  on  notifications,  complaints  and 
own-mauauve  proceedings  having  panicular 
political,  economic  or  legal  significance  for  ~e 
Community (12). Where these  features  are absent  an 
a  particular case,  notifications  will  not normally be 
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dealt with by means of a fprmal decision, but rather 
a  comfort  letter  (subject  to  the  consent  of  the 
parties), · and  complaints  should,  as · a  rule,  be 
handled  by national courts or other relevant auth-
orities..  In  this  conteXt,  it should be  noted that the 
competition  iules  are  directly ,effective (u)  so  that 
EC competition  law  is  enforceable  in  the national 
courts.  Even  where  other  Community  legislation 
has  been  respected,  this  does  not remove  the need 
to '  comply  with  the  Community  competition 
rules(").  , 
15.  Other  national  authorities,  in  particular  national 
regulatory  authorities  acting  within  the  ONP 
framework,  have  jurjsdiction  over  certain  access 
agreements  (which  must.  be  notified  to  them). 
However, notification of an agreement to an NRA 
does  not make notification of an agreement to the 
Commission  unnecessary.  The  national  regulation 
authorities  must. ensure  that actions  taken by them 
are  consistent  with  EC  competition  law (
11
),.  this 
duty  requires  them  to  refrain  from  action · that 
would  undermine  the  effective  protection  of 
Community  law  rights  under  .  the  competition 
rules (").  Therefore,  they  may ·  not  approve 
arrangements which are contrary to the competition 
rules (
11
).  H the  national  authorities  aa so . as  to 
undermine  ~ose  rights,  the  Member· State  may 
itself be liable  in damages to those  hanned by  this 
action C'>·  In·  addition,  national  regulatory  auth-
orities  have  jurisdiction  under the  ONP Directives 
to take steps to ensure effective competition ("). 
16.  Access  agreements  in  principle  regulate  the 
provision  of  certain  services  betwee_n  independent 
undertakings and do not result in the creation of an 
·autonomous  entit}r  which  would  be  distina  from 
the  parties  to  the  agreements.  Access  agreements : 
are thus  generally outside  the scope of the · Merger 
Regulation eo). 
17.  Under .Regulation  17 (
21
), the Commission could be 
seised  of an issue  relati.ng  to  access  agreements· by 
way of a notification of an access agreemeilt by one 
or more  of  the  parties  involved (
22
),  by  way of a 
complaint  against  a  restrictive  access  agreement or 
against  the  behaviour  of a  dominant  company  in 
granting  or  refusing  access (2,),  by  way  of  a 
Commission  own-initiative  procedure  into  such  a 
grant or refusal, or by way of a  seetor inquiry (~)~ 
In .addition,  a  complain~t may .request  that  the 
· ~ceommission take interim measures. in circumstances 
where .  there  ~ an urgent risk 'of serious  and irrep-
arable  hann  to  the  complainant  or to  the  public 
interest (
25
). It should,  however,  be  noted in  cases 
of great  urgency  tha~ procedures  before  national 
courts can usually result more  quickly in  an ·order 
to end the infringements than procedure$ before the 
Commission (~'). 
18.  There are a number of areas where agreements will 
be  subject  to  both  the  competition  rules  and 
national  or  European  sector  specific  regulation, 
most  notably  internal  market  regulation.  In  the 
telecommunications sector, the ONP Directives aim 
at  establishing  a  regulato.ry  regime  for  access 
agreements.  Given  the  detailed  nature  of  ONP 
rules·  and  the ·fact  that  they  may  go  beyond  the 
requirements  of Anicle  86,  undertak:ings  operating 
in  the ·telecommunications  sector shoUld  be  aware 
that  compliance  with  the  Community  competition 
rules  does  not absolve· them of their duty to abide 
by  obligations  imposed  in  the  ONP context,  ·and· 
vice  vers~. 
2~ Conimi.ssion  action in relation .  to access agrecinents e
7
) 
19.  Access. agreements  taken  as  a  whole  are  of great 
significance,  and it  is  therefore  appropriate  for  the 
Commission  to  spell  out as  clearly  as  possible  the 
Community  legal  framew6rk  within  which  these 
agreements  should  be  concluded.  Access 
agreement$  having  restrictive  clauses  will  involve 
issues  under Article  .85.  Agreements. which  involve 
dominant,  o~  monopoliSt,  undertakings  involve 
Article  8~  issues:  concerns  arising  from  the 
dominance  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  will 
generally  be  of greater significance  in  the  context 
·of  a  particular agreement than those under Article 
.  85. 
20.  In  applying  the  competition  rules, _the  Commission 
will  build on .the ONP framework, and the national 
regulatory·  authorities  act  within  that  framework. 
Where  agreements  fall  within· Article  85  (1),  they 
must  be  notified  to the  Commission  if  they are  to 
benefit  from  an  exemption  under  Article  85  (3). 
Where  agreements  are  notified,  the  Com~ission 
intends  to  deal  with  one  or more  notifications  by 
way  of  formal  decisions,  following  appropriate 
publicity  in  the  Official Journal, and  in  accordance 
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with  the  principles  set  out below.  Once  the  legal 
principles  have  been  . clearly  established,  the 
Commission  then ,.  proposes  to  deal  by  way  of 
co~ort letter with  other  notifications  raising  the 
same iss\les. 
3.  Complaints e•> 
21.  Natural  or legal  persons  with  a  legitimate· interest 
may,  und~  certain  circumstances,  submit  a 
complaint  ·to  the  Commission,  requesting  that  the 
Commission  by  decision  require  that  an 
infringement of Article  85  or Article  86 of the  EC 
Treaty be  brought  ~o an end.  A  complainant  may 
additionally  request  that  the  Commission  take 
interim  measures  where· there  is  an  urgent risk  of 
serious  and  irreparable  hann (2').  A  prbSpective 
complainant  has  other  equally  or  even  more 
effective  options,  such  ·as  an  action  before . a 
national  coUrt.  In this  context,  it should  be  noted 
that procedures before the national couns can offer 
considerable  advantages  foi:  individ~als  and 
compani~, such as  in particular (l
0
): 
- national courts can deal with and award. a claim 
for  damages' resul~g from  an  infringement  of 
the  competition rules,. 
. •' 
- national  courts  can  usually  adopt  interim 
measures  and  order  the  termination  of  an 
infringement more quickly than  the Commission 
is  able to do, 
- before national ·courtS,  it  is  possible  to combine 
a  claim  under  Community  law  with  a  claim 
under national law, 
- legal  costs  can  be  awarded  to  the  successful 
applicant before a national court. 
Furthermore,  the  specific  national  regulatory  prin-
ciples.  as  harmonized  under  ONP  principles  can 
offer recourse both at the national  and  if necessary 
at Commul;lity level. 
3.1.  Use  of  national and ONP procedures 
22.  As  referred  to above (1
1
)  the  Commission  will  take 
into  account  the  Community interest  of each  case 
brought  to  its  attention.  In  evaluating  the 
•  ~i".. Community interest, the Commission examines: 
· '. . .  the significance  of the  alleged  infringement  as 
regards the functioning. of the common market, the 
probability  of  establishing  the  existence  of  the 
infringement . and  the  scope  of  the  investigation 
required  in  order to fulfil,  under the  best  possible 
conditions,  its task of ensuring that Articles  85  and 
. 86  are complied with' (S1).  .  . 
Another essential  element  in  this  evaluation  is  the 
extent to which· a national judge is  in  a position to 
provide  an  effective remedy for an  infringement of 
Article  85  or  86.  This  may  prove  difficult,  for 
example,  in  Cl$es  involving  extra-territorial 
elements. 
23.  Article  85  (1)  and  Article  86  of the  EC  Treaty 
produce · direct  effeets  in  rel~tions  betWeen  indi-
viduals  which  must  be  safeguarded  by  national 
courts (S
1
).  As  regards  actions  before  the  national 
regulatory  authority,  the  ONP  Directive  provides 
that such  an authority has  power to "intervene  and 
order changes in relation to both the existence  and 
.content  of access  agreements.  National  regulatory 
authorities·.  must  take  into  account  'the  need  to 
stimulate  a  .competitive  market'  and  may·  impose 
conditions  on  one  or more  parties,  inter  alia,  'to 
ensure  effe~e competition' ('
4
). 
24.  The Commission  may itself  be  seized  of a  ~ispute 
either  purSUant  to  the  competitic;m  rules,  or 
pursuant  to  an  ONP  conciliation  procedure. 
Multiple  si~ultaneous  proceedings  might  lead  to 
unneCe.ssary  duplication  of investigative  effortS  by 
the  Commission  and  the  national  authorities. 
Where ,complaints  are lodged with  the  Commission 
under Article  3  of Regulation  17  while  there  are 
related  actions  before  a  relevant · national  or 
European  authority  or  court,  the  Directorate-
Genera]  for competition  will  generally  not initially 
pursue·  any  investigation  as  to the  existence  of an 
infringement  under  Article  85  or  86  of  the  ~C 
Treaty.  This  is  subject,  however,  to  the  followmg 
points. 
3.2.  Safeguarding  complainant's  rights 
25.  Undertakings  are  entitled  to. effective  protection  of 
their Community law rights ('5). These rights  would 
be ·  undermined  if  national  proceedings  were 
allowed  to  lead  to  an  excessive  delay  of  the 
Commission's  action,  without  a  satisfactory \ 
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I'CfC)lution  of the  matter at a  national  level.  In  the 
telecommunications  ·sector,  innovation  eycles  are 
relatively  short,. .  an~  any  substantial  delay  in 
resolving  an· access  dispute  would  in  practice  be 
equivalent  to  a  refusal  of access,  thus  prejudging 
the proper determination of the  cas~. 
26.  The  Commission  therefore  takes  the  view  that ·an 
access  dispute  before  a  national  regulatory 
authority  should  be  resolved  within ·  a  reasonable 
period  of  time,  normally  speaking  not  extending 
beyond six  months of the. ·matter first  being  drawn 
to the attention of that authority or after initiation 
of  ONP . procedures,  including  the  ·conciliation 
proCedures e·>·  This  resolution could  take the fonn 
of  either  a  fmal  detennination  of  the  action  or 
another  fonn  of relief  which  would  safeguard  ~e  · 
rights  of  the  complainant.  If  the  matter  has  not 
reached  such  a  resolution  then,  prima  facie~  the 
rights  of  the  panics  are.  not  being  effectively 
protected,  and  the  Commission .  would  in  principle, 
upon  request  by the  complainant,  begin  its  investi-
gations into ·the case in  accordance with its  nonnal 
procedures,  after  consultation  and  in  cooperation 
with the national authority in question. 
3.3.  lnttrim  measures 
27.  As  tegard~ any  request  for  interim  measures,  the 
existence  of national  proceedings  is  relevant to the 
question·  of whether  there  is,  a  risk  of serious  and 
irreparable  hartn.  Such  proceedings  should,  prima 
facie,  remove  the  risk  of such  harm  and  it  would 
therefore not be  appropriate for the Commission  to 
grant interim  measures  in  the  absence  of eyidence 
that the risk would nevertheless remain. 
28.  The availability  of and  criteria  for  injunctive  relief 
is  an  important  factor which  the  Commission  must · 
take  into · account  in  reaching  this  prima  facie 
conclusion.  If injunctive relief were  not available, or 
if such relief was  not likely adequately to take into 
account the  complainant's  rights  under Community 
law;  the  Commission  would  consider  that  the 
national  proceedings  did  not  remove  the  risk  of 
harm,  and  would  therefore  commence  its  .investi-
gation of the case. 
4.  Own-initiative  investigation and sector inquiries 
29. If it appears  necessary,  the  Commission  will  open 
an. own-initiative  investigation.  It can_ also  launch  a 
sector  inquiry,  subject  to  c;:onsultation  of  the 
Advisory  Committee 'of Member  State  competition 
authorities. 
5.  Fanes 
30.  The .Commission  may  impose  fines  of up  to  10 % 
of the  annual  worldwide  turnover  of undertakings 
which  intentionally or pegligendy breach Article  85 
·. (1)  or Article  86 ("). Where  agreements  have  been 
notified  pursuant  to  Regulation·  17  for  an 
exemption  under  Article  85  (3  )~  no  fine·  may  be 
levied  by  the  Commission  in  respect  of .  activities 
described  in  the  notification e·>  for.  the  period 
-following  notification.  tfowcver,  the  Commission 
may  withdraw  the  im~unity  from  fines  by 
informing  the  undertakings  concerned  that,  after 
preliminary  eXamination,  it  is  of the  opinion  that 
Article  85  (1)  of  the  Treaty  applies  and  that 
applicatioq of Article 85  (3) is  not justified e'). 
31.  The  ONP  interconnection  Directive  has  two 
particular  provisions  wQich  should  be  taken  into 
account with  respect to ~e question of fines  under 
the  competition  rules.  ;First,  it  provides  that  inter-
connection  agreements  must  be  communicated  to 
the  relevant  national  regulatory  . authorities  and 
made  a~ilable to  interested  third  parties,·  with  the 
exception  of  those  pans  which  .  deal  with  the 
commercial  strategy of the  parties eo).  Secondly, 'it 
provides that the  national. regulatory -~uthority must 
have  a  number  of · powers  which  it  can  use  to 
influen~  or  amend  the  interconnection 
agreements e'>· These provisions ensure that appro-
priate  publicity  is  given  to  the  agreements,  and 
provide  the  n'ational  regulatory· authority  with  the 
opportUnity  to  take  steps,  where  appropriate,  to 
ensure effective competition on the market. 
32.  Where an agreement has  been notified to a national 
regulatory  authority,  but has  not  been  notified  to 
the Commission,  the Commission does  not consider 
it  would  be  generally  appropriate  as  a  matter  of 
poliey to impose  a fine  in  respect of the agreement, 
even  if  the  agreement  ultimately  proves  to  contain 
conditions  in  breach  of Article  85.  A  fine  would, 
however,  be  appropriate in· some cases,  for  example 
where: 
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(a)  the.  agreement  proves  co  contain  provisions  in 
breach of Anide 86; and/or 
(b)  the breach of Article 85  is particularly serious. 
The size of the fine  will depend on the gravity and 
duration of the infringement. 
33.  Notification  to the  NRA is  not a  substitute  for a 
notification  to  the  Commission  and  does· not limit 
the  poSsibility  for  interested  parties  co  ·submit  a 
complaint.  to  the  Commission,·  or  for  ·the 
Commission  to begin an own-initiative investigation 
into a~  agreements.  Nor does  such  notification 
limit the rights of a party to seek damages before a 
national  court. for  harm caused  by anti-competitive 
agreementS (41).  · 
PARTU 
RELEVANT  MARKETS 
34.  In  the  course  of  investigating  cases  within  the 
framework set out in Part I above,  the Commission 
will  ·base  iuelf  on .  the  following  approach  to  the 
definition of relevant marketS )n this seaor. 
35.  Firms  are  subject  to  three  main  sources  of 
compeuuve  constraints;  demand  substitutability, 
- supply  substituta-bility  and  potential  competition, 
wii:h  the  first  constituting  the  most  immediate  and . 
effective  disciplinary  force  on  the  suppliers  of  a 
given  product or service ..  Demand substitutability is 
therefore  the main  tool used  to define  the relevant 
product  market  . on  ·which  resmcuons  of 
con:tpetition  for the purposes of Articles  85  (1) and 
86 can be identified.  · 
I 
36.  Supply  substitutability  is  generally  not  used  to 
define  relevant  markets.  In  practice  it  cannot  be 
clearly  distinguished  from  potential  competition. 
Supply  side  ·  substitutability  and  potential 
competition  are  used  for  the  purpose  of  deter-
mining  whether  the  undertaking  has  a  dominant 
position or whether the restriction of competition  is 
significant  within  the  meaning  of  Article  85,  or 
whether there  i$  elimination of competition. 
37.  In assessing  relevant markets it is  necessary· to look 
at developments in  the market in the short tenn. 
1. ~  p~  market 
38.  Section 6 of  Form AJB defines the relevant product . 
market as  follows:  · 
'A  relevant  product  market  comprises  all  .,those 
producu  and/  or  services  which  are  regarded  as 
intetchangeable  or substitutable  by  the  consumer, 
by.  reason  of  the  products'  characteristics,  their 
prices and their intended use'. 
39.  The ending of the legal monopolies in  the telecom-
munications  seaor,  whereby  third  parties  can 
provide  .services  to  end-users,  will  lead  to  the 
emergence  of a  second  type . of market,  related  to 
the  market fpr provision of se,rtices,  that of. access 
to facilities which are currently necessary co  provide 
these semces. In  this  sectOr,  interCOnnection  to the 
'  public  switched  telecommunications  netWork  would 
be  a typical  example  of such access. Without inter-
. connection,  it will  not be  commercially possible  for 
third  parties  to  provide,  for  example,  compre-
hensive  voice  telephony services. 
40.  It is  clear, therefore,. that in. the telecommunications 
seaor  there  are  at  least  tw:o  types  of  relevant 
prOduct markets to consider - that of a service to 
~  provided to end users and that of access to those 
facilities  necessary  to  provide  that  service  to  end 
users  (information,  physical  network,  etc.).  In  the 
conteXt  of ·any  particular case,  it· will  be  necessary 
·  to· define  the  relevant  access  and  seivices  markets, 
such  as  interconnection  to the public telecommuni-
cations  netWork,  and  provision  of  public  voice 
telephony ·services,  respectively. 
41.  When appropriate, the Commission will use  the  test 
o(  a  rel~t. market  which  is  made  by  asking 
whether,· if all  the  suppliers  of  the  services  in 
question  raised  their  prices  by  5  to  10 96, ·  · their 
collective  p{Ofits  would rise.  According to this  test, 
.  it· their profits would rise,  the  market considered  is 
a separate relevant market. 
42.  Tlte Commission considers that the principles under 
·  competition  law  governing  these  markets  remain 
the  same  regardless  of  the·  particular  market  in 
question.  Qiven  the pace of technological change in 
this sector, any attempt to define. particular produa 
markets in  this  notice would run the risk of rapidly 
becoming inaccurate or irrelevant. The definition of 
particular. product markets  is  best done  in  the  ligh~ 
of a detailed examination of an individual case. 
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1.1.  Services  market 
43.  This can be broadly defined as  the .provision of any 
telecommunications  service  to  a  user.  Different 
telecomrn~nications  services  will  be  considered 
substitutable  if  they  show  a  sufficient  degree  of 
interchangeability  for  the  end-user,  which  would 
me~ that  effective  competition  can  take · place 
'I  between the different providers of these services. 
i "2.  Access  to  facilities 
44.  For  a  service  provider  to  provide  services  to 
end-users  it  will  often  require  access  to  one  or 
more  (upstream  or  downstream)  facilities.  For 
example,  to  deliver  physically  the  service  to 
end-users,  it  needs ·access  to the termination points 
of the  telecommunications. network to which  these 
end-users  are  connected.  This  access  can .  be 
achieved  at the physica,l  level  through dedicated or 
shared  local  infrastructure,  either  self  provided  or 
leased  from  a  local  infrastructure  provider.  It can 
also  be  achieved  either  through  a  service  provider 
who  already  has  these  end-users  as  subscribers,  or 
through  an  interconnection  provider  who  has 
access  directly  or indirectly  to  the  relevant  termi-
nation points. 
45.  In  addition  to  physical  access,  a  service  provider 
may  need  access  to  other facilities  to  enable  it  tq 
market  its  service  to  end  users:  for  example,  a 
service  provider  must  be  able  to  make  end  users 
aware  of its  services.  Where,  as  is  often  the  case, 
for example, with directory information, the facility 
can only be  obtained from  the  telecommunications 
operator,  similar  concerns  arise  as  -with  physical 
access  issues. 
46.  In  many  cases,  the  Commission  will  be  concerned 
with physical  access  issues,  where what is  necessary 
is  interconnection  to  the  network  of the  telecom-
munications  operator (
0
). 
47.  Some.  incumb~nt telecommunications operators may 
be tempted  to resist  providing  access  to third-party 
service  providers  or  other  network  operators, 
particularly in  areas where the proposed service will 
be  in  competition  with  a  service  provided  by  the 
telecommunications  operator  itself~  This  resistance 
will  often  manifest  itself  as  a  reluctance  to  allow 
access or a willingness to allow it only under disad-
vantageous  conditions.  It  is  the  role  of  the 
competition  rules  to  ensure  that  these  prospective 
access  markets  are  allowed  to  develop,  and  that 
incumbent operators are not permitted to use their 
. ~~ntrol over  access  to  stifle  developments  on  the 
services.  markets. 
It should be stressed that in the telecommunications 
sector, liberalization can  be expected to lead to the 
development  of  new,  alternative  networks  which 
will  ultimately  have · an  impact  on  access  market 
definition  involving  the  incumbent  telecommuni-
cations  operator. 
2.  Relevant  geographic  market 
48.  Relevant  geographic  markets  are  defmed  m  Form 
AlB as  follows:  , 
'The relevant geographic market comprises the area 
in  which  the  undenakings  concerned  are  involved 
in  the supply  and  demand of products or services, 
in  which  the  conditions  of  competition  are 
sufficiently  homogeneous  and which  can  be  distin-
guished  from  neighbouring  areas  because  the 
conditions  of competition  are  appreciably  different 
in those areas.' 
49.  As  regards  the  proVlSton  of  telecommunication 
services  and access  markets, the relevant geographic 
· market  will · be  the  area  in  which  the  obj~ctive 
conditions  of  competition  applying  to  service 
providers  are similar.  It will  therefore  be  necessary 
to examine the possibility for  t~ese service providers 
to access an end-user in  any part of this area, under 
equ,ivalent  and  economically  v.iable  conditions. 
Regulatory conditions such  as  the terms of licences, 
and  any  exclusive  or  special  rights  owned  by 






so.  The Commission will -apply  the following  principles 
in cases before it. 
51.  The Commission has recognized that: 
'Anicles  85  and  86  ... constitute  law  in  force  and 
enforceable  throughout  the  Community.  Conflicts 
should  not  arise  with  other  Community  rules 
because· Community  law  forms  a  coherent  regu-
latory framework  . . . it  is  obvious  that Community 
acts  adopted  in  the  telecommunications  sector  are 
to  be  interpreted  in  a  way  consistent  with 
I  100 . 
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competition  rules,  so  as  to  ensure  the  best possible 
implementation  of  all  aspectS .of  the  Community 
telecommunications  policy  . . .  This  applies,  inter 
Jill, to  the  relatioruhip  between  competition  rules 
applicable to undertakings and the ONP rules' (
4
'). 
52.  Thus,  competition  rules  continue  to  apply  in 
cirCumstances  where  other  Treaty  provisions  or 
. secondary  legislation  are  applicable.  In  the  conteXt 
. of  access  agreements  the  internal  market  and 
competition provisioru  of Community law are both · 
important  and  mutually  reinforcing  for  the  proper 
functiomng  of the  se<:tor.  Therefore  in  making  an 
assessment  ~nder  the  competiti9n  rules,  . the 
Commission .will seek to  build  as  far as  p~ssible on 
the  principles  established  in  the  harmonization 
legislation.  It should  also  ~  borne  in  mind  that a 
number  of the  competition  law  principles  set  out· 
below  ·are  also  cov~d by · ~c  rules  in  the 
conteXt of the ONP framework.  Proper application 
·Of  these  tules  should  often  avoid  the  need.  for  the 
application of ~e  competition rules. 
53.  &  regards  the  teleeommunications  seaor, attention 
should  ~  paid to the  cost of universal service obli-
gations. Article. 90 (2)  of the  EC Treaty may justify 
eXceptions to the pril:lciples of Anicles  85  and  86  of 
the EC Treaty. The details. of universal service Obli-· · 
gations  are  a  regulatory  matter.  The  field  of 
application  of Anicle  90 (2)  has  been  specified  in· 
the Article .  90  Directives  in  the  telecommunications 
sector,  and  the  Commission  will  apply  the 
competition rules in this  context. 
54.  Articles  85  and  86  of the  EC  Treaty· apply  in  the 
normal  manner  to  agreements  9r practices .  which 
have  been  approved  or authorized  by  a  national 
authority (
4
'), or where  the  national  authority  has 
required  the  inclusion  of terms  in  an  agreement  at 
the request of one or more of the parties involved. 
55.  How~er, if a· national regulatory authority were  to 
require  terms  which  were  contrary  to  .  the 
competition  rules,  the  undertakings  involVed  would 
in  practice not be fined,  although the Member State 
itself would  be in  breach  of Anicles  3 (g) and  S of 
the  EC  Treaty (
4
')  and  therefore  subject  to 
challenge  by  the  Commission  under Article  169  of 
the  EC.  Treaty.  Additionally,  if  an  undenaking 
having  special  or  exclusive  rights  within  the 
meaning  of  Article  90,  or  a  state-owned  under-
taking,  were  required  or authorised  by  a  national 
tegUlator  to·  engage  in  behavioUr- constituting  an 
.  abuse  of its  dominant  position,  the  Member  State 
·  ~..-.  would  also  be  in  breach  of Article  90 (l) and  the 
Commission  could  adopt  a  decision  requiring 
·termination of the infraction (41).  •  . 
56.  National  regulatory  authorities  may  require  strict 
standards  of  transparency,  ~bligations  to  supply 
· and  priciz).g  practices  on  the  JDarket,  particularly 
where this is necessary in the early stages of h"be~­
ization. -When  appropriate,  legislation  sucli  as  the 
ONP framework will be used as an aid in the inter-
pretation  of the  competition  rules (
41
).  Given  the 
duty  resting  on  national  regulatory  authorities  to 
ensure  thai  effective  competition  is  possible, 
application  of  the  competition  rules  is  likewise 
required  for  an  appropriate  interpretation  of the 
ONP principles.  It should  also  be  noted  that many 
of the issues set out below are also covered by rules 
·  under  the  full  competition  Directive  and  the 
existing  and  proposed  ONP,  licensing · and  'data 
protection  D~es:  effective  enforcement  of this 
regulatory  framework  should  prevent  many  of the 
competition issues set out below from  arising. 
1.  Dominance  (Artid~  ~6) 
57.  In  order for  an  undertaking  to  provide  services  in 
the telecommunications services market,  it will· need 
to  obtain  access  to  various  facilities.  For  the 
provision  of.  telecomm.unication$  services,  for 
example,  interconnection  to  the  public  switched 
telecommunications  netWork  will  usually  be 
necessl1j. Access to this network will almost always 
be  in  the  hands  of a dominant  telecommunications 
operator  ..  As  regards  access  agreements,  dominance 
stemming from  conuol on facilities will  be the most 
relevant to the  Commission's  a~praisal. 
58.  Whether  or not .a  company  is  dominant  does  not 
. depend  only  on  the  legal  rightS  granted  to  that 
.  co~pany. The  mere  ending  of  legal  monopolies 
does  not  put  an  end  to  dominance:  Indeed, 
notwithstanding  the  liberalization  Directives,  the 
development  of  effective  competition  from  alter-
native  network  providers  with  adequate  capacity 
and geographic reach will take time. 
59.  In  the  telecommunications  sector,  the  concept  of 
'essential  facilities'  will  in  many  cues be  of direct 
relevance  in  determining  the  duties  of  dominant 
telecommunications  operators.  The  phrase  essential 
facility  is  used  to  describe  a  facility  or  infra-
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suu~  which  is  essential  for  reaching  cusconiers 
and/or  enabling  competitors  to  carry  on  their 
business,  and  which  cannot  be  replicated  by  any 
reasonable  means (
10
). 
A  company  conttalling  the  aCCess  to  an  essential 
,  facility  enjoys  a  dominant  position  within  the 
~  meaning of'Article 86.  Conversdy, a company may 
enjoy  a  dominan~ position  pursuant  to  Article  86 
witliout controlling an essential facility. 
The  following  ·. facilities  could  at  present  be· 
expected  to constitute essential facilities  in  the tele-
coinmunications  sec:tOr: ' for  example,  the  public 
telecommunications networks for voice and/  or data 
services,  leased  circuit  or  and · related  network 
terminating  equipment,  basic  data·  regarding 
subscri~ers  to  the  public  voice  telephony  sC.rvice, 
numbering schemes and other customer or tecluiical 
information. 
1.1.  Seruices  marleet 
60.  Orie  of  the  factors  used  to  measure  the  market 
power ·of an  undertaking  are  the  sales  attributable 
to that  undertaking,· expressed  as  a  percentage -of 
total sales in the. market for subStitut«ble services in 
the  relevant  geographic  area.  &  regards  the 
services  market,  the  ComiJtission  will  assess,  inter 
alia,  the  turnover·  generated  by  the  sale  of 
~bstitutable services,  excluding  the  sale  or internal 
us~ge  o~ interconnection  services  and  the  sale  or 
internal  usage  of  local  infrastrUcture c•'),  taking 
into  consideration  the  c~mpetitive  conditions  and 
the strUcture of supply ·and demand on the market. 
1.2.  A«ess  to facilities 
61.  The  c~ncept of  'access'  as  referred . to  above  in 
point  •s  can  relate  to  a  rap.ge  of  situations, 
inCluding  the  availability  of leased  lines. enabling .a 
service- provider  to build  up  its  own  netWork,  and 
interconnection  problem  in  the  $U'ict  sense,  i.e. 
interconnecting  two . telecommunication  netWorks, 
e.g. . mobile  and  fixed.  In  relation  . to · access,  · 
incumbent  operators  often  occupy  a  monopoly 
position,  and  even  in  areas  where  liberalization  of 
the  legal  framework  has  begun,  it  is  probable  that 
the  incumbent  will  remain 'dominant  in  the· future. 
The  incumbent  operator,  which  controls  the 
facilities,  is  often  also .  the  largest  service  provider, 
~d  they have in the. past not needed to distinguish 
· ~enreen ·the  conveyance  of  telecommunications 
services  and  the  provision  of  these  services  to 
end-users. Today, an operator who is  also  a service 
provider does  not require iu downstream operating 
ann to pay for access,  and  therefore it  is  not. easy 
to  calculate · the  revenue  to  be  allocated  to  the 
facility.  In  a  case  where  an  operatbr  is  providing 
both  access  and  services  it  is  necessary  to  separate 
so  far as  possible  the revenues  for the two  markets 
before  using  revenues  as  the  basis  for  the  calcu-
lation  of the company's  share  of whichever market 
is. involved.  Article  8 (2)  of .~e proposed intercon-
nection  Directive  $hould  be  helpful  in  this  context 
as ;it  calls  for  sepuate  accounting  for  ·'activities 
related  to  interconnection  - covering  both  inter-
connection  services  provided  internally  and  inter-
connection services provided to others - and other 
activities'.  · 
62.  The economic significance  of obtaining  access  also 
depends on the coverage of ·the network with which 
interconnection is  sought. Therefore, in  addition to 
using  turnover figures,  the  Commission  will,  where 
this  is  possible,  also -take  into. account  the  number 
of  CUStomers  who  have·  subscn"bed  to  services 
comparable  with  those  which  the  service  provider 
requesting  aCcess  intends  to  provide.  Accordingly, 
market  power  for  a  given  undertaking  will  be 
· measured  panly by  the  number of subscribers  who 
are connected to tennination points of the telecom-
munications  ner.work  of that undertaking expressed 
·as ·a  percentage  of the  total  number of subscribers 
conneeted  to  termination  pointS  in  the  relevant 
geographic  area. 
Supply-side subnitutability 
63.  &  stated above  (see  point 37), supply-side substitu-
tability  is  also  relevant  to  the · queStion  of 
dominance.  A  ma(ket  share  of  over  SO % (
52
)  is 
· usually  sufficient  to  demonstrate  do~inance 
although  other  factors  will  be  · examined.  For 
example,  the  Commission  will  examine  the 
eXinence  of other network providers,  if any,  in  the 
relCVfDt geographic. area to detefl!line whe.ther such 
alternative  infrastrUctures  are  sufficiently  d·ense  to 
provide  competition  to  the  incumbent's  network 
and  the  extent  ~  which  it  would  be·  possible  for 
. new access providers to enter the market. 
Other -relevant fac.tors 
64. In  addition  to  market  share  data,  and  supply-side 
substitutability,  in  determining whether an  operator 
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is  dominant  the  Commission  will  abo  examine 
whether  the  operator  has.  privileged  ac~ to 
facilites which cannot be duplicated, either for legal 
reasons or because it would cost too much  •. 
65.  As competing access providers appear and challenge 
the  dominance  of the  incumbent,  the  scope  of the 
rights they receive from  M~mber States' authorities, 
and  notably  their  territorial  reach,  will  play  an 
important  part  in  ·the  determination  of  market 
power. The Commission  will closely follow  market 
·evolution  in  relation  to  these  issues  and  will  take 
account  of  any  altered  market  conditions  in  its 
assessment  of  access  issues  under  the ·competition 
rules.· 
1.3~ Joint  dominance 
66.  The wording  of Article  86  makes  it clear  that  the 
Article applies when more than one company shares 
a dominant position. The circumstances  in  which  a .. , 
joint  dominant  position  exists,  and  in  which  it ·is 
abused,  have not ·yet been. fullyrclarified  by the case 
law of the ·Community CourtS or the practice of the 
Commission,  and the law is  still developing.  · 
67.  The  words  of Article  86  ('abuse. by· one  or more 
undertakings')  describe  something  different  from 
. the  prohibition  on  anti-competitive  agreem~ts or 
concerted practices in Anicle 85. To hold otherwise 
would ·be  contraiy to  the  usual  principles  of inter-
pretation  of  the  Treaty,  and  would  render  the 
words  poin~ess and  without  practical  eHea.  This 
does  not,  however,  exclude  the  parallel  application· 
of  Articles  85  and  86  to  the. same  agreement  or 
practice, which  has· been upheld  by the  CommisSion 
aad the Court in a number of cases (u), nor is there 
anything  io  prevent .the  Commission  from  taking 
action only under one of ·the provisions,  when  both 
apply.  · 
68.  Two  companies,  each  dominant  in  a  separate 
national  market,  are  not  the  same  as  two  joindy 
dominant  companies.  National  public  voice 
telephony  telecommunications  operators  are  not 
likely to become jointly dominant until after liberal-. 
· ~~  ization  in  the  ·  Community.  .For  two  or  more 
companies  to  be  in  a joint dominant  position,  they 
must· together  have  substantially .  the  same  position 
w-4-'uis their c:ustOiners and competitors as a single 
company  has  if it  is  in  a dominant  pasition.  With 
specific  ref~ce to  the  telecommunications  sector, 
joint dominapce could  be attained  by two  telecom-
munications  infrasuuaure  operators  covering  the 
same geographic market. 
69.  In.  addition,  for  two  or  more  companies  to  be 
jo_indy  dominant  it  is  necessary,  but  not  sufficient, 
for there to be no  effectiv~ competition between the 
Companies  on  the  relevant  market.  This  lack  of 
competition may  in practice be  due  to  the  faa ·that 
the  ~mpanies have  links  such  as  agreements  for 
cooperation,  interConnection  or  roaming 
agreements.  The  Commission  does  not,  however, 
consider  that  'either  economic  theory  or 
Community  law  implies  that  such  links  are  legally 
necessary for  a joint dominant position  to  exist (
14
). 
It is  ·a sufficient economic link if there is the kind of· 
interdependence which ·often  con;1es ·about in  oligo-
poliStic  si~tions. There  does  not  seem  to  be  any 
reason in law or in economic theory to require  any 
· other economic link between .  thoSe  companies. This 
having  been  said,  in  practice  such  links  will  often 
exist  in  the  telecommunications  seaor  where 
national  telecominunication  operators  nearly 
inevitably  have  links  of  various  kind$  with  one 
another. 
70. ·To  take  as  an  example  acess  to  the  local  loop,  in 
.  some  Member  States  this  could  well  b~ controlled 
..  in  · the.  near  fuwe  by  two  operators  - the 
intumbent telecommunications' operator and a cable 
operator.  In order to provide  particular serv.ices  to 
consumers,  access  to·  the  local  loop  of  either  the 
telecommunications  operator or the  cable  television 
opera~or is  necessary.  Depending  on  the.  circum-
stances  of  the  ·case  and  in  particular  on  the 
relationship  between  them,  neither  operator  may 
hold  a dominant  position:  together,  however,  they 
may  hold  a  joint  monopoly  of  access  to  these 
facilites. 
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2. Abuse  of dominance 
2.1.  Refusal  to  grant  accrss  to  esseniud  facilities  and 
application  ·of un/awurable  terms 
;t 7
t.  A  refusal  to give  access  may  be  prolubited  under 
.  Article  86  if the  refusal  is  made  by  a  company 
which  is  dominant  because  of  its  control  of 
faCilities,  as  incumbent  telecommunications. 
operators· will usually be  for the foreseeable future. 
A refusal may have: 
~· 
'dte  effect· of  hinde~g the  maintena.pce  of  the 
degree of competition still  existirig in the market or 
the groWth of that competition' (
55
). · 
A  refusal  will  only  be  abusive  if . it  affecu 
competition.  Service  markets  in  the  telecommuni-
cationS  sectOr  will  initially  have  few  competitive 
players  and  refusals · will  therefore  generally  aff~. 
·competition  on  those  ·markets.  In · all  cases  of 
refusal, any justification will .  be  closely ex~ed  tQ 
determine whether it is  objective. 
72.  Broadly there are three releVant scenarios: 
.t  '  . 
{a)  a  refusal  to grant access  fo~ the purposes of a . 
service  where  another operator has  been  given 
access by the access provider to operate on that 
services  market; 
(b) a ·refusal  to grant access  for, the purposes ·  of a 
service where no other operator has  been given 
access by the access provider to o~te  on that 
s~ces market; 
(c)  a  withC!rawal  of  supply  of  access  from  an 
existing  customer. 
73.  As  to the first of the above scenarios, it is  clear. that 
a refusal to supply a new custOmer in  circumstances 
where  a  dominant  facilities  owner  is  already 
supplying  one or more  custome~s operating in  the 
same  downstream  market  would  constitute 
discriminatOry  treatment which,  if it would restrict 
competition  on  that downstream  market,  would  be 
an  abuse~ Where  network operatOrs offer the same, 
or similar,  retail  .services  as  the  pany  requesting 
· ~.  they  may  have  both  the  incentive  and  the 
·opponunity ·to restrict .  competition  and  abuse  their 
dominant  position  in  this  way.  There  may,  of 
course,  be  justifications  for  such  refusal  - for 
example  fJis-ti...flis  applicants  which  represent  a 
potential credit risk. In the absence of any objective 
justifications, . a  refusal·  would  usually  be  an  abuse 
of the dominant position on the ·access  market  . 
74.  In  general  terms,  the  dominant  company's  duty· is 
to provide access in such  a way !;hat the' goods and 
services  offered  to  downstream  companies  are 
available  on  terms  no  less  favourable  than  those 
given  to  other  parties,  including  its  own  corrt-
sponding downstream operations. 
75.  AJ  to  the  second  of  the  above  situations,  the 
question  arises  as  to  whether  the  access  provider 
should  be  obliged  to  contract  with  the  service 
provider in  order to allow  the service  provider to . 
operate  on  a  new  service  market. .Where  capacity 
constraints are not an  issUe  and where the company 
refusing  to  provide  access  to  its  facility  has  not 
provided  access  to that facility,  either to its  down-
stream arm or to any other company operating on 
that sCrvices  market, then it is  not clear ·what other 
objective illltification there could be. 
76.  If  there  were  no  commercially  feasible  alternatives 
· to the  access  being  requested,  then unless  access  is 
granted,  the  pany requesting  access  would  not be 
able  to  operate  on  the  service  market.  Refusal  in 
this  case  would  therefore limit  the development  of 
new  markets,  or , new  productS  on  those  markets, 
contrary' to Article  86 (b).  In  the transport field (
5
'), 
the ·Commission  ruled  that  a  fmn  controlling  an 
essential  facility  must·  give· access  in  certain circum-
. SWi_ces (
51
}.  The. same  principl~ apply  to  the  tele-. 
communications. sector.  · 
77.  The  prin~iple  o~ligin'  dominant  companies  to 
contract  an  cerwn  cU'CUmstances  will  often  be 
relevant  in  the  ·  telecommunications  sector. 
Currendy,  there  are  monopolies  or  virtual 
monopolies  in  the  provision  of  network  infra-
StrUcture for most telecom ·services in the EU. Even 
· where  resuictions  have  already  been,  or will  soon 
be,  lifted,  competition  in  downstream  markets  will 
continue to depend upon the  pricing and conditions 
of  access~ to  upstream  network  services  that  will 
only  gradually  reflect  competitive  market  forces. 
Given  the pace of technological change in  the tele-
communications  secto.r,  it  is  possible  to  envis.age 
situations  where  companies  would  seek  to  offer 
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new  products  · or  services  which.  are  not  in 
competition  with  producu  or  services  already 
offered  by  the  dominant  access  operator,  but  for 
which this operator is  reluaant to provide access • 
78.  The Commission  must ensure that the control over 
facilities  enjoyed  by  ineumbent·  operators  is  not 
used  to  hamper  the  development  of a  competitive 
telecommunications  environment.  A  company 
which  is  dominant  on  a  market  for  services  and 
. which  comm.its  an abuse  contrary to Article  86  on 
that  market  may  be  required,  in  order to  put· an 
end to the abuse;  to supply access  to its  facility  to 
one  or  more  .  competitors  on  that  market.  In 
particular,  a  co;R~pany  may  abuse  its  .  dominant 
position if by its  actions  it prevents  the  emergence 
of a new product or service.· 
79. The  starting  point  for  the  Commission's.  analysis 
will  be  the  identification of an existing or potential 
·market  for  which  aceess  is  being  requested.  In 
order  to  determine  whether  access  should  be 
order~d under. the  competition  rules,  acco\mt  will 
be  taken  of a  breach by the dominant company of 
its  duty not  to  discriminate  (see  below)  or  of the 
following  elements,  taken cumulatively:  · 
(a)  access  to  the  facility  in  question  is  generally 
ess~ntial in  order for companies  to compete on 
that related market ("). 
The key issue here is  therefore what is essential. 
It will  not be  sufficient that the  position of the 
company  requesting  access  would  be  more 
advantageous  if  access  were  granted  - but 
refusal  of  access  must  lead  to  the  proposed 
activities  being  made  either  impossible  or 
seriously and unavoidably uneconomic. 
Although,  . for  example,:  ·alternative  infra-
strUctUre  may as  from  1 July 1996  be  used  for 
liberalized  services,  it  will  be  some  time  before 
this  is  in  many cases a satisfactory alternative to 
the  faciliteS  of  the  incumbent  operitor.  Such 
alternative  infrastructure  does  not  at  present 
offer  the  same  dense  geographic  coverage  as ' 
that  of  the  incumbent  telecommunications 
operator's network. 
(b)  there  is  sufficient  capacity  available  to  provide 
access. 
(c)  the facility owner fails  to satisfy demand on an 
existing  service  or product  market,  blocks  the 
emergenee  of  a  potential  new  service  or 
product, or  ~impedes competition on  an existing 
or potential service or product market; 
(d) the -company seeking access  is  prepared  to pay 
.the  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  pnce 
and  will  otherwise  in  all  resp~as  accept 
non-discriminatory access  terms and conditions. 
(e)  there is no -objective justification for refusing to 
.  provide  access.  · 
Relevant  justifications  in  this  conteXt  could 
. include . an  overriding  difficulty  of  providing 
access  to  the'· requesting  company,  or the  need 
for  a  facility  owner  which  has  undertaken 
investment  aimed  at the introduction  of a  new 
product or service  tQ  have  sufficien~ time  and 
opponunity to use the facility in  order to place 
that  new  product  or  service  on  the  market. 
However,  although  any  j':'5tification  will  have 
to  be  examined  carefully  on  a  case-~y-case 
basis.  It is panicularly important in  the telecom-
munications  sector  that  the  benefits  to 
. end-users  which  will  arise  from  a  competitive 
environment are nbt undermined by  the actions 
of the  former  state  monopolists  in  preventing 
competition from emerging and developing. 
In  detennining  whether  an  infringement  of Article 
86  has  been  committed, account  "!'~ill  be  taken  both 
of the factual situation in that and other geographic 
areas,  and,  where relevant the· relationship  between 
the access  requested and  ·the technical configuration 
of the facility. 
80.  The  question  of objective  justification  will.  require 
particularly  close  analysis  in  this  area.  In  addition 
to  deteimi~g whether  difficulties  cited  in  any · 
particular  case  are  serious  enough  to  justify  the 
refusal to grant .  access,  the relevant authorities must 
also  decide  whether  these  difficulties  are  sufficient 
to  outweigh  the  damage  done  to · competition  if 
access  is  refused  or made  more .  difficult  and  the 
downstream service market$ are thus limited .. 
81.  Three impo.nant  elements  relating  to  access  which 
could  be  manipulated  by  the  access  provider  in 
order,  in  effect,  to  refuse  to  provide  access  arc 
timing,  technical  configuration and price. 
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82.  Dominant  telecommunications  operators  have  a 
duty'  to  deal  with  rcqucsu  for  access  cfficicndy: 
undue  and  unexplained 'delays  in  responding  to  a 
request  for  access  may  constitute  an  abuse.  In 
particular,  however,  the  Commissipn  will  seek  to 
compare the response to a request for access with: 
,  (a)  the  usual  tim~-frame and  conditions ·applicable 
''  'when the responding party grants  access  to its 
I 
facilities  to ·  its  own  subsidiary  or  operating 
branch; 
(b.)  responses  to · requestS  f9r  access  ·to  similar 
facilities in other Member States; 
(c)  the explanations given  for  any delay in  dealing 
with requestS for access. 
83.  Issues  of  technical  configuration  will  similarly  be· 
closely  examined  in  order  to  determine  whether 
they  arc  genuine.  In  principle,  competition  rules 
require  that  the  party  requesting  access  must  be 
granted  access  at  the  most  suitable  point· for  the 
requesting  party,  provided  that  this  point  is 
technically  feasible  · for  the  access  provider. 
Questions  of technical  feasibility  may  be  objective 
justifications for refusing to supply - for example, 
the  traffic  for which  access  is  sought  must  satisfy 
the  relevant  technical  standards  for· the  in(ra-
strUcture  -:- or  questions  of  capapty  restraintS; 
where questions of rationing n:tay  arise (
5
'). 
84.  Excessive  pncmg  for  access,  as  weU  as  beipg 
abusive  in  itself ('
0
),  may  also  amount  to  an 
effective refusal to grant access. 
85.  There  are  a  number  of  elementS  of' these  testS 
which  require  careful  assessment.  Pricing  questions 
in  the  telecommunications  sector will  be 'facilitated 
by  the  obligations  un  ONP  Directives  to  have 
transparent cost-accounting systems. 
86.  As .  to the third of the situations referred to in point 
72  above,  some previous  Cornmission  decisions  and 
the  case-law  of  the  Court  have  been  concerned 
with  the  withdrawal  of  supply  from  downstream 
competitors  (the  third  case,  above).  In  Commercial 
Solvents, the Court held  that: 
'an undertaking which  has  a  dominant  position  on 
the  market ·in  raw  materials  and  which,  with  the 
object of reserving  such  raw  material  for  manufac-
turing  its  own  derivatives;··  refuses  to  supply  a 
customer,  which  is  itself  a  manufaCturer  of these 
·~..-.derivatives, · and  therefore  risks  eliminating  aU 
competition on the pan of this  CUStomer,  is  abusing 
'  its. dotninant position within· the meaning of Article 
86.' (")  . 
87.  Although  this  case  dealt with  the  withdrawal  of a 
product, there is no difference in  principle between 
this  case  and  the  withdrawal  of  access.  The 
unilateral  termination  of  access  agreementS  raises 
·substantially  similar  issues  to  those  examined  in 
relation  to .refusals.  Withdrawal  of access  from· an 
eXisting  customer  will  usually  be  abusive.  Again, 
objective  rtasons  may  be  provided  to  justify  the 
termination.  Any  such  reasons  must  be 
proportionate  to  the  effectS  on competition  of the 
withdrawal. 
2.2. Other forms  of  abuse 
88.  Refusals. to  provide  access  are  only  one  form  of 
possible  abuse in  this  area. Abuses  may also  arise  in 
the  context  of  access · having  been  granted.  An 
abuse  may  occur  inter  alia  where  the  operator  is 
· behaving · in  a  discriminatory  manner  or  the 
operator's ..  actions  otherwise  limit  marketS  or. 
technical  development.  The  following  are 
non-exhaustive  examples  of abuses  which  can  take 
place. 
Network configuration 
89.  Network  configuration  by  a  dominant  network 
operator  which  makes  access  objectively. more 
difficult  for- service  providers (
62
)  could  constitute 
an  abuse  unless  it were objectively justifiable.  One 
objective  justification  would  be  where the  network 
configuration  improves  the  efficiency  of  the 
netWork· generally. 
Tying 
·90.  This  is  of particular concern  where  it  involves  the 
tying  of services  for  which  the  telecommunications 
operator  is  dominant  with  those  for  which  it  is 
exposed  to  competition (u).  Where  the  vertically 
integrated  dominant  network  operator  obliges  the 
party  requesting  access  to  purchase  one  or  more 
services (  ... )  without  adequate  juStifications,  this 
may exclude  rivals  of the dominant access  provider 
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from  offering  these  elements  of the  package  inde-
pendently.  This  requirement  could  thus  constitute 
an abuse under Ar..icle  86. 
Pricing 
9  J.  P11eing  p1oblerns  in  connection  with  access  for 
service  providers  to  a  dominant  operator's 
(  es~cm  .. ;  al)  fac!lit.i~s  will  often  revolve  around 
ex.::css\;,-ely  h;gh  prices {'
5
):  in  the  absence  of 
.;~.r1other  viable  alternative  r.o  the  facility  to  which 
access  ::.  iJeing  sought  by  service  providers,  the 
dominant  or monopolistic  operator my  be  inclined 
to cn;ugc e::.:cessive  prices. 
'!be  problem  of unfairly  low  prices  could  arise  in 
the  context  of  competition  between  different  tele-
communications  infrastructure  networks,  where  a 
dominant operator may  tend to  charge unfci.irly  low 
prices  for  access  in  order to  eliminate  competition 
from  other  (emerging)  infrastructure  providers,  in 
violation  of  Article  8?  (a).  In  genera.l  a  price  is 
abusive  if  it  is  below  the  dominant  company's 
average variable  costS  or if it is  below  average  total 
coStS  and part of an  anti-competitive plan (
66
). 
If  a  case  arises,  the  ONP  rules  concerning 
accounting  requirements  and transparency will  help 
to  ensure  the  effective  application  of Anide  86  in · , 
this  context. 
92.  Where  the  operator  is  domiu"ant  in  the  product or 
services  market,  the  margin  between  the  price 
charged  to  all  competitors  on  the  downstream 
market  (including  the  dominant  company's  own 
downstream  operations,  if  any)  for  access  and  t~e 
price  which  the  network  operator  charges  in  the 
downstream  market must  be  large  enough to  allow 
a reasonably efficient service provider in  the down-
stream  market to obtain  a  normal  profit unless  the 
dominant  company  can  show  that  its  downstream 
operation  is.  exceptionally efficient ('
1
). If this  is  not 
the  case,  competitors  on  the  downstream  market 
are  faced  by  a  'price  squeeze'  which  could  force 
them out of the market. 
Discrimination 
93.  A  dominant  access  provider  may  not  discriminate 
between  different  access  agreements  where  such 
discrimination  would  restrict  competition.  Any 
differentiation  based  on  the  use  which  is  to  be 
made  of the  access  rather than  differences  between 
the  transactio~s for  the  access  provider itself,  if  the 
discrimination  is  sufficiently  likely  to  restrict  or 
distort  actual  or  potential  competition,  would  be 
· ~  ,...  contrary  to  Anicle  86.  This  discrimination·  could 
take  the  form  of  imposing  different  conditions, 
including  the  charging  of  different  prices,  or 
otherwise  differentiating  between  access 
agreements,  except  where  such  discrimination 
would  be  objectively  justified,  for  example  on  the 
basis  of cost or technical considerations or the fact 
that the  users  are operating at different levels.  Such 
discrimination  could  be  likely  to  restrict 
competition  in  the  downstream  marke~ on  which 
the  company  requesting  access  was  seeking  to 
operate, in that it might .limit 'the possibility for that 
operator  to  enter  the  market  or  expand  itS 
operations on that market ("). 
94.  With  regard  to  price  discrimination,  Article  86  (c) 
prohibits  discrimination  by  a  dominant  fum 
between  customers  of  that  fum ("),  including 
discriminating  between  customers  on  the -basis  of 
whether or not they agree  to  deal exclusively  with 
that dominant firm. 
95.  Discrimination  without -objective  justification  as 
regards  any  aspects  or  condition  of ·an  access 
agreement  may  constitute  an  abuse.  Discrimination 
may.  relate · to  elements  such  as  pricing,  delays, 
technical  access,  routing f
0
),  numbering, 
restnct1ons  on  network  use  exceeding  essential 
requirements  and  use  of  customer  network  data. 
However,  the  existence  of  discrimination  can  only 
be  determined  on  a  case  by  case  basis.  Discrimi-
nation  is  contrary  to  Article  86  whether  or not it 
results  from  or  is  apparent  from  the  terms  of  a 
particular access  agreement. 
96.  There  is,  in  this  context,  a  general  duty  on  the 
network operator to treat independent cuStomers  in 
the  same  way as  its  own subsidiary or downstream 
service  arm.  The  nature  of  the  customer  and  its 
demands  may play a  significant role in  determining 
whether  transactions  are  comparable.  Different 
prices  for  customers  at- different  levels  (e.g. 
wholesale  and  retail)  do  not  necessarily  constitute 
discrimination. 
97.  Discrimination  issues  may  a~ise  tn  respect  of  the 
technical  configuration  of  the  access,  given  its 
importance in  the context of access . 
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The  degree  of  technical  sophistication  of  the 
access:  restrictions  on  the  type  or  'level'  in  the 
netWork  hierarchy  of  exchange  involved  in  the 
access or the technical capabilities of this  exchange 
are· of direct. competitiVe  significance.  These  could 
be  the facilities  available to support a connection or 
the type of interface and signalijng  system used  to 
determine  the type 'Of service  available  to t}:le  party 
requesting access  (e.g.  intelligent netWork facilities). 
I  . 
The number and/  or location of connection points: 
the requirement to collect and distribute  traffic for 
p~cular areas at the sy.ritch  which  direetly. serves 
that  area  ~ther  than  at  a  higher  level  of  the 
network  hierarchy  may  be  important.  The  party 
requesting.  access  incUrs  additional  . expense  by 
. either providing links at a greater distance from  its 
own switching centre or being liable  to pay higher 
conveyance charges. 
Equal  access:  the  possibility  for  customers  of the 
party  requesting  access  to  obtain  the  services 
provided  by  the  access  provider  using  the  same 
number  of  dialled  digitS  as  are  used  by·  the 
customers  of  the  latter  is  a  crucial  feature  of 
competitive  telecommunications.  · 
Objective justification 
98.  The.se  could  include  factors  relating  to  the  actual · 
operation  of  the  network  owned  by  the  access 
provider,  or  licensing  restrictions  consistent  with, 
for  example,  the  subject  maner  of  intellecrual 
property rights. 
·2.3.  Abuses of  joint dominance 
.99.  In  the case of joint dominance (see above, points 65 
tt  stq.)  behaviour  by.  one  of  several  joindy 
dominant companies may be  abusive  even if others 
are not behaving in the same way. 
100.  In  addition  to  remedies  under  the  competition 
rules,  if  no  operator was  willing  to  grant  access, 
and if, there was no technical or commercial justifi-
cation  for  the  refusal,  one would  expect  that  the 
national  regulatory  authority  would  resolve  the 
problem by ordering one or more of the companies 
to  offer  ·access,  under  the  terms  of  the  ONP 
· ~·t"f>irective or under national law. 
3. Access  agreements  (Article  85) 
101.  Restrictions  of  competition  stemming  from  access 
agreCmentS may have nvo distinct effeets: to restrict 
competition  betWeen  the  two parties  to the  access 
agreement,_  or  to ·resuict  competition  from  third 
parties,  for example through exclusivity  for one or 
both  of the  parties  of the  agreem~t. In  addition, 
where  one  party  is  doplinant,  conditions  of  the 
access. agreement  may  lead  to  a  strengthening  of 
that dominant position,  or to an extension  of that 
dominant  position  ·to  a·  related  market,  or  may 
constitute an unlawful exploitation of the dominant 
position through the imposition of unfair terms. 
102. ·  Access  agreements  where  access  is  in  principle 
unlimited  are. . not  likely  to  be  restrictive  of 
competition  within  the  meaning  of Article  85  (1). 
Exclusivity obligations  in  contraCtS  providing a~ 
to  C?ne  company  are  likely  to  restrict  competition 
because they limit access  to infrastrUcture for other 
companies.  Since  moSt  netWorks  have  more 
capacity than any single  user is  likely to need,  this 
will  nonnally be .  the case in the telecommunications 
sector. 
103.  Access  ag-reements  .  can  have  significant 
pro-competitive  effeCtS  as  they can  improve  access 
to  the  downstream  market.  Access  agreements  in 
the context of'  interconnection are essential to inter-
operability  .  of  services  and  infrastructure,  thus 
increasing  competition  in  the  downstream  market 
for services, which is, likely to involve higher added 
value than local infraStructUre. 
104.  There  is,  hpwev~r,  obvious  potential  for  anti-
competitive  effectS  of certain  access  agreements  or 
clauses  therein.  Access  agreements  may,  for 
eXample:  · 
(a)  serve as  a· means of coordinating prices; 
(b)  or market sharing; 
(c)  have exclusionary effeCts  on third parties (
71
); 
(d) lead  to·  an  exchange  of commercially  sensitive 
information. between ·the parties. 
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lOS.  The risk  of price coordination  is  particularly acute 
in  the  telecommunications  seaor  since  intercon-
nection  charges  often  amount to  SO 96  or more  of 
the  total  cost of. the  services· provided,  and where 
interCOnnection  with  a  dominant  operator  Will 
usually  be  necessary.  In  these  circumstances,  th~ 
scope  for price  competition  is  limited  and  the  risk 
(and  the  seriousness)  of price· coordination  corre-
spondingly g(eater.  " 
106.  Furthennore,  interconnection  agreementS  between 
network operators may under certain circumstances 
be  an  innrument  of market  shari~g between  the 
network operator providing access  and the network 
operator seeking  access,  mstead  of the  emergence 
of network competiti<?l)  between them.  · 
107.  In  a  liberalized  telecommunications  environment, 
the  above  types  of restrictions  of competition  will 
be  monitored  by  the  national  authorities  ·and  the. 
Commission  under the  competition rules. The right 
· of  panies.  who  suffer  from  any  type  of  anti-
competitive  behaviour  to  complain.  to  the 
Commission  is  unaffeeted by national regulation. 
Clauses falling within Article 8 5 ( 1) 
108.  The  Commission  has  identifi~d  certain  types  of 
restriction  which  would  potentially  infringe  Article 
85  (1) of the EC Treaty and therefore require indi-
vidual .  exemption.  These  clauses  will  .mOSt 
commonly  relate  to  the  commercial  framework  of. 
the access. 
109.  In  the  telecommunications  sector,  interconnecting 
panies may wish  to exchange, ~mer  and  traffi~ 
infonnaiion. This exchange is likely to influence the 
competitive  behaviour·  of  the  undertakings 
concerned,  and  could  easily  be  used  by the  parties 
for  coUusiv~ practices,  such  as  market· sharing (
72
). 
Safeguards  will  therefore  be  necessary  to  ensure 
that  either  confidential  inform;uion  is  only · 
disclosed  to.  those  pans of the  tompanies  involved 
in  making .  the  interconnection  agreementS,  or  to 
ensure  that · the  information  is  not  used  for  anti-
competiti.ve  purposes. 
110.  Exclusivity  arrangements,  for  example  where  traffic 
would  be  conveyed  exclusively  through  the  tete-
communications  network  of  one  or  both  parties 
rather  than  to  the  network  of other  parties  with 
whom  access  agreementS  have  bee~ concluded  will 
similarly require analysis  under Article 85  (3). If no 
justification  is  provided  for  such  routing,  such 
. :-,. ~  clauses will be prohibited. 
111.  AccesS  agreement that have been concluded with an 
anti-competitive  object  are·  extremely.  unlikely  to 
fulfil  the criteria for an individual exemption under 
Article 85  (3 ).-
112.  Fu~ermore,  access  agreementS  may  have  an 
_imp.act  on  the  competitive  structure of the  market. 
Local.  access  charges  Will  often  account  for  a 
·considerable ponion of the total  COSt  of the services 
provided  to  end-users  by  the  party  requesting 
access,.  thus  l~aving  limited  scope  for  price 
.competition.- Because  of the  need  to safeguarc;l  this 
limited  degree  of competition,  the Commission  will 
· therefore  pay  particular  attention  to  scrutinizing 
access  agreementS  in  the  conteXt  of.  their  likely 
effects  on the. relevant  markets  in  order  to  ensure 
that such  agreementS  do not serve  as  a hidden and 
indirect  means  for  fixing  or  co-ordinating 
end-prices  for  end-users,  which  constitutes  one  of 
· the  mOSt  serious  i~ringemenu of Article  85  of the 
EC Treaty  (',). 
· li3. In·  addition,  clauses  involving  collective  discrimi-
nation  leading  to ·the exclusion  of third  parties  are 
similarly  restrictive  of  competition.  The  most 
·  important  is  discrimination  with  regard  to  price, 
quality or other commercially significant  aspeCtS  of 
the  access  to· the detriment of the  party requesting 
access,  which  will  generally  aim  at  unfairly 
favouring  the operations o£ the access provider. 
4.  Effect on trade between  Member States 
114.  The  application  of both  Article  85  and  Anicle  86 
.  requires an effect on trade between Member States. 
115.  In  order  for  an  agreement  to  have  an  effect  on 
trade  between  Member  States,  it  must  be  possible 
for the Commission to: 
· 'foresee  with  a  sufficient  degrte  of probability  on 
the  basis  of a  set of objective  faaors of law  or of 
fact  that  the  agreement  ·~n  question  may  h~ve an 
influence,  direct or indirect,  actual  or potenual,  on 
the pattern of trade between Member States.' ('
4
)· 
It  is  not  necessary  for  each  of the  restrictions  of · 
competition within  the  agreement  to  be  capable of 
affecting  trade ("),  provided  the  agreement  as  a 
whole does so.  · 
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116.  AJ  regards  acc:ess  agreements  in  the  telecommuni-
cations  seaor,  the  Commission  will  consider  not 
only the direct effea of restriCtions  of competition 
on  inter-swe trade  in  access  markets,  but  also  the 
effectS  on inter-State  trade in downstream  telecom-
munications  services.  The  Commission  will  also 
consider  · the  potential  of  these  agreements  to 
foreclose  a  given  geographic  market  which  could 
'  prevent  undertakings  already  established  in  other 
1  Me's:nber  States.  from  competing  in  this  geographic 
m~ket. 
117.  Telecommunications  access  agreements  will 
normally  affect  trade  between  Member  StateS  as 
semces  provided  over  a  network  are  .  traded 
throughout  the  EU  and  access  agreements  may 
govern  'the  ability.  o( a  service  provider  or  an  • 
operator  to  provide  any  given  service (").  Even 
• :'1-fl'. where  markets  are  mainly  national,  as  is  generally 
·  ·  the  case
1  at present  given  the  Stage  of development 
of liberalisation,  abuses  of dominance will  normally  . 
.speaking  affect  market  structUre,  leading  to reper-
cussions on trade between Member States. 
HS.  Cases  in  this  area  involving  issues  under Article  86 
will  relate  either  to  abusive  clauses  in  access 
·agreements,  or  a  refusal  to  conclude  an  access 
agreement on  appropriate  terms or· at all.  As such, 
-the criteria listed above for determining whether an 
access  agreement  is  capable  of  affeCting  trade 
between  ~e~  States  would  be  equally  relevant 
here.  · 
CoJJclusiotJS 
119.  The  Commission  considers  that  competition  rules  and  sector ·-specific  regulation  form  a 
coherent set  of measures  to ensure  a liberalized  and  competitive  market  ~vironment for 
telecommunications markets in the EU.  · 
1·20.  In  taking aCtion  in this sector, the  Commission will  aim  to avoid  unnecessary duplication . 
of  procedures,  in  particular,  competition  procedures  ·and  national/EU  regulatory 
procedures as set out und~r the ONP frameworlt, 
121.  Where  competition  rules  are  invoked  the  Commission. will  consider  which  markets  are 
relevant and will apply Article  85 and  86 in accordance with the principles set out above. 
~  . 
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(
1
)  AccordinJ  tO  Direaive 96/19/EC 'and  96/2/EC, certain .Member  S~tes may  request  a  ~tion  from  fuU  liberalization  for 
cenain  limited  periods.  See  Commission  Decision  of  27  November  1996  concerning  the  additional  implementation  r.:riods 
~ested  by Ireland  for  the  ~lementation of Commission  Directives 90/388/EEC and 96/2/EC as  reguds fuU  compeution  in 
the telecommunications markets. This notice is Without prejudice to such derogations, and the Commission ·will take account of the 
existence of any such derogation when applying the competition rules to access agreements, as described in this notice. 
r>  Communication by the Commission.to the EuropCan Parliament and the· CQunc:il,  Coftsultation .on the Green Paper on the h"beral-
ization .of celccommunications infrastruaure and cable television netWOrks, COM(95) 158 final,· 3 May 1995. 
(1)  Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16  Mar1988 on competition in  the markets in  teleQ)mmunications terminal equipment (OJ 
No L 131, 27. 5.  1988, p. 73); Commission Duective 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on coinpetition in the markets for celecommuni-
.  cations  services  (OJ No L  192,  2-4.  7.  1990,  p.  10);  Commission  Direcdve  9-4/46/EC  of 13  October  1994  amending  Directive 
88/301/EEC and  Oirective 90/388/EEC in panicular with~  tO sateUite communications (OJ No L 268,  19.  10.  1994, p.  15); 
Commi.uion  Directive  95/51/EC  of  18 . OCtober· 1995  amendinJ  Direaive  90/388/EEC  Wlth  reprd  to  the  abolition  of  the 
restrictions  on the use of cable television  netWorks  for. cbe  provision of alieacly liberalized  teleQ)mmunic&dons  serVices  (OJ No L 
256,  26.  10.  199~, p.  -49);  Commission  Directive  96/2/EC of 16  Januuy 1996  amending Directive  90/38,/EEC with  ·re~arc~ to 
mobile  and _Personal  communications  (OJ No L  20,  ~~.  1.  1.996,  p.  59);  Commission  Direa.ive  96/19/EC of  13  Marc1a  1996 
amending Dfreaive 90/388/EEC with regard to the  implemen~don of full competition in the telecommunication.s markeu (OJ No 
L· 74, 22. 3.  1~6,  p. 13).  .  .  .  . 
(
4
)  Interconnection agreements are .the most si~cant  form of access agreement in the t.eleQ)mmunications sector. 'A basic  fram~ork 
for interconnection. apements is  set up W  the  rules  on open netwOrk frovision (ONP), and the  ~pplication. of competition  rules 
mwt be seen a~  this  background: CoUncil Directive 90/387/EEC o  28 June 1990  on the  esti.blishment of the  internal market 
for telecommunications services through the implementation of open netwOrk provision  (OJ No L 192, .~4. 7.  1990, p.  1); Council 
Directive  92/44/EEG of 5 June  1992  on the  application  of o~  nework provision  to  leased·lines  (OJ No L  165,  19.  6.  1992, 
p. 27); Eu~  Parliament and Council Direc:tivei  95/62/EC of 13  Deceml:ier  1995 on the application of~  necwork provision 
to voice  telephony  (OJ No L  321,  30.  12.  1995~ p.  6);  Common position for  a E\ii'ope'-"  P&rliament  and  Council. Directive  on 
interconnection  in  telecommunications  with  regard  to  ensuring  umversal  service  and  mceroperability  through  apPlication  of the 
· principles.of open necworkprovision (ONP) (OJ No C 220, 29.  7.  1996,  p.  13); P~  for a European Paniament and Council 
Directive  ~ending Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the  purpoSe  of adaptation to a· competitive  environment 
in telecommunications, COM(95) 543  final,  14.  11.  1995. 
(')  In.the telecommunications area, notably Commission Decision of 18  October 1991,-Eirpage (0]-No L 306, 7.  11.  1?91, p.  22),  and 
Commission Decisions of 17 July 1996, Atlas and Phoenix (OJ No L 239,  19.  9.  1996,  p.  23  and 57). There are also a number of 
·  pending cases  involving access  issues.  . 
(')  Competition aspects of interconnection agreemenu in .the  telecommunications sector, June  1995; Competition ~  of access  by 
service providers to the resoui'CC$  of telecommunications operatOrs,  Decem~.  1995. ·See also  Competiuon aspects of access  pricing, 
Decemlier  1995.  ·  ·  · 
(') . In the ~  of the ONP leased line c!irective, ONP foresees  the firSt stage which allovn the aggrieved user to appeal to the national 
regulatory  ~uthority. This  can offer a  number of advantages.  In the  telecommunications  areas  where  experience  has  shown  that 
comP,anies  are often hesitant to be seen as  complainanu against the TO on which they heavily depend not only with respect to the 
specific  point of conflict  but also  a  much  broa.dcr  and  far-reaching  sense,  the  procedures  foreseen  under ONP arc  an  attractive 
option. ONP procedures furthermore can cover a broader range of access  ~roblems than could be  approached on the basis  of the 
competition rules.  F'mally,  these  procedures can offer users  the advantage of proximity  and familiarity with national  administrative 
p~ures;  languap is llso a factor to be taken into account.  · 
Under ONP procedures, if mauers  cannot be  resolved  at the  national  level,  a second  stage  is  organized  ~t the  European  level 
(conciliation  procedure).  Pursuant ·to  the  ONP .leased  line  Directive,  an  agreement  between  the  panies  involved  mUst  then  be 
reached within twO mond\5, with a possible extension of one month if the panies agree.  -· 
It should  be  noted  that in  the proposed  ONP interconnection  Directive,  as  opposed  to  the  leased  line  Directive,  a .conciliation 
procedure  is  foreseen  for  uansfrontier .cases  only,  that  is  interconnection  disputes  in  which  more  than  one  national  regulatory 
authority· is involved. If the national  r~latoty authorities dealing with an interconneCtion prOblem  do not reach a solution to the 
.~=~)~en  one of them  ~y  notify the  ~Jiunission ~ereof and  in~oke ~e  conciliatio~ procedure .(Article  17  of the proposed 
(') National  ~la!O;'Y  a~thority. iS  a sector specif!c  national telecommunicationS  regul~tory created by a Member State in  the context 
·  ·of the Semces Duecuve as amended, and tbe ONP framework.  : ·  '  .  ·  .  . 
'  . 
(•)  Article  7  of the  Services  Directive  (Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC, referred  to  above  in  fooUlote  3  ), . and  the  Commission's 
communication  95/C  275/02  to  the  E~n  Parliament  and ·the  Council  on  the  status  and  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC on competition  in  the  markets. for telecommunications services  (OJ No C  2751  20.  10.  1995,  p.  9 tt Sfll·>·  See  also 
Case  a-91/94, Thierry Tranchant and  Telephones  Stores  Sari,  Judpent of  Che  Court or Justice,  9  November  1995,  not  yet 
reponed.  ,  .  .  . 
(") Proposed .ONP interconnection Directive cited  in  fOOtnOte  4, Article 9 (3). 
(u) Case  T-24/90,  Automec  v.  Commission,  1992  ECR ll-2223,  paragraph  77;- and  case  T-114/92,  BEMIM  v.  Commission,  1995 
ECR-ll 147.  ·  .  , .  .  . 
{11)  Notice on cooperation between national courts ·and the Commission in applying Articles  85  and 86 of the EC Treaty (OJ No C 39, 
13.  2.  1993,  p.  6,  paragraph  14);  draft notice  on cooperation  between  national  competition  authorities  and  the  Commission  (OJ 
No 262,  10. 9.  1996, p. 5). 
(
11
)  Case  127/73, BRT v. Sabam,  1974  E<;:R St • 
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. ('•)  Case 66/86,,Ahmed Saeed, 1989 ECR 838. 
•  (
11
)  They must  noc,  for  example,  encourage  or  reinfo~ or approve  t1uuau1ts  of ami-competitive  behaviour:  Ahmed  Saeed,  above 
foomocc  14;  Case  153/93,  Federal  Republic of Germany v.  Delta  Sc:biffahn,s,  1994  ECR-I  2517;  Case  267/86, Van  Eycke,  1988 
ECR 4769.  · 
(i') Case  llm, GB-Inno-BWATAB,· 1?n  ECR  2115,  paragraph  33:  'while  it is  crue'·chat  Article  86  is  directed  at und~, 
nonetheless it is  also  tnle that the Treaty imposes  a duty on Member Swes not to adopt or maintain in force any measure wbfch 
could deprive the provision o£ its effectiveness.' . ·  ·  .  · 
.- .  '  . 
(~ For funher duties of national authorities see Case 103/88, F,atelli Costanzo SpA,·1989 ECR  1839.  ·  , 
.. '  See~  Saeed,  above  footnocc  H: 'Anides  5· and  90  of the  EC  Treacy. must  be  interpreted  as  (i)  prohibiting  the  national 
1/  authorities from  encou~g  the conclusion of a~ents  on  tariffs conuary to Anide 85 (1) or Article  86  of the Treacy,  as  the 
case. may be; (ii) precludiilg the app~  by. those authorities-of uriffs resulting from such agreementi. 
(") Joined  Cases C-6 and 9/90, Francovich,  1990.1 ECR. 5357; Joined· Cases C-%/93, Brasserie de Pecheur SA v.  Germany and Case 
·  C-48/93, R v. Secretary of  .sea~ for .Transport u  pat1l Faaoname ~  and ~  ~ent  of 5' March 1996, not yet reponed. 
('')  F~r ~pie,.  recital  18  of the  leased  line· D~e  referred  to  in  foocnoce  4 and  Anide 9 (3)  of the-. draft ONP inte-rconnection 
DiteetiVe.  .  ·  ·  . 
t") Cowicil  Relwation  No  ~i89  o£·21 -D~  1989  on .the  ~nuol of concentrations  ~en  yndertakings  (OJ No L 395, 
30. 12. 1989, p. 1).  .  '  '  . 
rs>  Council Regtilation No. 17 of 6 February  1962, first  Regulation  implementing.Articles  85  and 86 of the Treacy (OJ t:lo  13,  21.  12. 
1962, 'p.  204/6~), as amended.  .  .  ·  · 
(1
1
)  Anicles 2 and 4 (1) of R4ulation 17. 
(
11
)  Anicle. 3 of R.egulation .17. 
(") Articles 3 and  12 of Regulation  17. 
, 
(D)  Case 792/79 R, camera Care v. Commission,  1980 ECR 119. see also  Case T_../90, La Cinq v. Commission,  1992 ECR ll-1. 
·(I') See point  16 of the  ~otice on cooperation between national couns and the Commission cited. above in fooinote  12. 
(21)  Article 2 or 4 (1) of Regulation 17. 
(I') Arucle 3 (2). of Regulation  17.  · 
(
19
)  Camera Care and. La Cinq, referred to above in footnote ·25. 
e·>  Notice on cooperation between national  COUrtS and the Commission cited above. in  fQOtn~.  12, point 16. 
(sa)  Paragraph  14.  . 
(,.) See Automec,  footn~te 11  above, paraPp6 86. 
CS')  BRT v. Sabam; footnote  13  above. 
e•>  Articles 9 (1) and 9 (3) of the proposed ONP interconnection Pirective. 
(") Case  14/83, Von  Colson,  1984 ECR  1891. 
(,.) Telecommunications:  open  network  provisi~n (ONP) for leased  lines;  Conciliation  procedure;. 94/C 214/04  (.OJ  No C 2H, 4.  8. 
1994, p.  4).  . 
('') Article  15  (2) of Regulation  17. 
(") Article  15 (5) of Regulation  17. 
(1') Anicle  15 (6) of Regulation  17. 
(•) Alticle 6 (c) of the proposed ONP incerconn~on Directive. 
(•') lnkr ali4, in Article 9 of the proposed ONP interconnection  D~ve. 
(.1)  See footnote  18  above. 
(••.)  Interconnection  ~defined in  Directive 96/19/EC as: .  · 
•. . .  the  physical  and  logical  linking  of the  telecommunications  facilities  of orpnisa.tions  providing  telecommunications .  networks 
and/or celecommunications seriices, in order to allow the  user's  of one organization to communicate with 'the usen .of the same or 
another organization or to a~  services provided  ~y  th~  organizations.'  ·  ·  ·  · 
In the  full liberalization ·Directive and ONP Directives,  telecommunications services are defined  as:  . 
'services, whose provision consists wholly or partly in the  transmission and/or routing of signals on a telecommunications network.' 
It therefore  includes  the ·tranSmission  of. broadcasting signals  and CATV  necworks.  A telecommunications  network  is  itself defined 
as·  .  .  . 
•  . .'.  the  tranSmiSsion  equipment  and,  where  applicable,  ~tching  .  equipment and  other resources  which  pennit the· conveyance  of 
signals between defined termination points by wire, by radao,  by optical or by ocher electromagnetic means.' 
(••)  Eurotunnel (OJ No L 354, 31.  12.  1994, p. 66). 
r•>  Guidelines on the application of the competition rules  in the  telecommunications sector, see point 3 above,  parag~phs 15  and  16. 
(  ..  ) Commission Decision 821896./EEC BNIC/AROW (OJ No L.J79, 31.  12.  1982, p.  1). 
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(.,)  See  foocnoce  15  above. 
(•) Jomed Cases  C--48/~ and C-66/90,  ~etherlancls ~d  otheri v.  Commission,  1992 ECR 1-565. 
(") See Ahmed Saeed, footnote  1-4  above, where internal market legisl&aoii- ftlating to pricing was  used  as an  aid in determining what 
level of prices  shout~ be regarded as unfair for the purposes of Article 86.  . 
(  ..  ) See  also  the  definition  included  in  the  CAdditional" commitment  on  regulatory  principl~ by  the  European  Communities  and  their 
Mem~.  States'  used  by  the  Group  on  basic  telecommunicaaon.s  in  the  conteXt  of  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO) 
negouauons:  · .  .  ,  · 
•Essential facilities  mean facilities of a public  telecomm~cations ~on  netWork and service that: 
(a)  are exclusively or prcdominandy provided by a qe  or Umicecl nUmber of suppliers; and 
(b)  cannot feasibly be economicallY or technically submwted in order to provide a lei'Yice.' 
( 11)  Case. 6/72 Continental Can,  1973. ECR 215. 
( 11)  It should  be  noted  in  this  conteXt  that. under  the  ONP framework·· an  or:pnization may be  notified  as  having significant market 
power. -The ·determination  of whether  an  organization does  or does  not liave  si~t  market· poWer  depenCfs  on  a number  of 
factors,  but the starting presumption is that an organization with a market share Of more than· 25 96  will normally be cOnsidered to 
have  significant  market  power.  The  Commission  will  cake  account  of whether  an  undertaking· bas·  been  notified  .as  having 
significant market po~  ~der  the ONP ~  in it$ appraisal under the compeation rules.  .  . 
('
1
)  Case  85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche,  1979  ECR  -461~ Racal  Decca,  Commission Decision of .21  December  1988  (OJ No  L 43,  15.  2. 
1989, p.  27).  .  . .  .  .  .  .  . 
c••)  Nesd~/Perrier, Commission Decision of 22 July 1992 (OJ No  ~  356, s  .. 12. 1992, p.  1). 
(11)  Case 85/76  Hoffmann~La·  Roche,  i979 ECR 461.  · 
(") Commission  Decision  9-4/19/EC,  Sea  Con~ers v.  Stena  Sealink  (OJ  No  L  15,  18;  1.  199-4,  p.  8);  Commission  Decision 
. 9_4/119/EC, re· access to facilities of Port Redby (OJ No L 5~, 26. 2. 199-i, p.  5~).  . 
(") See  also  (among  others).: Judgntents  of the  Court:  Cases  6 and· 7/73, Commercial Solvents  v.  Co~ission, 1974  ECR  223;  Case 
311/84, T6l=atketing, 1985  ECR  3261; Case C-18/88 RTr v. GB-Inno,  1991  ECR 1-59-41; Case C-260/89, EUiniki  Radiophonia 
Teleorassi,  1991  ECR I-2925;  Cases  T-69, T-70  and  T-76/89, RTE,  BBC  and  ITP v.  Commission,  1991  ECR 11-485,  535,  575;. 
Case  C-271/90,  Spain  v.  Commission,  1992  ECR 1-5833;  Cases  C-241  and  242-91P,  R~  and  lTP Ltd  v.  Commission.(Magill), 
1995 ECR 1-7-43.  .  .  .  .  ·  · 
Commission Decisions: 76/185/EEC- National CarboniZing  Co11,1~y (OJ No L 35,  10.  Z.  1976, p.  6); 88/589/EEC- London 
Euro~- Sabena (OJ No L 317, 24.  11.  1988, p. 47); 92/2·13/EEC.- British Midland v. Aer Lingus (OJ No L 96,  10. 4.  1992, 
p. 34); B&I/Sealin.k, (1992) 5 CMLR 255; EC Bulletin, No 6- 1992; .point 1.3.30.  . 
('
1
)  Community  law /roteets  com~tion and  not  competitors,  ind  therefore,. it  viould  be  insufficient  to  demonstrate  that  one 
· competitor neede  acCess  to  a facility  in order to  compete 'in the downstream  market.  It would  be  necessary  to  demonstrate  that 
access is necessary for all except exceptional competitors in order for  acc:ess to be  mad~ compulsory.  ·  · · .  · 
.  .  !  - . 
('') As noted above in paragraph  SQ. 
("}  See paragraph 91  below. 
(") Case 6/73  a~d 7/73, Commercial Solvents,  1974 ECR 223. 
(
62
}  That· is to use the network to reach their bwn aistomers. 
('
1
)  This  is  also  dealt with  under the  ONP framework:  see Article  7  (4)  of the  Interconnection  Directive, Alticle  12  (4)  of the  voice 
telephony Directive and Annex II of the ONP framework Directive.  ·  · 
~) That is  including those which are  ~perfluous to the .latter, or indeed those which may constitute serviceS the afXW requester itself 
· would like to provide for its CUStomers.·  ·  .  ·  .  . 
(") The 6>mmission  communication on  assessment aiteria for  national  ic~Wnes for the costing and "financing. of universal  serrice and 
guidelines  for  the  operation  of such  schemes  will  be  relevant  for  the  determination  of die  extent  co  which  the  universal  service 
.  obligation can be used to justify the prices charged. See also the reference to the universal service obliption in paragraph 53  above • 
. (  ..  ) See AKZO, Case C-62186,  [199,1]  ECR.-3359.  .. 
However;  the  average  variable'  COSt  rule  cannot  be  applied  in  many situations in  the  telecommunications  sec:cor,  since  the  variable 
COStS  of  provi4inl  access  to  ~  already  existing  netWOrk  are  almOSt  zero.  Accordingly,  the  test which  the  Commission  considers 
should  be  applied  is whether a company charges a price  for:  goocb and ·semces- oilier ihan in. the context of a new  product or 
service - Which alchough above the average vlriable cost of 'providinf che specific good. or services for which the price  an quc:sUon 
is  paid  is  so  low  that  the  overall  revenues  for  all  the  goodS  or semces  U1  quescion  would  be  less  than .  ia averap total  COSts  of 
providing them if it sold the same proportion of its output at the same price on a continuing basis, eVell where no antent to e~ude 
a competitor is  proVed.  · 
(") Commission Decision 88/518/EEC, Brown Napier/BritiSh Sugar (OJ No L 284,  1'9.  10.  1988, p.  41): the. m~n  between industrial 
and  retail  prices  was  reduced  to the  point  w6ere  the  wholesale  purchaser with  packaging  operations  as  efficient  as  those  of the 
wholesale· supplier could  not  pro~tably serve the retail market.  See  also National Carbonizing, footnote  57  above. 
(") However,  when  infrastructure  capacity  is  under-utilised,  ~ng  a different  price  f~r access  depending  on  the  demand  in  the 
different downstream markets  may be justified to the extent that sUch differentiation permits a better utilisation of the infrasttuaure 
and a better development of certain markets, and  where such differentiation does not restrict or diston competition. In such a case, 
the Commission wiD  analyse the global effectS. of such price differentiation on all of the d~m  markets. 
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(") Case C-310/93 P, BPB .~uatries pic-and  British~  Ltd v.  Commission 'tJ,995] ECR. I-865, 904, applying co discriminacion by 
·  BPB among cuscomers m the related market for dry plaster.  .  · 
(") Tlw is co a preferred list of COrreSpondent ~rk  operatOrs.  ·  ·  -~ 
. (") Commission  Decision  9.Y663/EC,' N"Ight  Semce:t  (OJ  No  L  259, 7.  10.  1994,  p.  20);  COmmission  Decision  94/894/EC, ~  · 
t1111De1 (OJ No L 354, 31. 12. 1994, p. 66).  .  .  ·  . 
(") Case T-34/92, Fi~  UK Ltd and  New Horiand  Ford, Ltd  v.  Commission; Case T-35/92, John. Deere  Ltd v.  CompUssiqn;  Boch 
on appeal co the. ECj; Appealing against Commission decision, UK Ag~tural  Tractor Registration Exchange (OJ No L 68, 13. 3. 
1992, p.  19).  .  .  ·  · 
('J) Case sn2 Vercnipg van  Ceulenthandelaaren  v.  Commission  (1972]  ECR 977;  Que 123l83 Bureau  National  lnrerprofessionnel 
/I  du CogDac v. Oair [1985] ECR 391.  '  . 
('•)  Case 56/65, STM, 1966 ECR 235  at 249. 
(") Case  193/83, Windsurfing International Inc v. Commission,  1986 ECll 611. 
(") See telecommunications guidelines, point  3  ~ve. 
Non-opposition  to  a nodDed  ~tration  .  .. 
(Case  No  IV/M.859 - c:;;encrali/P~)  .. 
(97/C 76/07) 
(Text with  EEA  televaa.ce) 
. On  18  December  1996,  the  Commission  decid~d not  to oppose  the  above  notified  concen-
tration and to  declar~ it compatible with the  common market. This  decision  is  based  on Ani-. 
cle  6  (1)  {b)  of Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064(89.  Th~ full  text  of the  decision  is 
available only in Italian and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may 
contain. It will. be  available:  · 
I  • 
- as  a  pap~ version .  through  the  ~ales offices  of the  Office  far Official  Publications  of the 
European Communities (see list on. the last page), 
- in  electronic  form  in  th~ 'CIT' version  of the  Celex:  database,  under document  number 
396M0859 ..  Celex is  the computerized documentation system of European Community law; 
for more information concerning  subs~ptions ple~e contact: 
EUR-OP, 
Information, Marketing and Public Relations  (OP/4B), 
2, nie Mercier, 
L-2985  Luxembourg. 
Tel.: (352)  2929-4~4 55, :fax:  (352) 2929-427 63. 
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Notice ~t  to ~de  19  (3)  of Council  RecuJation· No  17 (')  COIKUIIin~ a request  for 
·  negatiVe  clearance or ari ~on  J'1I1"S':WlC  to Article· 85  (3)  of the EC Treaty 
.  (Que No IV/35:296-- ~t-P)  , 
(95/C  304/06) 
(Text with  EEA ,rdevaace) 
I.  INTR.OJ?UCO:ON 
On  11  November  1994  the  International · Maritime 
Satellite'  Organization,  which,  in'  December  1994 
changed  its  name  to  the.  International  MObile  Satelli~ 
Organization (Irimarsat),  notified  to the  Commission  the 
creation  of  an ·affiliate,  I-CO  Global  .  Communications 
Ltd  (ICO),  to  finance,  construct  and  operate  the 
lnmarsat~P  world-wide  mobile  satellite-based  telecom-
munications  system.  ICO was  actually  incorporated  as  a 
UK company with limited  liability on  16  December  1994 
after an  extraordinary meeting of the Inmarsat Assembly 
dec~ded to go  ~head  ~ith it. The Inmarsat assembly also 
dectded  that  s1gnator1es  of  Inmarsat  would ·  be  free  to 
deci~e wh~ther or not to  invest  in  ICO.  A large  number 
of stgnatones subsequently expressed  an  interest in  doing 
so.,  ~nd, finally,  38  of them  ·decided  to  i!lvest  d~ring a 
m~etmg h~ld on  17  ~o. 20 January  1995  providing  ICO · 
w1th  more  than  the  financi~ support  initially  expected. 
In  June  1995,  ICO was  restructu.red;. it  consists  now  of 
th_ree  entities,  a  holding  company. ·and  an  operating: 
company  registered  in.  the  Cayman  lshmds · and·  a 
management  services  company ·registered  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  ·  .  · 
ICO and  the  Inmarsat-P  system  are  at a· early  stage .of 
development. The_ first·satellite of the system. will only _be 
launche~ on  31  July  1999  ~d  ·the  fu~ operab.ility of the 
system  1S  foreseen  for  31  December 2000. In addition  no 
radio  frequencies  have  yet  been  alJocated  to  Inmars~t-P 
and  some of the required  technologies still  remain under 
d~elopment or  have  not·  yet  been  applied  in  systems 
dtrectly  analogous  to lnmarsat-P. 
II.  PARTIES 
......  .1.  lnmanat  is  an  international  inter-gove~ental 
.. ··organization  which  provides  mobile  satellite  communi-
.  cations  world-wi~e.  ~blished in  1979  to  serve  the 
maritime  community,  Inmarsat  has  since  envolved  into 
the  major·  provider  of  mobile . satellite  communications  · 
for  c:Ommercial  and  distress  and  safety  applications  at 
sea,  in ·  the air and  on land. 
Inmarsat ·'space  segment'  co~ists of  four  geostationary 
second generation  ~atelliteS located two. over the Adantic 
(
1
)  OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p. 204/62  .. 
Ocean,  one  over· the  Pacific  Ocean  and  one  over  the 
In~ian O~ean. A ~ird generation o! satellites is ·currently 
betng  budt  and  Its  expected  to  become  operational  in 
1996.  .  . 
The  services·.  offered  by  Inmarsat  include  direct-dial 
telephone,  telex,  facsimile,  electronic  mail  and  data 
connections  for  maritime  applications,  flight-deck  voice 
a?d  dat;a,  automa~c position  and  StatUS  reponing .  and 
dtrect-dlal  passenger  telephone  i)r  aircraft,  two-way 
data  exchange,  position  reporting,  electronic  mail  and  (j 
.  fleet  m3:~agement to land transport. Inmarsat is also used 
for  emergency  communications  at  times  of  human 
. disaster  and  natural  cawtrophe.  In  addition,  ll')marsat 
offers several different mobile  com~unication· systems:  in 
1991  Inmarsat  launched  its  Inmarsai-C  low-data  rate 
text  and  data  s~J;Vices  and  in  1993  its  Inmarsat-M 
portable  sa~llite phone.  By  the  end  of  1993  there  were 
3 790  Inmarsat-C :and  333  Inmarsat-M  terminals  in  use. 
. Inmarsat  had  been  developing  the  lnmarsat-P  concept 
for  the  last  few  years..- .  · 
Any  country  in  the  world  is. entided  to  be  an  Inmarsat 
member.  At  ·the  third  quarter· of  1994,  there  were  75 
member  countries.  Member  coUJ,ltries  designate  a 
nat!onal .  entity  to  be. its.  signatory;  usuaJly  the  (inter-
nauonal)  telecommurucauons  operator  or  the  satellite 
service  provider.  Signatories  have  an Investment share  in  t 
lniD:arsat which  is  proportional to the use  they make  of 
the  systeni.  This  principle  has  been  abandoned  for ·the 
se~ting-up of ICO. 
Inmarsat  has  invested  $150  million  in  ICO  corre-
sponding  tO  a  10,7 96 . of  the  ordinary ·shares  of  the 
co~~any and entitling  i~ to 15 96  of the voting  rights~ In 
addtuon,  Inmarsat  has  received  700 000 B  shares  in 
exchanges . for  its  in-kind  contribution (
2
}.  .  In-kind 
contribution$  by  Inmarsat  tO  ICO  have  been  paid 
(2)  In-kind  cc:>ntributions  refer  to  .ditures  made  by 
lnmanat  aW'I~utable to t.he  deVelopment of lnmarsat-P  a~CI 
.  to  CO!DpClllS&UOns  to  lnmarsat  .lor · benefiting  from  ats 
·  experience in  the  sateUiteS  communications  market,  for  t.he 
use  of  Inmarsat's  logo  and  trademarks  and  for  t.he 
comprom~ ~y Inmarsat  nOt  to  procure  a  separace  space 
segment  claiped for  t.he  ~u..po.e of  providing  hand  held 
se~ces Other than from  ICO.  .  ·  .  · 
11  A/  1 ~  .. 
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for  il)  shares  in  a~roance  with  an  independent 
valuator. 'the B shares will be  imm~diately. convertible 
into ordinary shares, provided ~t  if Inmarsat does so 
prior to 1 January 2002, .it calmot exceed  15 °/o  of the 
voting rightS  for more than 90 days. 
2.  37  sipatories  (or  subsidiaries  of signatories)  of 
Inmarsat,  all  'of  ·them  telecommunications  and/  or 
satellite(s)  operators,  freely  decided  to  join  ICO  and 
have signed  subscrip~on agreementS with ICO. None of 
them controls more than 6,7 °/o  of the ordinary shares of 
ICO. ICO's shares are split the following  way:  38,7 °/o 
of·  the  shares  are  in  the  hands  of Asian  signatories, 
12,·2 Ofo  are in the hands ·of Arabic signatories, 9,4 Ofo  are 
in the hands of Latin-American signatories, 6,7 °/o  are in 
the hands of the US.signatory, 3,9% are in the hands of 
non-EU Europ~an signatories(>), 1,7 Ofo  are in the hanCls 
of African signatories arid  0,1  °/o  belong to. Australia.  · 
·  EU  companies  ·account .for.  16,9 Ofo  of  the  ordinary 
shares.  Of · the  six  eompanies  so  involved,  five  are 
incumbent telecommunications operators: .Telef6nica ·de 
E~pai'la  (Spain,  2,2 °/o),  Telecom  Finland  (Finland,  . 
0,1  °/o), OTE (Greeee, 3,9 Ofo),  CPRM (Portugal, 1,8  Ofo} 
and  PTf Telecoms (4)  (the  Netherland~,  2,2 Ofo);  the 
sixth  is  Detemobil,  the  mobile  subsidiary  of  Deuts~he 
Telekom (6,7 Ofo). · 
( 
This  repartition  of the  shares  clearly  differs  from  the 
cilrrent structure of Inmarsat itself; where 75 °/o  of the 
shares are controlled by European and North-American 
signatories.  · 
This strUcture could be modified in the near future, .as it 
is foreseen that ICO's board may. issue additional equity 
of up to US $ 600 million that will be offered to strategic· 
...i~vestors, including C:ompanies  other than Inmarsat and 
its  signatories,  i.e.  tJ!e  spacecraft suppliers .  and  handset 
,manufacturers (
1
).  ·  · 
(')  Swiss  Telecom  (2,2 %),  Cyprus  Teleconuns  (0,1 %), 
Telemalta  (O,t %), Polish Telecom  (1,4 %) and  Monvias-
putnik oE Rqssia (0,1 %).  .  .  · 
(•f It  is  wonh  noting  t~tU·  three  out  oE  Eour  members  of 
Unisource  are  involved1  together  accounting  lor  $ 94 
million, or 6;7 o/o oE the snares. 
.(')  &  regards  the former,  ICO has  fma!Jy  chosen· Hughes  as 
the m.anuEacturer of the sateUites. Hug_hes will·also become a 
strategic ~  of ICO; w_hereas ABB, Ericsson and Nokia 
·  &11\0ng. die latter have· maintained contacts with lnm'arsat. 
Investors in ICO will be g~ted  rights and opportunities · 
to operate elements of the lnmarsat-P ground  segm~nt 
and  to  act  as  wholesalers  and/  Qr  retailers  fQr  the 
distribution. of the  ~ces  to be  provided through the-
system. 
3.1CO 
ICO hasd been established for the provision of an Inter-
mediate Circular Orbit space segment (i.e.  the satellites 
over which the service will  be  provided) and associated 
gr.ound  infrastructure  for  the  delivery  of  Inmarsat-P 
:hand-~eld  and  other  ancillary  telecommunications 
services.  ICO  will  then  be  offering  what .is  called  a 
world  .. wide  satellite-personal  communications  system 
(S-PCS) (').  ICO  will  mainly  be  a  network  provider. 
However,  it  can  require  wholesalers  to  provide  a 
.-ninimum set of services of a standard guality in order to 
ensure global  interconne~ivity.  ':: 
ICO  is  obliged  to  follows  a  number  of  principles 
included in the memorandum of association: 
(i)  it shall serve all areas where there is  a need  for the 
..  services; 
(ii)  it shall act exclusiveJy for  pe~ceful purposes, and 
{iii)  it shall not discrlmi~ate in service  provision on the 
.  basis of nationalitjr, provided that geographic price 
· differentiation should be  permitted based on costs, 
competition or similar consider.lti~ns.  . 
ICO will  be managed 'by  a  Board of Directors  (BOD) 
made of 13  members  (including  the  CEO)~ Ten of its 
members  are  elected  by  cumulative  voting.  The  first 
BOD has been· elected for a two-year term. Thereafter 
BOD  members  (other  than  the  CEO  and  th~  two 
directors appointed by lnmarsat) will serve for one-year 
terms. After the initial meeting of shareholders held on 
24 January 1995, three directors belonging to EU share-· 
holder$  have been elected to the BOD. The BOD will 
delegate certain executive  authoritY to the management 
team: of the company,. which will be led·by the CEO, to 
be  elected  by  the  BOD.  The  management  will  be 
responsible  for  carrying  out  the  directions  of  the 
- .  . 
(') The· term 'S-PCS system' is synonymous With the  ~rms  'Big 
LEO/MEO' or 'Mobile Satellite Systems (MSS)' commonly 
seen in the press and ~  by rru. ~PCS  llas been the term 
used ·by the  Commission  in the  'Communication  from  the 
COmnusrion  and  proposal  for  a' .Council  resolution  on 
sateUite penonal  co~unic:ations', COM(93) 171, 27 April 
-1993. 
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BOD  and  for.  infomiing  them  of  progress Jri  ·the 
company's  development  and  business. 
DeciSions  by  .the  BOD  will  be  adopted  by  simple 
majority, although some imponant matters will require a 
. two-thirds  majorit)' ·.(i.e.  nomination  and .  dismissal  of the 
chairman of the BOD  and  of die CEO).  In  view  of the 
above, and given that ihe powers of the general assembly 
do  not  seem  to be  very  su~tial, it  would·. seem  that 
the  company will  be  controlled  by the  BOD.  · 
m. 11iE INMARSAT-P  SYSTEM 
t.  The network 
., 
The  system  will  consist  of  the  following  elements:  the 
space  segment,  including. . satellites  and  tracking, 
telemetry  and  · control  stations  .  (IT  & C) (');  $everal 
network control stations (NCS) (
1
)  directed by a network 
control  centre  (NCC);· the. user  handheld  terminals;  the 
P-net  of  interconnected  ~atellite  access·  nodes  "(SAN); 
and  the  gateways· conn~ed to  the  P-net.  · 
A  m~jour feature  of  the  system  IS  ats  int~gration  of 
mqbile  satellite  communications . capability  with  public 
Ian.~  mobile  networks  and  public  switched.  telephone 
networks .. So,  the  system  will ·  route  calls  from  land 
networks  through  ·sANs  whiCh  will  select  a  satellite 
thtoug~ which  the  call  will  be  connected  to  a handheld 
terminal  (and  vice  versa).  · 
The  space  segment  will  consist  of a constellation  of 10 
satellites  to  be  deployed ··in  intermedi.ate  circular; orbit 
(10 JJS km  above  the Earth's surface). The ·satellites will 
~  arranged  in  two  planes  of  fi•e  satellites  each.  The 
··· system  will  also  include  two  spare  satellites  in  the  same 
orbit,  bringing .  the  total nu~r  of satellites  to  12.  This 
configuration  has  been  designed  to ·provide  optimal 
coverage  of the  entire  surface  of the  Earth  at all  times, 
so  ~at more  than  one  satellite  will  nearly  always  be 
available .at  the  same  time  to any  user,  which  increases 
the  likelihood  of succesSlul  and  uninterrupted  calls. 
(') IT  & C ·stations  will  uac:k  the  movements  of ~e  ·satellites 
·  a,nd  ad~ ~  orbics  to  maintain  the  constellation.  In 
addi~ d!eY  will  IDOIIilor  the  general  conditions  of  the 
satellites. There ~  be h  Tr  & Cs.  .  . 
(') 11le NCS.,  ac;tin& ~  ·n.&  Cs and SANs, will  ~nuol 
the  ~der  ·~  between  the  feeder  and  iervice 
.  antenna~ on che  sa~Uita. 
The· syste.m  will· use  ~ freque.n~ in_ ~e  range of-t  ,9[2,2 
GHz r> for user·links (that is  links between ·f:he  s~telliteS 
and  the user  tennirials  ).  · 
The  satellites  will  be.  linked  to  a  ground  backbone 
netw~rk  (the  P-net)  consisting  Qf  12  -interconnected 
SANs located throughout the world. SANs will comprise 
earth  stations  with  multiple  antennas  for  communicating 
with  satellites  and  associated  switching  equipment  and 
databases.  They  will  be  the  primary  interface  with  the 
satellites  for  coordinating  and  routing  traffic  and  main-
taining  certain  subscriber  data.  SANs  will  be.  owned  by 
ICO  but  installed  ·'and·  ·.operated  . by  'qualified 
operators' (1°).  The  P-net will  be  managed  by  the  NCC. 
In  order  to  provide  global  roaming,  the  P-net  Will 
include a system for  management of user mobility which 
will be based upon existing digital  ca&fular Standards such 
as  GSM. 
G~teways  are  switches  which  will ·  ~erve  as  the  link 
between  the  SANs  and  the  public  terrestrial  networks. 
The  most  likely  gatew-ay  implementation  is  an·  incre-
mental  hardware  and·  software  modification  to  existing 
switch~s. They  will  be  owned  by  third  party  operators 
which  will  be  responsible  for  the  implementation  and 
maintenance  of these  facilities  in  conformity  with  ICO's 
·technical  and  operational  requirements.  It  is  expected 
that,  in  reality, most gateway owners will  be wholesalers, 
retailers  and/or  signatorie$  of  Inmarsat  and/or  ICO 
shareholders. In  this  respect,  the  panics  have  stated  that 
the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  wholesaler  and/  or 
retailer  au~orizations· will  not  include  any  fo~ of 
provi$ion  binding  them  not to compete  with  competitors 
of  I<:O  or·  giving  · it ..  preferred  market  access. 
F~ermore, existing  or planned  EC  regulation  will  be 
applicable .  ~  the  oper-ation  of gateways,  in  panicular as 
regards  access.  ·  · · 
·The total system's  implementation  COSts  are  estimated  at 
nearly  us  $ 3 billion. 
Finally,  hand  seJS  will  be  produced  by  major  manu-
facturers  of  equipment,  benefitting  fr~m  terrestrial 
r> This  f!equenc:y  is  different.  from  those  reserved  by  the 
W  ARC92  co'nference  for .  user  links  in  S-PCS ~ 
(I 610.1 626,5/2 '<t83,5-2 500 MHz)  and  aUocated  m . the 
United  Stata by the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
·  CFCC) of die US io five US-based S-PCS sysccms, including 
:Iridium,  ~lobalsw_  ~d  Odyuey, on 31 January 1995. 
·  c••)  ICO  wiD  select  SAN. operaton  o~. commercial  grounds. 
Howm:r,  it  will . pe consideriuon  10  favouring  ~~rect 
·  iqveRon in ICO with p~  righcs 10 operate SANs. 
• 
• 
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cellular  technologies·.  Most  hand  setS  will  be  capable  of 
dual-mode  operation  with .both  satell~te  and  terrestrial 
cellular  (including  GSM  systems),  s0  that they  :will  be 
able to select, either automatically or under user control, 
satellite  or terrestrial  modes  of operation. 
2.  Distn"bution of the services 
The  available  information  concerning  the  future 
distribution  of the  ICO services  is  limited  to  the  broad 
principles  contained  mainly  in  the  information 
memorandum  included  in  the  notification  and  detailed 
below.  This  is  not supponed by the relevant agreements 
that, according to the parties, havt not,.been  drafted yet. 
Although  nothing  preven~ ICO from  supplying  services, 
it  is  essentially to be considered as  a network provider. It· 
will,  nevenheless,  prescribe  a  minimum  set  of  services 
and/  or features· to be  offered in  all territories in  order to 
ensure  global  interconnectivity.  In  addition,.  ICO  could 
adopt  guidelines  for  retailers.  According  to  the  parties, 
such  guidelines,  if  adopted,  will  not  cover  pricing  or 
·other  competitive  conditions. 
The  actual  telecommunication  services  will  be  provided 
to  end-users  through  a  network  of  wholesalers.  and 
retailers,  responsible  over one or· J110re  national markets, 
which  will  provide  the  services  at  their  own  risk  and · 
according  to terms  agreed  independently between  thelll. 
Such  retail  agreements  do not exist yet. 
A.  Wholesalers 
Any  investor which  has  invested  at least $ 20  million  in 
ICO has  an option to become a service wholesaler in  its 
natio.n.  In  case  that it  acCepts  to become  wholesaler,  it 
shall  agree  to meet  specific performance requirements to 
. be  defined  by  ICO. 
Appointment  of  wholesalers  for  territories  where  r:to 
investor  has  exercised  its  option  or ·where  there  is  no  ·. 
investor  will  be awarded  the  biggest  bid  in  an  auction. 
Each  investor  will  receive  a  voucher  for  every  s·t  of 
investment.  Vouchers  are  the  currency  used  in  the 
auction  to obtain  wholesal~ rights  over  different  terri-
tories. At. the discretion of ICO's board,  these  territories 
can be .awarded on  ~ national  o~ regional  basis. 
On the  other  h~d, the  board  is  entitled  to  nominate 
more than one wholesaler in one territory if necessary tO 
·meet  suategic  requirements,  if the  ~riginal  wholesaler  · 
fails  ~ achieve  . its  ·performance  requirements  or  if 
required  by  applicable  .  aptional  laws  or  regulatory 
~uthority. 
In  many  cases,  .  wholesalers  will  ~  and  operate 
gateWays  and  possibly  they  will  also  be  the  s~ 
operator~. 
As  indicated  above,  where  no  wholesaler  is  authorized, 
Inmarsat  itself  will  be  entitled  to act as  a  non-exclusive 
wholesaler .. 
The  terms  and  conditions  of  t¥·  wholesalers  auth-
orizations  are  to  be  developed  by  the  management  and 
Board  of ICO. 
The  number · of  wholesalers  and  their  respective  terri-
tories  are not known  yet. 
Wholesalers  will  arrange for  all  aspe~ts ·of  the  provision 
of the  services  within  their  territor(y)(ie~).  They  will 
purchase  'Inmarsat-P  services  from  ICO  (basically  air 
time)  and  resell  it  to retailers.  They will  be  responsible 
for arranging installation and operation of gateways,  for 
links  between  the P-net and  the  gateWays,  for  intercon-
neCtion  to  the  public  networks  and.  for  establishing 
satellite-cellular  integration  within  their  countries.  In 
apdition, they,  together with retailers, will be  respon5ible 
for  the  provision  of  value  added  and  .supplementary 
services  (vo.ice  messaging, .  call  waiting  and  forwarding 
and  so  on)  on  top  of  the  mobilC  voice  service  the 
Inmarsat-P system is ·designed for. In summary, they will 
perform within their territories a .role similar to that of a 
cellular  network  opera~r. 
B.  Retailers 
ltetailers  wi~l be  responsible for marketing and retail sale 
of  the  services  and  terminals  and  will  have  primary 
contact .with. end-iisers  within  one  country.  They  will 
also  be  .responsible  for  all  aspects  of  accQunt 
management . and  customer  care  including  customer 
credit,  billing,  accounting  and  related  administration. 
.• 
Retailer$ will hF appointed by wholesalers consistent with 
guidelines. provided by  IGO. They will  purchase services 
only  from  authorized  wholesalers.  . 
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All  Inmarsat  signataries  have  the · right  to  become 
non-exclusive  retailers. Apart from  that, the  nomination 
of retailers will be at the discrWon of wholesalers.  · 
It is envisaged that retailers will be  free  to  s~ntract 
some or all of their services .to resellers, distributors and 
dealers. 
Retailers will petforrn a role similar to that of an air-time 
reseller in cellular terrestrial mobile  services. 
C.  Tariff structure 
teo will set the structure and level of prices for serVices 
provided to the nation;ll services wholesaler$. The latter, 
in tum,  are  expe~d to have discretion in the ·level and 
structure of  prices charged to retailers. Retailers for their 
pan  will  also  have  price  discretion  in  chargi1;1g 
end-customers. In respect of any customer, IC.O (1
1
)  will 
bill  wholesalers,  which  then  will  bill  retailers,  which  in 
their  turn  wou~d  .fina~ly bill  resellers  or· end-customers. 
End-customers  will  have  to  pay  a  connection  fee,  a 
monthly fee  and  a tariff per voice  minute traffic. 
It  is  expected  that  end-customers  will,  in  pnnciple; be 
registered  in  one  out  of  two  ~tegories:  global 
customers,· us':lally  highly  mobile  international  business 
travellers,  will  be  charg~d higher tariffs,  as  their use  of 
the  system  is  likely to entail  more  extensive  use  of the 
system's  elements.  National  customers  will  be  charged 
lower tariffs,. but  ~ey  ~ill only have access. to the SANs 
eovering  their  home  country.  Custome!'S  will  have  the 
option  of changing  from  one  categoey io the  other  as 
desired  and subject to commer~al c~nsiderations. 
·:;.  Rclatioashipa  between  Imnanat  and  ICO  will  be 
governed  by  a  services ·  contract  llnd  the  subscription 
agreement entered  into by the  two  parti~s. Puriuant to 
the  services  contract  lnmarsat ·will  provide  JCO·  the 
services that the latter needs to put in place and operate · . 
the  Inmarsat-P syswtem. The services  Contract will  last 
until  30  April  1998,  although  it can  be  ren~d for  a · 
further three year period. Pursuant to ~at  agreement, all 
contracts  relating  tQ  equipment,  facilities,  services  and 
other common  activities  provided  by  Inmarsat  to ICO 
will  be  negotiated  at· arm's  length  and  paid  on  a fully 
allocated  t:osts  basis  plus  a .reasonable  fee  of  6,5 Ofo 
(") SAN  ~raton  will bill ICO·for their activity on the  basis 
~reed m their operadn• ~nuacu. ·  .  · 
of the actual total costs inCurred by Inmarsat in fulfilling 
the specific task (Articles  1.17 and  ~.1· respectively). 
. Also  as  part of the  services  con~a both  parties  have 
agreed  that ICO will  buy  a minimum  level  of services 
from  Inmarsat  during  ·  the  operation~  lif~  of  the 
agreement (Articles 4.3  and  4.4). 
In  addition  to its  involvement  with  ICO, Inmarsat will 
continue  to  p~de its  existing  geostationary  orbit· 
. (GEO)  satellite-based  mobile  satellite  communications 
· and  allied  services,  although  it  has  agreed,  subject  to 
certain  Conditions,  not  to  procure  a  separate  space 
segment  designated  for  the  purpose  of  providing 
handheld  services  other  than  throuo ICO  (point  2, 
schedule  2  of  the  Inmarsat  slfare  subscription. 
agreement). 
In exchange for lnmarsat's ownership of a 10,7% of the 
ordinary shares of ICO, Inmarsat will· have  the right to 
appoint  two  members  of the  ICO's board  of directors. 
These directors are  required to act in  the  •best interest' 
of [ICO). 
.  . 
Also,  as  p~  of its  investc;>r  benefits,  Inmarsat will  have 
the  right to act globally  as  an  exclusive  wholesaler  for 
maritime  and  aeronautical  services  provided·  to 
non-hand-held  termi}lals  so  long  as  lnmarsat  maintains 
1  S 0/o.  of the · voting  rights  in  ICP  and,  in  addition, 
·Inmarsat  . shall  have  the  right  to  be  appointed 
non-exclusive wholesaler. in any country or region where 
· no  investor. is  __ interest in  becoming  wholesal~r  .. 
Finally,  a  consultation  mech~m· will  be  .established  • 
between  Inmarsat  and  IG9  in  respect  of the  hant}.on-
ization  and · evolution  of  their  respective  range  of 
serviees;  an~ in  re$pCct  of the  use  or sharing  of each 
other seivicel'or facilities  (point~, schedule 2, Inmarsat'i 
share 11:'bscription agreement). According to the parties, 
it aims at reinfot:cing the certainty -t  lnmarsat's public 
service duties will not ~  jeopardized by the launching of 
Inmarsat-P. The precise form of this mechanism ·has not 
.  been formulated yet. 
IV.  RELEVANT MARKET 
·1.  Procluct market 
The tenD  S-PCS  is  used  to denote  a network  used  to 
.  provide  satellite  personal  communicationS  services, 
}~Nally  o~ a  worldwide  basis.  At  least  some  of  the 
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relevant .  technologies  were  developed  in  the  framework 
of R &: D  military  programs  in  the  US.  AS-PCS ~m 
encompasses  a  constellation  of LEO  (low  earth. orbit), 
MEO (medium earth orbit) or  ..  GEO (geostationary earth· 
orbit) -satellites (
12
),  their  control  earth  stations  aa4  a 
number of gateWay  earth stations  through  which  access. 
will  be  provided  to terrestrial. faxed  or mobile  ne~or~. 
Such  a configuration will support full  user mobility and 
·  idencification by a single  number anywhere in the world, 
•  using  'intelligent'  features,  similar  to  those  of  digital 
terrestrial  cellular  systems  (such  as  GSM),  that  will  be 
located  either  in  earth stations  or in  the  satellites  them-. 
selves.  Substantial  efforts  are  being  devoted  by 
equipment  manufacturers  to  develop  light  hand-held 
portable  terminals  capable  of either  satellite-only  or of 
dua.l  coverage  (terrestrial  when  within  cellular  terrestrial 
coverage,  and  satellite  when  outside  it).  It  is  expected 
that  voice  ·service  will  be  the  primary  application  for 
these  .networks,  but  other  significant  segments  will 
involve  low  rate  data  transmission,  positioning,  tracking 
and  paging. 
S-PCS  ·represent  the  ability  to  maximize  mobility  of 
users,  by  providing  global  seamless  coverage,  in 
particular  in  remote  areas  where  terrestrial services  may 
be  uneconomic.  'Global  seamless  coverage'  means  not 
only  that the  user can  move  anywhere,  but also ·  that the 
communications system  cari  'move' to serve  new faxed  or 
'stationary'· users:  the  system  is  never  out  of 'range.· 
S-PCS  is  expected  to  act  as  ·complement  and/or 
substitute  for  · wireless  terrestrial  mobile  technologies 
(including GSM C))  and digital  cordl~s telephony within 
a fixed  radius  - DECI).  In  this  respect,  it  will . be 
offered  by  terrestrial  c;ellular  mobile  n~twork operators· 
(such  as  GSM  in  the  European  Union)  as  an additional 
feature  priced  at  a  premium  rate.  In  addition,  ·it  is 
expected  t9 .act  as  a  complement  and·  even  a  substiwte 
for  the  ·public  switched  fixed  telephone  network, 
enhancing service coverage in  remote areas of low popu-
lation  density  and/  or where  the  terrestrial  infrastrUcture 
is  very poor. Another important use  of S-PCS will  be as 
a substitute for cellular mobile  telephony in areas where 
the  cellular  network  has  failed  to  penetrate  (i.e.  rural 
(
11
)  LEO  satellites  are  located  around  900 k.m  over  the  Earth. 
Full  coverage  of  the  Eanh's  surfac;e  would  require  a 
minimum of  -48  LEO satellites. 
MEO  satellites.  are  located  around  10 000  km  over  the 
Earth.  Full'cove~ge of the  Eanh's surface would' ~uire a 
minimum  of  10  MEO  satelliteS.  The Intermediate  Carcular 
Orbit (ICO) to be used  by ICO belongs to this category. 
. GEO sateUiteS are located at 36 000 km over the Earth.  Full 
coverage  ·of  the  Eanh's  surface  would  require  only  three 
GEO  satellites.  · 
(u) It  is  expected  that  the  price  differential  for  dual-mode 
(satellite  and  GSMk1enus single-mode  (GSM  only) will  be 
as  low  as  10 96.  .  · 
pans of the developed  0 world and  ~th urban and  rural 
·pans of lower.  in~me countries).  · 
In  this  respect,  Commission  studies (  ..  )  predict  that  the 
greatest potential by far in the S-PCS  ~arket in terms of 
numbers  of subscribers  will  be  for  communities  in  less 
developed  regions of the world as a substitute for 'fixed 
service'  where' fixed  networks· have  yet to be  rolled  out 
or are very poor. Central and. Eastern  Europe represent 
an important customer base  in  this  conteXt,  which  could 
.be a~  from  gaieways within  the  EU. 
In  any  event,  major  users  of S-PCS  in  the  EU  will  be 
international business  travellers using their dual  terminals 
in  the terrestrial mode where within a given  network and 
switching to  satelli~e in  areas  outside terrestriaf coverage 
or with  incompatible  networks.  .  :~ 
A  feature  of these  S-PCS  systems  is  that  they  pose  a 
number of unresolved  regvlatory  issues  in  panicular for 
the  EU: 
- contrary· to what the situation is in the US; where the 
Federal  COmmunications  Commission  (FCC)  granted 
frequencies  to  five  S-PCS  in  January  1995,  the  EU 
has  not yet  adopted  a  coordinatec;l  approach  .to  the 
licensing of these  systems (1
1
). 
~  S-PCS  regulation  requires  solving  a  number  of 
additional  questions;  first,  the  criteri·a  (technical  and 
~b()Ve  all  financial)  to  select  S-PCS  providers,  and 
second, the.licensing (on· a national or supra-national 
basis) of gateway operators.  .  _ 
2.  Geographical  market 
As  to  the  geographic  market,  notwithstanding  the 
particu~ar  commercial  arrangements  that.  could  be 
offered  in  the  future  to precise  categories  of potential 
customers, the Inmarsat-P system to be managed by ICO 
is  aiming  at  a  global  coverage,  and  so  the  relevant 
('
4
)  See  'Satellite  Personal  Communications  and  their  conse-
.  quences  for  European  Telecommunications,  Trade  and 
Industry'.  Repon  to the  Euro~  Commission  (DG  XIII) 
by ~~G  Peat Marwick, Maich 199-4. 
('
1
)  In  addition,  the  International  Telecommunfcations  Union's 
. (nu)  1995.  World  RadiOc:ommunication  Conference 
(WRC-95)  held  in· October  1995  focuaed  on  frequency 
issues  relating to  sa~llice c:ommunicacions. 
II  AI  6 
"  . •  • 
1" . 
No C,  304/12  []f[)  o~_cial Journal  of th~· _E~~pean Communities  15.  ll.-95 
geographical  market .  to  be  considered· is  worldwide  jn 
scope. 
3.  Competition in the future worldwide S-PCS market 
A number of alteniative projects are. known  to be trying 
to  offer  hand-held  telecommunication  services  through 
satellite,  some  of them  (the  so-called  'little LEOs'} have 
a  more  limite4  product  (usually  they  will  not  provide · 
voice  services) and/or geographical coverage, others (the  · 
so-called  'big  LEOs')  are  aiming  at  the  same.  relevant 
market as  ICO. Generally speaking, with the only major· 
exception of ICO itself,  most planned S-PCS systems  are 
US-led  initiatives.  As  of now,  there  is  no  prospect  of a 
European-led · world-wide  S-PCS  system.  However, 
many  European  companies  are  substantially  involved  in 
several  of the  announced  S-PCSs.  The  most  important 
competitors  of IGO (I') will  be: 
-Iridium 
Motorola,  a  major  US  telecommunications  .equip-
ment  manufacturer,  plays  the  leading  role  in  the 
Iridium  consonium  for  a  LEO  S-PCS  system.  A 
number 'of  European  companies  are  panicipating  by 
way  of  pannership  agre~mentS  and/  or · investmenL 
These  include  STET  (the  Italian  state·  holding 
company,  majority  owner  of  Telecom  Italia)  and 
Vebaoom  (subsidiary  of  the  .  major  German 
conglomerate VEBA AG). 
Motorola  Sa~llite Communications  is  in  charge  of 
spacecraft constrUction but Iridium itelf will  own and 
operate. the  system  once. in  place.  Lock4eea  Corp  ... 
(USA)  JS  contracted  to  build  125  LEO  satellites  for 
Iridium  by  the  year  ·2003.  Other .  partners/investors 
include  K.runichev  Enterprise  _(.~.ussia)  which  will 
launch  the  satellites  with  Proton  rocketS,  Scientific 
Atlanta  Inc  (USA)  which  will  develop  and  manu-
facture  the  hand-held  units  as  well  as  the  satellite 
earth terminals,  and  Sprint,  the  third  United  States 
long-distance  telecommunication  carrier.  The  total 
cost of the system is  estimate~ at US $ 3,8 billion. 
Iridium plans to be operational with a limited number 
of satellites .by  1997 to 1998, and  expectS  1,5  million 
~bsc:n'bers  by  the  year  2000.  It  will  offer  voice, 
paging and data services. 
(  ..  ) The.' Commission  has  commenced  in~estisadons ac  iu  own 
inidaave  on  Iridium  and  Globalscar  (see  !P/951549  of 7 
June  1995).  · 
- Globalstar 
G~obalstar intends  ~  put  in  place  a  S-PCS  system . 
usmg  48 LEO satellites. The Globalstar consortium is· 
led  and  sponsored  by  the  Loral  cOrporation,  .a 
leading  United  States  defence  eleetronies  and  space 
· company.  Panners/  contractors  include  the  European 
aerospace  companieS  Alcatel ·(France),  Aeorospatiale 
(F), Alenia  (I), Deutsche Aerospace  (D)  and Tesam, 
a  joint  venture  created  by  Alcatel  and  France 
T~l~com. The total cost of the system  is  estimated  at 
US $ 2 billion. 
Globalstar  expects  to  be  operational  in  the  US 
around  199? to 2000 and  globally,  around  five  years 
later.  Globalstar will. also  be  offeri!.B  voice  and  data, 
as well  as tracking services.  . 
-Odyssey 
The  Odyssey  S-PCS  system  is  supponed  by  the  US 
aerospace company TRW and the Canadian telecom-
munications  operator  Teleglobe  Inc.  Odyssey  will 
consist  of 12  MEO satellites  and  will  be  operational 
by 1999. 
S-PCS  systems  offering  global  mobile  communications 
using  hand-held  terminals  repres~nt a  market  which ·is 
expected  to  result  in  revenues  of ECU  10  to  20  billion 
·  during  the  next  decade.  Due  to  the  scarcity  of 
· frequencies,  the  very  heavy  financial  . implications 
involved  in  launching and operating the  large  number of 
satellites  needed  for  such  systems,  and the  high  level  of 
~J~arket uncertainty,  however,  it  appears  to  be ·unlikely 
that there· will be more·than a few major players, at least 
at the world-wide. level.  · 
V.  THE NOTIFIED  AGREEMENTS 
At  the  time  of the  notification,  only  the  memorandum · 
and  article$.  of association  of ICO  had  been. drafted. 
They were included in the notification together with the 
information  memorandum  that  was  made  available  .to 
potential investOrs  in  ICO. Later olt,  as part of the reply 
to a formal request for information, the parties submiued 
on .  6  Match  1995  copies  of  (i)  the  standard . share 
subscription  agreement  .signed  by  all  investors;  (ii)  the 
(non-exclusiYe,  irrevocable,  non-~erable, w~rldwide) 
Uitelleaual  property  righ~ licence between  lnmarsat and 
ICO  and  (~i)  the  (non-exclusive)  service  mark  licence 
~een  Inmarsat and ICO; together with  an  addendum 
to. the ·information  memorandum. "PinaUy,  on  26  April 
• 
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1995, the  panies submitted the services contr'aet between 
Inmarsat  and  ICO.  ~th these  agreemenu, ·information 
regarding  the  implementation  and  operation  of ICO  is 
now  Complete. 
However, a number of agreemenu and relevant pieces•of 
information  are  still  missing  cori<:erning  the  distribution 
of ICO's  services  once  the  system  is  operational. "These 
at least  include  the  nomination  of wholesalers .  and  terri-
tories  gran~ to diem,  the  terms  and  ~nditions of the 
wholesaler  authorizations,  the  guidelines  to  ·  .l>t  adopted 
by ICO for the appointment of retailers, the termS of the 
retailer  authorizations  as  agreed  with  :wholesalers  and 
the  agreements·  to  be·  signed  with  cellular  terrestrial 
operators  for  the  joint  offering  of  terrestrial/  satellite 
services  (and  terminals) to customers.  In their absence,  it 
~. not yet possible  to  take  a final· position  in  respect of 
the  aspects of ICO affected  by the  missing  information. 
The  Commission  intends  to  take  a  favourable  view 
pursuant to Anide 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of 
the  EEA  Agreement  towards  the  cnation  of ICO  and 
the relationship  between  Inmarsat  and  ICO as  described 
in  the  preseqt  notice.  Before  doing  so,  it  invites 
in~  third parties  to send  their  observatiolfS  within 
one  month  of  the  pubUcation  of  this  notice  to  the 
following  address,  quoting  the  reference  'IV  /35.29~ -
Inmarsat-P': 
Commission  of the  European  Unioni 
Directorate-9eneral  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate  C, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
B-1 049  Brussels. 
~·  .... 
RecapitUlation  of ~t  tenders, published  in the  SupplemeJJt  to  tb~ Ofii.cial ]olll'IJal of the 
European  Commrmities,  financed 'by  the. European  Community  under  the  European  Devel-
.  ·.  opment  Fund  (ED  F)  or the .  ~an  Communities  budget 
(week:  7 to U  November :1995) 
(95/C ·304/0'7) 
Invitation  ro  Number and  date  Final  date 
tender  No  of  'S' Journal  Country  s.ubject  for  submission 
of bids 
4079  S· 212,  7.  11.  1995  Niger  NE-Niamey:  vehicles,  motorcycles  6.  2.  1996 
4066  s 214,  9.  11., 1995  Zimbabwe  ZW-Harare:  vehicles  and  tractors  2.  1.  1996  . 
4079  s 214,  9.  11.  1995  Niger  NE-Niamey:  vehicles,  motorcycles 
(additional  infonMtion) . 
6.  2.  1996 
'. 
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Notice pu'rsuant to.,Article  19  (3) of Council Regui:Jtion  No  17  C')  and Article  J of Protocol 21 
of the  EuropC':ln  Economic Area AgrC'ement  concC'rning  a requC'st  for negative clearance or an 
exrmption  punuant  to  Article  85  (J)  of  the  EC  Treaty  anc.l  Article  SJ  (JJ  of  thr  EEA 
AgrC"emC'nt 
Ca\c No  IV I JS.JJ7 - Atlas 
(Y5/C  337 /02) 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  Atlas  was  notified  to  the.·  Commis\ion  on  16 
Dcn·mber  I 994.  This  transaction  brinRS  about  a  joint 
\'rntun· ownl.'d  50% hv  France Tclenm1 (FT)  anc.l  50% 
bv  Deutu:he Tdekom (DT).  Atla~ is  also  the  instrument 
of DT and  FT'\  p.uticipation  in  a  sc.·c:oml  transanion, 
named  Phoenix,  with  Sprint  Corporation (').  In  the.· 
course of the:  prc<·t-dure  before tlw  Commission,  I·T ar.d 
DT agreC'd  ·.o  modify  bc.,th  the.- Atlas  and  the  Phoenix 
agreements.  The  l:ltter,  notified  on  29  June  1995,  are 
described  in  a separate  notice.·  pursuant to Article  19  (3) 
of  Rrgulation  No  17,  published  in  this  edition  of the 
Official jottmal of  the  Ettropt•an  Comnumities. 
2.  The Atlas venture will  be structured :u two levels. A 
holding  company established  in  Brussels,  Atlas  SA,  will 
be- incorporatt'd  as  a  socirte  a11onyme  under the  laws  of 
Belgium.  Atlas  SA  will  have  three operating subsidiaries, 
namely  one in  France  (Atlas  france),  one  in  Germany 
(Atlas  Germ:tny), and  one for the  rest  of Europe.  Atlas 
France' and Atla.\ Germany' will  initially pro\'ide technical 
and  sales  support  to  J~r and  DT,  i.e.  thr  french  and 
German  dl!.tributors  of  Atlas  and  Phoenix  products. 
After full  liber/iution of the.- tdecommunirations infra-
structure ano  services  markets  in  France  and  Germany, 
·schedult'd  to occur by  J  J:.nuary  199~, DT's subsidia;.y 
for  the  prt•\'i!licn  of  standardized  low-lc.-\·d  packet-
switched  X.:!5  data  communications,  Datex-P,  will  be 
merged with  .o\:'tlas Germany whilt•  ET's subsidiary for the 
provision  oi l nandardiud  low-le\'cl  packet-switched 
X.25  data  communications,  Tr:tnspac  France,  will  be 
Mrrgrd  with  Atlas  J·ram·e. 
3.  Dcut\chr Tc.-lckom  AG  (DT)  and  l:ranl'l'  Telec.·om 
(J!T)  art'  thr  JlUhlic  TO  in  German)'  and  Francr.  Both 
\UpJlly  tcleJlhonr  exdtangt•  linrs  to  hc.lfllf\  and  bu\i-
nc-sses;  loC3L  trunk and  international c:omrnunic:ttions  to 
and  from  their  rrspel'ti\'r  homr  l'ounrry.  World-
I') OJ N,,  1.\,  21  }.  l'1b2, p.  20-4161. 
(
11 Nutifiration :mnounrt'tl in OJ Nu C  1114,  II<.  7.  l'l'l!t, Jl·  II. 
wic.lt•  turrHl\'t·r  in  IY94  w:l\  ECU  ,,J,S  hillion,  :1  4,3 °h 
inac.·a~c.·  O\'t•r  I'J'J),  for  DT  ami  ECll  !1,7  hillion,  a 
I ,H% inrn•a\('  m·c.·r  I 993,  for  tlw  VI'  •~roup. 
8.  TilE RELEVANT MAitKET 
I.  Product  m:ark~ts 
4.  Atlas  wiil  addn·\~ the  markc.·ts  for  the  prm·ision  nf 
\'alue-added  telecommunit'ations  ser\'in·s  to  rorporatt· 
u~ers bmh  Europe-wide and nationally.  Atlas  will  target 
two  separate  product  markets  for  valuc:-addcd  ~cn·ices, 
namely: 
5.  Tht  market for advanced tclecomtmmicatiom  strvices to 
corporate mers 
This  m:trkc.•t  compri~es mmtly  c.'U'itomilt'd  mmhinatiom 
Of  a  range  of  existing  teft'COmmunirations  srn·i<.'t'S, 
rnainlv  data  l'ommunications  and  libcraliud  voil't' 
sen·;  ·  •s  including  \'Oice  communil·ation  betwt·en 
mt•mocrs  of  a  closed  gro~p of  users  (\'irtual  private 
network  (VPN)  services),  high-'ipeed  data  St'rvices  and 
outsourced  telecommunications  solutions  spcciallr 
designed  for  individual  customer  requirements.  The 
market  for  ad·.-ancc.-d  telecommunications  ~en·ices  10 
corporate  usc.·rs,  enhanct'd  h}'  ft•atun·s  'iurh  as  tailort'd 
c.tpacity  alloc:nion,  billing,  24h/24h  tt·c.·hniral  \t'l"\'iCt', 
t•h.:.,  is  l'Urrently c:hnnging  and t'\'oh·ing  rapid!~'. Wlwthcr 
c:u:h  of  thtst•  sen·icrs  nmstitute~  a  srrt:tratt•  proc.lul'l 
market  l":tn  he  lrft open  fM 1ht·  purpost·  o( this  l':t!ic.·,  a~ 
Atlas  and  its  compc.·tiwn  usually  ofrt•r  ruswmi~c.·d 
(l:tckagcs  of sud1  scr\'ic.'es  in  nunbinatinn with  individual 
enhanced  features. 
Thl'se  sc.·n·ic.·rs  ar(•  pnwidcd  ovc.-r  high-spet•d  largC"-
l':tpat·it)'  lc.·asc.·c.l  lint',.  linking  suphistic.·au·d  c.·quipmt·nt  on 
ruuunwr llrt•rniu•!J  tu tht•  srrvit·c.·  provic.lc.·r\  node.·~. :\ltt'r-
nati\'rl}',  other  rnrans  of  transmission,  e.g.  sart'llirc  "r 
mohile  radio  c:apacity,  l'3n  ht'  used  10  rnsure  tht· 
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geographic  c.:uveragt•  Jc.·rnam.le<l  from  time  to tilltt'.  Sudt 
services  c.-mploy  :uJvann.'J  \lJtt·-of-thc.·-art  !lt.tnd.trJ,, d:ua 
comprc:s!lion  tcchniquc.·s,  c.·quipmcnt  JnJ  ~oftw.u-c:.  In  thi' 
market,  Atla~ is  expected  10 offc.·r  a  portfolio of  'ervin·~ 
including  the  following: 
data  services:  high  spt·cJ  p:u:kct-W.'itdlt'd  .llld  Frame 
Relay  scrvicc.•s;  pn·-pwvisio•wJ,  nllnagc.·d  .uul  drcuit-
!lwitt·hcd  bandwidth, 
valuc-addcJ  application  sc.·rvin·~:  v;th•c.·-aJJt·J 
messaging  and  vidc<~-confcrt·ncing  ~crvin:o,, 
voice  VPN ;;ervices, 
intelligent  network  services, 
integrated  very  small  aperture  satellill~  (VSAT) 
network services,  and 
outsourcing:  cu!olnmcr!;  :m:  offcre<l  to  tramfer 
responsibility  and  owncr!thip  of  their  network~  to 
Atlas.  In  this  connection,  Atla~ may  intc.•gr.uc  into  its 
own  offerings  third-party  products alrc.·;uly  ownl'd  by 
customers  who  wish  to ·keep  such  offering!~,  as  the 
case  may  be. 
6.  Dlle  to the  high  cost  of building  a:td  opc.·rating  the 
networks  needed  to provide  advanced  corporate.·  services, 
such  services  can  be  commerci:-~lly viable  only  if  provided 
to  large  businesses  and  other  largc  tclc.·communicatic. 
users  who  genf:ratc  com.inued  high  traffit·  volumc.·s ('). 
Customers  for  advanced  Sl'rviccs  targeted  by  Atlas  arc 
multinational  corporations,  extended  CJltl'rprilic.·s,  :-~nd 
ot ... er intensive  users  of telecommunications  and  nc1tably 
the  largest  among  these  customers.  Many  of  these 
potential  cu~~o.ncrs  have  huge  tclet·ommuniration  needs 
and  have  often  acquired  expertise  in  managing  own 
internal  networks; they  arc not  likely  to switch  to service 
providers  such  as  Atlas  unless  doing  this  proves  to  be 
cost-effective.  Finally,  given  their  knowledge  ·of  tht• 
market these customers arc  in  a position  to rl'qucst  offers 
from  different  competitors. 
7.  The  market  /or  stamlardiud  ,'ow-lt•vt•l  pMkt·t-switcbecl 
data  comm1micatiom  ct•rvices 
Atln will  al!tu  be  accivc  on  a st·p;uatc  markc.·t  for  packt·t-
switched  dat:a  communicatiom  servil-e!!.  The.·  Commission 
considers  data  communicJtions  st·rvicc~  a  Ji!ltinct  tdc-
communic:uions  product  market,  without  prc.·judice  to 
the  exinence  of  narrower  markets (
4
).  One  narrower 
(')  Sec  Commiuion  decision  in  Case:  No  IV/.H.l!57  (HT-MCI) 
o£  27 July  1~94 (OJ  No L 223,  27.  H.  1994). 
(
4
)  Commission''  Guidelines  on  the:  :applit'..llinn  of  EC 
competition  rults  in  tht'  telrconmtunic:auons  \t'fhlr  tOJ  No 
C 233, 6. 9.  1991, p.  2,  p:ar:agraph  27). 
market  ,.,  that  for  pat·ket- and  cirt·uit-switched 
\crvin·s (' ).  J>ackt·t  switching  is  a  me am  to  improve 
network  capacity  utilization  a'ld  consi!lu  of splitting data 
!lt:C)uenc.·cs  into  'packets',  feeding  these  and  other 
'packets'  into  the  network  optimizing  utilization  of 
:wailablc  rapacity,  switching  the  'packet!!'  to  th•:  desired 
Jestination  and  rearranging  the  'packets'  to  ohtain  the· 
dat:a  !IC<tucm:cs  .  .;em.  'Jne  most  t·ommon  stanJard  useJ 
fur  thl'  provision  nf  packet-!lwitchcd  data  Sl'rvires  is  the 
'X.25'  Mandard. 
Packet-switched  data  communications  !tcrviccs  constitutr 
a distinct  product market because  thc.·y  are  provided ovrr 
basic.:  terrestrial  network  infrastructure  and  based  on 
more  tnature  technology.  These  services  are  provided  to 
different  customer  segments  within  thr  same  product 
market,  namely: 
I.  On  the  one  hand,  cu~tomers  who  grnerate  mostly 
erratic  and  geographically  widespread  traffic.  These 
features  are due  either to  the specific  type  of use  (e.g. 
hanks  operating  cash  machines  nationwide,  networks 
of  points-of-sale  in  shops)  or  to  the  size  of  such 
customers,  i.:.  small  arid  medium-sized  enterprises 
(SMEs).  Such  services  are  billed  according  to 
published  tariffs  th3t  are  proportional  to  the  actual 
time of usc of the network. 
All  incumbent  Member  State TCs including  DT :and 
rT  operate  dense  public  data  networks  with 
nationwide  coverage  providing  p:acket-switched  data 
communications  services  to  this  customer  segment.  In 
each  Member  ~tate  there  is  only  one  public  data 
network  built  by  the  respective  incumbent  TO under 
a  public  service  obligation  before  market  liberal-
ization. 
2.  On  the  other  hand,  larger  corporate  customers  and 
other  extended  users  generate  more  sublitantial  and-
regular  traffic.  The  rc()Uiremrnts  of tht•!ic  U'i~rs justify 
that  either  third-party  servic&:  providcrs  or  the 
potential  customer  itself  assume  the  high  cost  of 
creating  customized  leased  lines  circuits  to  meet  indi-
vidual  service  demand.  Packet-switched  data 
communications  services  to  such  users  are  billed 
according  to negotiated  rates  that take account of the 
individual  demand  features  of a particular customer. 
(')  As  defined  in  An ide  I  (I ),  9th  indent  of  Commission 
Directive  90/388/EEC  of  2H  June  1990  on  comretition  in 
the  markeu  for  telecommunications  services  (OJ  No  L 192, 
14.  7.  1990, p.  10), (the  'Strvic~,; Directive'). 
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M.  Vinuallv  all  companies  acuvt·  m  eat·h  individual 
l\h·ml)(:r  Sta;c:  of  the  European  Union  are  pou·ntial  if 
nnt  .Ktual  customers  for  national  standardized  low-level 
packet-switched  data  communications  services.  These 
\ervin·s  are  also  required  by  SMEs,  albeit  in  smaller 
volumes  and  possibly  less  regularly  than  by  larger  users. 
Seldom  will  such  volumes  justify  that  service  providers 
invest  in  leased  lines  with  the  specific  purpose  of 
mu·hin,;  these  SMEs,  which  arc  tht·rcfure  in  a  weak 
ne,;uti:uing  pmition  and  hardly  capable  to  date  of 
swill·hing  from  the  l'urrent  provider,  typi<·ally  the 
im. umbent  TO, w  a  competitor. 
9.  Stand:mJizcd  low-level  pac:kct-switched  data 
communic:nion\  may  also  be  offert•d  as  one  service 
combined  with  J~vanced  corporate  serviet·  offerings. 
f lowever,  even  as  pln  uf  such  tombined  offerings 
p:u·ket-switl'hed  data  communicatiom.  services  .uc 
provided  over  standard  terrestrial  infrastructure.  At  the 
national  level,  l'hoice' from  a  wider  range  of  oHerings 
thJn  merely  standardized  low-level  plcket-switched  d:ua 
communications  services  may  also  be  availlble  to larger 
customers  that  arc  not  using  the  TO's  public  data 
networks  but  arc  served  over  customiud  leased-line 
circuits.  However,  most  existing  customers  for  stJnd-
Jrdized  low-level  packet-switched  data  communications 
currently  generate  annuJI  turnover  of  far  below  ECU 
J  0 000  each  and  are  not  therefore  potential  users  of 
advanced  corpor:ne  network  e;er\'iccs.  ·rnercforc, packet-
switched  data  communications  offered  by  Atlas 
constitute  a  product  market  S('parate  from  the  advanced 
network  services  market  ('<Jually  targeted  by  Atlas. 
2.  Gt'ORraphic  m:arkt'l\ 
Tht  markrtJ  for  advann•d  teleconrm111ricatiom  Jervices  to 
corporatt  userJ 
10.  Given  that  price  differences  arc  quite .substantial, 
demand  for  thesf  services  exists  in  at  least  three  distinct 
gt'ographic  markt!U,  namely  at  a  global,  a  cross-border 
regional  and  a national  levt'l.  Atl:as  will  provide advanced 
tdccommunicatio•u  services  u)  corporate  users 
Eumpr-wide  and  nationally.  ·n,rough  Phoenix, 
.1dvann·d  telecurn.nunic:uiom  !tt•rvin•\  uffc·rc.·d  hy  Atla\ 
will  :ai\n  have  •;lobal  'wnru.•ctivity',  i.l'.  the  tt'l'hnkal 
opuon  to extend  a given  service  oHering  beyond  Europe 
by  linking  a  customer's  premises  worldwide  over  the 
Phoenix  'Global  B:ackbone  Network'. 
I I.  Given  the  considerable  costs  invol\ed.  advanced 
services  are  today  mainly  demanded  by  large  multi-
national  corporatiom,  extended  enterprises,, as  well  a!. 
major  n:uional  and  ot~er intensive  users  of telecommuni-
.  . 
cation!~.  'llll'  rcqum·mcllt\  of  \uda  U\t•n,  that  t·xtenJ  to 
all  product'>  or  c:nrpnratt·  \ervin·~  provided  by  Atla\, 
were  discus!ted  in  detail  in  the  BT-MCI  Jt·ci~iou c•). 
Es~entially, cu!ltomcrs  demand  a  customized  package  of 
sophisticated  telecommunications  and  information 
services  offered  by  one  single  provider.  This  providt'r  is 
expected  to  take  full  responsibility  for  all  services 
contained in  the package from  'end  to end'. Accordingly, 
DT and  VJ'  intend  to offer such  customers  through Atla!l 
what  existing  technology  allow!~  to  offt·r  from  time  to 
time  within  the  applicable  regulatory  framework.  In  thi!l 
regard,  the  p:tnies  have  indicated  that  Atl:as  will 
eventually  extend  to  intt·rnational  voice  traffic  anc!  mher 
basic  services,  regulation  permitting. 
J  2.  Due  to  the  coM  structure  of advanced  corporate 
\t•rvin·!l,  notably  the  t'OM  of  leasing  the  required  infra-
structure,  prices  of  such  services  arc  rc:lated  to 
geographic coverage, as  is  the cost  of additional  features 
(e.g.  one-stop-billing,  help-desk  and  technical  assistance 
around  the clock, customized  billing). There is  indication 
that  increasing  availability  of  trans-European  networks 
will  ultimately  blur  the  distinction  between  national  and 
cross-border  or  ultimately  Europe-wide  advanced 
corporate  service~.  However,  cenain  national  sophis-
ticated  value-added  services  (e.g.  national  voice  VPN 
services  as  well  as  data communications services based on 
Asynchronous  Transfer  Mode  (ATM)  or  equivalent 
switching  technology)  currently  :available  from  DT and 
1-·T  in  Germany and  France  respectively  will  not be  inte-
grated  into  the  Atlas  offerings.  This  circumstance  illus-
tr:ates  that  a  distinction  between  national  and  cross-
border :advanced  network  services  remains  valid  to date. 
Tht  marketJ  for  standardized  low-letJel  packet-Jwitched 
data  commu11ications  Jtrvicts 
13.  Price  differences  may  be  less  acute  than  for 
adv:anced  corporate services.  However,  a  national,  cross-
border  regional  and  global  geographic  level  can  be 
distinguished  for  stand:ardi1.ed  low-level  packet-switched 
data  communic:atinns  u·rvin·s.  In  trrrm  of  trJffil· 
vnlumt''•  supply  and  demand  of  Sland:udizcd  low-level 
packet-switched  data  communications service' are  mostly 
national.  For  instance,  in  Germany  DT's  existing 
Datex-P  packet-switched  d:na  communication!~  scrvict•s 
division  hardly  ever  provides  such  services  across  the 
border  while  FT's  German  subsidiary  Info  AG,  in  spite 
of appenJining  to  I·T's  st·amlcss  cross-border  Tr~rupac 
(')  St-c  fontnotc  .}  abuvt'. 
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15.  I  2.  'J5  Offit i.tl  .JourrJ.d  of  the  1-.uropt".lll  '.lllllllllllllllt"\ 
n~twork, nnly  pruvidt'\  urK"t'fifth  of  it'l  pa"rkc:t-'lwitdwd 
d.:ua  rommunintiom  'l..rvin·'  Jl"rtl\\  the  honlc:r.  Thi' 
;l'i~C\\mt·nt  wa~ nmfirrnt·tJ  hy  inten·'ltc.'d  tltinl  p.:~nie'l  who 
~ubmih··d  oh\t•rv;uiom  funhcr  to  tltc  Cmnmi\\ion\ 
nntKt'  on  du·  Atfa,  - •tific.uion {'). 
14.  At  a  gluhal  anti  Europt·-widt·  levd,  low-levt·l  tbt;l 
servin·!l  and  aJvann·d  network  !lt·rvicc\  may  ht·  partl~' 
converJ~ing  to  the  extent  that  largt·  l'U\tnmt"r\  of  dw 
latter  do  not  n·quin·  scp:'ratt·  provi.,ion  ol  \landardi1cd 
low-level  packet-~witcht·d  data  communicuiom  \ervire' 
once such  ~crvi<:e~s arc available  as  pan of sc:rviet·  mmhi-
nations  offered  over  advanced  network  ...  Act:ordingly, 
large  European  tclccommunicatiom  users  dt"mand 
service~  with  glohal  'connectivity',  i.l'.  that  may  ht· 
extended beyond  Eurcpe if so  retJUired.  DT and rr  have 
moved  to  meet  this  demand  in  entcrin~;  the  Phoenix 
agreements  with  Sprint.  Along  with  incrt·ased  availability 
of  advanced  cro~s-border  network  infraMrunun·,  the 
market  is  generally  expected  to  ovt·rcomc  distinctions 
along  national  borders  in  the  medium  term.  Howt·ver, 
separate  national  J!eographic  markt·u  subsi'it  to date  for 
StJnd.ardized  low-ievcl  packet-swiu:ht·d  data  communi-
cations  services  and  :1dvanced  network  servin·s 
respectively. 
C.  MARKET SHARES  OF  ATLAS 
1"M  markets  /or  advanced  corporatt•  telecmnm•mications 
s~rvic~ 
15.  The panics  ~stimatc the  Europl'ln  rorporatt'  tclc.·-
communicatiom  srrvices  mJrkct\  Ct·xc.:lu\iV<"  of  d.ltJ 
communic:aiom  services)  to  l>t·  worth  approximately 
ECU  505  million  (1993  figure~).  Of  thi'i  total, 
end-to-r.nd  service\  arcounted  f H  approximatd)'  ECU 
15,1  million,  VPN services  for approximately  ECU 220,6 
million,  VSAT  scrvi(·es  for  approximately  ECU  173,2 
million  and  outsourcing  services  for  approximately  ECU 
96,4  million.  According  to the  notification  OT .:tnt.!  I·T\ 
;~.ggregJte  market  ~hares (1993  figures)  in  tht·  European 
Union  were  25 %  in  the  end-to-end  service!t  markl't, 
27%  in  the  VPN  ~ervices  market  and  2,3%  in  tlw 
outsourcing  servict·s  market.  Markt·t  \hart'\  for  VSJ\T 
services  Jrc  difficult  to  c;~.lculatc  givt·n  thJt  'J'().,  rnmtl~· 
use  VSAT terminals  c.-ithcr  a\ back-up  fac.:ilitic!t  for  oth<"r 
service~  or  to  extt'nd  the  geographir  sropc.·  of  \ervin·' 
despite  terrenrial  infrastructure  shonroming~;  how~:ver 
DT  and  FT  taken  together  operated  I  0 'J07  VSAT 
terminals  by  June  1994,  equivalent  to  29 % of  the  total 
installed  base  of  interactive,  data  one-wav  or  hu .. ineH 
tdevi~ion  VSAT  terminals  in  the  Europc.:an  Economic 
Area. 
(')  Nntiric::uiun  nf  a  joint  vc:murl'  fCa\t'  No  IV/.\5 ..  \.\i'  -
Atlu) (Qj Nu C  '!>77,  )1. 12.  I'I'H, p.  '1). 
:\,  ti•  diffc:rt·nt  'lt'J~ruc.·nt\  ';,f  tht·  ac.lv.:~m·c.·d  nHpor:Jtt· 
\ervin·'  m.:trkl't  .11  tlw  nation.1l  lc.·wl,  UT  ;•nd  IT\ 
.lggrt·gatt'  m.trkt·t  ,IJ.ut·'  in  Fr.HKt'  :111d  (,nru;Jn~· 
r::\pt·nivdy  .HC.'  'J) 7:.  in  tlw  rn·nch  VP:\  market  (v.hert· 
I rr  h.:t.,  ru•  prt·\t·nn·)  .lg.:timt  G  7:  in  rhc·  Cnnun  VJ>;".; 
markt.'t.  ;uul  f)O  ~ in  tlw  ht·rKh  rn.1rket  fo1  l'lld-tn-.-nd 
"·rvil e\  .1J~·•ill'lt  .\S  1':..  in  tl~t·  equiv.dt•ni  ( ;t·rruan  m.trkt·l. 
IJT anJ  IT\ oUt\ourring  joilll  n·:uurc,  l·.unetrom  UV, 
;Khit'\'t·d  36  1~  of  total  mmourrin~ turnovt·r  ~ent·ratt·tl 
in  FratKt'  and  2'J%  of  total  out\ourring  turnovC"r 
gc·twr;Hc:d  in  ( ;c·rrnany.  "' for  V~t\T \t·rvit·l',,  IJT  ha' 
imtallt·~  approximately  25%  of  all  VSAT  terrnin;ll'  in 
Germany;  thi.,  Mc.·mhl'r  State  a<:n>Unt\  for  I H%  of  dtl' 
total  imtallt·J  h.:t!.t.'  of  !ouch  terminal'  in  the.·  Eb\. 
'/1Jt'  mtlTkt•l jiJr SltUitf,m/izt•tf fow-ft"L't-/  ptlt'~'t'l-f'WIIt hctf tftlltl 
rmmn1miwtimrs  H'n.'i££•s 
16.  DT  and  I·T  c!ltirn.ut·  tlw  Europc.•an  markc·t  for 
data  <.·ommunit·atiom  \t·rvin·!l  to ht·  worth  approxirn.:ttel)· 
ECU  2,M  hill ion  (I  'J'J3  figurt'\ ).  Acnmling  tn  the.·  notifi-
<.:ation  DT and  1:1'\  :1ggrcgate  \hJrt'\  (I'I'JJ  figure\)  of 
this  market  wc:rc  35 %.  Among  nJtional  markt·t\,  Atl;~.s 
will  have  a  panic.·ularly  strong  pmition  in  Fr.1m:c  ;~.nd 
Germany.  DT and  FT's  aggregate  market  share  for  ;~.II 
data  communications  ~ervi<.·es  is  79%  in  Germanv  and 
77 %  in  France,  of  which  approximately  half  ar~ounn 
for  services  provided  h)'  DT's 0Jtex-P divi~ion .1nd  I·T's 
Tr:1nspac  France  suh'lidiary,  both  of  which  remain 
o~tside the  scope  of Atlas  until  the  French  and  German 
telecommunications  infra'itructure  and  services  markrts 
an·  fully  lilll'rali7.cd  J\  'i<:ht·dul~·d  for  I  J.:tnuary  19'JM. 
D.  MAIN COMPETITORS OF  ATLAS 
l1n•  md  r~·cts  lor  ,,,ft•tmc c·d  wrpor,lfc·  tc•lc·c om"""'  ic ,1/iom 
H'1"t'l(f'f 
17.  Sinn·  the  ( .nmmi\\ion\  HT.~IC:J  dn·i,ion  m.uty 
playt'r\,  acting  .1lnnc·  or  jointl~·  with  partnt·r.,,  have 
t'lltcrt·d  or  an·  t·mc.·ring  thl'  m.ukt·t  fnr  imc.·rn.Hional 
value-addc.·tl  ~~·rvin·'· Among tht·  lllll\t  important ol  thc.·\c.' 
playt•rs,  albeit  wtth  di,par;tte  gt·o~raphi( 'ropt· and  t.:~rgc.•t 
CU\tomer'i,  an·:  AT&T  WorltiPartm·n,  Cunrnt, 
IRM-Stt'l,  lntt·rn.nional  Priv.uc·  Satc.·llitc.·  P.utnt·r.,, 
Unisourn·  or  Uniworld.  Some.·  of  the  ahnvc.·  an·  mc.·rl' 
projc.·rt'i  of  stratt·~ic  allianrcs  hc·twc.·c.·n  ')'(),,  odlt'n  an· 
awaiting  regulatory  approval.  llnwl'\'t•r,  all  of  tlw  aht'Vt' 
'hare the  aim  to pmition  tlw  rc:\pl'rtivt·  p.utnt'r\  111  vrc.·w 
of  tht•  full  lil){'ralil.ltion  to rome.·. 
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7bf markt•t for stanJarJizrd lnw-h•f)f:/ packrt-swiuht•d tlllta 
communications  stroices 
I  K.  'Inc  market  fur  \tand:arc.Jii't'tl  low-lt•vt·l  p;lt kt-r-
\Witdwd  X.25  dat:c  l·urnmunic .:Ilium.  \C'rvin·\  fl'.ltUI'C'\  J 
sulmantially  larger  number  of  pla)'t'r\  than  that  for 
cunomiled  offering\  compri,ing  ac.Jvann·d  c:orpnratt· 
servict·s.  Among  the  global  piJ)'l'r\  in  thi' market  are  tht· 
alli:mces  mcntioncll  at  paragraph  17  almvt·  c:ompeting 
with  pr••  idcr:;  \Udt  as  EDS,  FNA,  lnfom•t,  SI'J'A  or 
SWIFT  and  upt•rating  suh\ic.Jiarie\  of  l:uge  glnhal 
comranics  sut·h  a\  AT&T  htcl,  Cahlc  &  Wirde•,\ 
Busim•ss  Nc.•twurk\,  DEC's  E;uynct,  or GElS. 
In  addition, a large number o( smaller pl.lycrs t.ompctc at 
a emu-border r'!:gional  or n:nion.tl  level  in  ~he EEA.  For 
instance,  l="'l"s  indirect  German  subsidiar;  Info  AG,  that 
rrovidcs  most  of iu data  comm~nicar!0ns services  within 
Gtrmany,  is  DT's  second-largrq  competitor  in  the 
Gtrm:aa  national  market  f,,:  standardi1.ed  low-level 
packet-switched  data  corr.municaLions  services.  None  of 
these  smaller rb  y,.~  ...  can  comrare with  large  alliances  in 
ac:rm\  ol  rc:adt,  access  to  tramrnission  capacity  and 
financial  backin~~-
E.  TI-lE  TRANSACTION 
19.  The Adas  tr~n action· notified  to the  Commis!lion 
comprises  a  set  of  agreements  whme  main  features  arc 
described  below. 
I. Agreements :u originally  notifi~d 
(a) The  Atlas  joint  Vt•ntllrf  Agrrrme11t  UV 
Agreemrttt)  is  the  main  agreement  prm·iding  for 
the establishmem of the Atlas  joint venture. 
(b) The  lntdlrctual  and  /ndmtrial  Propfrly  Tranifer 
and LiCfPICe  A.~rttmt'nll will  be  concludrd  by  r:u:h 
of  1-·r  ;tnd  DT  with  Atlas  SA.  Under  these 
agreements  FT  and  DT  make  avJilablc  to  AtiJs 
SA  the  imtllenual  p10prrt)'  rights  tiPRs)  m·cdrd 
to oprr:uc ,•,c  Atla\ hu\int'\\, 
(c)  The  Strt.'icts  Agrc·c•mc•nts  will  ht•  fr:uncwork 
agreements  \cUing  fonh  tht·  ba\i<:  tt•rm~  and 
conditions  with  rc\flCl't  tu tht·  "urpl~· by  DT and 
J;or  of ccnain  \crvice~ tu Atl•u  St\  and  the.- \urrl)· 
by Atlas SA  of cenain st>rviccs  to I·T and  IYJ'. 
(d) The  Diurib11tion  Agreements:  two  substantially 
similar  distribution  agreements  with  IT and  DT 
respectively  wil:  lay  out,  for  the  home  countries 
(France ancl  Germany  rt"srectivcly),  the  marketing 
and sale of Atlas products. 
(c.·)  'l11t·  Af''"'Y 1\gn•t•mrnu  under  whi<.·h  t•Jdt  parcm 
arroil:t\ Atla\  S:\  non-exdu,ive  worldwid«:  agent 
for  •i1t'  ~.lll'  of  DT and  FT\ intt·rn.:uional  lca\cd 
lin:\  Chalf-t·irc:uit\)  with  tht·  tt•rritorial  t'xt·epainn 
'·' Cit·rman)'  a\  rt·ganh DT\ half-c:irruit'l. 
"  Contractual  provi\ion\ 
20.  In  rarti<.·ular,  tht·  ahovt·  Jgrt·t·rnt'nt'  provide  for 
the  following: 
I. Stnte/Jtrr of  tbr Atlas t/tnlllrt' 
Ada\ SA  will  be  created a!l  a joint  venture brtwccn FT 
and  DT,  rach  owning  h.tlf  the  'hur  carital.  The 
managemt·nt  ~tructurc.· of Atl.t\  ~A will  be  J\ follow\: 
(a)  Sharrlm/Jers'  mf•rting:  Prinr .1pprm·al  of rhc.·  \hare-
holders'  meeting  is  nt·c:c\Sary  for  matters  such  as 
the  amendment  of  tht·  anicle~  of  .lSSt)(·iation, 
modification  of  capital,  issuJn  .. e  of  shares, 
merger~, sale  of  all  or  a  substantial  ran  of  the 
asseu, and  liquidation. 
(b)  Strattgic  RoarJ:  It  is  envisaged  that  th•·  Strategic 
Board  of Atlas  SA  will  have  two co-chairmtn and 
eight  members,  one  half  arroinr~d  by  each 
parent,  who  may  be  frt•cly  removed  and  shall 
meet  at  least  twi<.·e  a  yeoar.  ·Inc Strategic  Board 
has  a  quorum  of  a  majority  of  its  members, 
including at  least  two members  appointed  by  each 
rany; the co-chairmen do nnt  have  a tie-breaking 
VOlt'.  Prior  approval  by  the  Strategic·  Board  is 
required  for  matters such  as  the entry into a joint 
venture  or  other  strategic  alliance  with  a  third 
ran)', any  significam  modification of the  scope of 
Arla\'t;  bu~incss  and  such  matters  as  may  from 
timt'  10 time  be  submitu:d  to  it  bv  a  vote  of one 
h:tlf  of the  members  of  theo  Boa~c.J  of  Directors. 
'Inc Srroucgic  Board  dtall  alsn  rcvirw  all  \lrategic 
pl.1n"  u( Atl:as  SA. 
(c)  ·nu·  !JOclrJ  n.f /Jirrcttm:  h  i\  cnvi,agt·d  rhat  Atlas 
SA'!!  Bo:ard  of  Dirt•t·tun  will  h~tvt ninr  mrrnbrn, 
four  elected  hy  ra<.·h  nf  DT and  t:"l'  and  one  by 
Sprint.  Priur arrmval h)·  thr Board of  Din·t:tor~ is 
required  for  a numbtor  nf imrortant decisions  such 
as  the  approval  of  business  rlans  and  annual 
budgets  and  changes  in  the  scope  of  Atlas,  the 
conclusion  of  imponant  contracts,  etc.  Decisions 
on  change\  in  the  Atlas  business,  m;nagcment 
aprointments,  and  the  aprroval  of  the  business 
plan,  the  annual  operating  plan,  and  the  budget 
rc.•quire  that  at  least  two  directors  nominated  by 
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c·a<:h  pan)'  vote  with  tht·  mJ)onty.  Matter\  on 
whil"h  the  l~nJrd  of  v;rcnon  fail\  to  rearh 
agrec:mt·nt  'lhall  be  brought  before:  the  Strategic 
Board. 
1•l) Chief /:".'(ecutive  Officers  (CEO~): It  i'l  t•nvi,agcd 
th.:u  Atlas  SA  will  havt two CEO\, one  nnminau:d 
hy  I·T ;amnng  it~  rcprc~t·ntativc\  in  tlw  Bn:tre.l  of 
Dirtcwrs,  the  other  by  D'J'  among  it\  rcprt'\c:n-
tativcs  in  the  Board  of  Directors. The CEO.,  \hall 
be  jointly  resJnnsible  for  day-to-day  opcratiom 
and  the  management of the  bu~ines~ and  affain of 
Ada\.  Approval  of both  c.·o-CEOs  is  rec1uin·d  for 
all  important  dc.·cisions  including  the  hiring  ur 
di~mi!lsal of  l(c:y  employee\. 
'llu:  partit·'  will  t·ontributc  to  Atla~  their  t'XI'Itmg 
Eurnpc.·an  ;mcts nutsidt.•  France  and  Gc·rman)'  (J\  well 
:O\  'lome  .1\\<.'U  in  France  and  Germany)  U\t·d  for  tht· 
pruvi\inn of  scrvict~~ <.'oming  within  the  \Cope  of Atla\. 
2.  1'11rpnse and flctivitit>s  of  Atlas 
The Atl:u  venture:  is  to provide'  seamless  natior:tal  and 
international  end-to-end  services  to  corporate 
CU\tomer\  (i.e.  to  multinational  companies  (MNCs) 
and  SM Es  alike).  ·n1e  ponfolio  of  Atlas  \ervices 
"ompri~c.·.,  data  network  sc.·rvires,  international 
c:nd-to-end  service\  (managed  links),  voice  VPN 
'lcrvic.'e~.  CU\tnmer-dc:fined  network\,  out\ourring  and 
VSAT  \f:rviccli.  These  ~ocrvicr.\  an·  fully  liberalizt.'d  in 
the  Europc.·an  Union  and  an·  widely  liberalized 
worldwide.  Atlas  will  have  the  rc'lpomibility  fnr  the: 
\ervice\  pnatfnlio  mcntionc.·d  ahnve  out'lidc.·  of  Frann· 
and  Germany. 
In  Franre  and  Germany,  Atla!t  will  be.·  providing  ~ale!~ 
\upport  to  Fl'  and  DT's  sales  force\  as  regards  all 
\ervices  m<"ntioned  in  the  Ada\  ponfolio,  with  the 
ext:eption  of  public  X.25  packet-switched  network 
services  within  France  and  Germany,  which  will  be 
provided  by  FT'~  Tranc.pac  France  sub\idiary  and 
DT's  Datex-J>  sub!lidiary  respccti~a·ely  until  the:  tele-
communi<:atiom  infrJ\tru('turc.·  and  ~ervin~\  market\ 
arC'  fullv  liberalizcrJ  in  l=r.:tn(.'<'  and  Gcrm.tn~·.  :.~ 
\t:ht·dulc~J fur  I Janu.:try  I  CJ'JK. 
Each  lt:tinJ~  as  an  rxclu~ivr di\trihutor,  DT  will  sell 
Atla\  scrvit:es  in  Germanv,  while  FT  will  !tell  Atlas 
~crvices  in  Fr:anc.:c.  Atlas·  products  will  be  ~old  in 
France  and  Germany  under  the  common  globally 
used  Atla\/Phocnix  brand~.  PJ\!tivc.·  !tall'\  of  Atla!l 
\ervices  by  DT in  France,  hy  FT in  Gt'rmany  and  hy 
any  Atlas  operating entity  in  hoth  Member  State!\  will 
he.·  allowed.  Ouuidc:  hanrc.·  and  Germany,  Atlas 
,,roducu will  be  \old  by  the.·  Atl:as  ur1crating  cn•ity  fur 
th~ rc~t of Europe. 
It is  planned  that  there  will  be  a hal:uu:ill);  paymc.·nt  hy 
DT  at  cat:h  clming  to  CtJltJii~t·  tht·  rt·\pc.·di\'t• 
contribution  value.,  uf  tht:  twn  p:trtic.·'·  It  1\  further 
<:nvisaJ~ed  that  ccnain  J<liu\Unt·nt  paymt'lll\  will  hc.· 
made  on  the  rcspc.:c.·tin·  net  worth  of  the  cmitic\ 
concerned  at  the  time  of  fontribution  to  Atla\.  A 
scpuate  adju'itment  p3ymc.·nt  may  ht·  made  ht'twt·cn 
FT  anJ  DT  if  tht·  at:tual  pcrfnrm:1m·c·  of  th(.·  IT 
rontrilnncJ  hu,incw:'  in  hant:c  or  tht·  IJT 
c.:ontril>utc.:d  husine\\t'\  in  rJc:rmany  fa II\  ,i~ui fit·antly 
!lhnrt uf prujt:l'tion\  in  J'J'I) (and  pm,ihly  I'I'JIJ). 
Mutual  \t·rviu·  provi\ICHI  lu:twc.·t·n  Atla\  ancl  IT/DT 
will  In·  tht•  ohjc•c..·t  of  two  St•l"\·in•\  t\f•rc.•t·rn,•nt~ 
pur'luant  to  whirh  dr.-alin~~\ ht•twt•rn  I·T/DT .1nd  r\tl:l\ 
~ohall  ht•  tramparcnt,  nnn·<li~c.:riminatnry anJ  Jt  arrn'., 
length. 
As  for  ~ervice!l  generall)'  nffc:n·tl  hy  DT  nr  VI',  tllc 
prices  and  other  terms  which  DT  or  FT  generall)' 
apply  from  time  to  ·time  to  their  customers  shall 
equ:~lly apply  for  Atlas.  A\ for  service's  not  generally 
offered  by  t-•r  or  DT,  market  pric.·e.,  and  term'i  shall 
apply  and  be  negotiated  between  the  Panic\  in  good 
faith  at  arm's  length.  Consequent!)··  Atlas  will 
purcha\e  such  services  from  DT or fl' at  the  ume 
prices  and  conditions  th:u  any  third  pany  r,t·nC'rally 
offering  such  services  would  apply  under  thr  -.ame 
circum\tances.  H  inforrnatinn  on  rdt"v:un  market 
prit·es  i.,  nut  :wailahlc,  thr  prirr\ applicahlr  fnr  l\tl:ls 
'hall  be:  dctcrminctf  on  the  ha\i\  of  a  t·.:~kul.uinn 
model  that  ;,  uu·d,  within  vr.  tn  m.lkr.  nffr.f'l  to 
cunomcn  with  \pccial  re'JUe\U  ami,  within  DT,  tn 
t:akulate  intra-group  trJmft·r  pril't'\.  Price\  re\ulting 
from  \Ul'h  calculation  \hall  l'OVt'r,  for  tJw  rclc·v:~nt 
period, all  cosu as  well  3\ a rea\onahlt· profit  ma~in. 
Punuant  tn  t\rtidc.·  XIII  oi  the·  :\ti.H  JV  A•~rn·mt'nt, 
1-T  and  DT  will  not  eng.1gc.·  anywhc.·n·  in  tht• 
prudunion of  \t:rvit:t·\  that  an·  \Uh\t;unially  tlw  \Jf11t' 
or compt·te  dirrctly  with  the  AtiJ\  \rrvit·r,,  and  will 
not  engage  outsidt'  of  hanrc  and  Gt·rman~·  in  thr 
m:lrkcting,  sale  or  dinribution  of  \ervit·c·'  that  :~rc.· 
~ubst~ntiall)'  the  same  or  rnmpt•tt·  dirc·nly  with  the.· 
Atlas  scrvil'rS.  Furthermnrt•,  rr will  nol  markt'l  or 
diuribuu.•  Atla!l  ~crvi<.'cs  in  Gt•rm:tn)'  and  lfl' will  not 
markrt  Jnd  di\tribute 1\tla\  \c.·n·in·\  in  hann·; pa'l'livt· 
!lairs  :He  huwcvcr  prrmiltt•d  lt)'  F'J'  OUt\ic.Jc.·  c·f  f-rau,·r, 
b)·  DT  nut,idc  nf  German)'  and  hy  Atl.:t\  in  hnch 
1:r:anc~ and  German)'. 
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S.  PrrnJifions  r~latrng to  it~trllrct•~al and ind11strial proprrty 
.... r and  DT  will  cad•  condudc  an  Intellectual  and 
Industrial  Propt·rty  Tran!->fer  and  Licence  Agreement 
with  Atla!»  SA  under  which  thl'  panic:s  mak~ availahle 
to  Atlas  SA  the  intellectual  property  rights  ('IPRs') 
which  are  needed  to  operate  the  Atlas  business  in 
accordance  with  the  following  principles: 
(a)  IPRs owned  by, or licensed  to, the  parties th:u are 
used  exclusively  for  the  Atlas  business  shall  be 
tr:ansferred  to Atlas  SA; 
(b)  IPRs owned by, or licensed  to,  the  panics that are 
used  p1 c:clominamly  for  the  Atlas  business  shall 
al\o  be  trilnsferrc:d  to  Atlas  SA,  and  a suh-licc:nce 
sh01ll  be  granted  to  the  parties  (Grant  Back 
Licence  sub-licence);  and 
(c)  IPRs owned  by, or licensed  to, the parties that arc: 
used  predominantly  for  the  parties'  busine!»s  are 
(sub-)licensed  to  Atla~ SA. 
F.  CHANGES  MADE  AND  UNDERTAKINGS  GIVEN 
RJRTHER  TO  THE  COMMISSION'S  INTERVENTION 
21.  Certain  features  of  the  Atlas  transaction  as 
notified  appeared  to  be  incompatible  with  Community 
competition  rules.  Consequently,  the  Commission  by 
leuer  of  23  May  1995  i·.1formed  the  parties  of  its 
concerm.  In  the  course  of the  notification  procedure  the 
partie'  have  amended  the  original  agreements  and  givc.:n 
undertaking~ to  the  Commilision. 
I. Contractual  changes 
22.  Nrm-appmnlmtnl  of At/a,  SA  as  an  agrnt for  inttr-
national  ha/f-cirtuitJ.  Further  to  the  Commi!->\ion'\  letter 
of  23  May  1«195,  DT  and  Fl'  aboli~ht·d  the  Agency 
Agreemrrm  lnd  amrnded  the  original  Servit:e 
Agreemenu  tn  take  .tecou:u  of  the  nun-appointmem  of 
Atlu SA  •n  a  non-e~c:lu,ivt agrnt  for  IJT .uul  J·T'\  half-
circuit\. 
23.  Non-tnltRration  tif frtnch  and  (itnnan  p11Mic  ddta 
nttworlrJ  bt/ort  full  llbtralizatinn  fJ/  tht  ttltcnmmuni-
c;ations  rn/raJtruaurr  anJ  Jtl"'VictJ  marlrtts.  Atlas  SA  \hall 
uot  UfiUirc  legal  ownership  or  control  within  the 
meanir'lg  nf  Article  3 of  Council  Rtgulatinn  4064/H9 (') 
of tht htnch and  German  puhlic  X.25  packrt-\Witched 
data  networks.  Tran\pJc:  hann•  and  Datex-P 
respecti,·dy,  ht-fnrt- the  tdecommunication\  infra-
(') OJ Nu I.  39S,  30  12.  JY119,  p.  I. 
~tructurc  and  services  markc:u  arc  fullv  lihc.·ralizcJ  in 
France  and  Germany,  as  is  sl·hedulcci  t'l  nn-ur  by 
I January  1998.  l:ntil  then,  it  is  envi\aJ;c.·d  thar: 
I. Trampac  SA  will  be:  spli!  into  Tran~pac hann· and 
Transpac  Europe; 
2.  Transpac Europe  will  be  contributed tn  Atla!->; 
3.  Transpac  France  will  be  a wholly  owned  sub!lidial')'  of 
FT; 
4.  DT's Datex-P services  division  will  be  incorporau.·d  .l\ 
a separate company under German  law  and  bec:omc  ot 
wholly owned  subsidiary of DT; 
S.  DT  and  f-Ts  outsourcing  joint  venturC',  Eunc:tcom 
BV,  will  be  fully  contributed to Atlas SA; and 
6.  Atlas  SA  will  create  a  ~ubsidiary  in  France  :and 
Germany  (Atlas  Fr:ance  and  Atlas  Germany 
rrspectively) to provide the  following  services: 
(i)  sales  ~uppon  regarding  Atlas  products  to 
distributors in  France and Germany; and 
(ii)  services  within  the scope of Atlas  other than  X.2S 
packet-switched  data  network services  including: 
- VSAT  services, 
- international  end-to-end  servil·es, 
- voice  VPN  services, 
- customer-defined  solutions  (excluding 
national  X.25  data  communicatiom  \cr.·icc~ in 
France  and  Germany), and 
- outsourcing  services. 
Provided  the  tdecommunintions  infra,tnactun·  Jml 
\el'\·ice\  markct.c.  are  fully  liberalized  in  hanre  Jnd 
Grrman)'  on  I  January  I'J9H,  Tran!'ipac  J=ranc:c  .tml 
Datrx-P will  bt contributed to Atlas  on  th.·u  d:ue  in  \uch 
a  way  that  Atlas  l;rance  .tnd  Atl.u  Germany  ~·ill  be 
mrrged  with  Transpac  r=rancc  and  Oatcx-P  rr\ptctively. 
24.  l'rchnical  cooperation.  Ahead  of  full  hht'rali1atiun 
of  the  telecommunicati<mS  infrastruCtUrt  and  \t"I'Vit'e!l 
markeu  in  France  and  Germany,  schrdulcd  to  (t\·c:ur  h~· 
1 January  1998,  DT and  1:-r  will  cooper.lte  in  the  cll·vt"l-
opmrm  of  commnn  tel~hnical  network  dc:ml'nt~.  'l11i\ 
l'oopc.·ration  will  comprise  onl)•  the  foJio.,ing  arr:n: 
II  AI  15 ' 
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'"".!". ·  .: .. ,  .  .~ .. :.,  ,,,  ·h•  ..  '',  ·it.: ··~h..tt  I••:  ,h .. c·,r•·tl. 
.hh •ll•t.f  '11''\\•··~.  \C'f\ltl''  1.•:  !ll:litt!J,H'j.,ll,.!  ,,Jll'll!' 
"'""''  'u·.u!q;I.J!~' '' ,,,.  ,,;.,r-i.lt·  1,,:::aur1·, ··111.1.  Itt·  ·!r •• tt,· 
lc-11c·d  :  •  '.!!." 
.'"  111  .• u.!' !"i  h .....  _,!• .•  ;.:t•.t·r•  ri11  .lddilt"rt.d  uud,., 
t.al-.m~:'  .In, 11hn!  l•t·ll)\~ 
1-.a~h  "'  n  .lnd  In  will  ·"  Ill  I  .f.HlU.lr~·  l'1lJI,~ 
nt  .• hli'h  .wJ  1hert·.1h•·r  m~•int.urt  thinl·p.u·a~  J~n·'' to 
altt·•r  puhJj,··  \WitdwcJ  .J.It.l  llt'I\'.I•IK'  ir1  hut~···  .HHI 
l,.·rlll,\11~  rnp•·•·t;n:l\.  '••n·dj,,·rimiu;ltt•r~.  ''l't'fl  .111d 
tr.•mp.•rt•flt  .luc····  \\ill  he·  ~~r.lrtlc·d  111  .111  c!Jt.t  \t•n.j,.,., 
pr~t\IJl'l''  th.ll  ulfl'f  \.2:'  p.ll'kl·t·\Witdwtl  J.u.1 
, ••mrnuni(.ttic ,,.,  wn iu:,.  T••  t·mur,·  lltiii·JI\nimi-
IIJton·  .llrt'"  In  thl'ir  nJ!il•lo,ll  puhli-.·  X.l5  p:u.kl·t-
\\\itdat·cl  d.llJ flt•lwork,,  fT .and  fir ,jut·;: 
Ill c:'tJhli'h  .:and  mJir.l.lin  't.:md.udilt·cJ  X  .75 
10tt·ria.:c'  to  ,H'H''"  du:ir  n.ttionll  plihli.t  X.25 
p.u:kt·t·'\\ itdtt·d  J.na  nc:t w, •rk~;  rhi'  intt·rt:nn-
nc:"·tiun  j, 'uir.1hlc  f,u  the  pr• ,,.j,j,m (,f  t:nJ~t.c.N~nd 
't'r'\ iu·, h.Ht·d  un  X.lS  'Pl'(ili'-·ltiom  ft1.t  ~·nc! ·u..cr 
ll'Cl'"' \flt't·ch up tu ,,_.  khp'; .tnd .  · 
fh t  nHtr  'urh  J'"'-'l'\\  on  nun-di,criminJton·  tc:rm\, 
induJinJ,;  priu:,  J\'.tiiJhility  oi  \'olun1c  ;,r. ud)cr 
Jj,,·uunh  Jml  tht·  cltulit:•  of  iinc:rc.:c.nn'·~tion 
. pn  w itlt•d. 
I' r  .tnJ  I) r  'hJI!  hmltl'f  C.'l"Urt'  non-.Ji,  .. rimin.ltor\' 
lUl'" h~·  nt.tkm~ puhltdy  .lv.lil.lltlt- thl·  \t,l!h.i.lnl t.c·rn;, 
.uul  , cuulitin;h  fu,.  'tKh  X  .7;  intt·r1Ju•  \t.lnd.1nl'l, 
induchn~. it  .wv,  \'~tlu~e ·JnJ  ut.ht·r  cli"·uunt\: l\ oi I 
l:anuJn'  I ''t''·· .  Fr .1nt!  i,~T  will  rn.akt•  :tv.1ibbh:  'or 
.,,,llt'l t~nra  h~·  tlw  Comrni'l,inn  .tn~  .t~;r-.·c.·nu·mo,  rc·l,uin~ 
· ·  \Udt  X.71  intt'rflt.e,,  mdu,lint.t  .~11  '(Wt ifirJIIy 
~~rt·NI  u·rnh.  l !niil  \uc:h  timl·  .l' Tr.Hhfi;..t.  Fram:t·  .:ulf.f 
'.Jlt.·x-P  .trt:  tfltl·t.tt.m·d  intn  ·\tl.1,,  nt·itht·r  ;l flfl\('Jt' 
. r cran;  rtor  IJ.I!t'\-P ... h.1!l  dj,, lo\t'  111  :\tl.t~  any  \Ul'h 
ll<:dfit  .1!1~·  •l.l~rc·t·tl  tf'rm\ th.u  .m·  idt·mifit.·tJ. Jft~.l. m.lfn·· 
.tim:d  J\ .. ·uutitlcnti:el  hy  the:  p.ut\' nhtaintnt; .i!tU:rinn· 
·u·, tiun  throuvt.  ~Ut'h  X. iS  i.nu·rf.lt'tf'. · .'Fi:n.,;Jlv  .tht· 
,h,,,  .  .,.  ohli~~tlfl~t':'h:.ll iilo.t.·\\ i\t•  ·•J'ply  h1· .~n)'.:~·~~tk·r~U~· 
,,,.,j  C..Cf'l:'l'·\t~nc.laulinll  rutt·rt.·of'lnt.·t.ftun  j;rtw\c:ul 
·lr~u  nl.l~'  tnftc.lif~· •. rt.·rl~  ... ,.  ur  ro·l'''''  :t'iv  ~  .,~~(~,d.lrd 
.  d:awd  to  tlat·  X.t)  \t..lntbrd  JmJ  j,  U\c:tl  ~>'  rT :and 
: fl'.  ' 
l
1ruprit·toAry  inh'rl:ll't'\  rna~·  bt•  rc·tJinnl  · ·'  t'\t:thli,hl'J 
'""ua~~  Tr.•mp:tt  hJnn·.  I J.uc·x ·I'  .111·:  \tJ,,,;  'urh 
!tlt·rf.lu''  ;art'  ,!f.ltrw•l  '"  rlrt•  p.uti•uLl!  ·. i''' of  lt•t·h· 
·•olct~~~,  h.nd.,. .an  .111•.J  '""'  .. ·"''  th..  twtwork 
•.•(WrJtur  uw'  to  pr·-.vi•lt:  Jth.ann·,!  .. ·  ~uo,tcllnJI'l'd 
'- .: .  ~. 
: ·  ~~1"\~,(ot,  ;\li.H \\ 1ll  Itt·  .aHowt•d  '" .H' t'" tlw  ·1  r  .• :"p.K 
l·untF _:: Jncl  D:Hl'\-1'  puhlil·  pJ.l. kt·t:''.,t. itt l.nl  dJtJ 
· rtt't'\\-\t.r{\'  thrt•UJ,;la  th~'t'  prt•pf~lJr~  Jlltt·rl:tlt'\.  al\u 
f; •·•l~h-~  .~  pro\'i,ion  of  X.2:;  d:H.I  tlllllllllllliLIIinn' 
,,•;\~~\: ·pro\'itlt·tl  JUt'''  ~r~tntt·J  to  \tl,l\  tltn•u.,;lt 
,ui.ft  .: ..  intt·rfJt't"'  j,  t·ronumi4.·Jih  t·qui\Jil'fll  ro 
ti,inJ 1 p.~rt~  ll'l'l'''  tn  tht·  Tr.tn,p;t,  h.tiiH'  Jml 
·I J'.n..--'t-P.  tWt\\ork,. 
DT  .:tnd  VI'  'holll  not  enJ;Olt;r  in  \'rtWHul,,iJi:t.ttion 
withi-A  ihe  mc.-anin,;  uf  the.- Cnmmt'l'liun\  ~o·umpc.'titimt 
,;uid.:lim·'  for  the  telt.'l'umrnunicJtinn'l  .cc:tor (")  in 
t.'OOD(.'f.:ti()n  with  the :\tla'l \'cntUrC'. To J\'oid  thJt :\tl.:a'l 
henC."'i~\  fmm  l'fO\\·\Uh\idie'l  'ltcmmir~g  from  the 
tl~i':Uion nf  puhlir  tclt:eonlfllU,.Ut',ltinm  inft3\trunurc: 
and of '  n-~ocrvc·d  !lt'l'\'ice\  hv  ~ilher  DT  or  VI',  all 
en'~\ fornu·d  pur\u3nt  to 'tt.e.·  .~tl.n vt·nturc  will  bc:-
t·\t~bli\hcd l' di-,tinct  entittt.'\  ~qt:lr:uc  from  DT and 
l··t·.:  ' 
Ada~  SA.  D:ncx-P  :md  TrJMfW:  Pr.ln,·c  \hall  obt.1i:1 
tht.~il:~. ~n debt  fin:ancing  on '  t~eir  own  crc:dit. 
f?~tcf  th:n  FT and  DT: 
faJ .. !.-.y  m.lkc  capital  cmtrib"!:io."~  or  c.:omm~rcially 
·t;~:,nn·.lble  loans  &a  such  ri'l.ltttt'S  as  re<tu•rrd  to 
J(n3ble  A_da~. SA,  Oat!x·P ~.  Transp.lc  France" to 
·~~\tct thc•r  rcspecuve  bu$~"s; 
tb)  -$:l~:.;plc:~e thrir wc.-nturc  imere~u in  \Ul'h  t·ntities, 
'  ·if) ..  ~"'nnectinn  with  non-recounc:  fin:ml·in~  for 
. t'fudt :cntitit.'\; and 
(c):$~· guarantee  ;any  ihdc:bu.•clnc:u  of  'luch  entitle:\, 
.Jittwidcd  th:u  FT  and  DT  m;ay  only  mJkc 
.'f!ll\.'nlent~  put\uJnt  to  'any  \uc:!t  gu.uJntt·t· 
· ··jt;J.wing  J  default  by  such  t•ntitit·\  in  rt'\(lC.'l'l  nf 
~(h indcbtcdnt'i\. 
:\tl'a$;·  SA,  Dau.·x-P  arid.  Tr3n~c h:ulC.·t·  'h.1ll  nut 
:lHc!(k ..  dirtCtl>·  or  i"'dircct~  any  p.1n  of  tlwir 
. ~rlt\ng  c!<ptnsc:s,  c:o'lt'l,  dctprcc:i:ninn,  or  othcr · 
cx~.\cs of their  h.u'lint*\6  tn  .\~ r~ut' of  VI'  nr  DT\ 
b.U.iJtl~\  ·.  Untl\  (inc:JudinR  W'Jt~)Ut  lintit3tion  tnc,t 
·  ·  l'r-.#>~itl.n:ttt• cmh ha\t'd  un  -A'hr~  "~:tu.tlly pt·rfurnv.-d 
.'tbat:rarc:' attribuc:ahlc  l()  r.h3rc:d·~·n.ployl't'i ur  \.lit\ .\lf 
:~*ti"g  of Atl.l~ product\ and ~1'\·ice\ by  DT nr ltJ' 
em~tj:c.·c:~),  rrovided  htl~evcr.  that  nuthing  'lhoifl 
I "1 t  ,uh.ft-lint•\  un lht•  .lpphc.·.uiun  uf I.I·.C  <  .• ""l"'lillnn  Kulc· ..  111 
thl-:  'frlf"'llfiiMUni~·.liUtn\  ~C't'l•tt  tOJ  ~., f. 1\\, ''  ''·  I''''  I. 
r~ttnlt 1c1  ,., Jtq.,. 
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l5.  l2.  ~I) 
;·;  I·•·!  (,ll  \\di  Clll:j>cr.ue  111  dw  dndoprncnt  ,)f 
ll·~'d');d;  (l'•Hl'Jl!\  .1:1J  'llll)[ll(lfl  tnllllit,d  fll'('.l.<Hk 
t'i("!11 'l'.'- (I('  'l:l!J  pruduU\  .Hid  ticfllt'lll\  th.lt  \ll.ltt' 
·:w  >.':.tc  :nlt.rn.  :.et  '>crJr.Hclv  built  Jnd  owned); 
··;!;,rl  t' ···;,n.l!H>J;  .-,;:!  ~·xtend  to  tLC'  Frtnch  Jnd 
\  J('' id.l:i  .\.~' 'i  p.H kf.'l-W,Itl !Jt'J  J.ltJ  UJflllllUfll· 
(  ,;;;;;,'  r;:,('),;)rk•.  On:\  rhe  fullov.ing  iunUIOll\  will  h(' 
:•,,,, ";::·c;  !•·  .\dJ,  C.,:\  for  TrJr•'PJC  hanu·  Jnd 
. l;  rr' ;duu  lli.lfi lgt'Hle!lt  and  de\elopmtnt,  provided 
:i1.H  product  hr.~nding  Jnd  pricin~  J\  Wl'Jl  l~ 
pr"dull  implement.ltton  in  the  network  v.ill  be 
m.lnJged  hy  TrJmplr  Francl'  lnd  D.~tcx-f> 
rnpenivel~·; 
lhl lt'rl llfl  llt'IWOrk  ri:HJning  funttiom; lnd 
ll 1  in fnrm.tt1or1  'ntern\,  provided  1  h:11  rent rJ I 
1nfnnn.llinn  \\'\fc m  funninll\  (!-.g.  !,ill~r~g 
mlnrm.uinn  .uul  \l.lli,tin)  will  lw  liJ)('r.ucd  h~· 
Tr .1mp.u  h ,Ill•  c·  .uul  I  ).IIC''I · P  rnpl'l'! in·lv. 
,,,1  .1>11\1'  111'.1\  "' I  '"'I"''·'""" '''·"'  Ill  "" I·"'' '"' 
,.,,,,.,.,,,1111  '" ,,  ,f,. j,,,, IIIII'J~'·'''"''  lrf  tl,. I,,.,,,, """ 
(  rl'flff,lfl  pui.J1c  ~Will l11 d  d,of,l  III'IWIItk~,  Witte !J  wdl  lw 
lllfot111llr·d  f,/·  l\.1.111  \l'fl.ll.llf'  IWI11.111k  fii.UI.lJ~I'IIII'Ill 
1  :\tb.\ mJ\'  \ubu•ntr::~n  u:n.~m oper:~llor•Jl !unttlon\ lO 
Tr.1mp.1c  !·r:~nc~ lnd  Datt·x-P  re<,peniHl~·. 
2  5.  .\'rm-mlt'grtZ(lf!'l  ()l  ilHCIS  rl rrs  tnJtrC'CI  Genna" 
wbwil.11)'.  The .1\\t't'>  ol  Fl'\ German cnrpor:lle tt:lecom-
mun·{ Jtiom  '>t'r\'ll'l'\  prnvid•·r  Info  :\G  ~IJJII  not  be  intc-
grlte<'  into  :\til'>  '>ave  l'>  indicarcJ  at  plrlJ;raph  27 
heiO\'-.  \1on·over,  l·T  'hall  divnt  Info  :\G. 
26.  In  order  t~.>  provide  r  he  '>er.·icn  de'>crihed  under 
plrlgraph 5 ahov<.',  .-\til\ or  Jn~· other \ervire provider  i'> 
dependent  or1  the  public  '>w'itched  telecornmunicatiom 
nttwork  tP~T~J aqd  rc'><·rved  '>er.·in·'> {').  In  hlncc and 
Germlny,  only  IT lnd  DT  provide  both  Jcce~s  tn  the 
PST:":  lnd  re'>tr.·ed  \trviCt'\.  Given  thlt  FT  Jnd  DT J.re 
indirect  '>hlrehold.cr<,  of :\tlJ.'I  it  is  essentiJI  for  the  '>Jfe-
gulrdin~  of  fair  competition  between  r\tll\  lnd  other 
cxi'>ting  or  future  t~lecommunicltion\ '>ervin·c,  providerc, 
to  eliminlte  the  ric,k  thJ.t  the  former  are  grlnted  more 
favourlblt:  trt·ltmcnt  ~Cglrcing  J.CCCSS  lnd  U\C  of  the 
French  and  Germ:tn  PSTN  lnd  rc\erved  service\. 
t')  f{l'\t·rvcd  \I.T\'tlt'\  Ht'  \ef"\'ICt'\  wluch  .Ht'  prcwideJ  punu.lnl 
to  \fWl 1JI  or  txllu\fvt'  ngb1'  ~:rJrunl  h>  dw  l·l;  ~lc:mhrr 
\utn to the-Ir  rnpn!:\'t. T<.h  1n  uornplo.u1u·  v.nh  I·C  IJw 
'llH·  Commi\'>inr.  '>l't  out  in  it' IHHtrt·  1111  dw  lnfnrll't  J•  •Jrlt 
\'f•nturc (
1
:)  f1ow  pruhihllitlll  to  di,lr!llllfl.ltt·  tlllllt  ht 
undtr\tood  111  JctJd.  · .-u)rdin~-;1~·,  io  t•murt:  the  Jb,cnu· 
of  di~criminJtion, the  Commi'>'>ion  intend'>  ttl  dnidl' th.l! 
UT. IT lnd :\tiJ'>  \hJII  eomply  v.nh  the  folluv.  in~: 
I.  Tcnns  .. md  crmditimu:  The  tcrnh  .1nd  con<J;uom 
.~pplied  by  DT  and  IT to  Atll\  for  Jcn·">  to  the 
PST;'\;  Jnd  for  the  provi\ion  tlf  n·\er. td  \l'r\ itn Ct-.g . 
provision . of  k.Ht:c!  line~> 1  in  n>nnenion  with  the 
'>crvices  Jc\crihed  under  paragraph  5  Jhove  \h;ll  ht 
\imilar  to  the  term!)  and  ronditiom  applied  to  Olher 
providen  of  ~irniiJr  c,er.·ices.  This  re'luirt·ment  l'llHn 
J.Vlibbility  price,  qullity  of ser.·ice,  u~lgt: conditiom, 
de!J.y~  for  imtlllltion  of  rcque~ted  facilities,  J.nd 
rcplir lnd mlintenlnce services  among otht·r service\. 
2.  Stope  of Jt•n·itt'J  r.J7.',ul.tblt•.  :\tb~  ,hall  not  lw  grJmed 
tl"rm\  :uul  condition,,  or  I)(•  t'Xt·mp!  from  .Hi~'  U\,lg<' 
rt'\triniorn n·glrding the  f'~TN ami  rc·,er.·c·d  \t·rvin·,, 
wlrit h  would  rn,1hlc·  it  to  offc•r  \I'  I'\' itt'\  whit h 
tiiiiiiii'III•H  prn\·itll'l\  iltl'  1'11'\'C'IIIt'd  ftntll  nflt'IIIIH 
li·tlmlt•ll  111/'''"'•lfttJ,.'  Iii'  .tnd  1'1'  \lr.tll  "''' 
""' rimin;Ht•  lwtwrt'll  i\tl.n  .uul  .lilY  nllwr  v·r'>'u ,. 
~  .... ,,.,,4'"~,.  t~",rr-Y'r•r',<l,  "ll~rh  \.r~ .~  i<.  (It!'",,.~"',,,.,~  ., ..  ,~ 
;_-,!'_";~  ~  ~.l  f,)~,.J  ~~,  ..  ,.;.,J...i~.t'. ~~:~  4:\.1"/..-.  ..:  ~  "'J''I,.j' .; #  .. 
mteriatt~ for  th~  act~~ to  rt:x;.. t:ll  ~n  :tt·~  ·  .~~  tnt: 
disclmure  of lny other technical  informltion  relating 
to the operl•ion of ~he PST~. 
4.  Comrr.ercial  in/nnnatiou.  DT  and  IT  \hall  not 
di~criminlte  between  :\tbs  ;Jnd  other  provider~  of 
services  J.S  described  under  p.t:·agrlph  S  :~bovc  J'l 
rcglrds  the  disdosure  of  certlin  commercill 
informltion.  Thi\  means  thlt  DT lnd  IT ~hall  not 
provide  Atbs  with  systemi7.ed  lnd  orglnized 
customer  information  derived  cxdusivelv  irom  the 
operltion  of  t!1e  PST:"-:  or  the  provision. nf  re\t·rved 
scr.·ict:\  if  \uch  informltion  wouiJ confer  :1  \Uh\tJ.ntial 
competitive  J.dvlnt:tgc  JrH.l  i'  not  rcldily  lllll  t·quJJiv 
avlib.ble  dsewherc  hy  service  provider\  competing 
with  Atbs. 
3.  Und~rtaking\ giv~n by  th~ partie\ 
2  7.  /Jit•cstrture  o/  info  A G  FT  \fJJ II  d in·\t  pf  it' 
interest  in  Info  AG.  To  the  t'\tl'nt  \t'pJrlhlt·  from  the 
(10 )  :":otire  pur\uJnt  H•  \rtil It- I'' 1 \ t ,,f ( .<l\111111  Rq~ui.Ht"n :--.;,, 
17  ronrc.·rn•n~ C.nc  :--.;o  1\'/\\ \t,J  --- lut  ..  nn. n>l  '\,,, C" 
II  1  I'J'(!. p.  \, Jt  p.H.lJ~r.lph 'It 
II  A/  17 L!:SJ  Oifit:ial  Journai  uf tht·  Europeln  Communitie\  ~:., c 337111 
prt'\Cill  :\til\ ~:\, D.ucx-P and  Tr:~mplc f·rance  irnm 
billing  DT or rr for  produn!l  lnd sf'r•iccs  pro..-ided 
w  IJT or FT  L~·  ~uch entities on  the  bao;is  of the  same 
pri'e <.·harged  t.1ird  p:~rtieo; (in  the  CJ'ic of  products m 
~tervicc~ \old  to  third  parties  in  commercial  <JUlntitics) 
or  full  cmt  reimbursemen~  or  other  Jrm's  length 
pricing  method  (in  the  case  of  product4o  ;and  \ervic:e\ 
not  \old  to  third  p.:mie!l  in  commt·rcial  quantiric~). 
:\tla!~  S:\,  D.:ncx-P  Jnd  Trampac  han<.c:- shal:  ~cc:p 
\t·parJtt•  acrounting  records  that  identify  p;ayrnenL'i  01 
tr.1mfcr"~ w or from  DT and  rT.  Morecwc:r,  A1!'l"  SA, 
Oawx-P  and  Trampac  france  ~hall  not  receive  .1ny 
material  ~ub\id)'  (induding  forgivene\S  of  debt) 
dirc:ctlv  '>r  indircnlv  from  DT  or  FT,  or  .ln)' 
in..-c:\tr~ent  or  pJyme~t from  DT  or  PT  that  is  not 
recorded  in  the  hook'i  of  ~uch  entitie\  as  an 
irl\'c\tment  in  debt  or equity. 
UT,  I·T  .1nd  t\tl.1 ..  \hall  comply  with  the  .1bovc  until 
the  tdetommunic:n;ons  infromructure  and  service~ 
markets  in  h.1nce  .1nd  Germany  are  fully  libr·ralized, 
a' is  scheduled  to occur by  I January  1998. 
Atlas  SA  (which  includes  its  consolidated  subsi-
diaries), Transpac  Franc  and  Datex-P shall  be  audited 
on  a regular and customary basis,  and such  audit shall 
confirm  from  an  accounting  viewpoint  that  the  trans-
actions  between  thesr  entities,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
rr and  DT, on  the  other hand,  have  been  conducted 
at  arm's  length.  lllis obligation  \hall  remain  in  force 
until  the  telec:ommunications  infrastructure  and 
serviet·~  markeb  in  France  and  Germany  are  full)· 
liberali1.ed,  as  h  Kheduled  to  occur  by  I  January 
1998. 
4.  Rtcording  and reporting 
To allow  the  Commission  to  monitor compliance with 
the  undenakings  the  panics  have  agreed  the 
following: 
• 
(a)  Rtcording  obhgations.  DT,  FT  and  Atlas  each 
undenake to  keep  records and  ~ocuments suitable 
to  prove  compliance  with  the  terms  of the  above 
undenakings  ready  for  inspc.:tion  by  the 
Commission. 
(b)  Inspection  of rtcords.  for  the  p11rpose  of  ascer-
taining  and  ensuring  compltance  by  DT,  IT or 
Atlas  with  the  above  undenakings,  DT,  IT or 
Atlas  shall,  on  reasonable  notice,  during  office 
houn, and  without  a need  for  the  Commission  to 
invoke  the  powers  of  insprction  pursuant  to 
Regulation  No  i7,  give  the  C.:>mmission's  Direc-
torate-General  for  Competition  access  to  DT,  f·T 
or  Atll~'\ businc\\  prcmi\C:}  to inspect  n·cord.,  and 
document\  covered  b)·  the  ahm·e  n:<.ording  ohl:· 
gatiom  and  to  receive  oral  expbnatiom  rt"bting 
to such  document\. 
C  c)  Reporting  obligations.  D 1',  1-T  and  Atla  ~  al\o 
under.akc  to  provide  the  Commi!»'>inn\  Direc-
torate-General  for  Competition,  for  the  purpmc.-
of ascenaining whether  DT,  FT and  Atlas  comply 
with  the  requirements  of  the  above  undenakings, 
with: 
any  rt-cords  and  document\  !n  tht"  pm'IC:\sinn 
or control  of  DT,  1-·r  or  Atlas  necc:sury  for 
that  determination,  and 
- oral  or written  complemcnury explanariom. 
These  recording  and  reporting  obliguions  will  remain 
in  force  until  the  telecommunications  infrastructure 
and services  markets  in  France and  Germany  are  fully 
liberalized,  as  is  scheduled  to  occur  by  1  January 
1998. 
29.  In  so  far  as  related  to  ex1sung  ohli~ations under 
national  or  Community  law,  the  above  is  intended  to 
ensure  the  panics'  firm  commitment  to comply  with  the 
applicable  legal  framework. 
G.  THE REGULATORY  SITUATION 
30.  In  letters  sent  to  the  Commission,  the  French  and 
Gennan  Governments  have  undenaken  to  take  the 
necessary  steps  to  liberalize  alternative  infrastructure  for 
the  provision  of  liberalized  telecommunications  services 
bv  I  July  1996  and  to  liberalize  tht  voict'  tdephony 
-.rvicc :md  111  telecommunications  infrastructure  ru:ty  b~· 
I  January  1998.  The  availability  of  alternative  tdccom· 
munications  infrastructure  in  Germany  and  france 
render competitors of Atlas  independent  ~f DT Jnd  1:-T'~ 
infrastructure for  the purposts of creating trunk  network 
infrastructure  to  provide  liberalized  services. 
Early  alternative  infrastructure.- liberali1.ation  in  France 
and  Germany  adds  to  a  regubtory  framework  in  the 
home  countries  of  the  Atlas  panners  that  i'i  de~ignt'd w 
ensure  a  level  playing  field  in  the  telecommunications 
m.it.rkeu. 
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I.  France 
Punuant  to  hcrll'h  law,  the  rmrmtt·r  for  tc·lc.·llllll-
rnuniratinns  shall  c.•nsurc  that  rrgul:uion  tlf  dw 
tdec.·ummunir:uiom  markeu  is  und('rtakc.·n  'c.·par-
atdy  of  ~c.·n·in·  provision  in  thc.•st•  m.trkc.·t\.  A 
~prcific  nation.:tl  regulatory  :.uthority  (NRA),  the 
Uirec.·tion  Generate  des  Pones  et  Telrc.·omrnuni-
c:uiurn  (DGlYr),  is  t.·ompetent  for  lin·ming 
providen  of  telecommunications  networks  and 
services  111  l:rancc  based  on  objective  and  tran\-
par.:nt  criteria.  ·n,e  DGPT  shall  liurve~·  J·T's 
market  hc.•haviour  Jnd  approve  f:"'J.,s  tariffs  for  (i) 
reserved  ~c.·rvires  and  lc.~ased  linrs  and  (ii)  !ouch 
libcraliud  ~c.·rvi(c!a th:n  :tre  not  in  f.u:t  pruvidc.·d  hy 
a third  party active  in  the  french market. 
2.  Non-discriminatory  11cceu 
Further  w  ~~1c  adoption  of  the  Cornrniuiun\ 
Services  Directive  and  the  ONP  rr:1mework 
Directive (
11
)  Anicle  L.  32-l-4° of the  French  Law 
of  29  December  1990 granu all  users  equal  access 
to the public  network on  objective, tr:msparent and 
non-discriminatory conditions.  FT  is  under an  obli-
gation  to  effectively  grant  such  access  and  must 
publish  information  on  the  network  (e.g.  technical 
features,  tariffs  and  usage  conditions)  and  on 
leased  lin:.- offerings.  The  DGIYf  may  verify  Frs 
compliance  with  these  obligations  and  im•estigate 
compl:aims  filed  against  1:-r  for  non-compliance 
with  thelic  obligations.  The  DGJYr  !~hall  funher 
emure  compliance  with  J-""l"'s  oblig:~tion  to  ~h.ur 
availal;le  transmission  capacit)'  for  liberalized 
service~  with  competitors  and  shall  publi!ah  annual 
st:ltist!~al  reporu  on  Frs  compliance  with  these 
oblig•nior.s. 
3.  Prtvtntirm  of mm-subsidirs 
To  allow  ·.he.·  DGPT  to  'luper.·isr  FT\  m;ukrt 
beha\•iou:,  IT is  under the  lt"gal  obligation  w  kt•t•p 
an  analytical  :~ccounting system  that  relate'>  c.·osu  to 
each  indi\·idual  r·r  service.  Wher~  ~n  offering 
comprise~  the  provision  of  hmh  re~c.·n·ed  and 
liberaliud  ~ervices, FT  must  sepJrate  each  kim!  of 
\ervice  m  the:  contran  and  in  the  invoice. 
(
11
)  Count:il  Din•c."ti,·..- of  2M  Junr  ICJlJO  un  tilt"  t\t.lhlishmrnt  of 
the  inte-rnal  markrt  fllr  tdrcnmmunk;uinm \t'I"Vin:\  thrnu~h 
the  implemtntatiun  of  npt'n  nrtwork  prm·i\iun  (OJ  Nu  I. 
192, 24. i.  1~0. p.  I). 
In  d_,i,  nmllt't·tioll,  I·T',  ,tu.•  , unllntllllt-llltlll' 
\t'rvtc:t•\  art·  Jlrc·atly  prCI\·idt·tl  1,~ ..  1  ,t·rur.llt'  lt·~.t! 
c.·ntity. 
2.  Germany 
Pursuant  10  the  German  I'JH'J  PomtrukturJ!t'~c.·t:t  1 
the:  I'J'J.f  Pounc.·unrdnung\gc:u·tz  and  the.·  ~'J'J.f 
Post·  und  Tclc:kommunikation  l{c:gulit·rungllgt·\c.·t:t 1 
rc:culatory  rornpctc:ru:ic:!l  are  JS!.igrlt'd  w  a  Federal 
agent')'  crcau·d  under  the.·  r=c:dc.·ral  Mini·  ry  of Pmt 
and  Tclt"cc.mununications  (BMPT)  while.·  tclt·t.·om· 
muni<:ations  operation\  are  undc:rtakc.-n  hy  DT,  a 
full)·  State-owned  joint  stock  c:orpor:uion.  Rcgu-
l:uory  obligation~  of  DT  art:  polic.·ed  by  inde-
pendent  bodies,  \n·c.·alled  regulatory  charnbc.·r~. 
2.  Non-disaiminatory  access 
Under  the:  current  :1nd  future  German  regulatory 
framework,  DT  shall  provide  third  pJnics  with 
bc.nh  access  to  monopoly  infrastrul·ture  and 
reserved  or mandatorv  services  on  a  non-discrimi· 
natory and  tr:anspare~t basis  according  to  objt•cti\'C.' 
criteria.  Upon  appl:c.uion,  DT shall  supply  st:atc.·· 
of-the-an  leased  line-s  ovt'r  servic.'c·nc:utral  aCCC.'\S 
points  without  delay.  With  the  only  rc)triction  of 
voice  telephony  service:  provision,  lca\t'd  lines  may 
be  freely  interconnected  and  used  for  any  st·rvic.e. 
Leased  line)  must  meet  market  demand  :tnd  DT 
rnust  publish  data  concerning  availability  and 
quality  of such  lines. 
3.  PrnJentior~ of  cross-sa~bsidies 
Thf'  BMPT (i) dull appro\'c  hmh  tariH\  .111d  othc.·r 
price-scnsitin·  contractual  tt•rrm  for  DT's  rc.•scr.·cd 
\ervices  and  (ii)  may  <'bic:t.·t  to  DTs  tariffs  for 
mandaton•  srrvic.-e~.  '11u.·  UMirr  m:t\'  :tim  \t•ize 
DTs profits  stemming  from  tariffs  in  ~xn·ss of the 
approved  amount  and  take  any  mc.·asurc.·  nc.·rc!.sary 
to  rt•establish  a  fair  t:ompctitivt•  t•rwironmt·ru  it-op-
ardized  by  unlawful  nos~-subsidization. Mnrc.·uvc.·r, 
DTs  subsidiaries  and  affiliate~  ~hall  W•t'  rt•sen·t'd 
st"rvict!~  for  tht"  prm i!oion  of  (nmpctiti\'t'  \t'rvin·\ 
undt"r  tht·  \arne.·  trrm!l  :t\ DT\  l'U\Iornc.·r~ ;uul  mu't 
use  ~uch term~ tn .::acc:oum  intt·rna!  ••·n.'icc.·\  tramlt>r. 
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THE COMMISSION'S  INTt:F'IIIONS 
31.  On  the  ha~i!l  of  the  forrgoing,  the  Commis!lion 
intt"nds  to  take  a  favourablt•  pmition  on  the  notific.·d 
tramanions  undrr  tlw  competir:  ... >n  rule~  of  the  EC 
Treaty  and  under Article  53  of the  EEA  Agrct:me'lt  and 
to  grant  Atlas  an  individual  ext>rnption  pursuant  w 
Anicle  K5  (3) of tht•  EC Treaty and  Anidc.·  53  (3) of the 
EEA  Ar,recmcnt.  Before  doing  so,  the  Conunis~ion 
invites  interested  third  parties  w  send  thc.·ir  obsc.·rvatiom 
within  ~ix  wc.·c.·k!t  from  tilt'  puhlicuion  of  thi'  notin  to 
the  following  ac.ldrc''•  ·1uming  the  rdc.·n·ru:c.·  'IV /35.337 
-Alias': 
European  Conunis~ion, 
Directorate-General  for  Compt·tition  (  DG  IV), 
Directorate  for  Information,  Comrnu.ticnion  ami 
Multimedia, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Wetstraat  200, 
B- I  049  Bru~scls. 
i=ax:  (32-2)  296 98  ICJ. 
Notke punuant to Article  19  (J) of Council Regulation  No 17 (')and Article  J of Protocol  21 
of the  European  ~conomic Area Agreement concerning a  requc:st  for  negative  clearance or .an 
~umprion pursuant· to  Article  85  (J)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  Sl  (l)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement 
Case  No  JV/l5.6l7 - Phoenix 
(95/C  337/03) 
(Tnt wilh  EEA  rtltvaact) 
INTRODUCI10N 
I.  The  Phoenix  trotnS:l{"tion  was  notified  to  the 
Commission  on  29  June  1995.  'l11e  Phoenix  transaction 
is  linked  to  a separate  transaction  bringing  about  a  joint 
venture,  Atlas,  owned  50%  by  France  Telecom  (1-.T) 
and  50%  by  Deutsche  Telekom  (DT),  given  that  Atlas 
is  a parent  to the  joint  venture  entities  created  pursuant 
to  the  Phoenix  agreements.  The  Atlas  agreements, 
notified  on  16  December  1994,  are  described  in  a 
separate  notice  published  in  this  0./]ida/ journal of  th~ 
European  Communities. 
2.  The Phoen:x  agreements  comprise  two  m.ain  trans-
actions  invo!·.-ing  tWP  F.uropean  Union  telecommuni-
cations  organizations  (TO)  and  one  US  relec<Jmmuni-
cations  operator: 
(i)  each  of rf  and  DT is  to  acquire  an  equity  stake  of 
approximately  10 % in  Sprint  wonh  US$  4,2  billion. 
Both  FT  and  DT  will  obtain  proportionate  b<'ard 
representation  and  investor  protection  as  minority 
shareholders  in  Sprint;  as  detailed  below,  provisions 
have  been  ir.cluded  in  the  Investment  Agreement  to 
prevent  DT and/or  VI',  either  separately  or jointly, 
from  controlling or influencing Sprint; and 
(') OJ No 13, 21.  2.  1962, r- 204/62. 
(ii)  Atlas  .md  Sprint  are  to  create  a  joint  venture, 
Phoenix,  for  the  provision  of  enhanced  and 
value-added  global  telecommunications  services  and 
other telecommunications services  to corporate users, 
carriers  :md  consumers.  The  Phoenix  joint  venture 
will  be  structured  into  several  operational  entiries 
under  the  strategic  supervision  of  a  Global  Venture 
Board  (collectively  referred  to  as  the  'Phoenix 
entities•).  One  such  entity  will  provide  Phoenix 
services  worldwide  except  in  Europe and  the  United 
States  (the 'Rest of World  (ROW) entity•),  a second 
entity  will  provide  Phoenix  services  in  Europe except 
in  Fr"nce and  Germany (the 'Rest of Europe (ROE) 
entity')  and  a  third  entity  will  operate  the  global 
bad.bone network of Phoenix  (the 'Global  Backbone 
Network (GBN) entity•).  The Global  Venture  Board 
shall  take  decisions  on  matters  of  policv  only  and 
will  not  engage  in  the  management  of  individual 
operational  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements. 
A.  THE  PARTIES 
3.  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  (DT)  and  France  Telrcom 
(1-'T)  arc the  German  and  French  public TO respectively. 
DT  is  the  world's  second-largest  and  FT  the  world•s 
founh-largest  telecommunications  carrier  in  terms  of 
revenue.  Details of both  undenakings arc provided  in  the 
notice  on  the  Atlas  venture  published  in  this  issue  of the 
Official  Journal. 
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4.  ::print  ( :orpttr;llion  (~print)  j,  .1  J.,,Jtfin~~  flllliJ'·"". 
:n tilt'  I lnitt·c.l  ~l.ltt''· Tlu·  ~print grttup  ui \lllllJl.lllit·'  j,  .1 
di\'C'r\ific.·tl  tdt•rolnrnunir.uinn\  group  p111\'iding  ~loh.tl 
\·,,in·.  tbt;a  .uul  \'idt·o-ronfrrc'IH in~  \t·n·i, <''  .and  n·I.Hc·d 
pri)(IUt:t\  Sprim\  main  !\uh,idi.trit·\  pro\'idl'  ht\·,,J  (lJSJ 
t'Xrhangc·,  u·llul.tr  wirdt'!t\  "' wc·ll  ;t' clnmntit·  (I 1",)  ;and 
intc.•rnation.ll  lon~-di\t.tnn·  tt'fn,•nmumic.tt it •m  \t'r\'in·'· 
Othc·r  ',print  \Uh\icliaric·\  cng.agc·  in  whnlc·,,alc· 
di,trihution  of  tdc.·c.·nmmunic.·.uiom  prudut·t,  .uul  tlw 
puhlillhing  .lml  m:arkc-tin~  nf  white  ;md  ~·,·llm~o  p.1~c· 
tdc·plaom·  dirt·c·toric.·'·  Worldwide·  turnt~vc·r  for  ~print  in 
l'J'J.t  w.l\  FC:ll  I~.'J  hillion;  Sprin1  j,  till'  ""rid\  lltlt 
1.1 rgt'\t  u·lt·c.·ommunir .uiom  r .urit'l'  in  It'  rill'  ul  IT\'t'lllll''· 
U.  TilE  IU~I.I-:VANT MAitKET 
I.  Crntion of the:  Phoenix  c:ntitic:' 
~.  The  Plu•t·ni\  t·nutit.·'  will  .uldn·H  W\Tr.tl  ptndutt 
.111tl  .:c.·n.:raphic.·  m.trku'>,  n~•nu·l~·  ti)  tlw  m.Hkc·t'  lnr 
,  .•  1  hJc.·-adtlt.·d  tl'lt.·n 1111muniratinll\  1wt Wt •rk  ,,.,.,.,, ,.,  ''' 
rorporau•  U\t'r'  hoth  glohally  .mel  H·~ion.lll~·.  Iii)  tlw 
markt•t  fur  1 ravdlc·r  \t'rvin·'  .uul  (iii)  tlw  111.1 rkt·t  for 
\tt·l'JIIc.·d  r.uric.•r\  rarric.·r  ~ervin·'· 
I.  Product  market\ 
Tht•  markets  for  'f.•,dur-,,,/dc•d  lt•!t•commmliurtium  m·tumrk 
H'l"i.'ICC'f 
1,.  The  Phoenix  t'ntllle!o  will  hl·  Jc.·tin·  on  tlw  \lntl' 
markc:u  for  hc,th  adv:mc.·t.·tf  tdc.·c.·orn•mmic.·ation\  \t·rvin·' 
cn  corporate.·  mer\  ami  Mandardiud  low-lc.·,·c.·l  packc·I· 
\Witdu·d  tbt.t  nHnmunic.·atioll\  \l·rvin·'  dc·,c:rihc.·d  in  tlw 
'lc:paratc.•  nutire  on  tlw  Atla\  \'t.•ntun·  puhli,Jwtl  in  thi' 
i\\UC.'  nf  tlw  Offiri.1l  .Journal. 
7.  The  market  for  tr:t\'dlc.·r  tdt·(.·ommuniratiom 
~ervices  comprise'i  oHeringr,  that  met•t  the  dc.·manJ  of 
individuals  whn  are  away  from  tllt'ir  normal  location. 
eithrr at  honlC'  or lt  work.  AmnnJ~ the.·  mmt  relevant  nf 
1hc:\C'  uffc.•ring\  an·  thn\l'  nffc·rc·tl  h~·  the.·  Phoc.·nix  c·ntitit·'· 
namdy l':tlling  t':trc.h  (i.f•.  prt'flOiicl  r.mh with  m  without  ;1 
rnc.fr  and  po\tpJid cards),  indudm~ thmt•  in  romltinatiun 
with  c:rc.·dit  l'Mth  and  mht·r  hr.ultlc.·c.l  \c•rvin·  t'Mc.l\ 
('affinity  t·ard\'). 
M.  Custnmcn  for  travcllt·r  \t'rvU:t'\  induc.lc:  hoth 
hU\ine\\  travdlt•n  and  utht~r  tr:l\'ellc·r\.  In  tlw  rard 
hu\inc~\  targcrc~d  hy  i>h·lt·nix,  tlu·  former  .uc.·  hy  far  rhc.· 
largc.•\t  group of huyc:r\.  Uu~inn~  tr•tvdlc.·r~  .m.·  t;t•twrall~· 
intcmivc:  rartl  u~c:r\,  the.·  main  inn·ruivc:  fur  f~tnl  U\a~c.· 
being  the  pmsihilit)'  w  avnitl  payinJ~  hutc:l  tdc·phnm· 
\Urt:hargc~. 
'J.  The·  m.arkt·t  fnr  '.arrin\  '.1rrit·1.·  \t·n·in·~  n11npri\C'\ 
dat·  lc·.l\t'  of  1 r;lll\llli\\it Ill  l'  ;lp;tl'it y  .111d  tlu·  provi\inn  of 
rt'I.Jic·tf  \l'l'\'tt ,.,  tn  tltinl-p.lrt\'  tt'lc·n,mmunicuiom  traffic.· 
l'  .uric.·r,.  :\Inn~  with  lihn.1lil.ll ion  .Hid  ~lohali1  Jtion  of 
tc·lt-n 1111111\11111  .11 ion'  111.1 rkt•t '· dc·m.uul  for  dfic·ic.·m,  high-
qu.tlitv  tr.lfhc  tr.lll\flOrt.uinn  r.tp.lrity  h,J,  ri\t'n  :tmong 
oltl  a11d  nc·w  t';trnt'f\.  In  tJu,  nmm·c.·tion,  tiU'  trac.litiollJI 
mnclc·l  of  \l'p.n:au·  arr&HlJ~c·nwnt'  with  ndtn  individual 
t  .~n·ic·•,  ;,  innc',l\lll~ly  da.lllc.·n.:c·d  lty  pl.a~·c·n  with  )~lnhJI 
nt·twurk  infr.l\truc.·turt•  that  oHt•r  r.1rric·r'  an  :trrav  of 
\c·rvit't''·  Thl'  nto\l  n•lt•\' .ll\l  of  \lU:lt  \t·rvin·\  an·:  . 
(.tl  \Witdwd  trJII\it,  i.t·.  tl".lll'f"trt  of  tr.dtir  n\'C'r  hilatt·r.al 
bc.ilitic·'  ht•twc·c·n  the.·  ori~inJtillJ:  ,,,rric·r,  tht•  tr3n\it 
curic·r  .uul  du·  tt·nnin:uing  c."an·iN;  nl'itllt'r  the.·  urig-
iu:Hin~  r.anic·r  nor  dw  tc.·rrninatin~  rarrit•r  nc.·t·cl 
hil.llt'l,ll  IJttlitu•\  hc·twc.·c·n  tlwrn,t.J\'l'\,  ltut  only  with 
tlw  t  r.t II\  it  l.lrrit·r; 
lit)  c.lc·clif&llnl  tr.lll\it,  a.c:.  tr.tn,port  c•f  traffir  ovt•r 
pc.·rm;uwnt,  c.lt·dil':ttt-d  fJl·ilitit·'  thrnugh  the  dome~tic 
ttc.·rwc1rk  of  the.·  tramit  t'Jrrier;  f.u·ilitic.·~  u~cd for  this 
PU'llmt·  may  induc.lc.·  di\rrt•tt•  vnic.·t·  l'tn·uiu or a high-
handwic.lth  digital  rirt·uit  that  ran  he.·  U\rd  fnr  huth 
voin· and  c..lata  \rrviccs; and 
(r)  t ra ffit·  huhhing  uHc.·rings,  where:  tht·  provider  takl'\ 
rare:  of Jtl  or put of irm·rnatinn3l  ronnertiom; these: 
offl'ring\  arc.·  1\'pic:ally  c.Jr,ignt-d  fur  c:mc:rging 
r.uric.·r!J,  who  arr  imeromm·c.·tt·d  wi1h  thr  pruvider 
owr hil.m·ral  f.u-ilitit•\  anti  whmc intt·rn.ttitlltal  traHit· 
j, mc·rgc.·tJ  wi1h  otlwr  traffir on  the.·  provider'\ global 
nc.·twurk. 
,.,,  intc.•rnatitm:tl  tdet·ommuniratiun\  market!o  are 
dt·regulatc.·c.l.  dt·rnand  for  rarrit·r\  rarric.·r  'ICrvires  ;._ 
incrca,ingly driven  by  alternative t·arric:r\  cnnrcrm·d  with 
t•ntrusting  the:  inrumbrnt  TO  with  thri1  intc.•rnational 
traHir,  for  re:t!lon\  sudt  a~  tc:dmit·al  c..lrpendem:y  anc.J 
c.·omrnt•rrial  \t'n!litivit~'  of ru\tomc:r  inform.:ninn. 
I  0.  PurdJa!lt'r\  nf  l'Jrric.·r\  l'Mric.·r  !\c.'rvll"t'\  indu<lc.· 
t''lt:ibli,hc.·tl  and  c.·rnc:rging  l'.ll'ric.·rs.  Burh  ~roup' of dic:nt\ 
havt•  suh~tanrial  hargainin~  ptlwt•r  and  art•  highly 
c.·nmpt·titinn-\ensitivc:.  Among  the  latter  group,  nne.·  m:ay 
tlilltingui!lh  facilitit•!i·hasc:•.l  t'arrier'l  that  provide  tdrt:t'm-
municltiom  sc.·rvit•t•s  nver  :thrrnativc  infra'itnu:turc  ur 
r.thlr~ televi,inn  network\ \t·c:king  .:n·atrr dfit-ic.•tK)'  in  tht• 
lr.tm.purr  of  intt•rnatiunal  dic·nt  traHil',  while•  nun 
fal'ilitit·\-bil'ictl  t'arrit•rs  st·c.·k  10  Jlll'\t'l'\'t'  :1  rornpclltiVt' 
.HI\•antagt·  tty  Jvuidin~  tlept•ntlt·nn·  c.lll  a  lclr.:tl  TO  for 
inu~rnatiunJI  dic.·nt  tr  Jffit· . 
II  A/  21 IS.  12.  'IS  ( Hfiri.tl  Jour.nJI  of  tht·  Lurupt'.ln  ( :ollliii\HlitH'' 
l~ Geographic  rnarkth 
II.  Along  tlw  lines  of  the  Cornmi\!lion\  finding\  in  it\ 
BT-MCI  c.lt'li .. iun n.  the  t-;t·ographic  scopt·  of  n·rt;•in 
rnarkt·t~ largt·lc:d  hy  tht•  Ph<,enix  entitit:\  as  well  as  tlw 
markt•t  that  rnmt  he  considered  in  rcspt·n  of  t  ht' 
invemnt•nt  of  DT and  I·T  in  Sprint  is  international  and 
rvt•n  global.  Although  national  border~ subsist  for  many 
\crvice'l,  Mratt·gic.:  allianl'l'\  like  Phot•nix  arc  huih  not 
only  in  anticipation  of  a  market  unaffected  by  national 
bnund:uics  but  even  with  the  express  purpo\t'  to  offer 
large  global  tc:lecommunic:uions  use~s  scarn_lt·~s 
c.'nd-to-end  services  anywhere  by  overcommg  the  d•fft-
c:ulties  inherent  in  the  currrnt  market  structure  split 
along  national  borders.  However, the  service  offerings of 
thr  Phoenix  entities  will  be  relt•vant  to  different  existing 
geographic:  markt•t.\. 
J1,t  m"rkets  /or  t'alue-added  ttlfcommunications  network 
sen.•icrs 
12.  As  described  in  the  separate  Atlas  notice,  demand 
by  corporate users  for  advanced  services  exists  in  at  least 
threr  distinct  geographic  markets,  namely  at  a global,  a 
cross-border  regional  and  a  national  level.  Phoenix 
services  will  have  global  reach  given  that  each  of  DT, 
FT,  Sprint and  the  ROE and  ROW entities  will  be  inter-
rnnnel'tl'd  over the  Phoenix global  backbone network.  In 
tht·  glohal  market  for  advanced  telecommunications 
servicc:s  to  corporate  users,  the  Phoenix  venture  will 
therefore  create  competition  for  in~tance  for  BT  and 
MCJ•s  existing  Concert venture.  In  the  European  Union, 
the  ROE entity  will  cooperate with  DT. FT and  ATLAS 
to  provide  advanct•d  telecommunications  services  to 
corporate  users  at  the  cross-border  regional  level;  these 
services  will  have  'global  connectivity•,  i.e.  allow  for  an 
exten!iion  beyond  the  European  Union  if  a  customer  so 
requires. 
13.  Standardized  low-lt"vd  p:u·ktt-W.'itcht•cl  dJtJ 
communicatiom  !>crviccs  in  t'a<:h  l~t·u~;raphic  rnarkt.·t 
mentioned  in  the  previous  paragraph  are  a  pan  of  the 
Phoenix  offerings  portfolio.  However,  'iuch  services  will 
be  provided  at  the  national  level  only  if  so  decided  by 
the  regional  Phoenix  operating  entity.  Therefore,  the 
ROE  entity  will  pro,·ide  Europe-wide  packet-switched 
data  communications  srrvices,  that  will  initially  be  based 
on  the  existing  Transpac  and  Sprint  networks.  The 
cXtt'nt  to  which  the  ROE  entity  will  provide  such 
services  in  national  marketc  within  the  EEA  will  depend 
(') C(lnami\\iun  dc:Ti~inn of  27  July  I'J'H  (0_1  Nn  I.  22J,  27.  !1. 
I'JCI-t,  p ..  \b). 
--------·------
on  tht•  l·oortlinati<,iJ  ht·twet"n  AtJj, ..  1nd  dw  IH ll·.  emit:. 
as  tht·  compt'tt.·nt  Phoenix  l'ntity  in  ti1Jt  re~ion. 
H.  Alnng  with  the  glubali;,ration  of  tlw  t•conomy  tlw 
markt·t  fnr  travcllt•r  scrvit·c~  .lppt'.lr\  to  lw  inrn·a\ingly 
global;  worldwide  travdlt•n  dt•mantl  ufft·ring\  whidt 
include  a  single  hill  and  integr;m·d  funniom  \ud1  J.\ 
voi<.·c  mt·ssaging,  vokc  rts('On\t'  and  information  'Y'tc·rm. 
Gt!ographic  limitations  of  l'Urrent  tr;lVdlt·r  ~ervin· 
offerings  are gent·rally  due  to tl'chnical  \hont.·~unings  s~t 
to be overcome  in  the ncar future,  !!.Udl  as  tht·  mt·ompau-
bilitv  of mobile  communications systems  or difft.•rt·ncc\  in 
prepaid  cards  without  an  individual  U\cr  codc.  As  il~u!l­
trated  at  paragraph  7  above,  nom·  of  tht·  \ervll'C\ 
targeted  b)'  the  Phoenix  entities  i\  afft•l'tt·tl  hy  the\c 
shortcomings;  how~ver,  the  gcographil'  \c:npl'  nf  the 
traveller services  offered  by  Phoenix  can  hl'  ldt open  for 
the  purpose~  of  this  case,  as  the  fintling  of  narrow 
geographic  markets  would  not  afft•n  the  3\!lr~smrnt  of 
the  parties'  competitive  position. 
Tbe  market  for  carrier's  carrirr  sen.·icrs 
15.  Both  supply  of  and  demand  for  carrier's  carrier 
services  are  by  nature  international.  Geogfaphic 
proximity  between  purchaser  and  supplirr  of  switl·hed 
u ansit  capacity  is  hardly  relev  - for  switched  transit 
which  carriers  use  either  as  a  ~  "ititute  for  operating 
own  international  lines  or  to  deal  with  peak  traffit.·  on 
such  lines.  Likewise,  dedicated  transit  servin:s  offt•r 
cable- or  satellite-based  routing  capacity  acrms  third 
countries.  Finally,  using  hubbing  service·s  is  an  alternativr 
to  entering  into  an  undetermined  number  of  hilatt·ral 
Jgreemrnts  with  individual  carrien. 
2.  DT and  FT's  investment  in  Sprint 
16.  The  anJUISitiOn  by  DT  and  FT  llf  nt•w  t•quity 
t'cJuivalcnt  to  an  a('proximate  20 % stakt•  in  Sprint  aim\ 
at  l.Onsolidating  a  strategic  allianct·  to  t'nlt'r  thl'  gloh.1l 
telecommunications  markets,  whit"h  !>ervt'\  thl'  panic\ 
ben  interest  to  improvr  and  extt.•ml  'ervin·  in  nt·w 
market  segments.  Tdecommunicatiom  markrt\  art· 
developing  quickly  and  there  is  uncertainty  about  what 
they  will  look  like  in  a  few  years'  timc:  the  pro!iiprct  of 
full  liberalization  is  pushing  TO\ w  takt·  pmi1ions,  in 
order  to  be  in  the  best  possihll'  !lituatinn  wht'n  full 
liberali1.ation  comes.  As  shown  b\'  the  DT-MCI  alliann:, 
investme-nt  in  a  US  carrier  nffr~s  nm·  dficicnt  way  tn 
:Hidrc!ts  multinational  c:ompanit·'i,  i.t'.  tht·  lart-;t'''  tart-;t't 
customer  group  fur  global  \':tluc··.Hitlt.•d  tdc·r,unrnuni-
t.'ations  network  servit.-r~.  notably  in  tlw  lJ nitt·J  Stall'!t. 
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l1•t·  markc•IJ  for  ,,t/nmn·J  tt•lc•tmmnunications  St'1111Ct'S  to 
• "'/'"'"'('  I#J('T$ 
17.  <ilnbal  markrt.  ·nu~  pan~nt"  c.·!ltim:ue  the.·  globJI 
\'Jiuc.•-addc.·d  r.l'll·l·omo· ,.mic.·atiom  network  ~c.·rviccs 
m.1rkrt  addrt'~\rd  hy  Phocni:o:  (txdu\ive  of  data 
rnnununic.·atiom  \ervin·s)  to  he  wonh  .tpproxirn.lldy 
ECU  4,H  billion  ( J'J9J).  Of this  total, end-to-end 11erviccs 
.tc.-ruunted  for  apprnxim.ltdy  ECU  .37,6  million,  VPN 
\ervicr\  for  apprnxim.lldy  ECU  l,M  billion,  VSAT 
\t•rvicr\  for  .tpproxim:udy  ECU  1,4  billion  and 
ouuoun:ing  services  for  approxim:uely  ECU  527  million. 
In  19'JJ, the  aggreg:nr turnover of DT. rr  and Sprint  in 
thr  different  rnarkt·t  scgmenu  amounted  to 
:~pproximately ECU  J,H  million  for  end-to-end  services, 
approximately  ECU  576  million  for  VJ>N  services  and 
approxir:1atdy  ECU  6  million  for  outsc-urcing  services, 
giving  Phoc.·nix  a  thcort-tical  market  share  of  II,K%  in 
th('  global  markt-t  for  advanced  tclc.·communicJtions 
srrvic.·es  to  corp•lratc  users. 
18.  Cross-bordrr  rrgional  markrt.  Services  in  the 
EurC"ptan  Uniun  (exclusive  of  data  communications 
st-rvi.:-cs)  accounted  for  approximately  ECU  'i05  million 
in  1993.  According  to  the  notification  the  Phoenix 
part-nts'  aggregate  market shares  in  the  European  Union 
in  199.3  wert- [ ...  )%C)  in  the  end-to-end  services 
market,  [ ...  J% (')  ;n  the  VPN  services  market 
[ ...  ) % (')  in  the  outsourcing  servic.·es  market  and 
1  ...  J% (•)  in  the.•  VSAT  market.  However,  market  ~hares 
for  VSAT  serv•c.·es  are  difficult  to  calculate  given  that 
TOs mostly  use  VSAT  terminals  as  back-up  facilities  for 
othf"r  services  or  to  extend  the  geographic  scope  or 
\t-rvices  despite  terrestrial  infrastruc.·turc  shoncomings. 
19.  National  markns.  National  markets  for  advanced 
telecommunications  st·r vices  to  corrorate users  within  the 
EEA  are  discmscd  in  th~  notice  on  rhe  Atl:~s  venture, 
ruhlished  in  this  issue  of  ~he  Official  journal.  In  this 
rt"g:~rd, Sprint  f,as  a llignific.·ant  ~h:~n• of total  outsourcing 
turnover  gcor)er:ut•d  ir.  Mcmbcr  States  such  a~  the 
Ncotherlands  ( ...  ] % (')  Jnd  the  United  Kingdom 
f  ...  }  96 ('),  wherc  DT  and  I·T's  ounourc.·ing  joint 
vtnture,  Euneu:om  BV,  has  a  lesser  prescnct•  (5%  of 
tmal turnover in  both  Mc.•mbc.·r  States).  As  for  hilnc.·e  and 
Gtrmany, adding  Sprint  to  DT and  I·T brings  Phoenix's 
fic:tional  aggregate~ share  nf  total  turnuvt·r  gt•ncrated  by 
( 
1
)  8u\in~u \C'l'rC'I  Ot'\'  than  JO %  ). 
(')  Bu\in~u srnrt  (It~\  than  30 %). 
(')  Busin~n stcret  (ltu than  S %). 
t•)  8usinrn srcrc-t  (lt"~to  than  2S  ~). 
(')  Busintn  Sterr•  (IC"s\  1h.1n  10 %). 
(') 8usint\S  Stcrtt  (It\\ than  10 ~H 
outsourcing  services  to  ( ...  J% n  in  Frann·  and  to 
r  ...  ] % {'
0
)  in  Germany,  l'Ompared  with  31  % in  Fr:~nce 
and  J3%  in  Germ:~ny for  the.·  sec:ond-large~t  provider, 
Concen's  Syncordia,  in  both  thclie  na1ional  markets. 
7br markrt /or standardiztd low·lrvrl packrt·switchfd data 
comm1mications  Sfrvius 
20.  The  global  mJrkct  for  standardized  low-level 
packet-switched  data  services  was  worth  approximately 
ECU  5,3  billion  in  1993,  while  DT.  fl' and  Sprint's 
aggregate  sales  were  ( ...  } ('') or ( ...  ] % \
11
)  worldwide. 
The  Europc:1n  market  for  data  communications  sen•ices 
is  discussed  in  the  sepuau:  notice  on  the  Atlas  trans-
action,  published  in  this  issue  of  the  Official  Journal. 
Sprint's  turnover  for  standardiud  low-level  packet· 
switched  data  services  was  ( ...  ]  in  1993,  bringing  DT, 
1-·r  and  Sprint's  aggregate  shares  of  that  market  to 
[ ...  ] % (',).  As  for  n;uion:.l  mukets,  Sprint  achieved  its 
highest  turnov~r  in  Prance,  Germany,  hilly  and  the 
United  Kingdom.  Neitht-r DT nor FT have  a significant 
market  presence  in  the  latter two  Member  St:~tes, where 
Sprint  has  [ ...  ) % ('
4
)  and  [ ...  ] % ('')  market  share 
respectively.  In  turn,  Sprint's  turnover  in  France  {ECU 
[ ...  ] ('•))  and  Germany  (ECU  ( ...  ] ("))  equ11ls  market 
shares  in  these  Member  States  of  only  [ ...  ] %  and 
[ ...  ] %  respectively ("). 
The  marlttt /or trawlltr strvicts 
21.  Total calling  card  revenue  in  the  European  Union 
was  approximately  ECU  120,5  million  in  1994,  most  of 
which  generated  by  n:uional  dialling.  In  1993,  DT had 
issued  200 000  cards  (lll  of  which  in  Germany), 
equivalent  to  2,1  % of the  total  card  subscriber  base  in 
the European Union;  I~T had  issued  1,5  million  cards (all 
of  which  in  France),  equivalent  to  15,7%  of the  card 
subscriber  base  in  the  European  Union;  and  Sprint  had 
issued  I  2  million  cards  worldwide,  of  which  500 000 
(equivalent  to  a  5,2%  market  share)  in  the  Europran 
Union.  Tht- aggregate  market  shares  of  the  p:arents 
would  therefore  make  Phoenix  the  largcost  calling-card 
serv:ces  provider  in  the  European  Union  (23%  markl"t 
share)  in  terms  oF  subscriber  numbers,  ahead  of  AT&T 
and  BT with  21  and  17,8%  market  share  respectively. 
c·)  Busin~u St'Crt't  (lrn th.tn  45 %). 
(
10
)  Businrs.s  srcrtl  (ltss  tlt.ln  40  ~). 
(,.)  Buiintss  st'c.·rrr. 
(") Busir.ru  stcrer  (Jrss  th.tn  2S %). 
(") Bu,ineu  srL·rel  (lrss  th:an  40 %). 
(  ..  )  Businrss  se,ocrrt  (le-ss  th.tn  S %). 
(")  Businrss  St'Crtt  (lrss  than  S %). 
(") Bu,int-ss  ~C'l"rtl. 
(
1
') 8u$int'u  senrt. 
(")  Busirtt'U  ~ecrtl (len rhan  S % rt'Sr'C"l'ti,·eh·l 
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In  terms  of  calling  card·  traffic  withiA  tht:  Europtan 
Union,  the:  aggregate  market  shares  of  FT  (21  %)  and 
DT (3 %)  are  equal  to  BT's  market  share  of  24 %. 
The  market /or  carrier's  carrier  services 
22.  The  market  for  global  switched  transit  services  is 
c~timatcJ 'O be  wonh approximately  ECU  30 I, 1 million, 
equivalent  to  1 500  million  minutes  of  internation.ll 
traffic or approximately  3 %  of the  world's  international 
telephony  traffic.  Of  this  total,  approximately  ECU 
165,6 million  are services  provided  by  European  carriers, 
of  which  approximately  ECU  30,1  million  to  other 
European  carriers.  Within  the  global  switched  transit 
market  (1994),  with  5-6%  annual  growth,  DT  had  a 
turnover  of  ECU  [ ...  ] C'),  FT  of  t;CU  [ ...  J  e•>  and 
Sprint of  ECU  [ ...  ] (
11
). The aggregate  market shares of 
DT, IT and Sp-int make  Phoenix the third largest global 
switched  transit  provider  behind  AT&T and  BT  (20,2% 
each). 
D.  MAIN  COMPETITORS OF THE PHOENIX  ENTITIES 
71Jt  market  for  val11e-added  telecommunications  network 
services 
23.  The  situation  in  these  markets  is  discussed  in  the 
separate  notice  on  the  Atlas  venture  published  in  this 
issue  of the  Official  Journal. 
The  market for  traveller  services 
24.  More  than  one  third  of  cailing  cards  in  Europe 
are issued  by  US  operators. AT&T is  estimated to have  2 
million  postpaid  card  customers  in  Europe,  equivalent  to 
ll  % of all  cards  issued  there. These  customers  generate 
59%  of calling  card  traffic  initiated  in  Europe  on  the 
US  route.  MCI  i~  e!ttimated  to  have  I  million  postpaid 
card  customers  in  Europe  ( 10,5 %),  which  generate 
27 %  of  calling  card  traffic  initiated  in  Europe  on  the 
US  route.  Executive  Telecard  International  (E'l1) 
markets calling card!.  in  Europe through  agreements with 
local  oprr:non or credit  card  rompanic!J;  ETI's  markrt 
position  is  !Jimilar  to  that  ot  MCI. 
(")  Bu\inr-u  'ccrct (m:uktt  ~hare lr~\ than  10 %). 
('
0
)  Bu,incu secret  (markr-t  share  less  than  15 %). 
(
11
)  Busincu secret  (mukct share  It'\\  than  5 %). 
.11)''  m~rket fur  carrit•r's  carrier  u•rvict•s 
25.  Major  players  in  the  market  for  carrier's  carrier 
services  and  notably  global  switched  tramit  !Jervices 
competing  in  the  EEA  include  AT&T,  BT  (each  holding 
approximately  one  fifth  of  the  market),  Cable & 
Wireless,  MCI  and  Tdcglobe  Canada.  Along  with  the 
incrcasinc  proliferation  of  new  carriers  that  u·c:k  to  be 
independent of the  im:umbent  TO for  their  international 
trarfic,  new  supplier~  of  SUl'h  service!~,  some  with 
substantial  infrastructure  resources,  arc:  emerging  in  the 
market,  e.g.  Hermes  Europe  Railtcl. 
E.  THE TRANSACTION 
26.  ·The  transaction  notified  to  the  Commission 
comprises  a  sc:t  of agreements  whose:  mam  features  arc 
described  below. 
1.  Agreements as  originally notified 
1.  Agreements  regarding  the  Phoe,ix joint venwre 
The  panies  have  to  date  submitted  one  final 
agreement:  the  Phoenix  joint  Vent11re  Agreement 
(the  •jv  Agreement'),  that  sets  out  the  panics' 
essential  commitments  and  busine~s  objectives. 
Attached  as  annexes  to  the  JV  Agreement  are 
detailed  term  sheets  for  all  agreements  described 
below, which  will  be  submiucd  upon  dosing of the 
Phoenix  transaction.  These  term  sheets  detail  the 
agreed content of the following  agreements: 
(a)  the  Transfor  Agreements  will  provide  for  the 
transfer  by  Sprint,  FT,  DT,  and  Atlas 
{collectively  referred  to  as  the  'parents')  of 
certain  basic  and  related  businesses  to  the 
relevant  ROE, ROW, and  GBN  entities. 
(b) 'l11e  lntellrctllal  Property  cmd  Triltlc:mark  Licence: 
Agreements  will  concern  the  grant  by  ti•e 
parents  and  certain  affiliates  to  the  Phoenix 
t•ntities  'lf  non·exclusiVl·,  non-tramferahle 
lirences  to  u!:c:  cenain of the  p.ut·nt!J'  technil·al 
information  and  trademark~. 
(c)  111e  Services  Agreemruts  will  ~pecify the  terms 
and  conditions  of  trading  relationship!!  among 
Sprint,  Atlas,  and  the  ROE and  ROW entitic:!l, 
inchuling  the  supply  and  !>uppon  service!! 
nt·cded  to provide  Phoenix  services  worldwid~. 
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2.  Agreemtnts  ·regarding  Fr and  bT's  int,estment  in 
Sprint 
(a)  The  lrwestment  Agreement  will  provide  for  the 
purchase  by  each  of  FT  and  DT  of 
approximately  10%  of  the  common  stock  of 
Sprint. 
(b)  Tht'  Standstill Agreement  will  bind  FT  and  DT 
. for  a  period  of  IS  yean  not  to  acquire 
additional  shares  in  Sprint  which  would 
increase  d.~ir combined  aggregate  voting  rights 
to  more  th:m  20 %. 
(c)  The  Registration  Rights  Agretmt'nt  is  required 
in  order  for  each  pant  to  consummate  the 
transactions  contemplated  by  the  Investment 
Agrcemf.nt. 
2.  Main Contractual Provisions 
I. Concerning  the  Phoenix  Entities 
(a)  Structure of  the  Phoenix  venture 
. The JV Agreement  provides  for the  ~reation of 
the  following  operating  entities:  Phoenix  Rest 
of Europe  (ROE),  Phoenix  Rest  of the  World 
(ROW)  end  Global  Backbone  Net~·ork 
(GBN).  The  ROE  entity  will  conduct  the 
Phoenix  business  within  the  'rest  of  Europe• 
region  (i.e.  outside  'lf France  and  Germany), 
while  the  ROW  entity  will  coraduct  the 
Phoenix  business  within  the  'rest of the  world' 
region  (i.e.  outside  Eur\lpe  and  the  United 
States). The GBN  entity  will  own  and  operate 
a  global  transmission  network  over  which 
Phoenix  services  :and  other  traffic  will  be 
routed. 
FT  and  DT  will  each  be  the  exclusive 
distributor  of  Phoenix  services  in  France  and 
Germany  respectively;  however,  FT  and  DT 
will  meet  unsolicited  customer  requests  for 
4lervices  regardless  of  the  customer's  location. 
Moreover.  the  French  and  German subsidiaries 
of Atlas  will  provide  FT and  DT with  (i)  sales 
suppon services  regarding  Phoenix  products  to 
distributors  in  France  :\nd  Germany;  and  (ii) 
services  within  the scope of Phoenix  other than 
X.25  packet-switched  data  network services. 
A new,  wholly-owned  subsidiary  of Sprint (the 
'Sprint Subsidiary•)  :and  Atlas  will  each  initially 
own  SO%  of the  outstanding  voting  equity  of 
each  or the  p:arent  entities  of the  ROW entity 
and  the GBN entity. The Sprint Subsidiary and 
Ad:as  will  initially  own  331/)  :and  66'J/., %, 
re~pectivdy, of  the  voting.  c:ctuity ·~f the  parent 
entity of the  ROE entity. 
A Global  Venture  Board  will  be  :\ublished  to 
set  global  policies  and  monitor  · ompl:ance  of 
the  operating  group$  with  their  •usiness  plans. 
Any  initiative of the  Global  Venr Jrc:  Board  will 
generally  require  a unanimous  vcte. 
D:ay-to·day  opcr:ations  will  Ill·  the  responsi-
bility  of  the  chief  executive  officers  of  the 
operating  entities.  who  are  under  the  SUpt'r· 
vision  of  the  governing  board  of the  relevant 
parent  entity  of  either  the  ROE,  ROW  ... ·· or 
GBN  entity.  Most  decisions  of each  governing 
board  will  be  adapted  by  simple  majority  vote 
of the  members  present.  Unanimous  consent  is 
however  required  for  a  number  of imponant 
decisions  including  final  approval  of  business 
plans,  cenain  changes  in  structure  and  c~r•ital­
iz.ation.  and  cenain  decisions  on  technology 
and  investments. 
(b)  Purposes and actifJities of  Phoenix mtities 
The  business  of the  joint  venture  will  initially 
consist  of  the  provision  of  (i)  global  inter-
national  data.  voice,  and  video  business 
services  for  multinational  companies  and 
business  customers;  (ii)  international  services 
for  consumers,  initially  b~sed on  card  services 
for  travellers,  and  (iii)  carrier  services 
providing  cenain  transpon  services  for  the 
parents  and  other  carriea'S.  The  Phoenix 
entities  may  also  offer  telecommunications 
equipment and  invest  in  national operations. 
To  market  these  services  the  Phoenix  joint 
venture  will  be  responsible  for  the  planning 
and  management  functions  of  operations.  as 
well  as  marketing  and  customer  suppon, 
including  the  following: 
(i)  central  coordination  of  product  devel-
opment  and  management  to  ensure 
seamless  global  services;  the  Phoenix 
entities  shall  nOtably  define  functionality, 
technical  standards,  :and  service  level 
requirements  for  Phoenix  services; 
(ii)  implementation  of  a  common  global 
network and  information  systems  platform 
rationalizing  and  integrating  the  currently 
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\t.'plt .jtt'  intt·rn:uion;tl  d.11.1,  vhttT,  .111d 
o\'t.•rby  nt.·twork'l  of the:  p.Ht.'nt\;  tht·  (  ~ H:--; 
will  link  overbv  and  hark.hom·  nt·twork' 
in  eac:h  opt.·ra;ing  Mt'.l  (i.e.  ROt:  .llld 
I{ OW)  whilt•  proprit't:try  intnllu·'  will 
allow  prm·•~tun  of  ~t.'.ltnlt.•"  \l'n'i' n; 
within  it!.  fint  ft.·w  ~·c;lr\  of  opt·r ating, 
Phot'ni:\  will  hc~in  to  dt.·plo~·  tht'  nt·xt 
~t·ntr.atiun  of  :\\)'lll"hronoll\  Tr:~rl\fl'l" 
Modt·  (ATM)  tt.·rhnt~logy,  nHnpri.,iu~~  .111~· 
lnd  ;til  of  tr.:tmmi\\inn,  \Witc:hing, 
~ignalling,  network  intclli~t·ru:c,  .:111d 
~ervin· rnanagemc.·nt  dcrnt'nt\; 
(iii)  integration  and  dtvclopmt•nt  of 
information  systems  for  l'ourdinatt.·d 
billing,  customc.r  support,  and  otht.·r  hack-
office  functions,  supporting  national 
distributors;  and 
(iv)  devdopmcnt  of  a  sale\  pn:senct·  in  dw 
ROE  and  ROW  territorie~ either  direnlv 
or  through  di~tribution  a  rrangemen~s 
using  a  common  'ma~terhrand';  in 
plrticular,  nation:~!  ~crvire operatiom  will 
he  e~tablished  or  romolid:ned  in  t:ad1 
major l·ountry,  and  will  he  rc~ponsihlt for 
diuributing  Phoenix  ~ervice!l  within  that 
country;  in  addition,  regional  \lit·\ ofiin·., 
will  he  established  to  provide  tt·l"hniral 
and  \ales  ~upport,  induding  identificttion 
of  potential  customers  and  J'l\istin~  in 
prcraration of CU\tnmt·r  prnpm:tls. 
(c)  Pmvisiom  (01JCenung  tl£',,/i,Ks  u•JtNb)'  1'/ttmlix 
entities 
Pursuant  to  the  JV  Agrt•t·mcnt,  tran,aninm 
among  tlw  Phoenix  cntitit.•!.,  on  tht·  o1w  h.1ml, 
and  FL  DT,  ancl  AtLl\,  on  tlw  ntlll'r,  ·.viii 
gt·nc:rally  bt·  nmdunt.·d  on  tltt·  rnmt  f.tv(lurahle 
tt·rm\  :tnd  ronditiom  th.H  :Ht'  offnt.·d  hl  third 
p.trtic'l.  If  produn,,  \ervtn·'·  ''r  f:r,  iliut'!t 
rek·vam  to  tht'\l'  tr.1m.1ctiom  :lit'  not 
nmlrnt·n:iallv  .lv:tilahlc·,  'urh  tJ.Itl\,tl'tiom  ,h.lll 
bt•  t.·ontlun~d  in  an:ordarll:t'  with  .lit  :trtn\ 
length  prit.·ing  mt.·thoJ,  u\ing  full-l"mt  rC"irn-
bur\t'lllt'nt  or  \urh  other  arm\  lt:ngth  prit ing 
method  a'l  m:ty  he:  agrct·d  on  hy  the  partie\. 
The part·nt\ \hall  have  the  iim right  tn offt.•r  to 
~upply q:rt:tin  produt.·t\,  !tt'I'Vin·'·  and  f.H"ilitit·\ 
tn  tht.·  Phm:nix  c:ntitic.·\.  Notwitlt,t:t.nding.  t.·Jdl 
Phueni:\  t·ntity  may  pun~·ha~c  frum  .1  third 
p.uty  which,  on  otherwi,t·  t'< trnp:t.r.thlt·  tt·rm' 
\:I  I  (  0  .\ .\ 7  I 1 11 
.uul. '"""it  iom,  of lt·r'  lowt·r  pricn, t·it ht·r  OJll't' 
tht·  p; nin hJH'  ht•t·n  ~:ivcn  tltt·  opportU:IIt)"  to 
rnatdt  \Uch  tc:nm  and  t·ouditiom  or  if  J 
lll\tllrTH'r  \Cl  rt'CJUirt'\. 
L•t. h of  tlw  Phot·nix  t'llltltn  a11d  tht·ir  p.m·nt' 
lt:l\'t'  tlw  fint  ri~lu to olft·r  to  JWrlorm  in  tht·ir 
rt'\fll'l"livt·  tnritory  Jny  larilitic·'  or  \t'rvit'l'\ 
rt.'(Juirt·d  h~·  ;wothcr  p:~rty  to  tlu:  Phm·nix 
a~~rt·c·rnt·nt\.  Sut h  \t·h·in·'  may  ht·  olnainnl 
from  a  third  p;trty  at  a  lowl'f  prin·  undt•r 
romp:uahle  tcnm  and  nmditiom,  or  wht·re  a 
t.'U\tonu:r  so  rt.·ctuirc'l.  In  arrord;mn·  with  thi'l 
prim·iplc,  tht·  ROE  and  ROW cntitie'  will  he 
rt·ctuin·d  to  purcha\e  tdewmmunic:~tion\ 
rwtwork  transrni  .. ~ion  raparity  from  the  GBN 
entity  to the extent available. 
(d)  No" -compc'/('  prm:i1imu;  dimib11tirm 
Punuam  to  the  JV  Agreement  as  m iginally 
notified,  albeit  \ubjcct  to  variuw.  exception\, 
no  party  or lffil1atc  of a  party  may  di'itribute 
anv  intc:rnatiunal  tclc,·ommunication\  srrvicc\ 
whid1  an·  either  provided  b)·  the  Phoenix 
c:ntitic\  or  suh'ititutablc  for  !luch  servicr\. 
l.ikewi!!t•,  no  party  or lffiliau·  of a  party  mly 
invc\t  in  any  c·ntity  that  uffen  \U(h  servin:\. 
Moreover,  no party or any of it\ affililtC'i  mly 
offer  national  long-dist:lncc  scrvicrs  in 
curnpctitil>n  with  t•ither  a  national  operation of 
Phoenix  or  a  puhlir  tdcphonc  operator 
affiliated  with  Phoenix  (c.~.  a  national 
di~trihutor of Phoenix).  Nor may  any  party or 
any  of  it~  affiliates  make  invc\tmcnts  in  any 
entity  offering  \Uch  t.•t.lmpeting  national  long 
distance  !iervicc:~  or  in  any  national  operation 
aliit.·d  with  a major competitor of Phoenix. 
Out'lidt  tlw  p:t.n·nt!l'  h:mtt·  n1untrit·'  cxdu,ivity 
will  he  gr.Hltt.•J  to  Ji,trihuwn  on  .:1  l·aH'· 
bv-t::ISt'  ha~i!t.  P.:t!l'iin·  ,aft.·'  hv  otlt'  Ji,trihutor 
tt~  t"U\tonu·rs  in  thc  rt'\pt·c:ti\'t." \,lin tnritory of 
any  otlll'r  di!ttrihuw,  will  bt·  .1llmwd  in  tiiC' 
l·:E:\. 
(l')  /.inm£'S  /0 bt•  J.:Tomlt•c/  /fl  /'/1tJ(',II.\"  n1titics 
Under  tht·  lntdlt.·l'tual  J>rupt•rty  t\grl't'lllt'lll\, 
c·ach  part·nt  will  grant  t·.Kh  of  tht·  Phot.·ni~ 
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entities  non-exclusive,  non-transferable  licence~ 
to  usc  renain  tt:chnic.:al  information  of  that 
parent  in  the  respective  territories  of  s.ut.·h 
enuues  to  conduct  the  Phoenix  business.  Each 
Phot'nix  entity  shall  have  the  right  to 
~ub-liccme  the  rights  granted  to  any  other 
J>hot"nix  entity  or  any  affiliated  national 
operation  or local  partner,  to  the  extent  such 
sub-licence  is  necessary  to conduct the  Phoenix 
business.  Likewise,  each  Phoenix  entity  shall 
on  rcqucu  also  sub-licens.e  such  rights  to  any 
parent or affiliate  of such  parcnt,uo the  extent 
such  sub-licence  is  necessary  to  conduct  the 
Phoenix  business. 
Royalties  shall  be  payable  as  cusr-omary  in  the 
market  and  negotiated  by  the  panics  on  an 
arm's-length  basis.  Licence  rights \granted  to  a 
pany  under  the  Intellectual  Propeny 
Agreements  will  continue in  the event of either 
termination  of the  Phoenix  venture  or  transfer 
of such  pany•s interest  in  the  Phoenix  venture. 
Similarly.  pursuant  to  the  Trademark  Licence 
Agreement  each  parent  grants  each  oi  the 
Phoenix  entities  non-exclusive,  non-trans-
fcrabl~ rights  to use  cenain  trademarks owned 
by  or  licensed  to  such  parent  in  c.:onnecticn 
with  the  marketing  or  sale  of  certain  auth-
orized  products  and  services  in  the  respective 
territories of such  entity. 
2.  Conctmi"g FT atad DT's  invtslmrnt in  ~print 
(a)  Rtstrictions  on  transfer  of slktrt;  by  I·T or  DT 
and !imitis  on  incrtasts  of tbrir  shartholding  in 
Sprint 
Pursuant  to  the  lnve~tmcnt Agrccmern.  rt•ithcr 
r:r or OT may  dispose  of  it\  ~hare~ in  Sprint 
for  five  years  after the  dosing date. 'l'hert·aftcr 
restri•=tions  apply  to  large  lransfers.  whic:h 
would  in  most  circ:umstancrs  give  Sprint  the 
rights of fint refusal. 
Pursuant  to  the  Standnill  Agreement,  F'J'  and 
DT  shall  each  have  the  right  to  acquire 
addition:.!  Sprint  shares.  to  reach  and  maintain 
a  I 0 % shareholding,  but  shall  not  for  15  years 
after  the  closing  date  acquire  additional  shares 
that  would  increase  their  ;~ggrc:g:ue  voting 
··. 
rights  to  mort.·  t~ln  20 %.  Once  thi~  initial 
·~tandstill' period  has  expired,  Ff and  DT may 
acquire  additional  shares,  hut  may  not  incrc:ase 
their  aggregate  voting  rights  above  30 %  nor 
conduct  cenain  activities  intended  :u  taking 
control of Sprint. 
(b) Constnt  rights  and  board  rtprtstntation  of rr 
a11d DT 
I·T and  DT have  the  right  to elrct directors to 
the  Sprint  board  in  proportion  to  their  share-
holding,  provided  that  e:~ch  has  the  right  to 
elect  at  leilst  one  director.  Neither  FT  or DT 
may  have  access  to  confidential,  competitive 
information  on  Sprint's  ilctivitics  in  the  EEA 
through  their  represent:nion  on  Sprint's  boud. 
Nor  may  these  representatives  provide  Sprint 
with  confidential  information  that  I~r or  DT 
may  have  obtained  from  US  competitors 
through  correspondent  relationships. 
As  the  sole  holders of Sprint•s  class  A common 
stock,  1-T  and  DT  have  been  granted 
substantial  consensual  rights  with  respect  to 
certain  corporate  actions  of  Sprint,  which 
nevenheless  fall  considerably  short  of  control. 
These  actions  include  major  equity  issuances, 
disapproval  of investments  in  Sprint  by  major 
competitors,  participation  rights  in  transactions 
involving  change of control, and  other bil:neral 
corporate  transactions.  FT  and  DT  have  3 
right of first  offer with  respect  to long-distancr 
assets of Sprint for a fixed  period of time. 
F.  CHANGES  MADE  AND  UNDERTAKINGS  GIVEN 
FURTHER  TO  THE  COMMISSION'S  INTERVENTION 
27.  Some  features  of  the  agreements  as  notified 
appeared  to  be:  incompatible  with  the  Communit\·  • 
competition  rules.  In  the  roursc  of  the  notific~uio~ 
procedure:  the:  panics  have:  amended  certain  d.tusrs  in 
their  agreements  and  given  undertaking~  to  the 
Commission. 
I.  Contractual  change:\ 
28.  Non-appointmrtrl  of Phvrni:c  ,u  ""  agent for  irrtc•r· 
rrational  half-circuits.  J=ollowing  an  announn·rncnt  m:ade 
in  the  Phoenix  notification,  which  did  not  vet  rrflect  the 
panics  commitments  regarding  Atlas  fu.rthcr  to  the 
Commission•s  intervention.  DT.  1-T.  Atlas  and  Sprint 
have  deleted  FT  and  DT's  •international  private  linr,·. 
i.e.  FT and  DT's  international  h:alf-(irc:uiu,  from  the  list 
of rroducts  that  Phoenix  wouM  di~tribuu·  ;IS  3J,;('nt. 
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2~.  .  ,\'rm·u,mpt'lt'  prm.omom.  The  p.1nie\  hJvt'  n'ot  yet" 
~uu~ht  .ln  t'Xt'mption  punuant  to  :\nides  M5  0) of  the 
1-.C  Tn·.uy  .uul  ~.l  l3)  of  the.·  EEA  t\grt·t"ment  for  :tr•)' 
'fle'l ifil  ·'J~n·r·nH'Ill\.  rc.·garding  n.uional  long-di\t.1nn· 
,c·rvirn.  The·  non-fumpc·tt·  d.tU\t'  in  tltt'  nriginal  JV 
:\J~H't'lllt'fll  "·" tht'rdmt•  ht•t·n  amt·udt·d:  rht·  plrric:\  Jrt' 
now  ohligc·d  111  rdrain  only  frorn  tith<·r  li)  cornpt:ting 
with  or (ii)  invc·\tiiiJ;  in  .1  wmpt·titor of c.·ntitit'\  providing 
lonJ;-c.li\l.1nn·  \c'rvll"e\  provided  \Uch  entitit~  are 
nuurulled  h)·  Phcll'nix. 
2.  Non-di,crimination 
JO.  Ju\t  J\  OT  and  FT  shall  be  prohibited  from 
di!.niminating  in  favour  of the  joint ••enture,  as  de!lcribed 
in  the.·  separate  notice  on  the  Atlas  transaction,  the 
Cummis\ion  intends  likewise  to  prohibit  DT  a.1d  1-T 
from  di~niminJting  in  favour  of  the  Phoenix  entities. 




3.  Undenakings ginn by  the po.rtie\ 
·'I.  C11rru•r's  c11rrit-r  stn,oin·s.  Neither  Atlas,  Phoenix, 
IJT,  Fl',  Sprint  or  any  affiliate  of  these  entities  !~hall 
mJkc  a  panicular  telecommunications  o;>erator's  ability 
w  uc.e  Phoenix  international  carrier  services  conditional 
upon  uc.c  or  distribution  by  that  telecommunications 
operator of  ~ervicc~ provided  by  Atlas,  Phoenix,  1~·. DT 
or Sprint.  Neithtr  !>hall  Atlas,  Phoenix,  DT,  1-T,  Sprint 
or  an)·  affiliate  of  these  entities  make  its  commercial 
deoalings  (i.e.  terms, conditions, price,  discounts) with  any 
relecomrhunicatiom  operator  conditional  upon  use  or 
distril  .. utinn  b~·  th.:at  telerommunication's  operator  of 
~t·rvicc\  provided  by  Atl.l~.  Phoenix,  FT.  DT or  Sprint. 
32.  UT,  !·T and  Sprint  have  al!lo  given  further  under-
takings  that  mirror  the  undertaking~ given  in  connection 
with  the  Atlas  notification;  reference  is  therefore- made 
to the  ~epar.:are  nutic.:e  on  the  Atlas  trJnsaction  published 
in  thi~  i'sue  of  the  Official  Journal. 
I.  Crrm-mbsidilatiotr 
As  in  tht rontcxt of  the:  Atlas  transaction,  DT and  FT 
shall  not  c:ngagt•  in  crc.)!l-sub~idization  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Commi!t!lion's  competition  guidelines 
for  the.·  tclet:ommunications  ~el"tor (
11
)  in  connection 
(
11
)  Src:  nuticc:  pursuant to Aniclc:  I  'J  ( 3)  of Council  Regulation 
No  17  concerning  Ca~ No  JV/33.361  - lnfonc:t  (OJ 
No C 7,  II. I.  l'J'J2,  p.  3, at paragraph 'J). 
(''J Cuiddint"i nn  the:  application  uf EF.C  Competition  Rulr~ in 
thr Telc:wmmunil·:atiom  Seclur  101  No C  13.',  6.  'J.  I'I'Jl, 
p  . .:? , pu  .1gr  .a ph  I 02  tl stq.).  · 
with  the  Phoenix  venture.  To  avoid  th.lt '~the  Phoenix 
~ntities  or  their  di!ttributors  benefit  from  croS\-
~ub!tidic\ stemming  from  the  opera~ion of both  public 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  reserved 
· ~c:rvicc~  hv  either  DT  or  FT,  all  t:l'titic\  formed 
punuant  t~,  the  Phoenix  venture  will  be  e!ttJblished  a~ 
diHirll'l  cntitic!t  separate from  DT Jnd rr. 
The  ROE  and  ROW  entities  will  obtain  their  own 
debt  financing  on  their  own  credit,  provided  that 
Sprint,  1-'T and  DT: 
(a)  may  make  capital  contribu•ions  or  commercially 
reasonable  loans  to  such  entities  as  required  to 
enable the  ROE and  ROW entities to  conduct the 
Phoenjx  business; 
(b)  may  pledge  their venture  interests  in  such  enuues 
in  connection  with  non-recourse  financing  for 
such  entities;  and 
(c)  may  guarantee  any  indebtedness  of such  enuues, 
provided  that Sprint,  FT and  DT may  only  make 
payments  pursuant  to  any  such  guarantee 
following  a  default  by  such  entities  in  respect  of 
such  indebtedness. 
The  ROE  and  ROW  entities  shall  not  allocate 
directly  or  indirectly  any  part  of  their  operating 
expenses,  costs,  depreciation,  or  other  expenses  of 
their  businesses  to  ;any  parts  of DT of  1-"'Ps  business 
units  (including  without  limitation  the  proportionate 
costs  based  on  work  actually  performed  that  are 
attributable to shared employees  or sales  or marketing 
of  Phoenix  products  :md  sen·ices  b)'  DT  or  FT 
employees).  However,  nothing  ~hall  prevent  such 
Phoenix  entitit>s  from  billing  DT or  FT  for  p  .. ·..,duns 
and  services  provided  to  DT or Vr by  ~ul"h c.·mities  on 
the  basis  of the  same  prices  char~c:d  to  third  partie~ 
(in  the  case  of  products  or  services  ~old  to  third 
parties  in  commercial  quJntitit'\)  or  full  l'(lU  rc.-im-
bursement  or  othC'r  arm·~  length  pricing  method  (in 
the  case  of  product~ and  service!t  not  sold  10  third 
partil's  in  commercial  quantities). 
The  ROE  and  ROW  enuues  shall  kerp  separatt' 
acmunting  records  that  identify  payment\ or transft>rs 
to  or from  DT and  Vr.  Thr ROE  amf  ROW t>ntitie\ 
shall  not  rtcC'ivc  any  matt'ri.:al  \uhsidy  Cinduding 
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furgin·ru·\~ of  ddJt) din·nlv or irulirt'l tlv  from  [)'f' or 
IT. or  JIIY  lllVt'\tment  or. p.tym<'nl  fn;m  ur or rr 
thJt  i~  not rnorded in  tht' hook\ of \Udl  t·ntJtit·\  J\ .111 
im·e\tnll"nt  in  dl"bt  or t•quity. 
1.  Rt•rtmllllg ,,J rt•portmg 
·nH'  umt•  undertaking.,  apply  .n  dt·\nilu:d  in  tht· 
notic.:r  on  tht·  t\d.a\  tr.tmanion  puhli!thed  in  du\ i\\Ut' 
of the  Offic.:ial  Journal. 
33.  In  \O  far  .1~  rdatt~J  to  t'Xr\ttrlJ;  ohlig:.ti•'"''  undt•r 
n.uiont~l  ur  Cummunit)'  l.1w,  the  Jhm·t·  i~  intt·ndl'd  to 
emurc the  partit•s'  firm  rommiunent  to  I.'Omply  with  the 
applic.:Jblr  lt·gal  fr.1mework. 
G.  THE  REGULATORY  SITUATION 
34.  'Inc rrgulatory situJtiun  in  France anJ Germany  i~ 
drsc:ribcd  in  the  notice  on  the  Atlas  tramJction.  As  fur 
the  United  States,  pursu.1nt  to the  1934  Communications 
:\c:t,  Sprint  shall  publi\h  tariff  \c:hetlules  anti  contracts 
describing  its  network  arr;mgem~ms  and  scrvJc.:es. 
Furthermore,  the  19.\4  Communications  Al't,  cnforc:ed 
by  the  Federal  Cvmmunic.:.uiom  Commission  (fCC), 
p:-ohibits  Sprint  from  providing  services  that  unjunly  or 
unrea\onably discriminate  against  Sprint'\ competitors  or 
foreign  correspondents,  which  may  lodge  a  formal 
complaint beforr the  FCC  if Sprint  dOC's  not  comply  with 
these  obligations. 
h.  Wlulc·  tht·  Luropt'Jil  Cnmrni,,iun  w.l\ ,1\\('\\lrlg  du: 
l'lul<.'ru'  notification  um!cr  Conununitv  bw,  tht·  IJI., 
l>t·partmt·nt  of  Ju~tice havt.•  umduJt·J  :1  .prou·tlun· u.ul•·r 
l.:S  .tnli-lru\1  l.1w  hy  t·ntcring  a  l'omc·nt  Jc·l rt'('  Tlu' 
c.cm\t'lll dt'l'rt'c  ~pc·lls out  undt.·naking' hy  thc  flJIIIt'\  th.u 
l.ugcly  re\t·mblt·  rhme  desnibccl  in  thi'  notiu· 
TffE COMMISSION'S  INTENTION\ 
31).  On  thl'  hasi~  uf  the  foregoing.  t  ht·  Commi\\ion 
intends  to  take  a  favourable  position  on  tin·  notifit·d 
transution under the competition  nalts of the  EC  Trc.•at~· 
.1nd  under Anide 53 of the EEA  Agreement  ancl  to grant 
Phoenix  an  individual  exemption  punu:ant  to  Anide  H5 
(3)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Anicle  53  (3)  of  thC'  EEA 
Agreement.  Before  doing  so,  the  Commission  invitr\ 
interl'nC'd  third  panics  w  send  their  ob~erv.11iom within 
~ix  weeks  from  the  publication  of  this  notice  10  the 
following  address,  quoting  the  reference  'fV/35.617  -
Phoenix•: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV). 
Directort~te  for  Information,  Communication 
and  Multimedia, 
Rue  de  Ia  Loi/Wetstr:aat  200, 
B-1 04CJ  Brussels. 
F:ax:  (32 2)  296 CJ8  19. 
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COMMISSION DECISION 
of 17 July 1996 
relating to a proceeding under Article  85  of the EC Treaty and Article  53  of the EEA 
Agreement 
'  (Case No IV/35.337- Atlas) 
(Only the English, French and German .texts are  authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
(96/546/EC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  the  European . 
Economic Area, 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  No  17  of  6 
February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 
and 86  of the  Treaty(1), as  last  amended .by  the Act of 
Accession  of  Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden,  and  in 
particular Articles  2, 6, and 8 thereof, 
Having  regard  to the application  for  negative  clearance 
and  the  notification  for  exemption  submitted,  pursuant 
to  Articles  2  and  4  of  Regulation  No  17,  on 
16 December 1994, 
Having  regard  to  the  summary  of the  application  and 
notification  published  pursuant  to  Article  19 (3)  of 
Regulation No 17 and to Article 3 of Protocol 21 of the 
EEA  Agreement(2),  · 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Committee  for 
Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions, 
•  Whereas: 
I.  THE FACfS 
A.  INTRODUCfiON 
(  1)  The Atlas  venture was notified to the Commission 
on  16  December  1994.  This  transaction  brings 
about a joint venture owned as to 50% by France 
Telecom (FI') and as to 50% by DeutSche Telekom 
AG  (DT).  The  notification  of  Atlas  replaces .the 
notification  on 3 june 1993 (3)  of a  joint venture 
formed  by  FI'  and  DT  (at  the  time  Deutsche 
Bundespost Telekom) under the name of Eunetcom 
to  which  this  Decision  extends.  Atlas  is  also  the 
insuument  of  DT  and  FTs  participation  in  a 
(1)  OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
(1)  OJ  No C 337, 15.  12.  1995, p.  2. 
(l)  OJ  No C 175, 26. 6.  1993, p.  11. 
second  transaction,  notified  under  the  name  of 
Phoenix,  with  Sprint  Corporation  (Sprint) (4). 
Phoenix, since renamed as GlobaiOne, is  the object 
of a separate Decision pursuant to Article 85  (3)  of 
the EC  Treaty(·~). 
(2)  Atlas  is  structured  at  two  levels.  A  holding 
company  established  in  Brussels,  Atlas  SA, 
incorporated  as  a  societe  anonyme  under  the 
laws  of Belgium,  has  three  operating subsidiaries, 
namely  Atlas  Telecommunications  SA  (Atlas 
France)  in  France,  Telekom  lnternationale 
Telekommunikationsdienste  GmbH  (Atlas 
Germany)  in  Germany,  and  one  for  the  rest  of 
Europe.  Atlas  France  and  Atlas  Germany  will 
initially  provide  technical  and sales  support to FT 
and ·DT,  being the French and German distributors 
of Atlas  and  GlobalOne  products.  After  full  and 
effective  liberalization  of  the  telecommunications 
infrastructure  and services  markets  in  France  and 
Germany,  scheduled  to occur by. 1 january 1998, 
DT's  subsidiary  for  the  provision  of  X.25 
packet-switched  data  communications,  T-Data 
Gesellschaft  fi.ir  Datenkommunikation ·  mbH 
(T-Data) (6),  will  be  merged  with  Atlas  Germany 
while  FT's  subsidiary  for  the  provision  of X.25 
packet-switched  data  communications,  Transpac 
France, will be merged with Atlas France. 
B.  1HE PARTIES 
(3)  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  (DT)  and  France  Telecom 
(Ft)  are  the  public  telecommunications 
organizations (TOs)  in Germany and France.  Both 
('•)  OJ  No C 184, 18. 7.  1995, p.  11. 
(5)  See p. 57 of this Official Journal. 
(6)  The parties  have submitted that T  -Data is  the  new  name of 
DT"s  former  Datex-P  division  for  the  provision  of  X.2S 
packet-switched  data  communications services,  incorporated 
after  publication  of  the  Commission  notice  pursuant  to 
Article  19 (3) of Countil Regulation No 17 and Article  3 of 
Protocol  21  of the  European  Economic  Area  Agreement  in 
this case; OJ No C 337, 15. 12.  1995, p.  2 (hereinafter the 
•Anicle  19  (3)  notice'). 
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supply  telephone  exchange  lines  to  homes  and 
businesses;  local,  trunk  and  international 
communications to and from their respective home 
country.  Worldwide  turnover  in  1994  was  ECU 
31,8  billion,  a  4,3%  increase  over  1993,  for  DT 
and ECU 21,7 billion, a 1,8% increase over 1993, 
for the IT group. 
C.  THE RELEVANT MARKET 
1.  Product markets 
(  4)  Atlas  will  address the markets for the provision of 
non-reserved  telecommunications  services  to 
corporate  users  both  Europe-wide  and  nationally. 
Atlas  will  target two separate product markets for 
non-reserved services,  namely: 
(  5)  The  market for  customized packages of corporate 
telecommunictltions services 
This  market  comprises  mostly  customized 
combinations  of  a  range  of  ex1stmg 
telecommunications  services,  mainly  liberalized 
voice  services  including  voice  communication 
between  members  of  a  closed  group  of  users 
(virtual private network (VPN) services), high-speed. 
data  services  and  outsourced  telecommunications 
solutions specially designed for individual customer 
requirements.· The market for  customized packages 
of corporate telecommunications services, enhanced 
by  features  .  such  as  tailored  capacity. allocation, 
billing, a 24-hour technical  se~ice, etc., is currently 
changing and evolving rapidly. Customers demand 
such· packages  of sophisticated  tel~ommunications 
and  information · services  ()ffered  by  one  single 
provider.  That  provider  is.  expected  to  rake· 
full  responsibility for  all  services  contained  in  the 
package  from  'end  to end'.  Accordingly,  DT and 
IT intend  to  offer  such  customers  through  Atlas 
whatever  services  existing  technology  allows  them 
to  offer  from  time  to  time  within  the  applicable 
regulatory  framework.  In  this  regard,  the  parties 
have  indicated that Atlas will eventually extend to 
international voice  traffic and other basic  services, 
regulations permitting. 
These  services  are  provided  over  high-speed, 
large-capacity  leased  lines  linking  sophisticated 
equipment  on  customer  premises  to  the  service 
provider's  nodes.  Alternatively,·  other  means  of 
transmission,  such  as  satellite  or  mobile  radio 
capacity,  can  be  used  to  ensure  the  .geographic 
coverage  demanded  from  time  to  time.  Such 
services employ advanced state-of-the-art protocols, 
data  compression  techniques,  equipment  and 
software.  In  this  market, Atlas  is  expected to offer 
a  portfolio  of  services  including  the  following 
(the 'Atlas services'): 
- data  services:  ~igh- and  low-speed 
packet-switched, Frame Relay; Internet Protocol 
(IP)  services, 
- value-added  application  services:  value-added 
messaging,  video-coilferencing  and  electronic 
document interchange  (EDI)  services, 
- voice  VPN services, 
- value-added  · leased  lines  offerings: 
pre-provisioned,  managed  and  circuit-switched 
bandwidth, 
- very  small  aperture  satellite  (VSA T)  network I 
services, and 
- outsourcing:  customers  are  invited  to  transfer 
responsibility  and ownership  of their  networks 
to Atlas. If they agree, Atlas  may  integrate into 
its  own  offerings  any  third-party  products 
already owned  by  customers who wish  to keep  . 
such offerings, as  the case may be. 
Of the  above,  some  services  will  remain  with  DT 
and IT and  therefore  not be  Atlas services.  These 
services  are:  (i)  those  national  receive-only  VSAT 
services  in  France  which  provide  a  single  channel 
per  carrier  ('receive-only  SCPC');  (ii)  national 
messaging and EDI  services  in  Germany;  (iii)  data. 
network  services  using  Asynchronous  Transfer 
Mode  (ATM)  technology in  France, Germany and 
any third country; and (iv) national VPN services in 
France and Germany. The integration into Atlas of 
any such  service  and/or its  underlying  network  as 
well  as  of any  broadband  transmission  capacity ... 
operated  by  DT  and/or  IT necessitates  separate W 
notification to the  Commissio~. 
(6)  Due to the high cost of building and operating the 
networks  needed  to  provide  customized  packages 
of  corporate  telecommunications  services,  such 
services can be commercially viable only if provided 
. to multinational corporations, extended enterprises, 
and  other  intensive  users  of  telecommunications 
and in particular the largest among those customers 
generating  continuous  high  traffic  volumes (1). 
·Many of those  potential  customers  have  complex 
and  specific  needs  and  have  often  · acquired 
expertise  in  managing  own  internal  networks. 
Whether  each  of  the  services  listed  above 
constitutes  a  separate  product  market can  be  left 
open for present purposes, since a separate analysis 
would not ·affect the COmmission's conclusions. 
(')  See Commission Decision 94/579/EC of 27 July 1994 in Case 
No  IV/34.857  - BT-MCI;  OJ  No  L  223,  27.  8.  1994, 
p.  36. 
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(7)  However, this Decision relates only to Atlas' range 
of products and its  business scope as  notified. Any 
substantial  change  of products  or  business  scope, 
and  in  particular  (i)  the  integration  into  Atlas 
of  broadband  transmission  capacity  (such  as 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)  networks)  in 
France and Germany and  (l.i)  the offering by  Atlas 
of public basic telecommunications services (such as 
voice  telephony  services(8))  will  require  a  new 
notification. 
(  8)  The market for  packet-switched data 
communications services 
Atlas  will  also  be  active  on a separate  market for 
packet-switched data communications services.  The 
Commission  considers  data  communications 
services  to  be  a  distinct  telecommunications 
product market, without prejudice to the existence 
of  narrower  markets (9).  One  narrower  market  is 
that  for  packet-switched  data  communications 
services( 10). Packet switching is a means to improve 
network  capacity  utilization  and  consists  of 
splitting data sequences into 'packets', feeding these 
and  other  packets  into  the  network  optimizing 
utilization  of  available  capacity,  switching  the 
packets  to the desired  destination  and rearranging 
the  packets  to obtain  the  original  data sequences. 
One  standard  used  for  the  proVISIOn  of 
packet-switched  data  communications  services  is 
the  X.25  protocol.  Packet-switched  data  services 
using  this  protocol  (the  'X.25  data  services')  are 
slower  than packet-switched  data communications 
services  using  protocols  such  as  Frame  Relay, 
Asynchronous  Transfer  Mode  (ATM}  or Internet 
Protocol (IP), given that X.25 data services  rely on 
smaller  packets  and  require  switches  which  allow 
charging per packet. 
(9)  Packet-switched  data comniunications services  can 
be  divided into different customer segments within 
the same product .market. 
1.  On  the  one  hand,  some  customers  generate 
mostly  erratic  and  geographically  widespread 
demand  for·  low-speed,.  low-volume 
applications.  These  features  are  due  either  to 
.the specific type of use (such as banks operating 
cash  machines  · nationwide,  networks  of 
(1)  Defined  in the seventh  indent of Article  1  of Commission 
Directive  90/388/EEC  of 2~ June  1990 on competition  in 
the markets for telecommunications services; OJ No L 192, 
24.  7.  1990, p.  10,. hereinafter 'Services  Directive',  as  last 
amended by Directive 96/19/EC; OJ No L 74, 22.  3.  1996, 
p.  13. 
(9)  Commission's Guidelines on the application of Community 
competition rules  in the telecommunications sector, OJ No 
C 233, 6. 9.  1991, p.  2, at paragraph 27. 
( 10)  Defined  as  'packet- and  circuit-switched  services'  in  the 
ninth indent of Article 1 (1) of the Services Directive- see 
footnote  8. 
points-of-sale  in  shops)  or  to the  size  of such 
customers,  as  with  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises  (SMEs).  Such  services  are  billed  by 
volume sent, according to published tariffs.  All 
incumbent  Member  State  TOs  including  DT 
and  FT  operate  dense  public  networks  with 
nationwide  coverage  providing  X.25  data 
services  to  this  customer  segment  (the  'public 
packet-switched data networks').  There  is  only 
one  public  packet-switched  network  in  each 
Member  State,  built  by  the  incumbent  TO 
under  a  public  service  obligation  before 
market liberalization. 
2.  On the  other hand, larger corporate customers 
and  other  extended  users  generate  more 
substantial  and  regular  traffic.  Often  the 
requirements of these  users  make it  worthwhile 
for  either  third-party  service  providers  or  the 
potential customer itself to assume the high cost 
of creating customized  leased  lines  circuits  (for 
example,  to  set  up  VPNs)  to  meet  individual 
service  demand.  This  demand  is  therefore 
increasingly  met  either  by  packet-switched 
services  using  protocols  other  than  X.25, 
notably  Frame  Relay  and  ATM  (for  VPN 
applications)  and IP  (for  both  public and  VPN 
applications)  or  by  switched  services  (PSTN 
or  ISDN  services).  Packet-switched  data 
communications services to such users are billed 
according to negotiated rates that take account 
of  the  individual  demand  features  of  a 
particular customer. 
(10)  Virtually  all  companies  active  in  each  individual 
Member  State  of  the  European  Community  are 
potential  if  not  actual  customers  for  national 
packet-switched  data  communications  services. 
Such  services  are also  required  by SMEs,  albeit  in 
smaller volumes and possibly less regularly than by 
larger  users.  Seldom  will  such  volumes  make  it 
worthwhile for service providers to invest in leased 
lines  with  the  specific  purpose  of reaching  these 
SMEs,  which  are  therefore  in  a  weak  negotiating 
pos.ition  and  hardly  capable  to  date  oi switching 
from  the current provider, typically the incumbent 
TO, to a competitor. 
(i1)  Packet-switched data communications may  also  be 
offered  as  one service  in  a customized package of 
corporate  servkes.  However,  even  as  part  of 
such  an  arrangement,  packet-switched  data 
communications  services  are  based  on  mature 
internationally  standardized  technology  and 
provided over St!!ndard terrestrial infrastructure. At 
the  national  level,  choice  from  a  wider 'range  of 
packet-switched  data  communications  offerings 
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(12) 
(13) 
than merely X.25 data services is available to lar:ger 
customers that are not served over the TO's public 
packet-switched data networks but over customized 
leased-line  circuits.  However,  most  eXisting 
customers  for  packet-switched  ·data 
communications currently generate annual turnover 
of  far  below  ECU  10 000  ·each  and  are  not 
therefore potential users of customized packages of 
corporate  telecommunications  services.  Therefore, 
packet-switched  data  communications  services 
offered  by  Atlas  constitute  a  product  market 
separate from  the  market for  customized packages 
of  corporate  telecommunications  services  equally 
targeted by Atlas. 
2.  Geographic markets 
The  markets for  customized packages of corporate 
telecommunications services 
Given  that  cost  and  price  differences  are  quite 
substantial,  demand  for  customized  packages  of 
corporate  telecommunications  services  exists  in  at 
least three distinct geographic markets, namely at a 
global, at a cross-border regional and at a national 
level.  Atlas  will  provide  such  packages  to  large 
users  Europe-wide  and  nationally.  Through 
GlobalOne,  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications  services  offered  by  Atlas  will 
also  have  global  ~connectivity'  - the  technical 
option of extending a given service offering beyond 
Europe by linking a customer'-s premises worldwide 
over  Phoenix  'Global  .Backbone  Network' (11). 
Given  the  considerable costs  involved,  customized 
packages  of corporate telecommunications services 
'are today mainly demanded  by  large multinational 
corphrations, extended enterprises, as well as major 
national  and  other  intensive  users .  of 
telecommunications. The Commission has discussed 
the  requirements  of  such  users  in  .its 
Decision 94/579/EC (BT-MCI) (12). 
Due  to the cost sn:ucture  of providing customized 
packages of corporate telecommunications services, 
notably  the  cost  ·of  leasing ·  the  required 
infrastructure, prices of such services are related to 
geographic  coverage,  as  is  the  cost  of additional 
features  (for  example,  one-stop-billing,  help-desk 
and  technical  assistance  around  the  clock, 
customized  billing).  There  is  evidence  that 
increasing  availability  of trans-European  networks 
will ultimately blur the distinction between national 
and  cross-border  or  ·ultimately  Europe-wide 
proviSIOn  of  non-reserved  telecommunications 
services.  However,  certain  sophisticated  national 
( 11 )  See  Phoenix Decision  in  Case No 'IV/35.617, at recital 27  . 
( 12)  See  footnote  7. 
(14) 
(15) 
non-reserved  services  currently  available  from  DT 
and  Ff in  Germany  and  France  respectively  will 
not  be  At!as  services,  including  DT  and  Ff's 
national  data  network services  based  on  ATM  or 
equivalent  packet-switching  technology  (Datex-M 
and Transrel respectively) and the national services 
mentioned ·at recital  5.  This  de~onstrates that  a 
distinction  between  national  and  'cross-border 
provision  of  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications services  remai~s valid  to date. 
The  markets  for  packet-switched  data 
communications services 
PriCe  differences  for  these  services  may  be  less 
than  for  customized  packages  of  corporate t 
telecommunications  services.  However,  a  national, 
cross-border  regional  and  global  geographic  level 
can  be  distinguished  for  packet-switched  data 
communications  services.  In  terms  of  traffic 
volumes,  supply  and  demand  of packet-switched 
data communications  services  are  mostly  national. 
For  instance,  in  Germany  DT's  existing  T-Data 
packet-switched .  data  communications  services 
division  hardly  ever  provides  such  services  across 
the border while  FT's German subsidiary Info AG, 
in  spite  of  appertaining  to  Ff's  seamless 
cross-border Transpac network,  only  provides one 
fifth  of its  packet-switched  data  communications 
services  across  the  border.  This  assessment  was 
confirmed by  interested third parties further to the 
Commission's notice on the Atlas notification (13). 
At  a  global  and  Europe-wide  level,  X.25  data 
services  and  customized  packages  of  corporate 6 
telecommunications  services  may  be  partly  IIIIIP. 
converging  to  the  extent  that  large  customers 
of the latter do not require  separate  provision  of 
X.25. data services  once such services are available 
as  part  of  service  combinations  offered  over 
advanced  networks.  Accordingly,  large  European 
. telecommunications  users  demand  services  with 
global  'connectivity',  meaning  that  they  may  be 
extended beyond Europe if so required. DT and FT 
have  moved  to meet  this  demand  in  entering  the 
GlobalOne  agreements.  with  Sprint.  Along  with 
increased  availability · of  advanced,  cross-border 
· network  infrastructure,  the  market  is  generally 
expected  to  overcome  distinctions  along  national 
borders  in  the  medi1,1m  term.  However,  separate 
national  geographic  markets  subsist  to  date  for 
packet-switched  da~ communications services  and 
for  the  provision · of  customized  packages  of 
corporate teleco~unications services respecti,·ely. 
(13)  Notification  of  a  joint  venture  (Case  No  IV/35.337  -
Atlas),  OJ No  C  ~n, 31.  12.  1994, p.  9  and  the  Article 
19 (3)  notice  (see  footnote 6 and  recitals et seq.). 
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D.  MARKET SHARES  OF ATLAS 
The  market for  customized packages  of corporate 
telecommunications services 
(16)  The  parties  estimate  the  European  markets  for 
non-reserved corporate telecommunications services 
(exclusive  of data communications  services)  to  be 
worth  approximately  ECU  505  million  (1993 
figures).  Of  this  total,  end-to-end  services 
accounted  for  approximately  ECU  15,1  million,  . 
VPN  services  for  approximately  ECU 
220,6  million,  VSA T  services  for  approximately 
ECU  173,2  million  and  outsourcing  services  for 
approximately ECU  96,4 million.  According to the 
notification  DT  and  IT's aggregate  market shares 
(1993  figures)  in  the  European  Community  were 
25% in the end-to-end services market, 2 7% in the 
VPN  services  market and 2,3 % in  the outsourcing 
services  market.  Market shares  for  VSA T  services 
are difficult to calculate given that TOs mostly use 
VSAT  terminals  either  as  back-up  facilities  for 
other  services  or to  extend  the  geographic  scope 
of  services  despite  terrestrial  infrastructure 
shortcomings;  however,  DT and IT taken together 
operated  10 907  VSAT  terminals  by  June  1994, 
equivalent  to  29%  of the  total  installed  base  of 
interactive,  data  one-way  or  business  television 
VSAT terminals in  the European Economic. Area. 
As  to the  national market for customized packages 
of corporate telecommunications services  in  France 
and  Germany  respectively,  DT and Fr's aggregate 
market shares· for individual non-reserved corporate 
telecommunications services are 93% in the French 
VPN  market  (where  DT has  no presence)  against 
0% in the German VPN market, and 60% in .  the 
French market for end-to-end services against 35% 
in  the  equivalent  German  market.  DT  and  FT's 
outsourcing joint venture, Eunetcom B.V., achieved 
36%  of total  outsourcing  turnover  generated  in 
France  and  29 %  of  total  outsourcing  turnover 
generated  in  Germany.  As  for  VSAT  services,  DT 
has  installed  approximately  25 %  of  all  VSAT 
terminals in  Germany; this Member State accounts 
for  18%  of  the  total  installed  base  of  such 
terminals in the EEA. 
In  third-country  national  markets,  including  all 
EEA member countries, DT and Fr's presence is to 
date negligible  or non-existent. 
.The  market  for  packet-switched  data 
communications s(#rvices 
(  17)  DT and IT estimate the European market for data 
communications  services  to  be  · worth 
approximately  ECU  2,8  billion  (1993  fi~ures). 
According  to  the  notification  DT  and  FT's 
· aggregate shares (1993 figures)" of this market were 
35%. Among  national  markets,  Atlas  will  have  a 
particularly  strong  position  in  France  and 
Germany.  DT and Ff's aggregate market share for 
all  data  communications  ser:vices  is  79 %  in 
Germany  and  77%  in  France,  of  which 
approximately  half- relates  to services  provided  by 
DT's  X.25  data  services  subsidiary  (now 
incorporated as T-Data) and IT's Transpac France 
subsidiary. Both subsidiaries will remain outside the 
scope  of  Atlas  until  the  French  and  German 
telecommunications  infr;~structure  and  services 
markets  are  fully  and  effectively  liberalized,  as  is 
scheduled  for  1 january 1998  (see  recital  24 ). 
E.  MAIN COMPETITORS OF ATLAS 
. The markets for  customized packages of corporate 
telecommunications services 
(18)  Since  the  BT-MCI  Decision  several  players,  acting 
alone or jointly with partners, have entered or are 
entering  the  international  markets  providing 
non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications 
services. The most important of these players, albeit 
with  disparate  geographic  scope  and  target 
customers, include: AT&T WorldPartners, Concert, 
IBM-Stet,  International  Private  Satellite 
Partners(14),  Unisource( 15)  or  Uniworld( 16).  Some 
of these strategic alliances are merely projects while 
others are awaiting regulatory approval.  However, 
all  of the  above  share  the  aim  of positioning  the 
respective  partners  in  anticipation  of  the  full 
liberalization. 
The  market  for  packet-switched  data 
commun~cations services 
(19)  The  market  for  packet-switched  data 
communications  services  features  a  substantially 
larger number· of players  than that for customized 
packages of corporate telecommunications services. 
Among  the  global  players  in  this  market  are  the 
·alliances  mentioned  at  recital  18  competing  with 
providers  such · as  EDS,  FNA,  Infonet,  SIT A  or 
Swift  and  operating  subsidiaries  of  large  global 
companies such  as  AT&T lstel, ·Cable &  Wireless 
Business  Networks,  DEC's  Easynet,  or  GElS.  In 
addition,  a  large  number  of  smaller  players 
competes  at  a  cross-border  regional  or  national 
(14)  See  Commission Decision  94/895/EC of 15  December  1994 
(Case  No  IVI34. 768  - lntema~ional  Private  Satellite 
Partners); OJ No L 354, 31.  12.  1994, p.  75. 
(15)  Notification  of  a  joint  venture  (Case  No  IVI35  .. 830 
Unisourceffelef6nica); OJ No C 94, 30. 3.  1996, p. 5. 
(1') Notification  of  a  joint  venture  (Case  No  IV/35.738 
Uniworld);  OJ No C 276, 21.  10.  1995, p.  9. 
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level·  in  the  EEA.  For  instance,  FT's  .indirect 
German  subsidiary Info  AG,  ~hich provides  most 
of  its  data  communications  services  within 
Germany,  is  DT's second-largest competitor in the 
German  national  market  for.  packe~-switched data 
communications  servjces.  None  of  these  smaller 
players  can compare· to large  alliances  in terms  of 
reach, access to transmission capacity and financial 
backing. 
F.  THE TRANSACTION 
(20)  The  Atlas  transaction  notified  to  the  Comnussion 
comprises a set of ag~eements whose main features 
are described  below. 
1.  Agreements  as  originally notified 
(a)  The  Atlas  Joint  Venture  Agreement  UV 
Agreement) is the main agreement providing for 
the establishment of the Atlas  joint venture. 
(b)  The  Intellectual  and  Industrial  Pr-operty 
Transfer  and  Licence  Agreements  were 
concluded  by  FT  and  DT  respectively,  with 
Atlas  SA;  under  these  agreements  Ff and  DT 
make  available  to  Atlas  SA  the  intellectual 
property rights (the IPRs)  needed to operate the · 
Atlas business. 
(c)  The  Framework  Services  Agreements  are 
framework  agreements  setting  forth  the  basic 
terms and conditions with respect to the supply 
by  DT and  FT  of certain services  to Atlas  SA 
and the  supply  by  Atlas  SA  of certain services 
toFT and DT. 
(d)  The  Distribution  Agreements  are  two 
substantially  similar  distribution  agreements 
between Atlas SA and FT and DT respectively, 
regarding  the  marketing  and  sale  of'  Atlas 
products in France and Germany respectively. 
(e)  The  Agency  Agreements  under  which  ·each 
parent  appo.ints  Atlas  SA  a~  non-exclusive 
worldwide  agent  for  f;he  sale  of ·  DT and  FT's 
international leased lines '(half-circuits), with the 
territorial  exception  of  Germany  as  regards 
DT's half-circuits.· 
2.  Contractual Provisions 
. (21)  In  particu'l~r, the above agreements provide for  the 
following: 
1.  Structure of the Atlas venture 
Atlas  SA  is  created  as  a  joint venture  between 
FT and DT, each owning half the share capital. 
The  management  structure  of Atlas  SA  is  as 
·follows: 
(a)  Shareholders'  meeting:  Prior  approval  by 
the  shareholders'  meeting  is  necessary  for 
matters  such  as  the .. amendment  of  the 
articles  of association,  changes  of capital, 
issuance of shares, mergers, sale of all or a 
substantial  part  of  the  assets,  and 
liquidation. 
(b)  The board of directors: Atlas SA's board of 
directors  has  eleven  members,  fi-ve  apiece 
being  elected  by  DT and  FT  and one  by 
Sprint.  Prior  approval  by  the  board  of 
directors  is  required  for  a  number  of 
important decisions such as the approval of 
business  plans  and  annual  budgets  and 
changes  in  the  scope  of  Atlas,  the 
conclusion  of  important  contracts,  etc. 
Decisions on changes in  the Atlas business. 
management  appointments,  and  the 
approval  of  the  business  plan,  the  annual  f 
operating plan, and the  budget require that 
at  least  two  directors  nominated  by  each 
party vote  with the  majority( 17). 
(c)  Chief  executive  officers  (CEOs):  It  is 
envisaged  that  Atlas  SA  will  have 
two  CEOs,  one  nominated  by  Ff from 
among  its  representatives  in  the  board  of 
directors, the other by  DT from  among its 
representatives  in \the  board  of directors. 
The  CEOs  shall  be  jointly  responsible  for 
day-to-day operations and the management 
of  the  business  and  affairs  of  Atlas. 
Approval  of both co-CEOs  is  required for 
all ·important decisions including the hiring 
or· dismissal of key employees.  · 
The  parties  will  contribute  to  Atlas  their 
existing  European  assets  outside  France 
and  Germany  (as  well  as  some  assets  in 
France  and  Germany)  used  for  the 
pro~ision  of  services  coming  within  the f 
scope of Atlas. 
2.  Purpose and activities of Atlas · 
The  Atlas  venture  is  to  provide  seamless 
national and international non-reserved services 
to corporate customerS .(that is, to multinational 
companies  (MNCs)  and  SMEs  alike).  The 
portfolio  of  Atlas  services  comprises  data 
network  services,  international  end-to-end 
·services  (managed  links),  voice  VPN  services, 
customer-defined  networks,  outsourcing  and 
VSAT  services.  These  services  are  fully 
liberalized in the European Community and are 
widely  liberalized  worldwide.  Atlas  will  have 
the  responsibility  for  the  services  portfolio 
mentioned  above,  outside  France 
and Germany. 
(•7)  The  originally  envisaged  Strategic  Board  of  Atl~ts  SA, 
described  in  the  Article  19  (3)  notice  (footnote  6)  at 
paragraph  20  (b),  was  deleted  from  the  final  Atlas 
Agreements. 
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In France and Germany, Atlas will provide sales 
support to FT and DT's sales  forces  as  regards 
all  services  mentioned  in  the  Atlas  portfolio, 
with  the  exception  of public  packet-switched 
data  network  services  within  France  and 
Germany,  which  will  be  provided  by  FT's 
Transpac  France  subsidiary  and  DT's  T-Data 
subsidiary  respectively  until  the  tele-
communications  infrastructure  and  services 
markets  are  fully  and  effectively  liberalized  in 
France  and  Germany,  as  scheduled  for  1 
january 1998. 
Each acting as an exclusive distributor, DT will 
sell Atlas services in Germany, while FT will sell 
Atlas  servic:es  in  France. Atlas products will  be 
sold in France and Germany under the common 
globally  used  Atlas/GlobalOne  brands.  Passive 
sales  of Atlas  services  by  DT in  France,  by  FT 
in  GermiinY  and  by  any Atlas  oper~ting entity 
in both Member States will be allowed. Outside 
France  and  Germany,  Atlas  products  will  be 
sold by the Atlas operating entity for the rest of 
Europe. 
Pursuant  to  the  JV  Agreement,  a  balancing 
payment was made by DT at closing to equalize 
the  respective  contribution  values  of the  two 
parties. DT or FT will make a further balancing 
payment  upon  contribution  of  T-Data  and 
Transpac to Atlas to offset any difference in the 
valuation ofT-Data and Transpac respectively. 
3.  Provisions concerning dealings  with/by Atlas 
· Mutual  service  prov1s1on  between  Atlas  and 
FT/DT  is  the  subject.  of  two  Framework 
Services Agreements pursuant to which dealings 
between FTIOT and  Atl~s must· be  transparent, 
non-discriminatory and at arm's length. 
As  for;  services  generally offered  by  DT or FT, 
.  the  prices  and  other  terms  which  DT or Ff 
generally  apply  from  time  to  time  to  their 
customers are to apply equally for  Atlas~ A.s  for 
services  not  generally· offered  by  FT  ·Or  DT, 
market  prices  and  terms  apply  and  are 
negotiated  between  the  Parties  in  good  faith 
and  at arm's  length.  Consequently,  Atlas  will 
purchase such services from DT or FT at similar 
prices  and  on  similar  conditions  to those  that 
any  .. third party generally offering such services 
under  equival~nt circumstances would allow. If 
information  on  relevant  market  prices  is  not 
available, the  prices  applicable  for  Atlas  are  to 
be  determined  on  the  basis  of  a  calculation 
model that is used, within FT, tQ make offers to 
customers with special requests and, within DT, 
to  calculate  intra-group  transfer  prices.  Price~ 
resulting  from  such  calculation  will  cover,  for 
the  relevant  period,  all  costs  as  well  as  a 
reasonable profit margin. 
4.  Anti-competi~iorr provisions 
Pursuant  to  Article  XIII  af  the  Atlas  JV 
Agreement,  FT  and  DT  will  not  engage 
anywhere in  the production of services  that are 
substantially the same or compete directly with 
the  Atlas  services,  and  will  not engage  outside 
France  and  Germany  in  the  marketing,  sale  or 
distribution of services that are substantially the 
same  or  compete  directly  with  the  Atlas 
services.  Furthermore,  FT  will  not  marker  or 
distribute  Atlas  services  in  Germany  and  DT 
will  not market and distribute Atlas services  in 
France; passive sales are, however, permitted by 
FT outside France, by DT outside Germany and 
by Atlas in both France and Germany. 
·  5.  Provisions relating to intellectual and industrial 
prop.erty 
The parents each concluded an  lntell~crual and 
Industrial  Property  Trap.sfer  and  Licence 
Agreement with Atlas  SA  under which DT, FT, 
T-Data and Transpac France (the 'IPR holders') 
are  to  make  available  to  Atlas  SA  the  IPRs 
which are needed to operate the Atlas  business 
in accordance with the following principles: 
(a)  IPRs  ·owned  by,  or  licensed  to,  the  IPR 
holders  that  are  used  exclusively  for  the 
Atlas  business  will  be  transferred  to Atlas 
SA; 
(b)  IPRs  owned  by,  or  licensed  to,  the  IPR 
holders that are used predominantly for the 
Atlas  business shall be  transferred to Atlas 
SA, and a sub-licence will be granted to the 
Parties  (Grant-Back  Licence  sub-licence); 
and 
(c)  IPRs  owned  by,  or  licensed  to,  the  IPR 
holders that are used predominantly for the 
IPR  holders'  business  are  (sub-)licensed  to 
Atlas SA. 
G.  CHANGES MADE FURTHER TO THE 
COMMISSION'S INTERVENTION AND 
CONDffiONS ATTACHED TO THIS DECISION 
.(22)  Certa.in features of the Atlas transaction as notified 
appeared , to  be  incompatible  with  Community 
competition  rules.  Consequently,  the  Commission 
by  letter of 23  May  1995  informed  the  Parties  of 
its  concerns.  In  the  course  of  the  notification 
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procedur~ the  Parties  have  amended  the  original 
Agreements.  and  given  undertakings  to  the 
Commission. 
1.  Contractual changes 
(23)  Non-appointment  of  Atlas  SA  as  an  agent  for 
international half-circuits 
Further .  to  the  Commission's  letter  of  23  May 
1995, DT and FT abolished the Agency Agreements 
and  amended  the  original·  Service  Agreements  to 
take  account  of the  non-appointment of Atlas  SA 
as  a  non-exclusive  ~gent  for  DT  and  FT's 
half-circuits. 
(24)  Non-integration  of  French  and  German  public 
packet-switched  data  networks . before  full  and 
effective  liberalization  of  the  telecommunications 
infrastructure and services markets 
Atlas  SA  will  not  acquire  legal  ownership  or 
control within the meaning of Article  3 of Council 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89 (18)  of the  French 
and German public packet-switched data networks, 
Transpac  France  and  T-Data  respectively,  before 
the  telecommunications  infrastructure  and ser\rices 
markets  are· fully  and  effectively  liberalized  in 
France  and Gemtany,  as  is  scheduled to occur  by 
1 january 1998. Meanwhile: 
1.  FT has split Transpac SA into Transpac France 
apd Transpac Europe; 
· 2.  FT has yielded Transpac Europe to Atlas; 
3.  FT  will  keep  Transpac  Fra.nce  as  a  wholly 
owned subsidiary; 
4.  DT has  incorporated  DT's  X.25  data services 
division  as  a separate company under German 
law and a wholly owned subsidiary of .DT; 
5.  DT  and  Ff  havf?  fully  contributed  their 
outsourcing  joint  venture,  Eunetcom  B. V  .,  to 
Atlas SA;  and 
6.  Atlas SA has created a subsidiary in .France and 
Germany  (Atlas  France  and  Atlas  Germany 
respectively) to  provi~e t~e following services: 
(i)  sales  support  regarding  Atlas  products  to 
distributors in France and Germany; and 
(11)  OJ  No  L 395, 30.  12.  1989,  p.  1 (corrected  version  in  OJ 
No  L 257,  21.  9.  1990,  p.  13);  as  amended  by  the  Act  of 
Accession of Austria,  Finland and  Sweden. 
(ii)  services  within  the  scope  of Atlas  other 
than packet-switched data network services 
including: 
- VSAT  servic~s, 
- international end-to-end services, 
- voice VPN services, 
- customer-defined  solutions  (excluding 
national  X.25  data  services  in  France 
and Germany), and 
- outsourcing services, 
and excluding the services described  in  the 
last paragraph of recital  ~. 
Once  the  telecommunications  infrastructure  and 
services markets are fully  and effectively liberalized 
in  France  and  Germany,  Transpac  France  and 
T-Data will  be  contributed to Atlas  in  such a way  • 
that  Atlas  France  and  Atlas  Germany  will  be  • 
merged  with  Transpac  France  and  T-Data 
respectively.  For the purposes of such contribution, 
Transpac  France  and  T  -Data  shall  be  read  as 
comprising  only  the  public  packet-switched  data 
networks for the provision. of packet-switched data 
communications  services  based  on  the  X.25,  IP, 
SNA and Frame Relay protocols respectively. 
(25)  Technical cooperation 
Ahead  of  full  and  effective  liberalization  of the 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  services 
market~ in ·France and Germany,  DT and Ff will 
cooperate in the development of common technical 
network elements.  This  Decision  is  subject  to  the 
condition  that  DT  and  FT's  cooperation  in  this 
field  will~ until the date set in Article  2, comprise 
. the following areas only: 
1.  FT  and  DT will cooperate in  the  development 
of common  products  and  common  technical f 
network  elements  (namely  such  products  and  · 
elements · as  share  the  same  features,  whilst 
being  separately  built  and  owned);  such 
cooperation  will  extend  to  the  French  and 
'German public packet-switched data networks. 
Only the  following  functions  will  be  managed 
by  Atlas  SA  for  Transpac  France  and  T-Data 
respectively: 
(a)  product  management  and  development, 
namely:  (i) product definition (definition of 
inter alia  speed,  terms  and  availability  of 
interconnection  and  other  technical  and 
commercial  features),  (ii)  product 
marketing,  (iii)  product  life  cycle 
management,  (iv)  specification  of product 
requirements,  (v)  technical  specifications  · · 
and developments of the products and (vi) 
technical  development · of  the  products 
(hardware  and·  software),  provided  that 
product  branding  and  pricing  as  well  as 
product  implementation  in  the  network  is 
managed 'by  Transpac  France  and  T-Data 
respectively; 
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(b)  certain  network  planning  functions, 
namely: (i) central network engineering and 
optimization  of the  common  transmission 
network  so  as  to  avoid  an  unreasonable 
duplication  of  resour~es,  (ii)  engineering 
and  optimization  of the_· networks  for  the 
various  service  platforms  so  as  to  ensure 
seamless  services  and  (iii)  central  planning 
regarding  the  implementation  of  new 
network nodes  (such as  timing); and 
(c)  information  sy,stems,  namely:  (i)  definition 
of the informatiop. system architecture (for 
example,  development  of  common 
technical  features  for  future  information 
systems)~  (ii)  specification  of  information 
system  requirements  and  applications,  (iii) 
technical  development  of  hardware  and 
software  for  information  systems  and  (iv) 
central  implementation  planning  of 
hardware  and  software,  provided  that 
central  information  system  functions  (for 
example,  billing  information and statistics) 
will  be  operated  by  Transpac  France  and 
T-Data respectively. 
The  above  areas  of  cooperation  are  on  no 
account  to  be  tantamount  to  a  de  facto 
integration  of the  French  and  German  public 
packet~switched data  networks,  which  will  be 
controlled  by  two  .  separate  network 
management centres. The restriction of DT and 
FT's  technical  cooperation  to  the  elements  set 
out  above  is  attached . to  this  Decision  as  a 
condition within the meaning of Article 8 (  1) of 
Regulation No 17. 
2.  Atlas  may  subcon~act  certain  operational 
functions  to  Transpac  France  and  T-Data 
respectively. 
•  (26)  Non-integration of assets  of FI"s indirect German 
·subsidiary 
,.·· 
The  assets .. of  FT's  German  corporate 
telecommunications services provider ~  AG shall 
not be integrated into Atlas save as indicated in the 
following  undertaking: 
'To  meet  the  requirement  of  the  European 
Commission  that competition  is  not eliminated 
on  the  German  telecommunications  services 
market, France Telecom  (FT)  undertakes that it 
will  irrevocably  make  available  for  sale,  as  a 
going  business,  Transpac's  German  subsidiary 
Info AG,  or execute alternative remedies  if such 
sale  should not occur. 
Scope of the divestiture 
FT will divest of all assets as well as contracts of 
Info  AG.  Multinational  clients  whose · 
headquarters are outside Germany to whom Info 
AG  to  date  provides  advanced  network  services 
as  part  of  the  Transpac  netWork  may  be 
transferred  to  Atlas,  to the  extent to which  the 
Commission  is  satisfied  that  such  services  are 
separable from  the German activities of Info AG 
("Info  AG's  business")  without  significantly 
lessening the value  of those activities. 
The two parts of Info AG's business (i.e. Disaster 
Recovery  Services  (DRS)  and  Network  Services 
(NWS))  will  be  sold  separately  if  no  purchaser 
can be  found  for  Info AG's  business as  a whole. 
For the  purposes of this undertaking, the sale of 
Info  AG  will  be  considered  as  the  sale  of both 
the  DRS  and  the  NWS  parts  of  Info  AG's 
business. 
Obligations of France  Telecom 
1.  With regard to Info AG's present operations 
in  respect of customers whose  headquarters 
are  located  outside  Germany,  IT  will, 
before  the  sale  of  Transpac's  shares  in 
Info AG to the party purchasing such shares 
(the  'purchaser'),  try  to  bring  about  a 
service  agreement  between  Info  AG  and 
Transpac.  Pursuant  to  such  agreement, 
T  ranspac  will  continue  providing  for  Info 
AG  such  services  as  Transpac  is  currently 
providing to Info AG. 
2.  The  services  covered  by  the  agreement 
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall 
be  provided  so  as  not to impair Info  AG's 
remaining  business  as  presently  conducted. 
Conclusion  of  such  agreement  with  the 
purchaser is  not a condition and cannot be 
required  by  FT  for  the  purposes  of 
complying with this undertaking. 
3.  FT  also  agrees  to  provide  the  purchaser 
with  any  assistance  (e.g.  licences  and 
know-how) relating to the provision of Info 
AG's  services  to  the  extent  possible  under 
existing contractual obligations, as  the  case 
may  be.  FT  may  charge  the  purchaser  a 
market-based  fte  for  any  such  licence  and 
know-how.  The  market-based  fee  shall  be 
that normally  obtainable  on the  market at 
the  time  that  any  licence  or  know-how 
is provided. 
4.  FT  recognizes  the  Commission's  objectives 
to  (i)  maintain  the  viability,  marketability 
and  competitiveness  of  Info  AG's  current 
business  and  (ii)  to  provide  sufficient 
management  and  other  resources  for  this 
purpose.  To  achieve  these  objectives, 
FT  undertakes the following: 
(a)  to ensure that (i)  Info AG's  business  is 
legally  kept  separate  from  both 
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Transpac  and  T-Data  and  maintained 
as  a  distinct and saleable  business;  (ii) 
the value of Info AG's assets and of its 
business in every respect is  maintained, 
pursuant to  good  business  practice,  at 
their  current  level,  unless  a  change  in 
the assets is  necessary, in which case Ff 
shall  not make  any  significant  change 
without  prior  consultation  with  and 
approval of the  European Commission; 
and  (iii)  all  agreements  necessary  to 
maintain Info AG's business are entered 
into  or  continued  according  to  their 
terms, consistent with past practice and 
the . ordinary  course  of  business;  this 
notably  includes  all  agreements  and 
arrangements  related  to  leased  line 
capacity  and  interconnection  with 
T-Data and/or Deutsche Telekom; 
(b)  to  keep  all  administrative  and 
management  functions  relating  to  Info 
AG  which  have  been  carried. out at all 
levels  within  Ff and/or  Transpac  to 
maintain  the  viability,  marketability 
and  competitiveness  of Info  AG  until 
divestiture  is  completed  or · until  the 
crustee  advises  Ff that such  functions 
are  no  longer  necessary,  whichever 
occurs earlier; 
(c)  as soon as  is practiCal and in any event 
no  later  than  by  10  July  1996,  to 
appoint a trustee (the 'trustee'), such as 
an investment bank, subject to approval 
by the Commission (such approval shall 
not  be  withheld  without-·good  cause), 
provided  that;· $Ubject  to  approval  by 
the  Commission  (such  approval  shall 
not  be  withheld  'Yithout  good  cause), 
Ff  may  .  (i)  terminate  the  trustee 
agreement should Ff  decide at any time 
after  the  appointment  that .  the  trustee 
does  not  perform  its  duties  properly, 
and  (ii)  replace  the  previously 
appointed  trustee  by  another  trustee 
also  appr~ved by the Commission; 
(d)  to  give  such  trustee  an  irrevocable 
mandate  to  sell  Info  AG,  on  best 
possible  terms  and  conditions,  to  an 
available  purchaser  ·making  an  offer 
before [  ...  ](19); and 
(19)  Business secret. 
(e)  to  establish  and  facilitate  the 
management  structure  agreed  with  the 
trustee  in  the  framework  of  the 
divestiture negotiations. 
5.  When  the  trustee  is  appointed  to  sell  Info 
AG,  FT shall comply with the requirements 
of the  trustee to maintain the value  of Info 
AG's  assets,  to  the  extent  legally 
permissible,  unless  a change  in  the assets  is 
necessary,  in  which case Ff shall not make 
any  significant  change  without  prior 
consultation  with  and  approval  of  the 
European  Commission.  Ff  shall  in 
particular  ensure  that all  services  provided 
by  FT  or  any  of Ff's subsidiaries  to  Info 
AG  continue  to  be  provided efficiently  and 
satisfactorily and that 'no increase is made in  f 
the charge (if any)  made to Info AG for any 
service.  FT  shall  not,  except  with  the 
consent  of  the  trustee,  employ  or  offer 
employment  to  any  employee  or officer  of 
Info AG  until  after the sale of Info AG. 
Obligations of the trustee . 
6.  Pursuant to the agreement between Ff and 
the  trustee  appointed  with  the 
Commission's consent, the trustee shall: 
(a)  advise  Ff and·  Transpac  on  the  best 
management  structure  to  ensure  the 
continued  viability,  marketability  and f 
competitiveness  of Info  AG's  business. 
The trustee shall notably give advice on 
how  to. undertake an:y  restructuring of 
Info AG  in a way that guarantees Info 
AG's  viability,  marketability  and 
competitiveness; 
(b)  advise Ff and Transpac with regard to 
the  satisfactory  · operation  and 
management of Info  AG  to ensure the 
continued  viability,  marketability· and 
competitivene~s of Info  AG's  business 
as  well  as  supervise,  monitor  and 
control  the  implementation  of  the 
advice  by Info AG.  For the purposes of 
and  to  the  extent  necessary  for  such 
monitoring,  the  trustee  shall  have 
complete access  to Info AG's personnel 
and  facilities  as  well  as  to documents, 
books  and  records  of  both  Ff  · and 
Transpac,  including  such  personnel, 
facilities,  books  and  records  which, 
even  if not directly related to Info AG, 
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may  have an impact on the conduct of 
Info AG's operations; 
(c)  act  as  Ff's  investment  banker  in 
conducting good faith negotiations with 
interested  third  parties  with a  view  to 
selling  Info  AG  within  [  ...  ] (2°)  of the 
first  closing  date  · of  the  Atlas 
transaction  as  defined  therein,  i.e. 
before[ ...  ](21 )  (the 'target date'). In the 
event that the trustee at any time prior 
to  the  target  date  but  at  least  two 
months  before  that  date  determines 
together with the Commission that it is 
not  possible  to  identify  an  acceptable 
purchaser for  Info  AG  exclusive  of the 
customers  whose  headquarters  are 
located outside of Germany, the trustee, 
IT and  the  Commission  will  discuss 
appropriate alternatives to the proposed 
divestiture  of  Info  AG,  notably  an 
extended divestiture; 
(d)  provide  a  written  report  before  a 
binding  contract  is  signed  and  in  any 
event every  month on all  developments 
in  its  negotiations  with  third  parties 
interested  in  purchasing  Info  AG; 
such  reports,  with  · supporting 
documentation,  shall , be  furnished  to 
the Commission with copy to Ff; 
(e)  provide  the  Commission,  with copy  to 
Ff,  with  a  written  report  every  tWo 
months  concerning  the  monitoring  of 
the  operations  and  management  of 
Info AG; 
(f)  at  any  other  time  upon  the 
Commission's  request  provide  the 
Commission  with  a  written  or  oral 
report on any aspect of the duties and 
activities  of the  trustee  in  relation  to 
Info AG and its possible purchasers. Ff 
shall  receive  a  copy  of  such  written 
reports  and  shall  be  informed  of the 
content of oral reports; and  · 
(g)  cease  to  perform  its  duties  as · trustee 
for  the  purpose  of  this  undertaking 
when  the  sale  of  Info  AG  or  any 
alternative  remedy  within  the  meaning 
of  paragraph  6  (c)  above  becomes 
effective. 
7.  The trustee shall be "remunerated by Fr. The 
trustee's  remuneration  .  shall  provide 
incentives  for  a  prompt divestiture,  so  that 
the  trustee uses  its  best efforts in  arranging 
a prompt and value-maximizing sale of Info 
AG. 
(10)  Business secret. 
(11)  Business secret. 
a.  Ff  undertakes  to  give  all  reasonable 
assistance  requested  by  the  trustee  to  sell 
Inf9  AG  by  the  target  date.  Ff shall  be 
deemed .to have complied with its divestiture 
undertaking  if  by  such  date  it has  entered 
into a  binding· letter of intent or a  binding 
contract  for  the  sale  of  Info  AG  to  a 
purchaser  agreed  by  the  Commission, 
provided that such sale  is  completed within 
a reasonable time  limit,  after the  signing of 
such  binding  letter  of  intent  or  binding 
contract, agreed  by the  Commission. 
9.  The  Commission  may,  upon  FT's  request 
and good cause provided, extend the period 
granted to FT for  divestiture of Info  AG  by 
an  additional  six  months  after  the  target 
date (the 'extended target date'). 
10.  The  reports  referred  to  in  subparagraphs 
(6)  (d)  and  (f)  above shall  indicate whether 
a  proposed  purchaser  would  be  able  to 
ensure  that Info  AG  remains  a competitive 
participant  in  the  German  tele-
communications  market  and  whether 
negotiations  with  such  proposed  purchaser 
should continue. If within  10  working days 
of the  receipt  of such  indications  from  the 
trustee  the  Commission. does  not  formally 
disagree  · with  the  trustee's  favourable 
assessment  of  a  proposed  purchaser, 
negotiations  with  such  proposed  purchaser 
may proceed. The Commission may disagree 
with the  trustee's .assessment of a proposed 
purchaser if the proposed purchaser were in 
the Commission's view  unlikely to compete 
effectively with T  -Data, Atlas Germany and 
Global  One respectively. 
11.  The  [ ...  ](22)  period  up  to  the  target  date 
and  the  six-month  period  up  to  the 
extended target date, as the case may be, are 
suspended · in  cases  where  the  sale  of Info 
AG  is  suspended due to ·a  notification to a 
competition  authority  until  such  authority 
adopts its  final  decision  with regard to the 
sale of Info  AG. 
12.  Any  dispute.  between  Ff  and  the 
purchaser(s) of Info AG. with respect to Ff's 
undertaking  to  divest  of  the  Info  AG 
business 'will be subject to arbitration by an 
independent  third  party.  During  such 
arbitration,  the.  [ ...  ](23)  . period  up  to  the 
target date will  be  suspended. 
13.  If the  sale  of Info  AG's  business  does  not 
seem  likely  to  occur  by  the  date  stated  in 
paragraph  (4)  (d),  FT  shall,  at  least  two 
(21)  Business secret. 
(23)  Business secret. 
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months  before  that date, submit alternative 
remedies  sufficiently  satisfac~ory  to 
· safeguard - actual  competition  in  the 
German  market.  These  alternative remedies 
must  be  executed  by  the  date  stated  in 
paragraph (4)  (d).' 
The  Commission  makes  this  Decision  conditional 
on  IT's compliance  with  the  .terms  of the' above 
undertaking.  Where  they  are  separable  from  the 
product  divisions  of  Info  AG  that  are  to  be 
divested,  multinational  clients  to  whom  Info . AG 
now  provides·  network  services  as  part  of  the 
Transpac  network  and  whose  headquarters  are 
located  outside  Germany  may  be  transferred  to 
Atlas. 
(27)  IT, DT,  Atlas  and GlobalOne have  given  separate 
undertakings not to compete, for one year after the 
closing  date  of  the  sale  of  Info  AG,  with  the 
-purchaser  for  the  provision of telecommunications 
services  to  customers  of  Info  AG  whose 
headquarters  are  located  ~vithin  Germany  (the 
'transferred  customers')  at  the  specific  locations 
which  Info  AG  served,  except  where  such 
transferred customers decline in good faith  to deal 
with  the  purchaser  of Info  AG.  The  Commission 
makes  this  Decision  conditional on compliance  by 
IT,  DT,  Atlas  and  GlobalOne  comply  with  the 
requirements of this undertaking. 
2.  Non-discrimination condition 
(28)  In  order  to  provide  the  services  described  under· 
·recital  5,  Atlas  or  any  other  service  provider  is 
dependent  on  access  to  the  . public·  ~tched 
telecommunications network (PSTN), the integrated 
services  digital  network ·(ISDN)  and  to- other 
. essential facilities, and. also on reserved services (24). 
Until  there  is  full  and  effective  liberalization  of 
infrastructure and services in France and Germany, 
as  is  scheduled  to occur  by  1 january 1998, only 
Ff. and  DT  provide  access  to the  PSTN  and  the 
ISDN  as  well  as  reserved  services.  However,  even 
when  all  telecommunications facilities  and services  · 
are  non-reserved,  Fr and  DT will  at least  for  a 
number of years  remain  indispensable suppliers of . 
building  blocks  for  the  relevant services  in  France 
and  Germany.  Given  that  FT  and  DT  are 
shareholders  of  Atlas  it  is  essential  for  the 
safeguarding of fair competition between.Atlas and 
other existing or future telecommunications services 
providers  to  eliminate  the  risk  that  the  former 
(l
4
)  Reserved  services  are services  which  are provided  pursuant 
to  special  or exclusive  rights  granted  by  the  EU  Mem~r 
States to .their respective TOs. 
might  be  granted  more  favourable  treatment 
regarding  the  following  facilities-related  tele-
communications services provided by FT and DT to 
Atlas  i~ France and Germany respectively, pursuant 
to  the  Framework  Services 'Agreements:  (i)  leased 
lines services, in particular international leased lines 
(half-circuits)  and  domestic  leased  lines,  including 
any  discounts,  as  the  case  may  be;  and  (ii) 
PSlNIISDN services  including  both access  to such 
networks  (namely  analogue  access;  basic  ISDN 
access;  ISDN  access  to  the. public  packet-switched 
data  networks;  special  access  from  the  public 
packet-switched  data  networks  to  ISDN  (X. 75 
interface);  and  national  and  international  voice 
VPN and VPN interconnection services)  and traffic 
over  such  networks.  Likewise,  Atlas  is  not to  be 
granted  more  favourable  treatment  than  thi~~ 
parties  in  connection  with  other reserved  facilities 
and  services  and  with  such  facilities  and  services 
which  remain  an  essential  facility  after  full  and t 
effective  liberalization  of  telecommunications  . 
infrastructure and services in France and Germany. 
Thus: 
1.  Terms and conditions 
The .terms  and  conditions  applied  by  DT  and 
IT to  Atlas  for  the  abovementioned  services 
covered  by the Framework Services Agreements 
and for  the  provision  of other reserved  and/or 
essential  services  (for  example,- provision  of 
leased  lines,  allocation  of  numbers,  addresses 
and  names)  in  connection  with  the  services 
described under recital 5 shall be similar to the 
terms and conditions applied to other providers 
of similar. services. This requirement covers inter 
alia  availability,  price,·  quality  of  service, 
functionality,  usage  conditions,  timetable  for 
installation of requested facilities, connection of 
apparatus, or repair  an~ maintenance services.  f 
·  .. 2.  Scope of services available 
Atlas is not to be granted ·terms and conditions, 
or to be  exempted  from  any  usage  restrictions 
regarding the  abovementioned services  covered 
by  the  Framework  Services  Agreements  and 
other  reserved  and/or essential  services,  which 
would  enable  it  to  offer  services  which 
competing  providers .  are  prevented  from 
offering. 
. 3.  Technical information 
DT and FT is not· to discriminate between Atlas 
and any other service  provider competing with 
Atlas  in  connection  with  either  a  decision  to 
substantially modify technical interfaces for the 
access  to  reserved  and/or essential  facilities  or 
services or the disclosure of any other technical 
I 
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information  relating  to  the  operation  of  the 
PSTN/ISDN.  Competitors  will,  in  particular, 
have  access  to technical  information to which 
they can adapt lest their quality of services  be 
reduced, such as signalling sohware information 
for the provision of voice services. 
4.  Commercial information 
DT and FT is not to discriminate between Atlas 
and  other  providers  of  services  as  described 
under  recital  5  as  regards  the  disclosure  of 
certaist  commercial  information  (for  example, 
systemized and organized customer information 
derived  exclusively  from  the  operation  the 
PSTNIISDN or the provision of reserved and/or 
essential  services)  if  such  information  would 
confer a  substantial competitive advantage and 
is  not readily and equally available elsewhere by 
service  providers competing with Atlas. 
To ensure the absence of third-party discrimination, 
this Decision in application of Article 85  (3) of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53 (3) of the EEA Agreement 
is  to  be  valid only on condition that DT, FT  and 
Atlas  comply  with  the  following  additional 
conditions. 
3.  Other conditions attached to this Decision 
DT  and  F;r  have  also  entered  into  certain 
additional commitments. Where these comniitments 
are too general or insufficient, the Commission has 
specified  and  supplemented  the  behavioural 
constraints  imposed  on  the  parents.  Compliance 
with  the  constraints  described  below  will  be  a 
condition  for  the  validity  of this  Decision  within 
the meaning of Articie 8 (1) of Regulation No 17. 
1.  Access  to DT and FI"s public packet-switched 
data networks  · 
DT  and  Fr · have  given  the  following 
undertaking: 
'Each  of Ff and  DT will  as  of 1  January 
1996  establish  and  thereafter  maintain 
third-party  access  to  their  public  switched 
data  networks · in  France  and  Germany · 
respectively.  Non-discriminatory,  open  and 
transparent access will be granted to all data 
services  providers  that  offer  X.25 
packet-switched  data  communications 
services. To ensure non-discriminatory access 
to .their national public X.25 packet-switched 
data networks, FT and DT shall: 
(a)  establish  and  maintain  standardized 
X.75  interlaces  to access  their  national 
public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks; this interconnection is suitable 
for  the  provision  of end-to-end  services 
based on X.25 specifications for end-user 
access  speeds up to 64 kbps; and 
(b)  offer  such  access  on non-discriminatory 
terms,  including  price,  availability  of 
volume  or  .  other  discounts  and  the 
quality of interconnection provided. 
FT  and  DT  shall  further  ensure 
non-discriminatory access by  making publicly 
available  the  standard terms and conditions 
for  such X. 7  5 interface· standards, including, 
if  any,  volume  and other discounts,  as  of 1 
January  1996.  FT  and  DT  will  make 
available  for  inspection  by  the  Commission 
any  agreements  relating  to  such  X. 7  5 
interfaces,  including  all  specifically  agreed 
terms.  Until  such  time  as  Transpac  France 
and T-Data are integrated into Atlas,  neither 
Transpac France nor T-Data shall disclose to 
Atlas any such specifically agreed  terms that 
are identified  and maintained as  confidential 
by  the  party  obtaining  interconnection 
through  such  X.75 'interfaces.  Finally,  the 
above obligations shall likewise apply to any 
generally  used  ccm  -standardized 
interconnection  protocol  that  may  modify, 
replace  or co-exist  as  a  standard related  to 
the  X. 7  5  standard  and  is  used  by  FT  and 
DT. 
Proprietary  interfaces  may  be  retained  or 
established  among Transpac France,  T-Data 
and Atlas; such interfaces are defined  by the 
particular type of technology,  hardware and 
sohw~re that  a  network  operator  uses  to 
provide  advanced  or  customized  services. 
Atlas· will  be  allowed to access  the T ranspac 
France  and  T-Data  public  packet-switched 
data  networks  · through·  these  proprietary 
interfaces,  also  . fo1  the  provision  of 
packet-switched  data  communications 
services,  provided  access  granted  to  Atlas 
through  such  interfaces  is  economically 
equivalent  to  t_hird-party  access  to  the 
Transpac France and T-Data networks.' 
The Commission makes this Decision subject to 
the condition that Transpac France, T-Data and 
eventually Atlas grant third-party access to the 
French. and  German  public  packet-switched 
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data  networks  on  non-discriminatory 
transparent terms and conditions which must be 
economically  · equivfllent  to  the  terms  and 
conditions of Atlas' access to such networks. 
2.  Access  to  DT  and  FT's  other  networks  and 
facilities 
This  Decision  is  conditional on DT's and FT's · 
granting  to  any  third  party  that  operates  a 
telecommunications  facility  ('telecommuni-
cations  operator')  and  applies  for  the 
interconnection  of  such  facility  or  systems 
facilities  with  DT or  FT's  networks,  such  as 
PSTN,  ISDN  or  ATM  networks  and  related 
broadband  capacity,  as  the  case  may  be,  such 
interconnection  on  non-discriminatory  terms 
vis-a-vis  Atlas.  Such  terms  must  enable  the 
telecommunications  operator  to  provide 
telecommunications.  services  or  provide  its 
telecommunications facilities  without limitation 
in any respect within the reasonable capabilitjes 
of the ,telecommunications operator concerned. 
3.  Cross-subsidization 
DT and  FT  have  undertaken  not to engage  in 
cross-subsidization in connection with the Atlas 
venture. To prevent Atlas from  benefiting from 
cross-subsidies stemming from the operation of 
public telecommunications infrastructure and of 
reserved services by either DT or FT, all entities 
formed  pursuant  to  the Atlas  venture  will  be 
established as distinct entities separate from DT 
and Ff. 
Atlas  SA,  T-Data  and  Transpac  France  shall 
obtain their own debt financing  on their own 
credit, provided that FT and DT: 
(a)  may  make  capital  contributions.  or· 
commercially  reasonable  loans  . to  such 
entities as are required to enable Atlas SA, 
T-Data  anc;l  Transpac  France  to  conduct 
their respective businesses; 
(b)  may  pledge. tbeir  venture  interests in  such 
entities,  in  connection  with  non-recourse 
financing for such  ~ntities, and  · 
(c)  may  guarantee  any  indebtedness  .of  -such 
entities, provided that FT and DT may only 
make  payments  pursuant  to  any  such 
guarantee  following  a  default  by  such 
entities  ~n respect of such indebtedness. 
Compliance  with  the  above  undertaking  is  a 
condition  for  the  validity  of  this  Decision 
under  Article  8 (1)  of Regulation  No 17.  The 
Commission  extends  the  following .  conditions 
as  to  conduct  to  cover  all  entities  created 
pursuant  to  the  Atlas  agreement,  T-Data  and 
Transpac  France.  Such  entitles  are  not  to 
allocate  directly or indirectly any part of their 
operating expenses, costs, depreciation, or other 
expenses  of  their  business  to  any  parts  of 
FT  or DT's  business  units  (including  without 
limitation  the  proportionate  costs  based  on 
• work actually performed that are attributable to 
shared employees or sales or marketing of Atlas 
products and services  by  DT or FT employees); 
however, nothing is to prevent Atlas SA, T-Data 
and Transpac France from billing DT or FT for 
products and services provided to DT or FT by 
such  entities  on  the  basis  of the  same  price 
charged third parties (in the case of products or 
services  sold  to  third · parties  in  commercial 
quantities)  or full  cost reimbursement or other 
arm's  length  pricing  method  (in  the  case  of 
products and service's  not sold  to third  parties 
in commercial quantities). 
4.  Accounting 
The  Commission  imposes  a  condition  on 
T-Data,  Transpac  France  (including  all  sub-
sidiaries) and all entities created pursuant to the 
Atlas  agreements  which operate in  the  EEA  to 
keep  separate  accounting  records  (including 
profit  and  loss  account  and  balance  sheet 
or  statement  of  capital  employed)  using 
internatiGnal  accounting  standards  for  each 
service they provide in any country. 
• 
These  accounting  records  will  notably  identify( 
all services provided to such entities by DT and 
FT and payments  or transfers  to or from  DT 
and Ff; moreover,  no entity created  pursuant 
to  .the  A~las  Agreement,  nor  T-Data  or 
Transpac  France  will  receive  any  material 
subsidy  (including forgiveness  of debt)  directly 
or indirectly from DT or Ff, or any investment 
·or payment from DT or Ff that is not recorded 
in the books of such entities as an investment in 
debt or equity. 
The  Commission  also  imposes  a  condition  on 
DT and FT  (including all  subsidiaries)  to keep  .. 
separate  acco1:1nting  records  of  all  services 
provided to any entity created pursuant to the 
Atlas Agreements operating in the EEA. To that 
end,  DT and  FT are  to implement within one 
year  fro~ the  date of the exemption  pursuant 
to  Article ' 1  of·  this  Decision  an  accounting 
system which identifies detailed cost accounting 
data for  any such service. 
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The  records  mentioned.  in  the  previous  two 
subparagraphs will detail the following: 
(a)  the cost  ~tandard used; 
(b)  the  accounting  conventions  used  for ·  the 
treatment of costs; 
(c)  the  full  allocation  and  attribution  of 
expenses  or  costs,  revenues,  assets  and 
liabilities  shared between such entities and 
'their parents; and 
(d)  the attribution method chosen. 
5.  Bundling. 
The  Commission  imposes  a  condition  on  DT 
an·d  FT  to sell  DT and FT  services  respectively 
under contracts separate from the contracts for 
the  sale  of  Atlas  services  concluded  as 
distributors  of  Atlas  in  Germany  and  France 
respectively.  Each· separate contract will set out 
the  terms  and  conditions  of  each  individual 
service  sold  thereunder  and 'notably  attribute 
any quantity or other discounts to a  particular 
service, as  the case may be. 
4.  Obligations attached to this Decision 
The Commission attaches the following obligations 
within the  meaning of Article  8  (1)  of Regulation 
No 17 to this Decision, pursuant to Article 85  (3) 
of the  EC  Treaty  and Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA 
Agreement.  These  obligations will  remain  in  force 
for  the  .duration  of the  exemption.  In  so  far  as 
related  to  existing  obligations  under  national  or 
Community  law,  the  obligations  described  below 
are  intended  to  ensure  the  Parties'  firm 
commitment  to  comply  with  the  applicable  legal 
framework.  Pursuant  to  Article  8  (3)  (b)  of 
R~gulation No  17~  the  Commission  may  revoke 
this .  Decision  where  the  parties  breach  any  such 
obligation. 
1.  A':lditing 
Atlas  SA  (which  includes  its  consolidated 
subsidiaries), Transpac France  and T-Data 'are 
to  be  auJiited  every  year;  such  audit  will 
confirm from  an accounting viewpoint that: 
(a)  the transactions  between  these  entities, on 
the one hand, and Fr and DT, on the other 
hand,  have  been  conducted.  at'  arm's 
length; 
(b)  these  entltles  have  adhered  to  the 
accounting  procedures  chosen  within  the 
framework  set  out  under  recital  29  (4); 
and 
(c)  the calculation numbers are accurate. 
The  first  auditing  reports,  covering  the 
12-month period starting on the date on which 
(31) 
this  Decision  comes  into  force,  will  be 
submitted to the Commission within 15 months 
of  that  date.  This  obligation  will  remain  in 
. force for the duration of this Decision. 
2.  Recording obligations 
DT, FT and all entities created pursuant to the 
Atlas  Agreements  will  each  keep  records  and 
documents  suitable  to  prove  compliance  with 
the  terms  of  the  above  conditions  ready  for 
inspection by  the Commission. 
3.  Inspection of records 
For  the  p1.1rpose  of ascertaining  and  ensuring 
compliance by  DT, IT or Atlas with the above 
,conditions,  DT,  FT  and  all  entities  created 
pursuant  ·to  the  Atlas  Agreements  will,  on 
reasonable  notice,  durfng  office  hours,  and 
without a  need  for  the  Commission  to invoke 
the  powers  of  inspection  pursuant  to 
Regulation No 17, give·the Commission access 
to  DT,  FT  or  Atlas's  business  premises  to 
inspect  records  and  documents covered  by  the 
above recording obligations and to receive  oral 
explanations relating to such documents. 
4.  Reporting obligations 
T-Data,  Transpac  France,  DT,  FT  and  all 
entitles  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreements  will  provide  the  Commission,  for 
the  purpose  of  ascertaining  whether  DT,  Ff 
·and  Atlas  comply  with  the  above  obligations, 
with: 
(a)  any  records  and  documents  in  the 
possession  or  control  of  DT,  Ff or  an 
entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
agreements  necessary  for  that  determi-
nation;  in  particular,  every  six  months, 
starting  one  year  after  the  date  of  the 
exemption  pursuant  to  Article  1  of this 
Decision with unaudited accounting data as 
specified in recital 29 (4); and 
(b)  oral  or  written  complementary  explana-
tions. 
H.  THE REGULATORY SITUATION 
In letters  sent  to the ·Commission, the -French  and 
German Govetnments have ·undertaken to take the 
~ecessary  steps  to  effectively  allow  the  use  of 
alternative  infrastructure  for  the  provision  of 
liberalized  telecommunications  services  by  1  july 
1996 and to  liberalize  the voice  telephony  service 
and all  telecomn:tunications infrastructure fully  and 
effectively  by, 1 January  1998  •.  The  availability of 
alternative  telecommunications  infrastructure . in 
Germany  and France  r~nders competitors of Atlas 
II  AI  44 
• 
•  .. 
• ,..·· 
• 
No L239/38  Official Journal of the European Communities  19. 9. 96 
independent of DT and FT's infrastructUre for  the 
purpo.ses  of creating trunk network infrastructure 
to proyide liberalized services. 
Early  alternative  infrastructure  liberalization  in  · 
France  and  Germany  adds  to  a  regulatory 
framework  in  the  home  countries  of  the  Atlas 
partners that is  designed  to ensure a  l~vel playing 
field  in the telecommunications markets. 
1.  France 
1.  Separation of regulatory and operative 
functions 
Pursuant  to  French  Law,  the  Minister  of 
Telecommunications shall ensure that regulation 
of  the  telecommunications  markets  is 
undertaken  separately  of service  provision  in 
these  markets.  A·  specific  national  regulatory 
authority  (NRA),  the  Direction  Generale  des 
Postes  et  Telecommunications  (DGPT),  is 
competent  for  licensing  providers  of 
telecommuniCations  networks  and  services  in 
France  hased  on  objective  and  transparent 
criteria.  The  DGPT  shall  survey  FT's  market 
behaviour  and  approve  IT's  tariffs  for  (i) 
reserved  services  and leased  lines  and  (ii)  such 
liberalized services that are not in fact provided 
by a third party active in the French  ~arket. 
2.  Non-discriminatory access 
Further  to  the  adoption  of  the  Commission 
Services  Directive  and  Council  Directive 
90/387/EEC  ('ONP ·Framework  Directive')  (25 )~ 
Article  L  32-1-4°  of  the  French  Law  of 
29 December 1990 gtants all users equal access 
to the public networks on objective, transparent 
and non-discriminatory conditions. FT is under _ 
an  obligation  to  effectively  grant such  access 
and must ·publish  jnformation on the network 
(such  as  ·technical  features,  tariffs  and .  usa~e 
conditions)  and  on  leased  line  offerings.,  The 
DGPT may  verify  FT's compliance  with these 
obligations  and  investigate  complaints  filed 
against·  Fr  for  non-compliance  with . these 
obligations.  The  DGPT  is,  further,  to  ensure 
compliance  with  Ff's  obligation  to  share 
available  transmission  capacity  for  liberalized 
services  with  competitors  and  shall  publish· 
annual  statistical  reports  on  Ff's compliance 
with these obligations. 
fU)  Council  Directive  90/387/EEC  of  28  june  1990 .on. the 
establishment of·the internal market for telecommunacattons 
services  through  the · implementation  of  open  network 
provision; OJ No l  192, 24. 7. 1990, p.  1.  ~ 
.,,  '  ..  ,•, 
3.  Prevention of cross-subsidies 
To allow  the  DGPT to supervise  FT's  market 
behaviour,  FT  is  under the legal  obligation  to 
.keep  an  analytical  accounting  system  that 
'relates  costs  to  each  individual  FT  service. 
Where  an  offering  comprises  the  provision  of 
both reserved and liberalized services, FT must 
separate each kind of service in the contract and 
in  the  invoice.  In  this  connection,  FT's  data 
communications  services  are  already  provided 
by  a separate legal entity. 
2.  Germany 
1.  Separation  of regulatory and operative 
functions 
Pursuant  to  the  German  1989  Poststruktur-
gesetz, the 1994 Postneuordnungsgesetz and the 
1994  Post- und  Telekommunikation-
Regulierungsgesetz, regulatory competencies are 
assigned  to a  Federal agency created  under the 
Federal  Ministry  of  Post  and 
Telecommunications  (BMPT)  while 
telecommunications  operations  are  undertaken 
by  DT,  a  fully  State-owned  joint  stock 
corporation.  Regulatory  obligations  of DT. are 
policed  by  independent  bodies,  so-called 
regulatory ch~mbers. 
2.  Non-discriminatory access 
Under  the  current  and  future  German 
regulatory  framework,  DT is  to  provide  third 
parties  with  both  access  to  monopoly 
infrastructUre  and  reserved  or mandatory ser-f 
vices  on a  non-discriminatory  and transparent 
basis  according  to  objective  ·criteria.  Upon 
application,  DT  will.  supply  state-of-the-an 
leased  lines  over  service-neutral  access  points 
without delay. With the only restriction of voice 
telephony service provision, leased lines' may be 
freely  interconnected and used for any service. 
Leased lines must meet market demand and DT 
must publish  data concerning  availability  and 
quality of such lines.  · 
·  3.  Prevention of cross-subsidies 
The  BMPT  (i)  will ·approve  both  tariffs  and 
other price-sensitive contractual terms for DT's 
reserved  services  and  (ii)  may  object· to  DT's 
tariffs for mandatory services. The BMPT may 
also seize DT's profits stemming from tariffs in 
excess  of the  approved  amount and take any 
measure  nece~sary: to reeftablish  an effectively 
competitive  environment·  jeopardized  by 
unlawful  cross-subsidization.  Moreover,  DT's 
subsidiaries  and  affiliates  are  to  use  reserved 
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services for the provision of competitive services 
under equivalent  terms  as  DT's customers and 
must  use  such  terms  to  account  internal 
services transfer. 
I.  TIIIRD-PARTY OBSERVATIONS 
Following  the  publication  of a  notice  pursuant to 
Article  19 (3) of Regulation No 17 and to Article 3 
of  Protocol  21  of  the  EEA  Agreement(l6),  10 
interested third parties submitted comments to the 
Commission.  These  comments  approved. of  the 
structural  changes  made  by  DT  and  FT  to  the 
original  project, . whilst  suggesting  that  a  swift 
divestiture of FT's  indirect German subsidiary Info 
AG  was  ~rucial. Third  parties  also  contributed to 
the Commission's definition of the relevant markets 
emphasizing  the  indispensability  of (i)  an effective 
liberalization of 'alternative infrastructure in  France 
and  Germany,  namely  actual  access  to  alternative 
sources  of infrastructure  in  these  countries,  before 
Atlas  is  exempted  from  Articles  85  (  1)  of the  EC 
Treaty and  53  (1)  of the  EEA  Agreement  and (ii) 
surveillance  of· technical  cooperation  between  DT 
and  FT  lest  it  extend  to  sales,  marketing  and 
pricing. 
As  for  proposed  behavioural  restraints  to  be 
imposed  on  DT  and  FT,  third  parties  submitted 
that  obligations  and  condition!  should  remain  in 
place until there was effective competition in France 
and Germany. Finally, third-party observations also 
pointed to the relevance of appropriate accounting 
systems  and  interconnection  terms,  including 
technically  equivalent  interf~ces  for  the  joint-
venture companies and thiri:l parties, to ensure that 
Atlas's  competitors  are  not  , harmed  by 
cross-subsidies or discriminatory practices. 
The  Commission  carefully  reviewed  all  comments 
received·  and  concluded  that  most  concerns 
expressed  therein  had  already  becm  raised  by  the 
Commission  and discussed  in  detail  with  DT and 
IT,  who  had  provided  adequate  answers  and 
safeguards.  Those  comments  have  not  therefore 
affected  the  Commission's  substantive  position 
outlined in  the Article  19 (3)  notice as  regas.:ds  the 
notified  agreements.  However,  in  the  interests  of 
legai certainty the  Commission  has  spelled  out in 
more detail in this Decision the scope and duration 
of some conditions and obligations imposed on DT 
and FT. 
(2')  See  footnote  2. 
(35)  Subsequent  to  third-party  observations  the 
Commission also requested that fl', DT,  Atlas and 
GlobalOne give the undertakings reproduced under 
recitals  et  seq.  and  decided  to  attach  as  an 
additional condition to this  Decision  that DT and 
IT  sell  own  products  unbundled  from  Atlas 
products (see  recital  ~9 (5)).  · 
II.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A.  ARTICLE  85  (1)  OF THE EC TREATY AND 
ARTICLE 53  (1)  OF THE EEA AGREEMENT 
1.  Struc~ural cooperative joint venture 
The  Atlas  joint  venture  is  structural  and 
cooperative in  nature. 
(36)  Potential  competition  in  markets  for  Europe-wide 
and national telecommunications services 
Atlas  will  initially  combine  and  develop  products 
largely based on DT and FT's existing products, in 
respect of which  DT  and FT will  act as  exclusive 
distributors  within  their  respective  domestic 
markets.  Although  certain  services  transferred  to 
Atlas·  in  third-country  national  markets  and 
Europe-wide  remain  with · DT  and  FT  in  their 
respective  home  markets  (see  recital  5), 
Interconnection  allows  the  extension  of any  such 
service from the national home market into another 
· geographic  market.  FT  for  instance  provides  an 
international · .  extension  to  its  domestic  and 
international  VPN  services  offerings.  For  both 
·offerings  this  extension  may  include  Germany 
where  DT's national  VPN  services  remain  outside 
the scope of Atlas. MoreoYer, DT and FT will keep 
a residual staff presence at all their current foreign 
locations  and  continue  to  provide  international 
leased  li~es,  which  are  the  'building  blocks'  of 
self  .. provided private networks. 
In this  connection,  Atlas  will  undertake own R+D 
activities  but also  award important R+D  contracts 
to DT and FT. The parents will therefore keep and 
increase their proficiency and know-how in  respect· 
of  the  technologies  required  to  stay  in  (or  to 
re-enter) the relevant markets while keeping control 
of the  necessary:  infrastructure in the single  largest 
Member  State  telecommunications  markets. 
Moreov~r,  although  Atlas  may  own  new 
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developments (see recital 21  (5))  it is on the whole 
more likely that such ownership will  revert to the 
developing  parent. In  any event,  Atlas will  license 
ba"k  to  the  respective  parent  most  technology 
developed from IPRs contributed by  DT or FT. 
The Commission concludes that DT and FT remain 
potential  competitors  for- Atlas  services  and 
other  services  in  neighbouring  and  upstream. 
(transmission capacity) markets.  · 
(37)  Structural joint venture 
,.,. ...  · 
(38) 
Atlas  combines  DT and  FT's  activities  in  a  range 
of  Europe-wide  and  third-country  markets  for 
liberalized telecommunications services and is set to 
develop  and  take  over  new  services  in  these 
markets.  This venture entails major changes in the 
structures of DT and FT as· two undertakings with 
very  l~mited presence outside their respective home 
countries.  Through  Atlas  the  parents  pool  a 
significant number of assets in connection with the 
provision  and  marketing  of  telecommunications 
services.  Atlas  will  employ  2 500  people  across 
Europe. 
2.  Applicability of Article 85  (1) of the EC Treaty 
and Article 53  (1) of the EEA Agreement to the 
creation of Adas  · 
The  agreements  between  DT  and  FT  fall  within 
Article 85  (1)  of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (1) 
of the  EEA  Agreement as they restrict competition 
and  affect  trade  between  Member  States.  The 
Commission  cannot  therefore  give  negative 
clearance to the Agreements as the Parties requested  . 
in their application. 
The  Atlas  venture  eliminates  actual  and potential 
competition  between  DT  and  FT  both  In 
Germany  and  France  and  Europe-wide.  DT  an~ 
Ff were  already  competing  in  some  segments  of 
the  market  for  Europe-wide  if  not  global 
provision  of  customized  packages  of  corporate. 
telecommunications  services  to  corporate  users 
described  at  recitals  ·12  et  seq.:  prior  to  the 
implementation of their Eunetcom joint venture DT 
and  Ff  tendered  individually  for  outsourcing 
contracts,  offering  similar  corporate  services.  As 
any  European TO, DT and  FT also  competed on 
features  and  prices  for  , the  · ·location  of 
telecommunication  hubs of international  users (27). 
While currently targeting only large businesses, this 
competition was set to intensify along with further 
liberalization  and  ultimately  extend  to  private 
households.  With  the  exception  of  outsourcing 
services and in spite of substantial market shares in 
their  respective  home  markets,  the  parents  were 
actual competitors for Europe-wide services only in 
Germany (see  below). 
(39)  In  creating Atlas,  DT and  IT each  abandon their 
own  developments  and  activities  in  the  relevant 
markets  for  cross-border  and  ultimately  Europe-
. wide  telecommunications  services.  In  the  case  of 
Ff, such activities were substantial to the point th~t f · 
Fr's existing Transpac network is  the starting base 
for  Atlas'  envisaged  European  backbone  network. 
As  for  national  services,  the  large  numbers  of 
providers  of  liberalized  services,·  including  Ff's 
Transpac,  in  all  European  countries  targeted  by 
Atlas  show~ that the parents have the finanCial  and 
technological  capabilities  required  to  address 
national markets across Europe on their own. 
(40)  The elimination of competition between the parents 
is substantial as the Atlas venture is created by two 
internationally  active  TOs  and  covers  the  joint 
development and provision of services  throughout 
the  European  Economic  Area.  DT  and  Ff's 
·respective  dominant  positions  in  the  two  single 
largest Member State  telecommunications  markets (.  ·. 
is  reinforced  by  a  legal  infrastructure  monopoly 
until  such  markets  are  fully  and  effectively 
liberalized,  as  is .scheduled  to occur  by  1 January · 
.  1998,  and  will .  continue  to  rely  on  a  dominant 
position  for  terrestrial.  transinission  capacity  for 
years  thereafter.  Current ·prices  for  infrastructure  . 
access - leased lines tariffs or interconnection rates 
- together with  DT and Ff's strengthened  joint 
market  position  impair  competitors'  ability  to 
create a  competitive network of similar scope and 
density to DT and Frs in these  coun~ies  (28). 
(27)  BT-MCI Decision (footnote 7), at recital 41. 
(28)  See Commission Decision 93/49/EEC of 23  December 1992 
- FordNolkswagen, OJ No· L 20, 28.  1.  1993, p.  14,  at 
recitals  18  to 21;  Decision  94/32UEC of 18 May 1994-
Exxon/Shell, OJ No L 144, 9.  6.  1994, p. 20, at recitals 42 
et seq.;  and Decision  94/896/EC of 16 December  1994 -
Asahi/Saint Gobain, OJ No L 354, 31. 12.  1994, p.  87, at 
recitals  16 to 22. 
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3.  Application  of  Article  85  (1)  of  the  EC 
Treaty  and  Article  53  (1)  'of  the  EEA 
Agreement to contractual provisions 
(  41)  The  following  individual  provisions  are  restrictive 
of competition: 
(42) 
1.  the  anti-competltlon  provasaon  as  regards  the 
activities  of Atlas  (Article  XII JV  Agreement as 
amended  and  Article  VII  of  both  Distribution 
Agreements); 
2.  the  obligation  on  DT  and  FT  acting  as 
distributors  to  obtain  from  Atlas  all 
requirements  for  Europe-wide products (Article 
VII  of both Distribution Agreements); and 
3.  the  appointment  of  DT  and  FT  as  exclusive 
distributors of .t\.tlas  products  in  the  respective 
parent's ' home  market  (Article  IV  of  both 
Distribution Agreements). 
The  Commission  considers  the  anti-competltlon 
provision and DT and IT's obliga~ion to obtain all 
requirements for  global  products from  Atlas  to be 
ancillary  to  the  creation  and  operation  of Atlas. 
Therefore, these restrictions are not assessed  under 
Article  85  (1)  of the  EC Treaty and Article  53  (1) 
of the  EEA  Agreement  separately  from  the  joint 
venture as such. DT and Fr chose creating Atlas as 
a  way  to strenSthen their  presence  in the· relevant 
cross-border  and  ultimately  Europe-wide  markets 
and  as  a  first  step  towards  entering  the  global 
markets  for  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications  services.  In  this  respect,  both 
the  anti-competition  provision  and  the  exclusive 
purchasing  obligation  are  different  expressions  of . 
DT and Ff's sam~ commitment to the other parent 
and  to  their  joint  venture.  Atlas  requires  both 
restraints  to  successfully  establish  itself  in  the 
emerging market for customized packages of global 
corporate  telecommunications  services  given  the 
uncertainty  and  risks  associated  with such  market 
entry,  the  level  of  investment  required,  and 
competition from  similar ventures. 
1.  Anti-competition obligation  · 
Given  DT  and  FT's  substantial  investment  in 
Atlas,  this  clause  ensures·  that  DT  and  Fr 
concentrate their efforts in the relevant markets 
on  Atlas  lest  parallel  activities,  perhaps  in 
cooperation  with  other TOs,  jeopardize· Atlas'  · 
successful  establishment in  the  market. 
2.  Exclusive purchasing obligation 
This  restraint  on  DT .  and  FT  as  exclusive 
distributors  of Atlas  services  aims  at ensuring 
Atlas a steady stream of funds and at increasing 
its credibHicy  and  market reputation. Were  the 
parents free to obtain· such products from other 
suppliers,  notably  in  cases  where  Atlas  is 
in  a  position  to  meet  a  particular  demand 
requirement, this  would affect Atlas' credibility 
and  financial  position  alike:  Inversely,  Atlas  is 
not  under  an  obligation  to  obtain  all  its 
requirements for  telecommunications and other 
products and services  from  the  parents. 
The  .·  Commission  usually  accepts  ancillary 
provisions for a limited period of time only. In this 
case,  however,  given  the  particular features  of the 
market  in· which  Atlas  will  operate,  notably  the 
substantial  investment  ~equired  and  the  risks 
associated  to  such  investment,  the  Commission 
accepts  both  the  anti-competition  clause  and  DT 
and  FT's  obligation  to  obtain  all  provisions·  for 
Europe-wide  services  from  Atlas  as  ancillary 
restraints for the entire duration of this exemption 
Decision. 
(43)  Exclusive distribution 
DT  and  FT's  exclusive  distributorship  in  their 
respective  home  countries  is  caught  by  Article 
85  (1)  of the  E~  Treaty and Article  53  (1)  of the 
EEA.Agreement because  l.t  has the object or effect 
of isolating Germany and France against imports of 
~das services from other EEA Member States. This 
may adversely affect the conditions of ~ompetition 
within  the  EEA.  Unlike  the.!  other  restrictive 
provisions,  the· Commission  cannot  consider  DT 
and Ff's exclusive distributorship to be ancillary to 
the creation of ·the  joint venture,  as  non-exclusive 
forms of distribution are possible which would not 
iMpair  the  performance  or  marketing  of  Atlas 
services.  Given  that  Germany  and  France  taken 
together  account  for  more  than  40 %  of  all 
telecommunications  revenues  in  the  European 
Community, the restriction is  appreciable.  · 
4.  Effect on trade between Member States 
(44)  Pursuant to the  Commission's  telecommunications 
guidelines,  . agreements  concerning  non-reserved 
services,  equipment  and  space  segment 
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infrastructure  potentially  affect  trade  between 
Member  States (29).  The  creation  of Atlas  has  an 
effect on inter-Member State trade in that Atlas will 
provide  non-reserved  services  between  any  two 
Member States and within any Member ·State. The 
exclusive  distribution  provtston  caught  by 
Article  85  (1) of the  EC  Treaty and Article 53  (1) 
of the  EEA  Agreement  protect  the  parents  within 
their  respective  home  market  and  contribute  to 
dividing  the  single  market along national  borders. 
Therefore, this:'non-ancillary provision affects trade 
among Member States and between Member States 
and  the  EFT  A  countries.  The  Commission 
concludes  that  the  loss  of  two  powerful 
independent  and  potentially  competing  service 
providers  in  the  relevant  markets  generally and in 
France  and  Germany ·  in  particular  has  a 
considerable impact on trade. 
B.  ARTICLES  8.S  (3)  OF THE EC TREATY AND 
ARTICLE 53  (3)  OF THE EEA  AGREEMENT 
(45)  DT and  FT  pursue  different  aims  in  entering this 
set  of  transactions.  DT  was  for  a  long  time 
restricted to domestic  investments and additionally 
burdened  with  a programme  of  infrastructure 
modernization  in  the  former  German  Democratic 
Republic  territories.  · DT  has  little  presence 
elsewhere  in  Europe  and  aims  at  becoming  an 
international telecommllnications  services  provider 
worldwide,  albeit  seeing  European  markets  as  a 
priority. Cooperating with a major European player 
present in all of DT's target markets is  particularly 
important for DT to achieve its objectives, notably 
a  sufficiently  broad  European  base  to  justify  an 
extension  of  its  business  into  the  United  States 
market, where 40% of multinational companies are 
located. 
(46)  FT's  main  interest  is  to  maintain  its  competttrve 
position  as  a  cross-border  provider  of  business 
telecommunications  services  in  Europe  while 
addressing  increasing  customer  demand  for  global 
services.  The increasing presence of BT  and MCI's 
Concert  venture  in  Europe  convinced  FT  of  the 
need  for  wide coverage  in Europe  before adding a 
global  dimension  to  its  services;  given  that  the 
scope  of business  of Infonet, ·in  which  FT  held  a 
stake,  was  limited  compared'  to  the  range  of 
envisaged  Atlas  services,  Ff opted  for  an alliance 
with  another TO.  DT and Ef's joint  aim  now  is 
to  become  leading  providers  of non-reserved  rele-
e
9
)  Footnote 9,  at paragraph 39. 
communications services in Europe. This requires a 
substantial  investment  in  creating  seamless 
networks in  Europe, where DT and FT face  strong 
competition  from  Concert  and  possibly  from 
Uniworld (3°). 
(  4 7)  The  notified  agreements,  to  the  extent  caught  by 
Article  85  (1)  of the  EC  Treaty and Article  53  (1) 
of the EEA Agreement, satisfy the conditions for an 
exemption  set  out  in  Article  85  (3)  of  the  EC 
Treaty  and  Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement, 
for  the following  reasons: 
1.  Technical progress 
(48)  DT  and  FT  will  in  the·  framework  of  Atlas 
implement  a  se~mless  Europe--wide  network  by 
adJin;.',  value  to  basic  transmtsston  capacity 
purchased from  local TOs.  To that end, Atlas  will 
not. preserve  the  features  of each national network 
invol vtJ  but  will  insteaJ  1mpL·ment  harmonized 
technical  features,  own  swttching  systems,  call 
processing/routing, signalling and databases as  well 
as  software  applications,  notably  fully  compatible 
interfaces.  This  approach  has  substantial  advan-
tages  over  most existing international services  that 
are provided by  interconnecting national networks 
which  are  usually  incompatible  in  terms  of 
structure,  software,  hardware  and  management 
systems.  Consequently, the number and features of 
services  available  is  determined  by  the  least 
sophisticated  national  network  involved:  .The 
creation of a seamless trans-European network will 
allow the  technical  performance  already  requested 
by  large  business  customers  across  Europe,  which 
compentors  such  as  Concert  are  also  aiming  at 
through distribution agreements and ventures. 
(49)  Under the conditions attached to this Decision, the 
harmonized  joint  DT  and  FT  network  will  also 
improve  the  level  of  services  provided  by 
· competitors  of Atlas  which  may:  (i)  interconnect 
with  the  public  packet-switched  data  networks 
operated  by  Transpac  F~ance  and  T-Data  and 
eventu.1lly  by  Atlas  in  France  and  Germany  over 
X.75  interfaces;  (ii)  access  tbese  public  packet-
switched  data  networks  from  other  networks, 
notably  the  publi(.:  switched  telecommunications 
network (PSTN)  ar~d the  integrated services  digital 
·network (ISDN); anc,l  (iii)  interconnect with DT and 
IT's other networks,  notably the  PS1N  The latter 
(1°)  Set·  notice published  in  OJ  No C 276, 21.  10.  1995, p.  9. 
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is  indispensable  for  the  viability  of  competitive 
voice  services  offerings.  Third  parties  shall  be 
offered  access  to  the  public  packet-switched  data 
networks,  the  PSTN  and  the  ISDN  on· terms 
technically  and  commercially  non-discriminatory 
with  regard  to  Atlas.  Any  service  provider  who 
wishes to make app_lications  for  interconnection to 
DT and Ff will  be  able  to  rely  on a  substantive 
non-discrimination  duty  attached  to  this  Decision 
as a separate condition. 
(50)  The combination  of FT  and  DT's technology  will 
enable Atlas  from the outset to offer new services, 
albeit  initially  based  largely  on  parents'  existing 
services.  By  joining their R+D  in  the framework of 
the  joint venture  DT and Ff will  enable  Atlas  to 
provide more advanced  features  than either parent 
would  be  capable  of  providing  independently 
. within  the  same  time  frame.  Jointly,  DT and Ff 
will also be able to make the substantial investment 
required  to  create  a  large  seamless  state-of-the-art 
trans-European  network.  This  is  a  major 
improvement over  the  current situation in  Europe, 
where  many modern networks exist,  but can only 
be  interconnected at the price of a loss  of features. 
At  present,  the  most  relevant  example  of 
shortcomings  of  interconnection  is  data 
transmission  over  state-of-the-art  networks.  Most 
advanced  features  of  packet-switched  data 
communications  services,  for  example  reverse 
charging, closed user group definition or end-to-end 
management,  are  lost  as  soon  as  several  data 
communications networks. are interconnected unless 
the respective technical specifications and interfaces 
are harmonized. As  the Commission acknowledged 
in its  BT-MCI Decision,  successful  implementation 
of  trans-European  networks  will  allow  Europe's 
major  undertakings  to  chose  from  ·international 
telecommunications  services  improved  to  leveis  of 
quality  which  are  currently  available  only 
nationally  or  even  locally.  Availability  ·of 
international  state-of-the-art  telecommunications 
$ervices  is  critical  to  face  increasingly  global 
competition  stemming·  from  parts  of  the  world 
where  advanced  telecommunications  technology 
and services are already widely available. 
2.  Economic progress 
(51)  DT  and  Ff  jointly  intend  to  undertake  the 
investment  necessary  to  bring  about .a  qualitative 
improvement  of  European  telecommunications 
which Atlas  will  also  make  available to SMEs.  As 
the  Commission  acknowledged  in  its  BT-MCI 
Decision, this requires a costly and time consuming 
(52) 
effort.  DT and Ff will  implement investment plans 
amounting to a total of ECU 5 billion linked to the 
creation or enhancement of services.  Further to the 
Commission's preliminary position on the proposed 
alliance  as  expressed  on 23  May 1995 the  parties 
have:  (i)  changed  their  agreements  in  respect  of 
Atlas'  role  outside  France  and  Germany;  and  (ii) 
entered into a  global alliance with a  United  States 
operator. A sizeable presence across the EEA  is one 
requirement for  the provision of such non-reserved 
services  as  targeted  by  Atlas.  DT  and  Ff have 
submitted  data  showing  their  commitment  to 
substantial  investment  in  Europe.  Moreover,  DT 
and Ff have changed the original balance between 
Atlas'  own services  and services  outsourced to  the 
parents  in  Atlas'  favour.  Another  requirement  if 
service  offerings  are  to  progress  beyond  what  is 
already  available  in  the  European  market  is  the 
global  extension  of  services  as  needed  by 
multinational  companies,  so-called  global 
connectivity  of  services.  Atlas  meets  this 
requirement as  a parent of the Phoenix alliance. 
Given the current cost of leased line  infrastructure, 
Atlas'  investment  will  initially  be  driven  by  the 
large multi-national companies (MNCs)  with most 
complex  requirements  in  countries  other  than 
France ·and  Germany.  However;  as  a  result  of 
operating a  single  high-speed  network architecture 
Atlas  will  allow  economies  of  scale  at  both  the 
technological  and operational level,  i.e.  reduce  the 
cost per channel.  Atlas  is  further  likely  to reduce 
infrastructure  costs  in  respect  of  interconnection 
agreements  with  other  TOs  by  generating  larger 
traffic  volumes  which  allow  lowest-cost  routing. 
The  effects  of  economies  of  scale  along  with 
increased availability of infrastructure further to the 
implementation of recent Community legislation e
1
) 
will  eventually  allow  service  offerings  with 
sophisticated  technical  features  to  develop  and 
become widely available. 
3.  Benefits to consumers 
(53)  Atlas will  shorten the time required by  the  parents 
individually for  marketing new telecommunications 
(31)  Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of 13.  3.  1996  amending  · 
Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the  implementation of 
full  competition in the telecommunications markets; OJ No 
L 74, 22.  3.  1996, p.  13. 
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(54) 
(55) 
services  in  a  rapidly  changing  technological 
and  commercial  market  environment.  Business 
customers will benefit, more rapidly than if DT and 
·Ff acted separately,  from  both the  provision .of a 
larger product portfolio of newly developed services 
and  lower  pr1cmg.  Increased  choice  of 
telecommunications  services  and  related  cost 
benefits  will  spill  over  to  other  segments  of the 
telecommunications  market  and  economic  sectors. 
Atlas  will  also  provide  an  alternative  option  for 
the  supply  of  customized  offerings  which  cover 
the  complete  range  of  liberalized  business 
telecommunications services. 
Through  its  global  alliance  with  Sprint,  Phoenix, 
Atlas  will  also  offer  European  customers  an 
expanded  geographic  reach  of  its  customized 
packages of corporate telecommunications services. 
The  possibility  for  European  customers  to  reach 
remote  locations  worldwide  either  ad  hoc  or 
permanently without a loss  of quality  or technical 
features  and  without changing  supplier  is  a  major 
.advantage  for  such  customers,  for  ·example 
European  companies  endeavouring  to  establish  a 
worldwide  presence  in  an  increasingly  global 
economy.  Customers  have  the  advantages  of 
seamless  cross-border  services  through  Atlas  in 
Europe  and  through  Phoenix  worldwide  at  their 
convenience.  Only global alliances can offer global- . 
conp.ectivity of services. While the scope of Atlas is 
not in itself global,  DT and· Ff's investment plans 
through Atlas  ensure  that a substantial number of 
European  business  customers  will  have  the  option 
of global scope. 
The  exclusive  distributorship  in  Germany  and 
France  combined  with  the  agreements  concerning 
IPR  licensing and grant-back licensing will provide 
an incentive for DT and Ff to share with the joint 
venture  any  technical  progress  ·made  in  markets 
related  to  the  relevant  markets.·  This  is  an 
additional  benefit  for  large  non-reserved 
telecommunications  services  users  in  DT and FT's 
home countries, i.e. two of the Member States with 
a  substantial  number  of  potential  customers  for 
Atlas services. 
4.  Indispensability 
(56)  The creation of Atlas 
Creating  Atlas  is  indispensable  for  the  parents  to 
bring  about  the  benefits  within  the  meaning·  of 
Article  85  (3)  of the  EC  Treaty and 53  (3)  of the 
EEA  Agreement  discussed  above.  Compared  to 
individual  market  entry  or  other  forms  of 
cooperation with  a  lesser  level  of integration,  the 
degree  of cooperation between  DT and  FT  in  the 
framework  of  Atlas  is  necessary  to  provide  the 
relevant  services.  Atlas  will  shorten  the  time  DT 
and Ff would have required to compete with other 
providers of cross-border and Europe-wide services 
and  ~ubstantially reduce  the costs  and risks  borne 
by each  parent. In rapidly changing markets Ff is 
forced  to update  its Transpac network  and  DT to 
establish itself as a European pl~yer. Last, Atlas is a 
means  to  quickly  overcome  the  inadequacies  of 
most  services  and  features  currently  available  by 
creating  a  major  trans-European  network  which 
offers·  what  multinationals  and  other  large 
international users  need. 
(57)  E~clusive distribution 
Pursuant  to  the  Distribution  Agreements,  each 
parent  is  the  exclusive  . distributor  for  Atlas 
products  in  its  own  home  market.  The  exclusive 
· distribution provisions are indispensable in  that: 
i.  exclusivity  together  with  the  grant-back 
licensing  provisions  in  the  Intellectual  and 
Industrial  Property  and  Licence  Agreements  in 
respect· of technology  Atlas  receives  from  each 
parent protects DT and FI''s· technology against 
third  parties  and  against·  the  other  parent 
respectively; and 
2.  using  one  such  network  instead  of several  is 
technically  easier  and  therefore  allows  more 
efficient  distribution.  Atlas  as  ~  provider  of 
Europe-wide  services  relies  on·  national 
distribution  networks  with  broad  geographic 
co~erage.  The  alternative  to  using  the  TO's 
· . distritiution  networks  is  either  distribution  by 
several  smaller distributors or the construction 
of an own nationwide network in  the  parents' 
hom~ countries ..  Both would  deprive  European 
telecommunicationt markets of the benefits of a 
technical-harmonization of Europe's two largest 
existing public  pa~et-switched data networks. 
(58)  Atlas  will  use  Transpac-France  and  T-Data  as 
national  distribution  networks  in  France  and 
Germany. Thus, DT or Ff will provide the national 
ser:vices  required  a-nd  use  Atlas  to  provide  all 
cross-border and third-country connections needed. 
In the light of this, other distribution arrangements 
would  be  less  protective of the  parents intellectual 
property rights and less adequate to the importance 
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of  services  DT  and  FT  will  initially  provide  to 
Atlas. The Commission therefore concludes that the 
exclusive  distribution  arrangement  is  indispensable 
within  the  meaning  of Article  85  (  3)  of the  EC 
Treaty and Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA Agreement. 
5.  Non-elimination of competition 
(59)  The  conditions  imposed  on  DT  and  FT  and  the 
general  regulatory  framework  in  the  European 
Community  will  improve  the  environment  for 
competition  in  Ff and  DT's home  countries.  This 
applies  notably  to  the  conditions  regarding:  (i) 
interconnection to the  public packet-switched data 
networks  on  terms  non-discriminatory  and 
economically equivalent to those available to Atlas 
in  France  and  Germany;  (ii)  non-discriminatory 
interconnection  to  the  PSTN  and  the  ISDN  in 
France ·and  Germany;  and  (iii)  the  prohibition  on 
DT  and  Ff  to  take  advantage  of  their  market 
position  in  distributing  Atlas'  services  and  own 
services  through joint contracts. 
(60)  The condition described  in  recital 29 (5)  requirin 
DT  and  FT  to  sell  Atlas  products  under  separat 
contracts from the sale of own products will ensur 
that possible differences in calculation are verifiabl 
and  thus  that ·non-discriminatory  interconnectio 
works in practice. The outso~rcing and value-adde 
('managed')  leased  lines  services  provided by  Ada 
are  open  to  competition  and  returns  on· thes 
services  are  relatively  low.  Given  the  lega 
monopoly and eventually the dominant position fo 
infrastructure provision enjoyed by DT and FT fo 
the  duration.  of this  Decision~ DT  and  FT  coul 
eliminate  competition  by  using  discounts  on 
reserved  services  (such  as  leased  lines)  to  attract 
their clientS to use· Atlas' non-reserved services. 
The sale of packages of different services under one 
single  contract is  common  commercial  practice  in 
the telecommunications sector known as 'bundling.' 
In  liberalized  telecommunicati~ns  markets, 
dominant  providers  are  usually  prohibited  both 
·from  tying  sales  of  different  services  arid  from 
granting discounts on packages 'of services  without 
specifying:  (i)  the  terms  and  conditions  of each 
individual  'unbundled'  service;  and  (ii) .  the 
individual  servicc;(s)  subject  to  a  discount.  Also, 
dominant  providers  are  under  an  obligation  to 
publish all tariffs and must prove that discounts on 
packages  of  services  are  justified  by  . savings 
specifically  due  to  the  offering  of a  package  of 
services.  However, given:  (i)  the imbalance between 
DT and Ff's ubiquitous monopoly networks on the 
one  side  and  the  small  presence  and  reliance  on 
interconnection  of  new  market  entrants  on  the 
other;  and  (ii)  the  lack  of  sufficient  regul~tory 
transparency requirements for  t~e relevant services, 
allowing DT arid  FT  to  negotiate  single  contracts 
for  both liberalized and reserved  services  would at 
this  stage  effectively  impair  market  entry  by 
competitors  in  Germany  and  France.  DT  and  FT 
could  inter  alia  grant  quantity  discounts  or more 
favourable  conditions  in  respect  of  combined 
packages  of such  services  in  a  way  which  would 
make individual pricing and notably justification of 
any discounts  non-transparent  ..  The requirement to 
sell such services under separate contracts would in 
itself be insufficient unless terms and conditions are 
set out for  each  particular service  sold. 
(61)  Moreover, the  conditions  and obligations  imposed 
on  DT  and  Ff  to  keep  and  supply  detailed 
accounting  information  ensures  that  the  entities 
created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas  Agreements  and 
Atlas' parents gather sufficient information to allow 
the  Commission  a verification  of their competitive 
behaviour.  Accounting-related  requirements 
attached to this Decision will also make it possible 
for  national courts  to order discovery  of evidence 
of breaches  of the  substantive conditions  attached 
to  this  Decisions  and  of  any  alleged  anti-
,  competitive  behaviour  where  third  parties  seek 
remedies against such behaviour before the national 
courts.  The  Co~ssion concludes  that Atlas  will 
not afford the parents the possibility of eliminating 
competition  in  respect  of  the  envisaged  set  of 
services.  In  reaching  this  conclusion  the 
Commission  has  taken  into account the  following 
elements. 
Markets  for  cross-b.order and ultimately 
· Europe-wide services 
(62)  Competitors in the marketplace 
Atlas  is  one  of  ,  several  alliances  between  TOs 
and/or other undertakings in the  relevant markets. 
Se:veral alliances have obtained regulatory clearance 
and are already active in the market (32). DT and FT 
will  also  face  competition,  at  least  for  certain 
non-reserved  services  .  that  will  integrate  Atlas' 
·Europe-wide  packages  of corporate  telecommuni-
cations  services.  Competitors  range  from 
(32)  In  addition  to  BT-MCI's  Concert  (footnote  7),  the 
Commission  has  granted  regulatory  approval  in  Case  No 
IV/M.595  - BTNIAG,  OJ  No  C  15,  20.  1.  1996,  p.  4; 
Case No IVINI.618 - Cable &  Wireless/VEBA,  OJ No 23, 
5. 9. 1995, p. 3, and Case No IV/M.689 - ADSBIBelgacom 
(Decision of 29 February 1996; OJ No C 194,.5. 7.  1996, 
p. 4). 
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computer  and  data  processing  companies,  for 
example  IBM,  DEC  and  EDS,  to  information 
services companies such as GElS  and Compuserve. 
However,  most  of  these  competitors  have  small 
market shares and are dependent on a substantive 
change in current competitive conditions to develop 
their  presence  in  the  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications  services  markets.  As  for  the 
provision  of  cross-border  and  ultimately 
Europe-wide  services  from  and  into Germany and 
France,  these  conditions  will  change  as  soon  the 
two  main  elements  of competition  are  available, 
namely:  (i)  alternatives  to  using  DT  and  FT's 
infrastructure;  and  (ii)  access  to  DT  ·and  FT's 
networks  on  transparent  and  non-discriminatory 
terms. 
Both  elements  are  of  particular  relevance  to 
innovative  offerings  ·  of  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications  services  which  ·require 
state-of-the-an,  high-speed  lines  and  distribution 
networks  whose  use  does  not  entail  a  loss  of 
features. The mere presence of competing providers 
of cross-border and ultimately Europe:-wide services 
has  had  little  impact in  that market yet.  For both 
economic and geographic reasons, service provision 
into  or  across  Germany  and  France  is  key  to 
competition  in  the  markets  for  Europe-wide 
non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications 
services. DT and FT will  no~ eliminate competition 
if  preven~ed from  abusing  their .  market  positions 
and  from· preventing  effective  market  entry.  The 
Commission  concludes  that  the  following 
.conditions are indisp.ensable to that end.  · 
.(63)  Availability of alternative infrastructure 
Alternative  infrastructure  options  and  competitive 
pressure  on  leased-line  rates  will  be  possible  in 
Germany  and  France  when  at  least  two 
infrastructure  licences  for  the  . provision  of 
liberalized  telecommunications  services  are 
awarded, as  is  scheduled to occur by  1 July 1996. 
Given  the  existence  of  several  infrastructure 
operators  in  both· Member  States  and  given  the 
chance  these  operators  have  had  to  prepare  for 
early  infrastructure liberalization,  the  award of at 
least  two  alternative  infrastructure  licences  in 
Germany  and  France  should  mean  choice  of 
infrastructure  there.  Only  from  that moment  will 
other telecommunications services providers be·in a 
position  to  compete  with  Atlas· without  depen-
ding  on  Atlas'  parents  for  their  leased-line 
requirements. 
(  64)  Interconnection on  non-discriminatory technical 
terms 
Atlas, as· any of its competitors, must:  (i)  create an 
own  leased-line  network  to  provide  cross-border 
services;  and  (ii)  intercon~ect  to  the  public  f· 
packet-switched  data  networks,  the  PSlN or  the 
ISDN in France and Germany for final  distribution 
of the Atlas  services  to customers.  The  use  of DT 
and  FT's  networks  as  distribution  networks  will 
also  be  possible  for  competitors  from  the  date  of 
the exemption by interconnecting to such networks 
over X. 7  5 interfaces.  As to voice and sophisticated 
data  services,  DT and  FT  respectively  must  make 
available  upon  request  adequate  technical  infor-
mation relevant for PSlN or ISDN interconnection. 
This  enables  third-party  competitors  to  provide 
services .from and into DT and Fl''s home countries 
offering essential advanced features such as  reverse 
charging, closed user group definition or end-to-end 
management.  DT and  FT's  packet-switched  A  J"M 
netWorks  are not integrated into the Atlas venture; 
as  was  stated at recital  7, such  integration  would 
require  a  new  notification.  Atlas  must  therefore 
interconnect  to such  networks  if  so  required  for 
ce.rtain  high-speed  data  communications  services. 
The  condition  impoSed  on  DT  and · FT  not  to .  6.  ~ 
discriminate  between  Atlas  and  third-patty  y_;. 
competitors as regards technical information on DT 
and FT's  networks,  such  as ·full data  on DT and 
FT's  implementation  of the  Signalling  System  7 
(SS7) (33)  for  voice  services  interconnection  to the 
PS1N,  will  ensure  that  technical  performance 
options  for  Atlas'  non-reserved  services  involving 
interconnection  with  DT  and  Ff's networks  are 
similar for any competitor(34). 
(ll)  Major digital  protocoVsignalling  system  for  managing and 
transmitting control and routing information in networks. 
(34)  The  Commission  has  decided  similarly  in  previous  cases 
featuring  similar  market  structures  and  problems,  e.g. 
Decision  93/403/EEC  of 11  June  1993 - EBU/Eurovision 
System,  OJ No L  179, 22.  7.  1993, p.  23, at recital  82; 
Decision 94/594/EC of 27 July 1994 - ACI, OJ No L 224, 
30. 8. 1994, p. 28, at recital 66; ~nd Decision 94/663/EC of 
21  September 1994 -Night Services, OJ No L 259, 7.  10. 
1994, p. 20, at recitals 80 and 82. 
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(65)  Interconnection  on  non-discriminatory  economic 
terms 
DT and Ff are  constrained  under their  respective 
national  regulations· not  to  discriminate  against 
third  parties  and  to  comply  with  Open  Network 
Provision  (ONP)  obligatjons  such  as  providing  a 
minimum  set  of  lines  at  cost  oriented  and 
transparent  tariffs(35).  More.  importantly,  the 
exemption  of the  Atlas  transaction  is  conditional 
upon  DT  and  Ff inter.  alia  granting  transparent 
and  non-discriminatory  terms  of · interconnection 
and  implementing  an  accounting  system  which 
discloses  the  fully  allocated  costs  of each  service 
in  anticipation  of  the  ONP  Interconnection 
Directive (36).  While  the  existing  ~egal  framework 
alre~dy provides for  transparency, the Commission 
considers the additional conditions imposed on DT 
and Ff as  to separation and auditing of accounts, 
exclusion  of  cross  subsidies  and  economically 
equivalent rates for  interconnection to the German 
and. French  public  packet-swi~ched data  netWorks 
are  indispensable  to  ensure  that the  use  of DT or 
IT's  PSTN,  Transpac-France  in  France  and/or 
T  -Data  in  Germany  as  distribution  networks  will 
be  possible  for  Atlas  and  its  competitors  under 
equivalent conditions. 
(66)  No privileged information 
Atlas  will  not  have  a  competitive  advantage  over 
competitors  as  regards  access  to  DT  and  FT's 
privileged  commercial  information.  The  parents 
have also deleted from the Atlas Agreements those 
clauses  originally  notified  that appointed  Atlas  as 
DT and FT's agent for half-circuits. Given that such 
international  lea'Sed  lines  are  sought  either  by 
service  providers  competing  with  Atlas  or  by 
MNCs and other private network operators which 
are potential clients for Atlas' outsourcing services, 
the  agency  agreement  would  have  given  . Atlas 
a  competitive  .  iQformation  advantage  .  over 
competitors. 
(67)  Consumer bargaining power 
MNCs  or  other  large  companies  have  the. choice 
between either building their own private network 
(lS)  Articles  7 and  10  of Council  Directive  92/44/EC of 5 june 
1992 on the application of open network provision to leased 
lines, OJ No L i65, 19. 6.  1992, p. 27. 
(36)  See  Articles  6  and  7  of  the  modified  proposal  for  a 
European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  on 
interconnection  in  telecommunicatioqs  with  regard  to 
ensuring  universal  service  and  interoperability  through 
application  of  the  principles  of  open  network  provision 
(ONP), OJ  No C 178, 21.  6.  1996, p.  3. 
solutions  across  national  borders  or  purchasing 
them from service providers such as  Atlas; they are 
not likely  to choose the latter option unless  this  is 
cost-effective. Given their knowledge of the market 
these  customers are  in  a position to request offers 
from  different  competitors.  This  gives  MNCs 
considerable  bargaining  power,  reflected  in 
competition·  between  the  suppliers.  This  may 
equally  apply·  to  SMEs  when  lower  infrastructure 
prices  allow  small  suppliers  to  reach  the  scale 
necessary to enter the  market. 
French  and  German  markets  for  packet-switched 
data communications· services 
(68)  DT  and  FT  have  substantial  market  presence  in 
their  respective  home  countries,  where  they  own 
the  only existing nationwide, packet-switched data 
communications  networks.  Actual  competition 
existed  in  Germany  and  will  not  be  eliminated, 
thanks  to  the  divestiture  of FT's  indirect  German 
subsidiary  Info  AG.  However,  the  restriction  of 
potential  competition  between  FT  and  DT  in 
France  and  Germany  has  a  substantial  impact on 
the  respective  markets  for  packet-switched  data 
communications  services.  More  than  80%  of 
customers  for  this  service  in  France  and  Germany 
are  SMEs,  which  would  not  have  sufficient 
bargaining  power  to  counterbalance  the 
strengthening  -of  DT  and  FT's  market  position 
through  the  creation  of  a  joint  public 
packet-switched data network. 
(69)  For  the  purposes  of  this  assessment  the 
Commission  defines  two  different  albeit  partly 
overlapping  customer  segments  in  the  market  for 
packet-switched  data  communications  services, 
namely: (i) customers. demanding casual, low-speed, 
low-volume  applications,  which  are provided  over 
the  public  packet-switched  data  networks  in  each 
Member State and billed  by volume sent according 
to published tariffs (recital 9 (1)); and (ii) customers 
that generate more substantial and regular demand 
traffic, which service providers meet increasingly by 
packet-switched  services  using  protocols  such  as 
Frame Relay,  ATM  and IP  or by  switched services 
and  bill  according  to  individual  demand  features 
(recital 9 (2)). 
The  choice  of alternative  infrastructure  is  not  in 
itself sufficient  to  provide  competitive alternatives 
to X.25  data services T-Data and Transpac France 
offer  in  Germany  and  France  respectively  to  the 
fir~t  customer  segment  described  above.  These 
services  require  dense  networks  with  wide 
II  A/  54 
... No L239/48  Official Journal of the European Communities  .  19.  9.  96 
geographic  coverage,  which  DT  and  FT's 
competitors  will  continue  to  lack  for  som~ time. 
This  conclusion  is  based  on  two  considerations. 
First,  all  alternative  infrastructure  currently 
available  in  Germany  and  France  taken  together 
amounts  to  only  one  third  of total  infrastructure 
owned  by  DT and  FT  respectively.  Secondly,  the 
market for  X.25  data  services  is  characterized  by 
low  margins.  Consequently,  inves~ment  .  in 
alternative infrastructure with nationwide coverage 
as  required  to  serve  the  first.  customer  segment 
described  in  the  previous  recital  will  not begin  to 
narrow  the  gap  with  the  incumbent  TO's 
infrastructure  until  new  infrastructure  can  carry 
any telecommunications service and thus provide a 
better  return  on  investment.  The  legal  and 
administrative framework necessary to provide such 
new  infrastructure  is  scheduled  to  be  in  place  in 
France and Germany by  1 January 1998. 
(70)  Competitive alternatives 
No adequate competitive alternative to Atlas would 
exist in  Germany and France for customers  ip.  th~ 
first segment described at recital 9 (1) if  DT and FT 
were to integrate their respective nationwide, public 
packet-switched data networks  be~ore at least two 
competing nationwide carriers are licensed  in  each 
of  these  Member ·  States  to  provide  public 
telecommuni~ations  services.  The  integration  of 
these  public  packet-switched  data  networks  into 
Atlas  would  reinforce  Transpac  France  ·and 
T-Data's existing dominant position in  the  French 
and Getman markets for  national packet-switched 
data  communications  services  (more  than  70% 
market  share  respectively).  With  hardly  any 
competitive  alternative  yet  for  national  services, 
Atlas would at this stage lock in existing Transpac 
France  and  T  -Data  customers  with  restrictive 
effects  in  the  cross-border  and  . ultimately' 
Europe-wide  geographic  market  as  the  Single 
·Market develops.  Keeping the French and German 
public  packet-switched  data  networks  separate 
from  Atlas  and  prohibiting  FT  and  DT . from 
selling  own  services  and  Atlas  services  in  the 
same  contract,  customers  have  the  possibility  to: 
(i) compare Transpac France and T-Data's national 
X.25  data  services  to  emerging  competitive 
alternatives such as more advanced packet-switched 
data  communications  and  switched  services  (see 
below),  for  which  FT  and  DT  face  stronger 
competition; and  (ii)  choose  between  Atlas  and its 
competitors  for  separate provision  of cross-border 
and  ultimately  Europe-wide  X.25  data  services  if 
their requirements exceed the national scope. 
Generally,  competitive  alternatives  must  be 
effectively available to have  ~n appreciable  impact 
on  market  conditions.  However,  as  regards  the 
French  and  German  telecommunications  markets, 
the  Commission  envisages  that  competitive 
conditions  will  already  change  substantially  once 
·telecommunications services and networks are fully 
and  effectively  liberalized  and  first  nationwide 
carrier licences granted, as  is scheduled to occur by 
1 January 1998, and develop quiCkly  the~eafter. To 
reach  this  conclusion,  the  Commission  has  taken 
into  consideration:  (i)  the  decreasing  relevance  of 
public  packet-switched  data  networks  using  the 
X.25  protocol  for  the  provision  of  corporate  f 
packet-switched  data  communications  services; 
(ii)  the  outstanding  economic  importance  and 
attraction  of  the  French  and  German 
telecommunications markets to telecommunications 
operators;  (iii)  the  existence  of  operational 
expandable alternative infrastructure there and  (iv) 
the  positioning  af a  number  of strong competing 
alliances ahead of full and effective liberalization of 
telecommunications  networks  and  services  in 
France  and  Germany  by  1  January  1998  (see 
recital 18). 
Ahead  of full  ·and  effective  liberalization  of the 
French and German telecommunications markets it · • 
is possible in Germany to provide nationwide x  .. 25 
data services using the ISDN 'D' channel. Several of 
T-Data's competitors  use  this  alternative  to direct 
interconnection  with  DT's  public  packet-switched 
data  networks  (see  next  recital)  at  a  total  ~  ~ 
investment cost of approximately ECU i,t million.  .. .. > 
The ISDN 'D' channel is accessible in France using 
Transpac  France  as  a  transit  network  and  direct 
.  access  will  be  possible  by  the  end  of 1996.  The 
Commission considers that increasing availability of 
the  ISDN  might  eventually  offer  a  competitive 
alternative  for  the provision  of X.25  data services 
in  the  German  customer  segment  descJ;ibed  at 
recital  9  (1).  As  for  France  however,  the 
Commission  conCludes  from  the  density  of 
Transpac  France's  public  packet-switched  data 
·networks that using the ISDN is unlikely to prove a 
sufficiently competitive alternative.  · 
(71)  Economically equivalent interconnection terms 
Any  third  party  can  obtain  non-discriminatory 
interconnection  with  T-Data  and  Transpac-France 
II  A/  55 .t 
_.~·t  .. 
19. 9. 96  Official Journal of the European Communities  No L 239/49 
(before  these  entities  are  integrated  into  Atlas)  or 
Atlas Germany and Atlas France (after T-Data and 
Transpac  France  have  been  integrated  into  Atlas) 
in  Germany  and  France  over  X. 7  5  interfaces. 
Services  provided  over  two  or  more  networks 
interconnected  through  X. 7  5  interfaces  are  an 
alternative to using own networks in the market for 
packet-switched data communications services. This 
alternative is competitive only for  service provision 
to customers  in  the  second  segment  described  at 
recital  9 (2),  albeit demand for  X.25  data services 
in  th1s  segment  is  decreasing  quickly.  In  t}lis 
segment,  most value  is  ~dded to  services  provided 
over  customized  networks,  and  service  providers 
rely  on  interconnection  merely  to  relay  customer 
.  data communications  to  third  parties  unconnected 
to the customized network (call  termination). 
While  Atlas  may  use·  proprietary  interfaces  to 
interconnect  with  T-Data  and  Transpac  France, 
non-discriminatory  third-party  access  to  T-Data 
and  Transpac  France  via  X. 75  interfac;es  is 
sufficient  to  prevent  Atlas  from  eliminating 
competition in the market for packet-switched data 
communications  services.  For  instance,  to  date 
T-Data interconnects to most third-party networks 
over interfaces which use the X. 7  5 protocol and do 
not therefore support certain advanced feateres. DT 
and FT's tariffs for interconnection to their public 
packet-switched  data  communications -networks 
must  disclose  the  mark-up ·on  the  fully  allocated 
costs  of  providing  such  interconnection. 
Third-party  interconnection  must  be  non-
discriminatory  . compared  to  interconnection 
conditi9ns  for  Ada's,  inter  alia  as  regards 
availability of ancillary services,  provisioning time, 
repair.  ~nd  maintenance  levels  or  technical 
information· required. In the light of the above, the 
Commission  concludes  that  the  ·elimination  .of 
potential·  competition  between- T-Data  and 
Transpac  France  in  Germany  and  France 
respectively will  not allow the  parents to foreclose 
their  home  markets  for  the  prov1s1on  of · · 
standardized packet-switched data_ communications 
services. 
Markets  for  national  services  in  countries  other 
than  Ftance and Germany 
(72)  At  the  third-country  national  level,  Atlas  is  set  to 
develop into a significant competitor for incumbent 
TOs: Atlas aims at becoming the second  player on 
the  data  communications  services  markets  of all 
major European markets. with the exception of the 
UK.  In  respect  of  these  services,  the  parents' 
submitted market share target for Atlas in all major 
national markets other than France and Germany is 
20%. Atlas  is  therefore set to offer an alternative 
to  dominant  incumbent  TOs  rather  than  to 
eliminate actual competition in third countries. 
Markets  outside the scope _of the Atlas  venture 
(73)  The  liberalized  services  subject  to  cooperation 
within Atlas  contribute less  than  10 % to DT and 
FT's  respective  turnover.  Even  some  liberalized 
seririces such  as  national VPN  services  and all  data 
communications involving the  use  of DT and  FT's 
AJ'M networks are not Atlas services and therefore 
subject to competition  between  the  parents,  while 
Atlas  may purchase these services  and access  these 
networks  under  equivalent  non-discriminatory, 
transparent.  conditions  and  at  the  same  inter-
connection  rates  as  third-party  competitors.  The 
condition attached  to -this  Decision  restricting  the 
exchange of sensitive  information between  DT, FT 
and _Atlas  limit  the  potentially  negative  effects  of 
the· joint venture  both on competition between the 
parents acting as  Atlas  distributors and  on overall 
competition between the parents. 
Exclusive  distribution  arrangements  in  France  and 
Germany 
(74)  In  allowing  passive  sales  -the  Distribution 
Agreements provide an 'opening for customers with 
bargaining  power  to  exploit  margins  for 
competition  between  the  Atlas  parent  acting  as 
exclusive  distributor  in  its  home  country  aJ;J.d  the 
·other parent that may· offer the same Atlas  service 
at a· lower price.  More importantly, the restrictive 
effects  of the exclusive  distribution agreements  are 
likely to be increasingly balanced by _the availability 
of  alternative  infrastructure  and  the 
non-discriminatory  tellllS  of interconnection  witli 
T-bata and Transpac-France's n.etworks, which ·will 
induce competition  for  Atlas ·and  for  DT  and Ff 
acting as Atlas distributors. 
6.  Conclusion 
(75)  It  is  the  Co~mission's  conclusion  that  all 
conditions for an individual exemption pursuant to 
IT  A/  56 .. ·· 
.. 
No L239/50  Official Journal of the European Communities  19.  9.  96 
Article  85  (3)  of the  EC Treaty and Article 53  (3) 
of the  EEA  Agreement  are  met  in  respect  of the 
creation  of Atlas  and  in  respect  of the  individual 
restrictions discussed above. 
C.  DURATION OF THE EXEMPTION, 
CONDffiONS AND OBLIGATIONS 
(76)  Pursuant to Article  8 of Regulation No 17 and to 
Protocol 21  of the  EEA  Agreement  respectively,  a 
decision in application of Article  85  (3) of the EC 
Treaty and Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement 
shall be issued for a specified period and conditions 
and.  obligations may  be  attached thereto.  Pursuant 
to Article  6  of Regulation  No  17,  the  date  from 
which such a decision takes effect cannot be earlier 
than the date of notification. In that respect, in the 
present  case  the  Decision,  in  so  far  as  it  grants 
exemption, shall take effect: 
(a)  as  regards  the  creation  of Atlas  and  related 
agreements  as  described  above, except for  the 
integration  of Transpac  France  ·and  T-Data 
into  a  joint  venture,  for  five  years  from .the 
date · ori  which  the  second  new  infrastructure 
licence comes into force in both Germany and 
France  authorizing  the  licensee  to  oper~te 
infrastructure  for  the  provision  of  liberali~d 
services  in  competition  with  the  respective 
parent ··and  the respective first licensee; and 
(b)  as  regards  the integration of Transpac France 
and T-Data into a joint venture company, from 
the  date  on which  licences  to new applicants 
for  the provision of nationwide infrastructure 
and national and international voice telephony 
service$  which provide two alternatives to DT 
and FT in a  substantial part of Germany- and 
France  respectively  ·come  into  force  in  both 
Germany  and  France  to  the  expiry  of  the 
five-year  period  specifi.ed  in  the  preceding 
recital. 
(77)  This  exemption  Decision  shall  be  subject  to  fhe 
conditions described  in  recitals 25 to 30 (1).  This 
exemption Decision shall further impose on DT, FT 
and  the  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
agreements the obligations described  in recital  30. 
These  conditions  are  indispensable  to  prevent  an 
elimination of competition in  the relevant markets 
by  the  largest TOs in.  the  EEA.  The  Commission 
will,  upon the parties request,  review the. need  for 
·any  particular condition or obligation attached to 
this Decision  if circumstances change  substantially 
before the period of exemption expires. 
The  most  crucial  behavioural  requirements  to 
safeguard  competition  in  the  EEA  are  attached  as 
conditions rather than obligations to this Decision, 
given the need to prevent an elimination of effective 
competition.  Strict  compliance  with  these 
requirements is  so important that the Commission 
must ensure immediate  cons~uences in  the  event 
of a  breach.  Given  the legal consequences of such 
breach  of  a  condition,  national  courts  can 
adequately and swihly contribute to a decentralized 
policing  of compliance  and  thus  ensure  that  the 
competition rules  will  be  respected  for  the  benefit 
of private individuals (37). However, the principle of 
proportionality  requires  ·that  far-reaching  legal, 
financial  and  commercial  consequences  do  not 
ensue .from occasional or individual mistakes whose 
effects  on  the  market  are  negligible.  Therefore, 
violations  of  the  prohibitions  on 
cross-subsidization,  discrimination  and  bundling 
cannot  be  ~onsidered  to  breach  a  condition 
attached  to  this  Decision  unless  such  violations 
have a substantial impact on market conditions, for  • 
instance if practices are committed systematically or  •·:  .. 
repeatedly. 
The  condition  relating  to  non-discriminatory 
treatment of Atlas .and  its  competitors  (recital  28) 
will also allow DT and FT to compete against each 
other  at  the  distribution  l~vel,  albeit  through 
passive  sales.  Such competition is  possible  because 
the same Atlas service may be sold from either end 
of the requested circuits, namely from Germany or 
from  France.  To  limit  the  potentially  negative 
effects  of the joint venture on overall competition 
between  the  parents,  the  Commission considers  it 
appropriate to impose restrictions on the exchange 
of sensitive  information  between  the  parents  and 
Atlas (recital 28  (4)). 
(78)  This  Decision  is  without  prejudice  to  the 
applicability  of Article  86 .of the EC  Treaty  and  ~  .. 
Article 54 of the EEA Agreement,  V 
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: 
Article 1 . 
Pursuant  to .Article  85  (3)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and. 
Article· 53  (3)  of  the  EEA  Agreement  and  subject  to 
Articles  2  to·  5  of  this  Decision,  the  provisions  of 
(l7)  See  Commission  notice  on  cooperation  between  national 
courts and the Commission in  applying Articles  85  and  86 
of the EEC ·Treaty, OJ No  C 39, 13. 2. 1993, p.  6. 
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Articles 85  (1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (1) of the 
EEA  Agreement  are  hereby  declared  in~pplicable, for  a 
period of five  years from the date on which two or more 
licences for the construction or ownership and control of 
alternative  infrastructure for  the provision of liberalized 
telecommunications services take effect in both Germany 
and France, to: 
(a)  the creation of the Atlas  joint venture  by  D~~tsche 
Telekom  AG  ('DT')  and  France  Telecom  ('IT'), as 
notified  to  the  Commission,  including  the  ancillary' 
obligations .imposed on DT and· on FT: 
(i)  to obtain from  Atlas all requirements for  global 
products under Article  VII  of both Distribution 
Agreements; and 
(ii)  not .to  compete  with  the  joint  venture  for  the 
provision of Atlas services  under Article  XIII  of 
the Joint Venture Agreement and Article  VII  of 
both Distribution Agreements; and to 
(b)  the  appointment of DT as  the  exclusive  distributor 
for  Atlas  in  Germany  and  of  FT  as  the  exclusive 
distributor  for  Atlas  in  France  under  Article  IV  of 
both Distribution Agreements. 
Article 2 
Pursuant  to  Article  85  (.3)  of  the  EC  Treaty  and 
Article  53  (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement  and  subject  to 
Articles  3, 4  and  5  of this  Decision,  the  provisions  of 
Article 8$' (1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the 
EEA Agreement are  hereby declared  inapplicable  to the 
integration into Atlas  of the  German and French  public 
packet·switched  data:  networks,  provided  that  only 
networks  providing  packet-switched  data  communi-
cations  services  using  the  X.25,  Frame  Relay,  SNA  or 
Internet protocols shall  be  integrated,  from  the  date  on· 
which both Germany and France have: 
(a)  removed all legal prohibitions on entities other than 
DT and FT and their subsidiaries to: 
_...  (i)  build,  own  or  control  both  national  and 
international  telecommunications  infrastructure 
and  use  such  infrastructure  to  provide . any 
telecommunications service, and 
(ii)  provide  a  national  and  international  voice 
telephony· service; and 
(b)  granted  and made  effective  at least  two  licences  to 
applicants other than DT and FT for 
(i)  the  construction  or ownership,  and  control,  of 
telecommunications.  infrastructure  and  either 
separately or in combination, 
(ii)  the provision of national and international voice 
telephony  services,  provided  that  such  licences 
provide two suitable alternatives to DT and FT 
respectively  to serve  all  or a substantial part of 
the territory of Germany and France, 
until  the  expiry  of  the  five-year  period  specified  in 
Article 1. 
Article 3 
Until the date specified in Article 2 of this Decision, the 
exemption  from  Article  85  (1)  of the  EC  Treaty  and 
Article 53 (  1) of the EEA  Agreement set out in  Article  1 
of  this  Decision  is  subject  to  the  condition  that 
cooperation between  DT and FT in  developing common 
. technical  network elements comprise the following  areas 
only: 
(a)  the following product ma·nagement and development 
tasks: 
(i}  product definition, 
(ii)  product marketing, 
(iii)  product life-cycle management, 
(iv)  specification of product requirements, 
(v)  technical specifications and development of the 
products, and 
(vi)  technical  develo~ment of the products; 
(b)  the following network ·planning functions: 
(i)  central  network  engineering  and  optimization 
of the  common transmission  network  so  as  to 
avoid  ap  unreasonable  duplication  of 
resources, 
(ii)  engineering  and  optimization  of the  networks 
for the  v~rious service platforms so as to ensure 
seamless services, and 
(iii)  central  planning ·regarding  the  implementation 
of new network nodes; and 
(c)  the  foll~wing aspects of information systems: 
·(i)  definition  of  the  information  system  archi-
tecture, 
(ii)  specification  of  information  system  require-
ments .and applications, 
(iii)  technical.  development  of  hardware  and 
software for  infor~ation  .systems, and 
(iv)  central  implementation  planning  of  hardware 
and software. 
Until the date specified in  ArtiCle 2, all other aspects and 
functions  of each of the· French and the German  public 
packet-switched data networks shall be controlled by two 
separate network management centres. 
Article 4 
The exemption from the  ~pplication of Article  85  (1)  of 
the EC Treaty and Article 53  (1)  of the EEA Agreement 
set out in  Articles  1 and 2 of this  Decision  is  subject to 
the following conditions: 
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(a)  Divestiture of Info AG 
(  1)  FT shall: 
(i)  sell  Transpac's  shares  in  Info  AG  before 
[  •••  ] (38). The Commission may extend the 
period  granted  to  FT  for  divestiture  of 
Info AG by an additional six months after 
that  dare;  FT  shall  be  deemed  to  have 
complied  with  this  condition  by  [  ...  ] (39) 
if it  has  entered  into  a  binding  letter  of 
intent or a biRding contract for the sale of 
Info  AG  to  a  purchaser  agreed  by  the 
Commission,  provided  that  such  sale  is 
completed within a reasonable time limit, 
after the signing of such  binding letter of 
intent or binding contract, agreed  by  the 
Commission; 
(ii)  appoint  a  trustee  subject  to  approval  by 
the  Commission  to  advise  on  the 
management  and  to  sell  Info  AG, 
provided that, subject to approval  by  the 
Commission, FT may 
- terminate the trustee agreement should 
FT  decide  at  any  time  after  the 
appointment  that  the  trustee  is  not 
performing its duties properly, and 
- replace  the  previously  ·  appointed 
trustee  by  another  trustee  also 
approved by the Commission; 
(iii)  give the trustee an irrevocable mandate to 
sell  Info  AG,  on best possible  terms  and 
conditions,  to  any  available  purchaser 
making an offer before [  ..•  ](40);. 
(iv)  remunerate  the  trustee  providing 
incentives for a prompt divestiture; 
(.v)  give all reasonable assistance requested by 
the  trustee to sell  Info  AG  by  the target 
'date; 
(vi)  establish  and  facilitate  the  management 
structure  agreed  with  the  trustee  in 
the  framework  of  the  divestiture 
negotiations; 
(vii)  provide  the  purchaser  of Info  AG  with 
any  licences  and  know-how  relating  to 
the provision of Info AG's services to the 
extent possible under existing contractual 
obligations,  if  any.  FT  may  charge  the 
purchaser a market-based fee for any such 
licence and know-how; 
(viii)  keep  all  administrative  and  management 
functions relating to Info AG which have 
been  carried  out at all  levels  within  FT 
{"1)  Business secret. 
(l') Business secret. 
('10)  B-usiness secret. 
'and/or Transpac,  so  as  to  maintain  the 
viability,  marketability  · and  compe-
titiveness  of Info  AG  until  divestiture  is 
completed or until the trustee advises  FT 
that  such  functions  are  no  longer 
·necessary, whichever occurs earlier. 
(2)  FT  shall  at  all  times  use  its  best  efforts  to 
maintain  the  value  of  Info  AG  and  of  its 
business in every respect and, when the trustee is 
appointed  to  sell  Info  AG,  shall  consider A!e 
advice of t.he  trustee to maintain this  value. VFK_ 
shall  in  _particular  ensure  that  all  services 
provided  by  FT  or any  of Ff's subsidiaries  to 
Info AG continue to be provided efficiently and 
satisfactorily and that no increase is made in the 
charge  (if  any)  made  to  Info  AG  for  any  such 
service ..  Ff shall not, except with the consent of  t· 
the trustee, employ or offer employment to any  ·  · . 
employee  or officer  of Info  AG.  until  after  the 
sale of Info AG.  / 
(3)  .The trustee appointed by  FT shall: 
(i)  advise  FT  and  Transpac  on  the  best 
management  structure  to  ensure  the 
continued  ·viability,  marketability  and 
competitiveness of Info AG's business, also 
in  the  event  of a  restructuring  of  Info 
AG; 
(ii).  advise FT and Transpac with regard to the 
·satisfactory operation and management of 
Info  AG,  so  as  to  ensure  the  con-tinued 
viability,.  marketability  and  compe-
titiveness of Info AG's business, and shall 
supervise,  monitor  ·and  control  the 
implementation of the advice  by Info AG; 
for  these  purposes  the  trustee  shall  have 
complete  access  to  Info  AG's  personnel 
·and  facilities  as  well  as  to  documents, 
books  and  records  of  both  FT  and 
Transpac,  including  such  personnel, 
facilities,  books and records which, even if 
not directly related to Info AG,  may have. 
an  impact  Qn  the  conduct  of Info  AG's 
operations;  · 
f): 
(iii)  act  as  FT's  investment  banker  in 
conducting·  bona  fide  negotiations  with 
interested.  third  parties  with  a  view  to 
selling  Info  AG.  In  the  event  that  the 
trustee at any time prior to the target date 
determines  together with the Commission 
that  it  ,  is  not  possible  to  identify  an 
acceptable  purchaser  for  the  business  of 
Info  AG  other than· the  customers  whose 
headquarters are located outside Germany, 
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the trustee, Ff and the  Commission shall 
discuss  appropriate  alternatives  to  the 
proposed divestiture  o·f  Info  AG,  notably 
an extended divestiture; 
(iv)  provide  the  Commission  with  a  written 
report before a  binding contract is  signed 
and  in  any  event  every  month  on  all 
developments in its negotiations with third 
parties interested in  purchasing Info AG; 
(v)  provide  the  Commission  with  a  written 
report  every  two  months  concerning  the 
monitoring  of  the  operations  and 
management of Info AG; 
(vi)  at any other time  upon the  Commission's 
request,  pr.ovide  the  Commission  with  a 
written or oral report on any aspect of the 
duties  and  activities  of  the  trustee  in 
relation  to  Info  AG  and  its  p~ssible 
purchasers, indicating whether a proposed 
purchaser  would  be  able  to  ensure  that 
Info AG remains a competitive participant 
in the German telecommunications market 
and  whether  negotiations  with  such 
proposed purchaser should continue; and 
(vii)  cease  to perform  its  duties  as  trustee  for 
the· purpose  of this  condition  when  the 
sale of Info AG or any alternative remedy 
within the meaning of point (iii)  becomes 
effective. 
(  4)  Multinational clients to whom Info AG  has so 
far  provided  network  services. as  part  of the 
Transpac netWork  and whose  headquarter~ are 
located outside Germany may  be  transferred to 
Atlas  on  condition  that  the  Commission  is 
satisfied  that  these  services  can  be  separated 
from the German activities of Info AG  without 
. significantly  lessening  the  value  of  those 
activities. 
(5)  ·With  immediate  effect  from·  the  date  of 
notification of this Decision and until one year 
after  the  date  of -signature  of the  agreements 
between  Transpac  and  the  purchaser  of  Info 
AG,  neither DT, Ff, Atlas nor GlobalOne shall 
compete  with  Info  AG  for  the  provision  of 
telecommunications  services  to  customers  of 
Info AG whose headquarters are located within 
Germany except  where  such  customers  decline 
to deal with Info AG. 
(6)  ·If t  e sale of Info AG's business does  not seem 
lik  y to occur by the date stated in point (1)  (i), · 
shall,  at  least  two  months  before  that 
te,  submit  alternative  remedies  sufficiently 
arisfactory  to safeguard  actual  competition  in 
the  German market.  These  alternative  remedies 
must be executed by- the date stated in  point (  1) 
(i). 
(b)  Non-discrimination 
(  1)  DT and Fr shall not gra·nt to ~ny entity created 
pursuant  to  the  Atlas  Agreements  terms  and 
conditions dissimilar to the terms and conditions 
applied  to  othe_i:'  providers  of similar  services, 
nor  .exempt  such  entity  from  any  usage 
restrictions  which  would enable  such  entity  to 
offer  services  which  competing  providers  are 
prevented  from  offering  .  with  regard  to  the 
following  facilities-related  telecommunications 
services provided by Ff and DT in  France  and 
Germany respectively: 
(i)  leased  lines  services,  in  particular 
international leased  lines  (half-circuits)  and 
domestic  leased  lines,  including  any 
discounts, as  the case may be;  and 
(ii)  PSTNIISDN  services  including  both  access 
to such  networks (namely  analogue  access; 
basic  ISDN  access;  ISDN  access  to  the 
public  packet~switched  data  networks; 
special  access  from  the  p"ublic 
packet-switched  data  networks  to  ISDN; 
and national  and  international  voice  VPN 
and  VPN  interconnection  services)  and 
traffic over such networks. 
Atlas  shall  not  be  granted  more  favourable 
treatment than third parties in  connection with 
reserved  facilities  and  services  and  with  such 
facilities  and services which remain an essential 
facility  after  full  and effective  liberalization  of 
telecommunications  infrastructure  and  services 
in France and Germany. 
(2)  DT- and  Ff  shall  grant  any  entity  created 
. pursuant to the  Atlas Agreement and any third 
party  operat41g  a  telecommunications  facility 
that  apply  for  the  interconnection  of  such 
facility  with  DT  or  FT's  networks  such 
interconnection  on  non-discriminatory  ·terms 
that  enable  such  erttity  or  person  to  provide 
telecommuni~tions  services  or  provide  its 
telecommunications  facilities  without limitation 
in any respect within the reasonable capabilities 
of the operator concerned. 
(3)  DT and Ff shall  not ilt  any  way  discriminate 
between any entity created pursuant to the Atlas 
_Agreements  and  any  other  service  provider 
competing with such entity in connection with: 
(i)  either  a  decision  substantially  to  modify 
technical  interfaces  for  the  access  to 
reserved  services  and/or  essential  facilities 
or services,  or the  disclosure  of any  other 
technical  information  relating  to  the 
operation  pf  the  PSTNIISDN;  competitors 
shall  in  particular  have  access  to  such 
software  and  interface  information  as  is 
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indispensable  for  maintaining  the  technical 
features  of  voice  services  where  such 
competitors interconnect to the German or 
French PSlN/ISDN; and 
(ii)  the  disclosure  of  any  commercial 
information that would confer a substantial 
competitive  advantage  and  is  not  readily 
and  equally  available  elsewhere  by  service 
providers competing with such entity. 
(4)  Breaches of the requirements set out in points 1, 
2  and  3  shall  not  be  considered  to  infringe 
this  condition  unless  such  breaches  have  a 
substantial impact on the  market. 
(c)  Interconnection  to  DT  and  FT's  public  packet-
switched data networks 
(  1)  FT and DT shall immediately: 
(i)  establish  and  maintain  standardized  X.75 
interfaces  to  access  their  national  public 
packet-switched data networks; 
(ii)  offer  such  access  on  non-discriminatory 
terms,  including  price,  availability  of 
volume  or other discounts  and  the  quality 
of interconnection provided; and 
(iii)  publish  the  standard  terms  and conditions 
for  such  X.75  interface  standards, 
including,  if  any,  volume  discounts  and 
other  discounts  and  make  any  agreements 
relating  to such  X.7.$  interfaces,  including 
all  specifically  agreed  terms,  available  for 
inspection by  t.he  Commission. 
(2)  Tr~nspac France  and  T-Data  shall,  until  such 
time  as  Transpac  France  and  T-Data  are 
integrated  into Atlas,  not disclose  to arty entity 
· created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas. Agreement  aay 
such  specifically. agreed  terms  as .are  jdenrified 
and  maintained  as  confidential  by  the  party 
obtaining interconnection  through. standardized 
X.75  interfaces to access the French or'  German 
. national public packet-switched data networks. 
(3)  The  conditions  set  out  in  points  (1)  and  (2) 
shall  likewise  apply  to  any  generally  used 
ccm  -standardized  interconnection  protocol 
that  may  modify,  replace  or  co-exist  as  a 
standard  related  to  the  X.75  standard  and  is 
used  by  FT and DT. 
(  4)  Aqy  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreements may access  the  French and German 
public  packet-switched  data  networks  through 
proprietary interfaces, even  for  the provision of 
data  communications  services,  provided  that 
access  granted  to  such  entity  through  such 
interfaces  is  economically  equivalent  to 
third-party access  to those networks. 
(5)  Breaches of the  requir~ments set out in points 1 
· to  4  shall  not.  be  considered  to  infringe  this 
condition  unless  such  breaches  have  a 
substantial impact on the market. 
(d)  lntercoi:mection to DT and FT's other networks and 
facilities 
(  1)  DT  and  FT  shall  grant  to  any  third  party 
that  operates  a  telecommunications  facility 
('telecommunications  operator') and  applies  for 
the  interconnection  of such  facility  or  systems 
facilities  with  DT  or . FT's  networks,  such 
interconnection  on  non-discriminatory  terms  as 
.compared  to  the  terms  applied  to  Atlas.  Such 
terms  shall  enable  the  telecommunications 
operator to provide telecommunications services  ~.  , 
or  provide  its  telecommunications  facilities  • 
without  limitation  in  any  respect  within  the 
reasonable  capabilities  of  the  telecommuni-
cations operator concerned. 
(2)  Breaches of the  requirements set out in  point 1 
shall not be considered to infringe this condition 
unless  such  breaches  have  a substantial  impact 
on the market. 
(e)  Cross-subsidization 
(  1)  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreements  shall  be  established  as  distinct 
entities separate·from DT and FT. 
(2)  Atlas  SA,  T-Data  and  Transpac  France  shall 
obtain  their  own  ~ebt financing  on  their  own 
credit, provided that FT and DT: 
(i)  may  make  capital  contributions  or 
commercially  normal ·loans  to  Atlas  SA,  11· · 
.  T  -Data  and  Transpac  France,  to  enable  . 
them  to  conduct  their  respective 
businesses; 
(ii). may  pledge  their  venture  interests  in  su~h 
entities~  in  connection  with  non-recourse 
financing for such entities; and 
(iii)  may  guarantee  any  indebtedness  of  such 
entities, provided that FT and DT may only 
make  ·payments  pursuant  to  any  such 
guarantee  following  a  default  by  such 
entities in  respect of such indebtedness. 
(3)  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreement,  T-Data  and Transpac  France  shall 
not  allocate  directly  or indirectly  any  part  of 
their operating expenses, costs, depreciation, or 
other expenses of their business to any parts of 
FT · or  DT's  business  units  (including  without 
limitation  the  proportionate  costs  based  on 
work actually performed that are attributable to 
shared. employees or sales or marketing of Atlas 
products and services  by  DT or .FT employees). 
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These  undertakings  may  bill  DT  or  Ff  for 
products and services  supplied to DT or Ff by 
such undertakings at: 
(i)  the same  price  charged third parties in  the 
case  of products  or services  sold  to  third 
. parties in commercial quantities; or 
(i0  on the. basis of the full  cost reimbursement 
or other arm's length pricing method in the 
case  of products  and  services  not  sold  to 
third parties in commercial quantities. 
(4)  Breaches of the requirements set out in points 1, 
2 and 3 shall not be  considered to infringe this 
condition  unless  such  breaches  have  a 
substantial impact on the market. 
t  (f)  Bundling 
.-t 
(  1)  DT  and  Ff  shall  sell  their · services . under 
contracts  separate  from  the  c.ontracts  for  the 
sale  of Atlas  services  concluded  as  distributors 
of  Atlas  in  Germany  and  France  respectively. 
Each  separate  contract  shall  set  out the  terms 
and  conditions  of each  individual  service  sold 
thereunder and notably attribute any quantity or 
other  discounts  to  a  particular  service,  as  the 
case may be. 
(2)  Breaches of the above requirements shall not be 
considered to infringe this condition unless such 
breaches  . have  a  substantial  impact  on  the 
market.  · 
(g)  Accounting : 
(1)  T-Data,  Transpac  France  (including  all  their 
subsidiaries)  as  well  as  all  entities  created 
pursuant  to  the  Atlas  Agreements·  which  are 
operating  in  the  EEA  shall  keep  separate 
accounting  records  using  international 
accounting  standards  for  each  service  they 
provide  in  any country.  DT  and Ff (including 
all  subsidiaries)  shall  keep  separate  accounting 
records using international accounting standards 
for  each  service  they  provide  to  any  entity 
created  pursuant  ·to  the  Atl$s  Agreements, 
op~rating in the EEA. 
(2)  DT and Ff shall,  within  one  year  of the  date 
defined  in  Article  1,  implement  an  accounting 
system  which  generates  sufficiently  detailed 
records  of the  services  covered  by  point  (  1  ). 
Those records shall detail the following: 
(i)  the cost standard used; 
(ii)  the  accounting  conventions  used  for  the 
treatment of costs; 
(iii)  the  a·llocation  and  attribution  of  expenses 
·  or  costs,  re.venues,  assets  and  liabilities 
.shared between any entity created pursuant 
to the Atlas Agreements and DT and/or Ff; 
and 
(iv)  the attrib\ltion method chosen . 
(3)  The accounting records rderred to in points .( 1) 
and (2) shall identify all services provided to any 
entity created pursuant to the Atlas  Agreements 
by  DT  and  Ff or  transfers  to  or  from  DT 
and Fr. 
(4)  No  entity  created  pJJrsuant  to  the  Atlas 
Agreement, nor T-Data or Transpac France shall 
receive  any  material  subsidy  directly  or 
indirectly from DT or Ff, nor any investment or 
payment from  DT or Ff  ·that is  not recorded in 
the  books  of such  entities  as  an  investment  in 
debt or equity. 
Article 5 
The exemption granted under this  Decision  is  subject to 
the following obligations: 
(a)  Auditing 
(1)  Atlas  SA  and  any  consolidated  subsidiary  of 
Atlas SA,  Transpac France and T-Data shall  be 
audited  by  an  iQdependent  external  auditor 
every 12 months, provided that such audit shall 
certify from  an accounting viewpoint that:· 
(i)  all  transactions  between  those  under-
takings, on the  on~ hand, and Ff and DT. 
on the other hand, have beert conducted at 
arm's length;  .  · 
(ii)·  the  undertakings  have  adhered  to  the 
accounting procedures; and 
(iii)  the ·calculation numbers are accurate. 
(2)  The · first  auditing  report  and  certificate 
co.mplying  with  point  (  1  ),  covering  the 
12-month period starting on the date on which 
this Decision takes effect,  shall  be  submitted to 
the  Commission  within  15  months  of  that 
date. 
(b)  Other obligations 
DT,  Ff; T-Data,  Transpac  F~ance and·  all  entmes 
created pursuant to the Atlas Agreements shall each, 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  and  ensuring 
compliance  by  these  .  undertakings  with  the 
conditions set out in  Article  4: 
(  1)  keep  all  detailed  records  and  documents 
necessary  to.  prove  complete  compliance  with 
. the terms of the conditions set out in  Article  4 
ready for  inspection by  the  Commission and  to 
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enable the Commission to verify  the correctness 
of the  audit certificate  referred  to in  point  (a} 
(2); 
(2)  give  the· Commission  access  to  their  business 
premises  to  inspect  records  and  documents 
covered by the obligations set out under heading 
(a)  and to receive  oral explanations relating to 
such  documents  on  reasonable  notice,  during 
office  hours,  and  without  the  need  for  the 
Commission to invoke the powers of inspection 
pursuant to Regulation No 17; and 
(3)  provide the Commission with: 
(i)  any  records  and  documents  in  the 
possession or control of those undertakings 
necessary for  that determination; 
(ii)  unaudited  accounting  data  as  specified  in 
points  (1)  and  (2)  every  six  months, 
starting one year after  the commencement 
date  of  the  exemption  pursuant  to 
Article  1; and 
(iii)  further oral or written explanations  .. 
Article 6 
This Decision is addressed to: 




Place d'  Alleray, 
F-75505 PARIS. 
Done at Brussels,  17' July 1996. 
For. the Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIER T 
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· COMMISSION DECISION 
of 17 July 1996 
relating  to a proceeding under Article  85  of the  EC  Treaty and Article  53  of the ·EEA 
Agreement 
(Case No IV/35.617- Phoenix/GlobaiOne) 
(Only the English, French and German texts are authentic) 
(Text with EEA  relevance) 
(96/547/EC) 
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  the  European 
Economic Area, 
Having  regard  to  Council  Regulation  No  17  of 
6  February  1962,  First  Regulation  implementing 
Articles  85  and  86 of the  Treaty (1 ),  as  last amended  by 
the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, and 
in particular Articles 2, 6, and 8 thereof, 
Having  regard  to the  application for  negative  clearance 
and  the  notification  for  exemption  sub~itted, pursuant 
to Articles 2 and 4 of Regulation 17, on 29 June  1995, 
Having  regard  to  the  summary  of the  application  and 
notification  published  pursuant  to  Article  19 (3)  of 
Regulation 17 and to Article 3 of Protocol 21 of the EEA 
Agreement (2 ), 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Committee  for 
Restrictive  Practice~ and Dominant Positions, 
Whereas: 
..  ~·  I.  THE FACTS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  The  Phoenix  transaction  was  notified  to  the 
Commission on 29 June 1995. The notifying parties 
announced a new name, GlobalOne, at the signature 
of  the  agreements  on  5  March  1996.  This 
transaction  is  linked  to  a  separate  transaction 
creating a joint venture, Atlas, owned as to 50% by 
France  Telecom  (FT)  and  as  to  50%  by  Deutsche 
(')  OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
(1)  OJ No C 337, 15.  12.  1995, p.  13. 
Telekom  (DT),  given  that Atlas  is  a  parent  to  the 
joint  venture  entities  created  pursuant  to  the 
Phoenix  agreements.  A  separate  Decision  in  Case 
IV/35.337 ('the Atlas Decision') (3)  exempts the Atlas 
agreements,  notified  on  16  December  1994,  from 
the  application of Articles  85 (1)  of the  EC  Treaty 
and 53 (1)  of the EEA  Agreement. 
2.  The  Phoenix  agreements  consist  of  two  main 
transactions  involving  two  Community 
telecommunications  organizations  (TOs)  and  one 
United States telecommunications operator: 
(i)  FT  and  DT each  acquired  an  equity  stake  of 
approximately  10%  in  Sprint,  worth  United 
States  $3,7  billion.  Both  FT and  DT obtained 
proportionate board representation and investor 
protection as minority shareholders in Sprint; as 
detailed below, provisions have been included in 
the investment agreement to prevent DT and/or 
FT, either separately or jointly, from controlling 
or influencing Sprint; and 
(ii)  Atlas  and · Sprint  created  a  JOint  venture, 
Phoenix,  for  .  th~  provision  of  non-reserved 
global  telecommunications  services  and  other 
telecommunications  servi~s to corporate users, 
carriers  and  consumers.  The  Phoenix  joint 
venture is structured into groups of operational 
entities  under  the  strategic  supervision  of  a 
Global  Venture  Board  (collectively  referred  to 
as  the 'Phoenix entities'). One group of entities 
provides  Phoenix services  worldwide except in 
Europe  and  the  United  States  (the  'Rest  Of 
World  (ROW)  entities'),  a  second  group  of 
entities  provides  Phoenix . services  in  Europe 
except  in  France ·and  Germany  (the  'Rest  of 
Europe  (ROE)  entities').  The  ROW  and  ROE 
entities also manage Phoenix's global backbone 
network  until  the  parties  reach  agreement  on 
management by  an already created third entity 
(the 'Global Backbone Network (GBN)  entity'). 
The  Global Venture  Board shall take decisions 
on matters of pol~cy only and not engage in the 
(l)  See  p.  23  of this  Official Journal. 
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management  of individual  operational  entities 
created pursuant to the Phoenix agreements. 
B.  THE PARTIES 
3.  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  (DT)  and  France  Telecom 
(IT) are respectively the German and French public 
TOs.  Details  of both  undertakings  are  provided  in 
the  Decision  on the  Atlas  venture  published  in  this 
issue of the Official journal. 
4.  Sprint Corporation. (Sprint) is a holding company in 
the United States. The Sprint group of companies is 
a  diversified  telecommunications  group  providing 
global  voice,  data  and  video-conferencing  services 
and  related  products.  ·Sprint's  main  subsidiaries 
provide  local  (United  States)  exchange,  cellular 
wireless  as  .well  as  domestic  (United  States)  and 
international  long-distance  telecommunications 
services.  Other  Sprint  subsidiaries  engage  in 
wholesale  distribution  of  telecommunications 
products and the publishing and marketing of white 
and  yellow  page  telephone  directories.  Worldwide 
turnover for  Sprint in  1994 was  ECU  10,9  billion; 
Sprint  is  the  world's  11th  largest  tele-. 
communications carrier in terms of revenues. 
C.  THE RELEVANT MARKET 
1.  Creation of  the Phoenix entities 
5.  The  Phoenix  entities  address  several  product  and 
geograp.hic  markets,  namely:  (i)  the  markets  for 
non-reserved corporate telecommunications  services 
both  globally  and  regionally,  (ii)  the  market  for 
· traveller  services· and  (iii)  tl}.e  market  for  so-called 
carrier services. 
(  1)  Product markets 
The  markets  for  .  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications services · 
6.  The  Phoenix  entities  target  the  same  markets  for 
both  customized  packages  of ·  corporate 
telecommunications  services  and  packet-switched 
data  communications  services  (jointly  referred  to 
as  'non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications 
services')  described  in  the  separate  Atlas  Decision. 
Pursuant  to  the  joint  venture  agreement,  the 
offer:ings  of Phoenix include the following services: 
- corporate  voice  services:  global  virtual  private 
network  (VPN),  international  toll  free,  selected 
card  and  simple  resale  services  and  switched 
digital, 
- data communications ·services  using inter alia the 
X.25, Frame Relay and IP  protocols, 
- dedicated  transmission  for  voice  and  data 
services:  managed bandwidth and VSAT, 
- custom  network  solutions:  systems/equipment 
procurement, tailored and managed services and 
·outsourcing, 
- platform-based  enhanced  services:  messaging 
including  access  to  telex,  local  area  network 
(LAN)  interconnection,  electronic  document 
interchange·  (EDI),  video-conferencing  and 
a udio-conferencing. 
7.  Phoenix provides  voice  simple  resale  services  under 
Sprint's  licence  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  under 
IT's licence in Sweden. This Decision relates only to 
Phoenix's  range  of products and  business  scope  as 
notified.  Any  substantial  change  of  products  or 
business  scope,  notably  (i)  the  contribution  to  t 
Phoenix  of broadband  transmission  capacity  (such 
as  Asynchronous Transfer Mode  (ATM)  networks) 
in  France  and  Germany  and  (ii)  the  offering  by 
Phoenix of public basic telecommunications services 
(such as voice  telephony services(4))  requires a  new 
notification. 
The market for traveller services 
8.  The market for traveller telecommunications servic;es 
comprises  offerings  that  meet  the  demand  of 
individuals  who  are  away  from  ·their  normal 
location,  either  at home  or  at  work.  Among  the 
most relevant of these offerings are those offered by 
the Phoenix entities, namely (i)  calling card services 
(prepaid cards with or without a code and postpaid 
cards),  including  those  in  combination  with  credit 
cards  ancl'·.other  branded.  service  cards  ('affinity 
cards'), (ii)  specialized voice services  (such as  equal  • 
access· and ·code-based  authorization  services),  and 
(iii}  selected· data and enhanced platform (that is  to 
say, communications system software) services. 
9.  Cqstomers  for  traveller  services  include  both 
business  travellers  and other travellers.  In  the  card 
business targeted by Phoenix, the former are by  far 
the largest group of buyers.  Business  travellers  are 
generally intensive card users, the main incentive for 
card  usage  being  the  ability to avoid  paying  hotel 
telephone surcharges.  · 
The market for carrier services 
10.  The market for  carrier services  comprises  the  lease 
of transmission capacity and the provision of related 
(4)  Defined  in  the  seventh'  indent  of Article  1  of Commission 
Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in  the 
markets  for  telecommunications  services,  OJ  No  L  192, 
24. 7.  1990, p.  10. 
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servi<;es  to  third-party  telecommunications  traffic 
carriers  and  service  providers.  Along  with 
liberalization  and  globalization  of  tele-
communications  markets,  demand  for  efficient, 
high-quality traffic transportation capacity has risen 
among old and new carriers. In this connection, the 
traditional  model  of  separate  arrangements  with 
other individual carrit;rs is increasingly challenged by 
players with global network infrastructure that offer 
an  array  of  services.  The  most  relevant  of such 
services are: 
(a)  switched  transit,  meaning  transport  of  traffic 
over  bilateral  facilities  between  the  originating 
carrier,  the  transit  carrier  and  the  terminating 
carrier;  neither  the  originating  carrier  nor  the 
terminating  carrier  need  bilateral  facilities 
between  themselves,  but  only  with  the  transit 
carrier; 
(b)  dedicated  transit, meaning  leased  line  offerings 
for the transport of traffic through the domestic 
network  of  the  transit  carrier;  leased  line 
facilities  used  for  this  purpose  may  include 
discrete  voice  circuits  or  a  high-bandwidth 
digital  circuit  that can be  used  for  both  voice 
and data services; 
(c)  traffi~  hubbing  offerings,  where  the  provider 
takes  care  of  all  or  part.  of  international 
connections;  these  offerings  are  typically 
designed  for  emerging  carriers,  who  are 
int~rconnected with the provider  over  bilateral 
facilities  and  whose  international  traffic  is 
merged  with  other  traffic  on  the  provider's 
global network; and 
(d)  reseller  services  for  service  providers  without 
international  telecommunications  facilities  of 
their o~. 
As  international  telecommunications  markets  are 
deregulated,  demand  for  carrier  services  is 
_...  increasingly driven  by  alternative carriers concerned 
with  assigning  to  the  incumbent  to  their 
international  traffic,  for  reasons  such  as  technical 
dependency and commercial sensitivity of customer 
information. 
11.  Purchasers of carrier services include established and 
emerging  carriers.  Both  groups  of  clients  are 
sophisticated  purchasers.  Among  the  emerging 
carriers, one may distinguish facilities-based carriers 
that  provide  telecommunications  services  over 
alternative  infrastructure  or  cable  television 
networks seeking greater efficiency  in  the  transport 
of  international  client  traffic,  while  non 
facilities-based carriers and service providers seek to 
preserve  a  competitive  advantage  by · avoiding 
dependence  on a  loeal. TO for  international  client 
traffic. 
(2)  Geographic markets 
12.  Along  the  lines  of the  Commission's  findings  in  its 
Decision  94/579/EC(5)  (BT-MCI),  the  geographic 
scope  of certain  markets  targeted  by  the  Phoenix 
entities,  as  well  as  the  market  that  must  be 
considered  in  respect  of the  investment  of DT  and 
Ff  in  Sprint,.  is  international  and  even  global. 
Although national borders subsist for many services, 
strategic alliances like  Phoenix are  built not only  in 
anticipation  of  a  market  unaffected  by  national 
boundaries  but  even  with  the  express  purpose  of 
offering  large  global  telecommunications  users 
seamless  end-to-end  services.  anywhere  by 
overcoming  the  difficulties  inherent  in  the  current 
market  structure  split  along  national  borders. 
However,  the  service  offerings  of  the  Phoenix 
entities attain different existing geographic markets. 
The  markets  for  non-reserved  corporate  tele-
communications services 
13.  As  described  in  the  Atlas  Decision,  demand  from 
large  users  for  customized  packages  of corporate 
telecommunications  services  exists  in  at least  three 
- distinct  geographic  markets,  namely  at a  global,  a 
cross-border regional  and a national  level.  Phoenix 
services have global reach given that DT, Ff, Sprint 
and  the  ROE and ROW entities each  interconnect 
over  the  Phoenix global  backbone  network  .. In  the 
global market for ·customized packages of corporate 
telecommtinications  services  the  Phoenix  venture 
therefore  creates  competition,  for  instance  for  BT 
and  MCI's  existing  Concert  venture.  In  the 
Community,  the  ROE  entities  will  cooperate  with 
DT, FT and Atias to provide customized packages of 
corporate  telecommunications  services  at  the 
cross-border regional  level;  these  ser:vices  will  have 
global 'connectivity' - that is, they will allow for an 
extension  beyond  the  Gommunity  and  ultimately 
worldwide if a customer so requires. 
14.  Packet-switched  data  communications  services  in 
each  geographic  market  mentioned  in  the  previous 
recital are a part of the Phoenix offerings portfolio. 
However,  the  regional  Phoenix . operating  entity 
decides  whether  to ·provide  such  services  at  the 
(J)  Commission Decision of 27 July 1994 in Case No IV/34.857 
- BT-MCI, OJ No L 223, 27. 8.  1994, p.  36. 
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national  level.  Therefore,  the ·ROE  entities· provide · 
Europe-wide  packet-switched  data  communications 
services  initially  based  on the  network  that results 
from  merging  the  existing  T  ranspac  and  Sprint 
networks. The extent to which the ROE entities will 
provide such services in national markets within the 
European Economic Area  (EEA)  will depend on the 
coordination between Atlas and the ROE entities as 
the competent Phoenix entities in  the  EEA. 
The market for traveller ·services 
15.  Along  with  the  globalization  of the  economy  the 
market  for  traveller  services  appears  to  be 
increasingly  global;  travellers  demand  offerings 
which  include  a single  bill  and integrated  functions 
such  as  voice  messaging,  voice  response  and 
information  systems  everywhere.  Geographic 
limitations  of current traveller  service  offerings  are 
generally  due  to  technical  shortcomings  due  to  be 
overcome  in  the  near  future,  such  as  the 
Incompatibility  of mobile  communications  systems 
or differences in prepaid cards without an individual 
user code.  As  illustrated at recital  8 above,  none of 
the  services  targeted  by  the  Phoenix  entities  is 
affected  by  these  shortcomings;  however,  the 
geographic scope of the traveller services offered  by 
Phoenix  can  be  left  open  for  the  purposes  of this 
case,  as  the . finding  of narrow geographic. markets 
would  not  affect  the  assessment  of  the  parties' 
competitive position. 
16. 
The market for carrier services 
Both supply of and demand for carrier services  are 
by  nature  international.  Geographic  proximity 
between  purchaser and supplier of -switched  transit 
capacity. is hardly· relevant for switched transit which 
carriers use either as a substitute for operating own 
international  lines  or to. deal  with  peak  traffic  on 
such  lines-.  Likewise,  dedicated transit $ervices  offer 
cable- or satellite-based routing capacity across third 
countries.  Finally,  using  hubbing  services  is  an 
alternative to entering into an undetermined number 
of bilateral agreements with individual carriers. 
2.  DT and FT's investment in Sprint 
17.  The  acquiSition  by  DT  and  FT  of  new  equity 
amounting to·  an approximate 20% stake in Sprint 
aims at consolidating a strategic alliance to enter the 
global  telecommunications  markets  and  extending 
service  into  new  market  segments.  As  the  BT-MCI 
alliance  showed,  investment  in  a  United  States 
carrier  offers  one  efficient  way  of  addressing 
multinational  companies,  being  the  largest  target 
custom(!!  group  for  global  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications services. 
D.  MARKET SHARES  OF PHOENIX 
The  markets  for customized packages of corporate 
telecommunications· seroices 
18.  Global market 
The  parents  estimate  the  global  ·market  for 
customized  packages  of  corporate  tele-
communications  services  market  addressed  by 
Phoenix  (e~clusive of data communications services) 
to be  worth approximately ECU  4,8  billion  (1993). 
Of  this  total,  end-to-end  services  accounted  for f 
approximately  ECU  37,6  million,  VPN  services  for  -· 
approximately  ECU  2,8  billion,  VSA T  services  for 
approximately  ECU  1,4  billion  and  outsourcing 
services  for  approximately  ECU  527  million.  In 
1993, the aggregate turnover of DT,  FT  and Sprint 
in  the  different  market  segments  amounted  to 
approximately  ECU  3,8  million  for  end-to-end 
services,  approximately  ECU  576  million  for  VPN 
services  and  approximately  ECU  6  million  for 
outsourcing  services,  giving  Phoenix  a  theoretical 
market  share  of  12,2%  in  the  global  market 
for  customized  packages  of  corporate 
telecommunications services. 
19.  Cross:border  r~gional market 
Services  in  the  Com~unity  (exclusive  of  data 
communications  · services)  accounted  for 
approximately ECU 505 million in 1993. According 
to  the  notification  the  Phoeni~ pare~ts'  aggregate  • 
market  shares  in  the  Community  in  199  3  were 
[ ...  ] % (6)  in  the  end-to-end  services  market, 
[  ..  :1% (1)  in  the VPN services market, (  ...  ) %  ( 8)  in 
the outsourcing services market and [  ...  ] % (9)  in the 
VSAT  market.  However,  market  shares  for  VSAT 
services  are  difficult  to  calculate  given  that  TOs 
mostly use  VSAT terminals as  back-up facilities  for 
other  services  or  to  extend  the  geographic  scope 
of  services  despite  terrestrial  infrastructure 
shortcomings. 
20.  National markets 
National  markets  for  customized  packages  of 
corporate  telecommunications  services  within  the 
EEA  are  discussed  in  the  Atlas  Decision.  In  this 
regard,  Sprint  has  a  significant  share  of  total 
outsourcing  turnover  generated  in  Member  States 
(6)  Business secret (less· than 30%  ). 
(1)  Business secret (less  than 30%). 
(8)  Business secret (less  than 5 %). 
(9)  Business secret (less  than 30%). 
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such as the Netherlands ([ ...  ] % (1°))  and the United 
Kingdom  ([ ...  % (11)),  where  DT  and  IT's 
outso1,ucing joint venture, Eunetcom BV, has a lesser 
presence  (5%  of  total  turnover  in  both  Member 
States).  As  for  France  and Germany,  adding Sprint 
to DT and FT  brings  Phoenix's aggregate  share of 
total turnover generated  by  outsourcing services  to 
[ ...  % (12)  in France and to [ ...  % (13)  in  Germany, 
compared  with  31 %  in  France  and  33 %  in 
Germany  for  the  second-largest . provider  there, 
Co~cert's Syncordia. 
The  market for  packet-switched data 
communications services 
t 
The global market for  packet-switched data services 
was worth approximately ECU  5',3  billion in  1993, 
while  DT,  FT  and  Sprint's  aggregate  sales  were 
[ .•.  ] (14)  or  [ ...  ] % (15)  worldwide.  The  European 
market  for  data  communications  . services  is 
discussed in the Atlas Decision. Sprint's turnover for 
packet-switched data services  was  [ ...  ] (16)  in  1993, 
bringing  DT,  FT  and  Sprint's  aggregate  shares  of 
that market to [ ...  ] % (1 7). As  for  national markets, 
Sprint  achieved  its  highest  turnover  in  France, 
Germany,  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Neither 
DT nor FT have a significant market presence in the 
latter  two  Member  States,  where  Sprint  has  a 
[ ...  } % (18)  and [ ...  ) % (19)  market share respectively. 
In  turn, Sprint's turnover in  France (ECU  [ ...  ](20)) 
and  Germany  (ECU  [ ...  ]  (21))  equals  market shares 




The market for traveller services 
Total  calling  card revenue  in  the  Community  was 
approximately ECU  120,5 million in 1994, most of 
which was generated by  national dialling.  In  1993, 
DT  had  issued  200 000  c_ards  (all  of  them  in 
Germany),  equivalent  to  2,1 %.  of  the  total  card 
subscriber  base  in  the  Community;  FT  had  issued 
1,5 million cards (all of them in  France), equivalent 
to  15,7%  of  tile  card  ·subscriber  base  in  the 
Community; and Sprint had issued 12 million cards 
worldwide, of which 500 000 {equivalent to a 5,2% 
market  share)· were  issued  in  the  Community.  The 
aggregate  market  shares  of  the  parents  would 
(10)  Business secret (less  than 10 %). 
( 11)  Business secret (less  than 10 %). 
(12)  Business secret (less  than 45 %). 
•  (13)  Business secret (less than 40 %). 
(14)  Business secret. 
(15)  Business secret (less than 25 %). 
( 16)  Business secret. 
( 17)  Business secret (less than 40 %  ). 
(11)  Business secret (less than 5 %). 
(19)  Business secret (less than 10%). 
(1°)  Business secret. 
(2') Buwpess secret. 
(22)  Busin~ss secret (less  than 5% respectively). 
23. 
24. 
therefore  make  Phoenix  the  largest  calling  card 
services  provider  in  the  Community  (23%  market 
share)  in  terms  of  subscriber  numbers,  ahead  of 
AT&T  and  BT  with  a  21%  and  17,8%  market 
share  respectively.  In  terms  of calling  card  traffic 
within the Community, the aggregiJ.te  market shares 
of  FT  (21 %)  and  DT  (3 %)  are  equal  to  BT's 
market share of 24%. 
The marketfor carrier services 
The  market  for  global  switched  transit  services  is 
estimated  to  be  worth  approximately  ECU  301,1 
million  and  generates  1 500  million  minutes  of 
international  traffic  or  approximately  3 %  of  the 
world's international telephony traffic. Of this total, 
approximately  ECU  165,6  million  are  services 
provided  by  European  carriers,  of  which  in  turn 
approximately  ECU  30,1  million  goes  to  other 
European  carriers.  Within  the  global  switched 
transit  market  (1994),  which  grows  at  an  annual 
rate  of 5  to.  6%, DT had a turnover of ECU  [ ...  ] 
(23), FT of ECU  [ ...  ]  (24)  ·and  Sprint of ECU  [ ...  ] 
(25).  The  aggregate  market  shares  of DT,  FT  and 
Sprint  make  Phoenix  the  third  largest  global 
switched  transit  provider  behind  AT&T  and  BT 
(20,2% each). 
E.  MAIN COMPETITORS OF THE PHOENIX 
ENTITIES 
The  markets  for  non-reserved  corporate  tele-
communications seroices 
The situation in  these  relevant markets is  discussed 
in  the  Atlas  Decision.  The  parties  include  the 
following  players  among  their  -competitors: 
AT&T/Worldpartners,  Cable  and  Wireless  plc, 
Concert,  IBM,  Kokusai  Denshin  Denwa  Company 
Ltd.  ·(KDD),  Nippon  Telegraph. and  Telephone 
Corporation (NlT), Unisource and the United States 
regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs). 
The market for traveller services 
25.  More than one-third of calling cards in Europe are 
issued  by  United  ·States  operators.  AT&T  is 
estimated to have 2 million postpaid card customers 
in  Europe - 21 %  of all  cards issued  there.  These 
customers generate 59% of calling card traffic from 
Europe to the United States. MCI has an estimated 1 
million postpaid card customers in Europe (  10,5 % ), 
which  generate  2  7 %  of  calling  card  traffic  from 
(23)  Business  secrets (market share less  than 10%). 
(24)  Business secrets (market share less  than 15 %). 
(25)  Business secrets (market share less  than 5 %  ). 
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Europe  to  the  United  States.  Executive  Telecard 
International  (ETI)  markets calling cards in Europe 
through  agreements  with  local  operators  or credit 
card companies; ETI's market position is  similar to 
that of MCI. 
The market for canier seroices 
26.  Major players in the market for carrier services and 
notably global switched transit services competing in 
the  EEA  include  AT&T,  BT  (each  holding 
approximately  one  fifth  of  the  market),  Cable  & 
Wireless,  MCI  and  Teleglobe  Canada.  Along  with 
the growing numbers of new carriers that seek to be 
independent  of  the  incumbent  TO  for  their 
international traffic,  new suppliers of such  services, 
some  with  substantial  infrastructure  resources,  are 
emerging or active in the market, an example being 
Hermes Europe Railtel (26). 
F.  THE TRANSACfiON 
27.  The  transaction  notified  to  the  Commission 
comprises a set of agreements the  main features  of 
which are described  below. 
1.  Agreements as originally notified 
(  1)  Agreements  regarding  the  Phoenix  joint 
venture 
The .  parties  have  submitted  the  following 
agreements: 
(a). the  Phoenix  joint  venture  agreement  (the  'JV 
agreement')  sets  out  the  parties'  essential 
commitments and business objectives; 
(b)  the transfer agreements provide for the transfer 
by  Spri~t,  · FT,  DT,  and  Atlas  (collectively 
referred to as the 'parents') of certain basic and 
related  businesses  to  the  relevant  ROE,  ROW 
entities; 
(c)  the  intellectual  property and  trademark licence 
agreements  concern· the  grant  by  the  parents 
and certain affiliates  to the  Phoenix entities  of 
non-exclusive,  non-transferable  licences  to  use 
certain  of the  parents'  technical  information, 
trademarks  and  intellectual  ·  property  · rights 
(IPRs); 
.  (16)  Commission  Decision  in  Case  No  IV/M.683;  OJ  No  157, 
1.  6.  1996, p.  13. 
(d)  the  services  agreements  specify  terms  and 
conditions  of  trading  relationships  among 
Sprint, Atlas,  and the  ROE and 'ROW entities, 
including  the - supply  and  support  services 
needed  to  provide  Phoenix  services  world-
wide . 
(2)  Agreements regarding  FT and DT's investment 
in ·sprint· 
(a)  The  investment  agreement  provides  for  the 
purchase  by  each  of  FT  and  DT  of 
approximately  10% of the  common  stock  of 
.Sprint. 
(b)  The standstill agreement binds FT and DT for a 
period  of  15  years  not  to  acquire  additional 
shares  in  Sprint  which  would  increase  their 
co
0
mbined  aggregate  voting rights  to more  than  f:. 
2  %. 
(c)  The registration rights agreement is  required  in 
order  fo'r  each  party  to  consummate  the 
transactions  contemplated  by  the  investment 
agreement. 
(d)  The investor confidentiality agreements between 
Sprint and-DT, and Sprint and FT, respectively, 
provide  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
confidentiality  of  all  Sprint  proprietary 
information received  by  DT and Ff as  a result 
of the  investment  agreement  and in  particular 
by the DT and FT representatives on the Sprint 
board of directors, which  may  be  used  by  DT 
and FT only for the purposes of exercising their 
rights under such agreeme.rit. 
2.  Main contractual proVisions 
(1)  Concerning the Phoenix entities 
(a)  Structure of the Phoenix yenture 
The JV  agreement provides for  the creation of 
two  groups  of  operating  entities,  namely 
Phoenix  Rest  of Europe  (ROE)  and  Phoenix 
Rest of the World (ROW). Each group consists 
of  the  following  entities:  a  sales  entity,  a 
clearingwhouse  entity  and  a  holding  entity, 
which  is  in  turn  held  by  an entity  able  to  be 
bound  fo~ th~ purposes of the Consent  Decree 
entered  by  the  United  States  Department  of 
Justice.:Each  of the  above  entities  within  the 
ROE  group  (the  'ROE  parent entities')  has  a 
board  of six  members,  with  Adas  having  the 
right to nominate four members and Sprint two. 
Each  of  the  above  entities  within  the  ROW 
group (the  'ROW parent entities')  has  a  board 
of four members, with each of Atlas and Sprint 
having the right to nominate two members. 
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The  ROE  parent entities  conduct  the  Phoenix 
business within the 'rest of Europe' region (that 
is,  outside  France  and  Germany),  while  the 
ROW  parent  entities  conduct  the  Phoenix 
business  within  the  'rest  of the  world'  region 
(outside  Europe  and  the  United  States).  The 
· ROE entities and the ROW entities will initially 
own and operate a global transmission network 
over  which  Phoenix  services  and  other  traffic 
will  be·  routed:  Phoenix's  global  backbone 
network.  The  parties  have,  however,  created  a 
Global  Backbone  Network  (GBN)  entity,  a 
limited  liability holding company, which  is  due 
eventually  to  take  over  the  relevant  global  . 
backbone network assets and functions. 
Pursuant to section 2.1  of the operating entities 
services agreement, FT,  DT and their ·respective 
subsidiaries  each  are  exclusive  distributors  of 
Phoenix  services  in  France  and  Germany 
respectively,  while Sprint is  pursuant to section 
2.2 (b)  the  exclusive  distributor  of . Phoenix 
services  in  the  United  States.  However,  any 
parent,  Phoenix  and  their  respective  affiliates 
will  meet  unsolicited  customer  requests  for 
Phoenix  services  regardless  of  the  customer's 
location.  Moreover,  the  French  and  German 
subsidiaries of Atlas  provide FT,  DT and their 
respective  subsidiaries  with  (i)  sales  support 
services  regarding  Phoenix  products  to  the 
distributors  in  France  and  Germany;  and  (ii) 
services within the scope of Phoenix other than 
X.25  packet-switched data  network  services  in 
France and Germany. 
A new,  wholly-owned subsidiary of Sprint (the 
'Sprint subsidiary') and Atlas each initially owns 
50 %  of the outstanding voting equity  of each 
of the parent entities of the ROW. entity and the 
GBN  entity.  The  Sprint  subsidiary  and  Atlas 
initially ·owns 33th% and 66¥.3%, respectively, 
of the voting equity of the parent entity of the 
ROE entiry. 
A Global Venture Board was  established to set 
global  policies  and monitor compliance  of the 
operating groups with their business plans. Any 
initiative of the Global Venture Boa.r:d generally 
requires .  a unanimous vote. 
Day-to-day oper-ations  are  the  responsibility  of 
the  chief  executive  officers  of  the  operating 
entities,  who  are  under  the  supervision  of the 
governing board of the relevant parent entity of 
either  the  ROE~ ROW,  or  eventually  GBN 
entity.  Most decisions  of each governing  board 
are  adopted  by  simple  majority  vote  of  the 
members  present.  Unanimous  consent  is 
however  required  for  a  number  of important 
decisions  including  final  approval  of  business 
plans,  certain  changes  in 
· capitalization,  and  certain 
technology and investments. 
structure  and 
decisions  on 
{b)  Purposes and activities of Phoenix entities 
The  business  of  the  joint  venture  initially  is 
provision of (i)  global international data, voice, 
and  video  business  services  for  multinational 
companies  and  business  customers;  (ii) 
international  services  for  consumers,  initially 
based  on  card  services  for  travellers;  and  {iii) 
carrier  services  providing  certain  transport 
services  for  the  parents  and  other  carriers. 
The  Phoenix  entitles  may  also  offer 
telecommunications  equipment  and  invest  in 
national operations. 
To market these services  Phoenix is  responsible 
for  the  planning and  management functions  of 
operations, as  well  as  marketing  and  customer 
support, including the following: 
(i)  central  coordination  of  product 
development .  and  management  to  ensure 
seamless  global  services;  the  Phoenix 
entities  notably  defines  functionality, 
technic.al  standards,  and  service  level 
requirements for  Phoenix services; 
(ii)  implementation  of  a  common  global 
network and inforrp.ation systems platform 
rationalizing  and  integrating  the 
· international  data;  voice,  and  overlay 
networks  of  the  parents  which  are 
~urrently  separate;  the  GBN  will  link 
overlay  and  backbone  networks  in  each 
operating area (i.e.  ROE and ROW)  while 
proprietary interfaces will  allow provision 
of  seamless  serVices;  within  its  first  few 
years  of operation,  Phoenix  will  begin  to 
deploy  the  next  generation  of  ATM 
packet-switching  technology,  comprising 
any  and  all  of  transmission,  switching, 
signalling, network intelligence, and service 
management elements; 
(iii)  integration  and  development  of 
information  systems  for  coordinated 
·  billing,  customer  support,  and  other 
back-office  functions,  supporting  national 
distributors; and 
(iv)  development  of  a  sales  presence  in  the 
ROE  ana ROW  territories  either  directly 
or through distribution arrangements using 
a  common  'masterbrand';  in  particular, 
national  ' service  operations  will  be 
established  or consolidated  in  each  major 
country  to  distribute  Phoenix·  services 
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there;  in  addition,  regional  sales  offices 
will  be established to provide technical and 
sales  support,  including  identification  of 
potential  customers  and  assisting  in 
preparation of customer proposals. 
(c)  Provisions concerning dealings  with/by Phoenix 
entities 
Pursuant  to  the  JV  agreement,  transactions 
among  the  Phoenix  entities,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  FT,  DT,  and  Atlas,  on  the  other,  shall 
generally  be  conducted on the  most  favourable 
terms  and conditions  that· are  offered  to  third 
parties.  If  products,  services,  or  facilities 
relevant  to  these  transactions  are  not 
commercially  available,  such  transactions  shall 
be  conducted  in  accordance  with  an  arm's 
length  pricing  method,  using  full-cost 
reimbursement  or  such  other  arm's  length 
pricing  method  as  may  be  agreed  on  by  the 
parties. The parents have the first right to offer 
to  supply  certain  products,  services,  and 
facilities.  to  the  Phoenix  entities. 
Notwithstanding,  each  Phoenix  entity  may 
purchase  from  a  third  party  which,  on 
otherwise  compara.ble  terms  and  conditions, 
offers lower prices, either once the parties have 
been given ·the opportunity to match such terms 
and conditions or if a customer so  requires. 
Each  of the  Phoenix entities  and  their parents 
have  the first right to offer to perform in  their 
respective  territory  any  facilities  or  services 
required  by  another  party  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements. Such services may be obtained from 
a third party at a Jower price under comparable 
terms  and conditions, ·or  where  a customer  so 
requires.  In  accordance with  this  principle,  the 
ROE  and  ROW  entities  will  be  required 
to  purchase  telecommunications  network 
transmission capacity from  the  GBN  entity, to 
the  extent  available,  once  that entity  becomes 
operational. 
(d)  Anti-competition provisions; distribution 
Pursuant  to  the  ]V  agreement  as  originally 
notified, albeit subject to various exceptions, na 
party or affiliate of a party may  distribute any 
international telecommunications services which 
are  either  provided 'by  the  Phoenix  entities  or 
substitutable  for  such  services.  Likewise,  no 
party or affiliate  of a party may  invest  in  any 
entitY  that offers  such  services.  Moreover,  no 
party or any  of its  affiliates  may  offer  national 
long-distance services in competition with either 
a.  national  operation  of  Phoenix  or  a  public 
telephone  operator  affiliated  to  Phoenix  (such 
as  a national distributor of Phoenix).  Nor may 
any  party  or  any  of  its  affiliates  make 
investments  in  any  entity  offering  . such 
competing national long-distance services  or in 
any  national  operation  allied  with  a  major 
competitor of Phoenix. 
Sprint is under an obligation to cease competing 
actively  in  Germany  and ·France  by  selling  its 
data  and  card  business  to  DT's  subsidiary 
T-Data  Gesellschaft  fUr  Datenkommunikation 
mbH  ('T-Data')  and  to  FT's  subsidiary 
Transpac  France  respectively.  Outside  the 
parents'  home  countries  exclusivity  will  be 
granted  to  distributors on  a case-by-case  basis. 
Passive  sales  by  any  one  distributor  to 
customers in the respective sales territory of any 
other distributor are allowed  in  the  EEA. 
(e)  Li~nces to be granted to Phoenix entities 
Under  the  technical  information  licence  and 
access  master  agreement  and  agreements 
implementing· the framework applicable to IPRs 
. (the 'IPR agreements'), each parent grants each 
of  the  Phoenix  entities  non-exclusive, 
non-transferable· licences to use certain technical 
information  of  that  parent  in  the  respective 
territories  of  such  entities  to  conduct  the 
Phoenix  business.  Each  Phoenix entity  has  the 
right  to  sub-license  the  rights  granted  to  any 
other Phoenix  entity  or any  affiliated  national 
oPet"ation  or  local  ·partner,  wherever  such  a 
sub-licence is  necessary to conduct the  Phoenix 
business. Likewise, each Phoenix entity must on 
request  also  sub-license  such  rights  to  any 
parent or affiliate of such parent, to the extent 
that such a sub-licence  is  necessary  to conduct 
the Phoenix business. 
Royalties  are,  payable  as  customary  in  the 
market  and  negotiated  by  the  parties  on  an 
arm's-length  basis.  Licence  rights  granted  to a 
parey under the IPR agreements will continue in 
the  event of either termination of the  Phoenix 
venture  or transfer  of such  party's  interest  in 
the Phoenix venture. 
Similarly,  pursuant  to  the  trademark  licence 
master agreemeht and implementing agreements 
each  parent grants each of the Phoenix entities 
non-exclusive,  non-transferable  rights  to  use 
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such parent in connection with the marketing or 
sale of certain authorized products and services 
. in  the respective territories of such entity. 
(2)  Concerning FT and DT's investment in  Sprint 
(a)  Restrictions on transfer of shares by Ff and DT 
and limits on increases of their shareholding in 
Sprint 
Pursuant  to  the  investment  agreement,  neither 
Ff or DT may dispose of its shares in Sprint for 
five  years  after  the  closing  date.  Thereafter 
restrictions  apply  to  large  transfers,  which 
would  in  most  circumstances  give  Sprint  the 
right of first  refusal.  · 
Pursuant  to  the  standstill  agreement,  FT  and 
DT  each  have  the  right  to  acquire  additional 
Sprint  shares  to  reach  and  maintain  a  10 % 
shareholding,  but shall  not for  15  years  after 
the  closing  da'te  acquire  additional  shares  that 
would  increase  their aggregate  voting rights  to 
more  than -20%.  Once  this  initial  'standstill' 
period  has  expired,  Ff and  DT  may  acquire 
additional  shares,· but  may  not  increase  their 
aggregate voting rights above 30% nor conduct 
certain activities  intended  at taking  control of 
Sprint. 
(b)  •Consent rights  and board representation of FT 
and DT 
Ff and DT have the right to elect directors to 
the  Sprint  board · in  propqrtion  to  their 
shareholding,  provided that each  has  the  right 
to elect at least one director. Neither FT nor DT 
• have  access  to  confidential,  compet1t1ve 
information  on  Sprint's  activities  in  the  EEA 
through their  representation on Sprint's  board. 
Nor  may  these  representatives  provide  Sprint 
with  confidential  information  that  Ff ox:  DT 
may  have  obtained  from  United  States 
competitors  through  correspondent  relation-
ships. 
As  the sole holders of Sprint's class A common 
stock, FT and DT have been granted substantial 
consensual  rights  with  respect  to  certain 
corporate actions  of Sprint, which nevertheless 
fa~l considerably short of control. These actions 
include  major  equity  issuances,  disapproval  of 
investments  in  Sprint  by  major  competitors, 
participation  rights  in  transactions  involving 
change of control, ancl other bilateral corporate 
transactions.  FT  and  DT have  a  right  of first 
offer  with  respect  to  l<?ng-distance  assets  of 
Sprint for a ·fixed period of time. 
G.  CHANGES MADE AND UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN 
FURTHER TO THE COMMISSION'S 
INTERVENTION 
28.  Some  features  of  the  agreements  as  notified 
appeared  to  be  incompatible  with  the  Community 
competition  rules.  In  the  course  of the  notification 
procedure  the  parties  have  amended certain clauses 
in  their  agreements  and  given  undertakings  to  the 
Commission. 
1.  Contractual changes 
29.  Non-appointment  of  Phoenix  as  an  agent  for 
international half-circuits. 
Following  an  announcement  made  in  the  Phoenix 
notification,  which  did  not  yet  reflect  the  parties 
commitments  regarding  Atlas  further  to  the 
Commission's intervention, DT, Ff, Atlas and Sprint 
have  deleted  FT  and  DT's  'international  private 
lines',  meaning  FT  and  DT's  international ' 
half-circuits, from the list of products that Phoenix 
would distribute as agent. 
30.  Anti-competition provisions 
Phoenix  will . provide  international  simple · resale 
(ISR)  services  and  call  termination  PSlN services 
under  Sprint~s existing  licences  in  Sweden  and  the 
United  Kingdom.  However,  the  parties  have  not 
sought an exemption pursuant to Articles  85 (3)  of 
the  EC  Treaty  and 53 (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement 
for  any  specific  agreements  regarding  national 
long-distance  services,  which  these  services  would 
require (see recital 7). The anti-competition clause in 
the  original  JV  agreement  has  therefore  been 
ainended: the parties are now obliged to refrain only 
from either (i)  competing with or (ii)  investing in a 
competitor  of  · entities  providing  long-distance 
services  provided  such  entities  are  controlled  by 
Phoenix. 
2.  Non-discrimination 
31.  Just  as  DT  and  FT  are  prohibited  from 
discriminating  in  favour  of their  Atlas  venture,  so 
the  Commission  prohibits  DT  and  Ff  from 
discriminating  in  favour  of  any  entity  created 
pursuant to the Phoenix agreements. This condition 
includes all specific elements described at r~cital 28 
of the Atlas  Decision,  in  relation to access  and use 
of (i). the French and German PSTN,  (ii)  the French 
and  German  ISDN,  (iii)  reserved  facilities  and/or 
services  until  the  French  and  German 
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telecommunications  services  and  infrastructure 
markets  are  fully  and  effectively  liberalized,  as  is 
scheduled  to  occur  by  1  January  1998,  and  (iv) 
thereafter facilities and/or services for which FT and 
DT  respectively  are  dominant  and  which  are 
essential for the provision of a competitive service. 
32'.  Specific services 
The  Commission  attaches  as  a  condition  to  this 
'Decision  that DT and  FT  shall  not  discriminate  in 
favour of any entity created pursuant to the Phoenix 
agreements  with  regard  to  the  facilities-related 
telecommunication.s·  services  detailed  at  recital  28 
of  the  Atlas  Decision.  The  non-discrimination 
condition extends to all  aspects of access to and use 
of such facilities  and services, namely the terms and 
conditions,  scope  of  services  available,  technical 
information and commercial information. 
33.  Correspondent services 
The Commission imposes a specific condition not to 
discriminate  with  regard  to correspondent services, 
for  which  (i)  DT  and  Ff shall. not  unduly  prefer 
Sprint  over  other  United  States  correspondents; 
(ii)  DT and  IT shall  not unduly  prefer  each  other 
over  other  German  or French  correspondents  once 
telecommunications  services  markets  are .  fully 
liberalized,  as  is  foreseen  by  1 January  1998;  and 
(iii)  Sprint shall  not unduly  prefer DT and Ff over 
other  European  and eventually  over  other  German 
and French  c~rrespoftdents  .. The condition on Sprint 
relates  to . traffic  to  final  destinations  outside 
Germany and France respectively  until  the German 
and  French  telecommunications  services .  and 
infrastructure are fully and effectively liberalized, as 
is  scheduled to occur  by  1 January  1998,  and· to 
any  traffic  thereafter.  A  correspondent  is  a 
telecommunications services provider in one country 
party to a  bilaterally  negotiated  agreement  with  a 
provider of telecommunications  serviCes  in another 
country  by  which  each  ·party  undertakes  to 
terminate  in  its  country  traffic  originated . by  the 
other  party,  for  provision  of  an  international 
telecommunications service. 
3.  Other  Conditions  and obligations  attached_  to 
this Decision 
34 ..  Non-reserved corporate telecommunications services 
The  exemption  of Phoenix's  customized  packages 
of  corporate  tel.ecommunications  services  and 
packet-switched data communications services  from 
the  application  of .Articles  85 (1) 'of the  EC  Treaty 
and 53 t1)  of the EEA  Agreement  is  conditional on 
DT  and  Ff's  compliance  with  the  conditions 
attached  to  the  separate  Atlas  Decision  and 
described at recital 29 of that Decision. 
-35.  Carrier services 
36. 
37. 
Neither  Atlas,  Phoenix,  DT,  FT,  Sprint  or  any 
affiliate  of  these  entities  shall  make  a  particular 
telecommunications operator's ability to usc Phoenix 
·international carrier services conditional upon use or 
distribution by  that telecommunication's operator of 
services  provided  by  Atlas,  Phoenix,  Ff,  DT  or 
Sprint. Neither shall  Atlas,  Phoenix, DT,  IT, Sprint 
or  any  affiliate  of  these  entities  condition  its 
commercial  dealings  (i.e.  terms,  conditions,  pri..:e, 
discounts)  with  any  telecommunications  operator 
upon  use  or  distribution  by  'that  tele- a 
communication's  operator  of services  provided  by  ~ 
Atlas,  Phoenix, IT, DT or Sprint. 
DT and FT  shall  also  comply  with conditions that 
mirror  those  attached  to  the  Atlas  Decision 
concerning  (i)  use  of  DT  and  IT's  public  X.25 
p:;icket-switched  data  networks,  (ii)  cross-
subsidization,  (iii)  bundling,  and  accounting  in 
respect  of  the  entities  created  pursuant  to  rhe 
Phoenix agreements operating in the EEA,  and with 
recording  and reporting obligations matching  those 
imposed  on  DT  and  Ff  in  the  Atlas  Decision. 
Likewise, all entities created pursuant' to the Phoenix 
agreements  which  operate  in  the  EEA  shall  keep 
separating  accounting  records  using  international 
accounting standards  for  each  service  they  pro,ide 
in any country. 
To the extent related  to existing obligations under. 
national  or Community  law,  these  obligations and 
conditions  are  intended  to ensure  the  parties'  firm 
commitment  to  comply  with  the  applicable  legal 
framework. 
H.  THE REGULATORY SITUATION 
38.  The regulatory situation in  France and Germany  is 
described under recital 31  of the Atlas  Decision.  As 
for  the  United  States,  pursuant  to  the  19 34 
Communications  Act,  Sprint  is  required  to  publish 
tariff schedules and contracts describing its network 
arrangements  and  services.  Furthermore,  the  1934 
Communications  Act,  enforced  by  the  Federal 
Communications  Commission  (FCC),  prohibits 
Sprint  from  providing  services  that  unjustly  or 
unreasonably  ·.  discriminate  against  Sprint's 
competitors  or foreign  correspondents,  which  may 
lodge  a  formal  complaint  before  the  FCC  if  Sprint 
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does  not  comply  with  these  obligations.  The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 gives the FCC the 
authority  to  refrain  from  regulating  'charges, 
practices  or  classifications'  of  telecommunications 
carriers,  albeit  only  where  the  FCC  finds  that 
regulation  is  not  necessary  to  ensure  that  these 
elements are just and reasonable or not unjustly and 
unreasonably discriminatory. 
39.  While  the  Commission  was  assessing  the  Phoenix 
notification  under  Community  law,  Phoenix  was 
authorized  under  United  States  anti-trust  law  by  a 
judicial  consent  decree  filed  by  the  UQ.ited  States 
Department  of Justice  and  signed  on  16  February 
1996. This consent decree imposes conditions on the 
parties  that largely  resemble  those  attached  to  this 
Decision. 
I.  THIRD-PARTY  O~SERVATIONS 
40.  Following  the  publication_  of a  notice  pursuant  to 
Article 19 (3) of Regulation No 17 and to Article  3 
of  Protocol  21  of  the  EEA  Agreement (27),  six 
interested third parties submitted .observations to the 
Commission.  Concerns  expressed  in  these 
observations  included  the  risk  that  Phoenix  might 
(i)  increase the dangers of DT and FT's cooperation 
in  the framework of Atlas for Europe-wide markets 
given  the  elimination  of another  competitor  there, 
Sprint,  (ii)  further  facilitate  abuses  of  dominant 
position  by  DT  and  FT  in  their  respective  home 
markets and  (iii)  distort competition in  all  relevant 
markets  through  an  extension  of  the  notified 
cooperation  to  reserved  services,  notably 
correspondent services.  As  for  the latter allegation, 
third parties feared most that DT and FT might link 
favourable  conditions  for  reserved  services  to  the 
purchase of Phoenix services. 
41.  The  Commission  carefully  reviewed  all  third-party 
.· observations and concludes that concerns expressed 
therein  have  been  addressed during the notification. 
pr.ocedure.  Most  conditions  as  to  conduct  and 
obligations  attached  to  the  Atlas  Decision  take 
sufficient  account  of  anti-competitive  concerns  if 
extended  to  all  entities  created  pursuant  to  the 
Phoenix  agreements  and  to  Sprint  where 
appropriate.  Third-party  obseryations  have  not 
therefore  affected  the  Commission's  substantive 
position  described  in  the  Article  19 (3)  notice  in 
respect  of  the  transaction  named  Phoenix  at  the 
time.  However, in  the interest of legal  certainty the 
Commission has spelled out in  great~r detail in  this 
(17)  See  footnote  2  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  Article  19 (3) 
notice). 
Decision  the  scope  and  duration  of  certain 
conditions and obligations imposed on the parties. 
42.  Subsequent  to  third-party  observations  the 
Commission attaches an additional condition to this 
Decision  requiring  that DT  and  FT  unbundle  own 
services  for  which they  are  dominant and· Phoenix 
services, which restricts the contractual rights of DT, 
FT  and  their  affiliates  under  Section  2.1.1  of the 
operating.  entitles  :. services  agreement  dated 
31  january 1996.  As  the  Commission  explained at 
recital 60 of the Atlas Decision, dominant providers 
are  prohibited  from  bundling,  widespread  as  it 
might  be  in  .the  telecommunications  market,  under 
the  regulatory  framework  of most  countries  where 
that market is fully competitive. The same condition 
already  applies  to  DT  and Ff in  respect  of Atlas 
services,  as  described  at recital  29 (5)  of the  Atlas 
Decision. 
II.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A.  THE R6LE OF A  TI..AS IN PHOENIX 
43.  The  European parent company of Phoenix is  Atlas. 
Within  the  framework  of this  transaction  Atlas  is 
merely a vehicle to coordinate DT and FT, including 
their  respective  European  networks,  as  European 
providers which obtain global 'connectivity' - that 
is,  worldwide  reach  of  a  service  with  constant 
technical  perforinance  and  'features.  Phoenix's 
distribution agreements  make  a distinction between 
DT,  FT  and  Sprint's  home  respective  countries  on 
the  one  hand  and'  'rest  of  Europe'  and  'rest  of 
world'  areas  on  the  other  hand.  Under  these 
agreements,  DT  and  FT  jointly  exercise  decisive 
influence on Phoenix' European business. -
44.  Phoenix  ROE  entity  results  from  adding  Sprint's 
European  business  and  network  to  that  of  Atlas 
outside  France  and  Germany.  Indicative  of  the 
integration  of  Atlas'  Europe-wide  services  into 
Phoenix  is  that  Info  AG's  current customers  with 
headquarters  outside  Germany  are  transferred 
directly to Phoenix and not to Atlas.  Moreover, the 
technical  aspects  of network  cooperation  between 
DT  and  FT  which  are  exempted  from  the 
application of Articles  85 (1)  of the  EC  Treaty and 
53 (1)  of the  EEA  Agreement pursuant to Article  3 
of the Atlas Decision are under the responsibility of 
the  same  entity that provides network management 
services to the ROE entity. Given that the relevance 
of Atlas  as  a  separate 
1entity  from  DT and Ff for 
Phoenix . is  limited,  the  following  legal  assessment 
refers to DT,  FT and Atlas without distinction. 
...  ,. 
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B.  ARTICLES 85 (1) OF THE EC TREATY AND 53 (1) 
OF THE EEA AGREEMENT 
1.  Structural cooperative ioint venture 
The  Phoenix  joint  venture  is  cooperative  in 
nature,  since  Atl~s,  which  takes  over  FT's 
Europe-wide  Transpac  network,  and  Sprint 
(iointly referred to as the 'parents') are potential 
competitors  {or  the  provision  of  Europe-wide 
services  and  certain  global  offerings  within 
Phoenix's  envisaged  offerings  portfolio 
(hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  'Phoenix 
products'),  namely  customized  packages  ~f 
corporate  telecommunications  services.  Prior  to 
this transaction, Sprint was an actual competitor 
of DT in Germany and of FT in France. 
45.  Potential  competition  in  markets  for  Europe-wide 
services. 
DT and FT  remain potential competitors of Sprint 
as  a  provider  of services  over  an  own  leased-line 
network  in  Europe  and  worldwide  in  spite  of 
withdrawing  from  the  markets  addressed  by 
Phoenix.  While  licensing  some  technology  to 
Phoenix  the  parents· retain  their  respective  IPRs, 
know-how  and  R &: D  capabilities  and  receive 
grant-back licences for IPRs transferred to Phoenix. 
Phoenix· will also  awa~d DT, FT and Sprint R &: D 
contracts  and  license  them  to  use  any  own . 
developments  or · services  other  than  Phoenix 
products;  The .  parents  will  thus  keep  and  increase 
proficien¢y  and  know~how  it;t  respect  of  Sl;lCh 
technologies  as  the  market  requires  from  time  to 
time. 
46.  DT, FT and Sprint Will  maintain  their commercial 
/  presence, reputation and, as exclusive distributors of 
Phoenix  in  their  respective  home  countries,  keep 
tlieir  knowledge  of the market up  to date.  In  this 
connection,  Phoenix's  global  backbone  network 
linking  th~  ROW  and  ROE  entities  Will  initially 
be  a  mere  cross-Atlantic  line  concentrating  traffic 
between  Germany or France and the United  States 
which implies that DT, FT or Sprint's own offering 
could be  competing directly with Phoenix's where a 
cust~mer prefers favourable  terms  of an  agreement 
on  domestic  telecommunications  services  to  the 
international  scope  of Phoenix.  The  above  implies 
that  market  (re-)entry  by  DT,  FT  and  Sprint  is 
possible.  Moreover,  all  three  undertakings  directly 
develop  own activities  outside  their  home  markets 
through subsidiaries or as  members of international 
organizations, while  Sprint is  providing private  line 
services  to  and  from  the  United  States  under  a 
United Kingdom licence. 
47.  Structural joint venture. 
Phoenix  combine~ Sprin_t's  as  w~ll as  DT and FT's 
joint activities in a range of Europe-wide and global 
markets  for  non-reserved  telecommunications 
services  and  is  set  to  develop  and  take  over  new 
services in these markets. This venture entails major 
changes  in  the  structures  of  or_  and  FT, 
undertakings with very limited presence outside their 
respective  _home  countries,  and  of  Sprint  whose 
international presence was limited for lack of strong 
regional  ·partners.  Through  Phoenix  these  three 
undertakings pool a  significant number of assets  in 
connection  with  the  provision  and  marketing  of At 
non-reserved corporate telecommunicati9ns services.  W:
1 
2.  Application of  Articles 85 (1)  of the EC Treaty 
and 53 (1) of  the EEA Agreement to the creation 
of  Phoenix  · 
The Phoenix agreements creating a joint venture as a 
means  of cooperation  between  DT  and  FT,  and 
.Sprint  eliminat~ competition in the relevant markets 
and  affect  trade  between  Member · States.  The 
Commission cannot therefore give· negative clearance 
to ·the creation of the joint venture as  requested in 
the parties' application. 
.  ..  . 
48.  On the grounds set out under recital 38 of the Atlas 
Decision, Atlas and Sprint were competitors for the 
provision of outsourcing services.· DT_, FT and Sprint 
were  also  competitors  for  the  obtention  of large 
customers'  telecommunications  'hubs'.  Sprint's 
Sprintnet division also competed with. FT's Transpac 
for  the  provision  of  non-correspondent  services, 
. notably  Europe~wide and  national  packet-switched 
data  communications  services  with  limited  global 
connectivity,  under  licences  in·  several  European 
countries.  This  ~mpetidon is  eliminated  by  the 
·creation of Phoenix. 
49.  Creating Phoe.nix each of DT, FT and Sprint refrain 
from  developing  similar  offerings  to  compete 
individually,  reducing  R &: D  competition  and 
choice·  for  customers  in  the  relevant  markets.  In  a 
way  similar  to  Atlas'  effects (18)  eliminating 
I 
(21)  Recital 41  of the Atlas Decision. 
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50. 
competition  between  DT  and  Fr,  the  anti-
competition  prov1stons,  intellectual  property 
agreements,  geographical  scope  of the  licences  and 
grant-back  licences  agreed,  and  the  terms  of  the 
exclusive  distribution agreements turn Phoenix into 
an  instrument  for  pooling  and  cross-licensing  DT, 
FT and Sprint's respective IPRs. 
DT,  IT  and  Sprint  each  have  the  finahcial  and 
technological  capabilities  required  ~o  enter  the 
relevant  markets on their own.  DT,  FT  and Sprint 
are  among  the  world's  largest  telecommunications 
companies in terms of traffic. While DT and FT are 
dominant  for  most  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications services in their respective home 
countries,  Sprint  is  the  third-largest  long-distance 
carrier  in  the  United  States.  Creating  Phoenix  is 
therefore  not  DT,  IT and  Sprint's  only  objective 
means  to  enter  the  market  for  international 
non-reserved corporate telecommunications services. 
The  same  applies  to  carrier services,  which at least 
initially  will  mainly  serve  the  purpose of increasing 
efficiencies by selling unused network capacity. Atlas 
and  Sprint,  which  is  already  one  of  the  largest 
Internet carriers in the United States, could provide 
such·  services  in  competition  with  each  other  by 
investing  in  an  own  global  or  intercontinental 
extension  to  its  network.  Individual  market  entry 
would notably raise the same issues, for example in 
terms  of  regulatory  hurdles,  that  Phoenix  must 
address. 
3.  Applicability of  Articles 85 (1)  of  the EC Treaty 
and 53 (1)  of the EEA  Agreement to  DT and 
FI''s investment in Sprint 
51.  The  Commission  and the  Court of Justice  do  not 
consider Article  85 (1) of the EC  Treaty applicable· 
to  agreements  for  the  sale  or  purchase  of shares 
uriless  these  agre~ments  affect  the  COIJ!petitive 
behaviour of the· parties to the transaction (29). The 
.··  Commission  analysed  whether  the  appointment  of 
DT  and  FT  representatives  to  Sprint's  board  and 
subsequent  access  to  confidential  business  data 
could  give  rise  to coordination  of the  competitive 
behaviour  of  all  three  undertaking5.  The 
Commission found that (i)  the investment agreement 
signed on 31 July 1995 does not afford DT and FT 
the  possibility  of exercising  a  controlling  influence 
over  Sprint  and  (ii)  United  States  corporate  and 
antitrust laws are designed to prevent access to and 
misuse  of Sprint's  confi4ential  information  by  DT 
and  FT.  Sprint  and  DT,  and  Sprint  and  IT, 
respectively,  set  out  an  additional  prohibition  to 
fl9)  See  BT·MCI  Decision  (footnote  4)  at  recital  44  and 
footnote  1 of that Decision  for  references. 
misuse  such  information  in  two  investor 
confidentiality  agreements  signed  on  31  January 
1996. 
The  Commission  therefore  concludes  that DT and 
IT's investment in  Sprint fa'tls  outside the  scope  of 
Articles  85 (1)  of the  EC  Treaty and ·53 (1)  of the 
EEA Agreement. 
4.  Application of  Articles 85 (1)  of the EC  Treaty 
and 53 (1) of  the EEA Agreement to contractual 
provisions 
52.  The following provisions restrict competition: 
53. 
(a)  the  anti<ompetition  obligation  on  the  parents 
as  regards  the  activities  of  Phoenix  (sections 
10.2 and 10.3 of the JV agreement as  amended 
by Amendment  1 to the JV  agreement); 
(b)  the  obligation  on  the  parents  to  obtain  from 
Phoenix  all  r~quirements  for  global  services 
(section  2.1.1  of the  operating entities  services 
agreement) in Germany and France respectively; 
and 
(c)  the appointment of DT and Ff respectively  as 
exclusive distributors of Phoenix (section 2.2 (b) 
of. the JV  agreement as  amended)  in  Germany 
and France respectively. 
Of  the  above  restriCtiOns,  the  anti-competition 
provision  and  the  obligation.  to  purchase  all 
reqUirements  for  global  services  from  Phoenix  are 
ancillary  to  the  creation  and  successful  initial 
operation  of  Phoenix,  and  are  therefore  assessed 
under .A(ticles  85  of the  EC Treaty and 53  of the 
EEA Agreement together with the joint venture.  · 
Both  reStriCtiOns  reflect.  the  parties'  commitment, 
towards one another and towards Phoenix. Both are 
also  required  if  Phoenix  is  to  enter  the  market 
successfully,  given  considerable  uncertainty  and 
commercial  risks, .  substantial  investment 
requirements and strong competition in the relevant 
markets. Thus: 
(  1)  the  anti-competition  clause  expresses  DT  and 
Ff and. Sprint's commitment to withdraw from 
the relevant markets targeted by Phoenix and to 
concentrate  th~ir efforts in  the relevant services 
markets on Phoenix lest  other initiatives, alone 
or  in  cooperation  with  third  parties,  impair 
Phoenix's establishment in  the market; and 
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(2)  the  obligation  on  DT,  IT  and  Sprint  as 
exclusive  distributors  of Phoenix  products  in ' 
their  respective  home  countries  to  buy  all 
requirements  for  global services  from  Phoenix, 
aims  at  ensuring  Phoenix  steady  funding, 
credibility. and market reputation, which would 
be  seriously  jeopardized  if  the  very  founding 
partners of Phoenix  used  other global  services 
provide~s. 
Ancillary provisions are usually acceptable only for a 
limited  period  of time.  In  the  light  of the  BT-MCI 
Decision,  where  similar  volumes _of  investment and 
risks were at issue (3°), the Commission will however 
accept the above ancillary restrictions for  the entire 
duration  of  the  exemption  granted  by  this 
Decision. 
54.  Exclusive distribution. 
DT  and  IT's  exclusive  distributorship  in  their 
respective  home  countries  is  caught  by 
Articles  85 (1)  of the  EC  Treaty and  53 (1)  of the 
EEA Agreement because it has the object or effect of 
isolating  Germany  and  France  against  imports  of 
Phoenix services from other EEA Member States and 
from  outside  the  EEA,  which  may  adversely  affect 
the  conditions  of  competition  within  the  EEA. 
Unlike  the  other.  restncttve  provisions,- the 
Commission cannot consider DT and IT's exclusive 
distributorship to be  ancillary to the creation of the 
joint venture, as non-exclusive forms  of distribution 
are  possible  which  would  not  impair  the 
performance  or  marketing  of  Phoenix  services. 
Given  that  Germany  and  France  taken  together 
account  for  more  than  40 %  of  all  tele-
communications  revenues  in  the  European  Union, 
the restriction is  appreciable. 
5.·  Effect  on  trade  between  Member  States  and 
between Member States_ and EFTA countries 
55.  As  discussed under recital 44 of the Atlas Decision, 
a  joint  venture  designed  to  provide  cross-border 
non-reserved  corporate telecommuniCations  services 
in the EEA  has an effect on trade between Member 
States which is set to increase over the coming years.  · 
The same  appli~s to the appointment of DT and FT 
as  exclusive  distributors  in  the  two  largest  single 
national  telecommuniGations  markets in the Union, 
namely  in.  Germany  and  France.  This  effect  is 
especially . substantial  given  that ·the  purpose  of 
Phoenix  in  Europe  is  the  provision  of  services 
between Member States . 
56.  The  Commission  concludes  that  the  creation  of 
Phoenix falls  under Articles 85 (  1)  of the EC Treaty 
(-'0)  Footnote at recital 46 in  fine. 
and  53 (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement.  The  same 
conclusion  'is  drawn  as  regards  the  non-ancillary 
appointment of DT and FT as exclusive distributors 
iri  Germany  and  France  respectively.  The 
Commission  considers  the  restrictive  effect  on 
competition and on trade between Member States to 
be substantial in  both cases. 
C.  ARTICLES 85 (3) OF THE EC TREATY AND 53 (3) 
OF THE EEA  AGREEMENT 
1.  Technical and economic progress 
57.  The creation of Phoenix 
The  combination  of Atlas  and  Sprint's  technology 
will allow Phoenix to offer new services with global 
'connectivity'  at  lower  cost ·and  better  than  either 
Atlas or Sprint are capable of providing· alone given 
their  current  business.  Combining  different 
pl~tforms and  product  features  will  still  require  a 
considerable investment of time and money. Like BT 
and MCI's Concert and like  Atlas  at the  European 
and  national  level (31 ),  Phoenix  will  add  value  to 
leased  line  capacity  · by  implementing  own 
homogeneous  network  elements  such  as  switches, 
software platforms and signalling systems to provide 
seamless  international  telecommunications  services. 
Phoenix will  also allow cost savings; given  that the 
operation of a single network architecture generates 
economies of scale and scope at a technological and 
commercial level, and may contribute to downward 
_pressure  on  infrastructure  prices  across  the • 
Community,  for  example  through  lowest  cost 
routing. 
58.  Seamlessness  substantially  improves  international 
se.t;Vices  as  currently  provided  over  different 
interconnected  national  networks.  If  successful, 
Phoenix will increase choice in the relevant markets 
and  offer  businesses  across  the  Community 
state-of-the-art  telecommunications  services  which 
their competitors overseas can already use;  Although 
Sprint already operated a network in some European 
countries which allowed seamless connectivity  with 
certain  foreign  locations,  Sprint's  market  shares 
reveal  that  it  would  have  taken  much  longer  for 
Sprint to become  a globally competing supplier for 
the  ever  increasing  number  .of  multinational 
companies  that  ·need  a  comprehensive  range  of 
customized  global  non-reserved  corporate  tele-
-communications services. 
(11)  Recital 48 of the Atlas Decision.' 
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59.  Exclusive distributorship in  Germany and France 
60. 
Tpe exclusive distribution arrangements in respect of · 
DT,  FT  and  their  respective  subsidiaries  aim  at 
ensuring that DT and IT concentrate their respective 
marketing  efforts  through  Atlas,  such  as  customer 
prospecting  or  investments  in  regional  and/or 
national networks and other facilities  in their home 
countries on making Phoenix successful, rather than 
considering alternative options. Only if DT and Ff 
are seen as fully committed to Phoenix will the joint 
venture benefit from  the reputation and presence of 
its parents in the marketpla.ce. 
2.  Benefits to consumers 
The  benefits  of  seamless  network  implementation 
across national borders is  discussed under recital 54 
of the Atlas Decision. Phoenix makes it possible that 
consumers  benefit  from  a  considerably wider range 
of new  services  that DT, FT and Sprint would  not 
be  capable· of providing separately within the same 
period  of time.  The  Commission  stated  before  the 
notification  of  Phoenix  that  only  a  truly  global · 
dimension woulci  make the cooperation between DT 
and  FT  in  the  framework  of  Atlas  sufficiently 
important  to  consider  an  exemption  from  the 
prohibition of Articles 85 (1)  of the EC Treaty and 
53 (  1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement.  The  volume  of 
investment required to ensure a worldwide presence, 
~~hich is a requirement for global services provision, 
is  beyond the capabilities of most potential users of 
·such  services,  including  MNCs  active  iri  sectors 
other  than telecommunications.  The  creation  of a 
global  venture  committed  to  undertaking  the 
investment  needed  to  be  present  worldwide  is 
therefore  crucial  for  the  choice  and  quality  of 
communications  avail~ble to MNCs and eventually 
SMEs. 
Adding global 'connectivity' to Europe-wide services, 
Phoenix is  a  substantial step forward in relation to 
Atlas.  Accordingly, the  Commission  conclud~s that 
both  the  creation  of  Phoenix  and  the  exclusive 
distributorship  of  DT,  FT  and  their .. respective. 
subsidiaries are beneficial to consumers. 
3.  Indispensability 
61.  The creation of Phoenix 
Phoenix  is  indispensable  for  the  parents  to 
successfully  enter  the  relevant  global  and  regional 
markets.  Phoenix  will  allow  the  time  required  for 
the relevant services  to be  marketed in competition 
with longer existing competitors to be  substantially 
shortened.  As  further  companies enter the  relevant 
markets,  Phoenix  enables  DT,  FT  and  Sprint 
substantially to reduce costs and risks inherent to an 
organization set to offer telecommunications services 
worldwide  to multinationals and other large  users. 
While cost savings are important, an· alliance such as 
Phoenix  is  also  a  decisive  means  to overcome  the 
technical· and  logistic  difficulties  of  providing  the 
ser\'ices  and  features  (inter  alia  o.ne-stop  shopping, 
end-to-end  delivery,  seamlessness)  required  by  such 
users,  which  cannot  be  addressed  satisfactorily 
under the existing framework of TO correspondent 
relationships. 
62.  Exclusive distribution 
DT  and  FT  are  exclusive  distributors  of  Phoenix 
products in their respective home countries. Article 4 
(.2)  of the  'technical information  licence  and access 
master agreement' of 31 january 1996 provides that 
the. territory to which DT, FT and Sprint are granted 
licence  rights  shall generally  be  worldwide and not 
restricted  to  the  respective  party's  own  exclusive 
distribution  territory.  Under  the  terms  of  this 
Decision,  DT  and  FT  are  prohibited  from  selling 
Phoenix  products  as  distributors  under  the  same 
contracts covering own reserved services. 
63.  Exclusivity  is  a guarantee for DT and FT to protect 
IPRs  contributed  to the  joint venture  against  third 
partie,s  and  thus  an  incentive  to  contribute  more 
· ,·aluable  IPRs  than  would  otherwise  seem 
reasonable.  On the  other hand, the combination of 
(i)  competitive  alternatives  in  the  market, 
(ii)  bargaining  power  of customers  in  the  market 
for  customized  packages  of  corporate  tele-
communications services to corporate users and (iii) 
the opening for DT and 'FT's passive sales into each . 
other's  home  market  eJ;Isure  that  the  aim  of 
protecting DT and  FT's IPRs  does· not lead  to ·  an 
elimination of competition. 
64.  DT  and · FT  are  constrained  under  both  national 
legislation  and  the  terms  of  this  Decision  not  to 
disclose  information  derived  from  operating  the 
PS1N or providing  reserved. services  to the  entities 
whose  services  DT  and  FT  are  distributing.  This 
ensures  that  exclusive  distribution  by  DT  in 
Germany and FT in France will not give Phoenix an 
unfair  advantage  over  competitors  ·  in  these 
countries.  The  Commission  concludes  from  the 
above  that the  exclusive  distributorship of DT and 
FT  is  indispensable  within  the  meaning  of 
Articles  85 (3)  of the  EC  Treaty and 53 (3)  of the 
EEA  Agreement. 
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4.  Elimination of competition 
65.  The creation of Phoenix will  not in  itself afford the 
parties the possibility  of eliminating competition in 
the  relevant services  markets.  The  Commission  has 
addressed related concerns raised  by  the integration 
of DT  and  FT's  public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks  into  Atlas.  The  combination  of 
(i)  competitive  alternatives  in  the  market 
(ii)  bargaining  power  of customers  in  the  marke; 
for  customized  packages  of  corporate  tele-
communications  services  to  corporate  users  and 
(iii)  the  opening for  DT and  FT's passive  sales  into 
each other's home market ensure that the creation of 
Phoenix  does  not  eliminate  competition  in  the 
relevant markets. 
66.  ~s to the impact of DT and FT's dominant positions 
10  G.err_nany  and  France  respectively,  the 
Commission  concludes  that  the  terms  of  this 
Decision  are  sufficient to prevent an elimination  of 
competition  in  the  relevant  markets.  DT,  FT  and 
their  respective  subsidiaries  are  prohibited  from 
selling  Phoenix  products  as  distributors  under  the 
same  contracts covering  own reserved  services.  DT 
and  FT  are  also  constrained  under  both  national 
legislation  and  the  terms  of this  Decision  not  to 
disclose  information  derived  from  operating  the 
PSTN or providing reserved services  to the  Phoenix 
entities  whose  services  DT and  FT  are distributing. 
This. ensures that d~stribution of Phoenix services  by 
DT m Germany and FT  in  France  will  not lead  to 
market foreclosure or constitute a barrier to entry. 
In  the  context  of  Phoenix,  the  following 
considerations are relevant:  · 
Markets  for non-reserved corporate 
telecommunications services 
... 67.  Global markets 
Two years after the Commission's BT-MCI Decision 
global  ~arkets are  still  only  emerging.  Corporate 
users  With  global  telecommunications  needs  still 
have  an  open  demand  for  seamless  services  with 
customized  fea~ures  such  as  24-hour  . technical 
assistance and maintenance service,  one-stop billing 
across  language  ba.~;riers  and  currency  zones  and 
seamless  lin~s between  premises  spread  over  wide 
geographic  areas.  BT  and  MCI's  Concert  was  the 
first  player  to  enter  that emerging  market,  with  a 
head-stan  over  its  competitors.  Phoenix  is  set  to 
become  a  competitive  player  once  the  substantial 
required investment is  made and a reliable seamless 
backbone network created. At this point in time the 
Commission  regards  entry  of  a  competitor  to 
Concert  into  this  immature , market  as  being 
dependant  on  the  participation  of  an  established 
United  States  provider  with  wide  geographic 
coverage (32). Recent legislative changes in the United 
States  .have  allowed  regional  Bell  operating 
compames  (RBOCs)  to  enter  the  long-distance 
~arket there. However, before such changes are felt 
10  the  market  and  while  AT&T  and  MCI  are 
engaged  in  alliances  of their  own,  large  existing 
players  such  as  Sprint  or LDDS  are  DT  and  FT's 
natural  choice  among  United  States  long·distance 
carriers.  The  Commission  therefore  sees  no 
elimination  of competition  in  the  emerging  global 
market. 
68.  Cross-border regional  market 
This  relevant  market  is  discussed  in  detail  under 
recitals  62  et  seq.  of  ~he Atlas  Decision.  As  was 
noted  above,  Phoenix  essentially  adds  a  global 
dimension  to  DT  and  FT's  cooperation  in  the 
framework  of  Atlas  and  adds  Sprint's  existing 
European business in these markets. The elimination 
of Sprint as an independent supplier does not lead to 
a~  .e~iminati~n  of  competition  in  the  light  of 
S1gmf1cant  third-party  competition  stemming  from 
existing  alliances,  such  as  AT&T  WorldPanners, 
Concert and IPSP, and from future alliances between 
TOs that are not ye~ positioned, such as the RBOCs, 
NTf  and  European  TOs  such  as  Mercury. 
Moreover,  at least  partial  competition  for  certain 
components  of  global  customized  packages  of 
corporate  telecommunications  services  and  notably 
for  packet·switched  data  communications  services 
stems from  niche players (33), 
69.  National markets 
Phoenix  adds  to  the  restriction  of  competition 
brought about by Atlas in France and Germany  in 
that one competitor to FT or DT there aisappears. 
Adding  DT's  and  FT's  market  shares  to those  of 
Sprint  in  France  and  Germany  makes  Phoenix the 
market  leader  f~r  certain  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications  services. offered  in  customized 
packages,  notably  for  outsourdng  services. 
.Outsourcing  is  relevant  only  until  the  market  for 
cross-border  and  global  services  has  evolved 
sufficiently to give current .self-providers a choice of 
·services  that suits their needs.  The Commission has 
ensured  in  the  context  of  the  related  Atlas 
(31)  See  BT-MCI Decision (footnote 4) at recital 51. 
(ll)  Cf.  BT-MCI  Decision  (footnote  4)  at  recital  56,  first 
indent. 
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notification  and  in  its  'Full  Competition' 
Directive (34)  the  essential  prerequisite  of increased 
choice,  namely  infrastructure  liberalization.  The 
Commission  is  persuaded that competition will  not 
be  eliminated  given  the conditions imposed  on  DT 
and. FT  to  (i)  provide  aU  reserved  services  required 
for  the  provision  of  non-reserved  corporate 
telecommunications  services,  such  as  PSTN 
interconnection  with  all  relevant  information  on 
htter  alia  implementation  of protocols  such  as  the 
Signalling  System  7 (SS7) (l-~)  on non-discriminatory 
terms  to Phoenix and third parties,  (ii)  sell  Phoenix 
products  in  contracts  separate  from  those  for  own 
reserved  services  and  (iii)  gather,  submit  and  have 
available  the  informatiQn  required  to  verify 
compliance with those commitments. 
70.  The  sale  of  Sprint's  ·data  and ·card  business  to 
T-Data  in  Germany  and  to  Transpac  'France  in 
France  respectively  is  a concentration that does  not 
atrain a Community dimension. This does not affect 
the  Commission's  assessment  of  the  Phoenix 
transaction  under  Articles  85 (3)  of the  EC  Treaty 
and  53 (3)  of the  EEA  Agreement.  As  was  shown 
under  recital,  Sprint  has  small  market  shares  in 
absolute  figures  for  packet-switched  data 
communications services  in  the French and German 
markets,  but is  an  important player  given  that·  all 
competito.rs  of  FT  and  DT  respectively,  taken 
together add  up  to  less  than. a 20% market share. 
The  Commission  considers  that  this  will  not  be 
tantamount  to  an  elimination  of  competition.  ~A 
large  number of data services  providers is  active  in . 
Germany and in France, where six service providers 
have  been· licensed  to  provide  public  data  services 
under conditions similar to .  Sprint, in  addition to a · 
number of players that provide services  under class 
licences or in areas where no licence  is required. 
71.  DT  and  FT's  public  X.25  packet-switched · data 
networks  shall  not  be  contributed  to  Atlas  until 
there is full  and effective liberalization of the French 
and  German  telecommunications  markets. 
Moreover,  the  Commission  considers  that  the 
conditions  attached  to  this  Decision  for  its  entire 
duration,  such  as  non-discriminatory  inter-
connection of Phoenix ·and  third parties to DT and 
FT's  public  X.25  packet-switched  data  networks 
over  X.75  interfaces  or  equal  technical  and 
(34)  Commission  Directive  96/19/EC  of  13  March  1996 
amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with  regard  to  the 
implementation  of  .full  competition  in  the  tele-
communications markets, OJ No L 74, 22. 3.  1996, p.  13. 
· (lS)  Major _di~ital  protocoVsignalling  system  for  man~ging and 
transrmmng control and  routing information in  networks. 
commercial treatment of Phoenix and competitors in 
respect  of interconnection  to  the  PSTN  and  other 
services  relevant  to  call  termination  and  services 
distribution,  will  ensure  a  level  playing  field  more 
efficiently than in the past. Nevertheless, the existing 
regulatory  framework  in  the  respective  home 
countries  of DT,  FT  and  Sprint  already  prohibits 
cross-subsidization  and/or  discrimination.  These 
regulatory  const~aints, together  with  the  additional 
conditions  attached  to  this  Decision,  lead  the 
Commission  to  conclude  that  Phoenix  does  not 
afford  the  parties  the  possibility  of  eliminating 
. competition  by  either  discrimination  or  cross-
subsidization. 
Markets  for  traveller services and carrier services 
72.  The Commission sees  no elimination of competition 
attributable  to  the  creation  of  Phoenix,  in  the 
relevaqt  markets.  Phoenix's  aggregate  market  share 
in  the  Community  is  far  from  giving  it a dominant 
position;  it  includes  both  postpaid  and  prepaid 
cards,  although  in  the  latter  category  most  of the 
cards  issued  by· DT  and  FT  are  usable  in  national 
public  telephones  only  and·  are  thus  possibly  not 
directly comparable to Sprint's cards. As  for  carrier 
services,  Phoenix  will  be  ac~ve in  selling  excess 
capacity on its backbone network in a· market which 
is  only emerging. Phoenix's position as  third-largest 
global  switched  transit  provider  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  only  two  other  companies  meet  the  most 
valuable  requirement  in  this  market,  namely 
worldwide reach and ultimately coverage. 
· 5.  Conch:4Sion 
.  73.  The  Commission  concludes  that  the  Phoenix 
transactions  meet  all  four  conditions  for  an 
individual exemption pursuant to Articles  85 (3)  of 
the EC Treaty and 53 (3)  of the EEA Agreement, as 
regards  both  the  creation  of  Phoenix  and  the 
indispensable  restriction  of DT and  FT's  exclusive 
distributorship in Germany and France respectively. 
D.  DURATION OF THE EXEMmON, CONDmONS 
AND OBUGATIONS 
74.  Pursuant to  Article  8 of Regulation  No 17 and  to 
Protocol  21  of the EEA  Agreement  respectively,  the 
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. 76. 
·Commission  shall  ·issue  a  Decision  pursuant  to 
Articles  85 (3)  of the  EC Treaty and 53 (3)  of the 
EEA  Agreement  for  a  specified  period,  and  may 
attach  conditions  and  obligations.  Purs~ant  to 
Article  6  of  Regul~tion No  17,  such  a  Decision 
cannot take effect from an earlier date than the date 
of notification.  Accordingly,  this  Decision  shall,  in 
so far as it grants an exemption from Articles 85 (  1) 
of the EC Treaty and 53 (1)  of the EEA Agreement, 
take effect for seven  years from  th~ date on which 
the  second  new  infrastructure  licence  comes  into 
force  in  both  Germany and France authorizing the 
licensee to operate infrastructure for the provision of 
liberalized services  in competition with DT and Ff, 
and  the  respective  first  licensee  as  regards  the 
Phoenix  agreements  as  described  above.  Unlike 
Atlas,  Phoenix  is  not focused  on the  German  and 
French national markets, where the restrictive effects 
of. a  cooperation  between  DT  and  FT  are  felt 
strongest. These restrictive effects in a  fast-changing 
market  that is  not yet  fully  liberalized  meant  that 
Atlas  had  to  be  granted  an  exemption  only  for  a 
relatively short period of time.  By  contrast, Phoenix 
targets  mainly  cross-border  and  ultimately  global 
markets, and  only to' a certain extent third-country 
national markets.  Given that in  this regard Phoenix 
resembles  BT  and  MCI's  Concert  venture,  the 
Commission considers that the same duration of the 
exemption is  justified. 
Until  the  date  defined  in  Article  2  of  the  Atlas 
Decision, no entity created pursuant to the Phoenix 
agreements  should  receive  more  favourable 
treatment than any third-party in  respect of access 
to DT and  Ff's public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks,  provided  that Phoenix  may  access  such 
networks  over  proprietary  interfaces  on  condition 
that such interconnectioa is  economically equivalent 
to third-party access over interfaces using the X.  7  5 
protocol  or  any  other  generally  used  CCITT-
standardized  interconnection  protocol  that  may 
modify, replace or co-exist as a  standard related to 
the  X.75  standard  and  is  used  by  DT. and  FT, 
T-Data  and  Transpac  France  and eventually  Atlas 
Germany and Atlas France. 
Given  the  link  be~een Atlas  and  Phoenix,  the 
Commission  may  withdraw  this  Decision  if  the 
exemption  granted  to  the  Atlas  agreements  is  not 
renewed  by.  the  end  of  the  period  defined  in 
Article 1 of the Atlas Decision. Likewise, in the light 
of the assessment of the Atlas agreements due at the 
end of the initial exemption period the Commission 
will  lift or modify those· conditions attached to this 
Decision  which  parallel  the  conditions  and 
obligations  described  in  recitals  23  to  29  of  the 
Atlas  Decision.  Moreover,  the  Commission  will, 
upon  the  parties'  request,  review  the  need  for  any 
particular  condition  or obligation  attached  to  this 
Decision if circumstances change substantially before 
the period of exemption expires. 
77.  The  Commission  has  decided  to  attach  certain 
conditions  and  obligations  to  this  Decision  to 
exclude  the  risk  of collusion  between  DT,  FT  and 
Sp~int and to prevent an elimination of competition · 
in  the  relevant  markets.  To  this  end,  the 
Commission  must  ensure  that  DT and  FT,  where 
they are dominant in the provision of infrastructure 
and  services  used  by  Phoenix  or Sprint,  treat  both 
Sprint  and  all  •  entities  created  pursuant  to  the 
Phoenix agreements  on similar  terms as  third-party at 
competitors  in  respect  of  such  provision.  The W! 
conc!ition  imposed  on  DT,  FT  and  Sprint  not  to 
discriminate  in  each  other's  favour  is  necessary 
because Phoenix will offer non-reserved services and 
will  operate  under  Sprint's  existing  international 
simple  resale  (ISR)  licence  in  the  United  Ki':lgdom 
and  under  FT's  existing  ISR  licence  in  Sweden.  A 
distinction between reserved and non-reserved voice 
services  does  not exist in  a  number of geographic 
markets targeted  by  Phoenix and this distinction  is 
due to disappear  in  most· Member States  with full 
liberalization of public voice telephony by  1 January 
1998.  Therefore,  in the  absence  of such  condition 
the  parents'  cooperation  in  the  framework  of 
Phoenix  could  easily  spill  over  to  the  voice . 
telephony  markets,  thus  impairing  effec~ve 
liberalization of such markets and the development 
of competition in  the Community. 
The  non-discriminatory  treatment  of  Sprint,  of 
Phoenix · entities  and  of  third-party  competitors 
(recital  31)  will  allow  the  last-named  category 'to 
compete  against  DT and FT,  which  in  turn  ha~e 
room to compete over distribution: passive sales are 
possible  because  the  same  Pho~nix service  may  be 
sold  from  either  end  of the  requested  circuits,  for 
example from Germany or from France. To limit the 
potentially  negative  effects  of the  joint venture  on 
overall  competition  between  the  parents,  the 
Commission  considers  it  appropriate  to  impose 
restrictions on the exchange of sensitive ·information 
between the parents 'and Phoenix (recital 64) . 
The  most  crucial  requirements  as  to  conduct, 
designed  to safeguard  competition  in  the  EEA,  are 
attached as conditions rather than as obligations to 
this  Decision,  given  the  need  to  prevent  an 
• 
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elimination of effective competition. Given the legal 
consequences  of a  breach  of a  condition,  national 
courts  can  adequately  and  swiftly  contribute  to  a 
decentralized policing of compliance and thus ensure 
that  the  competition  rules  will  be  adhered  to the 
benefit  of  private  individuals (36).  However,  the 
principle  of  proportionality  requires  that 
far-reaching  legal,  financial  and  commercial 
consequences  do  not  ensue  from  occasional  or 
individual mistakes whose effects on· the market are 
negligible.  Therefore,  infringements  of  the 
prohibitions  on  cross-subsidization,  discrimination 
and.  bundling  cannot  be  considered  to  breach  a 
condition  attached  to  this  Decision  unless  such 
infringements  have  a  substantial  impact on  market 
conditions,  for  instance  if  practices  are  pursued 
systematically or repeatedly. 
•  78.  This Decision is  without prejudice to the application 
of Article 86 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the 
EEA  Agreement, 
• 
HAS ADOPTED THIS  DECISION: 
Article 1 
Pursuant to Articles  ~5 (3)  of the  EC  Treaty and 53 (3) 
of the EEA Agreement and subject to Articles 2 and 3 of 
this Decision, the. provisions of Articles  85 (  1)  of the EC 
Treaty  and  53 (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement  are  hereby 
declared  inapplicable,  for  a  period  of seven  years  from 
the  date  on  which  two  or  more  licences  for  the 
construction  or  ownership  and  control  of  alternative 
infrastructure  for  the  provision  of  liberalized  tele-
communications  services  come  into  force  in  both 
Germany and France, to: 
(a)  the  creation  of  the  Phoenix  joint  venture  by 
Deutsche Telekom AG ('DT'), France Telecom ('FT') 
and  Sprint  Communications  Corporation  ('Sprint'), 
as  notified  .to  the  Commission,  including  the  · 
ancillary  obligation  imposed  on  Sprint,  on DT and 
on Fr to obtain from  Phoenix all  requirements  for 
global products under section 2.1.1  of the operating 
entities services  agreement and not to compete with 
the  joint  venture  for  the  provision  of  Phoenix 
services  under  sections  10.2  and  10.3  of the  joint 
venture agreement, as  amended; and to 
(36)  Cf.  Commission  notice  on  cooperation  between  national 
courts and the Commission in  applying Articles  85  and 86 
of the  EEC Treaty, OJ  No C 39, 13. -2.  1993, p.  6. 
(b)  the  appointment of DT  as  the  exclusive  distributor 
of Phoenix  in  Germany  and  of FT  as  the  exclusive 
distributor  of  Phoenix  in  France  under  section 
2.2 (b)  of the  joint venture agreement as  amended. 
Article 2 
The  exemption  set  out  in  Article  1  is  subject  to  the 
following conditions: 
(a)  Non-discrimination 
1.  DT and FT  shall  not grant either Sprint or any 
entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements,  terms  and  conditions  dissimilar  to 
the  terms  and  conditions  applied  to  other 
providers . of  similar  services,  nor  shall  they 
exempt  Sprint  or  such  entity  from  any  usage 
restrictions  which  would  enable  such  entity  to 
offer  services  which  ·competing  providers  are 
prevented  from  offering  with  regard  to  the 
following  facilities-related  telecommunications 
services  provided  by  FT  and or in  France  and 
Germany respectively: 
(i)  leased  lines  services,  in  particular 
international  leased  lines  (half-circuits)  ancl 
domestic  · leased  lines,  including  any 
discounts, as  the case may be;  and 
(ii)  PSTN/ISDN  services,  including  both  access 
to  PSTN/ISDN  networks  (namely  analogue 
access;  basic  ISDN  access;  ISDN  access  to 
the  public  packet-switched  data  networks; 
special  access·  from  the  public  packet-
switched  data  networks  to  ISDN;  and 
national  and  international  voice  VPN  and 
VPN  interconnection  services)  and  traffiC 
over such networks. 
Similarly,  Phoenix  shall  not  be  granted  more 
favourable  treatment  than  third  parties  in 
connection  with  reserved .facilities  and  services 
and with such facilities and services as  remain an 
essential  facility  after  full  and  effective 
liberalization  of  telecommunications  infra-
structure and services  in France and Germany. 
2.  DT and  FT  shall  grant to Sprint,  to  any  entity 
created pursuant to the  Phoenix agreement, and 
to  any  third  party  operating  a 
telecommunications  facility  that  apply  for. the 
interconnection of such facility  with DT or FT's 
networks,  such  interconnection  on  non-
discriminatory  terms  as  will  enable  it/them  to 
provide  telecommunications  services  or  p~ovide 
its  telecommunicatjons  facilities  without 
limitation  in  any  respect  "Yithin  the  reasonable 
· capabilities of the operator concerned. 
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3.  DT  and  Ff shall  not in  any  way  discriminate 
betWeen  Sprint,  any  entitY  created  pursuant  to 
the  Phoenix  agreements,  and  any  other  service 
provider competing with Sprint or such entity in 
connection with: 
(i)  either  a  decision  substantially  to  modify 
technical interfaces for the access to reserved 
services, and/or essential facilities -or serVices, 
or  the  disclosure  of  any  other  technical 
information relating to the operation of the  ..... 
PSTNIISDN;  competitors shall  in  particular 
have  access  to  such  software  and  interface 
information  as  is  indispensable  for 
maintaining  the  technical  features  of voice 
s.ervices where .such competitors interconnect 
to the German or French PSTN/ISDN; and 
(ii)  the  disclosure  of  any  commercial 
information  which  would  confer  ·a 
substantial competitive advantage and which 
is not readily and equally available elsewhere 
to  service  providers  competing  with  such 
entity. 
4.  Breaches of the requirements set out in points 1, 
2 and  3 shall  not be  considered  to infringe  this 
condition unless such breaches have a substantial 
impact on the market. 
(b)  Interconnection  to  DT  and  Ff's  public  packet-
switched data ·networks 
1.  Ff and DT shall immediately grant to Sprint, to 
any  . entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements,  and  to  any  third  party'  access  to 
their respective public X.25 packet-switched data 
networks on non-discriminatory terms, including 
availability of volume or other discounts and the 
quality of interconnection provided-. 
2.  Transpac  France  and  T-Data  shall,  until  such 
time as Transpac France and T-Data are yielded 
to  Atlas,  not  disclose  either  to  Sprint  or  to 
any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements any specifically agreed terms that are 
identified  and  maintained  as  confidential  by 
the  party  obtaining  interconnection  through 
standardized X.75  interfaces to access the French 
or German national public X.25 packet-switched 
data networks.  · 
3.  Sprint  and  any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the. 
Phoenix  agreements  may  access  the  French  and 
German  public  X.25  packet-switched  data 
networks through proprietary interfaces, even for 
the  provision  of  X.25  data  communications 
services,  provided  that  the  access  granted  to 
Sprint  or such  entity  through  such  interfaces  is 
economically  equivalent  to  third-party  access  to 
these  networks.  • 
4.  Breaches of the requirements set out in  points 1, 
2  and 3 shall  not be  considered  to infringe  this 
condition unless such breaches have a substantial 
impact on the market. 
(c)  Correspondent services 
1.  DT  and  FT  shall  not  give  more  favourable 
treatment to:  ~ 
(i)  Sprint  over  other  United  States 
correspondents; or 
(ii)  each  other  over  other  German  or  French 
correspondents  once  telecommunications 
services  markets are fully  liberalized. 
2.  Sprint  shall  not  give  more  favourable  treatment 
to  DT  and  FT  over  other  German  or  French 
correspondents once  telecommunications services 
markets are  f~lly liberalized. 
(d)  Cross-subsidization 
1.  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements shall be established as distinct entities 
separate from  DT and FT. 
2.  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements shall obtain their own debt financing 
on their own credit,  provide~ that FT and DT: 
(i)  may  make  any ·capital  contributions  or 
commercially  normal  loans to such  entities 
that are required to enable such  entities  to 
• 
conduct their respective businesses;  • 
(ii)  may  pledge  their  venture  interests  in  such 
entities,  in  connection  with  non-recourse 
· financing for such entities; and 
(iii)  may  guarantee  any  indebtedness  of  such 
entities;  however,  FT  and  DT  may  only 
make  payments  pursuant  to  any.  such 
guarantee  following  a  default  by  such 
entities  i1_1  respect of such indebtedness. 
.3.  No  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements  shall  allocate  directly  or  indirectly 
any  part  of  its  operating  expenses,  costs, 
depreciation,  or other expenses  of their business 
to  any  parts  of  FT  or  DT's  business  units 
(including,  without limitation,  the  proportionate 
costs  based on work actually performed that are 
attributable  to  shared  employees  or  sales  or 
marketing  of Phoenix  products  and  services  by 
DT  or  FJ'  employees),  provided  that  any  such 
entity  may  bill  DT  or  FT  for  products  and 
services  supplied  to DT or FT  by  such  entity at: 
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(i)  the  same  price  charged  third  parties  in  the 
case  of products  or services  sold  to  third 
parties in commercial quantities, or 
(ii)  on the  basis  of the full  cost reimbursement. 
or other arm's length pricing method in the 
case  of products  and  services  not  sold  to 
third parties in  commercial quantities. 
4.  Breadies of the  requirements set out in points 1, 
2 and  3 shall  not  be  considered  to infringe  this 
condition unless such breaches have a substantial 
impact on the. market. 
(e)  Bundling 
1.  DT  and  FT  shall  sell  their  services  under 
contracts separate from the contracts for the sale 
of Phoenix services  concluded  as  distributors of 
Phoenix  in  Germany  and  France  respectively. 
Each separate contract shall set out the terms and 
conditions  of  each  individual  service  sold 
thereunder  and  shall,  in  particular,  attain  any· 
quantity  discounts  or  other  discounts  to  a 
particular service, as  the case may be. 
2.  Breaches  of the  requirements  set out in  point  1 
shall  not be  considered to infringe this condition 
unless such breaches have a substantial impact on 
the market. 
(f)  Accounting 
1.  Any entity created under the Phoenix agreements 
in  France and Germany,  any  ROE parent entity 
and any entity controlled by a ROE parent entity 
shall  keep  separate  accounting  records  using 
international  accounting  standards  for  each 
service  they provide in  any  coun~ry. DT and Ff 
(including  all  subsidiaries)  shall  keep .  separate 
accounting records using international accounting 
standards  for  each  service  they  provide  to  any 
entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements, operating in  the EEA. 
2.  DT  and  FT  shall  within  one  year  of the  date 
defined  in  Article  1  above  implement  an 
accounting  system  which  generates  sufficiently 
detailed  records  of  the  services  covered  by 
point  1  above.  These  records  shall  detail  the 
following: 
(i)  the cost standard used; 
(ii)  the  accounting  conventions  used  for  the  ' 
treatment o.f costs; 
(iii)  the allocation and attribution of expenses or 
costs,  revenues,  assets  and  liabilities  shared 
between  any  entity created pursuant to the 
Phoenix  agreements  and  DT  and/or  FT; 
~nd 
(iv)  the attribution method chosen. 
3.  The  accounting  records  referred  to  in  points  1 
and 2 shall identify all  services provided to: 
(i)  any  entity created  pursuant to  the  Phoenix 
agreements in France and Germany; 
(ii)  any ROE parent entity; and 
(iii)  any  entity  controlled  by  a  ROE  parent 
entity by DT and FT or transfers to or from 
DT and  FT. 
4.  No  entity  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreement,  ROE  parent  entity  or  entity 
controlled  by  a  ROE  parent entity  shall  receive 
any  material  subsidy  directly  or indirectly  from 
DT  or FT,  or any  investment  or payment from 
DT  or  FT  that is  not recorded  in  the  books  of 
such entities as  an investment in  debt or equity. 
Article 3 
The exemption granted under this Decision  is  subject to 
the following obligations: 
(a)  Auditing 
1.  All  entities  created  pursuant  to  the  Phoenix 
agreements  .in  France  and. Germany,  all  ROE 
parent  entities  and  any  entity  controlled  by  a 
ROE  parent  entity. shall  be  audited  by  an 
independent  external  auditor  every  12  months, 
provided  that  such  audit  shall  certify  from  an 
accounting viewpoint that: 
(i)  all transactions between these undertakings, 
on the  one  hand, and FT and DT,  on the 
other  hand,  have  beeri  conducted  at arm's 
length; 
(ii)  these  undertakings  have  adhered  to  the 
accounting procedures; and 
(iii)  the calculation numbers are accurate. 
2.  The  first  auditing  report  and  certificate 
complying  with  point 1, covering the  12-month 
period  starting  on  the  date  when  this  Decision 
takes  effect,  shall  be  submitted  to  the 
Commission within 15 months of that date. 
(b)  Other obligations 
DT,  FT,  all entities created pursuant to the Phoenix 
agreements  in  France and Germany, all  ROE parent 
entities  and all  entities controlled  by  a  ROE  parent 
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entity shall each, for the purpose of ascertaining and 
ensuring compliance  by  these  undertakings with the 
conditions set out in Article 2,  · 
1.  keep  all  detailed  records  and  documents · 
necessary to prove complete compliance with the 
terms of the conditions set out in Article 2 ready 
for  inspection by  the Commission and to enable 
the  Commission  to verify  the correctness  of the 
audit certificate referred to in  point (a) (2); 
2.  give  the  Commission  access  to  their  business 
premises  to  inspect  records  and  documents 
covered by  the obligations set out under heading 
(a)  and  to  recei:ve  oral explanations  relating  to 
such  documents  on  reasonable  notice,  during 
office  hours,  and  without  the  need  for  the 
Com.q~ission to  invoke  the powers of inspection 
pursuant to Regulation No 17; and 
3.  provide the Commission with: 
(i)  any  records  and  documents  in  the 
possession or control of these  undertakings 
necessary for that determination; 
(ii)  unaudited  accounting  data  as  specified  in 
points  1  and  2  every  six  months, ,  starting 
one  year  after  the  commencement  date  of 
the exemption pursuant to Article  1; and 
(iii)  further oral or written explanations. 
Article 4 
This Decision is  addressed to: 




Place d'  Alleray 
F-75505  Paris  Cedex 
Sprint Communications Corporation 
2330 Shawnee Mission Parkway 
Westwood, Kansas 
Missouri  66205 
USA. 
· Done at Brussels,  17 July  1996. 
For  the Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIER T 
Member of the Commission 
• 
• 
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(Aas  whose publication  is  not  obligatory) 
COMMISSION 
COMMISSION DECISION 
of 18  December 1996 
relating to a  proceeding under Article 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the 
EEA Agreement 
(Case· IV/35.518  - Iridium) 
(Only the English text is  authentic) 
·  (Text with  EEA  r~levance) 
(97/39/Eq 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNmES, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty establishing  the  European 
Community, 
Having  regard  to  the  Agreement  on  the  European 
Economic  Area, 
Having regard to Council Regulation N()  ~ 7 of 6 February 
1962,  First Regulation  implementing Articles  85 and 86 
of the Treaty('~  .as  last amended by the Act of Accession 
"''f Austria, Finland and Sweden, and in particular Article 
- thereof,  · 
Having regard  to  the  application  for  negative  clearance 
and the. notification for. exemption submitted  pursua~t to 
Article$ 2 and 4 o_f Resulation No 17, on 11  August 1995, 
Having· regard  to  the  summary  of  the  application  and 
notification published pursuant to Article  19 (3) of Regu-
lation No 17 and to Article 3 of ·Protocol 21  of the EEA 
Agreement (2),  · 
After  consultation  with  the  Advisory  Committee  for 
Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant Positions, 
Whereas: 
(') OJ No  13,  21.  2.  1962.  p.  204/62. 
(Z)  OJ No  C  255,  3.  9.  1996,  p.  2. 
I. THE FACTS 
A  Introduction 
(1)  The Iridium system  was  conceived by the United 
States  company Motorola  Inc. in  1987 to provide 
global  digital  wireless  communications  services 
using a constellation "'f low earth orbit (LEO) satel-
lites. SeiVices  will  include voice  telephony, paging 
.and basic data  services (such as  facsimile) and will 
be provided via  portable hand-held (dual  mode or 
single  mode)  telephones,  vehicle  mounted  tele-
phones,  pagers  and  other subscriber equipment. 
Iridium expects to be the first operational provider 
of global satellite personal-communications services 
(S-PCS).  The  system  is  expected  to  become 
commercially ,operational  by 1  October 1998.  For 
. that purpose, 66 .satellites will have to be  launched 
and  placed  in  orbit  during  the  next  24  months. 
B.  Parties 
(2)  Motorola  Inc.,  is  a  US  provider  of wireless  com-
munications  and  electronic  equipment,  systems, 
components  and  ·services  for  worldwide  markets. 
Motorola  is  the  originator of the  Iridium concept 
and  is  the  primary  contractor  to  Iridium  for  the 
procurement  of  the  space  segment  and  a  major 
supplier  for  . other  components  of  the  Iridium 
system. 
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Motorola's  investment  percentage  in  Iridium  is 
20,1  %.  It  has  reserved  for  itself  the  ,Mexican/ 
Central American gateway  (
1~ has an interest in the 
South  American  gateway  and  shares  the  North 
American gateway with Iridium Canada and Sprint. 
Under  the  Space  System  Contract  Motorola  has 
agreed  not  to  produce  for  itself  or  others  any 
similar  satellite-based  system  without  Iridium's 
prior written  approval  until  31  July 2003  or the 
termination  of  the  Space  System  Contract, 
whichever  is  earlier. 
(3)  Apart from Motorola, Iridium is owned by 16 strat-
egic  investors,  including  a  number  of  telecom-
munication  services  providers  and  equipment 
manufacturers  from  around  the  world.  Each . of 
them (with the exceptions of Lockheed Martin and 
Raytheon)  is  expected  to . own . and  operate  a 
gateway (individually or jointly) and may also act as 
service  provider  (or  nominate  others  to  do  so) 
within its allocated exclusive. gateway services terri-
tory. 
Investors  are  the  following:  Iridium  China (Hong 
Kong) Ltd (belonging to the corpo~te group China 
Great  Wall  Industry  Corporation:  investment 
percentage 4,4 %  ~ Iridium Africa  Co.,  (formed  by 
the  Saudi  group  Mawarid  Overseas  Company: 
2,5 %), Iridium Canada, Inc., (owned by a Motorola 
subsidiary:  33 %; and  by  two  subsidiaries  of the 
Canadian  company  BCE,  Inc.:  4,4 %),  Iridium 
India Telecom Private  Ltd. (India: 3,9 °/o~ Iridium 
·Middle East Co. (owned by two Saudi groups: 5%1 
Khnmichev State  Research  and Production  Space 
Center (Russia: 4,4%1 Iridium Sudamerica (owned 
by a Motorola subsidiary, a Venezl..elan consortium 
and a Brazilian ~up:  8,8 %1 Korea Mobile Tele-
communications (controlled  by the South  Korean 
conglo~erate Sunkyong  Business  Group:  4,4 %), 
Lockheed  Martin  (USA:  1,3 %1  Nippon  Iridium 
Co., (a consortium formed by two Japanese groups, 
DDI Co., and Kyocena Co., and a number of other 
Japanese investors: 13,2 %~Pacific Electric Wire&: 
Cable  Co.,  (I'aiwan:  4,4 %  ),  Raytheon  Co.,  (USA: 
0,7 °/o  ~ Sprint (USA: 4,4 %) and Thai Satellite Tele-
communications  Co.,  Ltd  (Thailand:  4,4 %). 
Two  European  companies are  also  strategic  inves-
. ~ors;  Stet  (Italy:  3,8 %)  and  Vebacom  (Germany: 
10 %  ). Each of the two has its own gateway service 
territory covering different parts of Europe and the 
(1)  For  a desc;ription  of  a gateway,  see  recital  12. 
associated exclusive right to construct and operate a 
ga,teway  within  its  respective  territory.  However, 
they have concluded an agreement to jointly install 
and operate their gatew~ys. In order to  do so, they 
will create a joint venture. The first gateway will be 
that in  Italy  . 
Most of the above investors do not operate yet; they 
have  been  created  for  the  purpose of investing in 
Iridium.  In  the  building-up  phase  of the  system, 
many of the investors will provide some services to 
Iridium,  basically  as  subcontractors  to  Motorola. 
Thus,·  China  Great  Wall  and  Khrunichev  will 
provide  launching services,  Lockheed  Martin  is  a 
principal subcontractor in the construction  of the 
Iridium satellites, Raytheon is  primarily responsible 
for  providing  the  satellite  antennas  and  Stet, 
through  its  subsidiary  Telespazio,  will  build  and 
operate  the  backup  system  control  facility. 
(4)  Iridium  LLC,  a  US-incorporated  company  with 
limited liability, has  been  formed  to  establish  and 
commercialize  ·the  Iridium  communications 
system. It will own the space-related portion of the 
system  including  the  satellites  and  the  related 
ground  infrastructure  for  the  delivery  of  Iridium 
services. 
(5)  As regards  distribution  of  Iridium services,  it will 
have  a  central  ·role,  issuing  guidelines  for  the' 
appointment of service providers by gateway opera-
tors and establishing commercial  an~ pricing poli-
cies.  In  addition  it  will_  provide  some  business 
support  functions  required  by ,gateway  operators 
and service providers, including a clearinghouse to 
calculate the amounts due to and from Iridium and 
each gateway operator. 
(6)  Iridium will  be· managed by a  Board  of Directors 
~ade up  of  24  members.  Of  these,  23  will  be 
elected by the investors and the Chairman will be 
elected by the other 23. The Board of Directors :will 
delegate certain executive authority to the manage-
ment team.  of the  company, which  will  include a 
Chief  Executive  Officer  and  a  President.  The 
Chairman of the Board of Directors will also be the 
·Chief  ExeCutive  Offi~er.  The  Chief  Executive 
Officer will be in ·  the general and active  charge of 
the entire · bu5iness  and affairs .  of the  corporation. 
The  President  shall  have  general  charge  of  the 
business,  affairs  and  property  of  the  corporation 
under the supervision of the Board of Directors and 
the Chief Executive Officer. The management will 
be responsible for carrying Out the directions of the 
Board of Directors and for informing it of progress 
in  the  company's  development  and  business. 
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(7)  Decisions  by  the  Board . of  Directors  will  be 
adopted  by_ simple  ~ajority. 
C.  The Iridium system 
1.  The  network 
(8)  The system (1} will consist of the space se~ent, the 
gateways and the user handheld terminals. Iridium 
will own  the space segrrient, while gateway operator 
investors  will  own  and  operate  the  gateways  and 
subscribers  will  purchas~ or  lease  the  subscriber 
terminal  equipment  from  service  providers  and 
other retailers. 
(9)  The space segment includes the satellites (2} and the 
system control segment (SCS} necessary to monitor, 
manage and control the satellites and the provision 
of  services.  · 
(1 0)  Iridium intends to  operate a constellation of 66 (l) 
satellites to be deployed in low earth orbit (780 km. 
above  the  earth's  surface).  The  satel~ites  will  be 
arranged in .six planes of 11  satellites each, in near 
polar orbit. Each satellite will circle the earth every 
100  minutes and will  cover  a circular area  with a 
diameter  of  approximately  4 700  km. 
Satellites  are  equipped  to  communicate  with 
subscriber terminals and to  send traffic direct from 
one satellite  to  another. As regards  the latter, each 
Iridium satellite will  have four cross·link antennas 
to allow it to communicate and route  traffic to the 
two satellites that are  fore and aft of it in the same 
orbital  plane  as  well  as  neighbouring satellites  in 
the  adjacent  co·rotating  orbital  planes.  Inter· 
satellite networking provides access  to the Iridium 
.... system irrespective of gateway location by routing a 
call from satellite to satellite until it is connected to 
the gateway which is most appropriate to the desti· 
nation  of  the  particular  call.  In  that  respect,  the 
system  allows  any  user  in  any  country  that  has 
authorized  the  Iridium  service  to  receive  a  call 
originating  from  any gateway. 
( 1)  The  total  system's  implementation  costs  are  estimated  at 
nearly  USD  4.7  billion  (not  including handsets). 
(J)  The system will  use  a frequency in the range of 1616-1626,5 
Mhz  for  user  links  (as  reserved  for  S-PCS  systems  during 
WRC-92),  19,4-19.6  (;hz and  29,1-29,3  Ghz  for  feeder  and 
gateway  links (space  to earth and earth  to  space) and 23,18-
23,38  Ghz  for  the  inter-satellite  links. 
(3)  The system also includes a number of spare satellites in orbit, 
intended  to  replace  failed  ones. 
(11)  The  ·  SCS  includes  a  master  control  facility (4} 
(located in the  USA1  a back·up control facility (to 
be located in Italy} and two tracking, telemetry ~nd 
control  stations  (IT&C} (S)  located. in ·eanada and 
Hawaii.·  · 
(12)  Gateways  are  switches  which  communicate  with 
subscribers•  units and  other satellites  via  the  SCS 
and the constellation. They will  serve  as  the inter-
face  between  the  satellite  constellation  and  the 
public switched telephone networks (PSTN). As was 
stated above, they will be owned by investors. There 
will  be  13  gateways  in operation.  . 
The  concrete  functions  of  a  gateway  will  be  to 
support the  subscriber  billing function,  to  process 
calls,  to  keep  track  of  each  user  location  and  to 
communicate with PSTN to which it will be inter· 
connected (in  case  of  calls  to  fixed  users). 
(13)  Finally, handsets will be  produced by major manu-
facturers  of  equipment.  Motorola  has  agreed  to 
license to other suppliers the right to use its propri-
etary information to manufacture and sell Iridium-
compatible  subscriber  equipment  subject  to 
. reasonable terms and conditions acceptable to both 
parties. Most handsets will be capable of dual·mode 
operation with both satellite and terrestrial cellular 
(including GSM) systems, so  that they will  be able 
to select, either automatically or under user control, 
satellite  or  terrestrial· modes  of operation. 
2.  Distribution  of the  services 
{14)  Distribution  of  Iridium  services  will  involve  dif· 
ferent  participants· in  the  notified  agreements: 
- Iridium  will  have  responsibility  for  central 
functions,  such  as  the  space  segment  and 
certain  business support systems  including the 
clearing-house, 
- gateway  operators  will  be  responsible  for  the 
gateway, 
and 
- service  providers  will  provide  services  to 
customers  and  will  sell  and/or lease  subscriber 
equipment. 
( 4)  The master control facility  will  control  the  performance and 
status of satellites and manage the network. The back-up con-
trol  facility  will  replace  the master control facility  in case of 
failure  and  will  control  spare  satellites  in  orbiL 
(5)  Tf&C stations will  track the movements of the satellites and 
adjust  their orbits  to  maintain  the  constellation.  . 
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(a)  Gateway operators 
(15)  Under  the  stock  purchase  agreements,  each 
investor  in  Iridium  designated  as  a  gateway 
operator  will  have  exclusive  rights  to  provide 
Iridium  services  within  the  geographic  territory 
provided in the contract. Iridium will not authorize 
any  other  person  to  provide  gateway  services  or 
construct gateways  in  the  investor  territory. 
(16)  In  addition, gateway operators will  have  exclusive 
rights  to  act  and/or  designate  others  to  act  as 
service  providers  within  their  designated  gateway 
territory.  It  is  the  intention of  Iridium  that  every 
gateway  operator shall  create  a network  of  service 
providers  within  its  allocated  territory. 
(17)  Finally,  under  each  gateway  authorization  agree-
ment,  Iridium  will  provide  the  gateway  operator, 
and  its  designated  service  providers,  with  con-
tinuous  access  to  the  Iridium  space  system. Such 
right is  subject  to  continued compliance with  th~ 
applicable  .mandatory  provisions  of  the  Iridium 
System  Practices (1). 
(18)  In  exchange, gateway  operators  have  to: 
- apply for, obtain and maintain all governmental 
authorizations and frequency allocations neces-
sary to construct and operate the gateway and to 
provide  services  in  each  of  the  countries 
included in  the  gateway  services  territory, 
- construct,  ope.rate  and  maintain  the  gateway, 
- establish. arid maintain appropriate interconnec-
_tion,  access  and  settlement  . arrangements 
through arid with every PSTN operating within 
the _gateway  services  territory, 
and 
- pro~de  gateway  services  to  its  designated 
semces  providers  in  each  of  the . countries 
included  within  its  allocated  service  ·territory. 
(b)  Service  providers 
(19)  Service  providers will  be responsible for marketing 
and retail sale of the services and terminal$ and will 
have  primary contact with  ~nd users  within  their 
(1)  Iridium Systems Practices (ISP) is the set of guidelines, recom-
mendations, rules, plans and other instructions related to tech-
nical and operational matters usociated with the operation of 
· the Iridium system. Some technical and operational  portions 
of these practices are  intended to be  mandatory in order to 
secure a high degree of network integrity. The ISP has not yet 
been  completed even  in  draft  form. 
territories.  They  will  also  be  responsible  for  all 
aspects of account-management and customer care 
including· customer credit,  billing, accounting and 
customer  credit  risk.  In  addition,  they  have  to 
support 'gateway  operators'  efforts  to  obtain  regu-
latory  authorizations  and  frequency  allocation 
wilbin  their  territories  · 
(20}  Appointment of the  service  provider will  in  prin-
ciple be  non-exclusive  in order to  allow  access  to 
the  largest  customer base  and  to  ensure  adequate 
availability of subscriber equipment and  customer 
service  within  the  gateway  service  territory.  Such 
would  be  the  case  in  wireless  markets  open  to 
competition.  However,  exclusive  service  provider 
agreements could also be possible in  other markets. 
It is  expected  that most will  also  be  local  cellular 
service  providers.  In  this  respect,  S-PCS  services 
will,  in  general,  be  offered  by  wireless  terrestrial 
networks  as  a premium service  in  order to  extend 
coverage  to  areas  outside  terrestrial  coverage  or 
where  terrestrial  roaming  is  not  possible. 
It is contemplated that a  singl~··company could act 
as  a  seryice  provider  for  more  than  one  gateway 
operator investor. In addition, service  providers can 
operate in more than one country within a gateway 
service  territory. 
(21)  Service  providers  will  be  appointed  by  gateway 
operators  in  accordance  with  guidelines  provided 
by Iridium. According to the notification, an initial 
screening of the service  provider will  assess  finan-
cial standing, reputation, concern for customers and 
resources. The major determinants f9r selection will 
be the existence of a substantial subscriber base  of 
wireless  mobile  uSers  and the degree  of perform-
ance· of the potential service provider for customer 
care and billing services which arc  essential for  an 
adequate  provision  of the service. 
(c)  Pricing 
(22)  Price  to  subscribers  will  be·  made  up  of  four 
charges: 
1.  a  payment by the gateway operator  to  Iridium 
for  use  of th'e. space  segment to  be  established 
by  the  Iridium  ~oard of Directors; 
2. ·a  payment to the gateway operator for use of the 
gateway link at a ·price to be set by  the gateway 
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. operator,  albeit  following  Iridium's  guidelines 
and  recommendations  to  the  extent  permitted 
by .applicable  law  and · regulation; 
3. a  payment to  the service  provider, 
and 
4.  tail  charges,  if  any,  for  the  origination  or 
completion  of  calls  over  the  PSTN. 
(23)  Setvice  providers  will  be  the  collection  point for 
charges  paid  by subscribers. Revenues  will  be dis-
tributed by the clearinghouse operated by Iridium. 
The clearinghouse will hence act as  a central point 
for collection of call detail record and will calculate 
and  execute  the  net  settlement  positipn  among 
Iridium  and  all  gateways. 
(24)  End  customers  for  voice  services  are  expected  to 
pay,  on  global  average  terms,  a  monthly  fee  of 
around USD  SO  and a tariff per voice minute traffic 
of around USD 3 (1), plus any applicable PSTN tail 
charges. 
D.  Relevant Market 
1.  Product  market 
(25)  The term S-PCS system denotes a network used to 
provide satellite personal communications services, 
usually  on  a  worldwide  basis.  A  S-PCS  system 
encompasses  a  constellation  of  LEO  (low  earth 
orbit), MEO (medium earth orbit) or GBO (geosta-
tionary earth orbit) satellites (1),  their control  e~h 
stations  and  a  number of  gateway  earth  stations 
through which access will be provided to terrestrial 
fixed or mobile networks. Such a configuration will 
support full  user  mobility and  identification  by a 
..... iingle number anywhere in the world, using 'intel-
ligent~-features, similar to those of digital terrestrial 
cellular systems (such as  GSM),  that will be located 
(')  Iridium will keep a part of the access fee and of the usage ·fee. 
In addition, lrichum expects to keep an  additional amount as 
compensation ·for the clearinghouse function. The remaining 
will  be  used  to  com~ensate gateway  operators,  service  pro-
viders  and other parties.  . 
(2)  LEO satellites are located around 900  km over the earth. Full 
coverage  of the earth•s  surface would  require  a minimum of 
66 LEO satellites. This is the kind of orbit chosen by Iridium. 
MEO satellites are located around  10 000  km  over the earth. 
Full coverage of the earth's surface would require a minimum 
of  10  MEO  satellites.  · 
GEO satellites are  located  at 36 000  km  over the earth. Full 
· coverage of the earth's surface would require only 3 GBO sa-
tellites. 
either in earth station_s or, as in the current case, in 
the satellites  themselves. 
(26)  It is expected that voice service will be the primary 
application for  these systems, but other significant 
segments  will  involve  so-called  mobile .  personal 
digital  assistants,  data  transmission  and. paging. 
(27)  LBO and MEO systems (to be used by most of the 
currently announced S-PCS systems) do not present 
a  high  degree  of  substitutability  with  existing ·or 
planned G_EO  systems.  Geostationary satellites are 
more complex and expensive  than other satellites. 
They require more  cooperation from  the  end-user 
to establish an unobstructed, clear -line  of sight to 
one of the satellites. In addition, power losses over 
such  great  distances  from  earth  make  hand-held 
portability currently impossible (l).  Sheer distances 
from  earth  also  cause  echo  and  time  delays·  (Qf  a 
magnitude of around half a second that compares 
very badly with  the 20-151  milliseconds of a LBO 
system  like  Iridium)  that  seriously  degrade  and 
confuse normal voice communications. In addition, 
GEO subscribers  located at  high  latitudes (that is, 
near the Poles) experience a shadowing effect that 
makes  the  successful  establishment  of  calls  dif-
ficult. 
(28)  S-PCS systems are expected to act as a complement 
to both GSM and digital cordless telephony within 
fixed  radius  (DECf)  wireless  terrestrial  mobile 
technologies. This will  be  particularly the case  in 
·areas where the cellular network has failed to pene-:-
trate (namely rural parts of the developed world and 
both urban and rural  parts of lower income coun-
tries) or where  terrestrial  roaming is  not available 
because  ·of  incompatible  technologies.  In  this 
respect,  they  will  be  offered  by  GSM  network 
operators  as  an  additional  feature  priced  at  a 
premium rate. 
However, S-PCS are  not intended to compete with 
terrestrial  cellular and paging systems in urban or 
other densely ·populated areas because of the advan-
tages  such  cellular  and  paging  systems  have  in 
terms of cost, voice quality and signal strength. In 
that respect, the perfomiance of. S-PCS systems will 
deteriorate in urban areas, given the existence of a 
large number of very densely spaced obstacles (such 
as buildings). That deterioration will be exacerbated 
in  moving automobiles  without external antennas 
and,  in  particular,  inside  buildings. 
(3)  The smallest GEO  receiver  is  as  big  as  a  small  briefcase. 
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(30) 
In addition, S-PCS systems are expected to act as  a , 
complement and. even  a  substitute  for  the  public 
switched  fixed  telephone  network,  enhancing 
service coverage in remote areas of low  population 
dellsity and/or where the terrestrial infrastructure is 
very  poor. 
Major users of S-PCS will  be international business 
travellers using their dual 'terminals (1)  in the terres-
trial mode within a given network and switching to 
satellite in areas outside terrestrial coverage or with 
incompatible networks. Other important cat~gories 
of  user  will  be  rural  communities;  Government 
communications  and aeronautical  users. 
2.·  Geographical  market 
(31)  When fully operational, the Iridium system will  be 
able,  from  a  technical  point of view, .  to  provide  a 
global  coverage  .. Hoy.rever,  the exact scope  of  the 
geographical  market  is  difficult  to  ascertain.  In 
addition,  the  conclusions  of  the  Commission  in 
this case will  n~t be affected by whether the IT,larket 
is  finally  worldwide or smaller than  that.  For .  that 
reason,  the  precise  dimension of the geographical 
market can  be  left open. 
3.  Competition  in  the future S-PCS  market 
(32)  S-PCS  systems  represent  a  market  which  is 
expected  to  result  in  revenues  of  ECU  10 000 
million to  20 000 million during the next decade. 
Competition is expected to be  very intense and to 
come not only from other S-PCS  syste~s, but also 
from  terrestrial  networks. 
(33)  A  number of alternative  projects are  known  to  be 
trying  to  offer  hand-held  telecommunication 
services  through  satellite,  some  of  them  (the 
so-called  'little  LBOs1  having  a  more  limited 
product and/or geographical coverage, whilst others 
(the so-called  'big LEOs) are  aiming at  the  same 
relevant  market  as  Iridium.  Most  planned  S-PCS 
systems  are.  US-led  initiatives.  However,  European 
industry  is  already  substantially  involved  in  the 
announced S-PCSs.  The most important competi-
tors  of  Iridium will  be: 
(
1
)  It is  ~xpected that the J?rice  differential  be~een dual-mode 
(satelhte and GSM) and Single-mode terminals (GSM only) will 
be  as  low  as  10 %. 
- Inmarsat-P/ICO (l) 
(34)  ICO is a S-PCS system sponsored by Inmarsat and 
a  substantial  number  of  its  signatories.  Unlike 
Iridium  it  will  use  10 · satellites  in  ICO  (inter-
mediate  circular orbit,  an orbit which  is  included 
among MEO  orbits)  to  provide global  mobile and 
other  ancillary  ~elecommunications  services.  The 
system is  expected to be  op~rational by the end of 
the year 2000. The cost of the system  approaches 
USD  3  billion. 
- Globalstar 
(35)  Globalstar intends to  set up a S-PCS system  using 
48  LEO satellites. The Globalstar consortium is  led 
and s·ponsored by the Loral  Corporation, a leading 
US  defence  electronics  and  space  company.  Part-
ners/contractors  include  the  European  aerospace 
comp~nies Alcatel  (France),  Aerospatiale  (France), 
Alenia  (Italy),  Deutsche  Aerospace  (Germany)  and 
Tesa'm,  a  joint  venture  created  by  Alcatel  and 
France  Telecom. The  total  cost  of  the  system  is 
estimated  at  USD  2 000  million. 
Globalstar expects  to  begin  launching satellites  in 
the second- half of  1.9.97  and to commence initial 
commercial  operations via  a  24-satellite  constella-
tion  in  1998.  Full  global  coverage,  via  the 
48-satellite  constellation,  is  expected  to  be  estab-
lished  in  the  first  half of  1999. 
-Odyssey 
(36)  The Odyssey S-PCS system is supported by the US 
aerospace  company TRW and  th~ Canadian  tele-
communications  operator Teleglobe  Inc.  Odyssey 
will consist of 12 MEO satellites and is  exp~cted to 
be  operational  by 1999. 
E.  The notified agreements 
(37)  The  ~otified agreements  are  the following: 
-:- the  'terrestrial  .network  development  contract' 
between  Iridium  and  Motorola, 
- the  •stock  purchase  agreements',  including 
those  signed  with  Stet and Vebacom, 
- the •space system contract' between Iridium and 
Motorola, 
(l)  For details of the lnmarsat-P system see Article 19 (3)  Notice: 
OJ No  C  304,  15.  11.  1995,  p.  6.  . 
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- the 'Iridium communications system operations 
and maintenance contract' between Iridium and 
Motorola,  and 
- the  'gateway  authorization  agreements' 
concluded·  between  Iridium  and  Stet  and 
Vebacom. 
(38)  In a subsequent submission, the parties provided a 
standard (non-b~nding) MoU to be used 'by gateway 
operators for  the appointment of service  providers 
and  the  •service  provider  appointment guide  for 
Iridium gateway  operators'. 
F.  Third party observations 
(39)  Followi.Qg the publication pursuant to Article 19 (3) 
of Regulation 17 and Article 3 of Protocol 21  of the 
EEA  Agreement,  comments  were  received  from 
three interested parties. These comments were fully 
assessed  by the Commission but proved not to  be 
such  as  to  cause  the  Commission  to  modify  its 
original  favourable  position. 
II.  LEGAL ASSESSMENT 
A.  Application  of  Article  85  (1)  of  the  EC 
Treaty and Article 53 (1) of the EEA Agree-
ment to. the creation of Iridium 
(40)  On  the  basis  of arguments  developed  below,  the 
partners of Iridium are  not to  be considered to be 
actual  or  potential  competitors  in  the  S-PCS 
market: 
- the S-PCS concept is  yet untried. By its nature, 
S-PCS  network  implementation  is  a  complex 
programme  involving  considerable  risk,  and 
will  not  prove  itself  until  deployed  in  the 
operational  configuration  and  loaded  .  with  a 
significant volume  of traffic,  something which 
will not happen until the early years of the next 
.century, 
- no ·investor  in  Iridium  could  reasonably  be 
expected to make the necessary fina!lcial invest-
ment to set up and operate a worldwide S-PCS 
system.  As  indicated  above,  the  investment 
required  for  the  setting-up  of  the  Iridium 
system approaches USD 5 000 million. Such an 
amount  is  furthermore  comparable  to  that of 
competing S-PCS  world-wide  systems, 
- in addition, no investor in Iridium is  in a posi-
tion to assume the substantial risk of technical 
failure  inherent in space operations. Launching 
failures (1),  satellites  which  are  unable  to  reach 
their final  position from their transit ·orbit, and 
satellites which do not work properly or which 
go out of control once in their final position are 
still quite common hazards in space operations, 
and  if one of these  happens, it usually entails 
the  total  loss  of  the  satellite  (it  is  already 
possible to recover or repair a satellite in orbit, 
but doing so  is  prohibitively  expensive). 
To  that risk has to be added  the possibility of 
commercial  failure  inherent  in  the  fact  that 
S-PCS srstems are a completely novel and even 
revolutionary concept which,  in the developed 
part  of  the  world,  are  expected  to  encounter 
tough  competition  from  cellular  terrestrial 
mobile  services  and  from  competing  S-PCS 
systems, 
. - furthermore,  given  the  global  reach  of  the 
system, no investor in Iridium holds the neces-
sary  authorizations  and  licences  to  provide 
international  telecommunication  services  on  a 
worldwide basis through satellite. In order to set 
· up  and  operate  a  S-PCS  system,  such  as 
Iridium, the following  regulatory approvals are 
required: 
(a)  the  international  allocation  by  a  World 
Radiocommunication Conference (WRq of 
the  International  Telecommunications 
Union (ITIJ)  of  the  spectrum  required  for 
the system  user, gateway  and inter-satellite 
links. WRC-92 and 95 dealt with the spec-
trum allocation  issues, 
(b)  a  licence . by  the  relevant  regulatory  au-
thority  for  the  construction,  launch  and 
operation  of· the  satellite  constellation  (as 
regards  Iridium,  the  Federal  Communica-
tions  Commission  of  the  US  granted  the 
required  licenses  in  January  1995.  Four 
other  US-based  S-PCS  systems,  including 
Globalstar  and  Odyssey,  were  also  granted 
licences), 
(c)  in  each  country  in  which  a  gateway  or a 
system control terminal will  be located, an 
authorization to construct and operate those 
facilities, 
(d)  in each country in which subscriber equip-
ment will  operate, authority to operate that 
(1)  The levei  of launch concentration in Iridium (66 satellites  to 
be launched - launching several satellites at a time - in just 
24 months) has not previously been undertaken on a commer-
cial  basis. 
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equipment with  the  system,  including  the 
necessary  user  link spectrum (1), 
(e)  international  coordination  of  the  system 
with other entities using or proposing to use 
the  spectrum  required  for  the  system  in 
order  to  ensure  the  avoidance  of  harmful 
interference, 
and 
(f)  consultation  with  Intelsat  and  Inmarsat  to 
ensure technical compatibility and  to  avoid 
significant  economic  harm  to  them, 
- finally,  the  array of technologies  required for  a 
S-PCS system  is  outside the  individual  capabil-
ities  of  investors  in  Iridium.  Even  if  Motorola 
has  title  to  many of the  technologies  required 
for  the Iridium system, a number of the  inves-
tors have a crucial role in developing important 
elements  of  the  system  that  are  outside  the 
capabilities  of  Motorola.  That  is  the  case  of 
Lockheed  Martin  for  the  satellites  themselves, 
of  Raytheon  for  the antennas,  of  China Great 
Wall and Khrunichev for the launchers, and so 
on. 
In conclusion, in view of the above, the creation of 
Iridium  means  the  introduction  of  a  viable  com-
petitor in  a completely new mobile telecommuni-
cations field and, as  such, falls outside the scope of 
both Article 85 (I) of the EC Treaty and Article 53 
(1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
B.  Application  of  Article  85  (1)  of  the  EC 
Treaty and Article 53 {1) of the EEA Agree-
ment to  the  pricing  policies  of  Iridium 
and to the distribution of Iridium services: 
ancillary restraints 
(42)  According  to  paragraph  3  (1)  of  each  gateway 
authorization  agreement,  the  Iridium  BOD  will 
establish  the  charge  for  accessing  the  space 
segment (owned  by  Iridium).  In  a~dition, it  may 
suggest  pricing  policies  as  guidelines.  Under  the 
guidelines,  which  take  into  account  Iridium's 
charge  for  access  to  the  space  segment,  gateway 
operators are  free  to  set their own  prices  within  a 
certain  range. The guidelines refer also  to  rules for 
the repartition of charges between gateways in calls 
(')  In  the  Community, although  exclusive  and special  rights  in 
respect of the use of terminal equipment and of the provision 
of  telecommunication  services  (excluding  voice  telephony 
until  1998) have been recently abolished (Commission Direc-
tive  94/46/EC  of  13  October  1994;  OJ  No  L  268,  19.  10. 
1995,  p.  15),  a common approach  to  frequency-licensing  has 
not  been  developed  yel 
that use  multiple gateways,  currency requirements 
and  exchange  rates.  Each  gateway  operator  is 
expected  to  comply  with  these  guidelines  to  the 
extent permitted by applicable law and regulation. 
The  guidelines  are  aimed  at  maintammg  the 
coherence  and  the  integrality  of  the  world-wide 
service that Iridium will provide. Such coherence is 
particularly  important  for  potential  users  .of  the 
system. They will  most of  the time  be  moving in 
different areas  of the world  but they will  neverthe-
less  want  to  receive  a  single  bill  in  a  single 
currency. On that  basis,  as  was  recognized  in  the 
IPSP  Decision (2),  the  principle  of  uniform  prices 
and  other  conditions  in  different  territories,  to-
gether with the implementation· of marketing prac-
tices in a decentralized manner, seems appropriate 
to  fulfil  customers'  needs. 
(43)  The  distribution  of  Iridium  services  will  be 
organised  around  on  the  one  hand  the  gateway 
operators  - the  strategic  investors  in  Iridium  -
which  have.  exclusive  rights  over  their  respective 
territories and on the other hand the service  provi-
ders which are  nominated by gateway operators, in 
general  on  a  non-exclusive  basis.  Iridium,  as 
'producer'  of  the  services  will  keep  some  central 
fvnctions  to  ensure  the  coherence  of  the  system. 
(44)  According to paragraph  3 of every Stock Purchase 
Agreement, investors in the Iridium system (that is, 
the gateway  operators) will  get exclusive  rights  for 
the  territory  provided  for  in  that  agreement.  The 
exclusive  rights  basically  mean  that  no  other 
company  will  acquire  rights  from  Iridium  (i)  to 
build  and  operate  a  gateway  within  that  territory 
and (ii)  to  provide  the Iridium services  inside  the 
territory.  In  exchange,  gateway  operators  must 
build,  maintain  and  operate  the  gateway  and 
perform several  other tasks,  such  as  obtaining the 
ne·cessary  regulatory  approvals  for  the  Iridium 
system in the countries included in their respective 
territories, which can be costly and cumbersome. In 
this respect, and taking into account the very high 
risks  entailed by the Iridium system and the need 
to attract gateway operators covering all  parts of the 
·world, such exclusivity can be  seen as  an incentive 
to  investors  to  assume  these  risks. 
(45)  In addition, any possible restrictive effect resulting 
from  the  exclusivity  is  reduced  by  the  following 
facts: 
1.  neither gateway  operators  nor service· providers 
are  prevented  from·  dealing  wit~  competing 
systems.  As  regards  services  providers,  it  is 
indeed  expected  that  some  of  them  (usually 
terrestrial  cellular  operators)  will  be  service 
(l)  OJ  No  L  354,  31.  12.  1994,  p.  75  (paragraph  55). .  .. 
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providers for as many S-PCS systems as possible 
in  order to  increase  the  attractiveness  of  their 
own  cellular  offerings  to  customers  (S-PCS 
systems  will  be  a  premium,  complementary 
service  to  cellular  terrestrial  Qfferings). 
In  this  respect,  as  regards  STET,  which _is  the 
only partner still having exclusive rights for the 
provision  of  telecommunications  services  and 
infrastructures,  the  parties  have  confirmed  that 
the Iridium agreements will not affect the ability 
of any other company or person to gain access 
to  the  telecommunications  infrastructure  of 
STET  other  than  those  STET  facilities  speci-
fically  developed  for  the  Iridium  system; 
2.  the agreements do not prohibit service providers 
from  selling  the  Iridium  service  to  customers 
which  are  not  lo~ted  in  the  same  area  or 
country as  the  gateway  operator investor; 
3.  the  intelligence  on  board  the  satellites  allows 
.any user to be reached from any gateway. In this 
respect, it is planned that subscribers (customers) 
of  a given  gateway  that  move  to  another area 
will  keep  their former contract and will  not be 
obliged  to  sign  a  new  contract with  a  service 
provider of the gateway operator with exclusive· 
rights over  ~e new country to which they have 
moved; 
4.  given  the global nature of the services,  a single 
call  will  usually  involve  several  gateways; 
S.  the  intense  competition  for  Iridium · services 
expected  from  other S-PCS  systems  and  other 
terrestrial  cellular systems; 
and 
6.  all  capacity provided  for  by the Iridium system 
satellites  will  be  used  by  Iridium,  its  gateway 
operators  investors  and  designated  service  pro-
viders  for  their  telecommunication  services. 
There  will  be  no  spare  capacity  available  for 
third  parties. 
(46)  Finally, exclusivity is also a result of the configura-
tion of the satellites: each satellite has antennas to 
link  at  any  one  time  with  only  three  gateWays 
within  its  footprint  (a  fourth  antenna  is·  kept  as 
reserve  in  case  of  failure).  This  feature  requires  a 
limited  number of gateways. 
(47)  As for the guidelines for the appointment of service 
providers, it appears to the Commission that selec-
tion  criteria  described  above  are  objective  and 
qualitative. 
(48)  On the basis of the particular circumstances of the 
present case,  it can  be  concluded that the  pricing 
policies  as  guidelines,  the  exclusivity  granted  to 
gateway  operators  and  the  guidelines  for  service 
provider selection are directly related and necessary 
to the successful  implementation and operation of 
the  Iridium  system.  Hence  they  have  to  be 
regarded  as  .ancillary  restraints  to  the  Iridium 
system  under  the  competition · rules  of  the  EC 
Treaty. and  the  EEA  Agreement. 
However, the above conclusion regarding the ancil-
lary  nature  of  the  exclusive  rights  granted  to 
-gateway operator investors could be revisited should 
the partieular circumstances of the· case change in a 
substantial manner. Such would be in particular the 
case should Iridium acquire a dominant position in 
respect  of  the  actual  provision  of S-PCS  services. 
(49)  Ancillary restraints are  to  be assessed together with 
the  creation  of  the  company.  In  this  respect,  as 
Iridium has been found not to fall within the scope 
of both Article 85 (1)  of the EC Treaty and Article 
53  (1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement,  then  neither  do 
provisions  detailed  above, 
HAS  ADOPTED  THIS  DECISION: 
Article  1 
On the basis  of the facts  in  its  possession,  the Commis-
sion has no grounds for action under Article 85 (I) of the 
EC  Treaty and Article  53  (1)  of the  EEA Agreement in 
respect of the notified agreements relating to the creation 
of Iridium. 
Article  2 
On the basis  of the facts  in  its  possession, the Commis-
sion has no grounds for action under Article 85 (1) of the 
EC  Treaty and  Article  53  (1)  of the EEA Agreement in 
respect  of  the  pricing  policies  to  be  established  by 
Iridium  as  guidelines  under  Paragraph  3.1  of  each 
Gateway.  Authorization  Agreement,  in  respect  of  the 
exclusive  distribution  rights  granted  to  gateway  investor 
operators  under  Paragraph  3  of  every  Stock  Purchase 
Agreement  and  in  respect  of  the  guidelines  for  service 
provider selection  as  notified. 
Article 3 
This  Decision  is  addressed  to: 
Iridium  LLC, 
1401  H.  Street,  NW, 
Washington,  DC 20005, 
USA 
Done  at  Brussels,  18  December  1996. 
For  the  Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT 
Member of the Commission 
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Notice pursuant to Article  19  (3)  of Council Regulation No 17 (') and Article 3. of Protocol 21 
of the EEA Agreement concemins a request for negative clearance or an exemption pursuant· to 
Article  85  (3)  of the EC Treaty and Article  53  (3)  of the EEA Agreement 
(Case  No IV  /35.738 - Uniworld) 
(97 IC 44104) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
On  29  September  1995  the  Commission  received  a 
notification  of a  joint venture  pursuant  to  Article  4  of 
Council  Regulation  No  tt  formed  by  Unisource 
Pan-European  Services  BV,  a  subsidiary  of  Unisource 
NV,  and  AT&T  P~n-European  Services,  Inc. e>,  a 
subsidiary  of AT&T Corp.  under  the  name  'Uniworld•. 
As  further  described  below,  Uniworld  (now  AT&T -
Unisource  Communication Services)  has, been  created  to 
provide  pan-European  telecommunications  services  with 
global  connectivity  to  the  European  business  market. 
The present case  is  inextricably linked  to  the Unisource 
- Telef6nica case  (Case  No IV  /35.830). An  Article  19 
(3)  notice  in  that case  has· been  publish~d in  this  same  . 
issue of the 0/fo:ial journal of  the European Communities. 
B.  1HE PARENT COMPANIES 
1.  Unisource  NV  is  a  joint  venture  company  the 
shareholders of which. are Telia AB,  PIT Telecom  BV, 
Swiss  Telecom and Telef6nica de Espana SA. .Unisource 
NV (hereinafter, Unisource) is  a holding company active 
in  the telecommunications sector that incorporates  seven 
operating ·subsidiaries.  Total  turnover  of the  group  in 
1994  was  Fl  933  million  (ECU 443  million).  Net result 
_...  was  losses  of Fl  41-,072  million  (ECU  20  million).  The 
activities  of the  Unisource  Group  can  be  split  in  three 
main  areas:  business  services,  personal  services  and 
network  services.  A  detailed  description  of the  services 
currendy provided  by Unisource  through  its subsidiaries 
can  be  found  in  the  Article  19  (3)  notice  in  the 
Unisource  - Telef6nica  case  (IV  /35.830). 
('}  OJ No  13, 21. 2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
e>  Unisource  Pan-European  Services  and  AT&T Pan-European 
Services  have  been  created  as  special subsidiaries  to  hold  the 
respective ·  interests  of.  the  parent  companies  in  Uniworld 
VOF. 
2.  AT&T  is  a  telecommunications  operator  in  the 
United  States providing a  broad  range of US  and  inter-
national  telecommunications  services  and  infrastructures 
to  and  from  the  US.  AT&T announced  in  September 
· 1995  a  restructure  pursuant  to  which  its  services7 
equipment  and  computer  business  will,  by  the  end  of 
1996,  become  wholly  separated  businesses  with  no 
common  management.  AT&T  Corp.  retains  the 
communications  and  information  services  business.  Its 
turnover in  1995  was  US $  47  billion. 
On  9  May  1996,  the  Federal  Communications 
Commission  (FCC)  of  .the  US  adopted  an  order 
declaring  AT&T  a  non-dominant  carrier  for  inter-
national  voice  services e  }. 
Direct revenues in  1995 of AT&T in  the EEA and  Swit-
zerland  were  as  follows:  AT&T  Easylink  (messaging) 
[ ...  ]; AT&T lstel  (corporate services)  [ ...  ] and  Business 
Communications  Europe  (hereinafter,  BCS-E)  [  ...  ]. 
C.  CONTRIBUTIONS  BY  PARENT  COMPANIES  TO 
UNIWORLD 
Unisource  will  contribute  to  Uniworld  the  following· 
companies  or  the  relevant  international  assets  thereof: 
·certain  of  the  Unisource  Business  Networks  (UBN) 
companies,  Unisource  Voice  Services  {lNS), Unisource 
France  SA,  Unisource  USA  Inc,  Unisource  Business 
Services  Inc.  and Unisource WPC Inc. 
AT&T will contribute the relevant assets of the following 
entities:  AT&T  Europe  SA,  most  of AT&T lstel  Ltd, 
BCS-E and  the AT&T companies in  the Member States. 
After  the  Uniworld  transaction, AT&T will  still  provide 
·in  the  EEA  and  Switzerland,  under  its  own  name, 
the  following  services:  new  high  value-added 
C)  By order released  on  23 OCtOber  1995, the  FCC reclassified 
AT&T  as  a  non-dominant  carrier  in  the  market  for 
interstate  (US  domestic}  telecommunications  services. 
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applications  (such  as  AT&T  network  notes),  consumer 
cards  and  calling  cards  services,  outsourcing  (AT&T 
solutions)  and  the  full  range  of voice  telephony  services 
to  business  and  consumer  customers  in  the  UK  - by 
means  of  AT&T  Communications  UK's  operating 
licence,  which  permits  also  international  simple  resale  to 
the  US. 
D.  THE JOINT VEN'TIJRE: UNIWORLD 
1.  Structure of Uniworld 
Uniworld consists  of two companies: Uniworld VOF and 
Uniworld  NV. 
(a)  Uniworld VOF is  a general pannership under Dutch 
law.  Unisource,  through  Unisource  Pan-European 
Services,  has  a  59,94 % shareholding  interest  in  it, 
AT&T,  through  AT&T  Pan-European  Services,  a 
39,96%,  and  Uniworld  NV  the  remaining  0,1 %. 
Uniworld VOF is  not a separate legal person  distinct 
from  its  owners.  In  addition  it  is  tax  transparent so 
the  income  flows  through  directly  to  the  parents. 
Uniworld  VOF  will  actually  provide  the  telecom-
munications  services  within  the  business  scope  of 
Uniworld. 
The Uniworld NV's supervisory board and CEO will 
be  directly responsible for the pannership. 
(b)  Uniworld NV has  been  created to supervise  and act 
as  general  partner of Uniworld  VOF. Thus it is  the 
only  partner  that  governs  and  can  bind  the  pan-
nership  and  has  legal  title  to  all  tangible  and 
intangible  assets  which it will  hold for the benefit of 
Uniworld VOF.  It also  has  the  authority  to  manage 
the  day-to-day  operation  and  affairs  of  the  pan-
nership  and  has  all  of  the  resources  necessary  to 
manage  and  operate  the  business  activities  of 
Uniworld  VOF.  Unisource,  through  Unisource 
Pan-European  Services,  has  a  60 %  shareholding 
. interest  in  Uniworld  NV,  whereas  AT&T,  through 
AT&T  Pan~European  Services,  owns.  the  other 
40%.  According  to  the  Parties,  Uniworld  NV, 
although joindy owned is  not a joint venwre in  itself 
. as  it  will  not  conduct  any  business  for  its  own 
account.  Uniworld  NV  will  earn  an  · annual 
management  fee  for  its  activities  as  general  partner 
of the pannership. 
Uniworld  NV is .governed  by  a  management  board 
of  one  chief  executive  officer  nominated  by 
Unisource  (AT&T  n~minates  the  chief  operating  · 
officer),  responsible  for  managing  the  company,  and 
a  supervisory  board  of  five  directors,  three 
nominated  by  Unisource  and  two  by  AT&T.  The 
supervisory  board  approves  the  budget  and  business 
plan  by  supermajority  (i.e.  unanimity  of  directOrs 
present  or  represented).  AT&T  has  been  granted 
veto rights in  respect of all  signifi~t matters. 
2.  Strategic  advisory  boards 
Upon  its  incorporation,  Uniworld  will  create  three 
strategic  advisory  boards  to  deal  with  the  following 
matters: 
(a)  service  ponfolio development  and  offerings; 
(b)  marketing  and  sales  (the  international  sales  board 
responsible  for  the  global  account  management 
plan);  and 
(c)  architecture  and  technology. 
All  panicipants  to  the  Uniworld  transaction,  including 
representatives  of  the  Unisource  shareholders  will  be 
represented  in  the  boards. 
The  boards  are  resources  for  achieving  consistency  in 
approach  to  an  issue,  as  well  as  working committees  to 
help  make  decision-making  processes  efficient.  They are 
also  a  forum  to solve  disputes  between  the  parents  that 
might  have  an  impact  on  Uniworld.  Uniworld  can  use 
them  to  forge  a  consensus  for  Uniworld's  initiatives  in 
advance  of supervisory  board  consideration.  Originally, 
recommendations  were  binding  on  all  participants. 
However,  after  the  Commission  objected  to  that,  the 
Parties modified  that provision  so  that recommendations 
shall  not·  be  binding  on  the  participants  and  ~eir 
pertinent  affiliated  companies  (see  later}. 
Infonnation  to  be  exchanged  by  participants  to  the 
boards  will  neither  include  actual  retail  prices  of 
Uniworld  end-user  services,  nor infonnation  relating ·to 
commercial  conoitions  of products  and  services  outside 
the  business  scope  of Uniworld  as  notified.  In  addition, 
market trends in pricing will  only be  discussed  in  general 
terms  without  disclosing  sensitive  customer  pricing 
information.  · 
3.  Business  scope 
The scope o'f Uniworld's business will  be  the provision of 
seamless (•)  multilateral (')  pan-European  telecommuni-
cations services  with  global  connectivity  to  the  European 
( 4)  Seamless~ess  is  defined  as  a  cohesive  and  homogenous 
approach  to  the  service .  from  a  user's  perspective.  So,  the 
customer  does  not  see  the  underlying  complexities  of 
providing the service. 
(') The  term  •multilateral'  encompasses  foreign-to-foreign  as 
well  as  home-to/from-foreign  traffic.  Bilateral  services  are 
not able  to encompass foreign-to-foreign  traffic. 
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business  market.  The Parties  have  identified  [ ...  ]  global 
and  European  multinationals  with  international .  telecom-
munications  expenditure greater than [ ...  ]  a year as  the 
iarget market for Uniworld. Of these, it will focus on the 
[ ...  ] biggest corporations having  at least an office in  the 
EEA  plus  Switzerland  (such  focus  does  not preclude the 
offering of Uniworld services to any other customer with 
similar  needs}. 
Global  connectivity outside  the  EEA  and  Switzerland ('} 
will  be  mainly achieved  through Uniworld's participation 
in  the  WorldPartners  Company  and  Association('}.  In 
this  respect,  Unisource  will  transfer  to  Uniworld  its 
rights  in  the  WorldPartners  Company  and  Association 
and  AT&T UK will  do  the  same  with  its  rights  in  the 
WorldPanners  Association.  As  a  result  Uniworld  will 
become  the  exclusive  distributor  in .the  EEA  plus  Swit-
zerland  of  the  telecommunication  services  bearing  the 
WorldSource  trade  mark (
1
}. 
In  accordance  with  the  initial  business  plan  for 
Uniworld, revenues would amount to [ ...  ] in  1996. They 
are  expected  to  grow  to  [ ...  ]  by  2005.  Break-even  is 
expected  to be  achieved  by  1999  (1998  for data). 
The Parties  aim  at. Uniworld achieving  market shares  of 
[ ...  ] in voice IVPN and ( ...  ] in data services. by 2005, in 
the  EEA  plus  Switzerland. 
(') In  areas  outside  Europe  or the  WorldPanners Association, 
the  bilateral  agreements  of the  Unisource  shareholders,  of 
Unisource ·and/or  AT&T  will  be  wed  to  extend  global 
connectivity.  In  the· future,  Uniworld  could  have  its  own 
bilateral  arrangements.  In  addition,  Unisource  has  recently 
announced a non-eX:clusive  aJreement with Infonet (which ts 
56 %  controlled  by  the  Urusource  shareholders)  ~garding 
the  provision  by  Infonet  of  X.25  conneaivity  ouuide 
Europe.  X.25  is  not  offered  within  the  WorldPanners 
framework. 
(') WorldParmers  is  a  limited  partnership  promoted  by AT&T 
·  basically to set  performance standards, agreed and respeaed · 
by  the  members  of the pannership, in  respect of given  tele-
communications  services.  Such  standards  are  a  way  to 
extend  connectivity for those services  outside the borders of 
each  of  its  members.  Members  of  the  WorldParmers 
Company  have  invested  in  it  and  participate,  among  other. 
things,  in  the  definition  of 'the  standards.  Members  of the 
WorldParmers Association  are distributors of the services  in 
given  territories.  The  agreements  regarding  Unisourcc  and 
AT&T UK's  entry into WorldPartners have  been separately 
notified  to the  Commission  (Case  No IV  /35.490 - World-
Partners). 
(') The  WorldParmers  portfolio  of  WorldSource  services  is 
limited  to  the  offering  of  vinual  network  services  (VNS), 
frame  relay  and private lines.  For each  of these,  a common 
denominator  of  features  is  defined.  Such  common 
denominator  would  be  proVided,  by  each  WorldPartner's 
member  or associate.  Services  complying  with  the  common 
denominator can  bear the WorldSource trademark.· 
Uniworld  is  expected  to  have  around  [ ...  ]  employees. 
·Although  Uniwodd · is  responsible  for  itS  own  product 
developmel,lt,  it  will  not  conduct its  own  basic  research 
activities.  It  will  have  access  to  research  capabilities  of 
AT&T,  Unisource  and  the  Unisource  shareholders  via 
intellectual property arrangements to be .agreed, the prin-
ciples  of which  have  been  notified. 
Uniworld  will  own  and/or  manage  all  frame  relay, 
messaging,  X.25  international  backbone,  X.25  domestic 
swit~hes  with  exclusive  or  predominantly  international 
usage,  non-home  country  X.25  networks  and  managed 
bandwidth  assetS.  Asset  selection  will  be  made  according 
to a set of rules  agreed ·upon by the parties in  accordance 
with  the  given  principles  for  asset  selection. 
In  addition,  the  eXIstmg  backbone  data  network  -
Unidata  --:  that  links  together  the  domestic  data 
networks  of the  shareholders  of Unisotirce  will  also  be 
assigned  to Uniworld. 
4.  T elecomm.unications  services  to  be  provided  by 
Uniworld 
Uniworld's  services  are  based  on end-to-end  control  by 
Uniworld  of  the  services  to  customers  including  the 
national  extensions  of such  services.  However, Uniworld 
will  not offer  purely  domestic  services ('}. 
The  services  will  initially  include  international  virtual 
private  network  (IVPN}  voice  services,  packet-switched, 
frame  relay  and  other  data  networks  and  services, 
messaging  and  network  related  outsourcing.  The  home 
countries,  France,  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom, 
Belgium  and  Italy. represent  primary target countries. 
- As  regards  voice  IVPN  services,  an  IVPN  service 
(Uniworld  VNS},  made  of  different  packages  with 
different  feawres,  will  be  offered  to  customers  to 
cover  their  intra-European  needs ('
0
).  The  backbone 
network  (basic  transmission  capacity) to be  used  will 
(')  In  this  respect,  according  to  the  ranies,  a  customer 
receiving  international  and  nationa  services  from  a 
diStributor  of  Uniworld,  will  clearly  perceive  that  he  is 
receiving  two different kinds of services. 
('
0
)  Such  service  is  basically  the  same  Phase  II service  jointly 
developed  by  Unisource  and  AT&T ·in  the  framework  of 
the EVUA bid. 
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be  that  of  UCS  and,  in  some  cases,  that  of 
third-party suppliers.  The Uniworld  VNS (
11
)  service 
is  defined as  'multilateral', as  opposed  to the· existing 
IVPN services of the Unisource shareholders that are 
available  abroad  depending  on  bilateral  agreements 
concluded  by  each  telecommunications  operator 
(T~), 
- as  regards  data  networks,  during  1996  to  1997, 
Uniworld will  integrate the existing international data 
networks assigned by the parents. These networks are 
not  currently  interworkable  as  they  are  based  on 
different  equipment  (mainly  Nonel  for  X.25  and 
frame  relay  in  the  case  of Unisource  and Stratacom 
.for  frame  relay  in  the  case  of  BCS-E).  As  a  first 
stage, a network to network interconnection - to be 
developed  by  manufacturers  of  the  equipment 
installed - will  improve seamlessness. A  TM will  then 
gradually be introduced - together with UCS - so 
that  an  integrated  voice-data  platform  will  be 
available  by  the  year  2000.  Pan  of the  integration 
will  involve  the standardization of delivery platforms 
for  each  service.  The  combined  network  will  be 
expanded  by  the  setting  up  of additional  points  of 
presence  (POPs);  in  panicular,  in  key  markets  like 
Germany  and  Italy,  where  current  coverage  is  very 
poor.  Integrated  traffic  will  make  feasible  the  instal-
lation  of POPs  in  countires  where  it  would  not  be 
economical to do so for a single type of traffic, 
- as  regards  data  services  the  Uniworld  services  will 
initially  be  based  on  the  current  pan-European 
offerings of Unisource and AT&T's BCS-E, but they 
' will  offer a  better geographical  coverage  than these 
existing  offerings,  given  the  different  POPs  of the 
existing data networks of the parents. 
In addition, Uniworld will  roll out new data services 
like  high  speed  IAN (
12
)  interconnect, .  high  speed 
bandwidth services,  interworking  a:nd  Internet access 
to big  business  users  (offering  improved  quality  and 
·security). Most of these will be introduced by the end 
_.··of  1996 and will generally be available in  1997. 
Alongside  these,  other  services  to  be  launched  (in 
early  1997)  are  integrated  (voice  and  data) 
(
11
)  It  also  offers  more  features  (than  the  minimum  common 
denominator)  but  less  geographical  coverage  (limited  to 
Europe), than the WorldSourcc VNS service that Unisource 
and  AT&T UK are  beginning  to  distribute  in  continental 
Europe and the UK respectively. 
(
11
)  Local  area network. 
~ervices  .<u)  like  video-conferencing,  ftxed-mobile 
mtegratton,  teleworking,  bandwidth  on  demand  and 
call  centres  including  automatic  re-routing  on  real 
time (1
4
),  and  remote  network  management  for 
customer's data networks, 
- the domestic data services  and networks in  the home 
countries  and  the  UK  will  not  be  contributed  to 
Uniworld  but  will  remain  in  Unisource  and  AT&T 
UK  respectively.  The  respective  Unisource  share-
holder will  act as  distributor  of Unisource  for these 
domestic productS in each home country, 
- messaging covers  electronic  mail  and EDI (electronic 
data  interchange).  Current  plans  foresee  the  use  by 
Uniworld  of AT&T's messaging  platform  (Easyli~k), 
instead of Unisource's existing one (400Net). 
All  of  the  above  services  are  divided  between 
exclusive {'
5
)  (vinual  network  services  - VNS/IVPN  I 
closed  user  group  voice  services,  X.25  bearer  service, 
frame  relay  service,  SNA  service (''),  managed 
bandwidth  service  and  X.400  bearer  service)  and 
non-exclusive  services  (call  centre  services,  l.AN  ~nter­
connect  services,  messaging  services,  VSAT  satellite 
services,  network-related  outsourcing,  network  facilities 
management,  private  network  provis~oning,  Internet 
access  services  anCI  data VPN services). 
5.  Uniwodd's  operating  functions:  sales,  marketing  and 
services 
(a)  Sales 
Uniworld  will  be responsible  for negotiating  distribution 
agreements and third-pany commercial sales  agreements. 
In  addition,  it  will  work  closely  with  distributors  to 
(") The  ~VUA  has  issued  in  1996  a new  tender for integrated 
voice/  data services.  . 
(
14
)  Service  applications  will  inclu4e  reservation  centres, 
cwtomers  service  support  centres  and  maintenance  and 
warranty  supROrt  centres.  These  services  require 
European-wide free  phone numbers (0 800). 
(") See below under pointE (2) (c). 
(  ..  ) SNA  is  an  extension  of the  frame  relay service  that offers 
network  access  interfaces .  suitable  to  meet  the  requests  of 
customers working within  an  IBM  environment. 
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ensure  that  offers  to  customers  respond  to  their 
expressed  needs  and  will  provide  sales  training  for 
Uniworld  employees  and distributors. Uniworld will  also 
support  the  development  of  a  single  integrated  sales 
process  incorporating  technical  support,  bid 
management,  contract support and  service  ordering. 
In  respect  of complex  bids,  Uniworld  will  assist  in  or 
assume  direct  leadership  responsibility. 
(b)  Marketing 
Uniworld  will  be  responsible  for  developing  the  service 
portfolio marketing strategy including  the  overall  pricing 
strategy (retail  pricing  will  however be  the  responsibility 
of  distributors).  It  will  also  conduct  competitive 
assessment  and  customer  analysis  and . assist  product 
managers  in  developing  individual  service  strategies. 
Uniworld  will  develop  marketing  communications 
products  including  advenising.  It  will  also  support  bid 
management  to  non-standard  ·requests  for  proposals 
requiring  the  integration  of multiple  services. 
(c)  Services 
Uniworld  will  define,  control and own service  definition 
and  define  and  control  service  platforms  (i.e.  the 
so~ware  installed  in  the  equipment  that  controls  the 
voice  and  data traffic over  the  backbone  network),  and 
customer care elements. It will  also  be responsible for the 
life  cycle  management of all  services  in  its  portfolio.  In 
addition,  it  will  determine  the  overall  architecture/tech-
nology/platform. evolution that enables  the services  to be 
competitive  and  efficient  in  terms  of  features,  func-
tionality,  customer  service·  attributes  and  cost..  In  so 
doing, it ·will  seek  to accommodate the  reasonable· needs 
of  its  affiliated  and  other  key  non-affili~ted  suppliers. 
The resulting  plans  will  be  approved  by  the  supervisory 
board  by  supermajority. 
E.  TiiE NOTIFIED AGREEMENfS 
1.  Agreements 
The  original  notification  comprised  the  Joint  Venture 
and  Shareholders  Agreement  and  the  following 
agreements  and  other documents  annexed  to  it: 
- the articles of association of Uniworld NV, 
- the  limited  partnership  agreement  of Uniworld  CV 
(now  Uniworld VOF), 
- the  by-laws  of  Uniworld  NV  and  Uniworld  CV 
(idem), 
- the  pa~ental support agreement, 
- principles  for asset selection, 
- the supply agreement between Uniworld and UCS, 
- the  master distribution  agreement, 
- principles  for  IPR  negotiations, and 
- the  network evolution  plan. 
2.  Contractual  provisions 
(a)  Supply  agreement  with  Unisource  Carrier  Services 
. (UCS) 
U niworld  will  be  a  service  provider  and  thus  will  not 
develop  or operate  its  own  basic  switching  and  trans-
mission  systems,  but will  purchase these capabilities  from 
suppliers.  The  preferred  supplier  will  be  UCS,  a 
.subsidiary  of  Unisource  NV  ~:esponsible  for  managing 
the  international  networks  of the  Unisource  NV share-
holders  ('preferred~ means  that Uniworld will  be  free  to 
contract  with  other suppliers  if  the  demanded  services 
are outside the scope of UCS or in case UCS does not or 
cannot compete  with  the  terms  and  conditions  of other 
suppliers). 
Under  the  supply  agreement,  UCS  will  deliver  basic 
switching  and  transmission ·  elements,  including  the  main 
switching  elements  and  .the  international  switching 
centres of the Unisource shareholders, and will  route the 
traffic  to  the . agreed  destination  or point  of  intercon-
nection  as  determined  by  the  service  database  admin-
istered by Uniworld. In  this  respect, UCS will  provide to 
Uniworld  interconnection  and  transmission  capacity  that 
will  include  international,  national  and  local  leased  lines 
and  international  and  national  PSTN terminations. 
UCS  will  have  a  contractual  requirement  to provide  the 
capacity necessary to meet UniworJd•s  traffic forecasts  at 
agreed performance levels.  The price for ucs· serviCes  is 
guaranteed  for  5  years.  The  average  minute/price 
charged by UCS will  be  reduced provided that Uniworld 
delivers  the  agreed  total  volume  of international  traffic 
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and  US~'"S the agreed capacity of international bandwidth. 
Should that not be the case,  prices  charged by UCS will 
be  adjusted  accordingly. 
The Panies  have  indicated  that similar  price  guarantees 
will  be  provided to third-pany customers that commit to 
deliver similar  volumes  of ·international  traffic. 
In  addition,  the  intention  of  the  panies  1s  to  use  the 
UCS'  pan-European  network  for  aH  internodal 
bandwidth  needs  of the  Uniworld  services. 
Uniworld  will  collect  customer  care  information  for 
billing,  account  inquiry,  etc.  In  addition,  Uniworld  will 
also own the service control points that maintain the real 
time  definition  and realization  of the  Uniworld-services. 
Such  points  will  be  connected  to  the. UCS  network. 
Uniworld's  CEO  will  attend  UCS'  board  meetings 
without the right to cast any vote - concerning network 
planning  and  other  matters  concerning  the  supply 
agreement. 
(b)  Relationship between  Uniworld and its parents 
Under  Anicle  10  of  the  Joint  Venture  Agreement,. 
Uniworld: 
__:..  shall  purchase  supplies  on  a  best  available  basis  in 
accordance _with  rules,  regulations  and  guidelines  of. 
the  European  Commission  and  the  relevant  national 
regulatory  agencies.  'Best  available'  refers  to  price, 
quality,  features  and  functions,  capacity  and 
geographical  coverage  purchased  from  affiliated 
parties offered (or not) by them to third parties, · 
- shall  be  provided  access  to networks  and  underlying 
facilities  of  any  company  involved  directly  or 
i~directly  in  Uniworld  at  non-discriminatory 
competitive  prices.  Such  prices  charged  to Uniworld 
shall  be  competitive  in  view  of  prices  charged  for 
similar  ser\rices  by  competitors  of  the  affiliated 
companies  and  shall  be  consistent  with  applicable 
national  and  European  law,  including  obligations  of 
non-discrimination  and  prohibitions  of  cross-subsi-
dizations.  Neither  must  they  be  more  advantageous 
than the  prices  charged for  similar services  in  similar 
circumstances  to  other  customers  of  such · afliliated 
companies, 
- shall  have  a 'privileged subsidiary' status, with regard 
to  terms  and  conditions  for  transactions  between 
Panies  for  resources  and  services  from  these 
companies. In this respect, it will  be treated as  though 
it were a subsidiary of Unisource, iu shareholders or 
AT&T in  respect of services, to the extent that there 
are  no  contractual  restrictions  with  third  parties 
prohibiting it, · 
- will  have  a  'most  favoured  customer  status'  from 
Unisource,  its  shareholders  and  its  affiliated 
Companies  and  AT&T  for  the  provision  of  other 
related  commercial  services,  such  as  the  purchase  of 
capacity.  Uniworld  will  be  offered  'best  customer' 
·prices  for  services  which  are  in  principle  available 
both  to  Uniworld  and  to  non-related  customers  in 
the marketplace. 
(c)  Non-competition 
Under Article  12  of the  Joint  Venture  Agreement,  the 
parents  agree  with  Uniworld  VOF  that  they  shall  not 
incorporate  a  business  or engage  in  exclusive  Uniworld 
services  (as  described  above)  or participate  in  any joint 
venture or other cooperative arrangement engaged in the 
provision  of exclusive  Uniworld  services. 
The  following  activities  are  excluded  from  the 
non-compete  provisions: 
- the  development  and  offering  to  customers  of  a 
parent's  national  services  and  international  services 
based on bilateral arrangements, 
- services  that  compete  with  non-exclusive  Uniworld 
services,  and 
- competing  offers  of -third  parties  (basically  Infonet's 
services,  but  also  Concen's  or  Atlas's)  who  have 
decided  tQ  market  their  services  through  the 
Unisource  shareholders. 
The  non-compete  obligation  shall  not  affect  the  access 
by third partic;s to any reserved and basic netwc;>rk  of the 
Parties  and their affiliated  companies,  nor shall  it  affect 
'any  parent  obligation  to  make  available  reserved  and 
basic  services. 
All  non-competition  obligations  of the  parents  and  their 
affiliated  companies would be valid  until  the termination 
of the  Joint  Venture  Agreement.  After  termination  no 
participant  ·shall  during  the  original  . duration  of  a 
customer  contract  solicit  those  existing  customers  with 
respect to which the other Pany has been assigned under 
the  termination  rules  the  right  to  provide  Uniworld 
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services  (Anide  16  (3)  (1)  (F) .  of  the  Joint  Venture 
Agreement).  Finally,  Article  16  (3)  (2)  (B)  (ii) ·of the 
joint  Venture  Agreement  provides  that  a  company 
exiting  (from  Uniworld)  shall,  under  the  non-permitted 
exit (
17
)  provision  as  from  the date of the  non-permitted 
exit. and for a period of 12 months continue to be subject 
to Anicle  12  of the Joint Venture Agreement. 
(d)  Distribution 
(1)  Distribution of services 
Uniworld  will  distribute  its  services  through  local 
distributors.  Uniworld  intends,  wherever  appropriate,  to 
own  or  control  them.  Distributors  are  responsible  for 
managing  (and  can  own)  local/national  networks. 
However,  Uniworld  will  approve  the  delivery  platforms 
to  be  used  by  distributors  in  delivering  Uniworld 
services,  the  overall  architecture  of  the  combined 
distributor/Uniworld  network  and  the  location  and 
capacity  of  the  gateways  to  be  used  to  interface  the 
distributor's ·and Uniworld's  networks. 
In  the  home  countries,  the  respective  Unisource  share-
holder will  be  the  exclusive  distributor.  AT&T UK will 
be the exclusive distributor in the UK and AT&T will act 
as  the  exclusive  distributor  in  the  US  of  Uniworld's 
services  to  be  delivered  in  Europe  ..  In  addition,  AT&T 
could  sell  Uniworld  services  to  a  European-head-
quartered.  fum  which  vested  its  European  and/  or 
worldwide  teleco'mmunications  decisions  with  its  US 
subsidiaries  or locations. 
In  other  countries  ·where  Unisource,  AT&T,  the 
Unisource  shareholders  or  any  of  their  affiliated 
companies have selected a national partner, the latter will 
be  the  preferred  distributor. 
Distributors will  pay to Uniworld the  established transfer 
price  for  any  given  service.  Uniworld  will  provide 
distributors  with  lists  of  recommended  retail  prices. 
Distributors,  however,  are  free  to  set  their  own  retail 
( 17)  Under  Article  16  (3)  (1)  neither  parent  company  of 
Uniworld  may  terminate  the  agreement  before  1  January 
2000.  Most  terminations  before  that  date,  in  particular  in 
case  of  material  breach  of  the  agreement,  non-permitted 
transfers of shares or withdrawal, l)anknlptcy or suspension 
of payments  by  a  party,  are  deemed  to  be  non-permitted 
exit. 
prices.  Originally  such  prices  have  to  be  communicated 
to Uniworld. That was required in  order for Uniworld to 
provide  billing  services  to  distributors  and  final 
cwtomers  (using· AT&T's  proprietary  billing ·platform). 
However,  the  Commission  objected  to  that on  grounds 
that  Uniworld  could  use  such  information  to  influence 
resale  price  by  distributors.  On  that  basis,  the  Panics 
modified  such  provision  so  that  the  obligatioal  to 
communicate  retail  prices  to  Uniworld  has  been  elim-
inated.  In·  addition,  the  Parties  have  ensured  that 
Uniworld  will  not use  information  regarding retail  prices 
received  from  a distributor for fixing  or attempting to fix 
resale  prices.  · 
An  initial  distribution  of  potential  customers  has  been 
made  based  on  the  location  of the  decision  making units 
(DMU)  of the  top  target  customers.  However,  the  final 
assignment  of a customer to a distributor depends on  the 
choice  of the  customer.  In  any  event,  it  is  expected  that 
most  sales  will  involve  a  lead  distributor,  one  or several 
support  distributors  and  Uniworld.  Support  distributors 
will  receive  from  Uniworld  a  distributor  fee  of  4%  of 
the  transfer  price. 
In  addition,  Uniworld  plans  to  create  a·  'Uniworld 
Associatipn'  after  the  model  of  the  WorldPanners 
Association.  It  will  have  a  light  struCture  made  of  a 
permanent secretariat and  an executive forum  chaired by 
the  CEO  of Uniworld.  The  Uniworld  Association  will 
serve  as  a platform for discussion  between Uniworld and 
its  distributors,  so  that  the  latter  will  be  provided  an · 
opportunity  to  influence  Uniworld's  services  devel-
opment, processes and technology (i.e.  the growth of the 
network).  The  Association  will  act  as  a  central  coor· 
dinator  between  distributors  for  ensuring  that  the 
European requirements of customers are met in  the most 
efficient  manner. 
The Parties have indicated that no actual retail prices (or 
related conditions) of Uniworld end-user services will  be 
discussed  in  the  Association  and  that  market  trends  in 
pri~ing will  only  be  discussed .  in  general  terms  without 
~·,  disclosing  sensitive  customer  pricing  information. 
The  distribution  licences  extend  to  the  Uniworld  and 
WorldSource  services  in  the  territory granted. 
The  exclusivity  prov1s1ons  oblige  Uniworld  and  the 
distributor  not to  actively  seek customers  for  Uniworld's 
exclusive  services  in  the distributor's territory' as  regards 
Oniworld,  and  outside  it,  as  regards  the  distributor, 
respectively. 
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(ft)  Existing customer contracts 
Existing customer contracts that fall  within the  sc~pe and 
the  territory  entrusted  to  Uniworld,  concluded  by 
Unisource or AT&T prior to the setting up of Uniworld, 
will  be  assigned  to:  · 
(a)  Uniworld,  as  regards  the  right  to  provide  services 
which  it shall  deliver at transfer prices  to the specific 
distributor;  and 
(b)  the  Uniworld  distributor,  as  regards  the  customer 
relations  and  distributions  rights. 
These  customers  will  serve  as  a  customer  base  for 
Uniworld.  Such  customer  base  is  not  negligible  in. view 
of the number of contracts already signed  by its  parents. 
The following  rules will  apply in  the assignment of these 
existing  contracts: 
(i)  the  respective  parent  distributor  will  assume 
customer ·contracts  (and  the  associated  financial 
obligations)  for  .customers  whose  decision-making 
unit  (DMU)  is  in  any  of the  home  countries,  the 
UK or the US;  . 
(ii)  for  existing  customer  contractS  where  the  DMU is 
outside  the  abovementioned  countries,  the  contract 
will  be  assigned  to  the  new  distributor  in  that 
count.ry.  The  actual  conditions  of  the  assignment 
will  be  a  ma.tter  of negotiation  betWeen  the  owner 
of the contract and the new distributor; 
(iii)  in  countries where no Uniworld distributor has  been 
nominated  yet,  Uniworld  will  manage  the 
distnbution  activities. 
The  pnor1ty  considerations  are  the  maintenance  of 
customer satisfaction  and  customer preference. 
(3)  Global account m•n•gement programme 
Uniworld  will  organize  an  international  support  organ-
ization which will  support a  global  account management 
programme  created  to  enhance  business  relationships 
with multinational customers. It will  focus  on prospectiv.e 
customers  which  beeause  of  size  and/  or  strategic 
importance  will  be  selected  by  Uniworld's  international 
sales  board.  Instead  of  being  attributed  to  a  given 
distributor in ·accordance with  the  normal  procedures,  a 
global  account  team  will  be  formed  for  each  of these 
customers  comprising  a  global  account team  leader  anC:{ 
at least  one  regional  or national  aceount  manager.  The 
global  account  team  will  report  to  Uniworld's  multi-
national  accounts  group. 
The global  account team will  coordinate and involve  the 
worldwide  resources  of  Uniworld,  AT&T  Business 
solutions,' WorldPartners, Unisource and  its  shareholders 
as  required  in  order to  better serve  the  global  needs  of 
that category of top customers on am one-stop-shopping 
basis.  In  this  respect,  the  global  account  group  will 
request  suppon from  any  affiliated  or related  company 
through  a  defined  worldwide  sales  support process  that 
will  allow  for  a  simple,  low-cost  sales  support  coordi-
nation  process. 
According  to  the  Parties,  the  global  account 
management programme will  be  a very large determinant 
of the  relative  success  in  the  marketplace. 
F.  RELEVANT  MARKET 
1.  Product market 
Services  within  the  business  scope  of  Uniworld  fall 
within  the  customized  package  of  corporate  telecom-
munications services  and packet switched data communi-
cations  product  markets  as  described  in  the  Atlas  and 
Global  One  Decisions ("). 
Servic~  within  those  two  categories  are  mainly 
demanded  by  large  multinational  corporations, extended 
enterprises, as  well  as  major national and other intensive 
users  of telecommunications,  often  as  an  alternative  to 
self-provision.  The  requirements  of  such  users,  that 
extend  to all 'products or corporate services  provided by 
Uniwodd,  were  discussed.  in  detail. in  the  BT-MCI (I') 
Decision. Providers of such services  are expected to take 
fUll  responsibility  for  all  services  provided  from  'end to 
end'. 
Very  ~rge  compani~s  demand  that  · locations 
geographically  ~ispersed  across  different  territories  be 
( 11)  Commission  Decisions  of  17  july  1996  relating  to 
proceedings  under Article  85  of the  EC Treaty and Article 
53 .of  the  EEA  Agreement  (Case  Nos IV/35.337- Atla$, 
and IV/35.617- Global One). OJ No L 239, 19. 9.  1996. 
(") Commission  Decision of 27 July 1994, OJ No L 223,  27.  8. 
1994. 
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linked.  The  services  required  in  this  connea1on  (i.e. 
provision  of  sufficient  delivery  capacity  and  in-country 
support) must  be  supranational in  nature and respond to 
a  very  particular set  of features  including  the  provision 
of services  across  multiple  borders  at consistent  service 
levels,  the  availability  of  delivery  schedules;  the  irrel-
evance  of  time  zones,  languages  and  currencies;  and 
making  customers  assume  service  is  local  regardless  of 
where  such  service  is  provided  from.  Truly  global 
services  (i.e.  connecting  locations  of  companies  in 
countries  or territories  located  outside  the  main  indus-
trialized areas  of the world)  are  an extreme  case. 
The  prov1saon  of  such  services  would  appear  to 
customers to be  seamless.  However, the provision  of real 
seamless services  is  now only at a very rudimentary stage 
in  particular as  regards  customer care  and  global  billing 
features,  and  the  establishment  of infrastructure  abroad, 
the  latter  in  view  of differences  in  regulatory  regimes 
between  countries. 
2.  Geographic  market 
Due to the' cost structure of advanced corporate services, 
notably  the  cost  of leasing  the  required  infraStructure, 
prices  of  such  services  are  related  to  geographic 
coverage,  as  is  the  cost  of  additional  features  (e.g. 
one-stOp-billing,  help-dc-.sk  and  technical  assistance 
around  the  clock,  custOmized  billing).  In  that  respect, 
and  following  the  reasoning  applied  in  the  Atlas  and 
Global  One cases,  demand  for these services  exists  in  at 
least three distinct geographic markets, namely at glo~al, 
cross-border  regional  and  national  levels. 
Uniworld will  be active in  the cross-border regional layer 
of the geographical  market, that in  this  case will  be  the 
provision  of  such  services  on  a ·pan-European  basis 
(including  national  extensions  of the  latter). 
Given  the  links  between  Uniworld,  Unisource  and  its 
shareholders, and  given  the inextricable links  between  all 
notified  cases  involving  Unisource,  Uniworld  is  thought 
to have  also  an  impact  at least  on the domestic markets 
of the  European  home  countries,  where  each  Unisource · 
shareholder  enjoys  a  dominant  position. 
3.  Competition in the  markets 
(a)  Cross-border  regional  market:  the  market  for 
non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications  seroices  in 
Europe 
According  to  AT&T,  the  European  market  place 
currendy  will  resemble  the  US  market  that  existed 
between  1983  and  1993,  during  which  period  essential 
restrUcturing  of  the  telecommunications  industry 
occurred as  a result of market competition, new  se!Vices, 
pricing structures, marketing sales  and  services  strategies. 
The  result  was  a  very  big  shift  in  market  dynamics, 
significant  entry and  unparalleled  growth. 
According  to  the  Parties,  the  addressable  size  of  the 
European  market  will  grow  from  US$  1,9  billion  in 
1995  to  US $  4,2  billion  in  2005  for  IVPN  and  from 
US $  2,9  billion  in  1995  to  US $  4  billion  in  2005  for 
data se!Vices. 
BT-MCI's  Concen and  Atlas/Global  One are  expected 
to  become  major players  on  that  m~ket. To those  it  is 
necessary  to  add  some  other  significant  players  like 
Info~et, Sita  or IPSP. 
(b)  National markets in Europe 
· Each  of the shareholders of Unisource face  a number of 
competitOrs  in  their  respective  domestic  market  (or 
packet  switched  data  communication  services.  So,  such 
services  are completely liberalized  in  Sweden,  there  are 
at least· five  licences granted in  the Netherlands, eight in 
Spain  and  several  in  Switzerland.  Some  of  those 
companies  (such  as  Spain's  BT Tel  or Sweden's  Tele-
nordia) · are  also  the  domestic  extensions  of the  global 
alliances  (BT in  those  two  cases). 
4.  Market shares  of the  parties 
(a)  Cross-b<Jr.dtr  rtgional  market 
Market  shares  figures  for  the  cross-border  region~) 
market  are  highly  unreliable.  Their  emerging  and 
evolving  nature  and  the  large  traffic  volume  of  big 
corporate CQStomers  are  explanatory arguments  for such 
unreliability. 
Current combined  market  share  in  the  EEA  and  Swit-
zerland of the  panies is  less  than  10 % for data services 
and  10%  for  messaging.  No  data  are  available  for 
IVPN  voice  services  and  network  related  outsourcing. 
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(b)  National markets 
As  regards  domestic  packet  switched  data  communi-
cation services,  in  1995, Telia had 78 %  in  Sweden (2°), 
PIT  Telecom  and  Telef6nica  over  95%  in  the 
Netherlands and Spain and Swiss Telecom nearly 100 °/o 
in  Switzerland.  Market figures  in  respect of the  overall 
tlomestic  telecommunications  services  were  91  °/o  for 
Telia,  near 100% for PTT Telecom, 95,7% for Tele-
f6nica  and near  100 °/o  for Swiss  Telecom. 
G.  CHANGES  MADE  AND  UNDERTAKINGS  GIVEN 
FURTHER  TO  THE  COMMISSION'S  INTER-
VENTION 
Cenain features  of the  notified  transaction appeared  to 
he  incompatible  with  Community  competition  rules. 
Consequently,  the Commission  by  letter of 7  May 1996 
informed the Panics of its concerns. In  the course of the 
notification  procedure  the  Parties  have  amended  the 
tlrigina!  agreements  and  given  undertakings  to  the 
Commission. 
I . Contractual changes 
As described before, the Panics committed to amend the 
following  provisions  in  the notified agreements_: 
(a)  the communication of  retail prices to  Uniwor/d 
The· Panics  agreed  to  remove  the  stipulation  that 
distributors  are  obligated  to  communicate  price 
information  to  t,Jniworl~  regarding  specific 
customers (2'). 
(b)  strategic advisory boards 
·The panics agree to amend the notified agreement in 
respect  of the strategic  advisory 'boards  to  ~ipulate 
that:  · 
- recommendations  by  the  strategic  · advisory 
boards  shall  not  be  binding  on  the  participants 
and their pertinent affiliated companies, and 
- no information relating. to prices and commercial 
conditions  of produCts  and  services  outside  the 
( 10)  ln.  all  cases  through  the  respectiv.e  UBN  domestic 
subsidiary. 
( 11)  Where a  distributor chooses  not  to communicate its  retail 
prices to Uniworld, then clearly that distributor's customers 
would  not  be  able  to  benefit  fully  from  Uniworld's 
centralized billing capacity, :as described above. 
business  scope of Uniwo~ld will  be  exchanged in 
· the strategic advisory boards.  · 
2.  l!ndertak.ings. given  ~y the parties 
In  addition,  the  Parties  have  provided  the  following 
behavioural  undertakings: 
(a)  Undertakings  by  Unisource  NV and all of its  share-
holders 
(1)  Unisource  and  every·  one  of  its  shareholders 
undenakes  that  it  or its  subsidiaries  will  not  offer 
terms  and  conditions  to  Uniworld  in  respect  of 
access. to  basic  switched  transmission  capacity  and 
leased lines  as  well  as  interconnection to PSTN and 
PSDN  networks  in.  the  home  countries  of  the 
Unisource shareholders which  are  discriminatory in 
favour of Uniworld. · 
(2)  Unisource  and  every  one  of  its  shar~holders 
undertakes  not  to  misuse  confidential  information 
obtained  from  third  panics  to  · the  benefit  of 
Uniworld  and  will  in  relation  to Uniworld  ensure 
and facilitate the respect of the undertakings related 
to  misuse  of confidential  information  given  in  the 
context of the Unisource·- Telef6nica  case  (Case 
No IV  /35.830). 
..  · 
(b)  Undertakings by all Unisource shareholders 
(3)  Every shareholder undertakes not to grant any cross-
subsidies  to  any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the 
U niworld  agreements  funded  out  of  income 
generated  by  any  business  which  they  operate 
pursuant to any exclusive right. 
(4)  Every shareholder undertakes that it will  not tie  in 
the sale  of any service  provided  by  Uniworld  with 
any  service  provided  by  each  of them.  Each  will 
moreover,  for as  long  as  it has ,exclusive  or special 
rights to provide telecommunications services and/or 
·infrastructures,  only  make  combined  offerings  of 
Uniworld  and  its  own  services  in  a  way that  the 
customer can identify in the contract forms the price 
charged as well  as the other terms and conditions f~r 
these  services  and  it  will  ensure  that each  of these 
components  is  separately  available  at  equivalent 
conditions. 
(5)  Every  shareholder  undertakes  not  to  bundle  the 
provision  of Uniworld  (international)  services  with 
the provision  of domestic services outside the scope 
of Uniworld.  · 
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3.  Position of AT&T 
During·  the  assessment  of  the  case,  AT&T  made  a 
detailed  description  of its  obligations  under  US  regu-
lations  in  respect  of  its  international  facilities  and 
services,  in  particular  regarding  interconnection  to  its 
networks. AT&T further confirmed its intention to abide 
by all  relevant US  legislation and  FCC rules to which it 
is subject from time to time in  respect of its international 
facilities  and services. 
In  addition,  AT&T  offered  to  the  Commission  the 
following: 
(a)  AT&T underta~es to advise DG IV promptly of any 
complaint filed  with the FCC regarding access  to or 
interconnection with AT&T's international facilities, 
including  any  complaint  filed  with  the  FCC 
regarding  bilateral  correspondent  arrangements,  by 
telecommunications  operators  or  service  providers 
from  the  EEA  or  Switzerland.  AT&T  further 
undertakes  to  inform  DG  IV  of any  final  decision 
taken by the FCC in regard to any such complaint; 
(b)  with respect to operators with  international facilities 
licences  in  the  EEA  and  Switzerland  with  whom 
AT&T today has an accounting rate agreement, and 
for traffic sent in  the context of the  bilateral corre-
spondent  regime,  AT&T  undertakes  to  offer 
cost-based accounting rates  that, in  all  cases, would 
be  no ·higher than the lowest accounting rate estab-
lished  between  AT&T ·and  any  Unisource  share-
holder; 
(c)  with respect to operators with international facilities 
licences  in  the  EEA  and  Switzerland  with  whom 
AT&T- may in the future establish an accounting rate 
agreement,  AT&T  undertakes  to  offer  cost-based 
accounting  rates  that,  in  ~II  cases,  would  be  no 
higher than the lowest accounting rate then in  effect 
between AT&T and any Unisource shareholder. 
H. THE COMMISSION'S INTENTIONS 
On the  basis  of the foregoing,  the  Commission  intends 
to  take a favourable  view  pursuant to Article  85  of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53  of the EEA Agreement and to 
grant to Uniworld an  individual  exemption  pursuant to 
Article 85  (3)  of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (3)  of the 
EEA  Agreement.  Before  doing  so,  it  invites  interested· 
third parties to send their observations withi·n  one month 
of the publication of this notice to the following .address, 
quoting the reference 'IV  /35.738 - Uniworld'. 
European Commission,  . 
. Directorate-General for Competition (DG  IV), 
Directorate C, 
Rue de Ia  Loi/Wetstraat 200, 
B-1 049  Brussels; 
Fax: (32 2) .296 98  19 . 
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Notice pursuant to Article 19  (3) of Council Regulation No· 17 C)  and ~ide  3 of Protocol 21 
of the EEA Agreement concerning a request for negative clearance or an exemption pursuant to 
Article 85  (3) of the EC Treaty. and Article 53  (3)  of the EEA Agreement 
(Case  No IV  /35.830 ·- Uni$ource - Telefonica) 
(97 /C 44/05) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
On  4  March  1996,  Unisource  NV  (hereinafter 
'Unisource')  and  Telef6nica filed  a  modified  agreement 
providing  for  the  _  incorporation  of  Telef6nica  to 
'£!nisource  as  a fourth  equal shareholder. 
Unisource  NV was  established  on 24  April  1992, was  a 
50-50  joint  venture  between  Pll Telecom  BV,  the 
Dutch  telecom  operator,  and  Swedish  Telecom  Inter-
national,  a  subsidiary of Televerket,  the  predecessor of 
Telia AB, a Swedish telecom operator, for the purpose of 
concentrating the international value added networks of 
the  two  Parties.  The  Panics  effectively  transferred  the 
corresponding networks as  from  1 January 1993. 
The joint venture  was  first  expanded  by  an  entry into 
Unisource  Satellite  Services  BV  of  Swiss  PTf  on 
4  November  1992  and  later by its  entry into Unisource 
NV on ·1  July  1993. During 1994, Unisource and Tele-
f6nica  staned negotiations  aimed  at  the  entry of Tele-
f6nica  into Unisource as  a  founh shareholder. A result 
of  these  negotiations  were  the  original  agreements 
notified  to  the  Commission  under the  merger  control 
regulation on 29 September 1995. 
On 6  November 1995, the Commission decided that the 
notified  transaction was  not a  concentration. Following 
the  Commission's  decision,  and  at  the  request  of the 
.,anies the notification was converted into a notification 
..1nder  Regulation  17. 
Almost at the same time, following further negotiations, 
an  l'greement  was  reached  by  the  parties  on  22 
November  1995  as  to  the  v.alue  of Telef6nica's  packet 
switched data networks (PSDN). As  a consequence, the 
Parties modified the structure of ~he transaction, so that, 
Telef6nica  will  contribute  to  Unisource  its  subsidiaries 
Telef6nica  Transmisi6n  de  Datos .  SA  (owner  of  the 
Iberpac and  Red  Uno networks)  and Telef6nica VSAT 
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B.  TELEF6~ICAAND  THE EXISTING SHAREHOLDERS 
OF UNISOURCE 
- Telef6nica SA  is  the  incumbent telecom operator in 
Spain,  where  it .  provides  national  and  international 
telecommunications services and infrastructures. 
T elef6nica  is  a  private  company  listed  in  the  stock 
exchange.  However,  the  Spanish  State  has  in  all  a 
21,16 °/o  shareholding and  has substantial powers  to 
control the  company.  In  particular, it nominates  the 
chairman of the board and 5 of the board's members 
(out  of  23).  In  addition,  the  State  is  further  and 
directly represented by a  delegate e>  which  is  also  a 
member  without  voting  power  of  the  board.  The 
delegate  is  at the same  time  the director general  of 
the  Direcci6n  General  de  Tefecommunicaciones 
(DGTEL, the existing regulator). 
The remaining shares 'of Telef6nica are in  the hands 
of two  big  Spanish  banks  and  the  biggest  s~vings 
bank  (around  11  Ofa),  American  pension  funds  and 
other  non-Spanish  shareholders  (25 %).  Around 
300 000 small private investors account for the rest. 
The consolidated turnover of the Telef6nica group in 
1995 was Pta 1 740 557 million (around ECU 10 927 
million)  of which  the  Telef6nica  mother  company 
accounted  for  Pta  1 372 674  million  (ECU  8 617 
million). 
Telef6nica  undertook  a  change  of  its  corporate 
structure  in  1994. As  a  result,  some  of its  activities 
(data  transmission,  mobile  telephony,  international 
businesses,  . multimedia,  payphones  and  publicity) 
have  been  transferred to separated subsidiaries. The 
basic  telephony  business  (including  infrastructure, 
leased  Jines  and  international  communications) 
remains with the corporate core. 
Telef6nica  is  the  only  European  telecom  operator 
operating voice  telephony .in  the US  through Tele-
f6nica  Larga  Distancia  de  Pueno Rico '(fLD). In 
1995,  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
(FCC) of the US  classified ·no  as  a  non-dominant 
(Z)  Under the terms of a Royal Decree Law recently adopted by 
the $panish  Parliament,  the post of delegate will  disappear 
as of I january 1998.  · 
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carrier for international traffic (except for routes to 
Spain,  Argentina,  Chile  and  Peru)  and  also  auth-
orized TLD to originate and terminate  long-di~tance 
domestic US traffic from all of the US territory. 
Telef6nica~s was  Europe•s  first  PSDN.  Based  on  a 
proprietary. standard, the networks began operations 
in  1973 with migration to an X.25 service by the end 
of the  1970s.  A  domestic  frame  relay  service  was 
introduced. in  t995, 
- PTf Telecom  BV  is  the.  telecom  operator  in  the 
Netherlands,  where  it  provides  national  and  inter-
national  telecommunications  services  and  infra-
structure. 
Royal PIT Netherlands NV (KPN), a public limited 
liability company, owns 100% of the shares in  PTI 
Telecom.  Currently  the  Dutch  State  holds 
approximately  44 °/o  of  the  outstanding  ordinary 
shares  of  KPN  (which  is  also  the  owner  of PIT 
Post). 
KPN's turnover in  1994 was  Fl  18 592  million  (ECU 
8 769 'million), of which Fl  12 686  (some ECU 6 000 
million) corresponded to PTT Telecom. 
By  the  end  of June  1996,  a  consortium  formed  by 
PTT Telecom and Telia was selected as  the strategic 
partner  for  a  stake  of  up  to  35 °/o  in  Telecom 
Eireann,  Ireland's  State-owned  telecommunications 
company, 
- Schweizerische  PTT  -Betriebe  (Swiss  PIT)  is  an 
incorporated  public-law  institution  which  is  part of 
the Swiss  federal administration. It encompasses post 
and ·telecommunications.  Total  turnover  of  Swiss 
PTf. ·in  1994  was  Sfr  13 838  million  (ECU  8 989  · 
million)  of which  telecommunications  (services  and 
infrastructures) accounted for Sfr 9 256 million (ECU 
6 010 million). 
Swiss  P'IT's  future  is  under  discussion,  and  it  is 
planned to divide  it up into Post and Telecom AG, 
the  latter being  a  joint stock· company with  limited 
liability  in  which  the·  State  will  keep  a  majority 
participation (51  Ofo), 
- Telia  AB  is  a  telecom  operator providing  domestic 
and  international  telecommunications  services  and 
infrastructure  in  Sweden.  It  is  ·a  limited  liability 
company incorporated under Swedish Ia?'. All  shares 
are owned by the Swedish State. 
Telia's  turnover  in  1995  was  Skr  41  066  million 
(ECU 4 729 million) .. 
Telia is  currently in  the middle of a substantial reor-
ganization that will  completely change  itS  structure. 
As a result, the provision of services will  be separated 
from the provision of networks. Thus Telia Network 
Services  will  support  all  the  other Telia's  business 
areas. 
C: THE JOINT VENTIJRE: UNISOURCE NV 
Unisource NV  is  a holding  company active  in  the  tele-
communications sector that incorporates seven operating 
subsidiaries.  Total  turnover  of the  group  in  1994  was 
Fl  933  million (ECU .443  million). Net result were losses 
of Fl  41,072  million  (ECU 20  million). 
1.  Current structure of Unisource NV 
U nisource  is  governed  by  a  management  board  and  a 
supervisory board. 
The  management  board,  which  is  entrusted  with  the 
day-to-day  business  of  Unisource ('),  is  composed  of 
three  members  appointed  by · the  general  meeting  of 
shareholders  by  unanimity.  The three  members  are 'the 
president and chief executive officer, the executive vice-
president  and  chief  financial  officer  and  the  executive 
vice-president  and  director  of  Business  Services.  t\11 
decisions  by  the  management  board  are  adopted  by  a 
majority of the votes. 
The supervisory board will  exercise supervision over the 
management  board  conduct  of  affairs  and  over  the 
general  course  of  business  in  U nisource  and  the 
operating  companies.  The  supervisory  board  shall  be 
composed , of four  members  appointed  by  the  general 
meeting  of shareholders.  Each  shareholder  nominates 
one of them. There would be  a chairman. The position 
of chairman .  will  rotate every two years. 
· Most resolutions of the supervisory board (including the 
annual  budget  and  business  plan)  shall  be  adopted  by 
unanimity of the votes cast e). 
Finally, every operational subsidiary has its own board of 
directors  or  management  · team  entitled  with  the 
day-to-day1 business of the subsidiary. 
, ____ _ 
(I)  Some decisions will  nevenheless require  the  approval  of the 
s.upervisory  board,  including  among  others,  acquisitions, 
entering into agreements and investments. 
(')  Absolute majority will  be required  for  resolution of disputes 
arising  out  of transactions  between  Unisource  and  any  of 
the shareholders. 
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The  supervisory  board  has  to  repon  to  the  general 
assembly  of  shareholders  which,  for  instance,  has  to 
approve  the  annual  accounts. 
2.  The Unisource alliance: the one telecom country 
According  to  the  Unisource's  'Organization  and 
Governance' document, one of the aims  of the alliance is 
'to  improve  time  to  market  and  cost  effectiveness  by 
merging  or  coordinating  activities  of  the  parents  and 
creating  service  transparency  between  mother  countries'. 
This  is  the  definition  of what  the  Panies  call  'the  one 
telecom  country'.  In  practical  terms  the  concept 
translates  into  a  structure,  which  is  still  independent 
from  the  structure of Unisource  NV as  described  below, 
made  of the  folJowing  alliance  boards: 
- network board (NB).  Its  mission wilJ  be  the adoption 
of  strategic  decisions  concerning  network  questions 
to  establish  one  transparent ,network  and  to  use  all 
opponunities  to  reduce  costs  and .the  harmonization 
•  and  integration  of  national  networks  and  archi-
tectures  of the  shareholders  between  them  and  with 
Unisource  Carrier  Services  (see.  below).  Membership 
will  include the presidents of the companies involved; 
- service  and  distribution  board  (S&DB).  Its  missions 
will  be  the  adoption of strategic decisions ·concerning 
the  joint  service  portfolio  and  its  coordinati~n, the 
harmoniza~on and jntegration of national  service~ of 
the  parents between themselves  and with the relevant 
Unisource  services; 
- R&D board. It will  be responsible for the adoption of 
strategic  decisions  regarding  annual  joint  research 
and  development  of portfolios  and  regarding  R&D 
optimi~tion. It will also support the NB and S&DB; 
- purchasing  board  (PB).  It will  be  mainly  responsible 
for  creating  common  opinions  and  making  decisions 
about  areas  worth  common  purchasing  and  for 
harmonizing  the  process  of purchasing  and  logistics 
both  in  support  systems  and  in  approach  to  the 
supplier  market; 
- IT board.  It  will  be  responsible  for  the  adoption  of 
strategic  decisions  concerning  planning,  provisioning 
and  implementation  of  IT  across  the  Alliance 
members,  the  harmonization  and  integration  of 
national  IT  systems  between  the  parent  companies 
and with the IT systems of Unisource. 
3.  Scope of activities of Unisource· NV 
The Unisource  product portfolio  is  developed :~long the 
lines  of  liberalization  of  the  EU  telecommunications 
market  and  follows  customer  demand.  According  to 
Unisource,  the  activities  of the  group  can  be  split  into 
three  main  areas:  business  services,  personal services  and 
network  services.  The  following  subsidiaries  operate  in 
each  of these  areas: 
(a) ·Business  seroices 
Unisource  Business  Networks  (UBN)  is  responsible  for 
the  provision  of  pan-European,  seamless,  end-to-end 
data  network  services,  managed  bandwidth·  services, 
messaging  and  outsourcing.  UBN  has  subsidiaries  in 
Sweden,  the  Netherlands,  Switzerland,  Spain,  Germany, 
the,· United  Kingdom,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Norway, 
. Denmark~ Finland  and  Italy. 
In  addition, the respective domestic packet switched data 
networks  (PSDN)  of the  Unisource  initial  parents  were 
contributed  in  1993  to  the  respective  domestic  UBN 
subsidiaries. 
· At  the  moment the situation regarding the integration of 
the above  networks  is  as  described  below; each  network 
is based on ·the same technology (Nonel (
5
)) and they are 
interfaced ·through a  common  backbone  network owned 
by  Unisource  (Unidata ('))  using  proprietary  interfaces 
(with  the  exc~ption of the  Netherlands,  see  below): 
- the  Netherlands:  the  domestic  X.25  data  network 
(Datanet  1)  is  owned  by  UBN  Netherlands.  It  is 
interfaced  to Unidata by  a  X.7  5 interface.  Domestic 
only data services  in  the !'!etherlands .  are  offered  by 
P1T  Telecom  as  exclusive  distributor  of  UBN 
Netherlands, 
.....:..  Sweden:  the  domestic  X.25  data  network  (Unidata 
Data  Pack)  is  owned  by  UBN  Sweden.  :It  is'  fully . 
integrated·  with  Unidata  using  Nonel's  proprietary 
internal  network .  protocol (INP). Domestic only data 
services  in  Sweden  are  offered  by Telia as ·exclusive 
distr_ibutor of UBN Sweden, 
- Switzerland:  the  domestic  X.25  data  network 
(relepac)  is  owned  by  UBN. Switzerland.  It  is  fully 
integrated  with  Unidata  using  Nortel's  proprietary 
INP  ..  Domestic  only  ~ata  services  in  Switzerland 
(') Nonel - Northern Telecom - is  ~ Canadian manufacturer 
of communications equipment. 
(') A3  for  Tele£6nica's  PSDN,  Iberpac  is  interfaced  with 
Uniclata  through  a  X.7S  interface  and  Red  Uno was  inte-
grated with Unidata in  1995. 
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are  offered  by  Swiss  PTf as  exclusive  distributor of 
UBN Switzerland. 
The  respective  UBN  subsidiaries  own  and  operate  the 
data  nodes,  the  associated  databases  and  the  network 
control  centres.  Basic  services  (leased  circuits)  are 
provided to the UBN domestic subsidiary by the relevant 
Unisource  shareholder.  The  latter  resells  the  Unisource 
services  to  its  local  customer  base.  The  networks  are 
used  to  suppon  the  offering  of pan-European  services 
and  purely  domestic  services.  The  country  specific 
domestic  services  are  branded  Unisource. 
The  three  networks  are  being  upgraded  to  offer  also 
frame  relay,  again  using  Norte!  switches.  That  None! 
network  is  being  interconnected  to  another  frame  relay 
network of Unisource that uses  Stratacom (') technology 
by using network-to-network interconnections specifically 
developed by Nonel and Stratacom. 
l11e  three  PSDN  and  Unidata  share  their  international 
X.75  gateways.  Finally,  the  respective  PSDN  services 
available  in  each  country  are  being  aligned  with  the 
Unisource's  Unidata  PSDN  service  to  create  a  basic 
PSDN service  with  a  wider reach. 
Unisource Voice Service  (UVS)  is  in  fact  a business  unit 
of Unisource offering pan-European voice NPN services 
and  other closed  user  group services. 
Unisource  Satellite  Services  (USS)  offers  international 
value-added, voice,  video,  text  and  data communications 
using  fixed  and VSAT satellite  terminals.  It allows  UBN 
services to be extended to remote areas outside terrestrial 
coverage. 
(b)  Personal  services 
'-"l.Jnisource  Card  Services  (UC)  offers  personal  and 
corporate post-paid  calling  cards. 
Unisource  Mobile  (UM)  is  a  provider  of pan-European 
GSM  mobile  services.  It · also  applies  for  licences  for 
mobile  networks  operators  in  Europe,  outside  the  home 
·countries. 
C)  Stratacom  is  an  US  manufacturer  of  communications 
equipment.  It  has  a  substantial  presence  in  frame  relay 
switches  . 
UM has  three subsidiaries,  GEAB AB  in  Sweden,  GEAB 
Norge  AS  in  Norway  and  TMG  GmbH  in  Germany 
which  act  as  distributors  and  retail  outletS  for  the 
national  mobile services  in  these countries. So GEAB  acts 
in  Norway as  distributor of Telenor Mobile  and  Netcom 
and  in  Germany,  where  TMG  is  a  service  provider  for 
the  German  D I,  D2 and  E  Plus  networks. 
UM  is  currently developing  a  vinual  mobile  network to 
provide  seamless  pan-European  mobile  telephony 
services  based  on  GSM  technology  at  a  significant 
discount  to. standard  roaming  tariffs. 
(c)  Network  servzces 
Unisource  Carrier  Services  (UCS)  is  currently 
responsible  for  managing  the  international  networks(') 
of  the  shareholders  of  Unisource.  It is  organized  as  a 
management  company  given  that  the  Unisource  share-
holders  are  not  permitted  to  assign  their  international 
networks  and  licences  to  UCS.  As  UCS  is  not  an 
!TV-recognized  telecom  operator,  nor  is  it  allowed  to 
negotiate  with  other telecom  operators  in  its  own  name 
for  transit  traffic. 
UCS  is  a crucial element  for  Unisource.  In  the  future  it 
will  pr:ovide  carri~r services  to  other services  providers. 
In this connection it is  building a pan-European network 
(PEN) with  global  connectivity  based  on  SOH (') tech-
nology  in  those  countries  where  legally  permissible. 
The  PEN  will  be  an  integrated,  centrally  managed 
network  that  will  provide  seamless  teleco~ services  in 
Europe. It will  take  advantage  of itS  presence  in  many 
European  countries  to  provide  an  advantage  to  the 
current system  of bilateral  settlementS. 
The  PEN  will  be  deployed  in  two  phases.  The  first 
phase,  aimed  to  be  completed  in  the  third  quaner  of 
1996, will  be  a  managed  high  capacity network between 
the  four  home  countries  with  centralized  management 
(') The  · international  networks  include  the  international 
switching  centres  in  the  three  countries,  the  international 
transmission  maintenance  centres,  the  international  network 
management  centres,  satellite  earth  stations,  sea  cables  and 
other  international  transit  capacity,  the  ATM- and 
SOH-cross connects  and  the international  signalling  transfer 
points of the  said  companies  in  the  said  countries  and  any 
other cross-border facilities  of the Unisource shareholders in 
the  countries involved . 
(') Acronym  for synchronous digital  hierarchy; an  international 
standardized  transmission  technique  which  enables  greater 
capacity  in  existing  fibre-optics  networks,  better  remote 
control and automatic rerouting in  the case of faults. 
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and  customer suppon. The second  phase  is  ai~ed to  be 
completed  on  1  January.  1998.  By  then  it  will  be 
extended  to  non-shareholder  countries  and  enhanced  in 
order  to  provide  signalling  and  intelligent  network 
services  to  customers. 
The services  provi4ed  on the PEN will  include switched 
transit  services,  switched  hubbing  services,  managed 
bandwidth  services,  delivery  of PS1N and  ISDN traffic 
and  signalling  services. 
At  present  UCS  only  offers  services  to  the  shareholders 
of Unisource  and  Uniworld.  However,  in  1997  it  will 
stan  providing  network  services  to  third  panies  in  its 
own  name  on  the  basis  of  network  services  purchased 
from  the  Unisource  shareholders  (and  other  operators) 
and  resold  in  an  integrated  manner  to service  providers. 
The terms  and  conditions  for  the  provision  of network 
services  will  be  laid  down in  supply agreements  between 
each  Unisource  shareholder  and  UCS C
0
). 
OutSide  that structure  there  is  another subsidiary,  Itema 
(to be renamed Unisource Information Services) active  in 
the  information technology field.  It provides  information 
services  (IS)  and  information  technology (IT) services  to 
the  Unisource  group  and  to  identified  common  projects 
in  the Unisource Alliance.  It also  plays  a leading role  in 
the  harmonization process  between  the  IS/IT services  of 
the  Unisource  shareholders.  · 
A management agreement has been signed to subcontract 
the management, coordination and supervision  of certain 
projects  and  programmes  to Itema.  It receives  a general 
management fee  for  its  activities. 
D.  TilE NOTIFIED AGREEMENTS 
1.  Agreements 
The  parties  have  notified  the  following  agreements 
regarding  Unisource: · 
.·· 
- the  Joint Venture  and  Shareholders  Agreement  and 
its  Appendices, 
- the  Contribution Agreement, 
- the articles  of association, 
( 11)  One of these  agreements  has  been concluded  between  UCS 
and  Uniworld (sec Case No IV/35.738 Uniworld). 
- the  by-laws, 
- the share issuance deed, and 
- the.  Non-Compete  Agreements  for  · UBN,  USS, 
Unisource Cards and Unisource Mobile. 
2.  Contractual  provisions 
(a)  The  non-compete  provisions 
In  accordance.  with  Anicle  19  .of  the Joint Venture  and 
Shareholders  Agreements,  the  Parties  are  free  to · 
conduct,  outside  Unisource  and  independently  of each 
other  all  activities  whether  or  not  within  the  areas  of 
cooperation.  Nevenheless,  at such· time  as  they agree  to 
develop  or  acquire  or  panicipate  in  an  operating 
company,  they  shall  negotiate  and  agree  to  a 
noJ?-competition  agreement  specifically  geared  to  the 
business  activities  to  be  conducted  by  that  operating 
company. 
As  of  now,  for  such  non-competition  agreementS  have 
been concluded  in  respect of the activities  of UBN, USS, 
1UC  and  Unisource  Mobile: 
- under  the  Non-Competition  Agreement  for  UBN'  s 
activities,  the  four  panies decide  to concentrate their 
international  value  added  data  network  services  in 
UBN.  Thus,  and  except  with  regard  to  Infonet 
services,  none  of  the  four  will  offer  comparative 
services  in  parailel  to  the  UBN  ponfolio.  Each  of 
them  will  offer  to  their  respective  national  markets 
the UBN product portfolio. as  an agent or distributor 
of UBN, 
- under  the  Non-Competition  Agreement  for 
Unisource  Satellite  Services,  none  of  the  four  will 
offer  comparative  VSAT-services  in  parallel  to  the 
USS  portfolio.  Each  of them  will  distribute  the  USS 
product ponfolio to their respective  national  markets 
as an agent or distributor of USS, 
- under  the  non:-competition·  provision  for  Uni~ource 
Cards,  the  panies  have  decided  to  concentrate  on 
UC  the  ownership  and  operation  of  the  technical 
platform  for  non-payphone  caning  card services  and 
product  development.  Consequently,  none  of  them 
will  offer  comparative  services  in  parallel  to the  UC 
pan-European  product  portfolio.  Nonetheless,  each 
of  them  will  continue  to  market  their  own 
non·payphone  calling  cards  within  their  respective 
national  markets,  and  UC will  market and  distn"bute 
its  cards on a real pan-European scale, 
- finally,  the  non-competition  provision  for  Unisource 
Mobile  (GSM  and  DCS  1800)  services  requires  the 
Unisource  shareholders  not  to  act  as  pan-European 
mobile  service  providers  outside  their  territories  in 
parallel  to  the  UM product ponfolio.  However, each 
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of them  will  continue offering  their GSM services  at 
home  and  abroad  through  the  relevant  roaming 
agreements  concluded  under  the  framework  of  the 
GSM  MoU. 
(b)  Distribution  of services 
The  services  of  UBN C 
1 
),  WS  and  USS  will  be 
distributed  through  exclusive  distributors.  Each  of  the 
Unisource shareholders  is  the  exclusive  distributor for  its 
own  country  (Telia  is  also  the  exclusive  distributor  for 
Norway  and  Denmark).  Exclusive  distributors  shall  not 
actively  seek  customers  outside  its  territory  and  are 
bound  by  non-competition  provisions.  (see  above).  The 
non-competition  provision  regarding  UBN  permits 
nevenheless  the  distribution  to  the  territory  of Infonet's 
(global)  data  services.  Thus,  as  in  all  other  European 
countries,  the · reseller  in  the  Unisource  countries  is  a 
business  unit  to  the  country's  telecom  operator.  Such 
business  unit  is  not  transferred  to  Unisource (
12
). 
E.  RELEVANT  MARKETS 
The  relevant  markets  involved  are  basically  the  same  as 
described  in  the  Atlas  and  Global  One  Decisions (u). 
1.  Product  markets 
(a)  The  markets /or  non-reserved  corporate  telecommuni-
cations  services 
Unisource,  through  UBN,  WS  and  USS  targets  the 
markets for  both  customized  packages  of corporate tele-
communications  services  and  packet-switched  data 
communications  services,  jointly  referred  to  as 
'non-reserved  corporate  telecommunications  services'. 
The  services.  to  be  provided  fall  within  the  following 
categories:. 
~  corporate  voice  services:  global  vii:tual  private 
·  network  (VPN),  international  toll  free,  selected  card 
and simple  resale services and switched digital, 
(
11
)  After  the  Uniworld  transaction,  the  UBN  distribution 
agreement will  relate  to national  data s·ervices  and to inter-
national  data  services  (bilateral)  outside  the  scope  of 
Uniworld. 
( 11)  In  these  countries,  Infonet  cl~ims  a  market  ~hare of  less 
than  1 96. 
(u) Commission  Decisions  of  17  July  1996  relating  to 
proceedings under Anicle  85  of the  EC Treaty and Anicle 
53  of the  EEA  Agreement  (Cases IV/35.337 - Atlas· and 
IV/35.617- Glo6al  One). OJ No L 239  of 19  September 
1996, pointS 4 to 15  and 5 to 16,  respectively . 
- data  communications  services  using,  inter  alia,  the 
X.25, Frame Relay and Internet protocols (IP), 
- dedicated ·transmission  for  voice  and  data  services: 
managed bandwidth and VSAT, 
- custom  network  solutions:  systems/  equipment 
procu,rement,  tailored  and  managed  services  and 
outsourcing, 
·- platform-based  enhanced  serv1ces:  messaging 
including  access  to  telex,  local  area  network  (LAN) 
interconnection,  electronic  document ·  interchange 
(EDI),  videoconferencing  and  audioconferencing. 
(b)  The  market for traveller services 
The  market  for  traveller  telecommunications  services 
comprises  offerings  that meet  the  demand  of individuals. 
who are away from  their normal location, either at home 
or at work. Among  the  most  relevant  of these  offerings 
are  calling  card  services  (i.e.  pre-paid  cards  with  or 
without  a  code  and post-paid  cards),  including  those  in 
combination with credit cards  and other branded service 
cards  ('affinity  cards'), 
CUStomers  for  traveller  services  include  both  business 
travellers  and  other  travellers.  In  the  card  business 
targeted  by  Unisource  through  UC,  the  former  are  by 
far  the  largest  group  of  buyers.  Business  travellers  are 
generally  intensive  card  users,  the  main  incentive  for 
card ·Wage  being  the  possibility  to  avoid  paying  hotel 
telephone . surcharges. 
The  pan-European  GSM  mobile  services  being 
developed  by UM are also  mainly  intended to serve  the 
needs  of  traveller  services  and  for  that  reason  are 
·incl~ded here  as  we'l.  However,  they are also  seen  as  a 
GSM  mobile  extension  to  corporate  customers'  fixed 
private or vinual private  {VPN)  networks,  it can .  not be 
excluded  now that they  will  have  to be  included  in  the 
previous  market in  the  future.  · 
(c)  The ·market /or carrier services 
The  market  for  carrier  services  comprises.  the  lease  of 
transmission  capacity  and  the  provision  of  related 
services to third-pany telecommunications  traffic carriers 
and  service  providers.  Along  with  liberalization  and 
globalization  of  telecommunications  markets,  demand 
for  efficient,  high-quality  traffic  uansponation  capacity 
has risen  among old and  new carriers. In this connection, 
the  traditional  model  of  separate  arrangements  with 
other  individual  carriers  is  increasingly  challenged  by 
players  with  global  network  infrastructure  that  offer  an 
array of services.  The most  relevant of such  services  are: 
II  A/  111 12.2.97  Official  Journal  of the  European  Communities  No C 44/21 
( 1)  switched  transit,  i.e.  transport of traffic over bilateral 
facilities  between  the  originating  carrier, -the  transit 
carrier and  the  terminating carrier; neither  the orig-
inating  carrier  nor  the  terminating  carrier  need 
bilateral  facilities  between  themselves,  but  only with 
the transit carrier; 
(2)  dedicated  transit,  i.e.  leased  line  offerings  for  the 
transport of traffic through the  domestic network of 
the  transit  carrier;  leased  line  facilities  used  for  this 
purpose may include discrete voice circuits or a high-
bandwidth  digital  circuit  that  can  be  used  for  both 
voice and data services; 
(3)  traffic  hubbing  offerings,  where  the  provider  takes 
care of all  or pan of international connections; these 
offerings  are  typically  designed  for  emerging-
carriers,  who  are  interconnected  with  the  provider 
over bilateral facilities  and whose international traffic 
is  merged  with  other traffic  on  the  provider's global 
network; and 
(  4)  reseller  services  for  service  providers  without  inter-
national  telecommunications facilities  of their own. 
Demand  for  carrier  serviceS  is  increasingly  driven  by 
alternative  carriers  concerned  with  entrusting  the 
incumbent  TO  with  their  international  traffic,  for 
reasons  such  as  technical  dependency  and  commercial 
sensitivity  of customer  information. 
Purchasers  of  carrier  services  include  established·  and 
emerging  carriers.  Both  groups  of . clients  are  sophis-
ticated  purchasers.  Among  the  emerging  carriers,  one 
may distinguish  facilities-based  carriers that provide tele-
communications  services  over  alternative  infrastructure 
or cable  television  networks seeking greater- efficiency in 
the  transport  · of  international  client  .  traffic,  while 
non-facilities-based  carriers  and  services  providers  seek 
to  preserve  a  competitive,  advantage  by  avoiding 
dependence on a local TO for international client ti:affic. 
2.  Geographic  markets 
Along  the  lines  of  the  Commission's  findings  in  its 
BT-MCI (
14
),  Atlas  and  Phoenix  decisions,  the 
geographic·  scope  of  certain  markets  targeted  by 
Unisource  is  cross-border  regional  and  pan-European  if 
not  global.  Although  national  'borders  subsist  for  many 
services,  strategic  alliances  like  Unisource  are . built  not 
(••)  Commission  Decision  of  27  July  1994  in  Case  No  , 
IV  134.857 - BT-MCI, OJ No L 223/36, 27. 8.  1994. 
only  in  anticipation  of a  market  unaffected  by  national 
boundaries but even  with the ·express purpose of offering 
large  global  telecommunications  users  seamless 
end-to-end  services  anyW-here  by  overcoming  the  diffi-
cul~ies  inherent  in  the  current  market  structure  split 
along national  borders. However,  the service  offerings of 
Unisource  through  its  · subsidiaries  reach  different 
existing  geographic  markets. 
(a)  The  markets  for  non-reserved  corporate  telecommuni-
cations  services 
As described  in  the Atlas decision,  demand by large users 
for  customized  packages  of  corporate  telecommuni-
cations services  exists  in  at least  three distinct geographic 
markets,  namely  at  a  global,  cross-border  regional  and 
national  level.  Unisource  services  have  pan-European 
reach. 
Packet-switched  data  communications·  services  are 
offered  by  Unisource,  through  UBN (and  the  domestic 
subsidiaries  thereof)  at  a  cross-border  regional  and 
national  level ·in  the  different  Member  States  involved. 
(b)  The  market for traveller services 
Along  with  the  globalization of the.  economy the tnarket 
for  traveller  services· appears  to  be  increasingly  global; 
travellers  demand  offerings  which  include  a  single  bill 
and  integrated  functions  such  as  voice  messaging,  voice 
response  and  information  systems  everywhere. 
Geographic  limitations  of  current  traveller  service 
offerings  are  generally due  to technieal  shortcomings set 
to be overcome in the near future, such as the incompati-
bility' of mobile  Communications systems  or differences in 
pre-paid  cards  without  an  individual  \lSer  code. 
(c)  The market /or carrier services 
Both  supply  of and  demand  for  carrier services  are  by 
nature  cross-border  regional.  Geographic  proximity 
between  purchaser  and  supplier  of  switched  transit 
capacity  is  hardly  relevant  for  switched  transit  which 
carriers use either as  a substitute for operating own inter-
national  lines  or to deal  with  peak  traffic  on  such  lines. 
Likewi'se,  dedicated  transit  services  offer  cable- or 
satellite-based  routing  capacity ' across  third  countries. 
Finally,  using  hubbing  services  is  an  alternative  to 
entering  into  an  undetermined  number  of  bilateral 
agreements  with  individual  carriers. 
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3. Competition in the markets 
(a)  Cross·border regional or global markets 
Many players, acting alone or jointly with partners, have 
entered  or are  entering  the  above  defined  cross-border 
regional  or global  markets:. 
(1)  the  m~rket .for non-reserved  corporate telecommuni-
cations  services:  BT-MCI's  Concert  and  Atlas/ 
Global  One  are  expected  to  become  major  players 
on  a  gl<?bal  basis.  To  those  it  is  necessary  to  add 
some  other significative  players  like  Infonet,  Sita  or 
IPSP; 
(2)  the market for traveller services: many companies are 
actively  marketing  calling  cards,  US  firms  like 
AT&T,  MCI  and  Sprint  and  alliances  like  Global 
One. In  addition, most European telecommunication 
operators and some new entrants are lauching. direct-
to·home  or  collect-call  services  in  order  to  follow 
their customers abroad; 
(3 )· the  market  for  carrier  services:  all  telecommuni-
cations  operators  compete  with  eac~ other  in  the 
provision  of  transit  and  hubbing  services.  A  few 
companies are entering tlie market on a cross-border 
regional  or  global  basis,  Global  One  and  Hermes 
are, in principle, the most important ones. 
(b)  National  markets 
Each of the shareholders of Unisource face  a  number of 
competitors  in  their  respective  domestic  market  for 
packet  switched  data  communication  services.  So  such 
se~ices are  completely  liberalized  in  Sweden,  there  are 
at least five  licences granted in  the Netherlands, eight in 
Spain  and  several  in  Switzerland.  Some  of  those 
companies  (such  as  Spain's  BT Tel  or Swedish's  Tele-
~ordia) are  also  the  domestic  extensions  'of  the  global 
····alliances  (BT. in  those· two cases). 
4.  Market shares of the parties 
(a)  Cross-border  regional  markets 
Market shares  figures  for  those  cross-border regional or 
global markets are highly unreliable. Their emerging and 
evolving nature and the high volume of traffic  generated 
by  large  corporate customers  are ·explanatory arguments 
for  such  unreliability.  · 
Unisource's  estimates of its  own market shares  for  1994 
were slightly above  5 % in  the EEA  plus  Switzerland  in 
respect  ·of  value  added  services  to  corporations 
(encompassing  most  of  the  services  within  the  three . 
m~kets  above)  and  slightly  over  15%  for  VSAT 
services. 
(b)  National  markets 
As  regards  domestic  packet  switched  data  communi-
cation. services,  in  1995,  Telia  had  78% in  Sweden (
11
), 
PIT  Telecom  and  Telef6nica  over  95%  in  the 
Netherlands  and Spain  and Swiss  Telecom  nearly  100% 
in  Switzerland.  Market figures  in  respect  of the  overall 
domestic  telcommunications  services  were  91  %  for 
Telia,  near  100%  for  PTf Telecom,  95,7%  for  Tele-
f6nica  and  near  100 % for  Swiss  Telecom. 
F.  CHANGES  MADE  AND  UNDERTAKINGS  GIVE~ 
RJRTHER TO THE COMMISSION•s  INfERVENTION 
Certain  features  of the  notified  transaction  appeared  to 
be  incompatible  with  Community  competition  rules. 
Consequently,  the  Commission  by  letter of 7  May  1996 
informed the Parties of its concerns. In the course of the 
notification  procedure  the  Parties  have  amended  ·the 
original  agreements  and  given  undertakings  to  the 
Commission.· 
In  addition,  the  Commission  wrote  to  the  four 
Governments  involved  enquiring  about  the  existing 
framework  and  the  intended  evolution  thereof.  Letters, 
where  required,  also  requested  changes  to  that 
framework  necessary in  the· Commission's view  in  order 
to create a  level  playing field.  The results  of such  action 
are summarized  under 3 below. 
1.  Contractu~ changes 
The  following  undertakings  reflect  changes  in  the 
no~fied  agreements: 
(a)  Spanish  data  networks 
From  the  date  of  completion  of  the  transactions 
envisaged  .in  the  notified  agreement  until  full  and 
effective  liberalization  of  telecommunication  infra-
Stroctures  and  services  in  Spain,  scheduled  for  30 
November  1998,  Unisource  NV undertakes  to  maintain 
the  Spanish  public  data  network  and  business  as  a 
separate legal  entity under Unisource  NV. The network 
will  during.  that  period  not  be.  integrated  in  the 
(") In  all  cases  through  the  respective  UBN  domestic 
subsidiary . 
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domestic  UBN  subsidiary  in  Spain  or  its  successor, 
Uniworld  Spain.  It will  keep  separate  accounts  and  will 
be  audited  ·as  such.  The  Commission  will  receive 
annually a copy of the auditors report. A register shall be 
kept of all  contracts  between  this  entity  and  any  other 
Unisource subsidiary.  Such  transactions will  comply with 
normal  market  Conditions.  The  Commission  will  be 
entitled  to  consult  this  register  pursuant  to this  under-
taking,  without  the  need  to  invoke  its  powers  under 
Council . Regulat,ion  17 I 62. 
(b)  Agency arrangements 
Unisource  NV  undertakes  that  neither  it  nor any of its 
subsidiaries  will  act  as  an  exclusive  agent  for  PTf 
Telecom or Telia in  respect of basic services  and will  not 
be  involved  with  the  provision  of leased  lines  on  behalf 
of  its  shareholders  (other  than  Telia)  until  1  January 
1998  except  as  purchaser  of  leased  lines  from  share-
holders for  its  own use  or for resale.  It will  terminate as 
from  the  date  of the  granting  of an  exemption  under 
Anicle 85  (3) of the EC Treaty and Anicle 53  (3) of the 
EEA  Agreement  the  exclusive  agency  agreem.ent  with 
P1T Telecom as  far as  it  is  concerned with leased  lines. 
Unisource NV undenakes  that neither  it  nor. any of its 
susidiaries will  act as  an exclusive agent for the provision 
of  leased  lines  on  behalf  of  Swiss  P1T or Telef6nica 
until  1 January  1998  except  as  purchaser  of leased  line 
from  each of thenn for its  own we or for resale. 
(c)  Transit  negotiations 
Unisource  NV  undenakes  that neither it nor any  of .  its 
subsidiaries,  in  particular  UCS,  will  act  as  the  sole 
representative  in  any ·capacity  for  any of the  Unisource 
shareholders  in  respect  of  the  negotiations  of  transit 
tariffs  in/through  the. Unisource  shareholders  countries 
on behalf of the shareholders with licensed operators and 
that  it  will  not  be  involved  in  these  negotiations  on 
behalf of the  shareholders  until  1 January  1998. 
2.  \Jndertakinas  pven  by the  parties 
(a)  Prewntion  of  discrimination 
Article  86  of· the  EC  Treaty  prohibits  the  abuse  of 
dominant  positions.  Each  of the  parents  of Unisource  is 
in  a  dominant  position  in  its  respective  domestic  market 
at least  for  the  provision  of infrastructures  required  by 
competitors  of  Unisource  in  those  domestic  markets. 
Accordingly,  to ensure the absence of discrimination, the 
Commission  intends  to ask  Unisource  and/  or its  parent 
companies  to  comply with  the  following: 
- all  shareholders undertake  that all  dealings  with any 
·  entity organized under the Unisource agreements will 
be  on non-discriminatory terms  with  regard to those 
terms  offered  to  third  parties  and  at  arm's  length 
basis,  in  connection  with  reserved  facilities  and 
services  and  with  such  facilities  and  services  which 
remain  an  essential  facility  after  full  and  effective 
liberalization  of  telecommunications  infrastructure 
and services in each of their respec.tive  countries. 
(1)  Leased  lines 
. - all  shareholders  undertake  that,  to  the  extent  that 
such  would  not  yet  be  the  case,  the  provision  of 
leased  lines  will  be  a  separated  service  for  which 
separate  accounts  will  be  kept  pursuant to  the  prin-
ciples,  rules  and  practices  currently  in  we  under 
national or community law, 
- all  shareholders  undertake  to  publish  the  standard 
terms and  conditions fcir  the leasing of lines  (national 
and  international).  The  terms  will  refer  to  the 
technical  sp·ecifications  of the  lines,  the  provisioning 
time, repair time,  tariffs and discounts, 
- all shareholders undenake that all  types of lines made 
available  to  any  of its  subsidiaries  or to  Unisource 
will  also  be  available  under  the  same  terms  and 
conditions for third parties, 
.  '  . 
- PIT Telecom has  no clause  in  its  general conditions 
containing any obligation  on customers  to reveal  the 
use  they intend to make  of leased lines  and does not 
request  such  informacion  from  (potential)  customers 
before  or  after  entering  into  contraCts  for  leased 
lines.  P1T 1:elecom  will  delete  any  clause  fonn  its 
general conditions containing references  ~o the usc of 
leued lines  (i.e.  clause  11.10)  and  international  half 
circuits  in ·any way which  would  not be  justified  by 
technical  considerations or mandatory provisions  and 
undertakes  not  to  introduce  such  clause  or  inter-
ference. 
(2)  Interconnection 
- Unisource  and  its  affiliates,  in  particular  UBN, 
undertakes  to  establish  and  maintain,  third  party 
access to public data networks (X.75 or any standard 
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that  might  replace  it)  of  domestic  UBN's  on 
non-discriminatory  cost-oriented  ~erms  including 
price,  availability  of volume  and other discounts  and 
the  quality  of interconnection  provided  as  from  the 
granting  of an  exemption  pursuant  to Article ·85  (3) 
of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  (3)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement.  These  terms  wiJJ  be  publicly . available. 
The  price  shall  be  based  on  costs  ·defined  and 
attributed using an analytical accounting system. This 
undertaking shall  remain  valid  for  the  period  of the 
validity  of  the  exemption  subject  to  review  upon 
request  of the  parties  of the  need  to  maintain  this 
undertaking by the Commission, 
- Telef6nica  will  provide  no  later than  on  the  date  of 
the  granting of an  exemption  under Article  85  (3) of 
the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  53  (3)  of  the  EEA 
Agreement  a  draft  standard  interconnection 
agreement to the Commission in  respect of the PSTN 
and ISDN networks which will  be in  accordance with 
relevant  EU and national  regulations. This agreement 
will  provide  for  timely  interconnection  and  will 
include  terms  and  conditions  (including  technical 
standards  and  specifications)  which  are non-discrimi-
natory  and  cost-oriented  on  a  service-by-service 
basis. 
Interconnection  will  be  available  at  a  reasonable 
range of termination points, in  accordance with inter-
national  technical  standards,  to ensure  adequate and 
efficient  interconnections  to  the  extent  necessary  to 
ensure  interoperability of services.  There would  be  a 
number  of regional  points  of interconnection  where 
international  standardized  interfaces  and  signalling 
synems  are  available  and  where  it  is  economically 
feasible, 
- Telef6nica  undertakes  th~t it  will.  continue  to  grant 
access  on  a  non-discriminatory  basis  to  customer 
databases  necessary  for  the  provision  of  directory 
services  at a cost-oriented pricing  and  in  compliance 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Public  Act  on  Personal 
Data Handling (LORTAD), 
- P1T Telecom  will  provide no later thap  on  the date 
of the granting of an exemption  under Article  85  (3) 
of  the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  53  (3)  pf  the  EEA 
Agreement  a  standard  interconnection  agreement  to 
the  Commission  in  respect  of the  PSTN  and  ISDN 
networks  which  will  provide  for  timely  intercon-
nection  and  will  include  terms  and  conditions 
(including  technical  standards  and  specifications) 
which  are  non-discriminatory  and  cost-oriented on  a 
service-by-service  basis. 
Interconnection  will  be  available  at  a  reasonable 
range of termination pointS  in  accordance with  inter-
national  technical  standards  to  ensure  adequate  and 
efficient  interconnections  to  the  extent  necessary  to 
ensure interoperability of services.  There would  be  a 
number  of regional  pointS  of interconnection  where 
international  standardized  interfaces  and  signalling 
systems  are  available  and  where  it  is  economically 
feasible, 
- PTr Telecom  undertakes  that  it  will  continue  to 
grant  access  on · a  non-discriminatory  basis  to 
customer  databases  necessary  for  the  provision  of 
directory services at a cost-oriented pricing, 
- Swiss  PTT will  provide  no later than  on· the  date  of 
the  granting of an  exemption  under Anicle  85  (3)  of 
the  EC  Treaty  and  Article  53  (3)  of  the  EE.A 
Agreement  a  standard  interconnection  agreement  to 
the  Commission  in  respect  of the  PSTN  and  ISDN 
networks  which  will  be  in  accordance  with  relevant 
Swiss  regulations.  This  agreement  will  provide  for 
timely  interconnection  and  will  include  terms  and 
conditions  (including  technical  standards and  specifi-
cations)  which  are  non-discriminatory  and  cost-
oriented on a service-by-service  basis. 
Interconnection  will  be  available  at  a  reasonable 
range of termination pointS  in  accordance with inter-
national  technical  standards  to  ensure  adequate  and 
efficient  interconnections  to  the  extent  necessary  to 
ensure  interoperability of services.  There would  be  a 
number  of regional  pointS  of  interconnection  where 
international  standardized  interfaces  and  signalling 
systems  are  available  and  where  it  is  economically 
feasible, 
- Swiss  J!IT undertakes  that it will  continue  to grant, 
in  accordance  to  the  relevant  Swiss  regulations, 
a~s on  a  non-disajminatory  basis  to  customer 
databases  necessary  for  the  provision  of  directory 
services at a cost-oriented pricing, 
~  Telia undertakes that interconnection charges  will  be 
non-discrimintory,  cost-oriented  and  transparent  in 
compliance with  relevant Swedish  regulations. 
(b)  No  misuse of  confulential information 
- Unisource  NV  undertakes  that  UCS  will  not  make 
available  to  any  other  of  itS  subsidiaries  or  share-
holders  confidential  information  in  respect  of 
reserved  services  e.g.  in  respect of customer contract-
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related  data such as  prices  received  in  its  capacity as 
agent of the Unisource shareholders, 
- Unisource NV will  require  that the  Unisource share-
holders  will  not  use  confidential  customer 
information  acquired  by  Unisource  in  the  provision 
of  Unisource  data  services  within  business  units  of 
the Unisource  shareholders selling  competing services 
or products. 
The above undertakings are also  given  by Unisource NV 
in  respect  of the subsidiary which  will  own  and  operate 
the  Spanish  public  data network and  business, 
- a:ll  sharehold~rs undertake  that  they  will  not  misuse 
confidential  information  in  respect  of  customer 
contract  related  data  such  as  prices  received ·in , its 
capacity  as  shareholders  in  Unisource  NV.,  because 
of  its  representation  on  any  board · or  committee  in 
any  entity  established  pursuant  to  the  Unisource 
agreements,  or  as  distributor  for  any  Unisource 
services, 
- all  shareholders  will  furthermore  ensure  that · 
Unisource NV or its  subsidiaries will  not have  access 
to  confidential  information  in  respect  of  customer 
contract-related  data  such  as  prices  acquired  by 
providing  reserved  services  (for  instance  intercon- . 
nection agreements or the provision  of basic  capacity 
to competitors of Unisource). 
(c)  Prevention  of  cross-subsidies 
The parties shall  not engage in  cross-subsidization within 
the  meaning  of the  Commission's  competition  guidelines. 
for  the  telecommunications  sector C'): 
- all  shareholders  undertake  not  to  grant  any  cross-
subsidies  to  any  entity  created  pursuant  to  the 
···  Unisource  agreements  funded  out  of  income 
generated  by  any  business  which  they  operate 
pursuant to any exclusive right or in  respect of which 
they  hold  a  dominant  position  in  the  meaning  of 
Article 86 of the EC Treaty, 
- all  shareholders further undertake; (i) to provide  any 
entity  created  pursuant to  the  Unisource ·agreements 
with  their  own  debt  financing;  (ii)  not 
(") Guidelines  on  the  application  of  EEC  competition  rules  in 
the  telecommunieationl  sector.  OJ  No  C 233,  6.  9.  1991. 
Point 102 tt ltq. 
to allocate  operating expenses  of these  entities  to  the 
shareholders; and (iii)  to  charge  the shareholders  the 
same  price  as  they  charge  third  parties  for  the 
provision of services, 
- all  shar_cholders  will  ensure  transparency  by  ensuring 
compliance  with  the  accounting  rules,  principles  and 
practices  currently  in  use  under  national  or 
community  law.  Such  rules,  principles  and  practices 
include  the  cost  standard  used,  the  accounting 
conventions  used  for  the  treatement of costs  and  the 
attribution method chosen.  Payments .  and  transfers  to 
Unisource and Unisource companies can be  identified 
on  the  basis  of  accounting  reports  that  are  period-
.  ically  available, 
- Telef6nica  undertakes  and  confirms  that  it  will 
continue to keep  the analytical  accounts  according to 
the  rules,  principles  and  practices  already  in  use  and 
to  the  extent  that  it  is  not  the  case  yet,  Telef6nica 
will·  fully  implement  such  analytical  accounting 
system.  T elef6nica  refers  specifically  to  the  Spanish 
Royal  Decree  1558/1995  (whiches  gives  implemen-
tation to Council Directive 92/44/EEC for the estab-
lishment  of  the  open  network  provision  for  leased 
circuits)  and  to  the  resolution  of  the  Directorate-
General  for  Telecommunications  (DGTEL)  of  21 
February  1996  approving  the  contract-type  for  the 
provision  of  the  national  and  international  circuit 
leasing  carrier  service  that  was  already  sent· to  the 
Commission on April  26. 
(d)  Prevention of  bundling 
- Telef6nica  undertakes  that it  will  not tie  in  the  sale 
of  any  service  provided  by  Unisource  with  any 
service  provided  by Telef6nica.  It  ·  will  moreover  for 
as long as  it has  exclusive or special  rights to provide 
telecommunications  services  and/  or  infrastructures 
only  make  combined  offerings  of Unisource  and  its 
own services  in  a way that the customer can  identify 
in  the contract forms the price charged as  well  as  the 
order terms  and  conditions  for  these  services  and  it 
will  ensure  that  each  of these  components  .is  sepa-
rately available  at equivalent conditions, 
- P1T Telecom  urtdertakes  that it  will  not  tie  in  the 
sale  of any  service  provided  by  Unisource  with  any 
service  provided  by PTr Telecom.  It will  moreover, 
for as  long  as. it has  the exclusive or special  rights  to 
provide  telecommunication  services  and/  or  infra-
structures,  only  make  combil;ted  offerings  of 
Unisource  and  its  own  services  in  a  way  that  the 
customer can identifiy in  the contract forms  the price 
charged as  well  as  the other terms and conditions for 
these  services  and  it  will  ensure  that  each  of these 
components  is  separately  available · at  equivalent 
conditions, 
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- Swiss  PTr undertakes  that it will  not tie  in  the  sale 
of  any  service  provided  by  Unisource  with  any 
service  provided by Swiss .PIT. It will  moreover,  for 
as  long as  it has exclusive or special rights to provide 
telecommunications  selVices  -and/  or  infrastructures; 
only  make  combined  offerings  of Unisource  and  its 
own services  in  a way that the customer can  identify 
in  the contraCt forms  the price charged as  well  as  the 
other terms  and  coilditiom  for  these  selVices  and  it 
will  ensure  that  each  of these  components  is  sepa-
rately available at equivalent conditions. 
All  the  above  undertakings  will  be  valid  as  from  date  of 
the  exemption  for  the  period  of  validity  of  such 
exemption. 
3.  Changes  to the  regulatory framework in  the  countries 
involved in Unisource 
The  Commission  discussed  with  the  governments 
involved  the  degree  of  liberalization  of  each  national 
market  directly  involved  and  the  existence  of regulatory 
mechanisms  to  ensu,re  a  level  playing  field  in  these  tele-
communications markets. Such discussions  took the form 
of an  exchange  of letters  between  the  Commission  and 
each government which  began on 10  April  1996. 
Sweden 
There  is  already  full  liberalizati~n in  Sweden. 
By  letter  of  25  April  1995,  ~e Swedish  Minister  for 
Telecommunications  added  that  the  current  Telecom-
,  munications Aet of 1 July 1993 will be reformed in  1997. 
The  most  imponant changes  will  regard  the  powers· of 
the  regulat~r (the  National  Post  and. Telecom Agency), 
which  will  be  extended  as  a  consequence  of  the  EU 
Interconnection  DireCtive  to  be  adopted.  -
The Netherlands 
The  Commission  sought  confirmation  that  the 
Netherlands  will  respect  the  dates  for  dte  liberalization 
of alternative  infrastrUcture  and  for  the  introduction  of 
full  competition  respectively,  and  that  an  independent 
regulatory agency  was  in  place. 
In  her reply of 25 June 1996,  the Minister for ·Transport 
and Waterways of the Netherlands indicated that as  of 1 
of january  1996,  it  is  possible  to  use  cable  television 
networks  for  liberalized  telecommunications  services  and 
as  leased  lines.  Furthermore,  under new  legislation  being 
. adopted  by  the  Parliament,  full  liberalization  will  take 
place  on  1 July  1997. Two more  national  licences  (apart 
from  KPN's  concession)  without  territorial  limitation 
and  a  large  number  of  regional  licences  with  territorial 
limitations  will  be  granted  to  install,  maintain  and 
operate  fuced  infrastruCture.  All  these· new  infrastructure 
licences  "(ill  have  the  right and  (after an  interim period) 
the  obligation  to  supply  leased  lines.  All  of  them  will 
have  rights  of way . 
Further ·fixed  networks  can  be  installed  by  any  person 
without a licence.  Such  networks will  be  used  to provide 
leased  lines  or telecommunication  services  (except  voice 
telephony).  However,  they  will  not  have  rights  of way. 
Finally,  an  independent  regulator  will  be  established  by 
1 January  1997. 
Spain 
The liberalization  of alternative  infrastructure  by  1 July 
1996,  the setting up  of an  independent regulatory agency 
and  the  formal  relinquishment  by  Spain  of the  right  to 
request a temporary derogation  in  respect of the date of 
liberalization  of  voice  telephony  and  infrastruCture 
granted  to  Spain  by  Directive  96/19/EC of  13  March 
1996,  amending  Directive  90/388/EEC  with  regard  to 
the  implementation  of  full  competition  in  telecommuni-
cations  markets,  constituted  the  subject  matter  of  an 
.  exchange·  of  letters  between  the  Commission  and  the 
Spanish  Governm~nt. 
In  his  initial  reply of 25 June 1996,  the Spanish Minister 
for Public Works and Telecommunications indicated that 
the  Royal  Decree-Law  6/96  of 7 June  on  the  liberal-
ization  of  telecommunications  proposed  by  the  new 
Spanish  Government  and  adopted  by  the  Spanish 
Parliament (f')  provides,  among  other  things,  for  the 
immediate  liberalization  of alternative  infrastruaure  (as 
of now, Retevisi6n and Correos - the post office - are 
already  authorized  to  provide  capacity  to  third  parties) 
and · for  the  creation  of  a  new.  independent  regulator 
(Comisi6n  del  Mercado  de  las  Telecommunicationes), 
the memtiers  of which have already been nominated and 
which  will  be  operational  be  the  end .of  1996. 
The  Spanish  telecommunications  market  will  be  fully 
liberalized  before  30  November  1998.  By  that  date, 
further  licences  for  voice  telephony  services  and  public 
infrastrUcture  wm  be  granted,  in  addition  to  those 
granted  that date  (as  further  described  below). 
(") The  Spanish  Parliament  decided  at  the  same  time  tO  pass 
the  Royal  Decree-Law  as  a law,  which  would  delay  by  a 
few  months the entry into force of the new legislation.  · 
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The  abovementioned  Royal  Decree-Law  established  a 
second  operator - Retevisi6n - for the entire range of 
telecommunications  services  and  infraStrUctures.  The 
second  operator  will  be  privatized  by  tender  to  be 
awarded during the fll'St  quarter of 1997. A third licence 
for  the  provision  of voice  telephony  and  public  infra-
structures  with  nationwide  coverage  will  be  granted  by 
the  beginning  of January  1998.  By  the same date,  cable 
television  operators  which  so  request  will  start offering 
voice  telephony  and  public  infrastructures  within  their 
respective  areas.  On  that  basis, . the  Commission  has 
considered  that the  degree  of actual  competition  in  the 
Spanish  telecommunications  market  by the  beginning  of 
1998  will  be  comparable  to that of most  Member States 
which  will  abide  by  the  liberalization  date of 1 January 
1998. 
Switzerland 
The  Commission  requested  the  acceptance  by  Swit-
zerland  of the  l  July  1996 and  1 January 1998  dates  for 
the  liberalization of alternative  infrastructure and  for the 
introduction  of  full  competition  respectively  and  the 
confirmation  that an  independent regulatory agency was 
in  place. 
By  letters  of 2  July and  13  September  1996,  the  Swiss 
Minister  for  Transport,  Communications  and  Energy 
stated  that  telecommunications  in  Switzerland  will  be 
fully  liberalized  by  1 January  1998  in  parallel  with  the 
EU.  A new_ law  wiU  be  enacted  in  the  new  future  elim.,. 
inating  remaining  restrictions. 
As  regards  alternative  infrastructure  liberalization,  the 
Minister  indicated  that  since  1  May  1995  15  pilot 
licences  have  been  granted  (the  majority  to  cable  tv 
operators).  Such  pilot  licences  allow  the  provision  of 
some  telecommunications  services  to  subscribers 
{Internet  access,  data  transmission,  multimedia  and 
telephony  within  closed  users  groups).  The  contents  of 
such  licences will  be  extended before the end of 1996 to 
offer  the  possibility  to  owners  of  alternative  infra-
structUres  in  Switzerland  to  carry  out  commercial 
activities, .  in  particular  for  the  provision  over  them  of 
corporate  telecommunications  services.  Competitors  to 
Swiss PIT for the  provision  of such  corporate .telecom-
munications  services  will  be  allowed  ·to  use  such  alter-
native  infrastructures. 
As  regards  the  regulator,  the  existing  regulator (Ofcom) 
wiJJ  be  supplemented  by .  a  communications  commission 
independent  from  the  Swiss  federal  administration.  The 
new  commission  will  be  particularly  responsible  for 
decisions  in  respect of which a conflict of intereSts  could 
exist between Ofcom as  regulator and the Confederation 
as .owner of Swiss  PTf. 
G.  11iE COMMISSION'S  INTENTIONS 
On  the  basis  of the  foregoing,  the  Commission  intends 
to take  a  favourable  view  pursuant  to Article  85  of the 
EC Treaty and Article 53  of the EEA Agreement and to 
grant  to  Unisource  and  to  the  incorporation  of Tele-
f6nica  to  Unisource  an  individual  exemption pursuant to 
Article  85  (3) of the EC Treaty and Article 53  (3) of the 
EEA  Agreement.  Before  doing  so,  it  invites  interested 
third parties to send their observations within one month 
of the publication of this notice to the-following address, 
quoting  the  reference  IV  /35.830 - Unisource - Tele-
~nkL  · 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (GD IV), 
Direaorate  C, 
Rue  de Ia  Loi/W  etstraat 200, 
B-1 049  Brussels, 
Fax:  (32-2)  296 98 19. 
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Notice relating to  Case  Nos  IV/35.337 - Adas and IV/35.617 - Phoenix/Global One 
(97 IC 47 /08) 
(Text with  EEA relevance) 
On 17 July 1996  the Commission adopted individual exemption decisions pursuant to Article 
85  {3)  of the EC Treaty and Article ·53  (3)  of the EEA Agreement in  Case Nos IV /35.337-
Atlas (I) and IV /35.617- Phoenix/Global One e). Pursuant to Article 6 (1) of Council Regu-
lation  No 17 (l),  the Commission specified  t~at the exemptions would become effective from 
the  date  on  which  two  or more  licences  for  the  construction  or ownership  and  control  of 
alternative infrastructure for the provision of liberalized telecommunications services take effect 
in  both Germany and France. 
On 15  October 1996, the Federal Republic of Germany granted three alternative infrastructure 
licences  pursuant to the German telecommunications  law,  one with  nationwide coverage  and 
two with .broad coverage of major urban areas.  By  22  November, seven  further licences,  one 
allowing . for  nationwide  coverage,  had  been  granted  and ·awards  of  several  more  were 
announced before  the  end of 1996.  In  France,  the  first  alternative  infrastructure licence  was 
granted  under  the  French  telecommunications  law  on  21  November  1996  and  the  second, 
allowing for nationwide coverage, on 29  November 1996. Two further licences were awarded 
in  December  1996,  whereby aU  outstanding requests  for licences  had been dealt with  by  the 
competent French authorities. In both countries, these licences entitle the respective licensees to 
provide  all  telecommunications  services  to  the  public  except  public  voice  telephone  services 
between  fixed  points.  This  means  that there are  no longer any regulatory constraints on  the 
licensees  in  question  to provide such  telecommunications services,  including infrastructure, to 
telecommunications  services  providers  competing with  the Atlas. and  Global  One companies. 
Furthermore,  the  granting. of  the  licences  referred  to  above  indicates  that  the  licensing 
procedures established  under the  respective  national  telecommunications legislation  in  France 
and Germany are working satisfactorily and that competition in the provision of infrastructure 
can be expected to increase; it  is  expected that there will be requests for and awards of further 
licences  in  both countries. 
Pursuant to Article  1 of the Atlas  and Phoenix/Global One decisions, the exemptions granted 
by the Commission were stated to take effect once two alternative infrastructure licences  have 
become effective  in  both France and Germany. 'The alternative infrastructure licences ·granted 
by  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  in  October  and  November  1996  became  effective 
immediately upon  being issued  to the licensees. The alternative  infrastructure licences granted 
by the French Republic on 21  November and 29  November 1996 became effective upon publi-
cation  in  the Journal  Officiel  de  la  Republique  Fran~aise, on 23  November and  1 December 
1996 respectively. Therefore, the conditions referred to which were required by Article I of the 
Atlas decision  and Article  1 of the  Phoenix/Global One decision  have been fulfilled  and the 
exemptions granted on  17  July  1996  have  taken effect on  1 December 1996 . 
(')  OJ No L 239,  19. 9.  1996, p. 23. 
(Z)  OJ No L 239,  19. 9.  1996, p.  57. 
e>  OJ No 13, 21. 2.  1962, p. 204162. 
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Notification of a joint venture 
(Case  No  IV/36.308  ~''BT/News International - Springboard) 
(97 /C 651bt,1" 
(Text  with  EEA .relevance) 
1.  On 6 December  1996, the  Commission  received  notification of an agreement pursuant to 
Anicle  4 of Council  Regulation  No 17 (') signed  between  British  Telecommunications  plc  and 
News  International  plc.  The Parties  have  formed  a joint venture  to be  known  as  Springboard 
Internet Services  Limited, with  the principal services provided by  the joint venture to be  known 
as  LineOne. The mass  market service will  be  aimed at UK and non-UK consumers. The panics 
state  that  BT's  technical  expertise  and  News  In~ernational's  extensive  content  and  editorial 
skills  are  necessary  for  the  joint venture.  Springboard will  provide: 
- an integrated consumer oriented Internet access  and content service  to UK customers, 
- a consumer-oriented Internet content-only service to EU and worldwide customers, 
- a third party Web site creation service for business customers. 
Content  will  be  sourced  from  the  joint  venture  parents  and  third  parties,  and  will  also  be 
developed  by  Springboard  itself.  Content  rights  will  be  acquired  on  an  exclusive  and  a. 
non-exclusive  basis. 
2.  On  preliminary  exalJlination,  the  Commission  finds  that  the  notified  agreement  falls 
within  the scope  of Regulation  No  17. 
3.  The  Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to  submit  any  observations  on  the 
proposed agreements  to  the  Commission. Third parties  submitting observations  should  indicate 
clearly  any  business  secrets  which  should  be  kept confidential. 
Observations must reach the Commission to later than  10  days following the date of this  publi-
cation.  Observations  may be  sent to the  Commission by fax  (No (32-2) 296 70 81)  or by  mail, 
stating  the  reference  IV  /36.308,  to  the  following  address:  · 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV), 
Directorate  C, 
Avenue  de  Cortenberg/Kortenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
(')  OJ.No 13, 21.  2.  1962, p.  204/62. 
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(ltas whost puiJiitation  is not  oiJ/igatoty) 
COMMISSION 
COMMIS~ION DECISION 
.  of i7  Pe~ruary·t9JS  ~ 
dee~g  a c:onceatratfon to be -compab"ble with the common ·market 
(Cue IVIM.<C61  ~·  Siemens/laaltel) 
(~ly  _the  English tat is authentic) 
(9SI2SSIEC) 
THE  COMMissiON  OF THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNmBS, 
. Having  repd to tbe  T~nty establishing  the  European 
Community,  .  · ·  . 
Havina repd to ~a1  Replation (BBC) No -4064/89 
of  21  December  1989  on  the control of concentrations 
between  undertaldft&t r~ and  in  particular  Aiticle  8 (2) 
the~f. 
. Having repd to the  BBA ·Apemtnt and  in  partiaular 
Aitide 57  (I) thereof, 
Hmag repnl to the Commission Decision of 14 October 
1994  to initiate  proc:ecdinp  in this  case. 
...  Having teprd to the opinion of. the Advisory cOmmittee 
on  COncenbadons~  . · 
Whereu: 
(1)  The  abovementioned  ·operation  concerns  the 
-.ablishmcnt of a joint venture between STET -
Societi  Pinanziaria  Telefonica ·- per.  Azioni 
('S'm1 and ·si:mens Aktiengesellschaft ('Siemens1. 
(') OJ No L 39S, 30. J2. lflt,  p. 1. Corriamdum: OJ No L 157, 
21. '·· lffO, p.  IJ.  .  .  . 
(2)  OJ No  C 116.  11.  7.  I,S, p.  4.  .  . 
.J. THE OPERATION  AND THE  PARnES 
(2)  On  26  March  1994, STBT and  Siemens  siped a 
·mf!morandum of undentanding aimed at the crea-
tion  of  a  European  Telecom  pup capable  of 
playing a majOr role u  an international ·supplier• In 
the  notified  operad~n. the  parties  will  transfer  to 
~e joint  venture  theit  Italian  subsidiaries,  ltaltel 
ind  Siemens  Telecomuni~oni (S'I).  ·for  deve-
lopina, manufactu~&  sales and service activities in 
the  field  of  telecommunications.  '  .  -
STET and Siemens will create .•  -.holding :to which 
STET  will  trinsfer  initially  60 °/o  of  the  capital 
stock of  Italtel (the  remaining 40 %  equity ·being 
contributed  later)  and  Siemens  will  contribute  by 
trllllferring the whole capitalJtOc:k of ST as well u 
an  amount  in  C'Uh. 
(3)  STBT is an  Italian  company of which  46,61  1/o  of 
the  ~pita! ·shares (64,20 °/o  of the· ordinary voting 
alwea) is owned by the Istituto per Ia Ricostruzione 
IJidUitriale SpA (IRI). STST coordinates  the activ· 
idea of a JrOUP of companies operatinJ in the fjeJd 
of  telecommunicadona.  ·  . 
(4)  STBT operates  a fully  independent company  and 
its  stoc:lc  is quoted  on  the  Milan  Stock  Exchanp. 
mrs  ·function  is. limited.  to  that ·of  a  holding 
company on behalf of the Italian ·state, and for the 
purposes of this notification, STBT1s considered to 
be· •an  economic  unit with  an  independent power 
of dccilion' u described in recital  12 of the Merser 
... -Replation. 
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ltalcel  is  the  manufactu~na  and  marketina 
company  of  STET  in  tt.e  telecommunications 
sector.  STET  holds  100 1/o  'of  ltaltel'•  repcered 
shares. 
· ltallcl  is  mainly  active  in  developina.  producin& 
and  marketina systems  and  equipment  for  public 
and  private  telecommunications  in  the  fields  of 
swilchin&  tnnsmission  systems.  mobile  radio 
netwOrks.  PBX's  and  tenninals. 
(S)  Siemens  is a publicly  held  German  industrial and 
· electronics company and the ultimate parent of the 
Siemens group  of companies. The  principal  activ-
ities  of  Siemens  are :  industrial  · and  building 
systems, drives  and  standard  products, automation, 
automotive  systems.  power  seneration  (K~ 
power  transmission  and  distribution.  Semiconduc-
tors.  medical  enJineerin&  public  communication 
networks,  netWOrk  systems.  passive  components 
·  and electron tubes, private communication systems, 
defense  electronics· and  transportation  systems. 
ST is a wholly-owned IJalian subsidiary of Siemens, 
with  manufacturing, sales and services activities in 
the fields of public and private telecommunications 
equipment, systems  and  Services,  includin&  public 
and  private  switchina,  transmission,  fixed  and 
mobile·  radio  networks, u  well  as  terminal equip-
ment  fot  the  private  market. 
(6)  Alter  ~veral years'  work  on  the  rationalization  of 
the  Italian  telecommunications  sector  in  the 
cum:nt year  a single  telecommunication  operator 
has  been  established.  further to  the  resolution  of 
the sharehol.ders of SIP, ltalcable, Iritel. Telespazio 
and  Sinn· on  19 ·May  1994, the deed  mergina the 
other  concessionaire  companies  into  SIP  was 
siped  on  27 July  1994  and .  took  retros~ve 
effect  in  accounting  and  fiscal  terms  as  of  I · 
Jan~ary 1994.  · 
The merser was implemented· on  I 8 Aupst 1994. 
While retainina its present name, SIP hu also been 
entitled to adopt the ·  name  of Telecon:t  ltalia SpA 
for  Ill ·lepl purposes. &  a result of the operation 
STET  hu  .S6,10 1/o  of  the  ordinary  sham  qf 
Telecom  ltalia  and.  IRI  2.81  1/o  ·Of  the  ordin.,Y 
shares. Telecom ltalia is listed on the stock market 
and the rema,nina part of the share capital is held 
by  private  minority  shareholden. 
.  . 
· With· the abovementioned operation and  the other 
subsequent resolutions the major puts of the atepa 
for  the completion  of the· plan  for the reorpniu-
,...  •  '  ..  • •  'r 
tion  of  the  'Italian  telecommuniation  sector 
· accordina  to  the  lines  approved  by  ~the  Italian 
. Govemment  h~  been  taken. 
In  panicular the  com·ptny  which 'is  active  in  the 
provision  of  the  telecommunication  services 
(I'elecom  ltalia)  has  been  separated  within  the 
STET  poup  from  the  companies  which  are  in 
charae  of  the  equipment  ~anufacturing activities 
(Jtaltel,  ·s~rti and  Act~ 
The  remainin&  steps  of  the ·  reorpnization  plan 
concern  the  transfer  from  Telecom  ltalia  of  its 
mobile  phone  operations  and  space  divisions  to 
independent  companl~. 
(7)  ltaltel had been lookina ~  a tecl,lnoloaical  panner 
in the  past. It fint establfibed a number of agree· 
menta with  ATllr which .  included  the  acquisition 
by AT&T of a minority stake in the capital share of 
ltaltel. 'I'he apements with AT&T have  now been 
terminated  and  AT&T  has  sold  its  stake  back  to 
STET.· 
U. ntE CONCENTRATION 
Joint control 
(8) ·  STBT  and  Siemens  shall  each  own  SO %  of  the 
share capital in the Joint venture. The joint venture 
will have a nine-member Board of  Directors. STET 
and  Siemens  will  appoint  four  members  each, 
. while  the  ninth  member,  the  Chairman  of  the 
BOard, will be designated by STET and approved by 
Siemens.  ·  ·  -
(9)  The  BOard  shall  be  governing  body  of  the  joint 
venture and shall have the authority to adopt reso-
lutions on any matter not  ~rved  by virtue of 1.,.-
to the shareholden' meetina. The resolution of key 
decisions will be adopted by the Board of Directori 
with the approval of the STBT and Siemens' repre-
sentatives. These decisions inJcude amnna othen : 
.  (10) 
. - the approval of the  atra~&ic business  plan  and  . 
~e yearly  l;»udaet.  · 
- the  proposals  of  the  CBO  as  to  the  appoint-
ment and removal of. senior o~ficen of the joint 
endty  and  of  the  Board  members  of  the 
holding'~• subsidiaries. 
With· re.rrd to mauen reserved to the shaMhotden 
meetina• .  decision,  under  the ..shareholders  agree· 
me~t  each party c:omml'- itself to vote its shares in 
conformity .with the proposals previously approved 
by the  Board  accorcJing  to  the  above. 
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Each  of  the  parties wi!l  have  the ript of  veto  at 
least  over  the  principal  decisions  conumina the 
joint venture, which are mentioned under point 9  • 
Therefore.  they  will  have  joint  control  over  the 
joint venture. 
Pull funccion encity 
The  parties will  transfer to  the  joint venture  their 
Italian  subsidiaries  which  are  active  in  the  m,nu-
. facturina  of  telecommunicatiora  equipment.  The  · 
operation will brina about the ,.industrial merser of 
·  the activitia of the parties  i~ the product ueu of 
switchinJ, transmission. radio systems, mobile radio 
and  private communication systems and terminals. 
The  joint  venture  will  have  all  the  asscta  and 
resources necessary to perform all the  functions of 
.  an  autonomous  entity,  indudins bD, manufac-
turina and  distribution:. 
Por the main  product:~ of the public  ~lecommuni· 
cation  sector (pUblic  switching systems and  ttln$· 
miuion) the bulk of the sales of the joint venture 
will continue to be absorbed by. the Italian telecom 
operator, which is controlled by one of the parenta 
(STET). A hiJh level of sales to a parent in a down· 
saum market could lead to qtaestionins the auto-
nomy  of the  joint venture.  It is  true  th~ for  the 
, foreseable  future  Telecom  ltalia  will  be ·the  only 
buyer on the public telccom maikets. This is due to · 
the  infrastructure  monopoly  and  not  to  the  fact 
that the ·manufacture of telecommunication equip-
.  mentis an auxitiary_.activity to the provision of the 
service. 
AbHDce ·of coordinadon 
While  Siemens  will  rematn  active  in  the  .-me 
product markets is the joint venture  ~tside Italy, · 
SI'ET is  to withdnw from.  the markets  concemed 
by  transferrina  its  relevant  busineu  to .  the  joint 
· ventu~. The only exception  to this is that ABT, a 
subsidiary of STET~ is active in one of the markets 
(transmission) affected  by  the· operation.  Howmr, 
Siemens does  ~ot retain  any  business  activity  for 
transmission  in  Italy.  At  European  level  AJrr · 
tumover .in tnnsmlaioa is of minor importance : it 
represent~ las thin  I.S 'lo  of  the  ~tal market. 
Furthermore, the potential for coordination arisina 
hom this situation  is. minimal pven  ·'the.  fact .. that 
the. activities. of ABT.!n the transmission market in 
(1-4) 
Italy  arc  of  minor  imponance  in ·relation  to  che 
overall activities of the mersed entity (around 2%). 
Wich  rc~  to the role of Marconi IS I  compedtor 
of  ltaltel  on  the  relevant  markets,  it  hu to  be 
conaideted  that  recendy  Marconi,  which  is  an 
Italian  company  which  fonns  part  of  the  Gnc 
pup and  Pinmecanica,  a company  which,  like 
STET,  also  belonp  to  the  Italian  State  holdina 
company,  IRI,  established  a  concentrative  joint 
venture (1)  which  will  operate  in  a  number  of 
communications  m~ket sesments includina some 
(PTf  network  minapment  and  supervisory 
systems.  infrastNcturc  for  cellular  radio  networks 
and terminals for  public ceUull(. radio  network) in 
which  the  parties arc  present. ?Jthouah IRI  is  the 
ultimate  holdlna company  of  both  Finmeccanica, 
which  owns · SO  1/o  of  the  share  capital  of  the 
Narconi/Pinmecanica  joint  venture,  and  STET, 
which will have a SO 1/o stake in the Siemens/ltaltel 
joint venture, there .  is  no  link between  ~lET and 
Pinmeccanica,  both  of  which  operate  as  sep~rate 
economic units, conducting their business indepen-
dently  from  each  other. 
Thus effectively only Siemens will remain active on 
the  joint venture's  markets.· Havina  transferred  its 
wets  and  expertise  in  the  hiah-tech  products 
concemed,  it  would  be ·costly  and  commercially 
unreasonable  for ·STET to  attempt  to  re-enter the 
mirket. There is therefore no relevant risk of coor-
dination  arising  f~m the  notified  operation.  · 
IlL THE COMMUNJrY DIMENSION 
The  undertakinp  concemed  have·  a  combined 
appte. worldwide  turnover  in  excess  of·  ECU 
S 000  million. STBT· achieVed  a turnover  of  ECU 
16 174 mUiion  in  1993 ind Siemens one  of  ECU 
42 08i million  in  the financiaJ. year endina on  30 
September  1993. They  bOth  have  a .Communitya 
wide turnover of more than BCU lSO million. They 
do not achieve more than two-thirds of their aggre· 
gate  Community-wide  turnover  in  one  and  the 
ume Member State. The operation therefore  has a 
Community  dimension.  The  operation  is  nQt  an 
EEA  'coopemtion'  eue  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 58 and Protocoll4 of the BEA Agreement. 
(') OJ  No  C 253,  10.  9.'199-4,  p.  10. 
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IV. 1111 RELEVANT  PRODUCI"  MARKET 
(IS)  The  proposed· transaction  concema  broadl)·  the 
public and private telecommunications systems and 
equipment sectors. Por the  purposel of identifying 
the  relevant  affected  product  markets,  the  parties 
have subdivided the  first  of these secton into four 
product  markets :  · 
1.  public  switching  systems 
2.  transmission 
3.  radio  systems 
4.  mobile  radio  network 
and the second they have  likewise subdivided  into 
two: 
S.  private  switching  and  key  telephone  systems 
. (KTS) 
6.  communication  terminals 
(I 6)  Public telecommunications 
1.  Public switching systems allow the interconntc-
tion  of service  usen. The switched  services can 
cover  voice,  data,  ima&e  and  text.  The  three 
main  network switching nodes are characterized 
by: 
(a)  local switching. functions which  inte~nnect 
. end-usen; 
(b)  _transit  exchanges  which  interconnect trans-
mission  links ; 
(c)  international  ·  . transit  exchanses  which 
provide  international  services. 
In  the  past, these switching nodes were built in 
analogue mode but, since the  1980s, public swit· 
/  ching  equipment  with  analogue  technoloSY ·is 
being  gradually  replaced  in  Europe  by  equip· 
ment  in  diJital  ·synchronous  mode  and  new 
extensions  i_n. the  networks  are  likewise  being 
carried  out  In  diJital  technology.  In  Italy,  this 
process of diJitaliution of the network is now at 
around  ~  'lo  of· its completion  and  is expected · 
to reach 90 1/o  by the end of  1998, according to 
the  parties. 
The  current  life  cycle  for  public  switching 
s)'stems  is  around  IS  years.  This .lengthy  life  · 
cycle, despite rapid progress, is ·due to the possi-
bility of adaptation and updating of the software 
programme~ that  run  the  switching equipment 
and to the reenJineering of parts of the systems. 
At present. the major technoloJical trend that is 
influencing development~ in  public switching is 
the increuing use of software to  provide: intelli· 
aen:e in the network. Examples of this trend are 
TNM  (telecommunication  . network  manap· 
ment~ IN  (inteltiscnt  network~ OS  (operator 
lystems)  and  AN  (access  network).  The  use  of 
.stand-aiP'Ie modules with open interfaces allot.'S 
for the continuoua upgrading and enhancing of 
the  network  by such  new  features  and  services. 
Software  is  frequently  updated  (e.g.  every  six 
. months or year) on a replar buis and has a life 
apnn  of  from  two  to  five  years. 
In .  the  future,  the  next  major  development  in 
public  switching systems  will  be  the  introduc-
tion of asynchronous iiinsfer mode (ATM) tech-
noloSY  which  will  allow ·the  broadband  'rans-
mission  of  voice,  data,  imaJe  and  text.  This 
technolo8Y  is  presently  undergoing  technical 
and commercial evaluation by telecom operaton 
in  field  trials being carried out _in  several  Euro-
pean  countri~,  including  Italy •• However,  its 
actual introduction in the  public network .is not 
expected bcfo~ the end of the 1990s. The future 
of ATM switching wiJI  depend also on  the atti· 
tude of the telecom operaton who may be reluc-
tant  to  rerlace  expensive  equipment,  that  has 
not been  fully depreciated, but could  be  forced 
to do so  by competition in  an· emerging libera-
lized  market.  Consequently,  there .seems  to  be 
no great certainty with regi,rd to when A  TM will 
find a large-scale application  in voice telephony 
and it is. possible that it may  be.  restricted  initi-
ally  to  an  overlay  network  for  business/service 
applications. According to market sources, A  TM 
switches are expected to  represent around  I 0 % 
·of the sales of switches  in  Europe  in  five  yean' 
time. 
With regard  to the evolution  of the  life cycle of 
public  switching equipment,  it  is  thought  that 
the .'1\ajor new techno!ogy developments in swit· 
ching, both  in  software  and  hardware  products, 
are more likely to expand the  ranse of available 
functions,  and  therefore  to  serve  new  needs, 
than to shorten the  life cycle of existing equip-
ment. This  trend  is  expecterl  to  continue  over 
the  next  five  to  I  0 yean. 
2.  Tnnsmission  provid~s  the  transport  fun-:tion 
for: 
(a)  traffic  bet.ween  local  central  switchin&  offices 
- and  transit  central  switching  offices ; 
(b)  leased  line  traffic  between  businesS  customers, 
by  cable  and. optics.  · 
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The  main  building  blocks  of  tnnsmission  Ire 
digital  multiplexers  and  optical  line  terminals 
(the parties are not acdve in the cable field). The 
latest major development in  transmission  is  the 
transition  to  synchronous  dijital  hierarchy 
(SlJH)  technology. from  plesiochronous  digital 
hierarchy  WDH)  in  network  management 
~tems equipment. which ·is  already  underway. 
This  new  technolOBY  enables  ATM  broadband 
switching  and  it  is  expected  that.  within  five 
years, SOH will represent'S% of the transmis-
sion  equipment  market.  It  is  operational  via 
TNM and  will,  in  the  future,  operate  via  the 
open  interfices  of  AN.  It  is  thought  that  the 
introduction  of  AN  will  open  up  this  market 
and  enforce  competition  as  there  will  be  an 
increasing  miption of  services  and  function-
ality away from  central office switching into .the 
local  access  networks. 
The life  cycle  for transmission  has been around 
10 years when only major technological changes 
are  regarded.  This  life  cycle  includes.  ho~ever, 
major  re~esigns .every three to  five  years .of  the 
PDH  equipment  which  Is  hardware  intensive. 
The life  cycle  of SOH  equipment. being more 
software  intensive, .  is  expected  to  behave  more 
like  the  life  cycle  !)f  switching equipment. 
3.  In  radio  systems.  line-of-sight  radio  technolog 
provides an  aherniti~ to cables in  info~n\ation 
. transport  among  switching  offi~s or  between  · 
subscribers and central offices. A -:ecent impor-
tant role of ndio is the interconnection of large 
·business customen to  the switched  network. or 
to  corporate  and  private  virtual  networks.  Line.; 
of-sight  radio  is  today.  being  applied  in  the 
interconnection of mobile ndio base stations, Jn 
particular in  the market segment of neW open-
tors  who  have  no  cable'  infrastructure.  Radio 
systems are, like  tnn~mission, migrating towardS 
SOH. ·R&D  expenditure  is  ·estimated  at  IS%, 
the same level u  for transmisSion, by the parties. 
The  parties  include  in  this  market ·microwave 
and  UHF/VHF  ra<Jio,  line-of-sigh.t  antennas, 
feeder  cables  and  operation  support  systems. 
The  parties  have.  confirmed,  however,.  that 
neither ltaltel nor any other company controlled 
by STET  is  active  in  the  radio  systems  market. 
For  this  reason,  the  market  is  not  an  affected 
product market and will not be analysed further. 
4.  Mobile  radio  networks  allow  for  communif;a• 
ti9n: 
(a)  within  the  own  network ; 
(b)  to or from  another fixed  or naobile  network 
u  longer u  the user is within radio coverage 
of  the  mobile  network. 
The  lut  major  technological  innontion  in 
mobile  communication  networks  has· been  the 
introduction of GSM.  the  pan  European  digital 
mobile communications systems,  in·l~89. G~M 
architecture  hu  been  clearly  defined  in  the 
GSM recOIJ!mendations promulpted by ETSI in 
the  EEA  countries. 
The  evolution  in  thii  area  is  expected  to  be 
towards  the  provision  of  an  increasing  propor-
tion  of  narrowband  services  by  mobile  (e.g. 
cellular) systems.  It is  thought that  the  signifi-
cant  growth  already  being  experienced  in  the 
customer demand .  for  such  mobile  services  will 
lead  to  the  introduction  of  new  technologies. 
.  ~ 
The next generation of infrasttticture is expected 
to be direct satellite communications whjch  it is 
thought  will  be  available  in  1998.  With  GSM 
tech~oloJY, innovation  cycles  of  two  to  three 
years  are  foreseen. 
(11)  Private telecommunications 
S.  In  private  tel~minunications systems.  private 
branch  exchanges  (PBX's)  and  key  telephone 
systems (KTS) allow for communication within/ 
between  users.  whether  public or private. They 
are  connected to ·the  public  networks  via  trunk 
lines,  operating  u  stand  alone  systems  or  in  ~ 
networking environment: Modem (ISDN) PBX's 
and KTS  provide  services such  u  fax-PC  inter· 
working, ·  video-conferencing,  and  nett:ork 
management. 
In  the present case, data communication equip-
ment is excluded from  the market definition as 
neither  Siem.ens  nor  ltaltel  ever  specifically 
addressed  this  market  segment. Thth· sales  of 
data  communication  equipment  are  marginal 
(I  0/o  of  their  turnover).  These  ules  ~re occa-
sional,  mainly  connected ·to the  integration  of 
OEM  data  products  into complex  projects.  For 
these  reasons,  the  analysis  of  the·  notified 
concentrat~on will  be  restricted  to  private  voice 
tranamiuion  equipment.  The  question  o~ 
whether data transmission should be included in 
the  market  may  be  left  open. 
The parties  point out· the  constandy increasing 
cost  of  R&D  in  private  telecommunications  at 
I  0  to  IS '1o  of  turnover,  due  to  heavy .R&D 
competition in  a  mar~e~ which  is r.haractcrized 
by  the  rapid  introduction  of  ac!ditionallnew 
tec.b:10logies  in  increasingly  shorter  time 
periods/life  cycles. 
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6.  Within  the  ranp of communication  terminals, 
the  parties  indicate  that  for  the  relevant  yean 
Siemens  and  ltaltel  bave  only sold  telephOila, 
fax machines and cellular telephones. They have . 
included  all  three  products  under one affected 
relevant  product  market,  althouah  they · have 
provided separate fiaures relatina to market esti-
mates and market shares separately for each type 
of  terminal. Since  the  notified .  transaction  does 
not nise competition issues of dominance either  · 
considerina  an  overall  product  market  for 
private terminals or separate narrow markets for 
each  type of terminal, the question of the exact 
product  market  definition .  can  ·be  left  open. 
(18)  The above  relevant product markets, a  defined by 
th~ parties. were confirmed by the competiton and 
the  telecom operaton in  the course of the investi-
ption. 
V.  THE  RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC  MARKET 
(19)  The overlap of the  parties' activities and the main 
impact of the opention will be in Italy. ltaltel only 
has limited sales of public telecom equ-ipment else· 
where : ECU I  millio~ in Germany for public swit· 
ching,  limited  sales  of  tnnsmission  equipment in 
Germiny, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain with 
a market share below S %  in all cases, and sales of 
mobile  ndio network· equipment  worth  ECU  24 
million  in  Greece. 
Public  telecommunications equipment 
(20)  The parties arpe in their notification that the strict 
application by SIP (now Telecom ltalia) of Council 
Direc:tive  90/  S31/EEC (1}  (the  Utilities  public 
procurement  directive)  and  the · cunent  level  of 
standardization ensure that burien to access to the 
Italian  markets  in  public  telecommunication 
equipment  are  of little  importance. Althoup ·the 
public  procurement  directives .  have  not  yet been 
transposed into ltalien law,· accord ina to the pirtiet 
since  1993 .SIP hu opemted its  own  intemal rules 
in  compliance  wich  the  directive, inchadina  the 
creation  of a quilification iyltem and a reJister of 
qualified  suppl~en. 
(21)  Until  now,  the  Commission  hu  only  defined 
popphic markets  in  public  telecommunication 
equipment in its Decision 91/lSI/EEC (1). AlcateV 
Telettra, ~here the market for public telecommuni-
_  (1)  OJ No L 2J7, 2t. 10~ IHO, p.l, replaced by Directive t3/381 
EIC (OJ  No  L I  H, t •. 8. ·t,3, p.  84).  . 
(2) OJ  No  L 122.;  17.  S.  19fl, p.  48. 
cation  equipment  was  found  to  be  national  for  a 
meraer affectina Spain. Some  of the facton which 
modvated  this  national·  market  definition  were 
specific to th~. situation in ·the Spanish telecommu-
nications market at that time, such a : that Teltfo. 
-nica, the Spanish telecommunications· operator, had 
traditionally  purchacd  from  local  supplien ; that 
the 'application of the Utilities public procurement 
directive  would  not  take  place  in  Spain  for  the 
followina  five  yein : and  that  there  were  vertical 
links  between Telefonica and its major equipment 
supplien throuah  minority  shareho1dinp. ·  · 
(22)  Of  the  Characteristi~  outlined  in  the  decision 
which  were  specific  to  the  Spanish  market,  none 
applies fully to the Italian market in the context of 
the current case• ThrouJh it is true that in the past . 
Telecom ltalia and its predltesson have purchased 
both  rwitc~tna and  tra~smiaion equipment  from 
lta1te), they have more recendy also sourced sipifi-
cant quantities  from  o~er supplien· outside  Italy. 
The  Utilities  Directive  has  applied  to  Italy  since 
the beginnins of  1993  a~d internal rules have been 
drawn up  witJ~in Telecom ltalia in order to comply 
With  it.  Finally,  there  is  a . type  of  link  between 
ltaltel  and  Telecom  ltalia  in  that  they  are  both 
separate  pa~ of  t~e STET group.  · 
(23)  Traditionally,· public· telecommunication equipment 
markets  have  shown  ~lear national  characteristics, 
arising from the different attitudes and strategies of 
the  national  mouopoliea  at  the  service  level. 
Usually,  domestic .  suppliers  have  en joyed  high 
market  shares  in  their home  countries,  and  other 
non-domeitic  ·supplien  have  often  aeiVed  other 
markets  from  national  subsidiaries  there,  so~e­
times  with  IOcll  manufacturing  facilities. 
(24)  The  prevailina view amona -manufactu~n of  tel~­
communications equipment and telecom operaton 
is that the  markets for  telecommunication's equip-
ment are  in· the  process of openina up to interna-
tional competition. The following  factors  are  rele-
vant  to  that  judpent : 
(25) 
- techraoloaical  developments, 
~  International  standards ·and  national  specifica· 
. tions/type-approval  of  equipment, 
- the  application  of  public  procurement  direc-
tives,  · 
- liberalization  of  public  voice  telephony  ar.~ 
telecot.ns  infrastNcture: 
(a)  Public switching 
The  technoi~BY of  pubJic· switchina equipment  is 
complex  .and  has  an  important  implict  on  the 
aeoanphlc  market  definition.  An  operator  will 
pnerally only  use· a maximum  of  three  different 
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types  of  sWitches  in  sipificant  quantities  in  a 
netWork. Once the suppliers have been  chO.Cn  for 
a  partieular  network,  then  those  supptien  will 
install  the switthes and  provide  software uppdes 
to  the operator. Should  an  increase  in  capacity be 
net.ded  with  requires  additional  switches  at  that · 
location,  then  for  technical  reasons -the  ame 
supplier  is  likely  to  be  us.td. 
(26)  This  technoloBY  •Jock-in'  effect  leads  to  differing 
conditions of competition at different stases in the 
life  cycle  of  a switch. The  opportUnity  to supply 
new switches to a network  is the subject of a high 
degree· of competition  between  switch  manufactu-
ren. At that stase, competition takes place· amongst 
the major public  sw~tch manufacturers at least on a 
Europe-wide  buis  and  possibly  on  a  worldwide 
buis.  However,  once  the  two  or  three  supplien 
have  secured  the contracts, it  becomes  more  dilfi· 
cult  for  new  entrants  to  enter  the ·market  whilst 
that  tcchnolog.  remains  extant.  Only  in  excep-
tional· circumstances,  for  example  if  an  existing 
supplier fails  to perform  to  the satisfaction  of the 
customer,  will  a new  supplier set the  opportunity 
to  enter· the  market.  Market  structures  to supply 
operators  then · remain  relatively  stable  until  the 
next  new  technology  is  introduced (which  in  the 
case of public swit~hing  will be ATM switching). 
(27) 
(28) 
The international standards  making bodies, and  in 
particular  ETSI,  are  in  the  process  of draWing  up 
. standards  for  public  switching  equipment.  Other 
standards  are  developed  independendy  and  are 
subsequently validated  by  ETSI. Given  manufactu-
rers'  wishes  to  protect  their  intellectual  property 
and  the continuing development of the standards, 
it  cannot  be  said  that  international  stan.dards  yet 
exist  for  digitd  switches.  Therefore,  though  stan· 
dardizatio.n  is breaking down  the burien between 
·markets, it. hu not yet" completely takerl  place and 
io sianificant  differences  amonpt Member States 
remain  fo~ existing digital  switch  technology. 
For  new  technology,  such  u  ATM  sWitches,  the 
picture  may  be  different.  ATM.  switches  are 
currently being pilot  tested  in  a number of  Euro-
pean  countries and  the  testing  programme  is  the 
subject  of  some  cooperation  be~een  telecom 
openton. It  may  be  expected  tht:refore  that once 
. ATM  ~ introduced. a higher level  of  stindardiza-
tion  across  Europe  may  have-been  .achieved  than 
was the case when digital switches  w~re introduced. 
The experience· of the. ·manufacturen and opcnton 
in  BTSI  and  elsewhere  in  cooperating to  produce 
standards  may also  me.kC  a wider standards  more 
likely  with  ATM  and  other  new  technology. 
(D)  The application of public procurement directives in 
the switching sector is closely  related  to  the 'tech· 
nolo8Y and standardization  factors  outlined above. 
Pursuant  to Article  20  (2)  (e) of Council  Directive 
93/38/EEC.  Telecom  operaton  may  use  a  proce-
dure.  without  a  prior·  call  for  competition,  for 
example, where a change in suppliers would oblise 
the  contacting entity  to  acquire  material  having 
different  technical  characteristics  which  would 
result  in incompatibility or ifsproportionate  tech· 
nical  difficulties  in  operation  and  maintenance. 
Other  small'  purchases  of  equipment  may  fall 
below  the  threshold  or  be  part  of  framework 
contncta  covering  more  than  one  individual 
purchase.  All  these  factos  tend  to  support  a 
n•tional 'market  definition.  Convenely, when  new 
tech~oloBY is  introduced,  then  the  procurement 
directives should  be  applied  fully,  with  invitations 
for  tender from  all  possible  supplien:. This would 




Uberalization at  the  level  of the ·operator will  also. 
have an effect on the geographic market definition. 
Liberalization  of  public  voice  telephony,  which  is 
scheduled  for  1998,  the  open  network  provision 
direc~ve and,  most  importantly,  liberalization  of 
the  infrastNcturc  will  almost  certainly  lead  to  a 
broader market definition tharr national  markets u 
the  ~ew operators  will  not  be  constrained  by  the 
existing  network  standards  and  will  have  a  free 
h,and  when  choosing  their equipment  suppliers. 
Competition  in  the  public  switching  market  only 
properly  takes  place  at  a European  level  when  a 
new  technology  fs  introduced. Once  the  supplien 
of  that  technology  have  been  chosen  by  the 
network  operator,  competition  only  takes  place 
between  these  suppliers. This  is  as  a result  of  the 
lock-in  of  technology  and  rhe  current  infrequent 
use  of  tender  procedures  under  the  procurement 
directives for upgrades to and extensions to existing 
technoloJY.  The  liberalization  of  services  and 
infrastructure appean to  be  the main  ~actor which 
will  ensure  a European  or wider  market  with  the 
continuing  proceu  of  Europein  standardization 
also  helping  to confirm  this  market  definition. 
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(b)  Traiumission 
(32)  For uusmission equipment. not all  of the  factors 
listed for public switchins apply. Standardization of 
transmission equipment is more  widesp~ead. partly 
because the interface aspects of the equipment are 
more in:aportant than for switch~. A hfaher priority 
is, therefore, necessary for compatibility with other 
types  of  equipment  from  other  manufacturen. 
Operators do not limit their soun:ins. of transmis-· 
sion equipment to three supplien in the same way 
that  tak~ place  for  nritchinJ. Market  sham are 
therefore lo.r u  more compinies can supply one · 
operator. 
(33)  Transmission equipment is a market which is more 
open  than  public switchina and  the· market sham 
of the parties in the Italian market are lower. Even 
on  the  buis  of  the  wont  cue scenario,  which 
would  be  a national  market definition, the  opera-
tions does not cause competitions problems,· so the 
precise  marktt  defi11ition  can  be  left  open. 
(c)  Mohi/1  radio  nttworlu .  . 
(34)  Ope'riton  of  mobile  iadio  networks  throuahout 
western  Europe haw confirmed that they P'-'ldtue 
telecommunication · equipmen't  throuJbt  tender 
procedures. The ppphic location of the equip-
ment manufacturers hu little relevance in tht deci-
sion to choose a supplier and in· all cases the main 
suppliers worldwide were .in a position to submit a 
bid. In any  cue~ and in view of the position of the 
merpd entity· in  Italy  and  in  Europe,  the  exact 
definition  of  the  JeOpphic makret  may  be  left 
open in this c:ae since the notified operation does 
not  raise  serious  competition  concerns. 
Private  telecommunications  equipment and 
communication terminals 
(35)  The markets of private switchina and related termi-
nals and communication teminals seem to be rela-
eom.,.n, 
1.  Alcaeel  Alathom 
2.  Siemena 
3~ AT&T 
4.  NEC 
S.  N. Ttlccom 
6.  Ericuon 
1.  IBM 
8.  Pujitau 
9.  Bolch 
10.  Nokia 
II. GEC 
12.  Philip~ 
13.  Sarnauna 
(36) 
lively  more  open  to  competition~ ~th a  hisher 
penetration of non-Italian companies. None of the 
competitors or clients consulted durins the invati· 
ption have indicated the existence of lepl or tech· 
nical  burien to  acce..a  to Italy.  In  any  case,  and 
Jiven  ~e  position of the notifyi._J parties on these 
. markets,  the  precise  aeoaraphic  market  does  not 
have  to  be  defined  in  this  decision~ The  notified 
·  transaction  does  not  raise  any  major  concems  in 
the  markets  of  private  telcommudication  equip· 
· meat  and  communication  terminals,  either  at 
national  or .  Europe.-n .  l~l. 
VI.  AS.~ESSMENT 
In  ord'r to  uaeu the  competitive  impact  of'  this 
operation,  the  followins  factors  have  to  be  taken 
into  account.  besides  the  market  positions  of  the 
parties: 
- public procurement  Nles, 
- chanses  in  techi)oloJY, 
- trends  in  liheralization,  and 
- vertical  aspects. 
(A)  Public telecommunication  equipment 
(37)_  A sene~ overview  of  the  worldwide  industry  of 
public  telecommunication  equipment  is  provided 
in  the  following  rankins of companies, with  their 
respective  worldwide  turnover  in  communications 
equipment in million dolln -in  .. 1993, to,ether with 
their  respective  share.  of  the  total  sales  of  these 
companies.  · 
S.la  'It lh•re 
1.f.S.f.i  1.$,'70 
II 98~  12,9  .. 
11'783  12,72. 
8'7l.f  9,41 
'7861  ·8,49 
'7'703  8.32 
.s 300  .S,'72 
4388  4,'74 
2'-S.S  2.8'7 
2161  1,33 
.t fl'7  U1 
1 Ill  1.96. 
1'788  1.93 
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·-·  eo.,..,.  .....  4Mt  lhltt 
14.  ltlltcl  ISSI  IM 
IS. AKom  I $38  1.6' 
'16.  MilD.  1508  1.63  ' 
17. Old  1462  I..SS 
'18.  Hitachi  1429  .l.S4 
19. s.acm  I 049  1,13 
20.  DSC  131  0,79 
11.  DeTeWe  . 121  0,78 
Total  9260f  100,00 
S•11m: CommuniacioM Week lntcmadond. Compan~  spedaliaccl in pmaet nccwodt tyiiCMS. mobile  nctWofb 
or data  nclWOib  haw not been  included. 
1.  Mark~t sharts oftht parties 
Pubfic switching 
(38)  The initial  market shares calculated ·by the  parties 
in their notification for public ·switching referred to 
a .market  inclusive  of  public switchinJ and  opera-
tina support systems (OSS).  power equipment and 
other relatina:exclusively to the pun:hases of  ~Wit­
china  and  OSS  by_  the  tclecom  operator (1'0) in 
Italy. The inclusion oripnally of-the other products 
in  the  market b.roupt in  supplien which  are  not 
able to sell  switches u  suc:h  and  therefore are  not 
... ·· 
· competiton of the  parti~ in  the strict sense, with 
the  result  that  the  parties'  initial  market  shares 
were  underestimattd.  On  ·this  basis,  the- market 
value,  sales ·  and  respective  market  shares  of  the 
parties and their main competitors in Italy are esta-
.  blished  as  follows : 
Purchua of Telceom Ieaiia 











Mukct ahara  (1) 
(ill~) 
1991  1992  1993 
Jtalacl  40-SO  S0-60  40·50 
Siemens  5-tO·  5·10  S-10 
Combined  S0-60  60-70  50·60 
Alcatel  10-IS  . 10·15  lO·IS 
-Erialon  lS-20  10·15  15·20. 
Othen  lO.·IS  10:15  15-20 
Total  100  100  tOO  -
(') "Pn:dse  fipftl deleced  •  business  sec:~L 
Competitors' have  broadly  confirmed  this  magni-
tude of muket sham. alth~ah they estimate that 
Siemens  and  ltaltel  combined  share  remained  at 
rouply 60 'It  in  I 993. 
Market shares in the Community •mount to  20%. 
in  tt91,  13 1/o  in  1992  and  24 'lo  in  1993  for 
Siemens and 12 'loin i991, 12 '/o in 1992 and 8 'I• 
In  1993  .for  Italtel.  The  combined  market  share 
repraedts therefore 32 %, 3S 0/o  .  .and 31 %  respec~ 
tively. 
The main  impact of the  notified operation  from .a 
com~tition point of vieW is in  prin~iple restricted 
to Italy, since the sales of Italtet and the overlap of 
the  parties'  activities  ue basically concentrated  in 
this country. In a broader geographic market. ltaltel 
II  R/ · "-•. · 
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is a  smaller  player,  and  the  joint  venture  is  not 
likely to have 1 lipificant impact on the competi· 
tivc  relations  between  the  I  0  lcadina  worldwide 
suppliers  of  telecommunication  equipment.  The 
combined  m•rket  sh~re of the  parties in  the sales 
of  public  switchina  equipment  in  ltal:  Will  be 
substanti&l  by the  usual  standard.  applied  under . 
Replation (EEq No  4064/89 (about  S$  to. 60 °/o 
dependina  on  the  year  taken  u  · reference). 
However, it hu to be noted than this market share 
is not hiaher than the market sham of the ladina 
supplien  in  other  Member  States.  lnfonnadon 
submitted  by  lhe  panics  lhcmsclva. compcdton 
and  the  public  teleeom ~  (ros)  in 
Gcm\U\y.  Fnnce.  the  Uaitccl ~  Spain. 
Denmark. Ncthcr\antk Btlaium and lrelaud .mow 
ia fatt that the hllila IDIRd ~  is ftbli'* 
'-~  ..  '" .,  ....  Nta\\w:t ~ 
of  a comparable  size.  reprdlea of  the e•nt of 
liberalization. 
(41)  The  high  concentration  of  the supply of sV(itches 
in all Member States is largely. e~plained by the fact 
that  TOs  nos:mally  limit  the  number of different 
technoloJies or. systems coexisting in a network to 
I  maximum  of  two  or  three.  Factors . such  IS 
network  management,  trainina,  service  logistics, 
security and· the introduction of new services in the 
network  lock  operators  into  a limited  number of 
suppli:n. Punhermore, once a ~echnolo8f hu been 
introduced  into  the  network,  given  the  long  life 
cycle of switches (around  I S yean, never less than 
I 0,  see  point  16~ demand  for  public  switching  is 
basically driven  b)' upgrades and extensions of· the 
network.  This  market · must  be  awarded  ·to  the 
original supplier of the already in•talled switch  for 
reasonr. of costS· and efficiency. With  the  ~xception 
of the time when a new major technoioJY (i.e. diai· 
talization)  is  pin& to  be. introduced  in  the  buic. 
network,  demand  · for  switchin&  equipment  is 
largely  determined  by  this  lock-in  effect  arising 
from  the  original  choice  of.  supplien  for  the 
'installed  base.  111is  fact  hu been  confirmed  by 
both  competitors  and  TOs  and  it  is  further 
confirmed  by  the  existing  situation  in  various 
Member  States. 
(42).  In Germany, the public neawork includes  o~ly two 
technoloaies :  Siemens'·.  and  Alcatel'l.  There  ·are 
·other  supplien  of  public  switcht •  (Bosch  ~nd 
DeTeWe  for  instance~ but  &he  supply  Siemens' 
technology  under  licence.  In  )!ranee, ·Aicatel  and 
Ericsson  supply  ·all  the  purchises  of  Pnnce 
Telecom, since the .French n,twork ia cora1posed of 
only  these  two •ystems.  In  the  United  KinacSom, 
the  installed  bue  comprises  switching  systems 
from  Gl'f and  Ericaon.  It  is  tniC  that  there  are 
ocher  companies  aupplina  switcbes  to  .  British 
Telecom  (81). such  u  Alcatel,  Northern  Telecom 
and  ATacT.  However,  these  purchases  referred  to 
one-off  operations  for  fielc!  trials  or  for  the  esta-
blishment  of  overlay  networks  to provide  special 
se~ccs. such  a  1  virtual  private  nc~rkl  or free 
call  services.  Their  shae  of  Drs  purchuet  is 
limited, and  their  f'teSCncc  docs not alter the  fiCt 
that  BT's  basic  network  comprisa only  two twit· 
. china  systems.  and  that  therefore  GPr  and 
Ericsson  account  IOJetbcr  for  most  of  B'rs 
purchases of public I'Witcbcs.. In Bel&ium. only two 
systems a  used: Alcatel  &1\Cl. Siemti\S. 1ft s,.in. 
tht t.k ~  is composed al Alcatel  ~Witches 
mel  to a-~  ~  EftcaDa ..t  AT4kT  ..  lD 
......  an ~  .. tq'lipmtat in  l99l to 
1994 'ftte supplied by eitiJ.er .Siemens  or Alcatel, 
since  ·these  are  the  only  systems  installed.  In 
Ireland,  the  network  is  based  on  Ericsson  and 
Alcatel  systems.  Finally, three different system  are 
installed  in  Italy : those  from  ltaltel,  Alcatel,  and 
Ericsson. Siemens'  subsidiary  in  Italy sells  ltaltel's 
syst~ms ·  under  licence.  Consequently,  ltaltel, 
Alcatel  and  Ericsson  account  for  ·most  of  the 
purchases  .of  switching  equipment· of  Telecom 
ltalia.  · 
(43)  In  view  of  the  above  considerations.  it cannot  be 
concluded  that  agreption  of  the  market  share 
Within  the  m~raed entity  in  Italy  constitu~s in 
itself  1  proof  of  possible  dominance.  A  high 
concentration  of  the  supply  of  public  switchina 
systems  is  the  normal  cqnsquence  of  the  basic 
ntionale  underlying  demand  for  these  products. 
Transmission 
(44)  ·The sales and  respective  market share of the  main 
competitors for tnnsmiuion equipment in Italy are 
u  follows  according  to  the  notification : 
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1991  1992  1993 
.. 
STET  30-40  40·50  30...0 
Siemens  10-IS  5-10  S·IO 
Comllinttl  50;.60  . 50-60  . ~50 
Alcatcl  25-30  20-25  l.f-30 
MIKoni  JS-20  f5-20  15·20 
Ochen  5-10  5-10·  5-10 
Total  100  100  .  100 
(')  Precitc  fipm  ·  deleted  u  Minas secret. 
(4S)  Market ahara in the Community amount to  18 ·•to ·· 
in  1991,  lO 'I•  in  1992  and  18 1/o  in  1993  for 
·Siemens and 8 1/e  in  I  99 I, 9 1/o  in  I  992 and  S ·•to 
in  I  993  for  ltaltel.  The  combined  market  share 
· represents therefore 26 1/o, 29 1/o  and 23 'I• respec.' . 
lively.  · 
(46)  The  lode-in  effect  arising from  the  installed  base 
described  above for public: switching plays a much 
lesser- role  with  respect  to  ua.nsmission. Standard-
ization for transmission is relatively  ~o:e advanced 
and generally TOs in the. EC tend to divenify more · 
thei'r  sources  of  supply.  Detailed  information 
submitted by TOs in the United KinJdom, France, 
Germany, Denmark, BeiJium and Spain  as well  as 
Telecom  ltalia show that there are  usually at least 
,  three  main  supplien. of  transmission .  equipment. 
and in most cases several other less important ones. 
2.  Pub/it procwrtmtnt 
(47)  Purchases · of  public  switching  and  transmission 
equipment  in  the  !C have  been  subject  to  the 
public procurement directive, Directive 93/38/EEC 
for  almosr  rwo  yean  now. 
Switching. 
(48)  Purchases  of  public  switching .under  the  public 
procurement directive, however, have in  mOlt cases 
been  carried  out  without  usin&  a call  for  tenders 
procedure. Most of these purchases have bee.n. done 
either applying the derogation  punuant to Article 
20 (2) of the Directive which includes an exception·  . 
for  cechnical  reuona  or  reasons  connected  with 
procecdon. of nclusiw riahts. or under multiannual 
c:onuacta entered in,o be the TOs with  their tradi· 
tional supplien prior to the entry into .force of the 
Directive. Supplien of public: switching equipment 
htve also  atated  that the  aitu~tion is  not likely to 
change  in  the  future. with  reprd to the extencion 
or uPJflding of the installed base. At stated above. 
there are technical reasons for awarding this type of 
c:on~c:t·  t~  a  jiven  supplier.  However,  public: 
procurement is likely to play a more important ~le 
at thoie times when TOs are considering the intro-
duction  of  ~ew major technological  developments 
·(such  u  digitalization  or  ATM  bro2dband 
switching)  in  their  networks.  ~is situation  opens 
up  the  possibility  lor  TOs  to  consider  new 
auppliel'li  and  for  supplierl  to  enter  dt  now a 
public:  network.  In  this situation. tenderir.g  proce-
dures would indeed be justified. An example of this 
is provided by the pan  European ilot trials of A  TM 
switching. Telecom· ltalia. a  most  of  the other  IS 
TOs involved  in  this trial,· issued a call  for  tenders 
following the procedures foresien  in  the  Directive. 
The call  for  tenden wu published  in  the  Of/ida/ 
jonmal of tht  European  Communitits  and  the 
technical  specifications  were  bued on  ETSI  stan-
dards.  Eight  manufact'Uren  were  in  a  position  to 
. bid, including ltaltel and Siemens. The competition 
·  was  won  by  Erricsson  and  Alcatel.  · 
Transmission 
. (49)  Because  of  the  lesser  constraints  to  diversify  the 
sources of supply and  the  relatively higher degree 
of  standardization  of  tranomission  equipment, the 
impact  of  public:  procurement  has  been  relatively 
higher  in  this  market.  In·  1993,  three  TOs  had 
purchased  significant  amounts  of  their  require· 
ments  after  c:alls  for  competition.  In  1994.  there 
hu been a .significant increase in  the proponion of 
purchases  acquired  after calls .for  tender, and  TOs 
in  other Member States  have  staned  to  usc  them. 
However,  in  most  cases.·  the  larger  pan  of  the 
purchases  were  still  attributable  to  multiannual 
contracts established before the entry into force  of 
Directive. 93/38/EEC,  notably  in  Italy. 
I 
3.  Ttthnolov 
(SO)  The public telecommunication equipment industry. 
and in panicular the development and manufactn--e 
of  public  switching,  is  rescarJ:h  intensive.  Com· 
panies  typically spend  aJOund  IS to  20 lfo  of their 
turnover  in  R&D.  The  cost  of  developing  a  new 
generation of telecommunication switches has been 
estimated ·as  high  as  ECU  4 billion  by  the  panies. 
l'he fipre varies depending on whether it refers to 
a  small  local  switch  or  a  major  intem1dO"nal 
exchanse. Lifetime expenditures for a major family 
of  digital  exchange  systems  (auch  as  E.WSD  from 
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(51) 
(SZ) 
Siemens or Unea trr from  ltaltel) approach  ECU 
1,6 billion. AccC'.,ting to information  su~itted by 
the  parties.  the  main  suppUen of public switches 
(JJcatel,  AT&T,  Ericsson,  Northern  TelecOift, 
Siemens) each invested dose to SOO million dollars 
or more in R&D for public switches in  199~  These 
costs  must  be  ~aarded as  necessary  to be  1ble  to 
maintain  a  competitive  position  from  a  techno-
logical  point  of  view.  Long-term  viability  in  the 
market  requires  therefore  a  certain  m~nimum 
amount  of  sales  in  order to  be  able  to  develop  a 
new aeneration of switches and maintain the usual 
:atio  in  the ·  industl)'  of  R&D  expense  to  •lea. 
Technology  constitutes  therefore  another  factor 
leading to a relatively high concentration of supply. 
The  major  technological  developments  ~prding 
public  switches  have  been  described  abdVe,  u~der 
product market definition. An  importa.nt  effect  in 
this context is that major technological innovatiQns 
typically  give  rise . to  operators  considering  new 
suppliers  and  supplien  Cl)nsideting  opportunities 
to  enter into new  market$.  In  rhis context, and  to · · 
anal~ the  possible  impact  of  the  notifed  opera-
tion,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  Telecom  ltalia  has 
already  made  its  .choice  of  suppliers  of  digital 
switches (Ericsson, Alcatel and ltaltel). Although ST 
has sold switches  in  the  past in  Italy, it has to  be 
noted  that  these  were  not  Siemens  switches,  but 
UT  switche- manufactured  under  licence  from . 
ltaltel. 
The  digitalization  of  the  Italian.  network  was 
decided according to an architecture defined during 
the.  J-980s.  when  the  decision  to  mo\le  from 
analogue syste.ms to digital systems was ttken. This 
architecture  is  based  on  about  600  a~  within 
each  of  which  the  switching  system  is 'homose-
neous.  At  that · ·time,  SIP  assigned·  each  single 
swit\:hing area throuah neptiations with ill manu-
facturen of switchina equipment that were able to 
paran.tee  ·m•intenance  service  1nd  isslstance 
throughout  the  whole  national  tenitory. The  lat 
usipment of  an  area  was  done  in  1991.  It  is 
improe.nt  to  note  th:.t  with  the  transition. from 
analope  to  diJital,  SIP  considered  reducina  the 
number  of  systems  in  it:s  network  from  three  to 
te-o,  in  line  wit~ the  situation  in  other Member 
States. The choice has been  described by reprc$en· 
~tatives  of  Telecom  ·Iealia  as  a  trade  off .between 
increased operating costs (in  terms of maintenance 
and introduction of  new services) and  maintaining 
lewaap against aupplien. The decision  wu taken 




diffe~nt systems in the network, unlike most" other· 
TOs  in  the  Community;  · 
The  next  technological. discontinuity  that  may  be 
compared  to  digitalization  is  the  introduction  of 
ATM switchina. At  presen~ no competitor expects 
larae  commercial  orden for  ATM  switches  in  the 
public·  sector  ~fore  the  end  of  the  century. 
·rurthennore, there  Is  at  present  uncenainty about 
the  eXtent  to  which  A  TM  switches  will  really 
replace digital  public voic, necworks. The  possibi-
lity remains  that ATM. will  only be  introduced  in 
overlay  networks  for  specific  services  of  a limitrd 
scope, or that it be restricted to LAN or LAN hner· 
connections. In any case, it has to be n,ted that the 
next round of competition' for public switching will 
take  place,  if  at. all,  un4cr a market structure  that 
will have been substantillly modified by liberaJiza. 
tion· of bu.ic services (anticipated in  Italy by  I  '98) 
and  infrastructures. 
·with  resj,ect  to  ATM  switches,  it' has  to  be  noted 
that  the  experience  in  those  countries  that  have 
started  to  introduce  overlay  networks  with  A  TM 
.switches  or  in  the  commercial·  applications  for 
A  TM in data  transfer hu shown  the emergence- of 
non-traditional  public  telecommunication  equip-
ment  supplier-..  According  to  specialized  press 
. reports,  there  are  number  of  non-conventional 
supplien of public switches  that  h_ave  already won 
commercial  contracts  from  ·public  network  opera· 
ton in the United States of America, Finland, Swit· 
zerland,  the  United  KinJdom  and  Denmark. 
4.  Libtralization  of: st.rrdtts  and  infmstrutturts 
Competitors  contacted  by  the  Commission  in  its 
enquiries.  have  stressed  that  liberalization  of 
services and  infrastr\lctures· is. more  relevant  to the 
actual functioning of the public teleco:nmunication 
equipment' maritets  th1n  the ·traditional  approach 
based  on  standardization  and  public  procurement. 
IJbenliiati~n of  public  voi~e service  is  planned 
&om  1 Janual)' 1998 ('). Furthermore, the  Council 
of Ministen agreed  on .17  Ncwem~r 1994 .on  the 
principle  that  public  telecommunications  infn. 
structures should be liberalized at the same time u 
the remaining services. It has to be noted that· Italy 
is· not  among  the  countries  that  have  requested 
specific  derogations  to  these  objectives. 
(1)  Council raoluticm of 22 July I  993 on the review of the sit•· 
tion  in  the  telecommunicationt  sr.cor  and·  the  nftd  for 
further dnclopment in that market (OJ No C 213. 6. 8. 1993. 
p.  I)· 
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156)  According  to  sonte  competitors,  the  propssive 
liberalization  of  semces  (private  telecommunica-
tions. GSM) has  reduced the potential for revenues 
of the TOs. TOs have  lost significant markets and 
when  they  have  still  maintained  a  presence  in 
those  markets.  prices and  margins are  in any case 
constrained  by  competition.  The .  ~stilt  of  the 
. liberalization of semces could therefore, indirectly 
induc:e  pressure  on  TO's  to  purchase  equipment 
competitively  even  in  the  non-liberalized  areas  if 
the}'  want  to  maintain  their  overall  profits.  Most 
other competitors have nevertheless  focu~d on the 
liberalization  of  infrastructures  as  the  detennin_..t 
factor  to  introduce  actual·  competition  in  this 
market.  · 
(S1)  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  to  be  considered  that 
even  if  infi'3Stuctures  are  fully  liberalized.  the 
current  monopolists  will  still  enjoy  a very  strOng 
position  in  their home  markets until  new entrants 
- progressively  set  up  their  own  infrastructures.  In 
any case, the decisions as to the principle of libera-
lization  and  its  time  ·  frame  have  been  already · 
adopted. Th~s  -is of  pani_c:Ul~r imponance in view of 
the  long  life  cycle  of  switches,  because  the  deci-
sions as to the infrastructure that TO's witl build in 
the following years will  have an  irreversible· impaq 
for a long time  fra~, and consequently, the· deci-
sions regarding the choice of systems and technolo-
gies  that will  determine  thr basic telecommunica-
tions infrastructure of a country cannot ignore  the 
future  impact  of  these  measures.  -
S.  Vtrtica{ asptds  in  public  ttlteommun.ication 
tquipmtnt 
(58)  One  of  the  reasons  for  which  the  Commission. 
decided  to  open  a second  phase  investiption  in 
this  c~e relates to the fact  that one of the parents 
of the joint venture, STET, controls Telecom ltalia. 
Telecom  ltalia  enjoys  exclusive  rights  to  .provide 
public  telecommunication  services  and  to · install 
and operate· the relevant· infrastructure in  Italy and 
consequently, it is not subject to the usual competi· 
tive  constraints  in  its  own  markets. On  the  other 
hand,  the  other  parent  of  the  joint  venture, 
Siemens,  is  a European .  and  world  leader  in  tele· 
communication  equipmenL Therefore  the notified 
operation raised serious doubts as to its compatibi· 
lity with  the  common  market  since  there  was,  in 
principle, scope  for. STET 11'\d  the joint venture' to 
significantly  diston  competition  among  suppliers 
of  p~blic· telecom·munication  equipmen~  ·in  Italy. 
(D)  After  the  second  phase  investigation,  and  havina 
consulted  a  large  number  of  telecommunication 
equipment  manufacturers  and  tetecommunication  . 
operators,, the Commission concludes that the noti-
fied  concentration  does  not  create  or  reinfor~:c a 
dominant  position  in  the  markets  of  public  tele-
. communication  equipment  (switching  and  trans-
mission)  for  the  reasons  given  gelow. 
(60)  Pir1t of all, it is  necessary to examine the extent to 
which  the  notified  concentration  creates  a market 
structure such that the objective interest of STET to 
force  Telecom  ltalia  to  pursue  an  anticompetitive 
purchasing policy, or give  privilcpd treatment to a 
S\1pplier, is created or reinforced. In  this respect, it 
has to be noted that if the notified concentration is 
not implemented, STET will  continue to have  full 
coqtrol of ltaltel through the ownership of its share 
capital.  In  the  situation  .whert.:-the  concentration 
has  been  implemeht.ed,  the  benefits  of any  privi- · 
leged  treatment  to  the  joint  venture  imposed  on 
Telecom  ltalia  by  STET  would  be  shared  with 
Siemens. Prima facie, the notified operation reduce 
therefore the objective interest of STET or Telecom 
ltalia  to  le~vour the  joint venture  at· the expense of 
"Telecom  I  tali~  for  instance  by·. accepting  hiaher 
prices . for  equipment.  This  is.  more  so  since 
Siemens  gains  a  direct  influence  only  over  the 
equipment supplier (ltaltel~ and no influence at all 
over the  telecom  operator (Telecom  ltalia) or over 
its parent (STE'l). Such' an operation would be of a 
very  different  nature. 
(~1)'  STET's cr in the last instance, IRI's, economic inte-· 
rests  are  much  wider with  respect to the  p~vision 
_  of telecommunication  service  than  with'  respect  to 
the  manufacture of  telecomm~nication equipment. 
The  turnover  generated  by  Telecom  ltalia  repre-
sents roughly 80 % of the total turnover pnerated 
by  the  companies  belonging  to  the  STET  group. 
(62)  Althouah  STET  has  control  of  Telecom  ltalia,  a 
large  part  of  the  share  capital  of  both  companies 
(over  40 %)  is  in  private  hands.  Both  companies 
cannot  be  identified  as  one  single  entity  and 
cenainly the  interests of a larp part of  the share-
holden of Telecom ltalia are clearly distinguishable 
from  tl.ose of the future  joint venture. The distinc· 
tion  between  the  interests  of  the  service  activities 
and  the  manufacturing activities  within  the  STET 
group has been further reinforced in the framework 
of the reorganization of STET.' through the creation 
.of  Tecnitel,  a  100%  owned  company  of 'STET. 
Tecnitel  constitutes  a separate  organizational  level 
in  the  structure  of  the  STET  group .  whose  main 
function  is  the  superviaion  of  che  manufacturing 
activities. of  STET,  including  the  planning,  tech· 
nical  and  economic ·control  of, the  manufact\lring 
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businesses and the exercise, on  behalf of snrr, of 
the voting  rights  in  the  shareholden  meetinss  in 
the manufacturing  companies~ Furthermore, in  the 
course  of  the  ptoceedinss. STET stated  in  writing 
that it would not interfere in the purehasing policy 
ot Telecom ltalia, more in  particular with reprd to 
the choice of supplien, and that it will  maintain a 
clear . separation  of  the  Boards  of  Directon,  the 
CEO, and in pneral the management of Telecom 
ltalia,  Tecnitel  and  the  companies  of  the  ltaltel 
group. 
(63)  The stN<:tutal characteristics of the publi' telecom-
. munication  markets  descaibed  above,  and  the 
evidence gathered during the in·.'estigation, indicate 
that  the  entry of Siemens  in  the  capital  of  ltaltel 
· will  not  result  in  a significant deterioration  of the 
conditions  of  competition.  The  shareholder  link 
between Siemens and STET and STET and ltaltel is 
unlikely  ·  to·  have · any  major  effect  during  the 
prOcess of upgrading and extending of the existing  · 
network. since  ... the decisions about  the systems on 
which  the network will  be based have already been 
taken. This is further confirmed by the forecasts of 
revenues  established  by  the  parties  for  the·  joint 
venture,  where  most  of  the  growth  of  the ·joint 
venture's turnover will.~ ,chieved through exports. 
The joint venture  agreements  set  a target  for  the 
joint  venture  attain  40 %  of  itS  sales  on  export 
markets by  1997. Furthermore, none of the current 
competiton of the parties in  Italy have approached 
the  Commission  during the  second  phase  investi-
gation to express serious concern  a~ to maintaining· 
their present  position  in  lta~y. 
(64)  With regard to "the longer term, and in  partieular to 
the  introduction  of  new  technologies,  the  markets 
for  telecommunications  equipment · are  in  the 
process  of  transformation  due  to  (i)  the  possible 
development· of large markets because of technolo-
gical  developments, (ii)  th~ fact  that the effects ·of 
standardization  and  public  proCurement legislation 
will  progressively  have  a larger impact in  opening 
up  :;::ional  markets,  (iii)  the  further  progress 
towards liberalization of services and, foremost, the 
liberalization  of  infrastructures  which  will  lead 
more  and  more  to  the  creation  of  a  worldwide 
market  for  puhlic  telecommunications equipment. 
The  effects  of  the  combination  of  these  dewl~p· 
menta have already been seen in the area of mobile 
.  communicitions, where· the  definition  of  a Euro-
pean  acandard  (GSM),  the  liberiliation of  services · 
and  the  liberalization  of  infrutNcturea  have 
resulted today in _the creation of a European, if not 
worldwide,  market for  the supply of telecommuni· 
cation  equipment. 
Mobile  radio  networks 
('S)  In. mobile  ~io  the  market share  of  ltaltel  in  the 
lut three _yean. has been. declining (from  64% in 
1990/91  to 39%  i~  1992/93),  while  Siemens  has 
reached a 6·% market share in .1992/93.-The main 
competiton  of  the  parties  are  Ericsson  with  ~ 
market share of 41  % in  1992/93 and Alcatel  with 
a market  share  of  arotJnd  I 0 %. 
Furthermore the marker for  mobile  radio  networks 
io .Italy hu been  opened  to  competition  with  the 
introduction  of  a  second  GSM  mobile  phont 
. operator Omnitei·Pronto  ltalia  Consortium  which 
has  been  awarded  the  contract  by  the  Italian 
Government  after  bidding. 
From the. investigation carried out in  the  European 
countries already opened  to  competition  it  ~n be 
stat.:d  that ·  the. access  of  a stcond  mobile  phone 
operator  for  GSM  in  Italy  will  have  a significant 
· impact on  the· competitive  situation of the  market 
of the equipment for  mQJ;Ue  ntdio. In  fact  it  is the 
usual  practice  of  the  new  operators  to  build  their 
own infrastructure for the provision of mobile  tele-
cominuni_ca.tion services utilizing the equipment of 
a variety of manufacturers. Some of the GSM opera-
ton have  more  thari  one  supplier for  each  of  the 
·various  pans  of -the  mobile  radio  infrastructure 
(switching, base station, microwave  equipment and 
terminals). 
-GSM  is  an  aut~nomous network,  interfacing  with 
the rest of the  telecommunication  infrastructure  at 
clearly  <lefined  points.  GS~ architecture  has  been 
defined in the GSM re(ommendations promulgated 
by  ETSI  and adopted  as  national  stand~rds in  the 
EE" countries. The clear architecture and interface 
~tructure of GSM  have  had  the  effect  of  ~reating a 
truly  European-wide  (and  subsequently  ~orldwide) 
market  for  the  equipm~nt. 
. Generally the s\Appliers of  infrast~cture are chosen 
on a worldwide  basis via tenders. A lot of suppliers 
w.ere  invited  to  tender for contracts. These  include 
Siemens,  Ericsson,  Sel-Alcatel,  Nokia,  Motorola, 
Matra,  AT&T,  Northern  Telecom  and  Orbitel. 
·The  more  common  criteria  followed  by  GSM 
·  operaton. to  award. contrac:ts  to  suppliers  a;e : 
~  ttchnoloJY, 
- reputation  of ·the  supplier, 
-price, 
...:..  engineering  and  technical  knowledge, 
-.. ability  to  mee~ ddiyery  requirem~nt:;. 
The choice of e-quipment is crucial  for  the compe· 
titivt.ness of the  service  of GSM  operators.  Even  if 
the market of the service has a strong local. compo-
·nent,  the  market  for  GSM' s  equipmenl  is 
worldwide. 
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(B)  Private telecommunication equipmenr 
(66)  With  reprd to  private  telecommunication  equip-
ment.  for  the  segment  of  PBX.  KTS  and .  related 
terminals,  the  market  share  of  ltaltel  has  been 
declining  (from  22,9 %  in  1990/91  to  17 %  in 
1992/93). whit: Siemens had a market share of 9 1/o 
in ·1992193.  In  compliance  with  the Commission 
Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on competi· 
tion  in  the  markets  in  telecommunicltions 
termina!  equipment (1), ·the individual  markets  are· 
now  fully  liberalized. There  is  a large  number of 
manufacturers  which  are  active  on the market.  In 
line with  the fngmented  production secto[  distri-
bution is carried out by a large number of 5ehers. 
(67)  With  reprd to  private  telecommunication  equip-
ment. the customers contacted in· the investiption 
have  state(t  that, even  after the completion  of the 
tnnsaction, they will  continue ·to. have a sufficient 
number of  alternative  suppliers  to  purchase  from. 
Genecally  they  have  indicated  that  they  purchase 
th.rough  SIP, which  has given  them the pouibilicy · 
of choosing the products of different manufacturers 
(Si~mens, Alcatel,  ltaltel,  Ericsson). They have  also 
indicated  that  there  are  other .potential  suppliers 
.like  Philips. Olivetti, IBM ind Northern Telecom. 
The  ~mpetiton conucted · by  the  Commission 
ba~e in .  F,nend stated  that  they  do  not  face  any 
maJor  o~tacle  ·  to selling  in  Italy. 
.  . 
(68)  The  position  of  the  merged  entity in  any  of the 
private  telecommunication  equipment  markets  is 
compantively weaker than  in  the  public telecom-
munication sector io  tenns of market ·shares. Also, 
ltaltel  has  lost significantly in  its  market share  in 
the  last three years. Even  though SIP continues to 
enjoy a very strOng  position  as a distributor direet 
sales  from  suppliers  to  customers  are  possible  in 
the"absence of legal  barriers..The competitors have 
stated  that  they  can  address  the  Italian  market 
selling directly or through channels of distribution 
other than  SIP,  like  independent distributors. 
(1)  OJ  No  L Ill, 27.  S.  1988,  p.  73. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
(69)  Por  the  reasons  outlined  aboVe,  the  Commission· 
considers that the proposed concentration does not 
lead to the creation or reinforcement of a dominant 
position  in any of the markets  identified above  in 
the  sectors  of  public  and  private  telecommunica-
tion  equipment,  u  a  result  of  ,.-hich  effective 
c~mpetition would be significantly impeded in  the 
common  market  within  the  meaning of Article  2 
(3) of Regulation  (EEC)  No 4064/89. The concen-
tntion can  therefore  be  declared  compatible with 
· the  common  market.  . 
. ~  ADOPTED 1liiS DECISION : 
Artitlt 1 
The proposed concentration  b~twee~ET  and Siemens 
is declared compatible with  the common market and the 
functioning  of  the  EBA  Agreement. 
Artitlt 2 
Thl~ Decision  is  addressed  to : 
~  Societi  Fin•nziaria  Telefonica  SpA 
Corso  d'ltalia  41  · 
1..00198  Roma 
and 
Siemens  Aktiengesellschaft 
Wittelsbacherplatz  2 
D-80333  MOnchen 
Done  at  Brussels,  17 .february  1995. 
For  tht Commission 
Karel  VAN  MIERT  . 
Mtmbtr of th.t _Commission 
...  ~ 
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Commission Decision 
\1 J ,, 
of  .  .  ·J  1995 
declaring  a  concentration to be incompatible with  the  common 
market 
(Case  No  IV/M .  .-490  - NORDIC  SATELLITE  DISTRIBUTION) 
Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89 
(Only  the English text is authentic) 
THE  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the  Trea~y establishing the European Community, 
i 
Having  jregard  to  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of  21 
December  1989
1  on  the  control  of  · concentrations  between 
undertakings,  and  in particular Article  8(3)  thereof, 
Having  regard  to Article  57  of  the  EEA  Agreement, 
Having  regard  to  the  Commission  Deci?ion  of  24  March  1995  to 
·initiate proceedings  in this  case,· 
Having  given  the  undertakings  concerned the opportunity to  make 
known  their views  on  the objections raised b'y  the  Commission,. 
Having  regard  to  the  opiriion  of  the  Advisory  Commit tee  on 
Concentrations, 
WHEREAS  : 
OJ  L257,21.09.1990,p.l3. 
.  .  ·.:  (  ~-
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I.  THE-PARTIES 
1.  Norsk  Telekom  AS  (NT),  Tele  Darunark  AS  (TD)  and 
Industriforvaltnings  AB  Kinnevik  (Kinnevik)  have  set  up  a 
joint  venture  called  Nordic  Satellite  Dist~ibution  (NSD) 
for  the  provision  of  satellite  transmission  services  and 
distribution services via cable networks  or direct-to-home 
broadcasts  for  television  programmes  in  the  Nordic  region 
(Denmark,  Sweden,  Norway  and  Finland) . 
2.  NT  is  a  Norwegian  company  controlled  by  Telenor  AS,  which 
is in turn owned  by  the Norwegian State.  Telenor AS  is  the 
principal provider of telephone services in Norway  and owns 
and/or  leases  transponder  capacity  from  the  satellites 
Thor,  Intelsat  and  TV-Sat,  situated ·at  1  degree  West.  NT 
owns  through  Telenor  Av"idi  AS  a  large  cable  network  in 
Norway.  Finally,  NT  also  provides  television distribution 
services to the  direct-to~home market in Norway,  Sweden  and 
Finl~nd and  in  Denmark  thtough its subsidiary Telenor  CTV. 
3.  TD,  is  the  Danish  telecom operator,  51%  owned  by  the  Danish 
State.  It  operates  under  a  concession  granting  it  the 
e~lusive right to provide public voice  telephone services 
and  other  related  services  in .Denmark,  as  well  as  to 
install  and  operate  the  Danish  public.  telecommunications 
network  infrastructure.  TD  owns  a  national  broadband 
distribution  network  called  the  Hybrid  Network,  which  is 
currently used for the transmission of radio and television 
signals  to  local  distribution  networks.  TD's  cable 
subsidiaries  distribute  TV  channels  to  its  own  and ·other 
local  networks. 
4.  Kinnevik  is  a  private  Swedish  group  of  companies  with 
activities  mainly  in  forestry,  farming,  packaging 
materials,  television and media,  and telecommunications.  In 
the· latter areas Kinnevik owns  or controls companies  in the 
Scandina~ian  countries  which  are  mainly  active  in  the 
following  main  fields~ 
satellite  television  broadcasting  (to  direct-to-home 
and  cable  subscribers)  of  commercial· channels  (TV  3, 
TV  G,  TV  6,  Z-TV)  and  pay-tv channels  (TV  1000,  Film 
Max  and  TV  1000  Cinema); 
distribution  of  satellite  television  (through  its 
subsidiaries  Viasat  S~eden,  Viasat  Norway  and  Viasat 
Denmark) ; 
Conditional  Access  Systems 
radio brqadcasting; 
In  addition,  Kinnevik  has  a  23%  shareholding  in  the 
commercial  TV  channel  TV  4  (a  Swedish  channel)  and  is 
represented on  the  Board cf Management  of  TV4. 
..... -':.::-:  .. 
-·-:··-·  ·.-..  ::.  -.. 
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Finally,  Kinnevik  has  a  37.4%  shareholding  in  Kabelvision 
AB,  a  cable  television operator in .sweden. 
II.  THE  OPERATION 
5.  The  operation  involves  the  creation,  by  NT,  TD  and 
Kinnevik,  of  the  joint  venture  Nordic  Satellite 
Distribution  AS  (NSD)  which  will  be  in  the  business  of 
providing  transponder  capacity  and  the  transmission  and 
distribution of satellite TV  channels to the Nordic market. 
6.  It is  the .aim of  NSD  to  establish  an  attractive satellite 
position  for  transmission  of  TV  signals  to  the  Nordic 
countries. 
7.  NSD  will  provide  satellite  TV  channels  . to  cable  TV 
operators  and  to direct-to-home  households. 
8.  It is  the  intention  that  th~ distribution of  satellite  TV 
channels  to  direct-to-home  users  and  to  cable  TV  networks 
provided  by  NSD  shall  take  plac..e  through  the  parents' 
distribution  companies  Vfasat  and  Telenor  CTV  and  through 
the parents'  cable  TV  operators. 
~  \ 
I 
III.  COMMUNITY/EEA  DIMENSION 
9.  NT,  TD  and  Kinnevik  have  a  combined  aggregate  worldwide 
·  turnover  ·of  5, 260  million  ECU.  TD  and  Kinnevik  have  a 
Community-wide  turnover  of more  than  250  million  ECU  of 
·which  not  more  than  two-thirds  is  achieved  in  one  and  the 
same  Member  State.  The  operation therefore has  a  Community 
dimension. 
10.  At  the  same  time,  since  the  combined  turnover  of  the 
undertakings  concerned in the territory of the EFTA-states 
equals  more  than  25%  of  their  total  turnover  in  the  EEA 
territory,  _the  operation . is  also  a  cooperation  ~case  in 
accordance  with  Article  58  and  protocol  24  of  the  EEA 
Agreement~  · 
IV.  THE  STRUCTURE  AND  TECHNOLOGY  OF  THE  INDUSTRY 
11.  The  provider  of  a  TV  channel  whether  this  is  a  public, 
advertising  based,·  mini-pay  or  pay-TV  is  called  a 
broadcaster. 
12.  If the  channel  is  to  be  transmitted via satellite from  the 
studio,  the  TV  signals are sent  to  an  up-link station.  Up-
link  is  the  process  of  sending  a  TV  signal  from  an  earth 
station to  a  satellite.  The  TV  signals  can  be broadcast  in 
clear or  encrypted  form .. 
... '  .  .:  ~  ..... -·  ' 
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13.  From  the  up-link  station  the  TV  signals  are  sent  to  the· 
satellite that retransmits them.  Satellites used for TV  are 
placed in a  ~geostationary orbit position and are  therefore 
able to maintain a  constant beam on a  given territory.  Each 
satellite contains  several  transponders  that  are  elements 
on  a  satellite used to receive and transmit  TV  signals.  The 
geographical  area  where  the  TV  signals  transmitted  by  a 
transponder  can  be  received  by  direct-to-home  customers 
having  standard  receiving  equipment  is  called  the 
footprint.  As  a  rule,  with  the  present  technology 
(analogue)  each  transponder  will  have  a  capacity  to 
transmit  one  TV  channel.  The  introduction  of  digital 
technology  is  expected  to  increase  the  capacity  of  each 
transponder  five  to  ten times. 
14.  The  TV  signal  is  received  by  a  satellite  dish  on  the 
ground.  The  receivers  can be  (1)  direct-to-home households 
with  (normally)  smaller dishes;  (2)  cable TV  operators with 
one  or more  much  larger dishes;  or  (3)  SMATV  operators2 • 
15.  _A  special  technical  infrastructure  is  required  to  operate 
pay-TV. _  This  technical  infrastructure  is  called  a 
conditional  access  sVstem,  and is required  to  ensure  that 
only authorised viewers,  ie.  subscribers to the particular 
encrypted  channel{s),  can  receive  the  channel(s).  Pay-TV 
arci  invariable encrypted.  In  the Nordic area all channels 
brdadcas-ted by satellite are encrypted in contrast to other 
parts of Europe.  When  encryption takes place  a  datastream 
is  inserted  along  with  the  TV  signal  for  use  by  the 
conditional  access  system.  A  conditional  access  system 
consists  essentially, of  (1)  an  adaptor. for  decryption 
(decoder),  (2)  a  subscriber management  system  (SMS),  (3)  a 
Subscriber Authorization System  (SAS)  and,  finally,  (4)  an 
encryption  system. 
16.  To  receive  encrypted  TV  signals  a  consumer  needs  a  decoder 
equipped  with  a  decryption  facility  and  a  security 
processor.  The  decoder  decrypts  the  television  picture, 
which  is encrypted when  the  TV  signal  is transmitted. 
17.  The  conditional access  system requires  the  transmission of 
a  data  stream  together  with  the  TV-signal,  containing 
information  on  the  channels  or  packages  of  channels 
subscribed  to  and  on  the entitlement of  the  subscribers  to 
receive  the  programmes.  If  an  open  encryption ,system  is 
used  (see below)  a  "personal"  smart card is made  available 
to  the  viewer  which  is  inserted  into  the  decoder  to  scan 
2  The  SMATV  segment  consists  of  entities· receiving  the  TV  signals 
using  a  Satellite  Master  Antenna  and  retransmitting  the  signal 
within  a  smaller  network.  Normally  the  SMATV  operators  have  no 
system  for  operating  pay-TV  and,  if they do,  it is  carried  iri  the 
network  on  the basis of collective payment  from all residents.  The 
SMATV  operators will rarely contract directly with the broadcasters, 
but  wi~l normally  be  customers  of local cable operators. 
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through  the  datastream that comes  along with the  TV  signal 
to  find  out  if its identity is present.  If the  smart  card 
finds  its "unique  key",  the  decoder  decryPts  the  TV  signal 
and passes it on  to  the  TV  set. 
18.  The  conditional  access  system  is  based  on  the  use  of  an 
encryption  system  ~n  which  ·the  .. messa,ges  are  encrypted.  A 
broadcaster  needs  an  agreement  with  a  supplier  giving  him 
the  right  to  encrypt  and  decode  TV  channels  in  a  certain 
enc;ryption  system.  However,  this is not  the  ca·se  for  cable 
·TV  operators,  since it i~ possible  for  cable  operators  to 
develop  and  use  their own  encryption system.  An  encryption 
system can either be closed  o~ open. 
19.  A  closed  system  implies  that  only broadcasters  si.gning  an 
agreement  with  the· owner  of  the  system  are  allowed  to 
encrypt  in  this  system.  Normally,  such  an  agreement 
includes  a  right  for  a  particular operator to administrate 
the  SMS  and,  thus,  prevents other operators  from  using the 
system.  The  use  of  a  closed  system makes  it necessary  for 
the  consumer  to  purchase  or  hire  a  special  decoder  to 
receive .TV  channels  encrypted  in  this  system.  This  means 
that  the  households  have  to  buy  or  rent  an  additional 
decoder  if  they  want  to  receive  TV  channels  which  are 
enFrypted  in another  system. 
I 
20.  AJopen system means  that  decoders are available from many 
sources  and  that  the  consumer  can,  with  the  same  decoder, 
. receive  TV  channels  in  different  open  systems  by  using 
different  smart  cards.  Normally,  any  broadcaster  for  a 
minor  payment  can  acquire  the  right  from  the  owner  to  use 
such  an ·open  system.  ' 
\ 
21.  Nearly  all  European  encryption  systems  are  closed,  for 
examp-le  Videocrypt  (used by BSkyB  and Adult  Channel  in the 
UK  and  by Multichoice  in  more  than  30  European  countries 
including  the  Nordic  countries)  and  Syster/Nagravision 
(used  by  Canal+  in  France  and  Spain,  Premiere  in  Germany 
and  Austria  and  Teleclub  in  Switzerland).  However,.  as  a 
rule,  open  encryption  systems  are  used  in  the.  Nordic 
count~ies. 
22.  In addition to the decoder base and access to an encryption 
syste~  a  subscriber  management  system  (SMS)  and  a 
subscriber authorization system  (SAS)  are also needed.  SMS 
is the computer system in charge of managing the subscriber 
base  (the  billing  and  collectio·n  of  subscriptions, 
telephone  answering,  statistics,  etc.}.  SAS  is  a  software 
with  the purpose· to  open or  clos~ the authorization of the 
individual  subscriber  to  receive  pay-TV  channels.  Control 
of  the  SMS,  which  contains  vi  tal  information  about  the 
customers,  would  be  especially  important  for·  a  pay-TV 
broadcaster or a  cable TV  operator.  It must be assumed that 
such operators would be  very reluctant to let a  competitor 
take  over  their SMS. 
~  ,.  ~-·  .  ~  ·:  ·:- -
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23.  Transparent  transmission means  that encryption takes place 
when  the  signal  is  transmitted  and  decryption  first  takes 
place  in  t:he  household.  At  the  moment,  direct-to-home 
households receive  transparent transmission.  This is not 
currently  the  case  for  households  connected  to  cable  TV 
networks.  Cable  TV  networks  consists  to  a  large  extent  of 
several  separate  cable  units,  and.in  each  unit  there  is  a 
"head-end"  in  which  reception  takes  place.  Currently  the 
cable operators  need  to have  one  decoder  for  each  head-end 
and for each  TV  channel.  By. transparent transmission,  a  TV 
household  connected  to  a  cable  TV  network  receives  the 
signal directly from  the satellite and,  thereby,  the  cable , 
TV  operator .could  save  an  e~coding and  decoding  system  in · 
each  head-end~ 
V.  CONCENTRATION 
Joint control 
24.  NSD  shall  be  owned  33,3%  by  each  of  NT,  TD  and  Kinnevik. 
Its  board  of  directors  shall  consist  of  four  directors: 
each party shall  nominate  one director and  one  independent 
director  who  shall  be  nominated  subject  to  agreement 
b~tween  the· parties  shall  also  be  the  chairman  of  the 
I  .  . 
b9ard. 
l 
25.  ·According to Article 5. 2  of NSD' s  Shareholders'  Agreement, 
board  resolutions  will  be  adopted  by  a  majority  of 
directors,  ex-cept  for.  a  . number  of  matters  for  which 
unanimity is iequired.  These matters  include: 
approval  of  and  amendments  to  NSD's  operational  and 
investment  budgets  and  strategic plans; 
borrowing  exceeding  2  million  NOK  (approximately 
250.000  Ecu); 
matters  .entailing  substantial  or  extraordinary 
financial  commitments  for  the  company,  including  the 
lease  of  satellite  capacity  if  the  company  thereby 
assumes  substantial liabilities when  such liabilities 
are  not  included  in  the  last  budget  approved  by  the 
board; 
use  of  other  satellite positions  than  1  degree  West 
and  5  degrees  East,  and decisions  on major  changes  in 
technical  standards  an  other operational  issues; 
employment  of  a  chief  exequtive  officer  who  will  be 
responsible  for  the  day-to-day  management  of  the 
company  and  the  approval  of  operation  guidelines  for 
this chief executive officer.·  · 
26.  The  chairman  of  the  board  of  directors  shall  act  as 
chairman  of  the  general  shareholders'  meeting,  unless  the 
parties agree otherwise.  The  chairman of the shareholders' 
meeting does .not  have  a  casting vote. 
Resolutions at the shareholders'  meeting will be adopted by 
JJ  R/  .., 1 ·,. 
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the  majority  required  by  the  Norwegian  Companies  Act, 
except  for  issues  listed  in  Clause  s·. 2  for  which,  if 
brought  to  ·the  shareholders'  meeting  ,  unanimity  will  be 
required.  · 
27.  As  a  result of the above,  it can be concluded that NSD  will 
be  jointly controlled by its three parent  companies. 
Full  function  joint venture 
28.  NSD's  main  activities will·be  the  following: 
to negotiate and enter into agreements  with programme 
providers  (broadcasters)  for  distribution  of 
television channels  via satellite; 
to  establish  a  leading  satellite position  ·(named  by  ' 
the  parties  as.  a  Nordic  "Hot  Bird")  for  the  Nordic 
market  by  leasing  satellite  capacity  in  the  orbital 
positions  1  degree  West  and  5  degrees  East; 
to  create a  programme  strategy based on  a  new  package 
of  television  channels  adapted  to  the  Nordic 
countries; 
to  distribute  such  a  package  via  satellite  to  the 
cable television  (cable TV),  master antenna television 
(SMATV)  and  direct-to-horne  markets  in  ·the  Nordic 
countries.  This  will  include  offering  Subscriber 
Management  Services,  distributing  smart  cards  and 
operating a  Subscriber .Access  System; 
to  promote  /and  implement  a  digital  transmission 
standard  and  a  joint Nordic  encryption  system  to  be 
used  for  cable  TV,  SMATV  and direct-to-horne; 
to  develop  new  products  and  services  related  to  the 
activities  of  the  . company.·  This  will  not  include 
telephone  services  and  data  or  other  services  to  the 
business market. 
29.  NSD  has  been  established  for  an  indefinite  term.  It will 
have  all  the  necessary ·assets  and  staff in order  to  carry 
out its business  activity on  a  lasting basis. 
30.  When  NSD  starts  to  operate,  NSD  itself  will  be  the 
contracting party to any new  contracts to be concluded ·with 
broadcasters.  All  Viasat' s  and  Telenor  CTV' s  agreements 
with  broadcasters  ,shall  be  transferred  to  NSD,  provided 
that  such  broadcasters  give  their consent. 
31.  NSD  will  provide  satellite  transponder  capacity  and 
satellite network services subleased from Telenor  ~nd other 
independent  satellite  operators  to· broadcasters.  Telenor 
owns  and  operates  the  Thor  satellite,  positioned  at  1 
degree  West,  and  has  re~erved a  number  of  transponders  on 
the  Intelsat  satellite  in  the  same  orbital  position. 
Furthermore,  Telenor  controls  ail  transponders  on  the 
satellite TV-Sat,  also  in the position  1  degree  West.  · 
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32.  According  to  the Cooperation Agreement  between Telenor  and 
NSD,  these  companies  will  have  a  ·mutual  right  of  first 
refusal  for  the  lease  and  provision  of  satellite 
transponder  capacity. for  ·the  transmission  of  television 
programmes  (internal  business  · television  and  data 
transmission  services  are  excluded) .  This  means  that  NSD 
shall have  a  right of first refusal: 
for  the  lease  of  satellite  transponder  capacity  and 
satellite network  services  from  Telenor; 
for  the provision of satellite capacity and satellite 
network services to third parties wishing to broadcast 
in  the  Nordic  countries  who  had  initially approached· 
·Telenor. 
33.  Telenor has  a  right of first  ref~sal to provide  NSD  or its 
affiliates with all the transponder capacity and satellite 
network  services  they . may  need.  In  the  case  of  excess. 
capacity  in  the  satellite  network  service  leased  by  NSD, 
Telenor is entitled to use this capacity after offering NSD 
an  economic  comp.ensa tion.  . 
34.  In  addition,  Kinnevik  and  TD  have  entered  into  lease 
agreements  with  the  Swedish  satellite  opera  tor  Nordiska 
Satelitaktiebolaget  (NSAB)  for  the  lease  of  six 
tr~nsponders situated at  5  degrees .East.  on· this position, 
NsAB  owns  the  Sirius  satellite· and  the  Tele-X  satellite, 
each with  5  transponders.  Kinnevik and  TD  have  leased four 
transponders  on  Sirius  which  now  transmit  four  of 
Kinnevik's channels,  TV3  Sweden,  TV6,  ZTV  and Filmmax.  This 
agreement  went  into effect· on August  1994  and. runs  for  six 
years.  In  addition  Kinnevik  and·  TD  have  leased  two 
transponders on Tele-X,  of which one is currently not used. 
TD  and  Kinnevik  entered  into  these  two  agreements  on 
November  1994  and January  1995 and both will expire on July 
1997  or  with  end  of  life  of  the  satellites.  Under  the 
agreements  Kinnevik  and  TD  will  have  a  right  of  first 
refusal  until August  2000  with  respect  to  the  remaining  4 
transponders'on 5°  East  (one on Sirius and three on Tele-X) 
and,  furthermore,  for  the  same  period  the  two  companies 
will  have  a  right  of ·first refusal  with  respect  to  future 
capacity  at  5°  East  becoming  available  to  NSAB.  All  the 
lease agreements containing the rights of first refusal are 
in  tended  to  be  transferred  to  NSD  prior  to  the  da, te  of 
commencement.of operations. 
35.  NSD  will offer an integrated satellite transmission service 
to  programme  providers.  The  fact  that  NSD  will  sublease 
satellite  transponder  capacity  and  network  seFvices  from 
Telenor or TD/Kinnevik does not put into question its full-
function  character  at  this  level,  since  NSD  will  control 
the·use of this transponder capacity for a  long time.  Lease 
contracts  for  satellite  transponder  capacity  are  usually 
concluded  for  a  long. period  (7-10  years)  which  normally 
coincides  with  the  life of  the  satellite itself.  NSD  will 





therefore be able to develop its own  commercial  strategy on 
a  lasting basis. 
NSD  will develop a  new  package of. television channels which 
will  be  specifically  adapted. to  the  Nordic  audience  in 
terms  of programme  mi~ and  language. 
Regarding  the  direct-to-home  distribution  of  TV  channels 
as  stated above,  before  the  setting up  of  NSD  both  NT  and 
Kinnevik  offered  television  distribution  services  in  the 
Nordic  countries.  NSD  will  ·now  grant  to  the  Viasat 
companies  the  exclusive  right  to  distribute  NSD's 
television  channels  to  the  direct-to-home  and  SMATV 
hous'eholds  in Denmark  and to  the direct-to-home,  SMATV  and 
cable  TV  households  in Sweden.  Viasat  Sweden  will continue 
to  be  100%  owned  by  Kinnevik,  but  Viasat  Denmark  will  be 
owned  by Kinnevik  and  TD  (51%  - 49%)  .  TD  has  a  conditional 
option to acquire  an  additional  6%  of the  share capital  in 
Viasat  Denmark  in  1998. 
In  Norway  NSD  will  have,  for  the  time  being,  two 
representatives: Viasat Norway  (100%  owned by Kinnevik)  and 
Telenor CTV.  It is foreseen that both entities should merge 
and  remain  under  control  of Telenor .. 
A~ the  exclusive distributor of  NSD,  the  Viasat  companies 
w~ll.have  : 
the right and obligation to distribute the TV  channels 
ptovided by  NSD 
the  possibility  to  distribute  , other  television 
channels  subj  ~ct  to.  NSD' s  approval.·  The  only 
limitation here  is that  in order  to  favour  NSD's  Hot 
Bird position,  if the  channel  in  question  is  located 
at  1  degree  West,  Sirius  or  Tele-X,  the  distributor 
will  not  be  able  to  distribute  the  same  channel  from 
another satellite position. 
40.  The  price  to  subscribers  of  the  individual  channels 
included  in  NSD's  package  will  be  decided  ~bY  the· 
broadcaster  itself,  when  NSD  acts  as  an  agent.  Where  NSD 
enters  into  a  distributorship_  agieement  with  the 
broadcaster the price to the subscribers will be decided by 
NSD  or  by  NSD's  distributors  if  they  act  as  sub-
distributors  in.  cooperation  with  NSD.  According  to  NSD's 
Programme  Strategy,  NSD's  distributors shall prepare every 
year  a  marketing budget per channel or package of channels, 
which shall reflect the agreements entered into between NSD 
and  the  broadcaster.  These  programme  budgets  shall  be 
presented  to  and  approved  by  NSD,  and  any  deviations  from 
them  shall be  approved by  NSD. 
41.  · The  fact  that,  as  stated above,  Viasat' s  and Telenor  CTV' s 
agreements  with  broadcasters  wil.+  be  transferred  to  NSD 
with  effect  from  NSD's  start of  operations,  and  that  NSD 
itself  will  negotiate  and  enter  into  any  new  agreements 
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shows  that  NSD  will  take- up  all  responsibilities  with , 
respect  to distribution.  Although  the Viasat  companies  and 
Telenor  CT~ will  not  be  owned  by  NSD  (except  for  Viasat 
Finland),  they will carry out  NSD's  strategic decisions  on 
distribution,  on  the.  basis  of  the  prices  and  budget 
approved by  NSD. 
42.  NSD  shall provide  and control its Subscriber Access  System 
(SAS)  .  Viasat  and  Telenor  CTV  will  keep  the  Subscriber 
Management  System  (SMS),  and will therefore make  available 
smart  cards  to  customers,  and carry out  the  administration 
of subscriptions and payments,  but they shall pay a  monthly 
fee  per  smart  card  for  the  SAS  services  provided  by  NSD. 
NSD  also  intends  to develop  a  new  SAS  for digital services 
as  soon  as it ·is  technically possible. 
4 3.  With  respect  to  cable  distribution,  NT  and  TD' s  cable 
operators  will  be  appointed  NSD's  representatives  for  the 
procurement  and sale of  TV  channels  on  the  cable  TV  market 
and  a  part of the  SMATV  market.  This  implies  that  : 
j 
NT  and  TD's  cable  operators  shall  have  the  right  and 
obligation  to  procure  the  sale  of  satellite  TV 
channels  provided  by  NSD  within  their  respective 
geographic  areas, . but  NSD  is  entitled- to  sell  any 
channel to other cable or antenna operators w{thin the 
same  area; 
the  two  cable operators shall be  able  to  distrib~te a 
TV  channel  which  NSD  cannot  provide  subject  to  NSD's 
prior approval; 
NSD  shall  have  the  exclusive  right  to  conduct 
negotiations  and  enter  into  agreements  with 
broadcasters concerning marketing and sale of channels 
via cable  in those  geographic areas. 
44.  In  a  similar  way  as  that  agreed  with  Viasat,  NT  and  TO's 
cable· operator~s  agreements  'with  broadcsters  shall  be 
transferred  to  NSD·  with  effect  from  NSD's  start  of 
operations subject to the approval of the broadcasters.  NSD 
will  therefore  assume  the  full  responsibility  for  the 
provi~ion of  satellite  TV  channels  to  the  cable  networks 
owned  by  the parties'. 
45.  Despite  of  the  fact,  that  NSD  will  be  relatively small  in 
economic  terms,  since it will only employ  around  20  people 
the first year and  a.round  50  within two  or three years  and 
it will  have ·assets  for  a  value  of· around  25  million  Ecu, 
as  a  result of all the  above  elements,  it can  be  concluded 
that  NSD  will  have ·all  the  necessary  resources  to  perform 
all  the  functions  normally  carried  out  b1  companies 
operating in the same market,  and will therefore constitute 
_a  full-function  joint  ~enture. 
.1  · ..  ·.·.·'I' 
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Cooperative aspects 
46.  NSD's  paren~ companies  are currently competitors  mai~ly at 
the distribution level,  since in the direct-to-home segment 
in  Norway,  Denmark  and  Sweden  NT,  through  Telenor  CTV, 
competes  with  Kinnevik' s  Vias at  companies  and  in  some 
regions  there  is  competition  between  Viasat  and  the  cable 
operators of  TD  and  NT. 
47.  In  the  direct-to-home  distribution  market  the  parties 
intend to merge Telenor CTV's activities in Sweden,  Denmark 
and  Norway  with  those  of  Viasat,  which  will  become  the 
exclusive distributor of NSD's  package of TV  channels these 
countries.  In  the  meantime,  the  transfer  of  all 
distribution  contracts  to  NSD  and  the  exclusive  right  to 
negotiate  new  ones  prevents  the  parent  companies  from 
providing direct-to-home distribution s·ervices on their own 
and  from developing a  distribution strategy to pursue their 
individual  inter.ests. 
4 8.  The  parties'  cable  operators  and  Vias at  will  continue 
operating in the  same  areas,  but they will all act as NSD's 
representatives offering as  a  general rule the same  package 
of  satellite  TV  channels.  As  for  the  direct-td-home 
segment,  the  transferral of the cable operators'  contracts 
as!  well  as  the  right  to  negotiate  to  NSD  prevents  the 
p~~ent  companies  from  providing. these  services  on  their. 
own. 
49.  There  is also  competition at present  between  NT  and  TD  in 
a  very  marginal  market  in  economic  terms:  TV  up-linking 
services  to  the  satellite  (see  point  53).  Both  parents 
currently  provide  these  services  from  their  respective 
countries,  but  the  insignificance  of  this  market  in 
economic terms clearly shows  that the operation has neither 
the  object or the  effect of coordinating the activities of 
these  two  parent  companies  with . re.spect  to  up-linking 
services. 
50.  Finally,  the  activities  of  NSD's  parent  companies  in 
. upstream  or  downstream  markets  are  not.likely  to  lead  to 
any  coordination  of'  their  competitive  behaviour.  NT  does 
not  compete  as  a  satellite  operator  with  TD  or  Kinnevik. 
Kinnevik will broadcast its pay-TV .and  commercial  channels 
through  NSD, ·  but  none  of  the  other  parties  are 
broadcasters. 
51.  The  facts  described  above  lead  to. the  conclusion  that  the 
setting up  of  NSD  has  neither the object nor  the effect of 
coordinating  the  competitive  behaviour  of  undertakings 
which  remain  independent.  It  can  therefore  be  concluded 
that  the  present  operation  constitutes  a  concentration 
withiri  the  meaning  of Article  3  of the Merger  Regulation. 
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VI.  RELEVANT  PRODUCT  MARKE';rS 
52.  The  operati~n involves the following three product markets: 
(i)  provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity  and 
related services to broad~asters;  (ii)  distribution of pay-
TV  and  other  encrypted·  TV  channels  to  direct-to-home 
households;  (iii)  operation of cable  TV  networks. 
(i) ·  Provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity 
and related services to broadcasters 
53.  Several  companies  are  in  the  business  of  providing 
satellite transponder capacity. These·companies- satellite 
operators  launch  and  operate  satellites  and  lease 
transponders  to  broadcasters  for  transmissions  of  TV 
signals.  According to  the parties,  around  250  transponders 
are  available  for  transmission  of  TV  ·signals·  to  Europe 
(turnover  approximately  625  Million  Ecu) .  The  most 
important satellite TV  channels in the Nordic countries are 
currently being provided by Astra,  Thor,  Intelsat_ 702  and 
Sirius..  These  tranipopders  are  normally  leased  to 
broadcasters  who  through  licensing  arrangements  deliver 
their  TV  channels  to  the  distributors  of  cable-TV  and 
direct-to-home  consumers. 
54.  D~stribution of  TV  signals via satellite  (transponders)  is 
a.l  market  distinct  from  TV· di'stribution  by  terrestrial 
links,  since considerable differences exist between the two 
modes  of distribution both technically and financially  (see 
the  decision  IV/M.469  MSG  Media  Se~vice).  The  NSD 
operation  will  result  in  a.  reorganisation  of  existing 
transponder capacity and will not lead to an enlargement of 
satellite transponder capacity suitable for Nordic viewers. 
(ii)  Distribu.tion of satellite pay-TV  and  other encrypted 
TV  channels  to direct-to-home households
3 
55.  On  this  market  (hereafter  called  direct-to-home 
distribution),  the  distributor  of  pay-TV  and  other 
encrypted  channels  market  and  sells  the  channels  or  a 
package  of  channels ·to  the  direct-to-home  households  and 
provides  the  households--with  the_necessary  smartcard.  In 
the  Nordic  area  most  direct-to-home  distributors  sell  the 
channels  in packages  (a  bouquet of channels)  of which  some 
contain  up  to  25  channels  of  all  types  e  Normally  I  the 
distributor  will  offer  a  "basic  package"  that  contains 
mixed financed pay-TV and advertising-financed TV  channels . 
.3  In the  statement of objections,  this ·market  was  named 
"Administrative and technical services in distribution 
of satellite pay-TV and other encrypted channels".  The 
change  has  been.  made  in  order  to  emphasize  the 
commercial  relationship  between  the  distributer  as  a 
provider  of  TV  channels  and  the  direct-to-home 
households. 
I 
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In addition,  the customer has  the option of adding other TV 
channels  to  the package.  Several  pay-TV channels  and other 
encrypted channels  are marketed in the,Nordic countries. 
56.  There  are currently three major distributors in the Nordic 
countries  :  Multichoice  (a  distribution  company  owned  by 
FilmNet)  and  Kinnevik  and  NT's  distribution  companies.  It 
is  intended  that  the  direct-to-home  distribution  of  TV 
channels  by  NSD  shall  take  place  through  the  parents 
distribuion  companies  on  an  exclusive  basis.  (see  points 
37-39) . 
57.  The  market  for  direct-to-home  distribution  has  a  high 
growth  potential.  Compared  to.  transmission  via  cable 
networks,  direct-to-home  reception  is  currently  a  smaller 
segment  of  the  market  (see  point  59).  According  to  the 
parties,  there  are  approximately  720  000  direct-to-home 
households  in  the  Nordic  countries  (Sweden  has  around 
360  000  direct-to-home households,  Denmark  170.000,  Norway 
160  000  and  Finlaod  around  30  000)  ~  However,  the  parties 
estimate that at the  end of  1998  the Nordic direct-to-home 
segment will  comprise  1,15 million households. 
(iii)  Operating cable-TV networks 
58.  'J:'h~  cable  operators  provide  the  following  services  to 
ho.bseholds  connected  to  their  networks  :  maintainance  of 
the  network,  sale  and  marketing  of  TV  channels.  In 
addition, ·the  cable  operators  target  the  SMATV  households 
in  order  to  sell  the  TV  channels.  also  to  this  segment. 
Households wanting access to pay-TV.normally rent a  decoder 
from  the  cable  TV.  operator.  However,  cable  TV  operators 
normally operate  their  own  SMS  and  SAS  based  on  their  own 
encryption  system  and  sell  these  services  to  broadcasters 
wanting  to  transmit  pay-TV  or other  encrypted  channels  in 
the  network.  · 
59.  From the point of ·view of the viewer there are considerable 
differences  between.  the  possible  transmission  routes 
terrestrial,  direct-to-home  satellite  and  cable  .- which 
affect  both  technical  requirements  and  finance.  While 
terrestrial  transmission  and  satellite  television  only 
require the viewer·to install an aerial or a  satellite dish 
at  his · own  expense,  cahle  TV  is  dependent  'on .  the 
maintenance  of  a  cable  network,  which  is  financed  by  the 
viewer  by  means  of  cable  fees  (see  IV/M.469  - MSG/Media 
Service).  As  shown/ currently approximately 4.3 million of 
the  10 million Nordic  households  are connected to cable  TV 
networks  and around  0.7  million are  connected  to  SMATV  of 
which  some  receives  the  signal  from  cable  TV  operators. 
. ·,;:_ 
....  _  ........ 
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cable  TV  1.05 mio  1.9 mio  0.565  mio  0.78  mio 
SMA TV  0.25  mio  0.3  mio  0.120  mio  0.10  mio 
60.  Cable  TV  is  currently  the  predominant  transmission  route 
for  satellite  distributed  TV  in  the  .Nordic  countries. 
However,  the cable  TV  market has reached a saturation point 
and  is  currently  characterised by  slow  growth,  and  it is 
·expected that no  more  than  50%.to  60%  of the  10  million  TV 
households  in  the  Nordic  countries  are  likely  in  the 
foreseeable  future to be cabled,  largely because of terrain 
difficultie~ and the dispersion of the population in a  wide 
geographical  area which  would be  uneconomical  to cable.  It 
could  be  argued  that  there  exists  a  certain  competitive 
link between the cable  TV  market and the market  for direct-
to-home. satellite distribution. However,  the choice between 
transmission by cable or direct-to-home is not possible for 
a  ilarge  number  of  currently  not  cabled  households  in  the 
Ndrdic  countries  in the  forseeable  future. 
! 
A  further  element  which  can  limit  the  option  for  a 
household  is  the  fact  that  in  some  households  the 
acquisition of satellite dishes is prohibited on aesthetic 
grounds  by  the  landlord  or  by  the  owners'  association  in 
the case of multiple dwellings.  Lastly,  a  household already 
·on  cable  or  having  a  satellite  receiver  is  normally  not 
ready  to  make  a  further  investment  in  another  form  of 
transmission  (lock-in  effect) .  For  the  reasons  mentioned 
above,  it appears  that  the  operation of  cable  networks  is 
an  independent  relevant market. 
61.  The  Nordic  cable  TV  market  consists  of  a  number  of  cable 
networks  of  different  size  each  consisting  of 
4  several 
separate cable.units. At the·individual head-ends the cable 
TV  operator  will  normally  have  satellite  dishes  directed 
towards  all  relevant satellite alternatives. 
VII.  RELEVANT  GEOGRAPHIC  MARRET 
(i)  Provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity  and 
related services  to broadcasters 
62.  A broadcaster wishing to  transmit to a  specific area needs 
a  transponder with a  footprint  (the geographical area where 
the  TV  signals  distributed by  a  satellite can  be  received 
by  direct-to-home  households  having·  standard  receiving 
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equipment)  that  co~ers the  relevant  geographical  area. 
63.  Technically,  it  is  possible  for  the  households  in  the 
Nordic  countries  to  receive  signals  from  all  European 
satellites. Quality of reception depends  on the size of the 
receiying  dish  and  .on  the  strength  of  the  transponder 
signal.  However,  economic  and  aesthetic  considerations 
will limit the dish size generally used and,  as  a  rule,  the 
Nordic  direct-to-home  households  will  only  have  equipmeQt 
which is adequate to ·receive signals from certain satellite 
positions.  For  cable  TV  operators  the  situation  is  quite 
different,  since,  as  they  are  not  faced  with  the  same 
economic  and  aesthetic  restrictions  as  the  direct-to-home 
households,  they  will  be  able  to  receive  signals  from 
nearly ·all-European satellite poiitions.  · 
64.  For  transmission  to  direct-to-home  households,  one  way  of 
defining  the  geographical  scope  of  transponders  is  to 
consider  th-e  size  of  the  dish  necessary  to  receive  good 
quality  signals  from  the  transponders  in  question. 
According to technical information provided by the parties, 
Societe  Europeenne  des  Satellites  (SES),. which  owns  the 
Astra  satellites,  has  specified  its  main  markets  to  be 
.areas  where  signals  can  be  received by dishes  of  up  to  60 
c~  in  diameter.  On  the  basis  of  a.60  em  dish  size,  the 
Ngrdic satellites  (Intelsat702/Thor/TV-Sat and Sirius/Tele 
xy,  the  Astra  satellites  and  the  Eutelsat  satellites  are 
relevant  for.Nordic  viewers. 
65.  The  transponders  on  the Nordic satellites have  a  footprint 
which  enables  all  Nordic  viewers  with  a . 60  em  dish  to 
receive  the  signals  from  the  transponders.  Astra  and 
Eutelsat  are  also  relevant  for  the  Nordic  area  since 
direct-to-home  households  in  the  whole  of  Denmark  and  in 
the  Southern parts  of  Norway  and  Sweden  with  a  60  em  dish 
could  receive  signals  from  some  of  Eutelsat  and  Astra's 
transponders.  Astra  cannot  be  received  in  Finland  with  a 
60  em  dish. 
66.  From  a  technical point of view,  for  a  broadcaster who  wants 
to  target  only  Denmark  the  transponders  on  Astra  and 
Eutelsat  would  be  as  relevant  as  the  Nordic  transponders. 
However,  a  broadcaster  who  wants  to  operate  on  a  Nordic 
·basis,  transpondets  which  only  cover  parts  of  the  Nordic 
market will not be considered as an attractive alternative. 
For such a  broadcaster there will be  imperfect substitution 
between  NSD.'s  transponders  and  the  transponders  on  Astra 
and  Eutelsat.  This  is  supported  by  information  from  the 
parties  in  which  is  it  stated  that  prior  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Nordic  satellite positions  there  was 
no  transponder  capacity.with  an  ideal  foot-print  for  the 
Nordic  countries. 
6 7 .  Furthermore,  it has  ..  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  compared  to 
the Nordic satellites, Astra and Eutelsat are international 
businesses with a  Central  European  scope.  Information  from 
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the  parties  indicates  that  the  fee  for  leasing  a 
transponder  on  Astra  or  Eutelsat  will  be  considerably 
higher  than~ the  fee  will be  for  leasing a  Nordic satellite 
transponder.  If  ·NSD  maintains  a  considerable  price 
difference,  transponders  on Astra and Euteisat will not  be 
an  alternative  for  a  broadcaster  who  wants  to  be  a 
competitive player in the  Nordic  area. 
However,  in  this  case,  technical  questions  relating  to 
footprints  and  sizes  of  dishes,  and  the  prices  of 
transponders are not  determinant for  the definition of  the 
relevant geographic market  since the operation will create 
such  barriers  to  entry  for  providers  of  transponder 
capacity suitable for  Nordic viewers  that the operation in 
itself  will  lead  to  the  creation  of  a  separate· Nordic 
market.  As  will  be  shown  in  the  assessment,  through  its 
control  over  the  tr.ansponder  capacity  and  the  links  to 
Kinnevik  as  an  important  broadcaster  and  distributor  of 
. Nordic  TV  channels,  and  through  the  links  to  TD  and  NT  as 
important  cable  operators,  NSD  will  be  in  a  position  to 
foreclose  other  satellite  op~r·ators  from  leasing 





Distribution  of  satellite  pay-TV  and  other 
encrypted  TV  channels  to·  direct-to-home 
households 
69.  Direct-to-home  distribution  is  a  retail  operation  with 
direct local contact with the viewer,  FilmNet,  Kinnevik and 
NT  operate  national  companies  providing  these  services. 
Marketing  of  the  services  is  national.  Furthermore,  the 
operation itself will  foreclose  the  Nordic  region  for  new 
distribution  companies,  since  it  will  in  effect  be 
impossible  for  a  potential  entrant  to  create  a  smart  card 
with an attractive programme  package  (see points 135-138). 
The  market is 'likely to be national,  but it will not change 
the  ass~ssment whether the market is defined as national or 
Nordic  and  therefore this  question  can be  left open. 
(iii)  Operation of cable TV  networks 
70.  Provision  of  cable  TV  services  to  viewers  is  a  regional 
service.  Competition  between  operators  ·to  obtain 
connections  may  to  a  certain  extent  take  place  on  a 
national  scale  in  terms  of  marketing  efforts.  Cable  TV 
operators  are  faced  with  different  market  conditions  in 
different  countries  in ·terms  of  geography,  marketing  and 
legislation.  Operation of cable TV  networks is,  therefore, 
at least a  national market. 
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VIII.  ASSESSMENT 
71  The  operation  essentially involves  the  following  separate 
markets  : 
.A.  Provision  ·of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity  and 
related services  to broadcasters. 
B.  Operation of cable  TV  networks. 
C.  Distribution of  satellite pay-TV  and  other  encrypted 
TV  channels  to direct-to-home  households. 
The  operation will  have  an  impact  on  the  affected markets 
either horizontally or through the vertical links created. 
NSD  will,  after  the  operation,  control  an  integrated 
infrastructure  for  the  provision  of  TV  services  to  the 
Nordic  area  as  well  as  the  right  to  transmit  some  of  the 
most  important  TV  channels  in the  area. 
The  assessment  first discusses  the ·effect of the operation 
on  the  transponder capacity market  {section A).  It goes  on 
to  deal  with  the  operation's  effects  on  the  markets  for 
cable  TV  (section  B)  and  distribubion of satellite pay-TV 
and  other  encrypted  channels  to  direct-to-home  households 
(section C).  Sections  D  [ ...  ]  discuss  issues  relating  to 
ecpnomic  and  technical  progress. [ ...  ]  The  Commission's 
copclusions  are  set out  in section E . 
.' 
A.  Provision  of  satellite  TV  transponder  capacity  and 
related services  to broadcasters 
A.l.  Market structure and  capacity 
a)  Transponder capacity available for the Nordis;  "Hot Bird" 
72.  Currently,  there  are  five  satellites  in  the  position  1 o 
West  a~d 5  degrees  East.  These  are  : 
Thor  with  5  transponders  (of  which  all  are  used  for 
NSD ' s  cha~nel  s) 
Intelsat  with  10  transponders  (of  which  four  are  used 
for NSD's  channels;  three are used for public channels; 
the rest is used by other independent'broadcasters) 
TV-Sat  with  5  transponders  (of which  three are used for 
NSD 's  channels;  one  is·  used  by  an  independent 
broadcaster; one is currently not used but contrqlled by 
NSD) 
Sirius,  owned  by  the  Swedish  state  owned  company  NSAB, 
with  5  transponders  (of  which  four  are  used  for  NSD's 
channels;  one is used by an  independent broadcaste·r) 
Tele-X,  owned'by NSAB,  with 5  transponders  (of which one 
is used for NSD's  channel;  one is currently not used but 
controlled by NSD;  one is used for a  public channel;  the 
rest is used by other independent broadcasters) . 
Telenor owns  and operates the Thor satellite,  positioned at 






1  degree West.  Furthermore,  Telenor has leased  from German 
Telecom the TV-Sat satellite and,- in addition,  ha~ reserved 
all  the  transponders  on  the  Intelsat  satellite,  both 
satellites also located at 1  degree West.  At  the  same  time, 
Kinnevik  and  TD  have  entered  into  an  agreement  with  the 
Swedis~  satellite  operator  NSAB  for  the  lease  of  four 
transponders  on  the Sirius satellite and  two  on  the  Tele-X 
satellite,  both  situated  at  S
0  East.  This  agreement  is 
intended to  be  transferred to  NSD  prior to  the  date  of  the 
commencement  of operations.[ ...  ] 
NSD  and  its parents  will  directly-or  indirectly control  a 
large majority of the capacity available for the Nordic "Hot 
Bird".  Of  a  total of 30  tran~ponders in the position 1°  West 
and  S
0  East,  NSD  will .immediately lease  19.  [ ...  ] 
b)  Competition  from Astra  and Eutelsat 
The  parties  claim  that  the  Astra  and,  to  a  lesser  extent, 
the  Eutelsat  satellites  are  actual  competitors  to  the 
Nordic  satellites,  since  direct-to-home  households  in  the 
Southern parts of Scandinavia can receive signals  from  some 
of  Eutelsat's  and  Astra's  transponders  with  standard 
equipment.  According  to  the  parties,  more·  than  50 
transponders  on  Astra  and  Eutelsat  are  currently used  for 
ch)innels  which  are  aimed  at  or  -of  interests  to  Nordic 
hduseholds. 
7 5  It  is  true  that  today  approximately  70%  of  the  Nordic 
direct-to-home  households  have  their  dishes  directed  to 
Astra.  In  addition;  practically all Nordic  cable  networks 
have dishes directed to Astra and  Eutelsat.  However,  it has 
to  be  borne  in  mind  that,  except  for  Kinnevik' s  four 
channels  and  a  pay-TV  channel  which- is  transmitted  from 
Astra_ to Nordic viewers,  all channels  on Astra and Eutelsat 
are  in  foreign  languages  and  aimed  at  other  non-:Nordic 
countries.  Several  of  these  channels  can  be  said  to  be  of 
interest to Nordic households,  for example Eurosport and MTV 
Europe,  and  it cannot  be  excluded  that  others  are  popular 
in certain regions  (for  example  German  language  programmes 
in -the  Southern  par.ts  of  Denmark) .  Nevertheless,  national 
channels  are  by  far  the  most.pop~lar.  National  language  is 
the  most  decisive  element  in'the selection of  a  channel  by 
the  viewer  and  to  make  cost-effective  TV  advertising,  the. 
industry has  to  use  national  TV  channels. 
76  In  addition,  Astra  and  Eutelsat  have  a  central  European 
scope.  They have  up  to now  not  shown  a  particular interest 
in the Nordic area and the  foot prints of the satellites do 
not  cover  the  whole.Nordic  area.  The  satellites which  NSD 
controls  have  foot  prints  aimed  at  Nordic  viewers  in 
·particular.  Consequently,  ·broadcasters  using  NSD's 
transponders  will obtain  an  advantageous  position·compared 
to  competitors  without  access  to  NSD's  transponders . 
Anyhow,  because of the operation Astra and Eutelsat will not 
be  signifi~ant competitors  to  NSD's  Hot  Bird  as  providers 
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of  transponders  to  broadcasters  wanting  to  target  Nordic 
viewers.  The  reasons  are  as  follows  : 
(i)  The  importance of Kinnevik's  TV  channels 
Through the link to Kinnevik as a  broadcaster,  NSD 
will be  able  to offer some  very popular Nordic  TV 
channels  on  an  exclusive  basis.  As  a  result,  the 
majority of Nordic  direct~to-home households  will 
direct their dishes  toward NSD's  satellites. 
(ii)  The  link to Kinnevik  as  a  major distributor 
Getting  onto  the  Viasat  package  of  satellite  TV 
channels will be vital for broadcasters  aiming at 
the  Nordic  DTH. market, . because  of  the  pulling 
(iii) 
j 
( i v) 
,power  of  the  popular  Kinnevik  channels  being 
offered  there.  By  the  operation,  Viasat  will 
exclusively  distribute  these  channels  available 
from  the  NSD  satellites.  Therefore,  it will  be 
vital for broadcasters to be on the NSD  satellites 
so  as  to  be  on  the Viasat distribution package. 
The  link  to  the  parents  as  major  cable  TV 
operators 
Because  of NSD's  link to _TD  and  NT  as  major  cable 
TV  operators  a  broadcaster  must  anticipate  the 
possibility of not getting access  to  a  large part 
of the Nordic cable networks  if it transmits  from 
Astra or Eutelsat. 
The price difference 
Because  broadcasters  will  be  able  to  lease 
transponders  on  NSD  at lower prices  than on Astra 
and Eutelsat,  a  broadcaster targetting the  Nordic 
market will obtain an  advantage  by being  on NSD's 
satellites  compared  to  competitors  who  are  on 
Astra or· Eutelsat. 
(v)  No  capacftY on.Astra an Eutelsat 
All  transponder capacity on Astra  and Eutelsat is 
currently occupied. 
(i)  The  importance of Kinnevik's  TV  channels 
The  relationship between  Kinnevik  as  a  broadcaster  and  NSD 
as.a supplier of transponder  services will be  instrumental 
for  the  parties  in creating  a  "Nordic  Hot  Bird".  NSD  will 
offer a  package of approximately 25 programmes including the 
TV3  channels of Kinnevik.  The  TV3  channels will play a  major 
role  in creating t&e  "Nordic-Hot Bird".  When  launched  (TV3 
Sweden  in  1989  and  subsequently TV3  Denmark  and  TV3  Norway 
in 1991)  they were  transmitted from-Astra.  The  TV3.  channels 
became  very  popular  TV  channels  in  these  countries. 
According to  the parties  TV3  can be watched by about  50%  of 
all households  in  Sweden,  Norway  and  Denma'rk.  Information 
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from  cable operators  indicates that more  than  70%  of  their 
viewers regularly watch TV3  and that the channel ranks among 
the  4  most:  popular  channels  in  each  country.  Cable  TV 
operators generally indicated that TV3  is the most important 
channel  to  carry, · apart  from  the  national  terrestrially 
distributed  channels.  In  this  connection,  one  has  to  bear 
in mind that Nordic viewers  can watch the national channels 
without  having  to  buy 'a  di~h or  to  subscribe  to  cable  TV. 
Therefore,  the  reason  for  a  household  to  buy  a  dish  or 
subscribe  to  cable  TV  is  to  get  access  to  additional 
. channels,  of which  TV  3  is  the_. most  important. 
78  In  addition,  the  parties will within  a  short  time  be  able 
to add more attractive TV  channels to the package.  Kinnevik 
_owns  other  channels  (TV6,  TVG•,  Z-TV)  which  will  also  be 
transmitted exclusively  from  NSD's  transponders. 
79  It appears  that  following  the  operation Astra  will  not  be 
a  major  provider  of  satellite  TV  channels  to  the  Nordic 
market.  Currently,.  five-transponders  on Astra  are  used  for 
Nordic  TV  channels and no Nordic TV  channels are transmitted 
from Eutelsat.  Four of the five Nordic transponders on Astra 
are  leased  by  Kinnevik  and  used  for  its  channels  TV3 
Denmark,  TV3  Sweden,  TV3  Norway  and  TV1000.  Because  of  the 
operation, Astra shall no longer transmit the Kinnevik owned 
ch~nnels which will then be exclusively transmitted from the 
No~dic satellites.  In  addition,  it is  likely  that  Astra 
will also stop transmitting the remaining national chanpel, 
FilmNet's  pay-TV  channel,  since  FilmNet  by  the  agreement 
with  Telenor  (see  point  134)  will  get  access  to  an 
additional  transponder  on  1  degree  West. 
80  Kinnevik' s  four  transponders  on  Astra  will  not  become 
available for broadcasters of Nordic  TV  channels.  It is the 
stated  aim  of  Kinnevik  to  lease  the  four  transponders  to 
broadcasters  with  no  Nordic  interests.  In  a  market 
characterized by a  rise in demand  and ·a  shortage-of supply, 
such  a  move  serves  to  limit competition. 
81 
82 
Furthermore,  NSD  will  also  provide  Astra's  most-popular 
fo·reign  language  TV  channels  in  the·  Nordic  countries: 
Eurosport,  Discovery,  Children's  Channel,  . CNN  Int.,  MTV 
Europe.  The  first  four  mentioned  channels  will  be 
transmitted  in  a  more  attractive  Nordic  version  in  NSD's 
package.  According  to  the  parties,  other  international 
channels  are  also  considering  Nordic  versions  of  their 
channels  which  will  be  subtitled  or  dubbed.  It  is  most 
likely  that  these  channels  will  also  be  transmitted  from 
NSD ''s  satellites.  NT  has  exclusive  rights  to  .. distribute 
Eurosport  ~ordic,  CNN  Nordic  and  MTV  Europe  in  the  Nordic 
area.  Undoubtedly,  such rights will be  transferred to  NSD 
and  it is  likely  that  NSD  will  be  able  to  get  exclusive 
rights  to other popular channels. 
Based upon the above mentioned,  it appears that broadcasters 
will stop transmitting the Nordic channels on Astra and that 
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Astra will not  have  many  popular  foreign  language  channels 
to  offer  to  Nordic  viewers  which  they  cannot  get  from  the 
Nordic  sateilites,  some  even  in a  Nordic version. 
83  The  position of NSD  is likely·to_be further strengthened by 
the  fact  that  the  national  broadcasters  in  Denmark  are 
planning  to  launch . satellite  channels  as  supplements  to 
their  terrestrially distributed  channels.  It  appears  that 
NSD  is the only realistic distribution possibility for these 
companies.  Furthermore,  the inclusion of these companies  in 
NSD  will  take  away  strong  potential . broadcasters  for 
potential competitors to NSD  seeking.to distribute satellite 
television to  t~e NOrdic  area. 
84  The parties do  not deny the strength·of Kinnevik's channels. 
On  the  contrary,  they  consider  those  channels  a  decisive 
element  in  the  operation.  Information  provided  by  the 
parties  shows  that  they  .concur  ·with  the  Commission's 
expectation  that,  after  and  as  a  result  of  the  operation, 
most dishes in the area will be turned towards  1 degree West 
or  S·degrees  East. 
85  Th~ parties acceptance that most dishes  in the area  (70%  of 
which  are  presently  directed  at  Astra)  will  be  turned 
totards  the  Nordic  satellites as.  soon  as  'TV3  moves  to  them 
fr m Astra  ,  seems  to lead to the conclusion that TV3  is by 
faJ  the most  important satellite TV  channel to most  Nordic 
direct-to-home  households,  and  to  confirm  the  "pulling 
power"  of  the  Kinnevik  channels mentioned earlier.  · 
86  The  parties  state  that  TV  channels  carried  by  Astra  and 
Eutelsat  will still be attractive for Nordic direct-to-home 
households  and  mention  the  fact  that  it  is  possible  for 
households  to  receive  signals  from more  than one  satellite 
position by using certain equipment.  Such .equipment includes 
rnotorised dishes  and  fixed dishes with side-feeds.  If they 
wish  to,  _household~ can also  buy  another ·fixed  d~sh. 
87  However,  it seems clear that there are several problems with 
such. equipment.  There  are.  aesthetic  and  planning  concerns 
raised by the large size of the dishes required to fit side-
feeds.  They are also ·Costly.  The  high cost of the motorised 
and  second  dish  solutions  also  militates  against  them.  A 
ratio  of  2:1  in  price  difference  between  side-feed  and 
standard  e.quipment  has  been  mentioned· by  the  parties. 
Motorised  dishes  are  even  more  expensive,  and  the  cost  of 
buying  two  standard dishes  is obvious.  · 
Furthermore, even if such solutions were inexpensive and easy 
to  integrate  in.to  a  household,  it  seems  likely  that  a 
consumer  receiving  25  TV  channels  from  NSD  using  standard 
equipment  will  be  reluctant  to  spend  money  on  other 
equipment  so  as  to  receive  additional  channels  from  Astra 
or Eutelsat. 
88  ·It is clear,  therefore,  that,  because of the operation,  very 
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few  Nordic  direct-to-home  households  will  direct  their 
dishes  towards Astra,  Eutelsat or other satellite operators 
and,  therefore,  broadcasters  wanting  to  target  Nordic 
viewers  will  not  see  these  satellites  as  alternatives  to 
NSD. 
(ii)  The  link  to Kinnevik  as  a  major distributor 
89  A broadcaster  transmitting  from Astra  or  Eutelsat  will  be 
excluded from NSD's package of satellite TV  channels.  In the 
Nordic countries satellite TV  channels are sold in packages 
and  by  the  operation  NSD  will  offer  very  attractive 
packages.  To  be  excluded  from  NSD's  packages  of  channels 
will  put  a  broadcaster  in  a  very  disadvantaged  position 
compared  to  NSD' s  broadcasters.  It  is  very  unlike  1 y  tha  e· 
such  broadcasters  could  develop  new  packages  which  could 
compete. with NSD' s  package of channels. Another option would 
be  -to  get  onto  FilmNet' s  packages  of  channels·.  However, 
compared to what  NSD~s packages can offer (i.e. the Kinnevik 
channels  including  TV3,  the  Nordic  versions  of  other 
channels  see  points. 77-81  above)  FilmNet' s  package  (see 
point  132)  will  not  be  an  attractive  choice  for  a 
broadcaster.  Besides,  Filmnet's  position .as  a  significant 
player  on  this  market  will  be  undermined  because  of  the 
operation  (see point  140). 
~  .  . 
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(i:ii)  The  link  to  the  parents  as  major  cable  TV 
operators 
A  broadcaster  transmitting  from  Astra  or  Eutelsat  must 
anticipate  the  possibility of  exclusion  from  a  large part 
of  Nordic  viewers _connected  to  cable  rietworks.  Currently 
the parties control about 25%  of the approximately 5 million 
households connected to cable TV  networks and SMATV  networks 
in the Nordic countries. However,  in the digital environment 
NSD  will effectively be  able  to control  a  much  larger part 
of  the  cable  TV  network  in the Nordic  area  due  to its role 
as  a  "gate  keeper"  to . the  No.rdic  cable  TV  networks  (see 
point 128).  · 
(iv)  The price difference 
It  seems  likely  that  broadcasters  will  be  able  to  lease 
transponders  on  NSD  at  lower  prices  than  on  Astra  and 
Eutelsat.  This  is  mainly  because  of  the  difference  in 
population covered by the Nordic foot print of NSD  compared 
to  the  central European  foot  prints of Astra  and Eutelsat. 
This  means  that broadcasters  aiming at Nordic  viewers  will 
obtain  a  price  advantage .on  NSD' s  satellites  compared  to 
competing broadcasters without  access  to  NSD's  satellites. 
rn  addition,  a  broadcaster  transmitting  from  Astra  or 
Eutelsat  can  reach only  approximately-70~ of the  potential 
Nordic direct-to-home households while competitors on NSD's 
satellites  can  reach  all  Nordic  households  using  standard 
receiving  equipment.  For  these  reasons  alone,  most 
broadcasters  wanting  to  target Nordic  viewers  will  not  see 
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transponders  on Astra or Eutelsat as  relevant alte·rnatives 
to  NSD's  transponders. 
(v)  No  capacity on Astra and Eutelsat 
92  All  transponder  capcity  on  Astra  and.  Eutelsat  is  occupied 
and  in addition,  the  market  for  TV  transponder capacity is 
for  the.  moment  characterised  by  a  rise  in  demand  and  a 
shortage  on  the  supply  side.  Furthermore,  Kinnevik  which 
currently leases  4  transponders on Astra directed at Nordic 
region,  has  decided not  to  sub-lease  these  to broadcasters 
targetting the Nordic  region when it moves  its channels  to 
NSD  satellites. 
c)  Potential  competition  from  future  capacity 
93  The  parties  expect  the current situation in which  there  is 
a  shortage  of  transponders  to  change  because  of  a  net 
increase  in  transponders  in the near  future. 
(i}  Astra  I  Eutelsat 
ol 
,; 
94  The  parties  claim  that  Astra  has  plans  to  launch  a  new 
satellite  in  1995  which  will  increase  its  transponder 
capacity  from  64  to  82  and,  in  1996, ·a  further  satellite 
will  increase Astra's  capacity  to  102  transponders.  Other 
satellite  operators  with  European  coverage,  for  example 
Eutelsat, ·will also launch new satellites in the near future 
and  thereby  increase  the  total transponder capacity. 
95 
96 
Undoubtedly,  Astra,  Eutelsat  and other satellite operators 
have  plans  to  (and  · will)  increase  the  capacity  of 
transponder.s  in  the  ·coming ·  years  by  launchi~g  new 
satellites.  However,  .according  to  information  currently 
available  to  the  Commission,  transponders  will- not  be 
available for Nordic broadcasters in the next three to four 
years  at  least.  Besides,  even  if  transponders  for  Nordic 
viewers  were  to  be  available  there  would  not  be  that  many 
that  it would  be  possible·to  create  a  package  that  could 
compete  commercially with NSD'S'. 
(ii)  NSAB 
The parties have  in a  letter of 12 April 1995 mentioned that 
the  Swedish satellite ope·rator  NSAB  has  announced plans  to 
launch  a  32  transponder satellite tQ  become  operational  by 
mid 1997.  This means inter alia that NSAB  shall not acquire 
additional capacity at 5° East without first consulting NSD. 
Furthermore,  NSD  will  have  a  right  of  first  refusal  with 
regard. to  satellite  capacity  at  5°  East  which .is  or  will 
beco:me  available  to  NSAB  or  which  NSAB  plans  to  have 
II  8/  3R • 
24 
available.  Consequently,  NSD  will  also  control . those  32 
transponders,  if NSAB  ca.rries its plan through.  These  are 
non-ancillary agreements  subject to Art.  85  of the  trea~y  . 
(iii)  New  players using new satellites 
97  It is not  likely that  new  players  will  launch  and  operate 
TV  satellites for  the purpose of targeting the Nordic area. 
According  to  the  parties,  the  construction  cost  of  a 
satellite varies  between  40  and  100  million  Ecu.  To  this 
must  be  added  launching costs of between  20  and  75  million 
Ecu  and insurance costs of approximately 20%  of the  insured 
loss· (consisting of construction costs and launching costs). 
It usually takes  more  than  five  years  from  the decision is 
taken to built a· new satellite until the satellite can begin 
transmitting.·'  · 
(iv)  New  players using second hand satellites 
98  The  parties  argue  that  there  is  a  second  hand  market  for 
operative  satellites  which  means  that  potential  operators 
can  buy or  lease  an  operative satellite and move  them  into 
the  position  they  prefer.  In  this  connection  the  parties 
point  to  the  fact,  that the  satellites currently situated 
at.  1°  West  and  5°  East  are  "second-hand-satellites". 
Futthermore,  according  to  the  parties,  it is  possible  to 
tiht the  sat~llite so.that  the entire foot-print  is moved. 
99  However,  according  to  information·  available  . to  the 
Commission,  · although  it  is  possible  to  re-paint  the 
satellite to a  different region of the earth,  the  footprint 
coverage is unlikely·to be ideal since the satellite was  not 
originally designed; to  cover  the  new  region.  In  addition, 
even  if  an  independent  satellite.operator  chose  to  carry 
through  such  an  operation,  such  satellites  would  be 
competing  with  NSD' s  "Hot  Bird"  with  all  its  competitive 
programming  advantages  transmitting  20  -25  TV  channels  of 
which  several  are Nordic  channels  not  accessible  for  other 
satellite operators  than'NSD.  ( 
100  In  ~iew of  the  above,  it seems 'unlikely that it ~ould  be 
economically sensible for a  new  company to enter the market 
for provision of transponder capacity to the Nordic area by 
using  second  hand satellites. 
[ ...  ] 
d)  Digitalization 
101  The  introduction  o~  digital  technology  will  increase  the 
capacity  of  a  satellite  by  5-10  times.  According  to  the 
parties,  digitalization  on  a  commercial  basis  will  take 
place  within  the  next  one  or  two  years.  However,  the 
transition from analogue to digital technology will require 
the  replacement  of  the majority of the  receiving equipment 
of·the  cable  networks  and  direct-to-home  households.  This 
means  significant  .investments  for  cable  operators  and 
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direct-to-home  households.  The  direct\-to-home  households 
would  at  least  have  to  invest  in  a  digital  decoder  which 
will  cost  betwe~n 300  ~nd 500  Ecu.  For  that  reason  alone, 
practically all  companies  which  have  supplied  information 
to  the  Commission  agree  that  it will  take  several  years 
. before a  majority of the Nordic satellite TV  households will 
invest in the necessary equipment. According to the parties, 
it  is  generally  accepted  that  there  will  not  be  a  pure 
digital environment before the end of this century,  but for 
quite a  long period both analqgue and digital transmissions 
will  exist  side  by  side.  Consequently,  in  this 
transitional period there will be double illumination of the 
TV  channels  in both digital and  analogue  transmission  and, 
therefore,  a  need  for  more  capacity  than  before 
digitalization. 
102  Furthermore,  NSD  will still control the transponder capacity 
of  the  Nordic  satellites,.  and  it  is  not  evident  why 
digitalization would ~ake it more attractive for a potential 
riew  supplier of  transponder capacity to  supply  transponder 
capacity  directed  towards  the  Nordic  area.  It  seems  more 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  .a  potential  supplier  of 
transponder  capacity  in  the  digital  environment  will  not 
supply  transponder  capacity  for  the  Nordic  area,  for  the 
sa~e reasons  as  expressed above. 
I  . 
103  Thk  need for more channels for specialized pay~TV, video-on-
demand,  etc.  could  mean  a  strong  demand  for  digital 
transmission  capacity.  Information  supplied  to  the 
Commission· indicates that cap·acity created by digitalization 
could easily be  absorbed by  introduction of  new  capacity-
intensive  products  such  as  video-on-demand  etc.  On  that 
.basis,  it must·be  assumed  that  the  increase  in  transponder 
capacity  for  the  Nordic  area  due  to  the  introduction  of 
digital  technology will be  absorbed by  NSD  itself. 
A.2.  Conclusion 
104  In  it.s  communication.  of  .10  ,June  1994  on  satellite 
communications relating to the provision of - .and access  to 
- space  segment  capacity,  the  Commission  announced  its 
intention  to  use  the  competition ·rules·  to  remove  all 
national  restrictions·within  the  European  Union  on  access 
to  space  segments ..  This  was  stressed  again  in  the 
Commission's  Communication  to  the  European  Parliament  and 
the  Council  on  the  status  and  implementation  of  Directive 
90/388/EEC  on  compe.tition  in  the.  ·  markets  for 
telecommunications  services  (COM(95)  113  final  of 4.4.95). 
In  particular,  former  dominant  positions  held  by  national 
incumbent  .telecommunications  operators  as  a  result  of 
national. legislation  should  not  be  directly or  indirectly 
replaced by dominant positions held by p·rivate companies  as 
a  result of  commercial  agreements.  · 
105.  NSD  will  through  the operation acquire  a  dominant  position 




on the market for satellite TV  transponder services suitable 
for  Nordic  viewers.  [ ...  ] Currently  Telenor  controls  all 
three  satel:li  tes  in  the  position  1  degree  West  and  the 
present leasing agreements with NSAB  {the· swedish satellite 
operator)  ensures  NSD  control of[ ...  [  the majority of the 
transponder  capacity  situated  on  5  degrees  East.  As  a 
result,  NSD  and  its  parents  will  control  all  Nordic 
transponders.  [ ...  ] 
Through its control over the transponder capacity,  the links 
to  Kinnevik  as  an  important  broadcaster  of  Nordic  TV 
channels and distributor of satellite TV  channels to direct-
to-home households,  and through the links to the parents as 
cable  TV  operators,  NSD  will be  in a  position to  foreclose 
·other  satellite  operators  from  leasing  transponder  to 
broadcasters. 
Even  if  Astr·a  and  Eutelsat  could  be  considered  actual 
competitors,  they  will  not  have  transponders  to  offer 
eventual broadcasters wishing to transmit channels to Nordic 
households.  Of  the  five  "Nordicn  transponders  on  Astra 
Kinnevik  controls  four  and  in this connection it has  to  be 
borne  in  mind  that  Kinnevik  has  stated  that  the  four 
transponders  will  not  be  offered  to  broadcasters  with 
Nordic interests. This will contribute to the strengthening 
ofjNSD's dominance  and shows that it is the intention of the 
parties to prevent Astra from being a  competitor.  For these 
reasons it can be concluded that NSD  in the short term will 
·dominate  the  market  for  transponders  sui  table  for 
transmitting  TV  signals  to  Nordic  viewers. 
108  In ·the  medium  to  long  term  (1996. and  onwards)  it is  very 
unlikely  that  new  satellite  operators,  Astra  or  Eutelsat 
would  be  able  to  challenge  NSD's  dominant  position.  In  the 
next  two  to  three  years  there will  be  no  capacity  left on 
Astra and Eutelsat or on other satellites not controlled by 
NSD.  It· will  take even more  time before digitalization will 
have  an  impact  on  the  supply of  transponder  capacityJ  The 
additional  capacity  becoming  .  available  through 
digitalization is like.ly to be absorbed by NSD.  Furtl:lermore,. 
competition  within  NSD  ·-will  be  defined  by  NSD,  since  NSD 
will  be  able  to  deter~ine  which  companies  will  broadcast 
·through  NSD.  For  these  reasons  it is  likely that  NSD  even 
in  the  medium  to  long  term  will  be  able  to  maintain  its 
dominant  position on  this  ma~ket. 
109  The above conclusions are reinforced by the existence of the 
rights of first refusal on  5°  East even if these .are not· to 
be considered  ancilla~ and  therefore to be assessed under 
Art.  85  of the  Treaty. 
B  Operation of cable  TV  networks 
B.l.  Market structure 
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110  In  the  Nordic  area  about  4.2  million  of  10  million 
households  in  total  receive  cable  TV.  The  number  of -cable 
TV  connections is only expected to grow slowly in the coming 
years,  since  most  of  the  areas,  where  it is  economically 
sensible to lay cables have by now  been cabled.  Compared to 
other  European  countries  the  Nordic  cable  TV  sector  is 
characteriied  by  physically  smaller  units,  where  each 
network  tends  to  have  relatively few  connections.  However, 
a  few  large operators with many  units control  about  80%  of 
all connections  in the  Nordic  area. 
a)  Denmark 
111  Denmark  has  around  2, 3  million· households  of.  which  1, 05 
·million  are  connected  to·  cable  TV  networks  and  250  000 
households  connected to  SMATV  networks.  TD  Kabel  TV,  owned 
by  TD,  operates  the  largest ·  network  and  supplies 
approximately  625  000  cable  TV  and  SMATV  households 
(approximate~y 50%  of all households  connected to  cable  TV 
and  SMATV).  The  second  largest operator  is  Stofa.A/S  with 
around 110  000 households. Stofa is controlled by Telia,  the 
Swedish  telecom operator.  Besides  these  two  operators  the 
market  consists of  a  large  number  of aerial associations. 
112  Until now  it has not been possible to enter the Danish cable 
TVjmarket  with  full_scale operations  as  TD  has  had  a  legal 
monopoly.  on  the  ownership  of  commercial  cable  TV 
infrastructure and  the  transmission of  TV  signals  by cable 
across  municipal  borders.  However,  according  to  a 
parliamentary  decision  from  April  1995  the  Danish 
legislation  on  telecommunication  and  cable  TV  activities 
will  be  liberalized  in  two  steps:  The  first  step  will  be 
implemented  1  July  1995,  and  the  second  step  will  be 
implemented  not  later  than  · 1  January  1998.  The 
implementation of step one means  that cable operators other 
than TD  will be allowed to own  cable network infrastructure. 
However,  until the implementation of step two  TD  will retain 
the  exclusive  right . to  provide  the  infrastructure  for 
transmission  of  radio  and  TV  signals  as · well  as  other 
telecommunication services across municipal-borders  ..  Third 
parties  will  get  the  right  to  make  use  of  TD's 
infrastructure on a  leased line basis,  but will be  excluded 
from  offering·cross-municipal-border transmission in their 
own  infra'structure  ..  Denmark  is  made  up  of ·  27 5 
municipalities.  The  average population of a  municipality is 
19,000  inhabitants 
113  The  fact  that,  despite  the  liberalization,  undertakings 
o~her than TD  are denied the right to provide infrastructure 
for·transmission of signals  ~cross municipal borders  means 
that  competitors  are  denied  the · economies  of  scale  from 
which  TD  currently benefits.  Furthermore  TD  will  be  in  a 
position where it·will obtain knowledge· about the strategic 
considerations of their competitors·,  since all offers made 
by  the  competitors  of  TD  will  necessarily  involve  a 
contractual relationship with  TD  regarding the use  of  TD's 
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infrastructure.  In  contrast,  TD  can  make  an  offer without 
being  forced  to  negotiate  the  terms  for  using  another 
company's  infra~tructure. 
114  As  a  result of its legal  monopoly,  Tb  has  obtained  a  very 
strong  position  on  the  Danish  cable  TV  market.  The 
implementation  of  step  one  will  remove  some  of  TD's 
exclusive  rights,  but  TD  will  still  have  some  legal 
protection  from  which  it will  be  able  to  maintain or  even 
develop  its  position.  Although  the  legal  situation  is 
expected to change,  the heavy investment.needed to build up 
a  cable network together with the dominant position already 
held  by  TD  make  new  entry  unlikely.  The  proposed 
concentration-will lead to a  strengthening of TD's  dominant 
position  (see  section  B~2-3 below). 
115  rt·should be  noted,  that Stefa A/S,  a  private Danish  cable 
TV  operator,  has  fil-ed  a  complaint  with  the  Commission 
concerning  Danish  legislation  on  cable  TV.  The  Commission 
has  questioned
4  the  Danish  Government  on  the points  raised 
by Stefa.  In particular,  the Commission has asked the Danish 
authorities  to  lift  the  current  provisions  prohibiting 
private  companies  from  owning  cable  TV  networks  and  to 
ensure that companies other than TD  are allowed to transmit 
· si<inals  across municipal  borders  in Denmark. · 
j 
b)lNorway 
116  Norway ·has  ~round 1,9 million  households  of  which  565  000 
are  connected  to  cable  TV  and  120  000  are  connected  to 
SMATV.  There  are three  large cable  TV  operators that cover 
approximately  70%  of  all  households  connected  to  cable. 
Telenor Avidi,  .owned  by  NT,  is  the  largest  cable  operator 
with  about  190  000  connections  (approximately  30%  of  all 
connections).  Janco Kabel•TV AS,  owned by Helsinki Media SA, 
has  about  22%  of all connections,  and Norkabel AS  has.about 
i  20%  of all connections.  Norkabel is owned by TCI  and others. 
'•. 
117  Retransmission of satellite television programmes by way  of 
cable n~tworks does not .·require a  special license in-Norway. 
Cable TV  companies are .legally obliged ·to carry the--national -
TV  stations  NRK  and  TV2.  The  Norwegian  legislation  also 
states  that  agreements  concerning  retransmission  of 
satellite broadcasts  shall  contain  a  clause  to  the  effect 
that  Norwegian  cable  networks  may  enter  the  agreement  on 
equal  terms. 
118  Although  NT  is  the  market  leader,  the  Norwegian  cable  TV 
market  -consists  of  three  competitors  of  almost  equal. 
str.ength  and  NT.  probably does  not  have  a  domina.nt  position 
at  present.  According  to  the  Norwegian  competi.tion 
authority,  direct competition between cable TV  operators is 
Commission  letter  of 
Government. 
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to  a  large extent possible since about 2/3 of all cortnected 
households  have·the possibility of choosing  an alternative 
cable  TV  supplier.  Furthermore,  the  Norwegian  cable  TV 
market  is  expected  to  grow  by  ·2-3%  per  year  and  the 
penetration is  expected  to  reach  a  level  of  40-50%  of  the 
total  amount  of households. 
c)  Sweden 
119  Sweden has around 3,9 million households of which around 1,9 
million are connected to cable TV  networks and approximately 
600  000  are  connected  to  SMATV  networks.  Svenska  Kabel-TV 
AB,  which  is  owned  by  Telia  AB  (the  former  public  telecom 
operator  which  has  been  privatised)  .  is  the  dominant 
operator,with· approximately 1,2 million connections  (about 
50%  of  all  connections).  The  parties  had  invited  Svenska 
Kabel  to participate in NSD  but negotiations are  no  longer 
taking place.  Kinnevik  has  a  37.4%  interest  in  the  second 
largest cable operator Kabelvision AB  (TCI.  has  the majority 
shareholding),  which  has  around  300  000  subscribers  (about 
18%  of all connections).  Two  other companies  - Stjern-TV AB 
and Sweden-On-Line AB  have  each around 150  000  connections. 
The  Cable  Act  was  adopted  in  1992  and  has  removed  all 
important  legal barriers  to  entry. 
120  Kihnevik  has  a  37.4%  interest in  Kabelvision  and  appoints 
o~  member  of the board of directors of Kabelvision.  In 1993 
Kabelvision stopped distributing FilmNet's pay TV  channels, 
and  it . was  only  after  intervention  of  the  Swedish 
competition  authorities  that  Kabelvision  recommenced 
distribution of FilmNet in 1994. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to  conclude· that  Kinnevik  has  an  important  inFluence  on 
Kabelvision's  commercial policy.  In any case  the  fact  that 
potential  competitors  will  have  to  take  into  account  the 
possibility  that  Kinnevik  ·may  be  able·  to  influence  the 
commercial  strategy of  Kabelvision  is  enough  to  influence 
the  actions  of competitors. 
d)  Finland 
121  Finland  has  around  1,9  million  households  of  whic~ 
approximately 780  000 are connected· to cable TV  networks and 
about  100  000  to  SMATV  networks.  The  largest  cable  TV 
operator is Helsinki Television OY,  owned by Hels.inki Media, 
with  about  190  000  connected households  (approximately  20% 
of all connections).  The  second largest is Telecom Kabel-TV 
OY,  owned by the public telecom operator, with approximately 
120  0.00  connections.  Four  smaller  companies  have  shares 
between  4%  and  6%  of all connections  while  the  rest  (about 
40%  of  all  connections)  are  operated  by  many  small 
companies. 
122  The  parties  to· the  operation are not·active  on  the  Finnish 
cable  TV  market.  However,  the  parties  invited  the  two 
largest cable TV  operators - Helsinki Media,  which are also 
active  in  Norway  (Janko  Kabel  TV  with  about  22%  of  all 
.......  ·-~<· ·.  ~:e::.: ... : 
~..  .  . .  ..  ':.'",  .·"  -~  .... : 
.-:'  .· 
II  B/  44 (-
.  .  .  .  .  :  ~: <~-~  ·.  ·-·:~-~~/ ;.· 
30 
connections),  and  the  public  Finnish  telecom  operator,  to 
participate  in  the  joint  ventuie.  No  agreements  have  been 
reached  but~ it is still the  aim of the parties to  included 
the  two  Finnish cable  TV  operat9rs  in  th~ joint venture. 
B.2.  Impact of NSD  on  the cable  TV  market 
123  The  cable  TV  operators  questioned  by  the  Commission  have 
said that they would,  for competitive reasons, have to carry . 
the  NSD  package  of  programmes,  ·at least in Denmark,  Norway 
and  Sweden.  Due  to  the· dominant  position  of  NSD  on  the 
transponder  market,  this  will  give  NSD  a  strong  position 
towards  the  cable  TV  operators,  since  cable  TV  operators 
will  have  to  negotiate  with  NSD  to  obtain  the  TV  channels 
from  on  NSD,  instead of  directly with  broadcasters,  as  is 
the  case  toqay  ._  The  establishment  of  NSD  will  therefore 
lead  t-o  an  important  change  in the nego.tiating position of 
cable  TV  operators. 
124  The  parties have  argued that the creation of NSD  would  not 
prevent  the  independant  cable  operators  from  negotiating 
directly with Kinnevik  in order to obtain the  TV3  channels 
and  Kinnevik's  other  ~hannels if. operators  do  not  warit  to 
negotiate with  NSD.  It is true that the  NSD  agreements  do 
not  prevent  such  arrangements,  however,  it must  be  assumed 
th~t the parties interest is to promote Kinnevik's channels 
or/  a  NSD  package.  In  addition,  in  order · to  carry  the 
channels  of  which  NSD  will  most  likely obtain  exclusivity 
(;Eurosport  Nordic,  CNN  No-rdic  and  MTV  Europe  and  probably 
more  since  it  is  the , intention  of  NSD  to  obtain  such 
exclusivity  arrangements)  independant  broadc~sters  would 
have  to  negotiate  with  NSD.  Thus,  it  seems  that 
negotiations  directly  with  NSD  in  order  to  carry  NSD' s 
package  will  be  the most  realistic choice  for  the majority 
of cable operators.  In principle,  a  cable TV  operator could 
get programs  from Astra;  or  other satellites not controlled 
by NSD  and in such a  case they would negotiate directly with 
broadcasters.  However,  only non-Nordic  languaged channels 
will  be  available on Astra or other satellites. 
125  Furthermore,  the independent cable TV  operators in Denmark, 
Norway  and  Sweden  would  have  to negotiate prices  and other 
terms  with  a ':competitor  (this applies  also if the  cable  TV 
operators· negotiate directly with ·Kinnevik  since  Kinnevik 
is  a  part  of  NSD)  .  This  is  also  the  case  in  areas  where 
households  have  a  choice  between  being  connected  to  cable 
TV  or  buying  a  private  dish,  since  NSD  will  control  the 
dire~t-to-home  market  as  well.  NSD  would  thus  be  in  a 
position  to  price-discriminate  or  impose  terms  on 
independent cable operators in favor of the cable operators 
owned  by  ·the  parents  or  in  favor  of  its  direct-to-home 
operations. 
126  It should.be noted that several independent cable operators 
which have supplied information to the Commission have shown 
a  great  deal  of  concern  about  the  possibility  of 
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discrimination by  NSD  in order to  favor  its own  interests. 
However,  even  if  there. was  no  discrimination,  NSD  would 
still  be  able  to  exploit  its  position  on  the  ·cable  TV 
markets  due  to  its  dominant  position  on  the  transponder 
market. 
127  According  to  the ·parties,  in the digital environment it is 
the  intention  of  the  parties  to  develop  and  implement  a 
joint Nordic encryption system and a  joint Nordic head-end. 
NSD  will control the system and the head-end,  and have plans 
to  offer  transparent  tr~nsmission. of  its  package  of  TV 
channels and provision of SMS  and SAS  to cable TV  operators, 
including the parents'  own  cable operators. According to the 
parties,  such  a  solution  could  be  economically  atttactive 
to  many  cable  TV  operators,  since  they  could  eliminate  an 
encoding  and  decoding  system  in  each  head-end  and  thereby 
reduce c9sts significantly. This is of particular· relevance 
in  areas  with  many  smaller  cable  TV  networks,  as  in  the 
Nordic countries.  So~e independent  cable  TV  operators  have· 
hundreds  of head-ends  or more  and  needs  a  decoder  for  each 
channel  in  each  head-end,  with  current  technology. 
Undoubtedly,  many cable operators would be reluctant to give 
up  providing  the  SMS  themselves,  since  this  is  a  critical 
part  · of  mast  cable  TV  operations  and  would  make  them 
de,fendent  on  NSD.  Considering  the  economic  benefits  for 
ca  le  households,  and  the  fact  that  subscribers  connected 
to.  the  networks  will  not  notice  any  difference  if  NSD 
provides transparent transmission toget.her with SMS  and SAS, 
it would  be  difficult  for  a  smaller  cable  TV  operator  to 
reject such  a  solution,. if it became  a ·reality. 
128  Consequently,  if NSD  develops  and  implements  such  a  system 
in  the  digital  environment,  it  is  most  likely  that  the 
majority  of  households  connected  to  cable  networks  in  the 
Nordic  countries  will  receive  transparent  transmission  of 
signals  using  NSD' s  joint· Nordic  encryption  system.  The 
parties have  not  yet decided what  technology to be used and 
whether  the  encryption  system  will  be  open  or  closed. 
C6nsequently,  it  is  also  difficult  to  assess  the 
competitive  and  economic  aspects  of  transparent 
transmission.  However,  it  must  be  ·foreseen  that  by 
controlling  such  a  ·system  NSD  will  be  in  a  position  to 
strengthen its function as  a  "gate keeper"  for broadcasters 
wishing to get access to Nordic cable networks.  It would be 
very  difficult  for· a  broadcaster  without  access  to  NSD's 
system for encryption to get access to cable networks should 
such  a  system be  developed. 
8.3.  Cor:tclusion 
Denmark 
129  TD.controls  approximately  50%  of the  cable  connections  in 
Denmark,  and  has  a  dominant  position  on  the  Danish  market 
due  to  the  legal  regime  there.  The  creation of  NSD  will 
result  in  the  strengthening  of  .TD' s  dominant  position 
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because 
i  N$D  will  be  able  to  discriminate  in  favour  of  TD 
when·o!fering channels  to Danish cable operators. 
ii  NSD's  monopolist position as  regards provision of 
programming  will  mean  that  the  terms  offered  to 
cable  operators  will  be.  those  most  favourable  to 
TD,  rather than  to others. 
iii  Cable· operators  in  competition with  TD  will  have 
to negotiate with  TD  as  an  NSD  partner ..  .  . 
This  situation is unlikely  to  change. after  the  first  step 
of liberalisation,  as  ·TD  will still retain many  advantages1 
over its compet.i tors· due  to its past  l.egal  monopoly. 
The  Wider  Nordic Area 
130  The  parties control or influence about 25  % of the cable and 
SMATV  connections in Norway,  Sweden  and Denmark.  Because of 
NSD's  dominance of the transponder market,  point i.  to iii. 
above  will  apply  to  the  competitive  situation between  the 
parties' cable opertors in Norway and Sweden as much  as  they 
do·,in  Denmark. 
\  .· 
131  HoJever,  there  will  be  no  reinforcement  of  a  pre-existing 
dominant  position  on  these  markets  other  than  in  Denmark, 
and  because  of ·the  relative  strength ·of  competitors  in 
Norway  and Sweden it seems unlikely. that dominant positions 
of  the  parties  in  Norway  and  Sweden  will  be  created  as  a 
result of ·the operation. 
132 
C.  Distribution of satellite pay-TV and other encrypted TV 
channels  to direct-to-home households 
C.l:  Market  structure 
There  are  currently  th;ee  major  distributors  in  this 
market  :  FilmNet  (Multichoice},  Telenor  CTV  and Viasat.  To 
be  competitive  a  distributor  must·  have  a  TV  channel  or 
package  of  TV  channels  on  his  smart  card  which  a 
considerable  number  of  viewers  find attractive.  The  three 
companies  use  competing  smart  cards  with  different  TV 
channels  : 
FilmNet's  card contains  its own  pay-TV  channel  FilmNet 
Plus,  The·  Complete Movie  Channel  and BBC.  In Denmark  the 
card  only·  contains  FilmNet  Plus  and/or  FilmNet  The 
Complete  Movie  Channel; 
Telenor  CTV  markets  the  CTV  card  which  includes  MTV, 
Eurosport  Nordic,  Discovery,  Children's  Channels,  CNN 
and  FilmNet  The  Complete  Movie  Channel ..  In  Sweden  (and 
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planned  for  Denmark)  the  card  also  includes  FilmNet 
Plus; 
The  Viasat card includes  TV3  (TV3.  Denmark,  TV3  Sweden or 
TV3  Norway  and its own  pay-TV channels  TV  1000,  Film Max 
and  TV  1000  Cinema. 
According to the parties,  by March  1995 Viasat,  FilmNet  and 
Telenor  CTV·provided  the  following  numbers  of  smart  cards 
in the  Nordic  countries: 
Denmark  Number  of cards  sold 
Vias at  148  000 
FilmNet  30  000 
Telenor  CTV  '4  000 
Norway 
Vias at  122  000 
FilmNet  30  000  . 
Te.Denor  CTV  31  000 
j 
Sweden 
Viasat  272  000 
FilmNet  50  000 
Telenor  CTV  29  000 
Finland 
Viasat  0 
FilmNet  5  000 
\ 
Telenor  CTV  11  000 
Nordic Total  Number  of Cards  so.ld 
Vias at  542  000 
FilmNet  115  000 
Telenor  CTV  75  000 
133  Measured  in  numbers  of  smart  cards  sold,  Viasat  as  a 
distribution  company  has  a  very  strong  position  on  this 
market.·  It  can  be  noted,  that  according  to  the 
FilmNet/Telenor agreement  (see below)  Telenor's CTV  package 
will be available also on.FilmNet's smart card.  However,  it 
has  to be.borne in mind that Viasat's smart.cards will.also 




contain  the  CTV  package  and  include  Kinnevik's  channels, 
which will be sold exclusively·by Viasat.  On  that basis,  it 
can be  concluded that the  operation will create  a  dominant 
position of Viasat·on this market.  In this connection it has 
to be borne  in mind that it is the intention of the parties 
to merge  the activities of Telenor  CTV  into Viasat. 
134  The  FilmNet/Telenor  agreement  :  FilmNet  is currently being 
broadcasted  from  the  Thor  satellite.  FilmNet's  lease  of  a 
transponder  on  the  Thor  satellite  and  its  distribution 
company Multichoice's distribution of Telenor's CTV  package 
in  Sweden  is  based  on  an  agreement  with  Telenor  AS  dated 
October  1992.  FilmNet  saw  the  NSD  operation as  a  threat  to 
its  interest  as  a  distibutor  of  pay-TV  in  the  .Nordic 
countries  and  has  filed  a  complaint  with  the  Commission 
concerning the proposed operation. In addition, Nethold  (the 
owner of Filrn.Net  and Mul,tichoice}  has initiated arbitration 
against Telenor for alleged breaches of the  above mentioned 
agreement.  In  december  1994  the  Norwegian  Court  granted 
an  injunction  against  Telenor  by  which  Telenor,  among 
otl:lers,  was  forbidden  to  implement  the  agreement  with  the 
Viasat  companies  by  which  Viasat  could  sell  Telenor's  CTV 
package.  The  Court  decision  would  have  blocked  the  NSD 
operation and made it necessary for the parties to negotiate 
a  ~ettlement with Nethold.  By  an  agreement  between Nethold 
an<ii  Telenor dated  29  March  1995  Telenor grants  Nethold  an 
op):ion  to  1ease  one  more  transponder  on  1  degree  West. 
Te.lenor' s  CTV  package  will  also  be  available  on 
Multichoice's  smartcard.  The  agreement only deals with the 
broadcasting of  channels  in  the  analogue  format._However, 
accordin~ to  the  agreement,  the  parties  will  establish  a 
joint  working  party  to  investigate  co-operation  on  the 
introduction of digital services. 
C.2  Foreclosure effects on the market fo·r distribution 
of  TV  channels  due  to the NSD  operation 
13 5  The  NSD  operation  will  foreclose  competitors  from  this 
market  because  : 
(i}  By  its control of Nordic  transponder capacity and 
its link to Kinnevik as a  broadcaster,  NSD  will be 
the  dominant·  provider ·of  TV  channels  to  Nordic 
viewers. 
(ii}  As  discussed above  (see points.123-128},  NSD  will, 
to  a  large  extent,  control  access  to  the. Nordic 
cable  sector,  by  means  of  its parental  links  to 
cable operators. 
For these reasons,  there would be very little room  for a  new 
distributor in the  Nordic market.  It is thus  unlikely that 
a  potential  competitor  would  be  able  to  establish  a 
distribution business able to compete with NSD  in the Nordic 
area. 
'  .  . .  "-'·  -;--• ....  . .  ~ 
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153  .The  dominant  position of NSD  in transponders  would provide 
NSD  with  a  "gate  keeper"  function  in  the  supply  of  TV 
channels  to7the Nordic  area.  Kinnevik will thereby be  able 
to  influence  which  channels  will  be  allowed  to  broadcast · 
advertising financed  TV  channels to the Nordic area,  and in 




The  vertical integration of NSD·means  that the positions of 
the  parties  in  various  markets  reinforces  each  other. 
Particularly it should be  noted  that  the  positions  of  the 
parties  in  the  down  stream markets  (.cable  TV  networks  and 
distribution  reinforces .  the  dominant  position  on 
transponders  by  deterring  potential  competitors  from 
broadcast~ng from  ot~er transponders  to  the Nordic area. 
Apart  from  the  three  markets  analysed  in the  decision  the· 
Commission  ~as investigated the four other businesses - pay-
TV,  other  commercial  TV  channels,  up-link  services  and 
provision of encryption· Systems  - in·  WQich  the parties are 
active.  The  Commission  has  found  that,  as  to  these 
activities,  the parties will not obtain a  dominant position 
due  to  the  operation. 
On  the basis of the  above  considerations,  it is considered 
that  the  proposed  merger  would  lead  to  the  creation  or 
strengthening of dominant positions through which effective 
cqmpetition in a  substantial part of the Community would be 
significantly  hindered.  The· concentration  is,  therefore, 
pursuant  to  Article  2 (  3).  of  the  Merger  Regulation  and 
Article  57  of the EEA. Agreement,  declared incompatible with 
the  common  market  and  with  the  ·functioning  of  the  EEA 
agreement. 
tor the  Commission 
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•  Nordic  region. 
147  The  Commission  recognizes  the  long  term  economic  benefits 
of having an integrated system for transmission of satellite 
TV.  However,  as  stated by  the parties,  the  system has  not 
been  developed  yet  and  it is  not  possible  to  say  when  it 
will  be  developed  and  implemented.  Furthermore,  the 
decision  as  to  the  technology  to  be  used  and  the  decision 
as  to whether  such ·an  encryption system shall be  closed or 
open  has  not  been  taken.  A~cording to  the parties,  such  a 
decision  will,  among  others,  be  based  on  the  competitive 
situation.  Thu~,  it is  impossibl~ to assess  to  what  degree 
NSD'.s  plans  for·  a  joint  Nordic  encryption  system  would 
enable·  NSD  to  exclude  broadcasters  from  transmitting  TV 
channels to Nordic viewers. A closed encryption system could 
make· the new  infrastructure highly anticompeti ti  ve.  The  same 
applies to an open system if the system becomes dominant  and 
third parties cannot get access to such a  system~  According 
to  the  parties  whethe~ NSD  will  be  willing  to  licence  the 
rights  to  a  new  standard  to  third·  parties  has  not  been 
d~cided. 
148  The  Commission  takes  the  view  that  an  infrastructure  as 
described  by  the  parties  could  be  highly  efficient  and 
be~eficial  to  consumers.  However,  it  must  be  an  open 
infrastructure  accessible  for  all  interested  parties.  In 
p&rticular  the  Commission  takes  the  view  that  the 
participation of  such  a  strong broadcaster  as  Kinnevik  in 
NSD  means  that  there  is  a  high  risk that  this will  not  be 
case.  Therefore,  it is likely that the  operation will  lead 
to  l~ss variety in the offer to Nordic  TV  households  in the 
future.  Furthermore,  in· the  opinion  of  the· Commission  the 
·vertically integrated nature  of  the  proposed  operation  is 
not  necessary  in  order  to  create  such  an  integrated 
infrastructure. 
149  Consequently,  the  reference  to  the  technical  and  economic 
progress in Article 2(1) (b)  of the Merger Regulation cannot 
be  taken into account. 
[ ...  ] 
E.  Conclusion 
150  As  a  result  of  the  operation,  NSD  will  acquire  a  dominant 
position on the market for satellite TV  transponder services 
suitable for  Nordic  viewers  both in  the  short  term  and  in 
the medium  to  long  term. 
151  NSD' s  dominant  position  on  transponders  would  strengthen 
TD's  dominant  position on  the  cable  TV  market  in Denmark. 
152  Viasat  will  obtain  a  dominant  position. on  the  market  for 
distribution  of  pay-TV  and  other  encrypted  channels  to 
direct-to-home  households  as  a  result of  the operation. 
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D.  Economic  and  techn~cal progress 
142  According  to  the  parties  NSD  will  lead  to  economic  and 
technical progress.  In ·the short to medium-term the creation 
of  a  "Nordic  Hotbird"  will  thus  give  an.  improved 
distribution of satellite  TV  in  the  Nordic  region,  and  in 
the  long  term,  after  digitalization,  NSD  will  make 
substantial rationalizations possible for cable TV operators 
and  SMATV  networks  to  the benefit of  the  consumers. 
143  However,  the  establishment of  NSD  will .not  in the  shor.t  to 
medium  term  lead·to  an  improved  distribution of satellite 
TV  to  the  Nordic  region, · since  NSD  does  not  add  any  new 
transponder capacity. yconsequently the  number· of satellite 
T~ channels offered to Nordic viewers in the. short term will 
not be affected by the operation.  The· co:mntission recognizes 
th~t it is necessary for  a  satellite operator to  be able  to 
promote  its  satellite  position,  but  in  view  of  the 
Commission the vertical integration of the operation is not 
necessary in order to do  so.  Rather the operation is likely 
to  affect  how  available  transponder  capacity  is  allocated 
to broadcasters. 
144  In,  the  long  term,  with  the  introduction  of  digital 
te~hnology, the parties wil+ use NSD  to create an integrated 
in!rastructure  for  the  distribution  of  satellite  TV  and 
other related services. 
145  According  to  the parties,  i~ the digital  environment it is 
the intention to develop and implement a  joint Nordic system 
for encryption to be used .for the direct-to-home,  SMATV  and 
cable  TV  market.  This  implies  that  the  individual  TV 
households  will  only  need  one  decoder  box  irrespectively 
whether  they  receive  the  signals  from  cable  or  via  a 
satellite  dish  antenna.  This  means  that  the  SMS  and  SAS 
systems  of  DTH,  SMATV,  and  -cable  TV  networks  can  be 
integrated.  Furthermore,  cable.  TV  networks  could  have 
considerable cost savings by not having to decode and encode 
signals in each of their head-ends. According to the-parties 
the system will allow independent cable-TV operators to use 
NSD  as  a  supplier and at the  same .time still be  able to  run 
their own  SMS  systems.  Furthermore,  the system will provide 
SMATV  networks with improved possibilities for reception of 
pay-TV  and  even  allow  them  to  run  their own  SMS~  which  is 
.basically not.possible  today.  · 
14 6  Because  of  NSD' s  dominant  position  as  provider  of  TV 
ch~nnels from Nordic transponders it is most likely that the 
majority of direct-to-home households and independent cable 
operators  in  the  Nordic  countries will  be  forced  to  use  an 
encryption  system  used  by  Nsn:  Broadcasters  who  want  to 
target  Nordic  viewers  will  have  to  lease  NSD' s  system. 
Thus,  if the  plans  are carried through,  NSD's  joint Nordic 
encryption  system  wo,uld  become  the  dominant  system  in  the 
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136  The  parties  claim  that  the  NSD  agreement  allows  an 
·independent  broadcaster  to  lease  a  transponder  from  NSD 
without· having  to  make  distribution  agreements  with·  the 
parent's distribution companies.  Such  a  broadcaster would 
be  free  to  enter  into  agreements  with  other distributors. 
The  parties  find  that  the  intention  of  such  a  policy  i~ 
confirmed by the above mentioned new  agreement with Film.Net. 
137  However,  such a  broadcaster would have  to make  an agreement 
with  NSD  which  is jointly controlled by Kinnevik.  Kinnevik 
could  thereby  influence  the  price  and  terms  for  the  lease 
contract  and  Viasat  would  be  able ·to  obtain  information 
about  such  a  potential competitor. 
138.  Furthermore,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  NSD  will  lease 
transponders  to  broadcasters  without  making  the  lease 
dependent  on  a  distribution  agreement  between  the 
broadcaster and Kinnevik's distribution company.  It is clear 
from  information made  available by  the  par~ies that  NSD's 
transponders  first  and  foremost  are  a  means  to  develop  a 
Nordic  satellite  TV  distribution  system.  To  lease 
transponders  to  broadcasters  who  qo  not  want  to  be 
distributed  by  NSD  would  counteract  th'e  purpose  of  the 
operation.  Furthermore,  in a  period with shortage of supply 
of.  transponders  it  is  not · neces.sary  for  NSD  to  lease 
I 
trp.n~ponders  t~  su~h  broadcasters.  T~e  attempt  o~  the 
part~es to conf1rm 1ts  "open"  lease-poll.cy by  referr1ng to 
the  new  agreement  with · FilmNet  is  not  convincing:  The 
Filn\Net agreement is the outcome of a  negotiated settlement. 
Through  a  court decision in Norway  FilmNet blocked parts of 
the  NSD  operation and it was  necessary for Telenor to  reach 
a  settlement with Filmnet.  Before the court decision it was 
not  the intention of the parties to.reach such a  settlement 
with  FilmNet. 
C.3  Conclusions 
139  The  foreclosure  effect  of  the  .operation  as  regards  new 
entrants  to  this  market  will  mean  that  the  only  likely 
competitors  in this market will be Viasat  and  F.ilmNet. 
140  The  agreement between  FilmNet  and Telenor allows  FilmNet  to 
sell  the  CTV  package  provided  by  NSD  and  to  continue  to 
market  its own  smartcards  and  therefore  to control  the  SAS 
and  SMS.  The  agreement,  therefore,  apparently  permits 
FilmNet  to continue to be an  important player in the market 
for  distribution  of  TV  channels  to  direct-to-home 
households.  However  Viasat will strengthen its position on 
the  distribution market  through  the  attractive  package  of 
channels it will put on the market,  and this will undermine 
FilrnNet's  position as  a  significant player in this market. 
141  It  can  therefore ·be  concluded  that  Viasat  will  obtain  a 
dominant  position  on  this  market  as  a  result  of  the 
operation. 
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Dear Sirs, 
.  -~~sels, 16.08.·1.99~ 
:MER.GJm, PROCEDURE .. 
ARTIC~E  -6(t)(b)o~cisloN  .  .  .  '  .  ' 
'  r  •  ."  ~.  ' 
To--the notifying parties, 
'  . 
Subject: Case N·_.IViM.6,18 --CABLE AND WIRELESSNEBA 
Notifi~tion of a concentration··pursuant  io ·Article  4 .of Council  Regul~tion No 
4064/89  .  .  - - . 
1.  The  above  operation  concerns  the  formation ·  Qf ·two jointly  controlled  companies  : 
VEBACOM  and  Cable &  Wireless (Europe)  to  ·offe~ telecommunications  services in 
Germ~ny and  the  EU  (plus  Switzerland  but  excluding  the  UK)  respectively.  After 
examination of  the notification, the Commission has concluded that the notified operation 
falls within the scope of  the Merger Regulation and that it does not raise serious d9ubts 
as to its compatibility  ~th  the CQmmon  market._  ·  ·  · 
I  THE PARTIES · 
. 2.  Cable  and  Wireless  pic  (C&W) ._is_ an  international  'provider  of telecomm~nications 
services with activities in  Asia,. the caribbean, Burope, · the: United  States,  Japan,  the 
·Middle East and Africa.  Its European activities are centred in the UK_ with itS majority 
interest in Mercury Communieations, ·the second telecommunications. operator· following 
liberal~sation,ofseM._cesin the UK~ C&W.also has a worldwide strategic alli~ce called 
the C&W Federation. the C&W Federation i$ an umbrella  org~sation which provides 
the participants with _the  opportunity  to co-operate by· making facilities  available  and 
o.ffefing joint se~ices to ·multinational C9rporate clients. 
3.  VEBA AG is a· German  holdi~g company for subsidiaries with activities. in electricity, 
chemicals,  oil,  trade,  transport . and .  serVices  and  telecommurlications..  Its  eXisting 
.  telecommunications  interests  are  consolidated  in  VEBA  Telecom.  VE~A holds  a 
shareholding of 10.5.% in C&W and is a m~mber  of  ~e  e&w  ...  ~ederation.·  . 
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ll ...  THE OPERATION 
4.  The  operaJion  consists  .Qf  the. fonnatiqn  of twQ  joint  ventures.~~  Europ~ ·in  the·. 
telecommun~cations  · secior.  ·  The  first,  VEBACOM,  Will  comprise  all  ·the  parties' · 
tclecommunications  .  interests .  ·in  .  Germany  (except  ·  for  \~rtain  'dedicated 
telecoll)munications  a~vities Carrie4 out by· and for .other VEBA AG ooinpanie8).  The 
second,  Cable & ·Wireless Europe. (CWE),  will  be  ~lished in B'elgiurn  and  Win· 
contain subStantially all. the .-parties' activities· in Europe other than in :Germany or the · 
·  UK..  C&W  will  .keep·  Mercury  .Communications  and. 'ihe  PCN  operator Mercury 
5. 
One20ne o~tSide the join~  v~ture$:  . ·  .  . .·,  ·  ·  .  .  _ 
Both  Patti~ h&v~ activities in  PGN  networ~ i~ Europe.  C&W has a SO'/o  stake in 
Mercury One20ne in the UK; a 20% $take in _Bouygues .Telecom in· France and.·a 5% 
s\lke in Mannesmann Mobilfunk·GrnbH in Germany.  WBA.has a  28.375% stake in 
E-Pius in Germany and  a 15%  ~take in aouygues Tel~om.  The E-Plus  ~take wil~ be 
transferred frotn .VEBA· to VEBACOM. at closing.  The two _parents'  stakes~in Bouygues · 
Telecom  will  be  managed  by  CWE  f.or  12  months  after  which  time  they  Will  be 
transferred to CWE or the .new joint venture outlined below.  C&W has undeqaken, •t 
the request of VEBA to either dispose of or waive its .rights .i.n Mannesmann· Mobil funk 
(except those relating to diyidends).  The C&W stake in Mercu.ry9ne20ne will remain  · 
outside the joint .Venture.  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
· 6.  ·The interests in the SWiss cable TV  a~vity, Cablecom and the French paging· business 
Infomobile will be .transferred. to  C.~  tollowing the consent of the other.shareholders. 
In the meanwhile,  the .stakes will  b·e  m~naged by  VEBACOM and CWE respectiyely. 
The transfer of shares. in the relevant C&w· subsidiaries will  b~ completed within three 
months of closing.··  C& W also  has· ·a .holding in  Tele  2 (the Swedish PSTN operator)· 
which may also be held for ·a short period before being transferred to the JV.  ·ewE will 
also manage the two· ParentS' stakes in Bouygues Telecom (C&W- 20%, VEBA.  - 15%). 
·  m  CONCENTRATION 
Jo~nt control 
7.  The shares in VEBACOM will  be held 55% by VEBA (through  VEBA Telecom) and 
45% by C&W.  VEBA·will ha:ve.the management lead.in VEBACOM ..  VEBACOM will 
have  four  lev~ls · of  corporate  governance:  Shareholders'  Meeting,·  Shareholders' 
Committee, Supervisory Board and. Management Briard.  Day to day matters will·be dealt· 
with at the latter  .. lev~l.  Strategic decision~ will be taken in the Shareholders' Committee 
and will require unanimity for inter a/ia·future budgets.and business plans following the 
expiry  of the  start  up  business  plan  for  1995/97  and  the  budget  for  1995,  caP.ital 
~penditure of over  DM  50  million  and  the .  entering  into  of any  interconnection 
agreement over·DM l.O  milli_on.  ·  · 
Accordingly, VEBACOM will  be jointly controlled by C&W and Veba. 
8.  The shares in CWE·will be held 500/o each by C&W and Veba.  Day to day management 
•  of CWE will  be· delegated to  a ma.riagem·ent committee which ··lYill  consis~· of at least 
three people and will be  ~ead by C&W.  This committee will manage CWE's affairs'in 
accordance With its  bu~iness plan· and budget. 
.  . 
CWE•s bOard of  directors will manage the companies' ordinary  ~ctivities :and wiil consist 
. ,-_) 
,',. 
fl  R/  '\'\ .... 
· of  no fewer t~an eight directors, fotir from  ea~h parent.  Othe.r direCtors can be ~ppointed 
with the agreementofboth shareholders.· The.initiat business plan (1'995/97) and. budget 
:have been agreed by C&W and Veba.· A revise.d business plan (1995/99) may be·a8reeci 
pre-completion.  All  future  business  plan·s. and  budgets  will  require  ~e \lilimimous 
. approval  of CWE's board  of ~irectori ~  well  ~·decisions on.  capi~l .exp.end~.~fe .in  · 
excess of DM  SO million and .applicatio~s for  l~cenees fr~m regulat<?rY il;tthorit,ies. ·  · 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  .  .  .  . .  l  .  :  :  :  . ·.-· 
Aceordi~gly", CWE will  J>ejoi~tly cOntrolled ·by .C&w and .. VEBA. 
'  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  ..  ~  ·.  '  ... 
. Autonomous full. (unction en:tity 
.  .  . 
9:  The.actiyities of the parent companies in the al~ocated.  territ~ry will be taken over by the 
joint v~ture  ...  VEBA's ·tel~m~unications interests in Germany will be taken: over by 
VEBACOM.  C&W will  transfer activities  in  the  relevant  territories: to  CWE.  Both 
companies' telecommunications businesses in the territories  ~f  the joint ·ventures will be 
contributed to the joint ventures together with their respective staff.  Therefore, the two 
joint ventures  ~re  a:ut~no~ous entities on • lasting  ~asis.  ·  · 
Absence of co-or.dinat.ion  o~ com11edtive behavio.ur 
·  (a)  Withdrawal ~tVEBA  f~oin·the market  .. 
10.  By the operation, VEBA will  tr~sfe~  all. of its principal activities in telecom·murtications 
·into the joint ventures.  It  will~ however,  retain  certain  marginal  activities which  are 
. integrated inio their subsidiaries which ·operate in other (non-teiec.ommunications)'.8eetors. 
These ·include· the  internal  telecommunications  activities  of the  VEBA  subsidiary 
companies  (for.  example  the. remote  measurement .  ~{·heat consumption  by  energy 
.companies via telecommunicatiOf?.S nenvorks) which .are incid'ental to those comp'anies' 
activities.  ·They do  not  undermi~e VEBA~s  withdra~al from  the telecommurucations 
market.  - · 
VEBA's has a non-~ontr~lling.stake (10  .. 5%) in C&W and a standstill agreement has been 
signe4  by  which  VEBA  undertak~ not  to  increase  it any. further.  VEBA  has  one  · 
member of the board of C&Vl by invitation of C&W.  . 
Accordingly,·VEB.A doos  not··ex~rcise any control  ~ver C&W and therefore it cannot b~  ... : 
· considered to retain·any presenc~  in telecommunications activities o~her  thm,t. through the ·l. 
joint venti;lre. 
(b)  No. likelihood of  th~ re-entry of  parent·coiiipa~ies into th·e markets ~f  ·t  ..  e joint 
.  .  ..  .  .  l  .  .  ·.··.  .  . 
·  v~nture 
II.  A:s both C&W and· VEBA .will put all their telecommuniCations activities  (~th certain 
minor exceptions as set out above) in the allOcated territories into the joint ·ventures, it 
is not  economi~ly feasible for ·the parents ·to re-enter the market in competition with 
either of the joint ventures ..  11tis is  particularly true' for c&w which  would,  outside 
VEBACOM,  lack the local  knowledge for :a  succe8~1 entry into the. ~an  market 
alone.  This withdrawal from the market is confirmed by the  non~eompete. clause in ·the . 
VEBACOM  agreement  which  exeiudes  the  possibility  of a  separate· entry  Into  th~ 
German market by c&W with any other German partner. 
'  .  '  ' 
In respect. of PSTN networks, certain activities in which VEBACOM: is expected to be 
active,  may involve the use  ~f  telecamm~nications infrastructure which belongs to the . 
• 
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VEBA subsidif!Y PreussenEI~  According to the a.Sreement; Vt:mA hal specified that 
it will  offer to  ~A<;OM  use of that netw.ork Oil  at Ieist ()p~ market arm's' leilgtl) . 
t~nns which it Qffers to thb-d parties  .. The rightofVEBACQM t~  ~se  ~e  net\y~  cannot 
be of an  exclu$ive natUre: since YEBA is obliged  tO  offer use Qf the  ~ssenEI~ktra.· 
network  to third  par:ties  by draft ~an  legislation which,·Win  _impl~~eiit the Open 
N~ork  Provision direCtive (9Q/387/CE). Howeyer, .this pro~~ion  oruy··app~l~ to.-thi.rd. 
partY access an~  ·not to the po$sibility of  VEBA offering teleconiJl!uilicatioits .~ces  in .  · 
competition  t<>·· "VEBACOA:f.  · Through  the  alliance  ~~  ~W,  \$Bf\.COM  .shall 
financially  and  technologically  be  put  into  the  position· to  compete  i~ seNice8  with 
:Peutsche Telelc()~· and other suppliers from  1998 onwards.·AJso," VEBA wiil tf.ansfer to 
VEBACOM-both the.shareholding and any rightS in respect of  the. proposed joint venture 
with  DeJHSc~~ Bahn to establish a fi~r~ optic network.  A re-entry. of VEBA into the 
_m~rket is therefore  eq~ally very unli.kely.  ·  · 
The vEBACOM agr~ment  contains  .. ~. verj limited exception  t~ the n~n-com.pete clause 
which allows for the possibility· of pn_ancial inveStments by one of the parents alone .if 
and only if they· CfallllOt  ag~ee within VEBACOM.  .  ·.  ·  ·  ·  ·  . 
·  .._.  For these reasons there is no  likel~hood of the parent. companies re-entering ti» market 
of  ~ither of thejc;>int venture·companies. ·  ·. 
(c)  Conclusion on absence of  eo-o~dination 
12.  In  the  light  of the  .. above  information,  th~re are  no· grounds  to  cons~der that  the 
establishm~nt and operation.ofCWE or VEBACOMwilllead to the co-ordi.na~on of  the 
competitive behaviour of  independent undertakings, falling within the meaning of  Article : 
3(2) second sub-paragraph of the Merger Regulation.  · .  ·  · 
Conclusion . 
13 ..  Thus, the notified operation constitutes a concentration within the terms of Article 3 of 
the _Merger Regulation  ·  · · 
IV  COMMUNITY DIMENSION . 
14.  C&W has a worldwide turnover of 6,615 million ECU hi the last financial year whilst 
~A  has a worldwide tumover·of36,9l5  million,.~Cu.· C&W.has a turnover of2,219 
million ECU in the EU whi.lst Veba's EU turnover is 30,927  mill~  on ECU.  C&W makes 
over .two-thirds of  'its EU tUrnover .in the United Kingdom  whilst VEBA makes more 
than two-thirds of its EU turnover in ·~any. ·.  ·  ·  · 
15.  Ac~rdingly, ~e concentration· has  a Community  dimension  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 1 of the Merger Reglllatioil. 
V  COI\P'ATmiLITY WITH THE COMMON ~RKET 
Market definitions  .  ,, 
16.  VEBACOM and CWE will be active in the following fields:  national. and international 
fixed  terrestrial teiephone  networks~ satellite telecoms services, mobile PCN networks, 
_paging,  cable TV,  corporate networks,  managed  bandWidth  and-value-added  services. 
•  ...  t  " 
•',.· 
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. and  also  signi.ficant ·actual  (eg  Deutsche  Telekont) and  potential  (eg  the  emerging· 
alliances mentioned bel6w). co~petitors are p~t.  ·  ,  ..  .  . 
17.  There is no overlap .betWeen  Veba'.~ and C&W's ·activities for national and intefuational 
terrestrial networks since for the-tiine bein8,' VEBA does. not operate ·those networks for . 
-third parties  ... The optic cable system  ofPreussenEie.~  a subsidiary of.VEaA, currently 
.  c;>nly serves its ·int~mal .telecoms .us.e, and  th~ proposed joint venture· between VBBA and 
Deutsche Bahn AG  conce..,Ung ·the. installation of  fibre-optic .links·alongside railway lines 
in . Germany  with  regard . to  deregulation  in  .1998 : would .  be  established  througb 
·  ·  VEB.ACOM.  ·Furthermore~ ·  VEI3A  has  ·no  activities:  i~  manawm  ban-dwidth  and-
international yoice aCcess nor-is c&W  ·aCtive in· satellite telecoms serVices. 
18.  Mobi1ft'~lephone  ne~or~s.  fo~  a distiit~t ma~ket  from  fixed telephony markets.  fW 
n~tworks. in  particular,  have  some  ~haracteristics which  even  distinguish  them  from 
GSM mobile networks.  PCN· ("Personal Communication network") and GSM. ("Global 
System for· Mobile communication") operate on ~iff~t  freql:lencies (900 MHz fQr GSM. 
and  1710-1880  ·MHz  for  PCN).  A  PCN  network  requires  a  denser· system· of 
transmitters  and  rathe,r  aims  at .local  or· regional users.  ln the  UK,  PCN  phones  are 
priinar:ily  ~sed by ~o~~stic and  small~rade users.  ·.A PCN phone  c~, fuJ1hsnlore,  not 
log into a'GSM network at. present,  PCN netWorks whi<?h are also  licen~ea oii a national 
··.basi.s are· altogether younger·than GS~  networks and the system infrastructure i's still in  . 
the  developing  stage (see for exampie E-Plus .as  eompared  to  the  Dl and  D2 GSM 
networks in  Germany).  International  roaming  agr~ments do  not yet exist,  ~d  e-ven 
, ~ational coverage· is  not  yet  re~ched for PCN  in  any  Member  State.  Due  to these 
characteristics of PCN, ·there are strong· indications that PCN fonris  ~ separate product 
market which is ·.different from  QSM and has to be. considered as a national  market. 
19.  However,  the  precise  market definition  can  be  left open  as,  even  o~ the  basis of the 
narrowest market definition,  ~he ,concentration· ~aises no ·competition problem. 
.  . 
20.  Mobile  radio  paging  systems  represent  a  separate  product  market  which  has  to  be 
considered  on a national  basis due to national  regulatory  systems and marketing on  a 
nationai  level.  ·  ·  ·  · 
21.  The markets for cable IY networks are  equal~y national  in scope (see  Comm.ission' s  i .: 
decision of 19.7.1995, IV/M.490  .. Nordic Satellite Distrib.ution,  no.  73). 
.  '  .  ''  .  ~  . 
22.  'Corporate networks exist for data transmission and for voice transmission between large 
closed user groups. l'he" Co.ncentration involves daia network services which are provided 
on  a  national  or  international  level ·  accQrding  tO.  th·e.  needs  required ·by  C<>q?~te 
customers.· 
23.  Yalue-added scMces ·comprise  a:  wide rmge ol  eleCtronic communication applications 
· which are taU~red to the nee4s ofcustamers. They may iitclude messaging services (EDI, 
~-mail, E-fax,  multi-messaaina),  in-fliaht  telephOny  or  acteas  to  4atlbaea  ..  Ia  tbe 
absence  of .regulatory  or technical  barriers,  th.ia  mlrbt is EEA-wide,  if not· a ,  wcrld 
market. 
24.  In  conclusion,  given  tfle ·  abtenee of any com,_.tion problems  in  any  of• the pollfble 
market segments affcqed ·by the ~ation  (u let out above), there ia no Mid co M• 
either product or aqraphic markets preci ..  y. 
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25.  .  Apart from the. above-mentioned markets where either of  the parent companieS has not 
' 
· been active up to now, the areas of.pa&Jna and ¢able TV involve onty activitieS· ~n  the 
Side ofVBBA, w~ch  will be transferred to th~.J:Vs:·a.4~ %.1ntereSt.ofVBBA.in.Miniiuf 
·-GmbH in  Germany  -an~ a  iOOio  stake ·in-Iinomobi'e  SA:  ·i~  f~ce.  (botJt  in  paging). 
CfkW' s paging. aCtivities  in ·the UK·· will,  in· any  case,  remain· outside the  operation~ 
· ~A  ·  will  transfer  two · cable  . Ty  bu~inesses;.  T~le.  Co~umbus  -~ ·eoncepta 
Kommunikations und Gebiudetechni.k GitibH,, as well as a Swiss· subsidiary (Cableoom) 
.  ·into VEBACOM while e&W's.cable TV interest in· the UK wiU remain separate.  In the 
·absence ~-any overlap, .cOmpetition concerns. do npt'arise.  In particul.ar, ·VEBA COJJld 
not  ~e seen  as·· a potential  entrant in the· UK  in both· markets .which are determined by · 
lieence·requirena.ents and strong actual cOmpetitors (BT Mobile, .V9(iapage,·fiutchlnson 
in  pa~ng; ancr' regional cable TV  operato~s).  ·,  ·  ·,  :  ·  ...  ' 
26.  As to comomte networks and value-added services,  VEJ;3A has a contr~IJi.ng interest in 
Meganet,  which ·operates· a  dat~ network primarily for ·customers of tlie financial  and 
·  ·services  sector  in  ~rlnany, .and  in  LION  wh1ch  proyides.  differen~ ·  coinntunic~tion~. 
· solutions. Apart from  its business in· the .UK, C&W is active in· Germany· only  as far as 
·  Gennany-based multinational companies or the ."Gertnan end" of intemationat networks 
are concerned.  Sin~e  ~ number ~f  significant suppliers such as national telecom operators 
(e.g. :peutsche Telekom), telecoms. and COJ)lputing service providers (ffiM, EDI etc.) and 
a ·growing  number  of' ·recently  created  or  proposed  allia~ces  (e.g.  BTNiag, 
RWE/Generale des Eaux) are already active. or will offer those services .in the$e ·fields, 
the proposed  c~Il:centration does not raise a competition problem.  · 
21:  Finally, both parent companies have  in~erests in  .. PCN networks. which Will,  apart from 
C&W' s UK  activities ("On·e20ne"),  be part of the JVs'  businesses:  VEBACOM has a 
28.375%  s~ke in  E-Plus in  Germany,  and  both. have  interests  in .Bouygues Telecom, 
currently.the only operator of PCN in.France(C&W 20. %,  VEBA  15  %).  The parties 
might at a later stage  put all  these  interests together in  another joint_ venture ·as· it is 
foreseen  in  a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding.  At present, E-Plus will  be 
. part of VEBACOM, and the two stakes in Bouygues  will~ as set out above, be managed'· ... 
hy  CWE  iuitil  the· final· transfer  of the  shares  within  12  months  time  provided  the  ·' 
agreement  of .the  other  Bouygues  shareholders  has  been  secured.  Th.e .three  PCN 
neiworks in which. the parties· or the Ns are  involv~.d  op~rate in different me~ber  states. 
This would, on the assumption of national markets, exclude any .overlap in mark~t  shares. 
On  a: European wide market for PCN and GSM combined, the market shares of  the two 
p~rties taken  ~ogethet.would be well below  10%.  · 
28.  As a result,  the creation of VEBACOM and ·CWE will  not lead  to the creation or  ·the 
strengthening Qf a domimint position in.any market. 
VI  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
•  •  t  • 
29.  In each of the  Shareh~lders' Agreements,  C& W .and  VEBA each undertake to procure 
that none of their respective group companies .will  compete with the two N s.  These 
non-compete covenants  are  necess~ry to  refl~ct the-laSting  withdrawal' of C&W  and 
VEBA from  the JVs' .markets and are integral to the concentration.  · 
'·  i 
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The proposed concentration thetefore does not n;U8e serious ctoubts as to its compatibility 
with the common market..  ·  .,  .. 
For the 'above r~ons, the Commis~irin has declded.not to oppo~  the·n~tified ~ration 
and to declare it 90mpatible with the _common. ,narket ~d  with  ~e  :functi~ng  ~f  tJte 
EEA.Agreement. This ·decisiQn .is  a~opted  i~ application. of Article  ~ (1) ~ of Council 
Reglllation No ·~064/89.  ·  ·  ·  · 
J  . 
.  ' 
.. 
\  . 
,· 
..  ·  .. 
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COMMISSION. OF tHE· EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Dear Sirs, 
Subject:  .Case.No IVIM.604- A~BACOM  · 
·Brussels, 15.09.1995 
I  PUBLIC.VERSIO~ 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(1)(a) DECISION 
To the potifying pa+ties · 
I 
Your  notification  or 11  August  1995  pursuant  to  Article  4  or  Council 
Regulation _No.  4064./89 
l.  This  operation  concerns  the  creation  of  a  company  which  will  combine  the 
telecommunications.  activities  of British· Telecommunications  pic  {BT)  and  Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro SpA .(BNL) in Italy. The new compan·y- to be called ALBACOM 
.  SpA .. will initially offer business communication services based on the ~o  companies' 
existing  networks  and · will·  expand  their  activities  to  offer  other  types  o~ 
telecommunications services as the Italian market is  .. liberalized. 
I  . 
2.  After  ex~inati~n of the notification,  the  Commissio~ has concluded that the  notifi~d 
operation involyes the acquisition of-sole control by BT of  a new joint venture company 
which incorporates ·certain· a8sets of BNL. The ·operation does not fall  within the scope 
of application of  Cou~cil ·Regulation 4064/89.  .  . 
L  THE PARTIES 
3.  BTs principal activity is the supply .of telecommunications services and equipment.  Its 
main  services are local  and  long-distance telephone calls  in. the UK,. the provision  of . 
telephone  exchange lines to  homes  and  businesses,' international  telephone calls  made 
from  and  to  the  UK  and  the  supply  of telecommunications  equipment for  customers' 
premises. BT and MCI Communica~ions  Corporation (MCI) are partners in the "Concert"  .  \ 
Rue dell Lol 200  •  8·1 0<4D Bru11111  •  Belgium 
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joint ven.ture,  for the provision of. advanced  puSif)eS~ tefecom  services  ~0: multinational, 
· companies<•>.: . 
BNL is ·one of Itaiy•s iargest b~nks with  a.t~taJ turnover of  about 2,5 billion Ecu. BNL's 
subsidiarY - Mult~setvizi - has an exclusive privat~ (X25, 1  oo· nOdes) telecoll}municatioras. 
·network ..  Mu1tiseivizi. also·.  op~rates  ·BNL's  primary  .data·  nbt:wo~k.  MultisetVizi's 
telecommunications activities ·~e offered  to. third  parties· as  weU  as  BNL. The  Italian 
Treasury holds a  stake of  .about_..73% in BNL. .  . 
·D.  rim OPERATION 
~-,  .. 
S.  The  operati·on  is  the  creation  of ALBACOM  as  a  f)ew  business  telecommunicati~ns 
operator in Italy.  BNL  will  contribute Multiservizi  and  the otber telecommuniCations 
activities in which BNL is engaged: BT Wiu contribute-the activiiies of  BT Italy· relating 
to· its it'etwork  business  within ·lf:aly. but  not  its  international- correspondel)t  business. 
AL~ACOM  will  immediately  acquire ·the BT. Italy  GNS  and  th'e  MultiserviZi  TDM 
networks. The Multiservizi X25 network will be  le~sed initially to ALBA COM,. i.n order 
.to  comply  with  [  ...  ]<
2>,  and  it  is·  planned  that' ihat. network  will  be  autoirilticaUy 
transferred to ALB.ACOM after five years.  In  811Y event, M4ltiservizi wi11  not be able to. 
s~II capacity on the network.  ··  . · 
DI.  .CONTROL 
6.  The parties' shareholdings in  ALBA COM will  be split 50.5% BT and '49.5% BNL .. At. 
board  level,  BT  is  expected  to  have  four  members  to  BNL's three.  Therefore· at  both. 
shareholder  and  board  level,  BT  will .  have  an  inbuilt  majority.  of issues  where  no 
~inority right provisions apply.  ·  · 
7.  BNL retains certain joint rights, some ~fwhich are on a permanent bas~s. (or until BNL's 
shareholding falls below zsro) and ·others of which are only applicable "to the. first three 
years (the Development Phase) of  ALBACOM's operations.' The permanent.nghts in9lu~e 
the following: 
·- .approval of  triennial  reviews to the Business Pta·n;·  . 
approval of  annual  update~ to the initi~l Business Plan. and Business Plan where these 
~ntail funding above the thresholds in the Initial Business Plan; 
changes to the power or authority of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); 
- shareholder related contracts; 
]
('l)  :  [  .... ;  . .  . 
,..  changes in the scope of the company and the Articles of Association; 
(I) 
(l) 
. - .  [  •.. ](2>.  ' 
. 
Case No.  IV/M.JSJ ·British Telecom./ MCI, of 13 September 199J and Case ~~o. I'V/34.8S7 BT•MCI, 
of 27 July .1994. 
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8.  ·.-For the first  th~ee years  o~ly, ~NL  enj~ys rights ~~o  ·in the foll~~ng  ~reas: 
..:  .. 
appointment and (Jismissal o( the CEO; 
[  ••• ]P>;  .  .  .  :  .  .  . .  . 
[  ... f>;. 
(  .. p]P> • 
9:  The areas in whicll a simple majority is sufficient include the approval of  the budget and 
long~teim $trategic decisions within ALBACOM's original scope.  w 
10.  A P~Option.  exists for  BNL  [." ..  ]C3>.  · 
ll.  On a. permanent  bas~s, a Call ·Option gives BT the· right to acquire BNL'  s shareholding 
.  [.:.](3).  .  .  J 
12.  An Initial· Bu~iness Plan  ha~ been·agreed between BT and  BNL."  Th~s·Business ?lan 
covers the .first ten years of operation of ALBACOM.  The Business Plan is updated 
annually (with the jo~nt rights .listed above) and .is  stibje~t .to a triennial t:Sview which is 
proposed [  ... f.> to the shareholders meeting where BNL [  ...  ](3>~.  ·  4r  •  .  ',  '  .. 
13.  In  the Commission  .Notic~··on the notion of'a concentration, the relative importance of 
veto rights· is assessed  in· se.ction  2.2.  In general, the principal  rights which a minority 
shareholder should  hold  in  order to  be able  to  exercise ·a  decisive influence are the 
appointment of  the management and  .. the determination of  the budget (see paragraph 25)  . 
. Next in order of importance is the· rights over the business plan (paragraph 26)  .. In the 
· ALBACOM ~hareholder's agreement, ·the appointment ofthe~Chief~xecutive Officer is 
subj~t to joint decision making ~uring the first three· years and is by simple majority  · 
thereafter. ·For the approval of  the budget,·a simple majority.is sufficient as BNL has no  . 
joint rights' at any  stage.  By  contrast,  BNL  retains joint rights- for both  the· triennial  ·  · 
reV.iew  of the  Business  Plan  and  for  the  annual  updates. where  these  involv·e  major 
funding· increases.  · 
14.  On  the  basis  of th~ above  inforQtation,  _it  could  be· argued  that  for  the time of the 
Development Phase (3  years), BNL has joint rights in relation to the Business Plan ~and 
to the appointment/dismissal of.the CEO and  ~ill therefore exerCise joint control' over 
ALBA  COM.  After the completion of the Development. Phase, ·BNL's veto- rights will be 
-limited I to  the  updates  and  revi~ws of the ,ijusiness  Plan  except of minor  funding 
increases where BT has a Call Option (see para.  15). ·Thus, ·ar will  subsequently not 
only  control  the  bu~~et and  long-ter.m  s~ategic ·decisions  of. the  IV,  but  also  the 
appointment and dism:issal  of the CEO, i.e. the management of ALBA  COM. 
.  . 
IS.  In the light of the BS/BT case<•>, the fact that after three years.BT wil-l  have the decisive 
influence over budget, management and .l~ng term strategic decisions in the context of 
a ten years business plan means that the operation  s~ould be assessed as sole control by 
BT. In BS/BT, both BT and Banco Santander were deemed to .have joint control during 
the first three years of  the operation of  the joint venture. n·ue to a significant  change in 
(]) 
(4) 
'  . 
Deleted; business secret. 
Case No.  IV/M.425- BS/BT of 28.03.1994. 
3 
ll'l!'  "'  ~.., the consent rights of the  parties and  a special  Jlut  O.ption  o(BS, BT was .deemed  to  ·· 
exercise a ,decisive influence over the J.V after three years.  \  .  . 
· 16.  In  th~ present case,  B~L  WiU retain joint rights after. t~ree.years as ·io the updates of the 
Business Plan  including  ~aj~r funding increases.· It is··true that a veto right over the 
business. plan may be sufficient-to confer joint cpntrol even in the absence ~f  any other 
veto right as it is  stat~ in  paragraph 26 ofthe  ·commission Notice on ·the notion .of a 
··  concentration. H~wever,  the ~usiness  Plan of  ALBACOM is in particularly close relation 
·.with the .budget of  the joint venture. According to section 1.11. of  the Business  Plan~ the · 
·annual budget wili  b~  established on a monthly basis, -allowing for variance anaiysis and  . 
updates. on actual  figures to be submitted to the Board on a monthly basis  .. Through the 
continuous c.ontrol  over the budget,  BT. will.thus have ·a considerable influence on the 
regUlar updates o(the B':Jsiness Plan itself.  .  '  .  ''  '  .  ' .  I 
17.  In addition, B~  will from  year 4· onwards l<;>se  the right to veto changes to the. [  ... ]<5>  . 
.  A part of the Business Plan which is of im'portance for .the activities of  AJ.,BACOM will 
: thus be solely 'coritroled by BT aner completion of the 'Development' Phase. 
.  .  .  ,  ·r  .. I  •  1 
18.  Finally and as opposed to the BS/BT case, the  options~ which are granted t_o ·  th;..parent 
companies  under  the  S~areholders Agreement, ·are  not. appropriate·  to  give  decisive 
influence  in  one  way· or  the  other.  The BNL  Put  Option  [  ... ]cs)  which.  c~n only  be 
exercised in  narrowly  defined circumstances.  Consequently, the Put. Option  cannot act 
as any  sort of deterrent to BT to act in· a way that takes· account of BNL's views more 
th~ if  it did  not exjst.  This is equally true for the. BT Ca.JI  Option  which can  only  be· 
•  d [  ](S)  ex~~c1se  ...  . 
19.  It would  appear,  therefore,  that  on  the basis of the traditional deter·minants of control, 
BNL ~  have joint .control  for  the first  three years:· It will. howev~r no  lo~ger have 
control  from  year. 4  onwards  since  it  has  no  longer  decisive  influence  on  the 
appointementofthe managn1ent and·the budget; whi~h are (according to the Commission 
Notice on the notion of a concentration) the most important veto rights.  As in the BS/BT 
case,  the  business  plan  covers  a  ten  year  period  and,  according  to  the  fi·nandal  . 
projections of the ·parties,  [  ... ]<
5>.  Given  the long term  nature of this investment in  th.e 
tele~oms· sector in  Italy,  the three year period  is  insufficient to  bring about  a lasting 
change  with  .regard  to  the ·participation  of BNL ·(see. also  paragraph  38  of the  ·,. .. · 
Commission Notice on. the not~  on of  a concentration). BT wi'If therefore have sole control 
over ALBA COM. ·consequendy, the operation is  th~ acquisition or' control by ·B.T of a 
· new joint venture company which incorporates certain assets ·or BNL. therefore, for the 
purposes of calculating turnover; Article 5(2) is appifcable.  .  ·  · · 
·IV  •.  ABSENCE OF COMMUNI'IY DIMENSION  · 
..... ·· 
20.  BT and  the  parts of BNL  which· are  the  subject of the  tran.sac~on have  a ·combi.ned 
worldwide  turnover .of more  than  5000 · million  ECU. as  BT ·  alon~ had a worldwide 
turnover of 17,905 million Ecu in the·financial year I994/95 .. BT has a Community wide 
turnover of over 250 .million Ecu: ·The assets of BNL acquired by BT are about 20 
·million Ecu and do thus not have the Communicy wide turnover ·required by  ~icie 1 
' 
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(2)  b.  of .  Council  Regulation  4064/89. · Therefore, =  the.  op~ration  docs  not·  have .  ~ 
· Community dimension.  . ·  .  ··  · ·· ·. ·  ·  .  ·  .  · 
,  .'•  •  I.,  ..  :  .  .  •  .  •  . 
.  ·  V.  CONCLUSION 
I  ••  ..  ,'I' 
21.'  Based on th·e· above, the ·Com.mi~ion has  coricl~ded that  tiu~ notified· operation does  .~ot 
hav~  a CommunitY dimension Within the meaning of  Article I of the Merger Regulation 
· and therefore does ·not fall  within the scope of  the. Merger·.Regulation~  This decision is 
adopted in application of  Articl_e 6(.l)(a) .or·council Regulation No 40621/89.  · 
'  •  o  ,'  ',  '  '  ,  '  .'  0  o  0  I 
,;· 
1  • ·  For the Commissio_n, 
.•  ,' 
:  .... 
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II  B/  65 · COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES . 
Dear Sirs, 
Subject:  Case No IV/M.604- ALBACOM 
Brussels, 15.09.1995 
I  PUBLIC VERSION 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
A:RTICLE 6(l)(a) DECISION 
To the ooti(yins partie.~ · 
I 
Your notification  of 11  August  1995  pursuant  to  Article  4  of Council 
Regulation No.  4064/89 
I.  This  operation  concerns  the  creation  of  a  company  which  will  combine  the 
telecommunications  activities  of British  Telec9.mmunications  pic  (BT)  and  Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro SpA (BNL) in. Italy. The new company - to be called ALBACOM 
SpA - will initially  o~er business communication services based on the two companies' 
existing  networks  and  will  expand  their  activities  to  offer  other  types  of 
telecommunications services as the Italian m·arket is liberalized. 
2.  After examination of the  notification,  the Commi·ssion has concluded that the notified 
operation involv'es the acquisition of  sole control by BT of  a new joint venture company 
· which incorporates certain assets of BNL. The operation does not fall  within the scope 
of application of Council Regulation 4064/89. 
L  THE PARTIES 
3.  BT's principal activity is the supply of telecommunications services and equipment.  Its 
main  services  are  local  and  long-distance telephone calls in  the UK,  the provision of' 
telephone exchange' lines to  homes  and ·businesses,  international  telephone calls made 
from  and  to  the UK  and  the  supply  of telecomm~nications equipment for  customers' 
premises. BT and MCI Communications Corporati-on (MCI) are partners in the "Concert" 
Rue delll..ol200 - B-1049 Bru8181s  - Belgium 
Telephone: exChange (+32·2)299.11.11 
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joint venture, for the provision of advanced business telecom services to  multin~tional 
companiesCI>. 
4.  BNL is one of Italy's largest banks with a total turnover of  about 2,5 billion Ecu. BNL's 
subsidiary- Multiservizi -has an exclusive private (X25, 1.00 nodes) telecommunications 
network.  Multiservizi  also  operates  BNL's  primary  data  n~twork.  Multiservizi's 
telecommunications activities are ·offered  to third  parties as well  a~ BNL.  The Italian 
Treasury  hol~s a stake of about 73% in BNL. 
ll.  THE OPERATION 
5.  The operation  is 'the creation  of ALBACOM as  a  new business telecommunications 
operator in  Italy.  BNL will  contribute Multiservizi  and the other telecommunications 
· activities in which BNL is engaged. BT will contribute the· activities of  BT Italy relating 
to its network  business  within  Italy  but  not  its  int~mational correspondent business. 
ALBACOM will  immediately  acquire  the  BT Italy  GNS  and  the  Multiservizi ·ToM 
networks. The Multiservizi X2S network will be leased initially to ALBACOM, in order 
to  comply  with  [  ... ]<
2>,  and  it  is ·planned  that  that  network  will  be  automatically 
transferred to ALBACOM after five years. In any event, Multiservizi will not be able to 
sell capacity on the network. 
m.  CONTROL 
6.  The parties' shareholdings ·in  ALBACOM ·will  be split 50.5% BT. and 49.5% BNt  ..  At 
board level, BT. is expected to have four members to BNL's three.  Therefore at both 
. shareholder  and  board  level, ·aT witl  have  an  inbuilt  majority  of issues  where  no 
minority right provisions apply. 
7.  BNL retains certain joint rights, some of which are on a .permanent basis (or until BNL's 
shareholding falls below 25%) and others of which are only applicable to the first three 




- approval of  triennial reviews to the Business Plan; 
- approval of  annual updates to the initial Business Plan and Business Plan where these 
entail funding above the thresholds in the Initial Business Plan~  . 
- changes to the power or authority of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); 
- shareholder related contracts; 
- [  ...  ]Cl>;  : 
- changes in the scope· of the company and the Articles of Association; 
- [  ... ]Cl>. 
Case No.  IV/M.353 -British Telecom./ MCI, of 13  September 1993 and Case No.  IV/34.857 BT-MCI, 
of 27 July  1994. 
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II  B/  67 8.  For the first  three years only, BNL enjoys rights also in the following areas: 
- appointment and dismissal  of the CEO; 
- [ •••  ](3)~ 
- [  ••• ]C3>; 
[ ..  ~](3). 
9.  The areas in which a simple majority is sufficient include the approval of the budget and 
long-term strategic decisions within ALBACOM's original  scope. 
10.  A Put Option exists for  BNL [  ... ]<
3>. 
11  ~  On a  permanent basis, a Call Option gives BT the right to acquire BNL'  s shareholding 
[  ...  ](3>. 
12.  An Initial  Business  Plan  has  been  agreed  between  BT  and  BNL.  This  Business  Plan 
covers the  first  ten  years  of operation  of ALBACOM.  The Business Plan  is  updated 
annually (with the joint rights listed above) and is subject to a triennial review which is 
proposed [  ... ]<3> to the shareholders meeting where BNL [  ... ]<
3>.  •  .  . 
13.  In "the Commission  Notice oil  the notion of a concentration,  the  relative importance of 
veto rights is assessed  in  section  2.2.  In general,  the  principal  right~ which a minority 
shareholder  should  hold  in  order  to  be  able  to  exercise  a decisive  influence  are  the 
appointment of the management and the determination of the budget (see paragraph 25). 
Next in order of importance is the rights over the business plan (paragraph  26). In the 
ALBACOM shareholder's agreement, the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer is 
subject to joint decision ·making during the first three years and  is by simple majority 
thereafter. For the approval of the budget, a simple majority is sufficient as BNL has no 
joint rights  at  any  stage.  By  contrast,· BNL  re~ns joint rights  for  both  the  triennial 
review  of the  Business  Plan  and  for  the  annual  updates  where  these  involve. major 
funding increases. r 
14.  On  the  basis  of the  above  information,  it  could  be  argued  that  for  the  time  of the 
Development Phase (3 years), BNL has joint rights in relation to the .Business Plan and 
to the appointment/dismissal  of the CEO  and will  therefore exercise joint control  over 
ALBACOM.  After the completion of the Development Phase, BNL's veto rights will  be 
limited  to  the  updates  and  reviews  of the  Business  Plan  except  of minor  funding 
increases where BT has a Call  Option  (see para.  15).  Thus,  BT will  subsequently  not 
only  control  the  budget  and  long-term  strategic  decisions  of the  JV,  but  also  the 
appointment and dismissal  of the CEO,  i.e. the management of ALBACOM.  · 
15.  In the light of the BS/BT case<•>, the fact that after three years BT will have the decisive 
influence over budget,  management and  long term  strategi"c decisions in the context of 
a ten years business plan means that the  operatio~ should be assessed as sole control by 
BT. In BS/BT, both BT and Banco Santander were deemed to have joint control during 
the first three years of the operation of the joint venture. Due to a significant· change in 
(3)  Deleted; business secret. 
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the consent rights of the parties and  a special  Put Option of BS,  BT was deemed  to 
exercise a decisive influence over the JV after three years. 
16.  In the present case. BNL will retain joint rights after three years as to the updates of the 
Business Plan  including major funding increases.  It is true that a 'veto right over the 
-business plan may be sufficient to confer joint control even in the absence of any other 
veto right as it is stated in paragraph 26 of  th~ Commission Notice on the notion of a 
concentration. However, the Business Plan of  ALBA  COM is in particularly close relation 
with the budget of  the joint venture. According to sectiQn  1.11  of  the Business Plan, the 
annual budget will be established on a monthly basis, allowing for variance analysis and 
upda~es on actual figures to be submitted to the Board on a monthly basis. Through the 
continuous control  over the budget, BT will thus .have a considerable influence on  th~ 
regular updates of the Business Plan itself.  · 
17.  In addition, BNL will from year 4 onwards lose the right to veto changes to the [  ...  ]<s>. 
A part of  the Business Plan which i~ of importance for the activities of  ALBA  COM will 
thus be solely controled by BT after completion of the Development Phase.  · 
18.  Finally and as opposed to the BS/BT case, the options, which are granted to the parent 
companies  under  the  Shareholders  Agreement,  are  not  appropriate  to  give  decisive 
influence  in  one  way ·or  the  other.  The  BNL  Put Option  [  ... ]<S>  which  can  only  be 
exercised in  narrowly defined circumstances. Consequently, the Put Option· cannot act 
as any sort of deterrent to BT to act in  a way that takes accou·nt of BNL's views more 
than if  it did not exist. This is equally true for the BT Call  Option which can only be . 
.  •  d [  ](S)  exercase  ...  . 
19.  It would appear,  therefore, that on  the basis of the traditional determinants of control, 
BNL may  have joint control  for the first  three years.  It  wi1J  however no longer have 
control  from  year  4  onwards  since·  if  has  no  longer  decisive  influence  on  the 
appointement of  the managment and  ~he budget, which ar.e (according to the Commission 
Notice on the notion of a concentration) the· tnost imp.ortant veto rights. As in the BS/BT 
case,  the  business  plan :covers  a  ten  year  period  and,  according  to  the  financial 
projections of the parties,  [  ... ]<
5>.  Given the long term  nature of this investment in  the 
telecoms sector in  Italy,  the three year period  is· insufficient to bring about a lasting 
change  with_  regard  to  the  participation  of BNL  (see  also  paragraph  38  of the 
Commission Notice on the ~otion of  a concentration). BT will therefore have sole control 
over ALBACOM. Consequently, the operation is the acquisition of control by BT of a 
new joint venture company which incorporates certain assets of  BNL. Therefore, for the 
purposes of calculating turnover, Article 5(2) is applicable. 
IV.  ABSENCE OF COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
20. 
(S) 
BT and· the parts of BNL which  are the subject of the transaction  have a  combined 
worldwide  turnover of more than  5000  million  ECU as  BT alone  had  a  worldwide 
turnover of 17,905 million Ecu in the financial year 1994/95. BT has a Community wide 
turnover of over 250 million ECU.  The assets of BNL acquired by BT are about 20 
million Ecu and do thus not have the Community wide turnover required by Article 1 
Deleted~ business secret. 
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II  8/  69 (2)  b  of Council  Regulation  4064/89.  Therefore  •. the  operation  docs  not  have  a 
Community dimension .. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
.  . 
21.  Based on the above, the Commission has concluded that the notified operation does ... it 
have a Community dimension within the meaning of Article I of the Merger RegulaLiun 
and therefore does _not fall  within the scope of the Merger Regulation.  This decision  is 
adopted in application of Article 6(I)(a) of Council  Regulation No 4064/89. 
For the Commission, 
5 
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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Dear Sirs, 
Subject : Case No IV/M.544 - Unisource/Telefonica 
Brussels,  6.11.1995 
PUBLIC VERSION 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(1)(a) DECISION 
To the _notifying parties 
Notification of 29.09.1995 pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation No 4064/89 
1.  Unisource International NV (Unisource lntermitional) is a proposed joint venture between 
Unisource ·NV (Unisource)  on  the  one  hand,  a comp~ny whose  shareholders  are  PTT 
Telecom. BV (the monopoly  telecom  operator in the Netherlands),  Tclia AB  (the main 
Swedish  telecom  operator)  and  Swiss·  PTT  (the  monopoly  telecom  operator  in 
Switzerland),  and  l;elef6nica,  the  Spanish  telecom  operator,  on  the  other hand.  The 
intention of  the parties is to pool their experience, business and efforts in certain business 
areas,  mainly  value-added tel'ecom  services.  ·After examination of the notification, the 
Commission  has  concluded  that  the  notified  operation  falls  outwith  the  scope  of 
application of Council Regulation  n°  4064/89. 
J.  THE PARTIES 
2.  Telef6nica is the public telecommunications operator in  Spain  and  is engaged  directly 
·.and/or indirectly ·in national and international telecommunications networks and. services. 
I,  ..  .  . 
3.  The  current structure of Unisource was  created  in  1993  when  Swiss PTT joined  with· 
PTT  Te~ecom and  Telia~ There  had  been  an  earlier agreement  between Telia  and  PTT 
Telecom  to  pool  their  satellite· services  and  later  to  create  a  international  data 
communications  company.  The· company  is  arranged  into  a  number  of  different 
subsidiaries for specific .service activities.  These are: · 
•  Unisource Business Networks (UBN)' which has  1,208 employees and a turnover in 
1994 of 388 MEcu; 
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Telephon•: exchange (+32-2)299.11 .11 
Telex: COMEU B 21877  - Telegraphic address:  COMEUR Brussels 
II  B/  71 - 2 -
- Unisource Voic·e Services .(UVS) a business unit of~N  which offers voice services 
to multinational business custom·ers. It represents 60/80 employees and a turnover of 
0.2 MEcu (est.  1994); 
- Unisource  Satellite  Services· (USS)  ~ subsidiary  off~ring international  satellite 
services. It has 25  employees and a turnover of 5.6 :MEcu (est.  1991); 
- Unisource Card Services (UC) a subsidiary offering personal and corporate post-paid 
calling card  services.  It represents  13  employees and  a turnover of 3.9  MEcu  (est. 
1994);  . 
- Unisource  Mobile  (UM)  .a  subsidia.ry  offering  mobile  services  (provision  + 
acquisition of licences). If  represents 236 employees and a turnover of  0.8 :MEcu (est 
1994);.  .  .  .  . 
Unisource  Carrier  Services  (UCS)  a  subsidiary . dealing  with  synergies  in 
international networks.  It represents 70 employees and. a turnover of 5. 76 MEcu (est. 
I  994)~·  . 
- ITEMA is a subsidiary the prime mission of which is to strengthen the ability of the 
EDP organisations of the Unisource shareholders to provide improved functionality 
and  qual.ity of  IT-servic~s at  lower· cost for internal  use.· 
II ..  THE OPERATION 
4.  The  Unisource  International  shareholders  will. pool  some  of their  businesses  in  value 
added  telecom  services.  Telef6nica will  contribute its satellite services (VSAT - very 
small aperture terminal) business.  Unisourc~ will contribute UCS, ITEMA, UM,  UC, the 
UVS  business  unit  of UBN  and  USS.  Unis.ource  will  also  contribute  UBN  BV  the 
holding  company  of  the  data  comm'unications  businesses  but  not  the· domestic 
subsidiaries where thi business is carded out. 
III.  ABSENCE OF CONCENTRATION 
A.  JOINT CONTROL/ABSENCE OF JOINT CONTROL 
5.  Unisource International will be jointly owned by Unisource (75%) and Telef6nica. (25%). 
The Unisource shareholding will  be. known as the A shares and Telef6nica wiU  h'old the 
D shares.·  · 
6.  The' Unisource International  struct,ure of control  is the following : 
1) The Supervisory Board 
7. ·  The General  Meeting of shareholders will  appoint' a Supervisory Board which  shall 
exercise  supervision  over  the  Management  Board,  in  charge  of the  day-to-day 
business of Unisource  International  and  over the general  course of business  in  the 
8. 
joint venture.  · 
The  Supervisory  Board  will  be  composed  of  12  members  appointed  by  the 
shareholders  : 9 for  Unisource  (divided  into  3 for  each  of PTT  Telecom  (the  A 
directors),  Telia  (the  B  directors)  and  Swiss  PTT  (the  C  directors))  and  3  for 




Telef6nica (the D directors). The board will have a chairman and three vice-chairmen, 
each of them  representing one of the four telecommunications companies.  · 
9.  All-resolutions of the Supervisory Board will  be adopted  by  una~imity of the votes 
cast. However, as far as budget and business plan related to the data communications 
business  are  concerned,  it  is  expressly  stated  in  article  12  of the  shareholders' 
agreement that : 
- the UBN budget and business plan will  be adopted by the vote of the Supervisory 
Board members A,  B and  C (who represent Unisource);  .  .  . 
- the  Telematica  buclge~ and  business  plan  will  be  adopted·. by  the  vote  of the 
Supervisory.Board members .b (who represent Tel.ef6nica). 
10.  This means that the two  parent companies .will  decide. separately on  two key  issues 
(budget + business plan) telated  to  the. data  communication  busi.ness  of Unisource 
International. Moreover, there is no provision  i~ the agreements 'that allow Unisource 
to impose its  conditions on  Telef6nica on  these issues.  There is,  therefore,  no joint 
control  at  the  Supervisory  Board  level  of Unisource  International  for  its  data 
communications acti.vities.  There is joint control  only for the  remaining activities of 
Unisource InternationaL 
2) The Management Board 
11.  The Management Board  will  be appointed  by  the General  Meeting  of shar.eholders 
and will  be the same as the management board of Unisource. Telef6nica will  not be 
,represented at this level  as a result ofthe operation. The Management Board will  be 
~ntrusted with the day-to,;,day  busirress of Unisource International. 
12.  Although  there  is  no  transfer  of assets  and  no  joint  control  as  far  ·as  data 
communications business is concerned,  the  parties have entered into a management 
~tsreement in  which  it  is  agreed  that  Unisource  International  will  coordinate  the 
responsibility for  the  manag·ement and  operations of the domestic  UBN subsidiaries 
and Telematica in order to avoid duplications of resources and to coordinate services 
development in  the data communications business area.  This coordination achieved 
through the Management Board. of Unisource Inteniational does  not amount to joint 
· Qontrol  as exp_lained above,  in  paragraph  10.  ·  · 
Conclusion 
13.  In  the  light  of the  above  information,  Unisource  International  will  only  be  jointly 
cpntrolled  for  the  non  data  communicatiorts  areas  of the  business.  As  the  parent 
companies· retain separate arrang~ments for the  ~ata communications businesses, they are 
not jointly controlled notwithstanding the co-ordination of  day-to-day management which 
is mentioned  in  the previous paragraph.  · 
B.  FULL FUNCTION JOINT VENTURE/NOT A  .FULL FUNCTION JOINT 
VENTURE 
14.  As  i-t  is  stated  above  Unisource  International  will  receive from  both  shareholders their 
aateJiite  service  businesses  and  from  Unisource,  UCS,  ITEMA.  UM,  UC,  the  UVS 
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business unit of UBN,  USS and· UBN  BY ..  The domestic subsidiaries of UBN BY will 
not be contributed to  Unisource International. 
J 5.  Unisource Carrier Service (UCS) is a subsidiary of Unisource which has been set up to 
exploit synergies in the international networks of the Unisource shareholders in order to 
reduce costs. Under. the national  laws of The Netherlands, Switzerland and Spain, :PTT 
Telecom,  Swis$ PTT and Telef6nica respectively are not presently permitted to assign 
their international  networks· and  cqrresponding  licences· to  UCS.  Consequently,  in  the 
current situation,  UCS  wiJl  only  perform  the  role ·of a management  company  for  the 
international  networks of the  Unisource International  shareholders themselves and  not 
as Unisource 'International. Accordingly, the activities of UCS are not full  function  and 
therefore fall  outside the scope of the Merger Regulation. 
16.  The  primary  activity  of ITEMA  (which  is  to  be  renamed  Unisource  Information 
Services) is  to  strengthen  the IT operations of the  Unisource shareholders in  order  to 
improve quality and  reduce_ costs for the shareholders .. Its secondary objective is to offer 
integrated IT solutions on the market.  Most of the resources of.ITEMA are hired  on  a 
secondment  basis  from  the  Unisource  shareholders.  On  the  basis .that  the  primary 
purpose of the company  is to  provide services to the  Unisource parents,  and  that  most 
of the  resources· are  provided  by  the  parents,  ITEMA  is  not  in  a position  to act  as  an 
autonomous economic entity and cannot therefore be considereq-as a full function entity. 
Its operations therefore fall· outside the scope. of the Merger Regulation. 
C.  RISK OF CO-ORDINATION OF COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR 
17.  For those activities which are jointly controlled and  are full  function  it is necessary  to 
assess the  likelihoo~ of co-ordination of competitive behaviour between Unisource and 
Telef6nica.  · 
AllJbile telephony 
18.  Unisource  Mobile  (UM),  a  subsidiary  of  Un~source,  specialises  in  mobile  service 
provision, is transferred to the joint venture. The Unisource shareholders and Telef6nica, 
through  its  100%  subsidiary  Telef6nica Mabile,  retain  their, domestic  services.  [  ... t> 
According to the parties, UM is a.ctive as a mobile service provider outside the countries 
of the Unisource shareholders where each  of them  remains active on  its own  account. 
However,  Unisource  has  no  licence  on  its  own  account  in  any  country.  The  parent 
companies are investigating the possibility of transferring their licences to Unisourcc in 
their  ~erritories. A non-competition agreement between the four shareholders states that 
19. 
(1) 
· they willlimi.t their offerings of their national mobile services to their respective national 
markets  only.  In  1994,  UM  acquired  a  retail  organisation  in  Sweden  for  mobile 
equipment (GEAB). 
UM will  be a GSM  network operator as are each of the parent  comp~nies in their own 
ter~tory. One of the most important characteristics of a GSM  network is that it enables 
the  consumer  to  use· the  mobile  phone  widely  across  Europe  as  a ·consequence  of 
roaming agreements between  the different network operators.  It is 'only  the availability 
of roaming agreements that  affects the consumer's  use of mobile  phones regardless  of 
the country in which the subscription is taken out. This integration of previously national 
mobile phone markets  is occurring quickly  and  an  ind.ication of this is  the existence of 
. 
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mobile  operators  independent  of the  national  telecommunications  network  provider 
offering services to consumers irrespective of location. 
20.  In addition,  as UM has no ·licence yet,  UM may  acquire a licence from  Telef6nica or 
from  one of the  sha~eholders of Unisource ·since nothing prevents it from doing so. and 
in~eed the  parent  companies  are  expl.oring  this  possibility.  In.  that  event,  the  parent 
companies may  have a strong interest in n?t competing with each ·other. 
2 J.  ln the light of the above, and on the basis of the Omnitel  decisionc
2>,  it.  i~ clear that this 
operation  will  increase  the  likelihood  for  Unisource,  Telef6nica  and  the  three  parent 
companies  of Unisource:  PTT  Telecom,  Telia  and  Swis~ PTT  to  co-ordinate  their 
activities  in  the  provision  of ·GSM  mobile. telephone  services  through  Unisource 
International. Because the shareholders of Unisource International. retain their domestic 
services, they.remain potential competitors, mainly within the framework of the roaming 
agreements  as  explained  above.  The  creation  of Unisourc'e  International  docs  not 
remove  this  likelihood  of competition  between  the  parent  companies.  The  non 
Qompetition agreement for the non parent c01npany territories showS' the non-withdrawal 
qf·the  pa·rent  companies  ·from  their  domesti·c  markets  rather  than  a  long-lasting 
withdrawal from  the joint venture m_arket. 
22.  Unisource Card Services (UC) is a. subsidiary of Unisource, which specialises in personal 
and  corporate  post-paid  calling card· services.  This  subsidiary  will  be  transferred  to 
·unisource International. The Unisource shareholders and Telef6nica currently offer post-
paid  calling cards  in  their respective territories .. UC  calling cards  are  only  offered  to 
customers who live outside shareholder h~me counJries and  Spain. 
23.  Hpweye,r, a subs.crib.er of any of  the four shareholders' card may use his card (or several 
c;ards  of' the  different  shareholders or  of UC)  aiJ  over Europe  to  the  extent  that  the 
&orvlcc  provider has got freephone  numbers in  the  different states.  The availability  of 
the~e freephone  numbers  is  therefore the  only  constraint to  the  European  wide  use  of 
c~lllns cards in a similar manner to the roaming agreements in  the mobile phone sector 
tta mentioned above.  Because they remain active in their respective domestic territories, 
parent companies may have therefore an interest iri n9t competing with the joint venture 
~r with each another. In that respect,  there is a non-competition agreement between the 
fol.Jr shareholders limited to marketing and distribution in  r~spective national market_s and 
in the UC territory.  As for· mobile services, this, non-cC?mp~tition agreement shows that 
the  paront. companies  remain  potential  competitors  from  their  respective·  domestic 
territories.  · 
VfJice services 
24.  t.Jnisource  Voice  Services  (UVS)  is  a business  uoit  of UBN.  However,  as  the  areas 
which  are  covered  by  the  special  separate  voting  arrangements  referred  to  above  are 
confined to the UBN Budget and Business Plan (which is clearly defined as the activities 
of the  domestic  UBN  subsidiaries)  these  arrangements  do  not  cover  UVS.  Therefore, 
UVS  is  subject  to  the  joint control  arrangements  which  apply  to  the  non-UBN  and 
Telematica areas of the joint venture.  · 
(2)  Cu,;o  No  IVIM.S38  - Omnitcl of 27  March  1995. 
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25.  UVS offers International  Virtual Private Network services and other closed user group 
services on an European basis.  According to the.parties, 40%. of its purchases were from 
the  parent  companies  in  1994.  Unisource  is  a partner  in  WorldPartners  and  is  the 
continental European member of that grouping. This arrangement has be~n  notified under 
Article 85. In the home territories of the shareholders, UVS  sel'Vices are distributed by 
the  relevant Unisource  shareholder .whilst  distribution  outside  the  parent  companies' 
home  territorie~ in carried out by the local UBN subsidiary. · 
26.  The market for IVPN services is at least European and possibly global. The demands of 
a customer for IVPN services will determine which provider they will look to to provide 
the service. Depending on the company's location in different countries, the solution may 
be  achievable  through  means  than  other  than  a European  .or global  service  provider. 
National telecommunications operators may  be able to offer comparable services on a 
bilateral  basis  by  ·entering into  bilateral  agreements with  the  national  public  netWork 
provi~er.· Therefore, a  company  may look to the parent companies as well. as to other 
providers such as Unisource International for these'services. Because they remain active 
in their respective domestic territory, the pare.nts wil.l therefore have an incentive to co-
ordinate competitive behaviour between themselves .through Unisource International. In 
addition, the parent companies will be a supplier of capacity to Unisource International 
for leased Jines in their home territories and even ·abroad. This will  further increase the 
scope for co-ordination. 
Satellite services 
27.  Unisource Satellite Services (USS) offers value  adde~ communications services using 
satellite terminals  based on VSAT  technology.  According  to  the  parties,  prior to  the 
establishment ofUSS the Unisoorce parents had no satellite services of their own. After 
· the  transaction,  the  shareholders 'of Unisource International  will  have  no  comparable 
VSAT services ou.tside their respective national markets as a result' of a non-competition 
agreement between the parents ofUnisoutce International. In ~he parent companies' home 
territories,  USS  services  will  be  distributed  by  the  parents  themselve~~ elsewhere  in 
Europe by the appropriate UBN  ~ational subsidiary and through distribution agreements 
in  countries where UBN has no presence.  : ·  · 
28.  VSAT  technology  is  used  where fixed  links  ~re impractical  or uneconomic or where 
there is a poor quality existing infrastructure. It can also be used instead of fixed  lines 
in  ·certain  circumstances  and  is  used·  in  that  way  by  companies  with  widespread 
distribution networks. us's targets  ~t business customers in the automotive, banking and 
finance sectors as well as government,· transport and retail operations and customers in 
Eastern Europe. 
29.  The  non-competition  agreement  between  Unisource  and  Telef6nica  covering  VSAT 
services· provides that the parents will  distribute the VSAT  services in their territories 
and will not offer a parallel product portfolio to Unisource International. This represents 
an  effective withdrawal  by  the  parents  from  VSAT .a.ctivities.  Though  there  js  some 
.  overlap with services provided through fixed lines, VSAT services can be considered as 
a distinct product segment in their own right. Accordingly, there is no likelihood of the 
co-ordination .of competitive  behaviour  in ·the  provision  of VSAT  serVices  between 
Unisource and  Telef6ni.ca.  ·( 
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30.  In conclusion, therefore, there is a likelihood of co-ordination of competitive behaviour. 
between the parent companies in the fields of mobile telephony, card services and voice 
telephony but not in the  area of sate11ite services.  In the light of this inform.ation  and 
taking into account the notice on the distinction between concentrative and co-:operati.ve 
joint  ventures(l)  (and·  in  particular  paragraph  20. second  sub-paragraph),  there  is'  a 
likelihooq of co-ordination of competitive behaviour between the parent companies as 
a result  of the  operation.  The  notified  operation  cannot  be  therefore  regarded  as  a 
'concentration as such.  ·  · 
CONCLUSION.ON ABSENCE OF CO~CENTRATION. 
31.  For'the above re,sons.the Commission  has concluded that the·notified operation  does 
not  constitUte  a  concentration  within  the  meaning  of Article  ·3(2)  of the  Merger 
Regulation  and: consequently  does  not  fall  within. the scop·e  of this  Regulation.  Thi.s 
· decision is adopted in application of Article 6(l}(a) of Council  Re~lation  No. 4064/89. 
I  '  '  '  • 
32.  The  Commission  will  treat  the  notification  pursuant  to  Article  5 of Commission 
Regulation  No 2367/90  as  .an  application  within  the  meaning  of Article  2  or  a 
· notification within the meaning of Article 4 of C9uncil  Regulat~on 17/62 as requested 
by the parties in their notificati.on.  ·  · 
For the  C~mmission, 
(3)  OJ C 385 of 31.12.1994. 
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'  I  PUBLIC VERSION  I 
'MERGER PROCEDl)RE . 
. ARTICLE "6(1)(b)DECISION 
To the notifying parties 
Dear Sirs. 
Subject : Case No IV/M.595  - British TelecommunicationsNIAG  . 
·Notification  of a concentration  pursuant· to  Arti~Ie 4 of Council  Regulation  No 
4064/89  ...  . 
I.  On  24  November  1995,  the  Commission  'received  a  notification  of  a  proposed 
·concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4064/89<
1
> by which 
the undertakings British Telecqmmunications (BT) and VIAG acquire within ~·e meaning 
·of Article·3  (I) b of the Councii·Regulation joint  contro~ o( their.SO:SO joint' venture 
VIAG Interkom (Interkom).  ·  ·  · 
2.  After examination  of the  notification,  the Commission has concluded that the notified 
operation  fall~ within  the  scope of Council  Regulation  No 4064/89 and does not raise 
serious  dou~ts as to its compatibility with the com.mon market and with the functioning 
· of the EEA  Agreement.  · 
I.  THE PARTIES 
3.  ·  BT is the main telecommunications operator in the United Kingdom. It has also activities 
.  outside the United Kingdom, in  particular the 'Concert' agreement with the US operator 
MCI,  for  the  provision  of  advanced  business.  telecom  services  to. multinational 
companies,  as  well  as  o,ther  joint ventures  in  Italy,. Sweden  and  Spain.  Its  Ge~an 
(1)  OJ No  L 395 of30.12.1989: Corrigendum: OJ No  L 2S7  of21.09.1990, p.  13. 
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subsidiary  BT  Tele~om. (Deutschland) GmbH had a .ttimov~rof less than [  ... ]<
2
> million 
in  1994:  · 
4.  VIAG is the holding company  ~f  operating·companies located primarily in Germany with 
acitivities  mainly  in  the  areas of energy,  chemicals, .packaging and  logistics.  VIAG's 
subsidiary  TB  &  D Telekommunikation  Gesellschaft fur Betrieb  uild Dienstleistungen 
GmbH (TB&D) provides telecommunications services to VIAG  subsi<Ji~ries, but not to 
third  parti.es  which  is  also  not · possibre  from  a  regulatorx  point  of view.  The 
telecommt.inica~ions  services  ·are  ·based  on  the  optical  fibre . netWork·  owned  by 
Bayernwerk,  in  which  VIAG has a [  ... t
3
> share.  · 
II.  THE OPERATION 
5.  The  objective  of· the  parties'  joint  venture  Interkom  is  to  become· an  alternative 
.  telecommunications operator in Germany, including· on· the public voice telephony market· 
as soon as this is pos.sible from  a regUlatory ·point .of view, and to· start with the setvices 
a·tready  liberalized (mainly  data  ~ransmi~sion and ·.services·  to  closed  u~er groups,  i.e. 
private network services).  All  German activities of the parties in  the field. of Interkom 
'are  transferred  .  to  the  joint  v~nture.  these  co~sist  ·or  BT' s · existing  German 
telecommunications  busin·ess  and  certain  activities  which  V~AG currently  carries  out 
through  its subsidiary TB&D  as  weB  as VIAG' s domestic managed net.work. services. 
.  - .  . 
m.  CONCENTRATION 
6.  The joint venture wili  be jointly controlled by BT and VIAG.  Each partner has 50% of 
·the  share.s  and  votes  in ·the  join~ venture.  Each  party  is  initially  entitled  to  appoint  3 
members to the Partner's Committee. which is responsibl.e for taking strategic decisions 
i  ncl  u~i  ng the approval ·of the ·budget.  · 
·7.  Furthermore,  the  joint  venture  will  perfoim  on  a lasting  basis  all  functions  of an 
autonomous  economic  entity.  Interkom  carries BT' s· and  VIAG' s telecommunications 
activities  i·n  Germany.  In  particular,  the exi'siting .German· telecommunications business 
of BT will be transferred to the joint venture. The activities of VIAG' s ·subsidiary TB&D 
in  the business field  of Interkom  will  also be· transferred to Interkom. 
I 
8.  The  creation of the joint venture·  wit~ not give. rise to  coordination of the competitive 
behaviour  of the  parties amongst  ~hemselv~s or--between  them  and  the joint venture. 
Interkom  will  basicaHy be a domestic Ger~an telecommunications provide'r.  VIAG will 
withdraw from  the markets on which Interkom  oper~tes. ·In  a_ddition,  it is economically 
implausible .that  VIAG' will  re-enter  the  markets. of lnterkom  because  of the  size  of 
investment required to  ac~ieve a _criti,cal  ma~s  ·on  the German  market. 
IV.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
.  ' 
9  ,The  conce.ntration  has a Community  dimension  withi-n  the  m·eaning of Article; I of the 
(2) 
(3) 
Merger  Regulation.  The  combined  aggregate ·worldwide  turnover  of BT  and  VIAG 
amounts to  more than  5.000 million ECU.  The aggregate Community-wide turno.ver of 
each  is more than  250 million ECU.  The parties do not achieve more than two-thirds of 
their Community-wide turnover in  one and  the same Memeber State. 
I>detc:d  bu);inc:!'s  );<:~rc:l.  Lc:ss  thnn  DM  JU  milliun. 
Dc:ktc:d. 
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V.  COMPATIJIILITY WITH THE COMMON MARKET 
10.  Interkom  will  be a competitor of Deutsc_he Telekom.  Its activities involve two distinct 
dimensions: 
a domestic German  dimension  where  interkom  Will  offer all  currently liberalized 
telecommunications  services  and· voice  services  to  closed  user goups;  when  full 
liberalisation· is' achieved, it will  also ofter public voice telephony· services; 
an  international  dimension,  as·  a  result  of the  fact  that  Interkom  will  .  be  a 
subdistributor  of BT/MCI' s .  'Concert'  services,  which  are  by  definition  of a 
transnational  nature. 
1· l.  The  servises  provided  by  lnterkom.  will  include  dot:nestic. and  transborder  managed 
network services including data, voice, visual and  ir:t~egrated access services t~  ~ustomers 
. in  Germany.  The  transborder _services  will  be  offered  by  'Concert',  the joint venture 
betWeen BT and MCI. Interkom  ~ill establish and operate a domestic network to deliver 
these  services  which  will  be  interconnected  with  the  'Conce~' network.  The  parties 
identified these as product  mar~_ets:. 
'domestic value added  n~twork services,  . 
·private switched voice ·services tq large business customers, 
domestic corporate network services and. 
public voice services. 
As  there is  no  risk  of the  creation  of a  dominant  position  in  any  relevant market,  the 
p~ecis~ market definition can  however be left open. 
12.  The  primary  area of ~ctivity, of the Joint venture is  Germany.  Therefore,  the relevant 
geographical  market  is  Germany.  For  some  services  including  'Concert'  services  and 
·certain  value  added  and  corporate  network ·services,  the relevant geographical  market 
could  ~e European- b~ worldwide.  ·  ··  · 
13.  As  Deutsche Telekom  clearly  dominates  the  German  market and  there are  also  other. 
alliances·  which  are  trying  to  enter  the  German  m~rket,  the  creation  of a  market 
domination position in Germany can not be· foreseen. The operation seems to be positive 
from  the competition point of view.  As far as the international dimension is concerned, 
there is  also no threat of a market domination  position. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
14.  The proposed con_centration therefore does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility 
with the common  market~  ·  · 
15.  For the above reasons  .. the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation 
and ·to declare  it.  compatible. with. the common  marker and  with  the functioning of the 
· EEA  Agreement.  This decision is  ~dopted in  application of Article 6 (I) b of Council 
Regulation  No 4064/89.  · 
For the Commission 
II  B/  80 Dear Sirs, 




ARTICLE 6{l){b) DECISION 
'  . 
To the notifying parties 
Subject:  Case N• IV/M.683 - GTS-Hermes Inc/HIT Rail BV 
I 
Notification of  a concentration pursuant to ·Article 4 of Council Regulation N. 
4064/89  . 
1.  On 2 February 1996, the Commission received a notification of  a proposed concentration 
pursuant  to  Article  4  of Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  4064/89<0  by  which  the 
undertakings  GTS-Hermes Inc.  (GTS)  and the parties from  2 to  12,  the  latter acting 
through HIT Rail B.V. {HIT Rail), aq_quire-within·the meaning of  Article 3 (I) b of the 
Council Regulatio11joint control of  their 50/SO joint  venture Hermes Europe Railtel B.V. 
(Hermes).  · 
·2.  After examination of the notification, the  Commission has concluded that the  notified 
operation falls within the scope of Council Regulation No 4064/89 and does not raise 
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market and within the functioning 
of the EEA Agreement. 
I.  THE PARTIES 
3.  GTS develops and operates a broad range of value-added telecommunications services, 
primarily  in  the  Commonwealth of Independent  States,  Central  Europe  and  Asia.  In 
We~tem  ·Europe, its only actiVity is a joint venture with the PTO in Monaco. 
4.  . The ten European national railway undertakings, the parties from 2 to 6 and 8 to 12, are 
principally active  in the ·transportation of freight  and· ·passengers,  mainly  within their 
national territories. In addition, most Railways have other business activities, e.g. travel 
agencies, banking, mechanical fabrication, electronic and data-processing services, energy 
and real estate management.  · 
(1)  OJ No L 395 of30.12.1989; Corrigendum OJ No L 257 of21.09.1990, p.13. 
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·-.~·  .. S.  Racal-BR Telecommunications Ltd.  (Racal) is part of the Raca1 Electronics group.  Its 
main  activity· is  the  provision  of the  business  and  operational telecommunications 
services to British Railways. Board in the t)nited Kingdom excluding Northern .Ireland · 
together :with the  maintenance  of· railway-specific terminal  systems.  Racal 's  ~etwork 
fa~ilities are those orig~ly  operated by British Railways Board and therefore national. 
The Racal Electronics group does not provide iitternational1ran$mission capacity to third 
parties.  · 
II.  THE 'OPERATION 
6.  GTS, the ten above mentioned national railway. undertakings and Racal intend to create 
a  joint  venture  Hermes,  which  will  introdtice  a  pan-European  telecommunications 
network dedicated to .the cross-border transport of telecommunication traffic primarily 
along the rights of  way of  the railway undertakings by public network operators, calrier 
consortia,  cellular . telephone.  companies  and  ·Other  authorised  telecommunication 
operators. 
III.  ·coNCENTRATION 
7.  Hermes will  be ·controlled equally by GTS and the parties from 2 to  12, who will  act 
together  through  HIT  Rail.  HIT .  Rml  is  used  in  order  to  facilitate  decision-making 
amongst the parties from 2 to  12 and to ensure that they speak and act as one. 
8.  lllT Rail is a Dutch company in which the parties from 2 to 12 have equal voting rights 
in the general meeting, where decisions are taken by a simple majority.  The supervisory 
board  consists  of 7 members,  one  from  each  of the  parties  from  2 to  12,  rotating 
periodically.  The general meeting reserves certain issues for its own decision, including 
the appointment of  the representatives of  HIT Raif on Hermes.  At least six of  the parties 
from  2 to  12  mus~ agree  on  a proposal  in  the  general  meeting.  This  configuration 
ensures that the parties from  2 to· 12  can exercise a decisive influence with the  other 
acquiring company, GTS, over Henne~  and avoids the situation where that other acquirer 
could exercise sole control because of their inability to reach a unified position ·on any 
decision.  < 2>  ·  ·  · 
9.  The railway undertakings and Racal act through HIT Rail which was originally formed 
in 1990 for the purpose of managing international IT projectS for its members. In this 
role, HIT Rail has been involved in two or three joint projects of  the Railways, the most 
important  of which  is  Hermes-plus,  a ·project  providing  for  network  signalling  and 
ticketing systems. Its primary function now is to serve as a vehicle through which the 
railway  ~dertakings and Racal jointly participate in Hermes. Furthermore, Racal has a 
common·  interest  with  the  railway  undertakings.  Racal  represents  the  privatized 
telecommunications activities of British Railways. It is partner of Hermes because with 
respect  to  Hermes  it  ba:s  the  same  kind  of business  and  interest  as  the  railway 
undertakings. 
I  0.  GTS and HIT Rail basically have equal rights as· shareholders. Decisions of  the General 
Assembly are adopted on the basis of a two-thirds majority unless and until ·either GTS 
or HIT Rail holds two thirds of  the votes, in which case simple majority suffices, except 
(2)  See Commission decision IV/M.102 ·TNT/Canada Post and others 
2 
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. ' for some decisions·which require unanimity. At the moment, both companies have a SO% 
share. GTS and JUT Rail are also equally represented on the Supervisory Board, where 
decisions are taken by simple majority. In case of  deadlock, there is no casting vote but 
provision exists for further discussions and final reference tp an independent committee 
of experts. The Supervisory Board has complete and exclusive power to supervise the 
policy of the Management Board and the general course of affairs of Hermes and its 
business.  · 
11.  Hermes will operate as an independent economic entity which possesses all the assets 
and resources to act autonomQusly on the market.· It will obtain the necessary rights of 
way and/or dark fibre from the Railways, through negotiations at arm's length, or· from 
third parties. It will have complete end-to-end operational control of its network. Hermes 
acts  as  a  single  entity  in selecting  its  prime contractor  for  the  construction of the 
network.  It will act autonomously in relation to its customers, which may include the 
Railways ~d  GTS. The provisions of  infrastructure facilities by Hermes to the RailwaYs 
and GTS  will'b~ on an arm's length basis. 
12.  The creation of  Hermes. does· not give rise to-cootdination of  the competitive behaviour 
of  the parties. None of  the parent companies is active in the market of  the joint venture,. 
which  is  the  market ·for  carrier's  carriers.  According  to  the  Phoenix  notice  under 
Regulation 17/62 art 19 (IV/35  .. 617, 15 December 1995), the market for carrier's carrier 
services comprises the lease of  transmission capacity and the provision of  related services 
to third-party telecommunications traffic carriers.  Some of the parent companies are 
..  active on a market which is downstream from the joint venture's market, which is the 
market  for  carriers<
3>.  GTS  and  Racal  are  presently  active  in  the  field  of 
telecommunications  services  but not in  the  same·. geographical  markets.  Even if the 
national  railway  companies  enter  into  national . joint  ventures  with  other' 
telecommunications services operators, it ~s ·unlikely that they will become competitors · 
as they will probably operate only  OJ)  a national .. basis. The Railways are  ~ctive in a 
market which is  up~tream from the Hermes's market as they will provide networks to 
Hermes. However, they will each provide a network for a different geographical market. 
IV.  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
13.  The present operation has a Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1(2) 
of the Merger Regulation.  The worldwide turnover of all  the undertakings concerned 
amounted,  in  1994,  to  more  than ECU. 5 billion  ([  ...  ]<
4>)  and  more  than two of the 
undertakings achieved a·Community-wide turnover of  more than ECU 250 million. The 
undertakings  concerned  did  not  achieve  more  than  two-thirds  of their  respective 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.  · 
V.  ASSESSMENT UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE MERGER REGULATION 
A.  Relevant product marbt 
14.  In the terminology used in the Commission's Phoenix notice Hermes will be a carrier's 
carrier. More specifically Hermes will provide infrastructure services similar to dedicated 
transit services - ie the transport of  traffic over permanent dedicated facilities through the 
(3) 
(4) 
See par. 14  f. 
Deleted for publication 
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and data services.  ·  · 
15.  This kind of business of a carrier of telecommunications carriers differs ·generally from 
the business provided by a teleconununi~tions carrier, i.e of a typical services provider. 
The latter typically provides services to end-users, i.e. the typical customer of  a services .  ~ 
provider. The business of a carrie:( s carrier is broadly described as providing capacity  j , 
and  rel~ted services for these telecommunications operators, i.e. a kind of wholesale. 
16  Two different types of business can be regarded as forming  a pan-European carrier's. 
c8.rrier market: the provision of bandwidth (in Mbit/s) interlinking the switch locations 
of carriers, and the provision of switched-minute services (in millions of  paid minutes), 
taking  telephone  calls  from  one  carrier  and. either  terminating  ~ese calls  upon  a 
company's own switched network infrastructure, or passing them to another carrier for  , 
the final stage. The traditional way of providing cross-border services to end users is to 
make separate arrangements with a range of other carriers. In future, :especially because 
of the formation  of alternative  national  telecommunications  services providers,  these 
carriers might seek to entrust the transport of  international traffic to a single provider or 
a small number thereof.  ·  ' 
17.  Hermes will provide two categories of transmission capacity: 
During 'its start-up period Hennes will supply cross-border basic transport capacity 
(point-to-point) targeted at caniers requiring large bandwidth capacity between two 
gateway points, 
With the commencement of the liberalisation of telecommunication infrastructure 
markets in the EU from  1996 Hermes will'provide instead a pan-European virtual 
private transport network supplying bulk capacity to carriers who  will sub-supply 
to end-users.  !  · 
18.  .Accord~g to  the  parties  these  services  should  be  located  in  two  separate  product 
markets:  the  first  is merely  an alternative to the traditional point-to-point connections 
offered by PTOs .  by combining two or more half-circuits;  the second is a part of a new 
and distinct product market - the provisi~n of pan-European transport networks.- which 
in  consequence  of liberalisation will  develop  as  the  role  of traditional  PTOs  on  the 
market for international infrastructure services gradually decreases. 
19.  For the purposes of the present decision the Commission can leave open the defmition 
of both the product markets involved,· since on the narrowest definitions - those given 
by the parties  - no competition problems arise. 
B.  Relevant geographic market 
20.  Hermes  ~ill initially  supply  its  telecommunications  network  between  some  of the 
countries whose railway undertakings participate in the operation; it will then extend its 
activities  to  other  countries  in  the  present .  network.  It  is  possible  that  railway 
undertakings in other countries in the EEA will join the operation at a later date.  The 
Commission accordingly concludes that the relevant product market is at least EEA-wide. 
C.  Competitive Assessment 
4 
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to-point) - Hennes will compete with PTOs and will have an insignificant share  .. 
22.  The parties clam{ that, since the second market _described by the parties - the provision  . 
of pan-European transport networks - is new, po valid market share data are available. 
However, market play~rs with global network infrastructures or regional ones will be in 
a position to provide a variety of  s~rvices to telecommunications carriers. If  the creation 
of a  pan-European network like  that  one  of ·Hermes  is part of an  already  existing 
carrier's canier market, the creation of  a market  dominating position cannot be expected 
because of the· market power of the national  PTOs.  Only if the provision of a  pan-
European network by the parties creates a new product·  market, will it be possible to 
conclude  tha~, as the first entrant into it, Hermes will in the immediate future enjoy a 
very high. share, possibly even 100 pc, of this new market. 
23.  Even if a seamless pan-E~opean  telecommunications network is a product of its own, 
the Commission is ·confident that the potential competitors of Hermes are equally or 
more· pQwerful and that Hermes will have no opportunity to foreclose the market. The 
principal  source of such competition  is  the national  PTO  operators;  as the  national 
regulation of  telecommunications, the main barrier to entry, dimihishes in the next few 
years, they will have the capacity to combine into a pan-European network resources 
(particularly infrastructure) which are much greater than .those available to the parties. 
Furthermore, the national PTO operators are dominant in the field of  cross-border traffic 
with respect to the existing connections between the several PTOs which ·enable cross-
border telecommunications to take place at the moment. Another type of infrastructure 
suitable for telecommunications is that of the. national energy and wate.r  undertakings; 
already  the  electricity  grid  in  Germany  is  used  as  the  infrastructure  for 
telecommunications,  cs>  and  there  is  no  reason  ~hy following  the  ~iberalisation of 
telecommunications  energy  and  water .  undertakings  should  not  in  cooperation  with 
telecommunications operators create .. ~ross-border·  networks of comparable  strength to 
those of Hermes.  yompetition coulq  also  be  provided  by  such  telecommunications 
consortia as Unisource, Carrier Services, Orion and Atlas/Phoenix; these coQ.sortia have 
the advantage of  v~rtical integration both upstream and downstream, whereas Hermes 
will have to negotiate with each of the railway companies on an arm's length basis and 
will  not  have  the  resources  to  supply  telecommunications  services  to  end-users. 
Furthermore, one has to take into account .that the proposed Hermes infrastructure still 
has to be set up. Further market entries can already be expected from 1 January 1998. 
24.  Therefore, even if the business of Hermes is regarded as a new product, it cannot be 
foreseen that the. formation of Hermes will lead to the creation of  a market-dominating 
position.  Furthermore, ·this ·conclusion  is  underlined  by the  fact  that  the  potential 
customers .of Hermes are strong and well informed companies which have considerable 
buying power and will be able tQ  limit the market power of any supplier of carrier's 
carrier services, especially with respect to existing alternatives. 
25.  The proposed concentration therefore does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility 
with the common market. 
VI.  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
(5)  Commission decision IV/M.618 Cable &  WirelessNebacom 
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concentration. To answer thejr request, the assessment made below is also related to the 
question whether a provision is an integral part of  the operation. 
27.  HIT Rail and OTS agree not to &Ssist or cooperate in the development of  any other pan-
.  European Telecommunications operator while HIT Rail and OTS remain shareholders in 
Hermes;  for HIT Rail the obligation continues for a further year. The evaluation of  this 
clause must take account of the characteristics peculiar. to concentrative jomt ventures. 
This prohibition on the parent tindertakings oompeting with the joint .venture aims at 
expressing the reality of  the lasting withdrawal of  th~ parents from the market assigned 
to the joint venture. However, insofar as this clause is a restriction of  comp~tition, it can 
be regarded as an ancillary  restri~tion. 
28.  The parties  agree  not to  disclose confidential  information  relating  to  Hermes.  This 
restriction is directly· related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. 
Therefore it can be regarded. as ancillary to the concentration. 
29.  Hennes agrees not to provide telecommunication network facilities services .at a national 
level, unless on the application of a customer the relevant national railway consents. 
Insofar as this is only a defmition of  the scope of  business of  Hennes, it can be regarded 
as  an  integral  part of the  concentration,  since  it  reflects  the  decision of the  parent 
companies  to  limit  the  business  of  the  joint  venture  to  international  services. 
Nevertheless, the second part of  the clause leads to the ·conclusion that the limitation is 
not an integral part of the concentration as this part of the clause in question provides 
an exemption from the limitation. This part of  the clause therefore cannot be regarded 
as an integral part of the operation. Furthermore, as this clause imposes an obligation 
only on Hennes, ,it cannot be regarded as ancillary to the concentration. 
30.  Hennes will  not be obliged  ~o  ob~.in dark  fibre and  rights of way  from the railway 
companies; nor will the railway companies be obliged to supply those assets to Hennes. 
Rights of  way and related agreements will be concluded on an ann's length, commercial 
basis. This  claus~ is not restrictive of competition. 
31.  However, Hennes will be obliged to negotiate with the railways concerning contracts for 
the installation and maintenance of  the network; only if  fair and commercial terms cannot 
be agreed will Hermes be entitled to contract with other suppliers. This provision cannot 
be regarded as directly related and necessary to the implementation of  the concentration. 
Therefore it cannot be regarded as ancillary to the concentration. 
VII. CONCLUSION· 
32.  For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation 
and to declare it compatible with the common market and with the functioning of the 
EEA Agreement. 'IJtis decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1 )(b) of Council 
Regulation N. 4064/89.  l.  · 
For the Commission, 
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Dear Sirs, 




ARTICLE 6(1)(b) DECISION 
To the notifying parties 
Notification  of a concentration ·pursuant  to· Article  4 of Council  Regulation  No 
4064/89 
1.  On  26  January  1996  the  Commission  received  a notification  on  an  acquisition  of a 
shareholding in Belgacom  by a Consortium consisting of Ameritech International, Inc. 
Tete Danmark A/S and Singapore T·elecommunications Limited (the Consortium) from 
the Belgian State.  ·  ·· 
2.  After examination of the notification,  the Commission  has concluded that the notified 
operation falls within the scope of Council Regulation 4064/89 and does not raise serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. 
I  THEPARTIES 
3.  Belgacom is the principal  provider of domestic and  international  telephone services in 
Belgium. The aelgian  Stat~ currently  holds all  of the capital  stock of Belgacom. 
4.  Ameritech International Inc. (Ameritech) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ameritech 
Corporation,  a  US  corporation  and  one  of the  largest  full-service  communications 
companies in the world.  Ameritech International is the entity through which Ameritech 
Corporation conducts its international  activities land investments. 
5.  Tele Danmark A/S  is the  principal  provider of domestic  and  international  telepho"e 
services in Denmark. 
6.  Singapore Telecommunications Limited (Singapore Telecom) is the principal provider 
of domestic  and  international  telephone  services  in  Singapore.  It  also  provides  postal 
services. 
Rue de Ia Lol200  •  B-1049 Brussels  •  Belgium 
Telephone:exchange (+32-2)299.11.11 
Telex: COMEU B 21~77 •  Telegraphic address: COMEUR Brussels 
II  B/  87 ll  THE OPERATION 
7.  On  21  December  1995,  a Stock Purchase  Agreement was  signed  between on the  one 
hand, the Belgian State and, on the other hand, the consortium consisting of Ameritech, 
Tele  Danmark  and  Singapore  Telecom  (the  Consortium),  pursuant  to  which  the 
Consortium will  acquire 50% minus one share of the capital  stock of Belgacom  from 
the Belgian State.  The members of the Consortium  will  acquire the Belgacom  shares 
through a.special purpose vehicle company: ADSB Telecommunications B.V. (ADSB). 
ADSB  is a private limited liability company incorporated in the Netherlands which  is 
jointly owned by the members of the Consortium. 
m  CONCENTRATION 
JOINT CONTROL 
(a)  ADSB 
8.  The members of the Consortium currently own shares  iJ:t  ADSB  as· follows: 
Ameritech  40% 
Tele Danmark- 33% 
Singapore Telecom  27% 
9.  A Belgian financial  partner may  be invited to invest  U.P  to  5%  of the share capital  of 
ADSB which would be subtracted from  the Ameritech shareholding.  [  ...  ](1> .. 
10.  At the shareholder level of  ADSB, 95% of the votes are needed for certain matters [  ... ]Cl>. 
At board level,  [  ... ]<
3>.  Each shareholder must have one  represen~tive present for the 
meeting  to  constitute  a quorum  and' 'the  board  member(s)  representing  each  parent 
exercise the  voting' rights  in  proportion  to  the  shareholdings  of that  parent.  A [  ... ]<
4> 
majority of the shares is required for matters relating to the adoption or amendment of 
the Business Plan and Budget and to decisions relating to voting behaviour at Belgacom's 
shareholders meetings.  ..  . 
11.  Accordingly,  Ameritech, Tele Danmark and Singapore Telecom will  have joint control 
over ADSB. 
(b)  Belgacom 
12.  The Belgacom shareholders' agreement (Article 3) provides that shares ofBelgacom will 
be divided into three classes. Class A will include all shares owned by the State or public 
institutions,  Class B shares will  be  owned  by  ADSB,  and  Class C will  include shares 
which could come to be held by persons or entities· other than those already mentioned 
[  .•. ]<'>.  These C shares would not have voting rights. 
<•>  Deleted business secrets 
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II  B!  88 13.  Belgian  company  law  requires  a majority  of 75%  within  eac~ class for  a number of 
matters  including the  increase or reduction  of the  share  capital  or the  app~oval of a 
merger or split-up .and 80% for .other issues including the redemption of  .own shares or 
the  change  of the  corporate  object.  The .  shareholders'  agreement  requires  .that  the 
disposition of earnings and profits must be approved by a majority of votes in both Class 
A and Class B --s long as [  ... ]<
6>. 
14.  The  management  of. Belgacom  will  be  conducted  by  ·the  Board  of Directors.  The 
Belgacom Board of Directors will consist of eighteen members,· nine of which will  be 
appointed by Belgian State (through Royal Decree) and the other nine by the Consortium 
Members.  The  chairman  of the  Board  will  be  appointed  from  among  the  directors 
appointed  by  the  BeJgian  State.  He  will  have  a casting  vote.  However,  all  decisions 
relating to  the strategic com·mercial  behaviour of Belgacom  including the adoption  or 
amendment  of the  Business  Plan  and  of the  Budget,  any  delegation  of management 
powers,  strategic acquisitions or alliances,  the  appointment or removal  of Belgacom's 
Chief Executive Officer, will require a majority of two  ... thirds or m.ore of the votes cast 
at Board meetings. In addition, these strategic decisions ~II demand a quorum of at least 
two directors representing Class A and two directors representing Class B. 
15.  Class C shareholders would be entitled to board representation when their shareholding 
reached 5%.  Even if  these shareholders had board representation there are several factors 
which indicate that the structure of  the various  sha~eholdings will continue to ensure that 
ADSB and the Belgian State will  hold joint control for the foreseeable future.  Belgian 
law requires the Belgian State to hold at least 50% plus one share of the capital  stock 
'  ~)  ofBelgacom.  [  ... ]  . 
16.  The executive  manageme~t of Belgacom  lies with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
assisted by one or two deputies who will together fonn the Executive Office. The CEO 
is formally appointed and removed by a Royal Decree which is taken in accordance with 
the proposal of the Board of Directors,  which requires a majority of at least two-thirds 
of the votes cast.  ·  · 
17.  In  the  light  of the  above  information  and  the  Commission  notice  on  undertakings 
concerned<•>,  Ameritech,  Tele Danmark and  Singapore Telecom,  through  ADSB,  have 
joint control  over Belgacom with the Belgian State. 
FULL FUNClJON AUTONOMOUS ECONOMIC ENTITY 
18.  Belgacom has been operational as the Belgian national telecommunications provider for 
a considerable period.  Its net cash flow of Belgacom in  1994 amounted to I ,351 million 
BF and at the end of 1994 it employed about 27,000 staff. 
19.  According  to  Article  11  of Exhibit  M to  the  Stock  Purchase  Agreement  dated  21 
December 1995 the parties to the Joint Venture have entered into the Agreement for a 
term of thirty years which will  be automatically renewable for two successive terms of 
ten years.  In addition,  as stated above,  the Belgian Government is required by law to 
hold at least 50% plus one share of the stock of Belgacom and [  ... ](9). 
< 6>  Deleted business secrets 
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II  B/  89 20.  Accordingly,  Belgacom  will  perform  as  a Joint  Venture  on  a lasting  basis,  all  the 
functions of an autonomous economic entity, on grounds of disposal of assets, staff and 
financial  independence,  in the field  of the provision of telecomm.unication services. 
ABSENCE  OF  SCOPE  FOR  CO-ORDINATION  OF  COMPETITIVE 
BEHAVIOUR 
21.  The  Belgian  State is  not  active  in  telecommunications  other than  through  Belgacom. 
Accordingly, the likelihood of coordination must be measured between the members of 
the Consortium. 
22.  The parent companies are potential competitors to Belgacom tbllowing the liberalisation 
of  telecommunications and services in Belgium.  It is unlikely that the parent companies 
would  enter the market following  the 'substantial  investment which  they have made in 
acquiring  the  stake  in  Belgacom.  Even .  if they  were  to  offer  services  in  Belgium 
following  liberatisation,  the  number and  strength  of the  other potential  competitors  in 
Belgium would make any co-operative behaviour insignificant.  This. is c~nfirmed by the 
non-compete clause in which the Consortium  m~mbers have undertaken not to compete 
with Belgacom directly  ~r indirectly in the provision of telecommunications and related 
services offered in Belgium.  Limited exceptions apply for activities which account for 
less than 0.5% of Belgacom's revenues in any one year, for the publication of industrial 
directories  by  Ameritech  (through  Wer  Liefert  Was?)· and  for  electronic  commerce 
services through GElS.  · 
23.  With the exception of  those services which are offered by Belgacom on a national basis 
(and where the Consortium members have agreed not to compete with Belgacom), most 
remaining services have geographical. market definitions which have been considered to 
be at least European wide.  These services include certain data communications services, 
cellular telephone services, certain non cellular mobJie activities and certain value added 
services (as set out in the market definition section V bel.ow). 
24.  Tele Danmark's  international  activities (which  account  for  under  2%  of its turnover) 
include paging services and Telenordia, a joint venture in Sweden with BT and Telenor, 
which offers communications services to companies in Sweden.  Ameritech currently has 
activities  in  the  EU  for  industrial  directories  (primarily  in  Germany  but  also  with 
turnover in  neighbouring countries)  and  certain  activities through  GElS  for  electronic 
commerce services on an  European basis.  Singapore Telecom  has EU activities in the 
UK  and  Sweden  through  cable  TV  operations.  There  is  no  overlap  between  Tele 
Danmark and Singapore Telecom's activities in Sweden-and the Ameritech activities in 
Belgium  are  of such  a limited  extent  that  there  is  no  likelihood  of significant  co-
ordination. 
25.  As liberalisation takes place across the EU,  the opportunities for new entrants to enter 
telecommunications markets on an EU wide basis will increase.  Even though all of the 
Consortium members will be potential competitors on these markets; and that they have 
activities already ·in the EUIEEA;  the potential  restriction of competition will  not have 
a significant  effect  on  competition  given  the  number  and  strength ·  of existing  and 
potential competitors on this market.  For those services which have world-wide market 
definitions, the absence of any anti-competitive effect is even stronger, given the relative 
absence of economic power of the parties against the competition which they do or will 
face. 
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Ameritech, Tele Danmark and Singapore Telecom or between them and the Belgian State 
through Belgacom..  .. 
27.  Accordingly,  the notified operation is a concentration. 
IV  COMMUNITY DIMENSION 
28.  The undertakings concerned  have a combined aggregate worldwide turnover in excess 
. of 5,000 million ECU (Belgacom:  2,951  million ECU,  Ameritech Corporation:  10,747 
million  ECU,  Tele Danmark:  2,366  million  ECU,  Singapore  Telecom:  1,927  million 
ECU), following their latest reports and accounts.  At least two undertakings concerned 
have a community-wide turnover of more than ECU.250 million (Belgacom: [  ... ]<10>, Tele 
Danmark: [  ...  ]<
11~.  The undertakings concerned do not achieve more than two-thirds of 
their  aggregate  Community-wide  turnover  within  one  and  the  same  member  State. 
Therefore, the operation has a Community dimension. 
V  COMPATIBILITY WITH THE COMMON MARKET 
A  RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS 
29.  The relevant product market  in this operation are a wide range of telecommunications 
and related services. 
According to the notifying parties, Belgacom operates in the following product areas. 
Local telephone services (PSTN and ISDN) 
Domestic long distance telephone services. 
International telephon·e services (inc. VPN) 
Leased lines  , 
Data communication services (inc. MAN&LAN, Telex, Telegraph, EDI) 
Cellular telephone activities 
Non-cellular  mobile  activities  {paging,  calling  card,  pay  phones,  maritime  radio 
services) 
Value added services (inc.centrex,operator services) 
Supply and seryice of CPE 
Telephone directories publishing . 
Telephone directories data 
Telecommunication and engineering consulting 
-~- ·-·  --- .. ----- ~--~- ---- __ _.  ..  ,  ....... -~  ... --·---- .. 
-. ---------::.· ---. .  ....  -:,...- .... 
--·-·--······-·-.. ---·· --.  ---------· -- --·-.  ---·- --·-- ":'!'-- ...... -..--- ~-....  ...;..  ---·- ---- ----..... ~-- -··  ~-~  ~--~- ---~·  .,,  .-·--..::  _  ... -.:...~~~~~~---
·- .. -·--~-3&.~·--However,··a·pre~tslfproducrmarkefCfelinition is not necessary  as,  given the respective 
market  positions  of the  parties  in  the·  sectors  referred  to  above  or  even  in  separate 
narrower markets,  such a definition 'Would  not alter the Commission's conclusion with 
regard to dominance in this case described under Assessment below. 
<to>  Business secret - more than 250 million ECU 
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31.  Basic services  related  mainly  to  reserved  services in  Belgium  (e.g.  fix~d national  and 
international voice,  leased lines,  telex) have traditionally been considered as a national 
geographic  market  due  to  the  still  prevailing  regulations  and  the  role  of the  national 
telecommunications operators. 
32.  The geographic market for certain value added services is generally considered as at least 
European  and  possibly  worldwide.  In  any  case  the  markets  for  telecommunications 
services are evolving very rapidly as a result of technical change and liberalisation of the 
regulatory environment. 
33.  However, given that the operation does not result in  any  problem of dominance· in  the 
EUIEEA area,  for  the  reasoris exposed  in  the assessment below,  it is  not necessary to 
define the relevant geographic market in the present case. 
C  ASSESSMENT 
Belgium 
34.  The  market  behaviour  of telecommunications  operators  in  Belgium  is  controlled  by 
regulatory mechanisms which are being put into place.  A telecommunications regulatory 
authority  is  already  in  existence  and  legislation  which  will  provide  some  of the 
conditions necessary for competition  is  in  place.  Further measures are envisaged,  and 
will be necessary, in order for the proper competitive conditions to exist for new entrants 
to  compete  effectively  with  Belgacom  on  the  markets  in  which  it currently  has  a 
monopoly. 
35.  Belgacom holds very high market shares (including  J.OO% for some services). FoJiowing 
the operation, it appears that this position will  not change t)ntil liberalisation of services 
and infrastructure  b~comes effective in Belgium.  In European and worldwide markets, 
Belgacom should become a stronger competitor following the operation and will be able 
to take advantage of  the liberalised telecommunications markets in most of the EU which 
should take place by the beginning of 1998.  Belgacom will compete on those European 
markets with strong competitors such as BT, Unisource, Deutsche Telekom and France 
Telecom.  However, in the short term, the possibility exists that Belgacom may undergo 
a financial  and technical strengthening without having to face actual competition on the 
markets for its currently non liberalised activities. 
36.  In  the  light  of infonnation  provided  by  the  notifying  parties,  the  products  in  which 
Selgacom  has  (  ... ]C1
1> of sales  in  Belgium  comprise:  local  and  domestic long distance 
telephone services, international  ~elephone services, leased lines, value added services and 
telephone  directories  data.  It  has  in  excess  of [  ...  ]<
12> of sales  in  Belgium  for  data 
communication  services,  cellular  telephone  services,  non  cellular  mobile  services, 
payphone  services  and  paging  services  and  [  ... ]<
13> for  the  publishing  of ·telephone 
directories and [  ... ]u•> in the telecommunications and en8ineering consulting sector. Also, 
< 11>  Business secret· close to  100% 
< 12>  Business secret • at least 90% 
< 13>  Business secret·· between 30% and 40% 
c 14>  Business secret· between 3S% and 4S% 
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Belgacom  was responsible for  [  ... ](1
5> of the supply  and  service of Customer Premises 
Equipment in Belgium in  1995. 
There  are  only  two  very  limited  areas  of overlap  between  any  of the  Consortium 
members and Belgacom  in  Belgium.  These are a limited. number of sal~s of industrial 
directories by a German subsidiary (Wer Liefert Was?) of Ameritech into Belgium  and 
the activities of GE  Information  Services (GElS)  in  which  Ameritech ·has an  interest, 
which  offers electronic commerce services throughout  Europe,  includiog,  to a limited 
extent, Belgium.  Neither of these activities, combined with those ofBelgacom, give rise 
to  the  creation  or  strengthening  of a dominant  position.  This  is  because,  as  far  as 
directories are concem.ed, the addition of market shares is insignificant and with regard 
to  electronic  commerce  services  there  is  no  direct  overlap  between  Arneritech  and 
Belgacom.  The issue of potential  competition is covered in paragraph 22 above. 
37.  There are  nQ  overlapping  activities  of any  significance  in  Belgium  between  different 
Consortium  members.  Ameritech,  Tele Danmark .and  Singapore  Telecom  conduct the 
bulk of their operations in their. respective home territories. 
38.  Accordingly,  in the light of the above information, there is no creation or strengthening 
of a dominant  position  in  Belgium  within  the  meaning  of Article  2 of the  Merger 
Regulation.  · 
Outside Belgium 
39.  Belgacom  is  active  only  in  Europe.  Apart  from  its  activities  in .Belgium,  it  has  the 
limited interests in Russia as described above.  Ameritech, Tele Danmark and Singapore 
Telecom also have activities in the EU/EEA as set out above.  This operation involves 
no addition of market shares in those countries. 
For the services which have a market definition which is Europe or even world wide, the 
combined market shares of Belgacom and Tele Danmark in Europe and Belgacom and 
all  the consortium members on world wide markets, the transaction does not raise any 
competition problems. 
Conclusion 
In the light of  the above information, the notified operation does not raise serious doubts 
as to its compatibility  ~ith the common market. 
VI  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
40.  [  ...  ](16)  the  Consortium  members  undertake  not  to  compete  with  Belgacom  in  the 
provision of telecommunications services and related services in Belgium.  An exception 
is provided for operations which represent less than 0.5% ofBelgacom's revenues for the 
publication of directories by  Ameritech and for electronic commerce services provided 
through  GElS.  Ameritech  has given  a similar non  com.pete undertaking for it and  its 
controlled  affiliates.  This  clause  is  a normal  consequence  of the  parent  companies' 
investment in the joint venture and reflects the parent companies' withdrawal as potential 
(U)  Business secret - between 50% and 70% 
(lei)  Deleted business secrets 
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competitors in  the Belgian  market.  Insofar as this is  a restriction of competition,  this 
provision is directly  related and necessary to the implementation of the concentration. 
For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation and 
to  declare  it compatible  with  the  common  market  and  with  the  functioning  of the  EEA 
Agreement. This decision. is adopted  in application of Article 6{l){b) of Council  Regulation 
No 4064/89: 
For the Commission, 
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Subject:  Case No  JV/M. 802 - Telecom  Eirennn 
Brussels~ 18.12.1996 
[  PUfiLIC  VERSION 
MERGER  PROCEDURE 
ARTICLE 6(1)(b) DECISION 
Registered with advice of delivery: 
To the notifying parties 
I 
Notification of 14.11.1996 flurstutnt to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 4064/89. 
I.  On  14.1 I .1996  the  C~ommission received  a  notification  of a  proposed  concentration 
pursuant to Article 4 of Council  Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 by  which  PTT Telecom 
BV  ("PTT  Telecom .. )  and  Telia  AB  pwbl  ("Telia"),  acting  together  through  a joint 
venture  company  called  ~omsource, and  the  Irish  State,  will  acquire joint control  of 
Telecom Eireann. 
I.  THE PARTIES ANI>  THE OPERATION  . 
2.  Telecom Eireann  is  a limited liability company incorporated  under  Irish  law.  It .is  the 
national telecommunications operator in  Ireland otwhich all  shares are currently owned 
by  the Irish  State.  Through a 75% sharcholding in  Cahlelink Limited Telecom  Eireann 
is also active in  the provision of cable iclcvision services in  Ireland. 
3.  The Irish State is in this operation represented by the Minister f(>r  transport,  Energy and 
Communications and  by the Minister for Finance ("the Ministers"), who are the present 
shareholders of Telecom  Eireann. 
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telephony  services.  mobile  communication  services  and  sales  of telecommunications 
equipment.  Telia is  a limited  liability  company  of which  all  shares  are  owned  by  the 
Swedish State.  Its  main  activities are the provision of telecommunications services. 
5.  The concentration involves the establishment of  a consortium between PTT Telecom and 
Telia, named Comsource, and the acquisition by Comsource of 20o/o of the issued share 
capital of  Telecom Eireann. Comsource shall act solely as a holding company to perform 
the role of shareholder of Telecom  Eireann.  As  a consequence of this  acquisition  of 
20% of the shares of Telecom Eireann Com source will  acquire control, jointly with the 
Irish State, of  Telecom Eireann. The Ministers will grant Com source an option to acquire 
a further  15% of shares in  Telecom  Eireann. 
II.  CON<~ENTRATIV·E  .JOt·NT  VENTIJI~~: 
·Joint c.on'trol 
(a) Comsource 
6.  According to the information provided by the parties PTT Telecom and Telia will  each 
be entitled to appoint four Directors. The Board of Directors has to decide on the major 
issues of the business policy of Comsource.  In such decisions neither of the parties has 
a casting vote and consequently both  parties have a de facto veto right. 
7.  Accordingly,  PTT Telecom and Telia will  have joint control  over Comsource. 
(b) Telecom  Eireann  .  .  . 
8.  With respect to decisions on major issues of the business policy of Telecom  Eireann  the 
follow,ing  provisions apply.  [  ... ]OJ  · 
9.  It can  be concluded that  the Irish  State and  Comsource wiil  be ·able  to  veto  the  major 
strategic decisions on  the business policy of Telecom  Eireann and that they thus will  be 
control1ing this company jointly. 
I  0.  It follows from  the above that PTT Telecom and Tclia, through Com source. and the Irish 




Autonomous full function entity operating on ;•  lasting b~tsis 
Telecom Eireann is the national telecommunications operator in Ireland. The parties have 
entered  into  a  strategic  agreement  for  an  indefinite  period  of time.  The  parties  in 
Com source will  supply major contributions to a further development of the Irish market 
and  to  enhance the  competitiveness of Telecom  Eireann  in  the  international  markets. 
These contributions will be related to human resources, technologies, operational support 
systems, and  will  include mobile and  multimedia markets: 
It can  therefore be concluded that  the .Joint  Venturc·will  operate on  a lasting basis and 
will  perform all  the functions of nn  autonomous economic entity. 
Deleted~ business secrets. Description uf veto rights of I he  p:u1ics. 
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• 
.. 
Absenr.e of roonlinntion 
13.  The Irish State is not active in telecommunications or cable television other than through 
Telecom  Eireann.  Accordingly,  the  likelihood  of coor~dination must  be  assessed  with 
respect to PTT Telecom and Telia  . 
14.  PTT Telecom and Telia can be considered as potential competitors to Telecom  Eireann 
on  the  telecommunication  markets  and  the  market  for  services  supplied  by  cable 
operators in  Ireland which are liberalized or are to be liberalized. However, it is unlikely 
that  they  will  enter these markets other than  through  Telecom  Eircann,  following  the 
substantial investments to which  th·~; are committed within the framework of the present 
operation. 
1  S.  With respect to telecommunications services for which  the relevant geographic market 
is wider than national, PTT Telecom, Telia and Telecom Eireann are actual or potential 
competitors.  it must also be noted that PTT Telecom and Telia are, together with Swiss 
PTT  and  Telef6nica,  partners  in  t.JnismJrceJUniworld  (Case·  No  ·IV/M.S44  -
Unisource/Telefonica).  It  is foreseen  that Telecom  Eireann  will  become the distributor 
of the services of Unisource/Uniworld  in  Ireland. 
16.  The possible cooperative aspects of this operation are only of minor importance relative 
to the operation as a whole.  The revenues derived from the value added operations tor 
which the market has to be con~idered international amount for PTT Telecom and Telia 
to  a very  small  proportion  of less  than  1%  of their total  turnover.  Also,  the  present 
operation  can  not  be  considered  as  a cause  for  strengthening of the  already  existing 
coordination  between  the  partners  in  Unisource  in  any  significant  way.  (Case  No. 
IV/M.570 -TBT/BT/TELE DANMARK/TELENOR pt.  29). 
17.  It can be ~oncluded  t~at the present operation does not. give rise to coordination between 
PTT Telecom and  Telia. 
18.  Accordingly, the notified operation is a concentration. 
Ill.  COMMUNITY UIMENSION 
J 9.  The undertakings concerned  have  a combined  aggregate worldwide turnover of more 
than 5,000 million ECU (Telecom Eireann 1.367m ECU, PTT Telecom 6,25Sm ECU and 
Telia 4,743.26m  ECU).  Each of these undertakings has a Community-wide turnover in 
excess  of 250  million  ECU,  and  they  do  not  achieve  more  than  two-thirds  of their 
aggregate  Community-wide  turnover  within  one  and  the  same  Member  State.  The 
notified operation therefore has a Community dimension according to Article I  (2) of the 
Merger Regulation . 
II  B/  97 IV  COMPATIBILITY WITH TlfE COM:MO·N  MARKET 
A. RELEVANT PRODUCT ·MARKETS 
20.  Telecommunications operators can be-regarded as engaging in several different activities. 
These include the provision of infrastructure to terminate calls,  provide the local  loop 
and the provision of services.  Telecom  Eireann  provides. both  infrastructure (where it 
currently has  a statutory monopoly) and  services. 
21.  Telecommunications services could  be  grouped  into Basic  Services and  Value-Added 
Services.  Basic  services  include  voice  telephony,  leased  lines,  mobile  telephony  and 
telex.  The main product, voice telephony, accounts for 70-80% of telecommunications 
services. 
22.  . Value-added  services  comprise non-public  s·ervices.  as  well  as.  enhanced  services  to 
multinational corporations and other intensive users  of  telecommunications services over 
intelligent networks.  Within  this .group distinction  should  be  made  between  a segment 
concerned with advanced telecommunication se'rviccs  to corporate users and  a segment 
concerned with standardised low-level packet-switched data communication services (see 
Decisions  of  17  July  1996  in  Cases  No.  JV/35.337  - Atlas  (at  para.  5 et  seq)  and 
No.35.617- Phoenix/GiobaJOne (at para 6) and  Cominission decision of 27 July  1994 
Case fV/34.857  ~ BT-MCI). 
23.  In  previous cases involving concentration or  telecommunications' operators (Case No. 
IV/570  - TBT/BT/TELE  DANMARK/TELENOR  and  Case  No.IV/M.6K<J-
ADSB/Belgacom),  the  question  of the  precise  delimitation  of the  telecommunication 
services market  has  been  left open  by  the Commission.  In  the present case a precise 
segmentation of services is not required for the assessment of the operation since, even 
on  the basis of the narrowest definition.  the  operati~~ 1 does not  raise serious doubts as 
to strength the market position of Telecom  Eireann . 
..  .  . 
24.  Cablelink  Limited  (which  is  75%  owned  by  Telecom  Eireann)  is  a provider of cable 
television  services  in  Greater ·Dublin,  Galway  City  and  Waterford.  In  each  of these 
areas. Cablelink has a monopoly of cable TV services.  Other cable TV companies have 
similar geographic  monopolies  in  their own  area.  Cablelink's infrastn1cture  could  be 
used  to  provide telecommunications services. 
25.  The Commission hets recognised the existence of a sepan1te market  for  ~crvices supplied 
by cable operators to their subscribers. Sec Commission  Decision of  <J  November  I  994. 
Case  IV/M.469 - MSG  Media Service and  Commission  Decision  of 31  October  1995. 
Case No.IV/M.490 - Nordic Satel-lite  Distribution. 
B.  RELEVANT GEOGRAl,HIC ·MARKETS 
26.  Basic  servi'ces  e.g.  fixed  national  and  international  voice,  leased  lines,  telex,  have 
traditionally been considered as a national geographic market due to the still  prevailing 
regulations  and  the  role  of the  national  telecommunications  openttors.  See  Case  No. 
IV/'570  - TBT/BTITELE  DANMARK/TELENOR  and  Case  No.  IV/M.689  -
ADSB/Belgacom.  For  public  voice telephony  in  Ireland.  there  will  continue  to  be  a 
statutory monopoly until  I January 2000 which  is another 6tctor indicating the national 
nature of the market. 
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27.  Geographic market for  certain value added  services is generally considered  as  at  least 
European  and  possibly  worldwide.  Markets  for  telecommunications  services  are 
evolving very rapidly as a result of technical change and  liberalisa~ion of the regulatory 
environment. See Case No.  IV/570 - TBT/BTffELE DANMARK/TELENOR  and Case 
No.  IV/M.689 -ADSB/Belgacom.  However, given that the open1tion  docs  not  result  in 
any  problem  of dominance  in· the  EU/EEA·  area,  for  the  reasons  exposed  in  the 
.  assessment  below,  it  is  not  necessary·  to  detine  the  relevant  geographic  market  for 
telecommunications services  in  the present case. 
28.  The Commission has considered  the market for services supplied by cable operators to 
their subscribers as national  in  scor ; (See Commission  Occision of 9 November  I  <J<J4. 
Case  IV/M.469 - MSG  Media  Se~ice and  Comrnissi~n Decision of 31  October  1995. 
Case No.JV/M.490 - Nord~c Satellite Distribu:tion). 
C. ASSESSMENT 
29.  Telecom  Eireann  has  the  exclusive  privilege  of providing  within. Ireland  the  public 
telecommunications  network,  voice telephony  services and  telex  services.  The  market 
behaviour  of telecommunications· operators  in  Ireland  is  controlled  by  regulatory 
mechanisms  which  are  not  yet  in  place.  The  legislation  which  will  set  up  the 
independent regulatory authority  is currently being considered  by  the  Irish  P<trli<trncnt. 
According to the notifying par1ies,  the i·cgulatory authority should he set up in  the early 
part of 1997. On 27 November 1996, the Commission took a Decisionc
2
'  to set out in the 
timetable for the liberalisation of services in  Ireland in  response to the request from  the 
Irish Government for a derogation from ·the deadlines tbr liberalisation proposed  in  the 
various telecommunications liberalisation directives. 
30.  For the  provision  of telecommunications  infrastructure,  Telecom  Eireann  will  have  a 
monopoly until  I July  1997.  Potential aiternative infrastructure providers would include 
cable TV networks, the electricity network and  possibly some others.  Accordingly, the 
Cablelink  network  will  be  an  important . network  immediately  available  when 
liberalisation  takes  place.  This  is  because  of its  network  in  Greater  Dublin,  which 
contains inuch  of the population and  business activity in  Ireland. 
3 J.  The original acquisition of  a majority of  shares in Cablelink by Telecom Eireann in  1990 
was  examined  by  the  Fair  Trade  Commissionc
3
'  in  Ireland.  At  that  time,  the  Irish 
Government secured  commitments  wh{m  authorising the operationc
4
> which  included  a 
commitment from  Telecom Eireann that Cablelink would be operated on an arms' length 
basis from  Telecom  Eireann  with  management separate fhun  that  of Telecom  Eireann. 
Acc·ording  to  the  Irish  Government,  these  commitments  still  apply.  In  addition,  the 
Commission  notes  that  the  Irish  Government  has  stated  that  access  to  the  Cablelink 
network for telecommunications services will  be open to third  parties on a cost oriented 
(3) 
(4) 
Commission dcdsion C (W,) 1342 of 27 November  ltJl)(,  Voice telephony will  not  be  liberalised until 
I January  2000. Providers of alternative infrastmcture will  be allowed from  I July  I  tJtJ7.  Finally, direct 
internal  ion:~ I iuterconnection of mobile  networks will  be effective from  I January  I  tJ99 . 
Under the  Mergers. Take-overs and  Monopolies (Control) Acts  I  CJ7X  and  I  CJR7. 
CnntCiincd  in  a press notice  from  the  Dcp:111111CIIt  or Industry  ami  Cotlllm.:n.:~; dalcd  X  JtiiiC  I'JIJO. 







and non-discriminatory basis.  This open access will be supervised hy the new regulatory 
authority when  it is formed. 
Value  added  and  mobile services  and  the  infrastructure for  the  provision  of mobile 
services is liberalised and subject to licensing by the Minister for Transpm1,  Energy and 
Communications.  In  the light of information  provided by  the.}lotifying parties, for the 
period to March  1996, the products in  which Telecom Eireann has [  ... t
5
'  market shares 
in  Ireland  comprise:  voice  telephony  services,  leased  private  circuits,  data  services, 
telemessage  and· telegram,  mobile  telephony,  value  added  services  and  telephone 
directories. However, liberalised telecommunications services (mainly value-added) arc 
presently  provided  in  Ireland  by  38  licensed  service  providers  including  the  main 
European telecommunications' operators. Value-added income represents approximately 
[  ... t
6
> of Telecom  Eireann  revenue.  Esat  Telecom  ([ ... ]m  market  share on  liberalised 
services), TCL ([ ... ]"'>)  and  other important players such  us  Cable &  Wireless and  BT 
are  currently  gaining  market  shares  in  various  market  segme.nts.  In  addition,  BT, 
Mercury  and  Cabletel,  whi·ch  have  a  presence  in  Northern  Ireland,  are  expected  to 
expand their operations in  Ireland.  In  Octo.ber  1995  the second  licence for GSM  was 
awarded  to  the  ESA T  DIGIFONE  consortium  with  Esat  and  Digifone  as  the  major 
shareholders.  ESA T DIGIFONE will start operating at the end  of 1996. 
Geographically, the areas of market overlap between PTT 'Telecom, Telia and Telecom 
Eireann  are  very  limited  since all  three  conduct  the bulk  of their  operations  in  their 
respective home territori·es  in .the  markets  for basic services.  In  the  market  for  value . 
added telecommunications services, which activity has been generally detined as broader 
than  nati'onal;  the activities of PTT Telecom, Tclia and  Telecom  Eireann arc relatively 
small.  Also even taken  into account the fact that PTT Telecom and  Tclia participate in 
Unisource/Uniworld the present operation does not give i·ise to dominance in  this market 
as  Unisource/Uniworld is one among other strong players. 
For non-liberalised services in  Ireland, the operation does not change the present position 
of Telecom  Eireann  until  liberalisation takes place.  ielecom Eireann  is,  at  present, and 
by  itself.  strong enough  and  well  rated  by  the  financial  markets and  it  is  in  the shor1 
term  technologically ·sufficient.  The  support  of the  new  partners  will  improve  the 
efficiency of the company .but it is  unlikely that.  in  the light of ongoing liberalization 
· proces, it will  strengthen its present market position.· 
The support of the new partners consequent on  their shareholding is  likely to improve 
the  efficiency  of the  company  and  strengthen  its  financial  and  technical  position. 
However,  this  developement  will  not  affect  the  change  in  the  competitive  position 
brought about by the liberal.isation due on  I July  1997. Telecoins liberalisation is to take 
place  in  Ireland. according to  a clear timetable set  out  in  the  Commission's decision. 
Under that decision, alternative infrastructure providers will be entitled to obtain licences 
to enter the market ·from  I July  1997.·  The present decision permits PTT Telecom and 
Telia to become shareholders in Telecom  Eireann but this joint venture agreement does 
not  bring  about  the  development  of a  supplier  or  distributor  relationship  between 
Telecom Eireann and  either Unisource or UniworJd. 
Deleted: business secrets - more  th:111  IJ5'X,. 
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II  B/  100 Even  if the  proposed  operation  will, .  in  the  long.  term,  strengthen  technically  and 
financially  Telecom  Eireann's  capacity  to  provide  services  on  lil?eralised  markets, 
Telecom  Eireann  will  face competition from  other strong players such_ as  BT.  Concert, 
GlobaiOne and  Atlas and  other  telecommunications operators. 
36.  Cablelink  has 313,000 subscribers in  Ireland  and  63% of the  Irish  market  for  services 
supplied  by  cable operators to their subscribers.  However,· neither  PTT  Telecom  nor 
TeJia  have  any  special  knowledge  or  expertise  which  would  strengthen  Cablelink's 
market position in  the provision of c<thle TV services over and  above that  which  would 
be  provided by  another cable operator or consultant 
37.  Accordingly, in the light of the aLove information, there is no creation or' strengthening 
of a dominant position  within the meaning of Article 2 of th·e  Merger Regulation. 
V  ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS 
38.  The notifying parties have  requested  that  the  clauses and  agreements described  below 
be considered as ancillary to the concentration. 
39.  Article  II  of the  Agreement on  Strcttegic Co-openttion  provides that  Comsource,  PTT 
Telecom  and  Telia shall  neither  individually  or  collectively  nor  through  subsidiaries, 
engage  in  certain  activities  during  the  Agreement  on  Strategic Co-operation  and  two 
years after. These activities include competition with Telecom Eireanl'), soliciting orders 
from  Telecom  Eireann's ·customers  or soliciting Telecom  Eireann's  employees.  This 
provision is directly related and .necessary to the implementation of the concentration and 
should  be considered as ancillary to  the qperation. 
40. ·  The agreements provide for the conciLision  of an  agreement between Telecom  Eireann 
and  Unisource and tJniworld whereby Telecom  Eireann  will· become the distributor of 
and the preferred supplier to  Unisource/Uniw~rld in  Ireland.  This provision should  not 
be considered as ancillary to the concentration.  Prior to this-operation, Telecom Eireann 
exists already as  a full  function  telecom-munications operator.  It can  not  be considered 
that the acquisition of  control by PTT Telecom and Telia can only be implemented under 
the  condition  of the  conclusion  of these  distribution/supply  agreements.  They  should 
therefore be assessed  under the scope of Article 85  and  86 of the Treaty. 
For the above reasons, the Commis::;ion  has decided not  to oppose the notified open1tion 
and  to declare it  compatible with  the  common  market  and  with  the  functioning of the 
EEA  Agreement.  This decision  is adopted  in  application of Article 6( I  )(b) of Council 
Regulation  No 4064/89 .. 
Ftx the Commission, 
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Prior notification  of a  concentration 
(Case  ~o  .  IV  /M.876 - TeHa!Ericsson) 
(97 IC  24/15) 
(Text  with EEA  relevance) 
1.  On 17 January 1997, the Commission  received  a notification of a proposed concentration 
pursuant to Article  4  of Council  Regulation  (EEC) No 4064/89 (') by which  Telia  A.B.  and 
Telefonaktiebolaget  L.M.  Ericsson  acquire  within  the  meaning  of  Article  3  (1)  (b)  of  that 
Regulation joint control  of the AU-System  Group by way of purchase  of shares. 
2.  The  business  activities  of the  undertakings  concerned  are: 
- for Telia A.B.:  the national Swedish telecommunications operator, 
- for Ericsson:  a Swedish  manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, 
- for AU-System  Group: a  Swedish group active  iri  telecommunications consultancy services, 
software  development,  and  distribution  of information  technology  and  telecommunications 
equipment. 
3.  Upon  preliminary  examination,  the  Commission  finds  that .  the  notified  concentration 
could  fall  within  the scope  of Regulation  (EEC) No 4064/89.  However,  the  final  decision  on 
this  point  is  reserved. 
4.  The Commission  invites  interested  third  parties  to submit  their  possible  observations  on 
the  proposed  operation. 
Observations  must  reach  the  Commission  not  later  than  10  days  following  the  date  of this 
publication~  Observations  can  be  sent  to  the  Commission  by  fax  (No  (32 2) 296 43 011 
296 72 44)  or by post,  under reference  number N IM.876  - Telia/Ericsson,  to  the  following 
address: 
European  Commission, 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG N), 
Directorate B- Merger Task Force, 
Avenue  de  Conenberg/Konenberglaan  150, 
B-1 040  Brussels. 
(') OJ No L 395,  30.  12.  1989; Corrigendum: OJ No L 257, 21. 9.  1990, p.  13. 
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By  the  year  2000  millions  of subscribers  worldwide  are  expected  to  be 
offered satellite personal  communications  services. 
In  this sector  global  consortia start  are being  set  up  involving  major 
american  and  european  companies.  This  new  phenomenon  which  is  set to  become 
a  dominant  feature  of the international  satellite market  in the  second  half 
of this decade  has  attracted the  attention of the  European  Commission,  among 
others  as  far  as  competition policy is  concerned. 
Hence,  Mr.  Karel  Van  Miert,  the  European  Commissioner  in  charge  of 
competition matters  has  recently asked his  services  to  send out  requests  for 
information  regarding  two  mobile satellite systems  (MSS),  Globalstar  (led by 
the  US  companies  Loral  and·Qualcomm)  and  Iridium  (led by  the  US  company 
Motorola).  Inmarsat-P,  another major  MSS,  has  already  notified its system 
and partnership agreements  to  the  Commission's  competition services.  Since 
Iridium  and  Globalstar have  not  yet  followed  suit,  the  Commission  has 
commenced  investigations at its own  initiative. 
Although MSS  systems  are inherently  global  and  the  establishment of  such 
systems,  in  principle  procompetitive,  it  is  important  that  they  are 
screened  from  the outset  under  the  EC  competition  rules.  The  aim  of  the 
investigation  is  to  ensure  level  playing  fields  in  the  EU  and,  in 
particular,  to assess  the  impact  of the  consortia  and their partnership  and 
related agreements  on  future  competition  in  the  relevant  more  localised 
markets  within the  European  Union. 
As  part of its  examination of these ventures,  the  two  consortia have  been 
asked  to  provide  a  comprehensive  description  of  their systems  from  the 
.technical,  financial  and  commercial  point  of  view.  Moreover,  the 
investigation  also addresses  the  major  areas  of potential  concern  which 
these projects present  from  the point  of view of  the  competition  rules  of 
the  EC  Treaty;  in  particular  the  nature,  terms  and  conditions  of  the 
distribution  policies  chosen  by  the  consortia,  the  nature  of  links  with 
cellul?tr  terrestrial  networks  and  the  access  by  competing  MSS  to 
infrastructure  owned  by partners  in one  of  them.  Most  of  these  areas  of 
concern  have  also been  identified with  regard to  Inmarsat-P. 
Satellite-based,  global  mobile  communications  using  hand-held  terminals 
represent  a  market  which  is  expected  to  result in revenues  of  10  to  20 
Billion  ECU  during  the  next  decade.  The  indirect effects  which will  ripple 
through  related markets  will  be  much  greater.  Due  to  the  scarcity  of 
frequencies,  the  very heavy  financial  implications  involved in launching  and 
operating  the  large  number  of satellites needed  for  such  syst.ems,  and  a  high 
level  of market  uncertainty,  however,  it is unlikely  that there will be  more 
than  a  few  major players.  Given  this  small  number  of alternatives  and  the 
potential market  power  of  these  global  satellite system  operators,  it  is 
particularly important  that  competition is maximised  in the  European  Union 
for  the  other,  "downstream",  elements  of  the market  involving local  service 
provision,  distribution and  equipment  supply.  Open,  non-discriminatory  and 
fair  conditions  regarding  partnerships  and  agreements  will  need  to  bA 
maximised. 
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The  Mobile  Satellite Systems  Services  Market 
The  general  service  to  be  offered involves  the  full  coverage  of  a  roaming 
satellite  system,  using  LEO  (low earth  orbit)  or  MEO  (medium earth orbit) 
satellites,  which will also  support  full  user mobility,  as  well  as  offering 
the  user  a  light hand-held portable  terminal  and identification by  a  single 
number  anywhere  in the  world.  Entering  the global  age,  it is  clear  that 
global  service  is  becoming  the  most  appropriate  solution to  solving  an 
increasing number  of  communication  needs.  It  is  expected that mobile  voice 
service will  be  the primary  application  for  these  networks,  but  two  other 
significant  segments  will  involve  so-called  mobile  personal  digital 
assistants,  data  transmission and paging. 
In  essence,  MSS  represent  the  ability to  maximise mobility  of users,  by 
providing global  roaming  and  coverage  in  remote  areas  where  terrestrial 
services  may  be  uneconomic.  "Global  coverage"  means  not  only that  the  user 
can  move  anywhere,  but  also  that  the  communications  system  can  "move"  to 
serve  new  fixed  or  "stationary"  users.  Thus,  these  systems  are  not  aimed 
only at  the  international business  traveller.  In  fact  Commission  studies 
predict  that  by  far  the  greatest  potential  (in  terms  of  numbers  of 
subscribers)  in the  MSS  market  will be  for  communities  in less  developed 
regions  of  the  world  as  a  substitute  for  "fixed  service"  where  fixed 
networks  have  yet  to  be  rolled out  or  are  very poor.  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  represent  an  important  customer  base  in this  context,  which  could  be 
accessed  from  gateways  within  the  EU.  A  third important  use  of MSS  will  be 
as  a  substitute  for  cellular mobile  telephony in areas  where  the  cellular 
network  has  failed to penetrate  (i.e.  rural parts  of the  developed world  and 
both  urban  and  rural parts  of  lower  income  countries). 
MSS  is  expected  to  act  as  complement  to  both  GSM  and  DECT 
technologies  as  well  as  the public  telephone  network,  enhancing 






Motorola,  a  major  US  telecommunications  equipment manufacturer,  plays  the 
leading  role in  the  Iridium consortium.  A  number  of  European  companies  are 
participating  by  way  of partnership  agreements  and/or  investment.  This 
includes  companies  such  as  STET  (the  Italian state holding  company,  majority 
owner  of  Telecom Italia)  and  Vebacom  (subsidiary of  the  major  German  telecom 
corporation  VEBA  AG)  . 
Motorola  Satellite  Communications  is  in charge  of  spacecraft  construction 
but  Iridium  itself will  own  and  operate  the  system  once  in place.  Lockheed 
Corp.  (USA)  is  contracted to  actually build 125  satellites  for  Iridium  by 
the  year  2003.  Other partners/investors  include  Krunichev Enterprise  (CIS) 
who  will  launch  the satellites with  Proton  rockets,  Scientific Atlanta  Inc 
(USA)  who  will  develop  and manufacture  the  hand-held units  as  well  as  the 
satellite  earth  terminals,  and  Sprint,  the  third  US  long-distance 
telecommunication  carrier.  The  total cost of  the  system  is estimated at 
US$  3.8  billion. 
In  1990  Motorola  filed  its  application  to  operate  a  global  satellite 
personal  communications  system with  the  US  Federal  Communications  Commission 
(FCC).  Approval  was  given  and  frequencies  allocated by  the  FCC  in January 
1995.  Iridium  plans  to  be  operational  with  a  limited number  of satellites 
by  1997-98,  and  expects  1.5 million  subscribers  by  the  year  2000.  It will 
offer voice,  paging  and  data  services. 
GlobalStar 
The  Globalstar  consortium  is led and  sponsored by  the  Loral  Corporation,  a 
leading  US  defence  electronics  company  which  acquired  Ford Aerospace  in 
1990.  Loral  Qualcomm Satellite Service  has  bypassed  many  funding  problems 
experienced  by  other players  in the  satellite industry by  use  of  existing, 
in orbit,  satellites.  Partners/contractors  include  the  European  companies 
Alcatel  (France),  Aerospatiale  (F),  Alenia  (I)  and  Deutsche Aerospace  {D). 
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The  total cost of the  system is estimated at US$800  million. 
Like  Iridium,  Globalstar  has  been  approved·  in the  US  by  the  FCC  in January 
1995.  It  expects  to be  operational in the  US  around  1999-2000  and  globally, 
around  five  years  later.  Globalstar will  also be  offering voice  and data, 
as  well  as  tracking servi9es 
Inmarsat-P 
Inmarsat-P is  a  MSS  system sponsored by the  International Maritime  Satellite 
Organization  (Inmarsat}  and  a  large number  of its signatories,  including  the 
European  companies  Telef6nica  de  Espana  {E),  Telecom  Finland  {SF},  OTE  {Gr), 
Swiss  Telecom  {Swt},  CPRM  {P),  PTT  Telecom  {Nl)  and  Detemobil  (D).  The 
Inmarsat-P  system  which  will  consist of  12  satellites  in  intermediate 
circular orbit,  will be  operational  around  the  turn of the  century. 
*  *  * 
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In  the  wake  of  the  Telecoms  Council  of  June  13,  Commissioner  Van  Miert,  in 
cooperation with  Commissioner  Bangemann  has  put  forward  an  Article  90 
directive  to  introduce  full  competition  in  the  EU  mobile  and  personal 
communications  market  by  1  January  1996.  Substantial  progress  has  already 
been  made  in  the Member  States  as  EU  competition rules  have  been  applied to 
abolish monopolies  in the provision  of mobile  services.  However  the  new 
measures  include  liberalisation of the most  important  cost  factors  for  the 
new  market  entrants,  particularly  use  of  own  facilities  and  alternative 
infrastructure. 
With  the directive,  the  European  Union  takes  the lead in setting  the  right 
regulatory conditions  for  encouraging the development  of mobile  and  personal 
communications  into  a  vast mass  market.  The  EU  market will  be  the  first  to 
enjoy the  combination  of liberalisation  of services  and  networks,  together 
with  the  deployment  of harmonised,  leading edge,  digital standards  over  such 
a  large area.  These  are  GSM,  DCS  1800  (the  two  frequencies  available  for 
digital mobile  services)  and  DECT  (digital cordless  telephony within  a  fixed 
radius).  The  directive  is based  on  the discussion  process  launched  last 
year  by  the  Green  Paper  on  Mobile  and  Personal  Communications.  It requires 
Member  States  to  abolish  all exclusive  and  special  rights  in the area  of 
mobile  communications  and,  '  wherever this  has  not  yet been  achieved,  to 
establish  licensing procedures  to authorise the  launch  of digital services 
GSM,  DCS  1800  and  DECT. 
1 
Consensus  building 
Building  on  the  consensus  reached  by  EU  Telecoms  Ministers  at  last week's 
Telecoms  Council  the  directive also  goes  further  on  specific issues,  most 
importantly  concerning  use  of  own  and  alternative infrastructure.  It thus 
removes  all existing restrictions  on  use  of facilities  for  mobile  networks, 
allowing  new mobile  operators  to make  full  use  of their  own  infrastructure 
as  well  as  that  provided by  third parties  such  as  utilities'  networks.  The 
countries  with  less  developed networks  are  to  be  given derogations  of  up  to 
five  years  to  take  account  of  their specific  situations.  This  concerns 
Portugal,  Greece,  Spain  and  Ireland.  Very  small  networks  (Luxembourg)  will 
have  a  two  year  derogation  Alongside  this,  the directive  also abolishes 
restrictions  on  direct interconnection  for mobile  networks. 
Use  of infrastructure other  than  those  controlled by  the  incumbent  telecoms 
operator is  essential to  the  success  of  new entrants  to  the mobile  market  as 
it gives  them  much  greater control  ov~r  their cost base.  Leasing  capacity 
currently represents  a  cost  factor  for  second  operators  of  between  30  and 
50%.  Furthermore,  the  right  to set  up  their  own  networks  and  choose 
alternative  infrastructure  and  connections  gives  mobile  operators 
significantly more  flexibility which  represents  an  important push  towards 
further  development  and  innovation in the market. 
Competing  operators  in Member  States  have  complained,  for  example,  that  for 
the price  of  renting  capacity  from  the  incumbent  they  could already  have 
built  up  their  own  networks  but  regulatory restrictions  have  prevented  them 
taking  up  this  obviously preferable  opportunity.  Current  restrictions  on 
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direct interconnection  means  that,  in most  Member  States  the  second mobile 
operator  is  obliged  to  pass  a  call  through  the  fixed  network  of  the 
incumbent  national  operator  for  interconnection  into another  Member  State, 
whereas  direct interconnection  with  a  chosen  operator  in the  country of 
destination is often both technically logical and  cheaper. 
A  booming  market 
The  mobile  sector  is  by  far  the most  dynamic  in  the 
experiencing levels  of  growth  averaging  60%.  In  just one 
cellular  subscribers  in  Europe  has  grown  from  around  9 
around  15  million  (3/95),  now  outstripping  growth  in 
subscribers. 
telecoms  market 
year  the  number  of 
million  (3/94)  to 
numbers  of  fixed 
Commission  studies predict  38  million cellular mobile  users  in  Europe  by  the 
year  2000  and  around  80  million by  2010. 
On  top  of  very  substantial analogue  networks  in countries  such  as  the  UK, 
Italy and  Scandanavia,  the  growth  potential of  GSM  is  now  also  evident  in 
most  Member  States.  In  France,  for  example,  GSM  subscribers  grew  from  around 
112  000  to  around  500  000  over  the past year:  In  Belgium there were  around 
11  000  GSM  subscribers  at the beginning of  1994  and  there are  now  nearly  90 
000.·  Italy  saw  growth  over  the  same  period  from  9000  in  1994  to  94  000  in 
1995.  Germany still  remains  by  far  the most  important  market  with  over  two 
and  a  half million users,  of which  close  to  two  million are  now  on  the  GSM 
network.  However  progress  in countries  with less  developed networks  is also 
notable.  Last  year  GSM  subscribers  in  Greece  increased  from  45  000  to  180 
000,  and  in Portugal,  from  109  000  to  175  000.  The  Scandanavian  are  now 
also experiencing massive  growth  in take  up  of  GSM.  Most  impressive  is 
Sweden  where  the  GSM  market  has  grown  from  around  38  000  to  465  000  over  the 
past  year.  This  growth is  evenly  divided  between  the  two  competing 
operators. 
Job  creation and  universal  service 
Mobile  operations  are  increasingly significant  job  creators  in the  members 
states.  Extrapolating  from  current  figures it  is estimated  that  the market 
is  directly creating several  tens  of  thousands  of  jobs  across  the  European 
Union. 
One  of the most  important  aspects  of  development  of  the mobile  and  personal 
communications  market will be its  transformation into  a  truely  mass  market, 
making  mobile  communications  affordable  to  the  average  citizen  of  the 
European  Union.  Wireless  communications  are also becoming,  in many  cases 
the  cheapest alternative  to  reaching  remote  users  and  regions,  and  thus 
improving  universal  service. 
*** 
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The  Commission  has  today  (19th  July  1995)  agreed,  at  the initiative  of 
Commissioner  Van  Miert  in  charge  of  Competition and  Commissioner  Bangemann 
in charge  of  Telecommunications,  two  fundamental  measures  that together will 
shape  the  telecommunications  market  in Europe  over  the  coming  years. 
i  The  first,  a  draft Directive  (under Article  90  of the  Treaty)  implements 
the  political  agreement  among  Member  States  to  liberalise  all 
telecommunications  services  (i.e.  including public  voice  telephony)  and 
telecoms  infrastructure by  1st  January  1998,  with transition  periods  for 
certain Member  States.  It  also calls  on  Member  States  to  take  the 
necessary steps  before  1998  in order  to  ensure  that markets  are  fully  open 
by  the  agreed deadline.  In particular it specifies  that restrictions  on 
use  of  alternative infrastructure  should be lifted by  1996  (except  for 
public  voice  telephony until  1998)  and  that  licensing  conditions  and 
interconnection rules  should be  set down  by  1997.  Following  the  procedure 
chosen  for  the  Article  90  cable  and  mobile drafts,  this  draft Directive 
will  now  be  published for public consultation before  full  adoption  by  the 
Commission  by  the  end  of this  year. 
ii  The  second,  a  proposal  for  a  Directive  (based  on Article  lOOA),  sets  out 
a  harmonised  framework  for  interconnection in telecommunications  in the 
context  of  ONP,  with  the  aim  of  ensuring  universal  service  and 
interoperablity of  telecommunications  services  throughout  the  Union.  It 
will  enable  new  entrants  to liberalised telecommunications  markets  to 
interconnect  their  facilities  with  those  of  the  existing  network 
operators.  This  proposal will  be  subject to  approval  by  the  European 
Parliament  and  the  Council,  and  should be  implemented before  1998. 
The  two  measures  continue  the balanced  EU  approach  whereby liberalisation 
and  harmonisation in  the  telecommunications  sector are  progressing hand-in-
hand.  They  represent  the  core  of  a  package  of  regulatory  changes  that the 
Commission  is preparing  for  the post- 1998  environment,  and  are the  results 
of  extensive  consultation  with  the  sector  over  the past  months.  Other 
measures  already  announced  in  the  Commission's  Communication  on  the 
Infrastructure  Green  Paper  Consultations  are expected to be  published by  the 
end  of  1995[1] 
I  Liberalising all telecoms  services  and  infrastructure by  1998 
The  draft  text  adopted  today  fixes  the  basic principles  for  licensing  new 
entrants  to  both  voice  telephony  and  telecoms  infrastructure markets  by 
1998.  The  principles  not  only  safeguard the  introduction of  competition 
into  these  areas,  but also  allow  for  the  required measures  for  safeguarding 
universal  service in the  Member  States. 
The  directive  sets  down  firm  dates  for  the  Member  States  to  issue 
legislation  so  that  the  aims  of of  full  liberalisation by  1998  will  be 
effectively  realised.  By  January  1997  Member  States  must  notify  to  the 
Commission  licensing procedures  for  voice  telephony  and  public  telecoms 
networks,  and  by  July  1997  Member  States  must  publish  the  licensing 
conditions  and declaration  procedures  as  well  as  the  terms  and  conditions 
fot·  interconnection.  As  regards  the  dates  set  down  Member  States  with  les~;; 
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developed  telecoms  networks,  and  very  small  networks,  shall be  granted,  upon 
request,  extension periods  of  up  to  five  years  and  two  years  respectively. 
Universal  service means  permitting access  to  a  defined minimum  telecoms 
service of  a  specified  quality to  all users  everywhere  at an  affordable 
price.  Currently the  main  elements  of this  concern subcriber  connection to 
the  network,  basic  voice  telephony  service,  emergency  services  and  public 
call boxes.  However it  is also  recogniced  that the  concept  of  universal 
service must  evolve  to  keep  pace with technical  and  economic progress.  The 
directive  emphasises  that  universal  service  must  be  safeguarded but  that 
this  should  not  unnecessarily  distort  competition.  Thus  it  admits  the 
establishment  of  fair  schemes  for  sharing the net  cost of  universal  service 
obligations  between  the  incumbent  operator  and  competing public  operators, 
but it also  obliges  the  Member  States  to  communicate  such  schemes  to  the 
Commission  to  be  screened by  EU  competition  rules. 
This  directive  will  also liberalise  use  of  alternative infrastructure  for 
already liberalised telecoms  services  by  1  January  1996.  This  means  that, 
from  this date,  use  of  the  telecoms  netwdrks  of utilties  such  as  rail, 
electricity and  water may  be  not  be  restricted  from  carrying  any  telecoms 
service  except  for  public voice  telephony.  Such  alternative networks  will 
provide  high  capacity high  speed  networks  at lower  prices.  Such  capacity is 
now  either  unavailable  or prohibitively  expensive  on  the  national  telecoms 
operator's  network  in most  Member  States.  The  type  of services  which  will 
benefit will  include:  interactive  audiovisual  and  multimedia  services  for 
businesses,  educational  and  public  institutions;  information  services 
providing  access  to  data bases,  remote  data  processing,  electronic mail, 
transaction  services  (such  as  financial  transactions,  commercial  data 
transfer,  teleshopping  and  telereservations),  corporate  voice  services  and 
other value  added services.  As  with  1998  liberalisation,  Member  States  with 
less  developed  and  very  small  networks  may  apply  for  an  extension  for 
alternative infrastructure liberalisation  of  up  to  five  years  (and  two  years 
for  very  small  networks)  from  the  1996  date. 
Interconnection  between  the  new entrants  (often  with limited  coverage  of 
their  own)  and  the  national  network  operators  is essential  to  full  and 
effective  competition in  a  market  where  "any-to-any"  communications  is often 
a  pre-requiste.  The  general  features  and principles  for  interconnection in 
a  pro-competition environment  are  laid out  here,  representing  a  necessary 
complement  to  the provisions  in the  ONP  Interconnection Directive. 
In  sum,  the  Article  90  full  competition  directive  will  create  early 
certainty with  regard  to national legislation and  the  rights  and  obligations 
of market  players  in the liberali$ed  telecoms  environment.  Its provisions 
aim  to  give  full  effect  to  the  commitment  to  the  1998  date  for  full 
liberalisation. 
II  Ensuring  universal  service  and  interoperability:  Proposal  for  a 
Directive  on  Interconnection in Telecommunications 
New  entrants  to  the  future  liberalised telecommunications  market  must  be 
able  to  interconnect  their  facilities  with  those  of  the  existing 
telecommunications  operators  in  order to  access  business  and  residential 
customers.  Clear  rules  on  interconnection  are  essential  in  order  to 
encourage  new  investment,  to  stimulate  the  rapid  development  of  effective 
competition,  to  secure  universal  service,  and  to  ensure  that liberalisation 
brings  immediate benefits  to all European  users. 
Access  to  advanced  telecommunications  and  information  technology  networks 
and  servi~es is  at  the  heart  of  the  future  information society.  The 
evolving  European  telecommunications  infrastructure  will  comprise  a 
multitude  of  independently  owned  and  operated networks,  supporting  a  wide 
range  of  telecommunications  and  information  based  services.  Ensur·inq 
adequate  interconnection  and  interoperability of these  networks  and  services 
is  crucial.  The  proposed  Directive  sets  out  the  basic  rights  dlld 
obligations  of  the market  players  in this  area,  under  the  supervisibn  of  tl1~ 
national  regulatory  authorities  for  telecommunications.  Current 
prohibitions  on  cross-border  interconnection  within  the  EU  are  set  to 
disappear. 
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The  important  features  which  will  be  ensured  by  the  proposed  regulatory 
framework  for  interconnection are  : 
application  of the  principles  of  transparency,  objectivity,  and  non-
discrimination to  guarantee  a  fair deal  in interconnection  agreements 
in  particular  between  new  entrants  and  the  powerful  incumbent 
telecommunications  op~rators 
priority  given  to  commercial  negotiations 
parties  while  reserving  some  conditions  to be 
telecommunications  regulatory authorities 
between  interconnection 
set a  priori by  national 
clear  responsibilities  for  national  regulatory  authorities,  in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  including effective 
mechanisms  for  dispute  resolution at the national  and  European  level. 
Issues  addressed in the  Directive include 
Interconnection  and  Universal  Service contribution 
Requirements  for  non-discrimination  and  transparency 
Principles  for  interconnection  charges  and  cost  accounting  systems 
Accounting  separation and  financial  accounts 
General  responsibilities  of  the national  regulatory authorities 
Essential  requirements  (security  of  network  operations,  maintenance  of 
network  integrity,  interoperability of services,  protection of data) 
Numbering  (provision  of  numbers  and  numbering  ranges  for  all public 
telecommunications  services) 
Technical  standards 
Publication of  and  access  to  information 
*** 
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The  agreements  between  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  (DT),  France  Telecom  (FT)  and  the 
US  Sprint  Corporation  (Sprint)  were  notified to  the  Commission  on  29  June 
1995  and  have  been  subject  to  a  first  examination  by  the  Commission 
services.  The  agreements  include  the  creation of  a  global  telecommunications 
joint venture,  PHOENIX,  between ATLAS,  itself a  joint venture  between  DT  and 
FT,  and Sprint. 
This  notification  is  an  important  factor  in  the  ongoing  notification 
procedure  regarding  DT  and  FT's  proposed  ATLAS  venture:  PHOENIX  addresses 
one  of the  aspects  raised in the  Commission's  administrative letter sent  to 
DT  and  FT  (see  Press  Release  IP/95/524),  namely that  ATLAS  did not  appear  to 
be in a  position to address  the  global  needs  of multinational  companies  in 
competition with  other strategic alliances  (e.g.  BT-MCI's  Concert  venture). 
The  Commission  is  now  further  assessing  the  remaining  aspects  of  the 
proposed ATLAS  venture which  raise concern  under  the  EC  competition rules. 
Mr  Karel  Van  Miert,  the  European  Commissioner  in charge  of  competition 
matters,  has  spelled  out  in detail  the  conditions  which  DT  and  FT  must 
fulfil if the  Commission  is to  consider authorising ATLAS.  The  parties  have 
been  given  a  deadline until  15  September  1995  at  the latest  to  reach  an 
agreement  on  these detailed requirements. 
*** 
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Following  the proposal  by  Mr.  Karel  Van  Miert,  the  Commission  has  decided  to 
declare  the  proposed  joint venture  NORDIC  SATELLITE  DISTRIBUTION  (NSD)  in 
its current  form  incompatible with  the  Common  Market  and  the  EEA  Agreement. 
However,  Commissioner  Karel  Van  Miert  remains  open  to  examine  new proposals 
from  the parties. 
NSD  is  conceived as  a  joint  venture  between  Norsk  Telekom  A/S  (NT), 
TeleDanmark  A/S  (TD)  and  Industriforvaltnings  AB  Kinnevik  (Kinnevik)  with 
each parent holding  one  third of the  company.  The  proposed  joint venture  was 
notified to  the  Commission  on  February  23,  1995.  The  Commission  opened  a 
phase  II  in-depth investigation on  March  24,  1995  (IP/95/311). 
Dominant  position 
In its investigation the  Commission  found  that 
current  form  would  create  or  strengthen  a 
markets: 
(i)  On  the  market  for  provision of satellite 
Nordic  region  (Denmark,  Norway,  Sweden,  and 
dominant  position. 
the  NSD  joint venture in  its 
dominant  position  on  three 
TV  transponder  capacity to  the 
Finland),  NSD  would  achieve  a 
(ii)  On  the  Danish  market  for  operation of  cable  TV  networks,  TD's  dominant 
position would  be  strengthened. 
(iii)  On  the market  for distribution of satellite pay-TV  and  other 




The  vertically integrated  nature  of the  operation  means  that  the market 
positions  down-stream  (cable  TV  operations  and  pay-TV)  reinforce the  market 
positions  up-stream  (satellite transponders,  provision of  programmes)  and 
vice  versa.  All  in  all,  the parties would  achieve  such  strong positions  that 
they would  be  able  to  foreclose  the Nordic market  for  satellite TV. 
In this  respect  the  operation to  some  extent  resembles  the  joint venture  MSG 
Media  Service,  proposed by  Bertelsman,  Kirch  Group,  and  Deutsche  Telecom, 
which  was  blocked  by the  Commission  in  the  autumn  of  1994.  Through  the 
vertical  nature  of  the  MSG  operation the parents  would  have  obtained control 
over  competitors  in the  German  pay-TV  market  and  thereby  competitors  would 
have  had  to  accept  the  conditions  offered by  MSG  for its services. 
However,  there is  a  considerable difference between  the  size  and  the market 
power  of  the  NSD  parents  and  those  of  the  MSG  parents.  Bertelsmann  and  Kirch 
together  as  suppliers  of  pay-TV  and  Kirch  as  supplier  of  films  and  TV 
programmes  represent  market  power  significantly  stronger  than  that  of 
Kinnevik.  Furthermore,  the position of  Deutsche  Telecom in the  German  cable 
TV  market  is  much  stronger  than  that of  the  NSD  parents  in the  Nordic 
countries. 
The  affected  markets  are  currently  in  a  transitional  phase,  since  the 
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telecommunications  markets  are  about  to be  liberalized  and  new  technologies 
and  services  are being  developed  and  are  about  to  be  introduced.  In  this 
situation the  decision of the  Commission  takes  on  a  particular importance, 
since  this is  a  period  during  which  future  market  structures are  being 
defined.  It is  important that the  Commission  does  not  allow future  markets 
to be  foreclosed. 
However,  the  Commission  recognizes  that  joint ventures  and  particularly 
transnational  joint ventures  can be  instrumental in developing  the media  and 
telecommunications  sectors  to their  full potential.  It should therefore  be 
noted that it  is the policy of the  Commission  to  take  new  developments  into 
account.  Thus  the parties  remain  invited to present  a  modified project which 
is  compatible  with  the  Common  Market  and  the  functioning  of  the  EEA 
agreement. 
The  parties  to  NSD  are  three  very strong players  in the Nordic  TV  and media 
industry: 
NT  is the  largest  cable  TV  operator in  Norway  with  about  30%  of  the 
connections.  NT  controls  the  satellite capacity  on  the  loWest  satellite 
position  (one  of  the  two  Nordic positions),  and  it is  an  important  pay-TV 
distributor in Norway  through its company  Telenor  CTV. 
- TD  is  the  largest cable  TV  operator  in  Denmark  with  about  50%  of  the 
connections,  and it will still enjoy  a  privileged situation for its cable  TV 
operations  possibly  until  January  1,  1998,  the  latest  date  for  the 
telecommunications  markets  to  be  liberalized.  TD  also,  together  with 
Kinnevik,  controls  most  of  the  satellite capacity on  the  So  East satellite 
position  (the  other Nordic position). 
- Kinnevik  is  a  Swedish  conglomerate  with  interests in  TV  programming, 
magazines  and  newspapers  as  well  as  in  steel,  paper,  packaging  and 
telecommunications.  Kinnevik  is  the  most  important  provider  of  Nordic 
satellite TV  programmes  with,  among  others,  the very popoular  TV3  channels, 
TV6,  Z-TV,  and  the  TVlOOO  pay-TV channels.  The  company is  the largest pay-TV 
distributor in the Nordic  countries  through its Viasat  companies.  Kinnevik 
also  has  an  important stake  in Kabelvision,  the  second  largest cable  TV 
company in  Sweden,  as  well  as  in  TV4,  the  largest  advertising-financed 
Swedish  channel. 
NSD  intends  to  transmit  satellite TV  programmes  to  cable  TV  operators  and 
households  receiving  satellite  TV  on  their  own  dish  ("direct-to-home" 
market) .  The  establishment  of  NSD  in its  current  form  would  in  effect lead 
to  a  concentration of the  activities of NT,  TD  and  Kinnevik,  resulting  in 
the  creation  of  a  highly  vertically  integrated operation  extending  from 
production of  TV  programmes  through  operation  of satellites  and  cable  TV 
networks  to  retail  distribution services  for  pay-TV  and  other  encrypted 
channels. 
*** 
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GSM  (Global  System  for  Mobile  communications)  is  the  digital  mobile 
telephony  system  developed  in  the  European  Union,  which  is  currently 
achieving large-scale  success.  Following intervention  of the  Commission; 
nearly  all Member  States  have  now  introduced  competition  as  regards  the 
provision of this  new  service. 
The  Commission  welcomes  this introduction of competition  which will  ensure 
better v·alue  and greater service  choice  for  consumers  in the  rapidly growing 
mobile  market.  However  the  Commission  has  also intensified its  screening of 
the  GSM  licensing  processes  in the Member  States  to ensure  a  level playing 
field between  the  new  entrant and  the  incumbent.  In nearly all cases  the 
latter is  the  former  monopoly  telecoms  operator or one  of its subsidiaries .. 
In  July  1995,  Commissioner  Karel  Van  Miert  successfully  concluded 
negotiations  with  the  Irish  and  Belgian Telecommunications  Ministers  and  is 
currently engaged in further  discussions  with Italy and  Spain.  ·  Moreover  he 
intends  to  keep  a  close watch  on  others,  notably Austria. 
One  point  of  concern is the  auction procedure  which  these Member  States  have 
included in·  the  selection criteria  of  the  second operator,  whereby  the 
second  licence is awarded  not  only  on  the basis  of  a  comparison of intrinsic 
qualitative elements  such  as  intended coverage  roll out,  expertise in  the 
area  and  envisaged tariffs,  but also  on  the basis of  a  financial  bid above  a 
certain set threshold. 
The  Commission  has  always  criticized this  type  of  auction approach  which 
implies  a  selective  burden  on  new,  innovative  technologies  which  will 
ultimately  disadvantage  future  users.  In  its  Green  paper  on  Mobile 
Communications  (27  April  1994)  the  Commission  emphasized  the  drawbacks  of 
auction procedures  for  granting mobile  licences. 
In  the  selection  procedures  screened to date,  it  appeared moreover  that  the 
use  of auctions  for  the  selection  of  the  second  operator only,  lead to 
unfair  conditions  and  thus  threatened  to  thwart  competition  in  the 
developing  GSM  market.  The  Commission  therefore decided in  December  1994  to 
take  legal  action  (under  Treaty  Article  90)  against  Italy and  considered 
similar  steps  against  the  other  governments  who  impose  such  conditions. 
Under  this  procedure,  when  the  Member  State  has  not  amended  the  offending 
regulations,  or  justified or  compensated  for  them after  receiving  a  letter 
of  formal  notice  of  the  Commission,  the latter may  adopt  a  formal Article  90 
(3)  decision  requiring the  government  to  end  the  infringement within  a  set 
time  period.  If it  still does  not  comply proceedings  under  Treaty Article 
169  may  be  launched  which  result  in  a  judgement  from  the  European  Court  of 
Justice. 
The  Commission  takes  the  view that  imposing  a  significant  charge  only  on  the 
new  entrant,  threatens  to unfairly burden  this  undertaking in  competing  with 
the  incumbent  national  mobile  operator.  In  general,  the latter,  not  only 
enjoys  all  the  competitive  advantages  of its universal  network,  entrenched 
market  dominance  and  established  mobile  subscriber  base,  but  also  was 
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granted its  GSM  licence automatically and  for  free. 
In  the  GSM  cases  the  Commission  stated  that it would  renounce  legal action 
if the  relevant  Member  States,  either  abolished the  discriminatory  fee,  or 
required  the  incumbent  to pay  the  same  fee,  or,  by  implementing  regulatory 
measures,  adequately  compensated  the  second  operator.  In principle,  the 
compensatory  measures  should  be  at  least as  "valuable",  vis  a  vis  the 
business  plans  of  the  latter,  as  the  imposed  cost of licence.  Compensation 
might  concern,  for  example,  better  conditions  of  interconnection with  the 
national  operator's  network  and/or  a  commitment  to earlier liberalisation of 
infrastructure for  mobile  communications  than previously  foreseen.  Since 
interconnections  with,  and  use  of,  leased  line capacity  of  the  incumbent 
operators  currently  represents  around  30  to  40  %  of the  second  operator's 
turnover,  the  significance of  such  compensatory measures  is clear. 
Following  discussions  with  the  Commission,  the  Irish  government  agreed  to 
impose  a  similar  fee  on  the public operator Telecom  Eireann  and  communicated 
further measures  to  ensure  a  level playing field in the  area.  For  example, 
the  regulator is  to  ensure  that efficient  and  fair procedures  are  in place 
to deal  with  interconnection disputes  between  the  new  operator  and  the 
incumbent.  This  includes  a  clear  accounting  methodology  (vis  a  vis 
interconnect  charges)  which  is  in  line  with  EU  competition  principles. 
Furthermore,  the  Irish  Government  has  granted  the  second  operator  the 
immediate  right  to  use its  own  or alternative  infrastructure to  carry  and 
terminate its  calls,  in line  with  the  wording  of  the  Commission's  draft 
directive  on  mobile  communications  (see  below). 
In  view  of  these  circumstances  and,  assuming  that  the  measures  are 
effectively  implemented  the  Commission  has  now  deemed  that  the  granting 
procedure  followed  by  the  Irish  Government  does  not  favour  the  extension  of 
the  dominant  position  of the  incumbent  operator,  and  so,  there is  no  longer 
grounds  for  legal  action against  Ireland.  Accordingly  the  Commission  wrote 
to  the  Irish authorities  on  July  14  1995  to officially close  the  case. 
Belgium who  had  also  chosen  to  include  an  auction  element  in  the  selection 
procedure  announced  the  second  GSM  licensee  on  September  7,  1995.  Subsequent 
to  contacts  between  Commissioner  Van  Miert  and  the  competent  Belgian 
Minister  concerning  the  conditions  under  which  such  an  auction  element  could 
be  accepted,  the  Belgian  government  announced  that the  first licensee will 
have  to  pay  an  amount  equivalent  to  the  license  fee  the  second  licensee 
agreed  to pay. 
In  the  Italian  case,  however,  the  Commission  is  still  pursuing  the 
procedure.  While  substantial progress  was  achieved,  in particular  with  the 
recent  announced  measures,  concerned  with liberalisation of  infrastructure 
for mobile  communications,  the  Commission  has  not  yet  received  the ultimate 
reassurances  regarding  the  actual  implementation  of this  liberalisation. 
Thus  the  Commission  will  soon  have  to  consider  the  adoption  of  a  formal 
Article  90  (3)  decision  against  the  Italian Government.  A  final  warning 
letter was  notified to  the  Italian authorities  on  July  27  1995. 
The  screening  of  the_Spanish  situation is  also  still in  progress.  The 
Spanish  Ministry  reacted to  the  Commission's  concern  about  the  auction 
procedure  in Spain  with  a  list  of  clarifications  regarding  the measures 
taken in  favour  of  the  new  entrant.  However  further details  are  needed  to 
allow  for  a  final  assessment  of  these measures.  For  example,  the  government 
does  propose  to take into  account decreasing underlying  costs  to Telefonica 
in ensuring  reasonable  interconnect  fees,  but provides  no  appropriate  cost 
accounting  system  (e.g.  average  long  term  incremental  costs).  Implementation 
of  the  Spanish  agreement  to  establish  cost  accounting between  Telefonica's 
GSM  operation  and its  activities  as  a  monopoly  provider  of  fixed  and 
analogue  mobile  telephony is  also not  yet  clear.  Therefore,  in this  case 
the  Commission  has  sent  out  a  request  for  more  fnformation  from  the  Spanish 
Government  (July  18). 
Austria  has  recently  launched  a  call  for  tender  which  will  expire at  the  end 
of  October.  Upon  a  request  from  Commissioner  Van  Miert  the  Austrian 
government  provided  the  Commission  with  detailed  information  on  the 
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tendering  procedure  in  August 
Commission's  services. 
which  is  currently  analysed  by  the 
The  Commission  has  in  the meantime  approved  the wording  of  a  draft  mobile 
communications  directive  on  June  14  1995  and published  it in  the Official 
Journal  on  1  August  1995  for  a  two  months  public consultation period.  The 
draft  text will  also  be presented  to  the  Council  and  the  Parliament  this 
Autumn  and  the  Commission  intends  to  adopt this Directive before the  end  of 
this  year.  It will  apply  Article  90(3)  more  generally across  the  EU  GSM 
market,  specifying competitive  conditions  required by  the Treaty  and  pre-
empting  a  growing  number  of  complaints  in  the area.  In  particular  it 
requires  that  competing mobile  operators  be  allowed unrestricted use  of  own 
and alternative infrastructure,  direct interconnections with  each  other  and 
fair  conditions  of  access  to  the  incumbent's  network. 
*  *  * 
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COMMISSION FINDS DANCA NAZIONALE DEL LA  VORO/BT TELECOMS 
JOINT VENTURE ALBACOM TO BE OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF 
THE MERGER REGULATION 
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The  European  Commission  has  found  the  agreement  between  Banca  Nazionale  de 
Lavoro  (BNL)  and  British  Telecommunications  (BT)  to  set  up  a  telecoms 
company  named  ALBACOM  in Italy to be  outside  the  jurisdiction of  the  Merger 
Control  Regulation.  Consequently,  it has  not  assessed  the  competitive  impact 
of the  operation. 
BNL  and  BT  notified to  the  Commission  an  operation to set up  a  company  to 
offer  business  communication  services  and  subsequently  other 
telecommunications  services  based  on  the  two  companies'  existing  networks  in 
Italy.  This  company  would  compete  against  the  current  monopoly  supplier of 
telecommunications,  Telecom Italia. 
After assessing the  operation,  the  Commission  found  that  BNL  and  BT  may  have 
joint control  of  the  company  for  the  first three years.  After  that period, 
however,  BT  would definitively  have  sole control  as  BT  will  then  have  the 
decisive  influence  on  the  appointment  of  the management  and  on  the  budget 
of ALBACOM.  As  in  the  case  Banco  Santander/BT,  the  three  year period  was 
judged  to  be  insufficient to  decide  that the  company  would  be  jointly 
controlled.  The  operation  was,  therefore,  an  acquisition by  BT  of  certain 
assets  of  BNL.  As  a  result,  the operation  did not  exceed  the  threshold  set 
out  in the  merger  control  regulation which  requires  that  at least  two  of 
the  parties  to  an  operation  each  have  an  EU-wide  turnover  of 
250  million  ECU. 
The  Commission  has  declared  that the  operation  does  not  fall  under  the 
merger  control  regulation. 
*** 
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At  the  initiative  of  Commissioner 
Directorate  General  for  competition 
investigate the  creation  and  operation 
Europe  Online. 
Karel  Van  Miert,  the  Commission's 
(DG  IV)  has  opened  a  procedure  to 
of the online  services  joint venture 
The  Commission's  main  objective in  dealing with  online  cases will  be  to 
prevent at an  early stage the  establishment  of anti-competitive  situations 
which  could  stifle the development  of  online services  and  the  'Information 
Society'  by  ruling out viable  competition before  an  effective market  has  had 
a  chance  to  grow.  In  the  Europe  Online  case,  the  Commission  would  like to 
know if  (i)  access  to  the publications  controlled by the partners  would  be 
available  at  fair  conditions  to  .other  online services,  both  concerning 
advertising for  the  new  services  and  online provision  of their content,  (ii) 
publications  not  belonging  to the  founding  groups  would  have  access  to 
Europe  Online's  subscribers  at conditions  similar  to  those  enjoyed by  the 
partners'  publications,  and  (iii)  anti-competitive  agreements  with  other 
companies  would be  avoided. 
DG  IV has  asked  the partners  of  Europe  Online  to provide  the  information 
necessary  for  this  enquiry.  The  opening of this procedure  does  not  prejudice 
the  Commission's  ultimate position on  Europe  Online.  In  line with  European 
competition  rules  and  with  its opinion  on  the  'information society',  the 
Commission  is  committed  to providing the  conditions  for  as  much  innovation 
as  possible;  it will take into  particular consideration  the benefits  which 
the  emergence  of  new  online service providers  represent  for  consumers. 
According  to  the  information presently  available  with  DG  IV,  the  joint 
venture  Europe  Online  brings  together important players  from  the publishing 
and  communication  fields  as  well  as  financial  participants with  broader 
interests.  The  three  main  shareholders  are  the major  publishing groups 
Burda  (Germany),  Matra-Hachette  (France)  and  Pearson  (UK).  It  seems  that 
another  German  publishing  group,  Springer  Verlag,  recently joined  as  well. 
In addition,  two  US  companies  would  contribute experience  from  the  US  online 
services  sector.  These  are:  Meigher  Communications  (created by  certain 
founders  of America  Online)  and  Interchange Online  Network  (developer  of 
some  software  used by  Europe  Online,  and  recently acquired by  the leading  US 
telecom operator  AT&T).  The  financial  partners  include  the  Luxembourg-
based Societe  Nationale  de  Credit  a  l'Investissement  and  the  Banque  et 
Caisse  d'Epargne  de l'Etat,  Luxembourg,  both  of which  are  also involved  in 
Societe  Europeenne  de  Satellites  (SES),  promoter  of the Astra  satellites. 
In  competition with  existing online  companies  in Europe,  such  as  CompuServe, 
Europe  Online  aims  to provide  domestic  and  business  users  with  the  "gateway" 
linking  their  personal  computer  with  a  range  of  online services.  Currently 
such  services  mainly  concern  electronic  mail,  specialized  databases 
•  providing  publications  and  other  data,  access  to  bulletin  boards, 
discussion  groups  and  interactive  games.  Online  services  are,  however, 
developing  rapidly  and  will  increasingly  include  more  sophisticated 
audiovisual  communications  such  as  video-on-demand,  videoconferencing  and 
"virtual shopping  malls"  together with  tele-transaction  services  (shopping, 
banking,  reservations  etc.  from  the  home).  They  will  become  increasingly 
accessible  via  personal  computers,  cable  TV  and  videotex  services  such  as 
the  French Minitel. 
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These  services which  mark  the  start of  the  Information  Society  have  been 
identified  in the  Commission's  'White  Paper  on  growth,  competitiveness  and 
employment'  as  major  areas  for  growth  of  the  European  economy.  To  ensure 
stronger  innovation,  investments  and benefits  to  the  consumers  in  Europe,  a 
careful  monitoring  is  required,  especially  to  ensure  respect  for  the 
competition  rules.  Today,  Europe's  online  services market  is less  than half 
that of  the  US  market.  It is also  two  to  three years  behind the  US  in terms 
of available  products  and  consumer  interest.  But  this  gap  is narrowing, 
particularly as  new  services  become  available in all European  languages.  The 
European market  for  online  services is expected to  double  by  the  year  2000, 
reaching  around  ECU  5  to  6  bn. 
In  addition  to  a  number  of  existing  companies,  at  least  two  other 
international  online  services  are to establish  themselves  in  Europe  by  the 
end  of  1995:  the  joint  venture  between  America  Online  (AOL)  and 
Bertelsmann,  and  the Microsoft  Network  (MSN)  .  AOL/Bertelsmann  has  already 
had  contacts  with  the  Commission  and  MSN  is being monitored  carefully both 
by  the  Commission  and  by  the  US  authorities.  On  a  more  national  or  local 
basis  many  other  players  are  hoping  to  reach  that  critical  mass  of 
subscribers  which  makes  an  on-line enterprise commercially viable. 
*** 
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On  the initiative of M.  Karel  Van  Miert  the  Commission  has  today  decided  to 
. ask  the  Italian Government  to  take  necessary measures  to establish  a  level 
playing  field between  the  two  competing  operators  on  the  Italian GSM  market. 
The  Commission  has  indeed  requested that  the  Italian  authorities  take  the 
necessary steps  to abolish  the  distortion of  competition  resulting  from  the 
initial payment  imposed  on  Omnitel  Pronto  Italia  and  to  secure  equal 
conditions  for all operators  of  GSM  radiotelephony by  the  following  means: 
The 
in 
a  requirement that Telecom Italia make  an  identical payment;  or 
the  adoption,  after  rece~v~ng  the  agreement  of  the  Commission,  of 
corrective measures  equivalent  in  economic  terms  to  the  payment  made  by 
the  second operator 
Commission  recognises  and  supports  the  significant progress  already made 
Italy  in  this latter  context,  with  the  recent  submission of  draft 
legislation to  the  Italian  Parliament  for  fundamental  regulatory reform of 
the  Italian telecoms  market.  Within  three months  the  Italian  authorities 
are  to indicate what  measures  have  been  implemented. 
The  Commission  is  particularly concerned  with  the  auction procedure  which 
certain Member  States,  including  Italy,  have  included  in  the  selection 
criteria  of  the  second  operator.  In  these  cases  the  second  licence  is 
awarded  not  only  on  the basis  of  a  comparison  of  intrinsic qualitative 
elements  such  as  intended  coverage  roll  out,  expertise  in  the  area  and 
envisaged tariffs,  but also  on  the basis  of  a  financial  bid above  a  certain 
set threshold.  The  Commission  criticized  this  type  of  auction approach  in 
its  mobile  Green  paper of  1994  since it implies  a  selective burden  on  new, 
innovative  technologies  which will ultimately disadvantage  future  users.  In 
the  selection  procedures  screened to  date,  it  appears  that  the  use  of 
auctions  for  the  selection  of  the  second  operator only,  lead  to unfair 
conditions  and  thus  threatened to  thwart  competition in  the  developing  GSM 
market. 
The  Commission  decided in  December  1994  to  take legal action  (under  Treaty 
Article  90)  against  Italy.  The  Commission  stated that  it would  renounce 
legal  action  if Italy either abolished  the discriminatory  fee,  or  required 
the  incumbent  to  pay  the  same  fee,  or,  by  implementing  regulatory measures 
which  adequately  compensated  the  second  operator.  Compensation  might 
concern,  for  example,  better conditions. of interconnection with  the  national 
operator's  network  and/or  a  commitment  to  earlier  liberalisation  of 
infrastructure for  mobile  communications  than previously  foreseen.  Since 
interconnections  with,  and  use  of,  leased  line capacity  of  the  incumbent 
operators  currently  represents  around  30  to  40  %  of  the  second operator's 
turnover,  the  significance of  such  compensatory measures  is  clear  . 
COMPARATIVE  TABLE  REGUARDING  THE  GRANTING  OF  COMPETING  MOBILE  LICENCES  IN 
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Commission  taking 
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GSM ITALY: COMMISSION ASKS FAIR TREATMENT FOR OMNITEL 
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PDF: 
Word Processed: 
On  the initiative of M.  Karel  Van  Miert  the  Commission  has  today  decided to 
ask  the  Italian Government  to  take  necessary measures  to establish  a  level 
playing field between  the  two  competing  operators  on  the  Italian GSM  market. 
The  Commission  has  indeed  requested that  the  Italian  authorities  take  the 
necessary steps  to abolish the  distortion of competition resulting  from  the 
initial payment  imposed  on  Omnitel  Pronto  Italia  and  to  secure  equal 
conditions  for all operators  of  GSM  radiotelephony by  the  following means: 
a  requirement  that Telecom Italia make  an  identical payment;  or 
the  adoption, .after  rece~v~ng  the  agreement  of the  Commission,  of 
corrective measures  equivalent  in economic  terms  to  the  payment  made  by 
the  second operator 
The  Commission  recognises  and  supports  the  significant progress  already made 
in  Italy  in.  this latter  context,  with  the  recent  submission  of  draft 
legislation to  the  Italian  Parliament  for  fundamental  regulatory  reform of 
the Italian telecoms  market.  Within  three months  the  Italian  authorities 
are  to indicate what  measures  have  been  implemented. 
The  Commission is  particularly concerned  with the  auction procedure  which 
certain Member  States,  including  Italy,  have  included  in  the  selection 
criteria  of the  second  operator.  In  these  cases  the  second  licence  is 
awarded  not  only  on  the basis  of  a  comparison  of  intrinsic qualitative 
elements  such  as  intended  coverage  roll  out,  expertise  in  the area  and 
envisaged tariffs,  but  also  on  the basis  of  a  financial bid above  a  certain 
set threshold.  The  Commission  criticized  this  type  of  auction approach in 
its  mobile  Green  paper of  1994  since it implies  a  selective burden  on  new, 
innovative  technologies  which will ultimately disadvantage  future  users.  In 
the  selection  procedures  screened to  date,  it  appears  that  the  use  of 
auctions  for  the selection  of  the  second  operator only,  lead  to unfair 
conditions  and  thus  threatened to  thwart  competition in  the  developing  GSM 
market. 
The  Commission  decided in  December  1994  to  take  legal  action  (under  Treaty 
Article  90)  against  Italy.  The  Commission  stated that  it would  renounce 
legal  action  if Italy either abolished  the discriminatory  fee,  or  required 
the  incumbent  to pay  the  same  fee,  or,  by  implementing  regulatory measures 
which  adequately  compensated  the  ·second  operator.  Compensation  might 
concern,  for  example,  better conditions  of interconnection with  the  national 
operator's  network  and/or  a  commitment  to  earlier  liberalisation  of 
infrastructure  for  mobile  communications  than previously  foreseen.  Since 
interconnections  with,  and  use  of,  leased  line capacity  of  the  incumbent 
operators  currently  represents  around  30  to  40  %  of  the  second operator's 
turnover,  the  significance of  such  compensatory measures  is clear  . 
COMPARATIVE  TABLE  REGUARDING  THE  GRANTING  OF  COMPETING  MOBILE  LICENCES  IN 
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equivalent  amount  to  be 
paid by public operator 
same  annual  fee 
same  annual  fee 
public operator excluded 
from  auction 
compensations  currently 
discussed 
same  annual  fee 
same  annual  fee 
limited weighing  (19%)  -
similar amount  requested 
from public operator 
no  similar amount 
requested  from public 
operator 
no  intervention of  the 
Commission  taking 
account  size of the 
country 
same  annual  fee 
Austria  announced  same 
payment  by public 
operator 
same  annual  fee 
same  annual  fee 
same  annual  fee 
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THE COMMISSION OPENS CABLE TV NETWORKS TO LIBERALISED 
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At  the  initiative of  Commissioners  Van  Miert  and  Bangemann,  the  Commission 
has  today  adopted  a  directive  lifting restrictions  on  the  use  of  cable  TV 
networks  throughout  the  Union  for  the  carriage  of  all  liberalised 
telecommunications  services.  It aims,  in  particular,  to  allow new  multi-
media  telecoms  services  to  be  carried  on  cable  networks,  throughout  the 
European  Union,  by  1  January  1996. 
In  many  of  the  Member  States  existing national  regulation still  restricts 
use  of  cable  TV  networks  to  simple,  one-way  televisionbroadcasting services 
(see table).  The  regulatory  restrictions  thus  effectively prevent  cable  TV 
operators  from offering carriage  or  prov~s1on  of  any  of  the  new  switched 
(i.e.  interactive)  multimedia  services.  The  main  goal  of  the  Commission  is 
to lift those  restrictions in order to  encourage  investment  and  foster pilot 
projects  and  new  initiatives in this  field.  Examples  of  such  new  services 
include:  tele-shopping  and  tele-transaction packages,  interactive  games  and 
education services,  on-line databases  including detailed/moving  images 
Lifting  restrictions  on  cable  network  usage  should  also  introduce 
alternative means  for  all telecoms·service providers  to gain switched access 
to  end  customers  (instead of relying  exclusively on  the monopoly  telecoms 
operator)  permitting a  lowering of costs. 
Scope  of  the  Directive 
Like  the satellite  directive adopted in  October  1994,  the  cable  directive 
involves  an  amendment  to  the  1990  telecoms  services directive  (90/388)  .  The 
amendment  allows  service  providers  the  choice of  offering their  services 
over  cable  TV  networks.  This  does  not affect the  Member  States'  rights  to 
maintain monopolies  in provision of public voice  telephony until  1998. 
During  the  consultation  on  the draft  text,  the  European  Parliament,  as  well 
as  other interested parties proposed extending  the  scope  of  the directive to 
cover  the provision of cable  TV  services  by  telecom operators.  The  idea is 
based  on  "symmetry"  of liberalisation:  i.e.  once  cable  operators  may  enter 
the  telecoms  services  market,  then  telecom  operators  should  be  allowed  to 
enter the  TV  broadcasting market. 
For  legal  reasons  however it  was  not possible  to  address  the  "symmetry" 
issue in this directive.  The  question will  certainly need  to  be  addressed in 
the  context  of  the measures  surrounding  the  1998  date  for  full  telecoms 
liberalisation. 
Content  of  the  Directive 
*  Lifting Restrictions 
Article  1  of  the  cable  TV  directive  abolishes  restrictions  on  the  use  of 
transmission  capacity on  CATV  networks  for  all telecoms  services,  apart  from 
public voice  telephony,  from  1  January  1996.  This  covers,  in  particular 
data  communications,  corporate  networks  and multi-media  services.  The 
article also  ensures  that  cable  TV  networks  are  allowed  to  (a)  interconnect 
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with  the national  public telecoms  network,  and  (b)  directly interconnect 
with  each other  (i.e  in as  far  as  already possible in the  framework  of their 
broadcasting business). 
*  Competitive  safeguards  and  joint provision 
Article  2  of  the directive further  addresses  the  situation occurring in  some 
Member  States  where  the  telecoms  operator also  owns  cable  TV  companies. 
The  Directive  thus  asks  the  Member  States  to  impose  accounting transparency 
and  separation of  financial  accounts  between  the  two  business  activities  as 
soon  as  a  turnover  of  50  million Ecus  is  reached in the market  for  telecom. 
The  Commission  will  assess,  before  January  1,  1998,  whether  accounting 
separation is  sufficient to  avoid  ~busive practices. 
BACKGROUND 
The  current situation in the  Member  States 
The  most  extensive  cable  TV  networks  are  in the  Benelux  countries  with  over 
90%  of  households  passed.  They  are  generally provided by  local municipal 
monopolies.  Although  very developed  in terms  of penetration  technological 
upgrading will  be  needed in  most  cases  in  order to  cope  with  demands  for 
transmission  of  new  interactive audiovisual  services  and  other  two-way 
telecoms  services.  Cable  networks  in  Denmark  and  Germany  cover  around  70% 
of  households.  Denmark  has  over  6500  cable operators,  but  Germany  only  one, 
that is the  public telecoms  operator  DBPT. 
Ireland  has  a  relatively  developed  cable  network  with 
households  passed  and  around  13  cable  operators.  Services 
licence holders  in  conjunction  with  Telecom  Eireann. 
recently announced  an  increase  in its  stake to  75%  in 
cable  operator  and  programmer,  Cablelink. 
around  50% 
are provided 
The  latter 





In  Spain,  cable penetration is  also  low  with  around  8%  of  households  passed 
and  a  subscription  rate  of  1%  of all  households  .  Service  is  currently 
provided  in  a  limited  number  of  areas  by  regional  authorities  or  town 
councils.  There  are  28  of  these  local  cable  operations  which  generally 
started  as  local distributers  of satellite pay  TV.  However,  Telefonica,  in 
the  meantime  has  been  rapidly upgrading  its own  network  with optic  fibre 
capacity  and  claims  it  is  now  adapted  for  carriage  of  TV  signals  and 
multimedia  services  to  the  homes  of  the major part  of the population.  The 
Spanish  telecom  operator has  recently established  a  joint venture  called 
Cablevision with  the  leading media  group  in  Spain,  PRISA.  The  PRISA  group 
controls  the largest newspaper  publisher,  and broadcasting  operation as  well 
as  the  only pay  TV  channel  in the  country.  A  complaint  to  the  Commission 
against  the  formation  of this  joint venture  was  lodged  this  month  by  one  of 
Spain's  three private  TV  channels,  Antena  3. 
In  Italy there  is  no  significant cable  network  development  as  yet.  However 
Telecom  Italia  has  recently  announced  its  own  $7.8  billion  "Socrat~>~:" 
project  to  roll  out its  own  nationwide  cable  network,  like Telefonica,  by 
installing  fibre  optic lines  to  the  home.  The  target is  to  pass  at  least 
50%  of  households  by  1998.  In  a  first phase  Socrates will  offer  cable  TV 
channels  and  pay-per-view services.  In  a  second phase  interactive services 
including  video  games,  home-banking  and  home  shopping,  will  be  introduced. 
In  the  third  and  final  phase  Telecom  Italia  proposes  full  "services 
integration"  of  telecoms  and  broadcasting  services  over  a  common  network 
platform 
The  European  Commission  has  in the  meantime  sent  requests  for  information 
have  been  sent  to  Telecom Italia,  Telefonica  and  Telecom Eireann.  The  aim 
is  to  clarify  the  plans  of  these operators  and  to  assess  the  facts  and 
possible  legal  implications  concerning their  potential  use  of  monopoly 
telecoms  infrastructure to provide  cable  TV  services. 
In  the  UK 
a round  1 0  ·.~ 
cable  network  roll out  is  still relatively 
of  homes  passed  and  a  subscription rate  in 
limited with  only 
1994  of  only  2.8~. 
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However,  early  infrastructure  liberalisation  in  the  UK 
investment  was  made  in making  these  networks  technologically 
that  they  are generally  already capable  of providing switched 
services. 
ensured  that 
advanced,  so 
multi-media 
In  Portugal  cable  television only started at the  end  of  1994  through  TV  Cabo 
Portugal  which is  a  part of the  Portugal  Telecom group.  It  is divided into 
9  regional  operational  companies.  By  the  end  of this  year  TV  Cave  Portugal 
hopes  to  have  passed almost  400  000  homes. 
Greece  has  no  cable  TV  network  as  yet. 
Table 















Use  of  cable  TV  networks 
for liberalised services 
Non-voice  services  only 
No 
---------* 
No  legal provision 
---------*  (legislation 
pending) 
No  legal provision 
Limited use 
No 
No  (but  pending 
legislation) 
Yes 
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On  the initiative  of Mr  Bangemann,  the  Commission  has  decided to  forward  to 
the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  a  communication  setting  out 
guidelines  on  the  directories  market.  The  introduction of  a  competitive 
environment  in  the  telecommunications  sector requires,  on  the  one  hand,  an 
extension of  Community  telecommunications  rules  to  include directories  and 
information services  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the maintenance  of  a  universal 
directory and  an  information  service that is easily  accessible to all users 
at  an  affordable price.  · 
To  the  extent that  a  directory  is both  a  product  and  a  service,  the 
provisions  of the Treaty  relating to  competition  (Art.  85,  86,  90)  and  to 
the  free  movement  of  goods,  the  freedom  to provide  services  and  consumer 
protection  (Art.  30  to  34,  36,  59,  60,  lOOa,  129a  and several  directives 
based  on  these  articles)  must  be  applied.  The  Commission  will pursue  an 
application  of  these provisions  taking into  account  the guidelines  outlined 
in  the  communication.  Where  appropriate  they  will  be  incorporated  in 
proposals  to  be  presented to  the  European  Parliament  and  to  the  Council  in 
order  to  complete  the  legal  framework  for  a  liberalised  telecommunications 
market. 
The  directories  and  associated information services  sectors  are at  the  sharp 
end  of  telecommunications  and  publishing  and,  in  consequence,  their 
development is  completely at  the mercy  of any  changes  that  may  occur  in 
these  two  sectors.  Directories  account  for  a  major proportion of  the media 
and  represent  7.5%  of  the  advertising market  in the  European  Union. 
Directory services,  making  up  as  they  do  the  most  important  means  of access 
to  telecommunications  services,  will play a  central  role  with  regard to  the 
use  of  telecommunications  services  in a  competitive  environment. 
Drawing  on  the  benefits  of the  new  technologies  and,  in particular,  of  the 
interactivity  made  possible by  videotex  services,  this  sector is  currently 
making  its debut  in the  world of multimedia.  As  one  of  the major  elements 
in this  new market,  it should  contribute significantly  to  the  development  of 
the latter. 
Telecommunications  directories  are  supplied in  a  variety of  forms:  printed, 
electronic  (on  line or  CD-ROM)  or via  a  telephone  hotline. 
The  Commission  is  proposing  the  following  guidelines  with  a  view  to 
developing  this  sector: 
1.  Retention  of  a  universal directory and  a  telephone  information service 
in  a  competitive  environment.  In  each  Member  State,  users  of  voice 
telephony  services  must  have  at  their disposal  at  least one  complete 
"White  Pages"  directory  containing  the  telephone  particulars  of  the 
subscribers  to  fixed  and  mobile  services,  while  at  the  same  time  having 
access  to at least  one  information service at affordable 
2.  Abolition  of  the  exclusive  and  special  rights  in the  telecommunications 
directories market  which  exist under  certain national  regulations.  These 
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liberalization  measures  seek  to  promote  the  dynamic  development  of 
supply,  while  at  the  same  time  respecting the  rules  of  competition  and 
taking  account,  on  the  one  hand,  of recent  trends  in the  regulations 
applicable  to  telecommunications  services,  notably  the  complete 
liberalization  of  fixed  voice  telephony services  with  effect  from 
1  January  1998  and,  on  the other hand,  of  the anticipated development  of 
the  trans-European  networks  and mobile  telephony services  in the  year~ 
to  come. 
3.  Conditions  governing access  and marketing.  To  the  extent that directory 
services  and  other information services  for  subscribers  can  no  longer  be 
regarded  as  reserved activities,  access  to  raw  subscriber data,  pure  and 
simple,  should be  provided  on  the basis  of  objective,  transparent  and 
non-discriminatory  criteria  and  in accordance  with  the  Community 
provisions  in  force,  notably with  regard  to  the  rules  of  competition, 
the principles  of  Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  and  the protection  of 
personal  data  and  individual privacy. 
4.  Promotion  of  new  technologies  (electronic directory,  CD-ROM  and  XSOO 
service)  and  opening-up  to multimedia.  By  virtue  of  the  facilities 
already  offered by  electronic directories  (speed of  interrogation on 
line,  continuous  updating of  data,  diversification  of applications), 
steps  should be  taken  to  encourage  the  development  of interconnections 
between  the various  existing services  in the Union.  Furthermor€,  the 
emergence  of  electronic media  and  the interactivity  developed  through 
videotex  should facilitate the evolution of directories  along multimedia 
lines. 
5.  Precautionary measures 
Protection  of individual  privacy.  In the  context of the  provision of 
directory services,  the protection  of personal data  must  be  guaranteed. 
Subscribers  must  be  informed  of their rights  to  protection against  all 
forms  of  intrusion into their private  lives,  i.e.  the  right  not  to  be 
included in the directory,  the  right of access  and  the  right  to  correction 
in  respect  of data  which  concern  them,  the  right  to  oppose  the marketing 
of data  relating to  them  and  the  right  to limit the  use  of  such data. 
Protection of intellectual property rights.  The  benefits  of  the  national 
and  Community  provisions  governing  copyright  should be  extended to  include 
directories,  pursuant  to  the  criteria allowing  for  ,protection under  the 
regulations  currently in force. 
*  *  * 
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Mr.Karel  Van  Miert,  Commissioner  in  charge  of  EU  competition  policy,  has 
informed the  European  Commission  about  commitments  made  by  the  French  and 
German  ministers in  charge  of telecommunications  and  the  CEOs  of  France 
Telecom  and  Deutsche  Telekom  AG  regarding  the notified  ATLAS  and  PHOENIX 
telecommunications  alliance. 
On  the basis  of  these  main  and  other  commitments,  the  Commission  now  intends 
to  initiate the  formal  procedure,  the  first  step of  which  will  be  the 
publication of  a  Notice  in the Official  Journal  setting out  the  main  factual 
elements  of  the  notified  transactions,  including  the  amendments  and 
commitments  agreed  upon  by  the  parties,  and  inviting  interested  third 
parties  to  submit  any  comments  they  may  have  within  a  specified  period, 
normally  speaking one  month. 
The  procedure  also  involves  a  consultation  of  the Advisory  Comittee  of 
Member  State  competition  authorities  on  the  text of  a  draft decision by  the 
Commission,  which  could be  formally  adopted during  the  first half of  1996. 
The  amendments  and  undertakings  offered  by  the national  telecommunications 
ministers  of  France  and  Germany  and  the parties to  the  ATLAS  and  PHOENIX 
alliances  are  designed to  meet  the  concerns  expressed  by  the  Commission, 
i.e.: 
- the  French  and  German  governments  have  undertaken  a  firm  political 
commitment  to  liberalize alternative  telecommunications  infrastructure 
for  the provision  of liberalized  telecommunications  services,  i.e.  not 
basic public voice  telephony,  by  1  July  1996  and  to liberalize  fully all 
telecommunications  services, ,including public voice,  and infrastructure by 
1  January  1998; 
the  public  switched  data  networks  in  France  and  Germany,  Transpac  and 
Datex-P  respectively,  will until  1  January  1998  remain  separated  from  the 
ATLAS  joint venture  set  up  by  France  Telecom and  Deutsche  Telekom; 
- France  Telecom and  Deutsche  Telekom agree  to establish and maintain  acceH~ 
to  their domestic  public  switched data  networks  in  France  and  Germany  on  d 
non-discriminatory,  open  and  transparent  basis  to  all service providers 
offering  low-level  (so-called X.25)  data  services;  to  ensure  continued 
non-discriminatory  access  in  the  future,  the  parties'  commitment  also 
relates  to  any  generally  applied standardised  interconnection protocol 
that may  modify,  replace  or co-exist with,  the  current standard; 
- France  Telecom  and  Deutsche  Telekom agree  not  to  engage  in  cross-
subsidisation;  to prevent  cross-subsidies,  all entities  formed  pursuant  to 
the  ATLAS  and  PHOENIX  ventures will  be  established as  distinct entities, 
separate  from  the  parent  companies  and  subject to  regular  and  customary 
auditing,  to  ensure  that  dealings  between  these  entities  and  France 
Telecom  and  Deutsche  Telekom  take  place  on  an  arm's  length basis; 
- France  Telecom agrees  to  sell  the  INFO  AG  company,  an  important  competitor 
of  Datex-P  on  the  German  data  network  services market. 
*  *  * 
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On  a  proposal 
today adopted 
at  a  Union 
services".  The 
Council  by  the 
of  Commissioner  Martin  Bangemann,  the  European  Commission 
a  "Proposal  to  European  Parliament  and  Council  for  an  action 
level  in  the  field  of  satellite  personal  communications 
proposal  could be  adopted by  the  European  Parliament  and  the 
middle  of  1996. 
Satellite  personal  communications  services  will  provide  data  and/or 
voice(and  in the  future  also  video)  services  into  a  fixed or  protable 
personal  terminal,  approximately the  size of  today's  terrestrial  cellular 
phones,  by means  of  new  types  of the satellite  systems  such  as  Low  Earth 
Orbit(LEO)  constellation of  some  40-70  satellites overflying the  surface  of 
the  earth  at  around  1000  km.  These  systems  will  enable  global 
interconnectivity  and  mobility  via  the  use  of  personal  communications 
equipment  as  a  complement  to world-wide  mobile  terrestrial  networks.  (in 
particular  GSM)  . 
The  current situation:  European  action is urgently needed. 
There  is  a  significant opportunity for  European  mobile  and  space industry in 
both  equipment  and  services  in satellite  PCS.  Actual  European  industry 
contracts  are  valued  at about  500  million  ECU,  while  potential  further 
contracts  are  estimated  to  reach  tens  of  billions  of  ECU,  especially  in 
handsets. 
In  view  of  limited  availability of  frequency  spectrum resources  and  the 
number  of  announced satellite PCS  systems,  there is  a  need  to  come  worldwide 
to  a  co-ordinated selection  of satellite PCS  systems  taking  due  account  of 
the  economic,  industrial  and  social implications  of the proposed services. 
The  operation of  the satellite systems  is subject  to  two  inter-related sets 
of issues: 
formal  notification to the  ITU  (International-Telecommunications  Union) 
for  the purpose  of technical  frequency  coordination,  and 
selection and  authorisation of  the  systems  in nations  where  the  space 
segment  capacity is to  be  used. 
Successful  completion  of  the  ITU  frequency  coordination process  does  not 
provide  any  guarantee  that the satellite system will  indeed be  authorised to 
proviede  space  segment  capacity for  use  in  a  particular country. 
In  the  United  States,  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC)  has 
considered six  applications.  In early  1995  the  FCC  issued orders  selecting 
and  licensing  three  of  the  proposed  concepts  for  global  service provision, 
namely  Globalstar,  Iridium,  and  Odyssey. 
Regulatory measures,  including  licensing,  in other  parts  of  the  world  are 
yet  to  be  taken  although many  countries  are  evaluating  the  issues  arising 
from  the  introduction  of  these  services.  In  the  European  Union,  the 
Commission  has  undertaken  a  number  of  initiatives.  She  organised  a  hearing 
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in September  1992  where  the  industry  presented their  plans  to  interested 
regulators,  industry  and  users.  In its  Communication  on  Satellite Personal 
Communications  of  April  1993,  the  Commission  underlined  the  strategic 
importance  of satellite personal  communications  systems  and  services. 
There  needs  to  be  compatibility between  any  European  spectrum  usage  and 
usage  in  other  regions  of  the  world.  The  spectrum  is  to  some  extend 
controlled by  those  who  lay  first claim on  the  spectrum in the  context  of 
the  ITU  procedures  and  there is  a  danger that,  unless  precautions  are  taken, 
systems  capable  of  providing service in Europe  may  be  selected by  a  process 
outside  European  jurisdiction.  Therefore  a  European  approach  for  licensing 
is  urgently  needed  in  order  to  use  the  limited  frequency  resource  most 
efficiently and  to  strengthen  the  combined  European  position  on  this matter. 
The  proposed  action 
The  objectives  of action shall be  to  ensur,  within  a  period of  three  years 
selection of satellite  PCS  space  segment  operators; 
the  adoption  of  common  conditions  to be  attached to  authorisations  for 
satellite  PCS  spac  segment  operators; 
harmonisation  of  conditions  for  authorisations; 
the  establishment  of  a  dialogue  and,  where  appropriate,  negotiations 
between  the  European  Union  and  third  countries  with  the  aim  of 
establishing  international  cooperation in  order  to promote  development 
of satellite personal  communications  services  and  remove  the  obstacles 
to their development. 
As  a  first  step,  the  Commission  has  decided  to  publish  a  Call-for-
Information in the  Officiel Journal,  addressed to prospective  consortia  and 
other  relevant  industry  planning  to  provide  satellite  personal 
communications  services  and/or  equipment  in the  European  Union.  Through  this 
Call-for-Information,  the  Commission  seeks  detailed  information  of  all 
relevant  matters  which  may  assist the definition of  the  scope  and modalities 
of  a  selection and  authorisation process,  including suitable criteria  for 
selection and  conditions  for  authorisation. 
The  Commission  may  ask  the  European  standardisation  bodies  such  as  the 
European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute  (ETSI)  and  Cen/Cenelec,  as 
well  as  the  European  Radio  Committee  (ERC),  and  the  European  Committee  for 
Telecommunications  Regulatory Affairs  (ECTRA)  ·,  via  work  requirements  under 
the  relevant existing  framework  agreements  with  those  organisations,  to 
study the  necessary technical  criteria and  conditions. 
Finally  the  Commission,  who  shall  be  assisted  by  an  advisory  and  a 
regulatory Committee  shall adopt  Decisions  on: 
common  conditions  to be  attached  to  the  authorisations  of  the  selected 
satellite personal  communications  space  segment  operators; 
harmonised  conditions  for  the  authorisation  of providers  of  satellite 
personal  communications  services,  gateway  operators,  and,  if required, 
for  the  circulation and  use  of  equipment; 
any  other  measures  aimed  at  facilitating  .the development  of satellite 
personal  communications  services. 
As  to  International aspects,  the  Commission  monitors  developments  outside 
the  Community  and  consults  with  third  countries  on  the  coordinated 
introduction of  satellite personal  communications  at  a  global  level. 
Whenever  the  Commission  establishes  that  the  situation 
negotiations  with  third  countries,  the  Commission  will 
appropriate,  negotiations  in  view  of  these  aims.  The  principle 
action will  be  aimed  at  ensuring  effective  and  comparable 
Community  organisations  in all markets. 
Annex 
may  require 
start,  where 
of  Community 
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Ill 30 • 
Rapid Text File  ·  http://www.cc.eec/rapid/cgilrapcgi.ksh?p  ... on.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/95/l202j0jAGED&lg=EN 
to  a  European  Parliament  and  Council  Decision of 
on  an  action at  a  Union  level in the  field of 
satellite personal  communications  services  in the  European  Union. 
Time  schedule  for  measures 
Sept.  96  Establishmen.t  of  categories  of  satellite personal  communications 
services  for  which  a  selection of satellite systems  is required; 
Oct.  96 
Dec.  96 
Mar.  97 
*** 
Publication of  a  Call-for-Declaration of  Interest in  the Official 
Journal; 
Adoption  of criteria for  the  selection  of satellite  systems  and 
the principles  for  the  authorisations  for  these  systems; 
Based  on  a  comparative bidding process  and  subsequent  evaluation, 
selection  of  satellite  systems  used  for  the  provision  of 
categories  of satellite PCS  services; 
Adoption  of  common  conditions  for  the 
selected systems; 
authorisation  of  the 
Adoption  of  harmonised  conditions  for  the  authorisation of  all 
aspects  of  satellite - personal  cornmunicatio~s  as  they  concern, 
inter  alia,  service  provision,  equipment,  interconnection, 
numbering,  and  gateway  access. 
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COMMISSION ADOPTS TWO PROPOSALS COMPLETING THE 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR A LIBERALISED 
TELE-COMMUNICATIONS MARKET. 
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At  the initiative of  Commissioner  Bangemann,  the  Commission  today  adopted 
two  proposals  for  legislation  (both based  on Article  100A)  that constitute 
key  elements  of the  future  regulatory  framework  for  the  telecommunications 
sector,  following  liberalisation by  1  January 1998. 
1.  The  first  one,  a  proposal  for  a  European  Parliament  and  Council 
Directive,  will,  together  with  directive  90/388/EEC[1)  (based  on 
Article  90  of  the Treaty),  establish a  common  framework  for  general 
authorisations  and  individual licences  granted by Member  States  in  the 
field of  telecommunications  services. 
While  full  competition will be  introduced in the  telecommunications  sector 
in most  Member  States  in  1998,  authorisation  regimes  remain  necessary in 
order  to  ensure that certain public interest objectives  such  as  universal 
service are  attained.  At  the  same  time  no  undue  burdens  must  be  imposed  on 
market  players. 
In  that context,  the proposed directive sets  up  rules  to  be  implemented at 
national  level,  together  with  the  full  application  of  competition 
principles,  both  for  the procedures  for  the granting of authorisations  or 
licences  and  the  conditions  that  can  be  attached to  these  authorisations. 
Such  a  common  framework  should facilitate,  for  undertakings  acting in  the 
field of  telecommunications,  the  exercise of  freedom of establishment  and 
freedom  to provide  services  in the  European  Union. 
The  most  important  features  of the proposed directive are: 
in  line  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity,  the  granting  of 
authorisations will be  the  responsibility of Member  States; 
there  should  be  no 
authorisation,  but if 
following principles; 
obligation 
they  do  so 
for  Member 
they must  be 
States  to  require 
in  compliance  with 
the  prohibition  of  any 
entrants,  except  to  the 
radio  frequencies; 
a  priori limitation  in  the  number  of 





the  priority  given  to  general  authorisations  (every  undertaking 
complying  with  conditions  set out  in  general  rules  may  offer  its 
services  or infrastructure),  as  opposed to  individual  licences; 
national  authorisation  or  licencing 
transparent  and  non-discriminatory; 
procedures  have  to  be  open, 
the  definition  of  harmonised  principles  and  the  provision  of 
harmonisation.  mechanisms  both  for  the procedures  for  the  granting of 
authorisations  and  the  conditions  attached  to  authorisations  (for 
example  conditions  related to  the protection of  users,  in particular in 
relation to prior approval  by  the  regulatory authority of  the  standard 
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consumer  contract,  provision of detailed and  accurate billing,  provision 
of  emergency  services  and  special  arrangements  for  disabled people). 
the  introduction  of  provisions  designed  to  facilitate  cross-border 
services.  In  particular  an  undertaking  intending  to  provide  a 
telecommunications  service in more  than  one  Member  State may  request  the 
national  regulatory  authorities  concerned  to  co-ordinate  their 
authorisation  procedures  in  order  to  deliver  the  necessary 
authorisations  on  substantially the  same  conditions. 
The  second  text  adopted  today by  the  Commission  is  a  proposal  to  update 
two  existing Directives  in the  area  of  open  network provision  (ONP). 
Open  Network  Pr~ovision  (ONP)  concerns  the  harmonisation  of  conditions  for 
access  ~o,  and  use  of,  public  telecommunications  networks  and  services. 
The  framework  Directive  90/387  EEC  describes  objectives  and  procedures.  It 
covers  the  use  of  standards,  requirements  for  the  independence  of the 
national  regulatory authorities,  and  the  ONP  Committee  procedures.  The 
Directive  does  not place  any  specific obligations  on  market  players.  These 
obligations  are  covered by  two  individual  ONP  Dire~tives: 
Council  Directive  92/44/EEC  on  the  application  of  ONP  to  leased lines 
European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  on  the  application of  ONP  to 
voice  telephony  (adoption  expected by  the  end  of  1995) 
The  ONP  framework  Directive,  first  adopted in  1990,  and  the  ONP  Leased 
Lines  Directive,  adopted in  1992,  are  being  now  updated  to  take  account  of 
the  introduction of  competition  after  1998,  and  to provide  a  common 
approach  for  the provision of  important public telecommunications  services 
in the  European  Union. 
Given  the  crucial  role played by national  regulatory authorities  for  the 
telecommunications  in  a  liberalised market,  a  new  requirement  is being 
introduced in the  ONP  framework  Directive to·reinforce the  independence  of 
the  national  regulatory  authorities  fo·r  telecommunications  in each  Member 
State.  In particular,  where  a  Member  State maintains  a  significant  degree 
of  ownership  or  control  of  a  telecommunications  organisation,  it must 
ensure  the  effective  seperation  of  the  regulatory  activities  from 
activities  related to  ownership  or  control. 
The  objective  of  the  revised  ONP  framework  Directive  remains  the 
harmonisation  of  conditions  for  access  to  and  use  of  public 
telecommunications  networks  and  services,  but  the  emphasis  is  on  achieving 
this  through  voluntary observance  of standards.  The  existing procedure, 
whereby  standards  can  be  made  compulsory  under  certain circumstances, 
would  be  modified to  include  a  persod of public  consultation before  any 
decisiop  was  taken. 
The  leased lines  Directive  requires  that leased lines  shall be  offered and 
provided  on  request  without  discrimination to all users. 
Non-discrimination  applies  to,  inter alia,  availability  of  technical 
access,  tariffs,  quality  of service,  provision  time  (delivery period), 
fair  distribution  of  capacity  in  case  of  scarcity,  repair  time  and 
availability of  network  information. 
The  revised  ONP  leased lines  Directive will  continue  to  require  that  the 
present  minimum set of leased  lines  is available  to all  users  in the  EU 
from at least  one  organisation in each  Member  State.  This  obligation will 
be  placed  only  on  organisations  with  significant  market  power,  as 
determined  by  the  national  regulatory  authorities  in  accordance  with 
guidelines  given  in the  Directive.  Requirements  for  advance  publication of 
tariff changes  will  be  removed  and  the  requirement  for  cost  orientation of 
tari,ffs  will  be  relaxed where  there is  strong  competition  in the provision 
of  leased lines.  A  new  annex  identifies  other  types  of  high  speed  leased 
line  whose  provision  is  to  be  encouraged,  and  recommends  suitable 
voluntary standards  for  connection  to  these  types  of  leased line. 
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Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC  on  competition in  the markets  for 
telecommunications  services,  O.J.  L  192/10,  24.7.90,  and  in 
particular  its  amendment,  Draft  Commission  Directive  amending 
Commission  Directive  388/90/EEC  regarding  the  implementation  of 
full  competition  in the  telecommunications  markets,  O.J.  C  263/6, 
10.10.95  (adopted by  the  on  19  July 1995). 
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Following  the  introduction  of  a  legal procedure  (under  Article  90  of  the  EC 
Treaty)  by  the  Commission,  the  German  Ministry  of  Posts  and 
Telecommunications  has  granted  a  new  licence  for  the  establishment  and 
operation of  a  major alternative  telecommunications  network. 
Vebacom  is  the  telecommunications  subsidiary  of  the  VEBA  AG,  a  Ge rm.ln 
utilities  holding  company.  The  former  filed  a  complaint  with  the 
Commission's  Directorate General  for  competition in  April  1995  after several 
unsucessful  attempts  to 'obtain  a  licence  for  a  broadband  telecommunications 
network  based  on  SDH  (Synchronous  digital  hierarchy)  technology,  which 
would  allow  the transfer of  data between  36  different sites of the  German 
public television broadcaster ARD. 
The  Commission  took  the preliminary view  that  the  complaint  was  justified, 
in particular  since  Vebacom intends  to offer  a  service  based  on  a  new 
technology  (SDH)  which  is not  offered by  Deutsche  Telekom AG,  the  holder  of 
the  infrastructure monopoly in  Germany.  The  refusal  to  authorize  the  new 
offering is thus  holding back  technical progress. 
After informal  discussions  with  the  Commission  the  German  Ministry  of  Posts 
and  Telecommunications  ha~ now  agreed to  grant the licence  as  requested. 
Alternative  telecommunications  infrastructure  refers  in  general  to  the 
telecommunications  networks  owned  and  run  by  companies  other  than 
traditional  telecommunications  operators,  like  utilities  and  railways. 
Currently regulatory  restrictions in  most  Member  states limit  the  use  of 
these  networks  to the internal  needs  of the  company  who  owns  it.  That  is, 
they are  not  allowed to lease  spare capacity  to  the  third parties.  These 
restrictions  constitute  a  major  obstacle  for  the  introduction  of  a  fully 
liberalised regulatory  environment  for  the  telecommunications  sector  up  to 
1998  since  such  leased capacity is in great  demand  but mostly  only  available 
from  a  monopoly. 
In order  to  avoid legal  action in  similar cases  the  Commission  proposed  on 
the initiative  of  Commissioner  Van  Miert  in  a  Draft  Directive  of  19  July 
1995  to  generally  liberalise  alternative  infrastructures.  The  draft 
Directive  has  been  published  on  10  October  in  the Official  Journal  for  a 
two-months  public consultation period. 
*  *  * 
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COMMISSION OPENS AN ENQUIRY ON THE ALLIANCE AMERICA 
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Commissioner  Karel  van  Miert  asked  the  Directorate-General  for  Competition 
of  the  Commission  (DG  IV)  to  analyse  the  creation of this  alliance  in the 
field  of  online  services.  This  alliance  brings  together  the  companies 
America  Online  (leader  on  this  market  in the  United States),  Bertelsmann 
(first publishing  group  in  Germany  and  in  Europe)  and  Deutsche  Telekom 
(dominant  telecommunications  operator in  Germany  and first  in Europe);  it 
could also  be  opened  to  another  German  publisher:  Axel  Springer·. 
A  letter of  intent has  already been  signed  by  the  partners,  and  specific 
contracts  are being prepared.  The  agreement  envisages  in particular  cross-
shareholdings  between  AOL  I  Bertelsmann  on  the  one  hand,  and  Telekom Online 
on  the  other hand,  as· well  as  the  acquisition of shares  in America  Online  in 
the  United States  by  Deutsche  Telekom.  The  partners  intend to  segment  their 
offerings,  Telekom Online  specializing in services  to businesses,  and  AOL  in 
services  to  private  consumers.  An  extension  of  the alliance  to  include 
Springer is  also  under  discussion,  and  other partners  from  other  countries 
could  join it as  well. 
This  alliance  is important  due  to  the  size of  its  partners.  Deutsche 
Telekom,  in  particular,  holds  a  dominant  position  on  the  German  market  of 
online  services  (through its subsidiary  Telekom Online,  comprising  the  B1'X 
and  DATEX-J  services),  and  also  controls  networks  that are essential  for 
the  development  of  competing  online services  . 
DG  IV's  objectives  in relation  to  online  services  are  to  prevent  the 
establishment  of  anti-competitive  situations  which  could  slow  down  the 
development  on-line  services  and  of the  'Information Society'. 
In  the  case  of AOL  I  Bertelsrnann  I  Deutsche  Telekom,  the  Commission  wishes 
to  know  in particular under  which  conditions  (i)  competing  online  services 
would  be  able  to  obtain access  to  the  content of publications  controlled by 
the partners,  or  to  purchase  advertising space  to  promote  new  services  (ii) 
publications  not  belonging  to  the partners  would be  able  to propose  their 
content  online  (iii)  other online service  companies  would  be  able  to  use  the 
networks  and  services  of  Deutsche  Telekom  (iv)  agreements  with  other  online 
.services  companies  might  exist. 
DG  IV  has  asked  the  alliance partners  to provide  the  information  necessary 
for  this  enquiry.  This  enquiry  in no  prejudges  the  final  position of  the 
Commission.  In  accordance  with its  opinion  on  the  'Information  Society', 
the  Commission  is  ready  to  provide  the  conditions  for  the  greatest possible 
innovation,  including  alliances  and  joint-ventures,  while  respecting 
competition  rules.  It will  take  into particular consideration  the  advantages 
that  the  emergence  of  new  online  services brings  for  consumers. 
BACKGROUND 
In  addition  to  numerous  existing  companies,  at  least  two  other 
international online  services  are currently  being established  in several 
European  countries  in parallel:  Europe  Online  (grouping  the  German  publisher 
Butd<l  ~.-ll'ld  several  Luxembourg  financial  institutions)  and Microsoft  Network 
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(MSN)  .  DG  IV  opened  an  enquiry  into  Europe  Online  in  September  1995,  the 
answers  to  which  are being  examined,  and  MSN  is being monitored  closely both 
by the  Commission  and  by  the American  authorities.  On  a  more  national  or 
local basis  many  other  new  entrants  hope  to  reach  the  critical  mass  of 
subscribers  which  makes  an  online service  commercially viable. 
The  commercial  online  services  provide  a  "bridge"  connecting  Personal 
Computers  (PC)  with  a  broad  range  of  online  s~rvices,  including  a  screen 
interface,  telecommunication  access  through  local  telephone  numbers  ,  and 
access  to  the  services  themselves. 
These  services  are provided  either by  the partners 
companies  taken  under  contract,  such  as  other 
worldwide  lletwork  Internet. 
themselves, 
publishers, 
or  by  ot-lw r 
or  vi.t  t-h~· 
Currently,  such  services  concern  mainly  electronic  mail,  specialized 
databases  providing  publications  and  other data,  access  to bulletin boards, 
to discussion  groups  and  to  interactive  games.  However,  online  services 
develop  quickly  and,  in  the  future,  will  comprise  more  sophisticated 
audio-visual  communications  such  as  video-on  demand,  videoconference  as  well 
as  "virtual  shopping malls"  including teletransactions  from  home  (purchases, 
banks,  travel  and  entertainment  reservations).  Access  to  such  services will 
improve  gradually,  from  PCs,  from  cable  TV  and  from  vitieotex  systems  like 
France's Minitel. 
These  services,  which mark  the beginning  of the  'Information Society'  were 
identified  by  the  Commission's  White  Paper  on  'Growth,  competitiveness  and 
employment'  as  important  sectors  for  European  economic  growth.  To  ensure 
stronger innovation,  investments  and  the interests  of the  consumers,  careful 
monitoring is necessary,  including in particular  compliance  with  competition 
rules.  Today,  the  European market  for  online  services  is less  than half  that 
of  the United States.  Europe  is  also  a  few  years  behind  in  terms  of  new 
services  availability and  consumer  interest.  But  this  gap  is  narrowing, 
particularly as  new  services  become  available in all European  languages.  The 
European  market  for  online services  is  expected to  double  between  now  and 
the  year  2000,  reaching approximately  5  to  6  billion ECU. 
*** 
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On  27  November  1995  the  Commisssion  was  notified  by  Ericsson  and  Ascom  of 
their  agreement  to  establish  a  joint  venture  company,  for  which  Ascom's 
Swedish  subsidiary,  Ascom  Tateco,  will  serve  as  vehicle.  The  joint venture 
which  will  carry  out activities  in  the wireless  businesss  communications 
sector,  in  particular the  development,  manufacture,  sales  and  installation 
of  on-site paging  systems  and  equipment,  in which  up  to  the  present both  of 
the  parents  have  been  active in the market. 
The  investigation  carried  out  by  the  Commission  among  customers  and 
competitors  of the  parties  in the on-site  paging market  has  shown  that the 
joint venture  will be  faced  with  sufficient competition  throughout  the  EEA 
'from the present  players,  which  are either  strong multinational  companies 
such  as  Philips,  Bosch  and Motorola,  or are  companies  specialized 
in on-site  paging,  such  as  Multitone.  Furthermore,  the  market  concerned is 
characterized  by  the  existence  of  large  sophisticated  customers,  in 
particular  in  the  public  sector,  who  are  in  a  position  to  exercise 
significant bargaining  power  and  who  frequently  use  calls  for  tenders  to 
award  contracts.  In  addition,  the  Commission  has  taken  into  account  the 
competitive  pressure  of  other  wireless  technologies,  such  as  cordless 
telephony. 
Given  the  above-mentioned  factors,  the  Commission  has  concluded that there 
is neither  creation  nor  strengthening of  a  dominant  position as  a  result  of 
the  operation  and  has,  therefore,  decided not  to  oppose it. 
*  *  * 
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The  Commission  has  today  formally  adopted  the  Article  90  directive,  put 
forward  by  Commissioner  Van  Miert  in  cooperation  with  Commissioner 
Bangemann,  opening  the  EU  mobile  and personal  communications  market  to  full 
competition. 
The  directive is  based  on  the discussion  process  launched last year  by  the 
Green  Paper  on  Mobile  and  Personal  Communications.  It  requires  Member 
States  to  abolish all  exclusive  and special  rights  in  the area  of  mobile 
communications  and,  wherever  this has  not  yet been  achieved,  to  establish 
open  and  fair licensing  procedures  to  authorise  the  launch  of the digital 
services  GSM,  DCS  1800  and  DECT.  This  includes lifting the  restrictions  on 
current licensees  for  one  of  these  frequencies  from  applying  to extend their 
services  into  the others.  The  directive stipulates that Member  States must 
cease  to restrict the  combination  of the mobile  technologies  or  systems,  in 
particular  where multistandard  equipment  is  available,  while  also  taking 
into account  the benefit  of ensuring effective competition between  operators 
in the  relevant markets  by allowing  new entrants  gain  a  foothold. 
The  directive also  removes  all existing  restrictions  on  use  of  facilities 
for  mobile  networks,  allowing  new mobile  operators  to  make  full  use  of their 
own  infrastructure  as  well  as  that  provided by  third  parties  such  as 
utilities'  networks.  Use  of infrastructure  other  than  those  controlled by 
the  incumbent  telecoms  operator is essential to  the  success  of  new  entrants 
to  the mobile  market  as it giv~s them  much  greater control  over  their cost 
base.  Leasing  capacity  currently  represents  a  cost  factor  for  second 
operators  of betweep  30  and  50%.  The  right to set  up  their own  networks  and 
choose  alternative  infrastructure  and  connections  also  gives  mobile 
operators  significantly more  flexibility representing  an  strong push  towards 
further development  and  innovation in the mobile market. 
Greater efficency  and  choice bought  about  by  competition in  the  mobile 
market is  particularly  important  in  the  run  up  to  1998  full  telecoms 
liberalisation  as it  will  dampen  the  potential  for  increases  in  {fixed) 
local  charges  to  the  consumer.  The  increasingly commercial  incumbent  (fixed 
link)  operations  are  now  set to  position themselves  to make  the  most  of 
their local  loop  monopoly before  the effects  of full  network  competition  are 
felt.  However,  the  rapidly  decreasing price  of  competitive  mobile  services 
will  set  an  effective ceiling  for  the wire  based local tariffs. 
'fht-~  Cmrun.ission  will  be  paying  close  attention to price  adjustments  in  tIll' 
telecoms  sector between  now  and  1998  in order  to  secure  the  maximum  benefits 
of liberalisation for  consumers  across  the  EU. 
Time  Table 
The  mobile  directive will  enter into  force  twenty  days  after publication in 
the  Official  Journal  of  the  EC  which  is expected within  the  next  ten  days. 
The  Hember  States  then  have  nine  months  to  notify the  Commission  of  the 
dppt·op.r.iate  n<ltional  measures  taken  to  implement  its provisions. 
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From  the  moment  the directive  enters  into  force,  in addition  to  what  has 
already been  achieved in  opening  up  the  GSM  licensing process  across  the 
Union,  Member  States must  open  licence allocation procedures  for  all public 
access/Telepoint  applications,  including systems  operating  on  the basis  of 
the  DECT  standard. 
By  January  1,  1998,  at the  latest the  Member  States must  also  have  opened  up 
the  licencing of mobile  systems  according  to  the  DCS  1800  standard. 
Restrictions  on  infrastructure  and  direct  interconnection  for  mobile 
communications  must  be  abolished  immediately.  However,  Member  States  with 
1ess developed  networks  may  apply  for  derogations  of  up  to  five  years  to 
take  account  of their specific  situations.  This  concerns  Portugal,  Greece, 
Spain  and  Ireland. 
Some  figures  about  the Mobile  Market 
With  adoption  of  these  measures  the  European  Union  has  now  taken  the  lead in 
setting the  right  regulatory  conditions  for  encouraging  the  development  of 
mobile  and personal  communications  into  a  vast mass  market.  The  directive 
means  that the  EU  market will be  the first  region in the world  to  enjoy  the 
combination  of liberalisation  of services  and  networks,  together  with  the 
deployment  of  harmonised,  leading  edge,  digital standards  over  such  a  large 
area.  The  standards  confirmed  for  the  EU  are  GSM,  DCS  1800  (the  two 
frequencies  available  for  digital mobile  services)  and  DECT  (for digital 
cordless  telephony  within  a  fixed  radius).  This  both  reflects  and  further 
establishes  the  global  momentum behind the  take  up  of  this  technology  for 
the  second  generation digital mobile  systems.  The  wireless  market  is  now  set 
to  become  a  core  component  of the information  society and  the  development  of 
true person to person  communications. 
The  mobile  sector is by  far  the most  dynamic  in  the  telecoms  market  in the 
EU  experiencing levels  of  growth  of  over  60%.  In  the last year  the  number 
of cellular subscribers  in  Europe  has  grown  from  around  12  million  to  over 
20  million,  clearly  outstripping growth  in numbers  of  fixed  subscribers. 
The  vast majority of  the  new mobile  customers  are  enjoying digital services, 
particularly GSM,  which  allows'  them  to  roam  throughout  Europe  with  the  same 
handset  and  is also  much  more  efficient concerning  use  of  the  frequency 
spectrum. 
On  top  of  very  substantial  analogue  networks  in countries  such  as  the  UK, 
Italy  and  Scandinavia,  the  growth potential of  GSM  is  now  also  evident  in 
nearly all the  Member  States.  In  France,  for  example,  GSM  subscribers  grew 
from  around  337  000  to  around  797  000  over  the past  year.  In  Belgium there 
were  around  53  000  GSM  subscribers  at  the  end  of  1994  and  there are  now 
nearly  146  000.  Italy saw  growth  over  the  same  period  from  45  000  in  1994 
to  170  000  in October  1995.  Germany still remains  by  far  the most  important 
market  with  almost  three  and  a  half million users,  of which  over  two  and  a 
half million are  now  on  the  GSM  network.  However  progress  in countries  with 
less  developed  networks  is  also  notable.  Over  the last  12  months  GSM 
subscribers  in  Greece  increased  from  125  000  to  255  000,  and  in  Portug~l, 
from  122  000  to  241  000.  The  Scandinavian  countries  are  now  also 
expe.riencing massive  growth  in take  up  of  GSM.  Most  impressive is  Sweden 
whr~l.'e  thL~  GSM  market  has  grown  from  around  200  000  to  905  000  over  the  past 
yedr. 
In  total,  Commission  studies  predict  38  million cellular  mobile  usecs  in 
Eu.ropt:-- by  the  year  2000  and  around  80  million by  2010. 
The  M,nkt>t  9rowth  and  lower  prices  brought  about  by  introducing  compPt it i or\ 
into  t:hc~~:e  markets  will  t~ffpct all sorts  of  users:  residential,  both  yollll<J 
singles  as  well  as  families,  and  elderly or  disabled people  who  benefit  from 
a  cordless  phone;  small  and  medium  sized businesses  benefitting  from  the 
organisational  flexibility implied by  the  cordless  office,  and  international 
business  travellers benefitting  from  cross  border  GSM  roaming. 
*** 
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ON: IP/96/129  Date: 1996-02-07 
TXT: FR EN DE DA NL IT EL 
PDF: 
Word Processed: 
The  Commission  has  given  the  green light  for  the acquisition by  AT&T  Corp., 
the  American  telecommunications  company,of  certain  business  units  of  the 
Dutch  company  Philips  Electronics  N.V.  in  the market  for  the provision  of 
public  telecommunications  equipment. 
AT&T,  the American  telecommunications  company,  provides  a  broad  range  of 
voice  and  data  communications  services,  in particular  US  and  international 
long-distance carrier  services.  AT&T  is the  ultimate parent  company  o1  u 
group  engaged in the  full  range  of  telecoms  operator activities. 
AT&T's  activities  are organised into  a  number  of  different businesses.  The 
telecoms  equipment  manufacturing  activities are  in  the  Network  Systems 
Group.  The  acquisition  takes  place  in the  framework  of the  process  of 
restructuring  of  AT&T  which  will  lead  to  the  separation  of  the 
telecommunications  equipment  business  from other  groups  (including  telecoms 
services)  by  01.01.97. 
Philips,  the  Dutch  company,  is  one  of  the  world's  largest  electronics 
companies.  Its  products  include  lighting,  industrial  and  consumer 
electronics,  recorded music,  components,  semiconductors,  medical  systems, 
and  communications  systems. 
The  two  divisions  from  which  the Acquired  Businesses  are to be  divested are 
Telecommunications  Radioelectriques  et  Telephoniques  (TRT)  and  Philips 
Kommunikations  Industrie AG  (PKI).  Both  of  these divisions  are within  the 
Philips  Communication  Systems  division  and  are  engaged in the  development, 
production  and distribution of  telecommunication  equipment. 
A  number  of National  Sales  Organisations will also  be  acquired by  AT&T  in 
the  operation.  The  NSOs  concerned are  those located  in Austria,  Belgium, 
D  e  n  m  a  r  k 
Greece,Ireland,Italy,Netherlands,Norway,Portugal,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland 
and  the United  Kingdom. 
The  operation  will mainly 
market  shares  of  AT&T  and 
markets. 
be  of  a  complementary  character 
Philips  in  the  relevant  product 
with  regard  to 
and  geographic 
The  Commission  investigation has  concluded  that  the operation  will  not 
cre~te or  strengthen  a  dominant  position in the  affected market. 
*** 
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At  the  initiative of  Commissioners  Van  Miert  and  Bangemann,  the  Commission 
today  agreed to  adopt  the directive implementing  in  EU  law  the  commitment  to 
full  competition in  the  EU  telecommunications  market  by  1st January  1998. 
Issued under  Treaty  Article  90,  the  directive  fixes  the date  for  full 
liberalisation into  EU  legislation  and  sets  out  deadlines  for  progress  in 
national  implementation  in preparation  for  this  goal.  Underpinning  the 
directive is the  recognition that  competition,  in the presence  of  necessary 
regulatory safeguards,  enhances  the provision of universal  service.  Member 
States must  notify the  Commission  of measures  to  ensure universal  service  by 
1  July  1997  at the latest. 
In  line  with  the  broader  interests  of  global  information  society 
coordination,  adoption of this  new  EU  legislative  framework  comes  just  four 
weeks  after final  agreement  in the  US  of the  1996  Telecoms  Act  which  fully 
modernises  US  telecoms  regulations  and market  structure. 
In  addition  to  the  1998  date  for  opening  up  the markets  in voice  telephony 
and  public  network  infrastructure,  the  directive  accelerates  the 
liberalisation in all other areas:  the lifting of  all remaining  Member  State 
restrictions  which  do  not  require  major  changes  in  legislative  and 
regulatory  frameworks  must  be  achieved  this  year  (1996).  Restrictions  have 
already been  abolished in satellite,  cable  and mobile  communications.  The 
current directive  thus  removes  the last  hurdle before  the  final  gate  is 
opened:  As  of  July  1  of  this  year  use  of all alternative  infrastructure 
(such  as  the  telecoms  networks  of  railways,  energy  and  water  companies  which 
are  currently  only authorised  for  restricted  "in-house"  purposes)  must  be 
liberalised for  carriage of  commercial  telecoms  services.  This  provision 
excludes  public  voice  telephony  service  which  may  be  reserved  to  the 
national  telecoms  organisation until  1998. 
The  original  date put 
lifting restrictions  on 
months  as  a  compromise 
consideration here: 
forward  by  the  Commission  of  January  1,  1996,  for 
alternative infrastructure  has  been  moved  back  six 
to  the Member  States.  Two  factors  were  taken  into 
the  time  needed  to  achieve  the  implementation 
bringing  the date  in  line with  the  agreement 
Commission  in important  competition  cases 
requirements 
conditions  set down  by  the 
As  regards  the deadlines  of  July  1996  and  January  1998  for  alternative 
infrastructure  and  full  competition  respectively,  Member  States  with  less 
developed  networks  shall  be  granted,  upon  request,  additional  implementation 
periods  of  up  to  five  years  provided that this  is  needed  to  achieve  the 
necessary structural  adjustments.  Member  States with  very  small  networks 
may  be  granted  up  to  two  years  under  the  same  conditions. 
Alongside  the  lifting  of  government  restrictions,  the  Full  Competition 
directive  also  sets  down  broad  competition  principles  as  regards  the 
appropriate  national  regulatory  frameworks  for  the  post  1998  environment. 
This  concerns,  in particular,  interconnection,  licensing  and  financing  of 
universal  service.  Such  regulatory instruments  should be  transparent,  non-
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discriminatory and  as  least  restrictive of competition  as  possible  whilst 
still achieving  important policy goals  of public service,  interoperability 
and  use  of limited resources  such  as  spectrum and  rights  of  way. 
Universal  service in  fact  the  subject  of  the  recently adopted  (13/12/96}, 
Parliament  and  Council  directive  applying  open  access  rules  to  voice 
telephony.  In the  coming  weeks,  the  Commission  will isssue  a  detailed 
Commission  Communication  which will  set out  the  scope  of universal  service 
and  the  future  approach  of the  Commission in this  regard. 
The  harmonisation  requirements  of  Member  State  rules  in  these areas  fall 
under  the  EU's  ONP  (Open  Network  Provision)  framework  which  is  concerned 
with  open  and  efficient access  to,  and  use  of,  the public telecoms  networks 
and  services.  ONP  Council  and  Parliament legislation in these  areas,  issued 
under Article  100A,  is currently  under  discussion.  The  Commission  has 
ensured that the  Article  90  framework  is fully coordinated and  coherent with 
the draft  ONP  framework. 
In  the meantime,  before implementation  of  ONP  rules  is  achieved and/or  in 
areas  where  their  application  is limited,  the  rights  of  new  entrant~ to 
liberalised  markets  under  the  Treaty  competition  rules  should  not  be 
compromised. 
Size  and  growth  of  telecoms  markets  and  impact  of  competition* 
Telecommunications  is  one  of  the  largest  and  most  profitable economic 
sectors  in  the world.  In  1992  public  telecoms  services  revenue  reached  $505 
billion.  The  global  telecoms  equipment market  came  to  $120  billion  in  the 
same  year.  At  a  time  when  nearly  all  large  industrial  and  service 
corporations  faced  general  economic  slow  down  the  telecoms  sector  has 
thrived.  In  1993,  for  example,  the largest  25  public telecoms  operators  in 
the  developed  world were  more  profitable  than  the  largest  100  commercial 
banks.  Where  telecoms  services  (data,  long distance  and mobile)  have  been 
subjected to the greatest level of competition is  where  the  greatest  revenue 
growth  and  new  employment  have  been  created.  In  those  countries  in the  EU 
and  around  the world  with  the  longest  experience of  liberalisation,  it is 
demonstratable*  that  telecoms  employment  by  new  service suppliers  offsets 
jobs  shed  by  incumbent  PTOs  as  they take  on  the productivity gains  of  new 
technology. 
At  the  same  time,  the  increasingly  strong link  between efficient  telecon1s 
service  and  the  whole  national  economy  is  shown  in the  growing  reliance 
which  business  in general places  on  telecoms.  Over  the last  ten  years  the 
ratio of business  telecoms  links  to  employees  was  around  one  to nine,  now  it 
is more  than  one  to three. 
The  benefits  to business  of  telecoms  competition are of  course  well  known. 
It is  important to  underline that  residential users  also  see  significant 
benefits  when  competition  is introduced as  is  shown  in the  following  graphs 
(based  on  OECD  research  on  countries in the  OECD  region) . 
Source:  OECD  1995 
Communication  Outlook. 
*** 
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Date:  1996-06-26 
Word Processed: 
The  Telecommunications  Council 
1996,  beginning at 10.00 a.m. 
following  ones: 
is going  to  have its  next  session on  27  June 
in Luxembourg.  The  topics  of the  day  are  the 
1.  Framework  for 
services. 
authorisations  and  licences  for  telecommunications 
The  proposed directive based  on Art.  57(2),  66  and  100  A  sets  up  rules  to 
be  implemented  at  national  level,  together with  full  application  of 
competition  principles,  both  for  the  procedures  for  the  granting  of 
authorisations  or licences  and  the  conditions  that  can  be  attached to 
these  authorisations.  Such  a  common  framework  should  facilitate  for 
undertakings  acting  in the  field of  telecommunications  the  exercise of 
freedom  of  establishment  and  freedom  to provide  services  in the  European 
Union. 
The  Council  could  reach  a  Common  Position in  principle with  a  view  to 
formal  adoption in September  on  this proposal. 
2.  Adaptation of  two  Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  Directives. 
Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  concerns  the harmonisation of  conditions  for 
access  to,  and  use  of,  public telecommunications  networks  and services. 
The  ONP  Framework  Directive  (90/387  EEC)  and  the  ONP  Leased  Lines 
Directive  (92/44  EEC),  both based  on Art.  100  A,  are being  now  updated  to 
take  account  of the  introduction of competition after 1998,  and  to provide 
a  common  approach  for  the provision of important public telecommunications 
services  ~n the  European  Union. 
The  objective  of  the  revised  ONP  framework 
harmonisation  of  conditions  for  access  to 
telecommunications  networks  and  services.  The 
requires  that  leased lines  shall  be  offered 
without discrimination to all users. 
Directive  remains  the 
and  use  of  public 
leased  lines  Directive 
and  provided  on  request 
Given  the  crucial  role played  by national  regulatory  authorities  for  the 
telecommunications  in  a  liberalised  market,  a  new  requirement is  being 
introduced  to  reinforce  the  independence  of  the  national  regulatory 
authorities  for  telecommunications  in each Member  State. 
The  Council  could  reach  a  Common  Position  on  this proposal. 
3.  Postal  Services 
The  proposed Directive based  on Art.  100  A  of the  EC  Treaty.provides  for  a 
mandatory  level  of  universal  service  to  be  provided  throughout  the 
Community  to all  citizens,  wherever  they are located,  at affordable prices 
and  for  a  high degree  of quality of service. 
In order  to  ensure  the  financial  viability of the  universal  service,  the 
proposed  Directive  defines  harmonised  criteria for  the  services  that may 
~e reserved  for  universal  service providers  and  a  timetable  for  a  partial 
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opening  of  the market  (direct mail  and  incoming  cross-border mail). 
The  Council will  have  an  orientation  debate  on  the  definition of  the 
universal  service and.the  reserved area. 
4.  Directive  concerning the  Protection of Personal  Data. 
The  proposal  (based  on Art.  100  A)  defines  general  principles  for  the 
protection.  of  personal  data  and  privacy  in  the  context  of 
telecommunication  networks,  in particular  the integrated services digital 
network  (ISDN) . 
The  Council  could  - 6  years  after the  first proposal  of the  Commission  -
~each  a  common  position.  This  would  be  an  important  step  towards  an 
efficient protection of the  ISDN  users. 
5.  Programme  to promote  the linguistic diversity  of the  Community  in  the 
Information Society. 
The  programme  covering language  aspects  of  the  Information  Society  will 
run  for  a  period of  three  years  1996-1998  and  have  a  budget  of  15  MECU. 
The  three  action lines  proposed seek  to  support  efforts to  construct  a 
European infrastructure  for multilingual  language  resources,  to spur  the 
language  industries into  action by  stimulating  technology transfer  and 
demand  through  a  limited number  of shared-cost demonstration projects. 
Transferring the  experience acquired  by  the  European institutions in  the 
processing of multilingualism to the  administrations  in the Member  States 
and  sharing the  language  resources  which  each produces  can  help  achieve 
economies  of scale  and  reduce  the  cost to  multilingual  communication  to 
encourage  cooperation between administrations in the Member  States  and  the 
European  institutions  in  order  to  reduce  the  cost  of  multilingual 
communication  in the  European public sector. 
The  Council  could  adopt this proposal,  which  is based  on Art.  130  (3)  of 
the Treaty. 
6.  Universal  service in the  telecommunications  sector. 
The  Commission  presented  on  13  March  1996  a  communication  on  the  future 
development  of  the  universal  service  in the  European  Union.  In  a  fully 
liberalised environment,  every  citizen of  the Union,  whatever  his  living 
standard  or the  region  he  lives in,  will  benefit  a  guaranteed access  at 
affordable  conditions  to a range  of telecommunication services  including 
voice telephony,  fax,  electronic data,  allowing  him thereby to participate 
in the  Information Society. 
The  Presidencey  has  prepared  a  Council  resolution  which  follows  the 
Commissions  communication  and  opens  the  way  for  the  proposed revision of 
the  ONP  voice  telephony directive  in order  to integrate  the notion  of 
affordability,  equivalent  level  of  service  to disabled  users  and  the 
introduction of  advanced  features. 
*** 
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The  Telecommunications  Council  on  27  June  1996  in  Luxembourg  reached 
political agreements  for  common  positions  on  two  important directives: 
1.  Directive  concerning  the  Protection of  Personal  Data. 
The  Council  reached  a  political agreement  on  this proposal.  A  common 
position will be  adopted at one  of the next  Council meetings. 
The  proposal  for  a  Directive  (based  on  Art.  100  A)  on  the protection of 
data  and privacy  in the  telecommunications  sector,  dates  back  to  1990, 
when it was  submitted together  with  a  draft  for  a  general  Directive  on 
Data  Protection.  In  1994  both drafts  were  formally  revised  by  the 
Commission  to  take  account  of the  first  reading  in  the  European 
Parliament  and  of the  new  tide of subsidiarity. 
However,  the  Council  suspended  work  on  the  telecommunications  data 
protection  Directive until work  on  the general  Directive was  completed. 
In  October  1995  the  general  Directive was  formally  adopted  and  the 
telecommunications  data protection directive was  put  back  on  the  agenda 
again  by  the  Spanish  Presidency.  The  text represents  a  considerable 
added  value in relation to  the General  Directive  on  Data  Protection. 
The  added  value  consists  in particular of  the  coverage  of legal persons 
(General  Directive  only covers  natural  persons),  the protection  of 
privacy  (e.G.  by  the  articles  on  unsolicited calls  and  on  automatic 
call  forwarding)  and  of  the  translation  of the  principles  of  the 
General  Directive into  more  concrete  and  operational  requirements  which 
limit the  scope  for divergent  interpretations  by Member  States  and/or 
operators. 
2.  Adaptation of  two  Open  Network  Provision  (ONP)  Directives. 
The  Council  reached  a  political agreement  on  this proposal.  A  common 
position will be  adopted at one  of the next  Council  meetings. 
The  ONP  Framework  Directive  (90/387  EEC)  and  the  ONP  Leased  Lines 
Directive  (92/44  EEC),  both  based  on Art.  100  A,  are being  now  updated 
to  take  account  of  the  introduction  of competition after 1998,  and  to 
provide  a  common  approach  for  the  prov~s~on  of  important  public 
telecommunications  services  in the  European  Union. 
The  most  important  modification of  the  ONP  framework  Directive  is that 
given  the  crucial  role played  by  national  regulatory authorities  for 
the  telecommunications  in  a  liberalised  market,  a  new  requirement  is 
introduced to  reinforce  the  independence  of  the national  regulatory 
authorities  for  telecommunications  in each Member  State. 
The  objective  of  the  revised  ONP  framework  Directive  remains  the 
harmonisation  of  conditions  for  access  to  and  use  of  public 
telecommunications  networks  and  services.  The  leased lines  Directive 
requires  that  leased lines  shall be  offered and  provided on  request 
without  discrimination to all users. 
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As  the  European  Parliament has  not  yet  given its position,  the  Council 
could not  take  a  formal  decision,  but it came  to  a  political agreement 
to  renew its decision,  this  time  based  on  Article  129  D.  The  decision 
will  cover  the period 1997-1999  with  a  budget  of  ECU  30  million. 
4.  Postal  Services 
5. 
The  proposed Directive based  on  Art.  100  A  of the  EC  Treaty provides 
for  a  mandatory level  of universal  service  to be  provided  throughout 
the  Community to all citizens,  wherever  they  are located,  at affordable 
prices  and  for  a  high degree  of quality of service. 
In  order  to ensure  the  financial viability 
the proposed  Directive  defines  harmonised 
that may  be  reserved  for  universal  service 
for  a  partial opening  of  the market  (direct 
border mail). 
of  the  universal  service, 
criteria  for  the  services 
providers  and  a  timetable 
mail  and  incoming  cross-
After  a  debate  on  the definition  of  the universal  service  and  the 
reserved  area,  the  Council  charged the  COREPER  · to  continue its work  on 
the proposal. 
Framework  for 
services. 
authorisations  and·  licences  for  telecommunications 
The  proposed directive based  on Art.  57(2),  66  and  100  A  sets  up  rules 
to be  implemented  at .national level,  together with  full  application of 
competition  principles,  both  for  the  procedures  for  the granting  of 
authorisations  or  licences  and  the  conditions  that  can be  attached  to 
these authorisations.  Such  a  common  framework  should facilitate  for 
undertakings  acting in the field  of telecommunications  the exercise  of 
freedom  of  establishment  and  freedom  to  provide  services  in  the 
European  Union. 
After  a  long discussion,  the  Council  was  of the  opinion  that  the 
further preparation by  COREPER  was  necessary. 
The  most difficult  question is whether  scarce  ressources  should  be  the 
only possible  justification  for  a  limitation of the  number  of licences 
or whether  other  criteria should be  introduced  (for example  size of the 
market). 
6.  Programme  to  promote  the linguistic diversity  of the  Community  in  the 
Information Society. 
The  Commission  has  proposed  a  programme  covering language  aspects  of 
the  Information Society  which will  run  for  a  period  of  three  years 
1996-1998  and  have  a  budget  of  ECU  15  million.  The  three action  lines 
proposed  seek  to  support efforts to construct  a  European  infrastructure 
for  multilingual  language  resources,  to  spur  the·  language industries 
into  action  by  stimulating  technology transfer  and  demand  through  a 
limited number  of shared-cost demonstration projects. 
Transferring  the  experience  acquired by  the  European  institutions in 
the processing of  multilingualism to the administrations  in  the  Member 
States  and  sharing  the  language  resources  which  each  produces  can  help 
achieve  economies  of  scale  and  reduce  the  cost  to  multilingual 
communication  to  encourage  cooperation between  administrations  in  the 
Member  States  and  the  European  institutions in order to  reduce  the  cost 
of multilingual  communication  in the  European  public sector. 
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As  the proposal  is based  on  Art.  130  (3)  of  the Treaty,  an  unanimous 
Council  decision  is  required.  Two  delegations  being  opposed  to  the 
proposal,  the  programme  was  not  adopted. 
7.  Universal  service in the  telecommunications  sector. 
The  Commission  presented on  13  March  1996  a  communication  on  the  future 
development  of the universal  service in  the  European  Union.  In  a  fully 
liberalised environment,  every  citizen  of  the  Union,  whatever  his 
living standard or  the  region he  lives in,  will benefit  a  guaranteed 
access  at  affordable  conditions  to  a  range  of  telecommunication 
services  including voice  telephony,  fax,  electronic data,  allowing  him 
thereby to participate in the  Information Society. 
The  Council  has  a  comprehensive 
communication  but  took  no  decision. 
discussion  on  the  Commissions 
8.  Consequences  of  the  turn  of the  century  for  information  technology 
systems. 
*** 
At  lunch  the  Council  discussed the  problems  posed by  the  turn of  the 
century  for  information  technology  systems.  Wherever  a  unique 
indication of the  year  is required,  the  use  of  an  abbreviated  2  digit 
indication  is  no  longer  acceptable,  and  instead the  full  4  digit 
representation  will  have  to be  used,  e.g.  1996  instead of  '96. 
Changing  the  software,  and  where  necessary also  the data,  represents  a 
major  effort.  In  particular administrative,  financial  and  accounting 
applications will be  affected,  in public administrations  as  well  as  in 
the  private sector.  Furthermore,  it will have  to be  feared  that not all 
problems  will,  or even  can  be_  pinpointed before  they  appear,  and 
therefore  some  disruption and  artefacts  have  to be  foreseen  for  the 
beginning of the next  century. 
The  Council  asked the  Commission  to  convoke  a  group  of experts  in order 
to analyse  further this  question. 
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effective  tools  or organisational  frameworks  have  not  yet  been  fully 
developed:  in  particular  this means  clearer  coordination of  critical 
aspects  of  telecoms  specific regulation 
Let  us  begin,  in any  case,  with the  "good  news":  the 
made  to date  and  my  vision  of the  full  and  enhanced 
competition policy in this  area: 
progress  we  have 
use  of effective 
As  most  of  you will  no  doubt  be  aware,  the  EU  liberalisation  timetable 
is  now  fully  confirmed  and  set  into  legislation,  with  the  Full 
Competition  Directive  adopted  last  March.  It culminates  with  the 
lifting  of all  government  restrictions  on  provision  of all  and  any 
telecoms  services  or networks  by  January  1998.  But  the  real  work,  both 
for  the  Commission  and  the Member  States,  of  course  starts  now  in the 
run  up  to  the deadline.  July  1  was  the deadline  for  liberalisation  of 
alternative infrastructure  and  I  will  come  back  to this in  a  moment.  By 
October  1st  member  states must  notify the measures  they have  taken  to 
open  up  use  of  cable  networks  for  telecoms  purposes  and  by  November  15 
they  must  notify  liberalisati0n  measures  for  mobile  networks  and 
services.  During  1997  arrangements  for  licensing,  dealing  with 
interconnect  agreements  and  mechanisms  for  sharing  out  and  funding 
universal  service must  be  notified to  the  Commission  so  that  they can  be 
scrutinised under  the  competition  rules  and  so that we  can  ensure  the 
framework  is in place  for effective market  entry in  1998. 
The  Member  States  are  committed,  politically  and  legally  to  this 
timetable  which  is  a  great  achievement  in itself,  but the  true impact is 
of  course  only felt when  we  have  full  and effective  implementation  of 
these  commitments.  I  am  determined  to use  the  full potential  of  the 
Competition  Rules  of the Treaty to maintain  a  tough  stance in this area. 
We  cannot  tolerate tardy or  incomplete  implementation at  this  stage,  and 
luckily we  have  the  legal tools  to  impose  this: 
On  the  one·  hand  we  can  and  will  start  infringement  procedures 
immediately  a  deadline  has  passed or  a  notification has  been  found  to  be 
lacking 
On  the  other  hand  we  are  taking full  advantage  of  the  strong  and 
effective  link  between  implementation  of  government  commitments  to 
liberalisation  and  our  conditions  for  allowing  alliances  involving 
dominant  telecom operators.  Let  me  illustrate what  I  mean  by  this  with 
some  recent  cases  in this area. 
The  arrangement  between  the  French  and  German  national operators  in the 
Atlas  I  GlobalOne  alliance  agreements  raised  some  very serious  concerns 
regarding  their  home  markets  in  the  relevant  services  where  both 
operators  were  holding legal  and de  facto  dominant  positions.  One  of 
the main  condi~ions for  us  to  give  this  joint venture  the  go-ahead under 
competition  rules is  that full  implementation  of  the  commitment  to 
liberalise alternative  infrastructure in both  Germany  and  France is not 
only notified  but actually effective - this means  new  licences  granted 
and  new  players  entering  the market.  The  same  strategy  for putting 
pressure  on  governments'  commitments  is  being used  in relation to  the 
Unisource  agreements.  We  cannot  look  favourably  upon  such  a  deal  unless 
the  relevant markets  are  really open  to competition. 
Another  point  I  might mention  here  is that both  these  cases  have  also 
involved  a  major  American partner.  We  are  being  no  less  tough  on 
ensuring  appropriate  market  entry  conditions  in  AT&T's  home  market 
before  allowing  involvement  in a  European  Operation  such  as  Unisource  I 
Uniworld. 
Another  illustration  of  this  link  between  competition  cases  and 
implementation  of  the  liberalisation timetable  was  the  recent  GSM  case 
in Italy.  As  part of  a  compensation package  for  what  we  regarded as  an 
unfair  fee  being  charged  to  the  second  operator,  we  demanded  that the 
Italian  government  make  firm and  specific  commitments  to  an  early 
opening  of  the  alternative infrastructure market  to  competition.  I  am 
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determined to insist on  this  co~tment in our current contacts  with  the 
new  Italian Government. 
These  cases  have  of  course  been very  much  in the  public eye  and  I 
believe  the  general  momentum  caused by  them has  played no  small part in 
the  success  we  have  had  with  the  July 1  deadline  for notification  of 
alternative infrastructure under  the provisions  of the full  competition 
dir~tive.  Apart  from  four  of the  five eligible  countries  applying  for 
derogations  due  to  small  or  less  developed  networks,  all the  member 
states  are generally  on  track  and many  are  already in  advance  of  our 
timetable to lift restrictions  on all services  and infrastructure. 
The  other side of this  strong parallel link  between applying  competition 
rules  to  key  cases  and  achieving  effective  liberalisation  concerns 
direct control  of  the  commercial  behaviour of the  dominant  operators  in 
the  market  once it  is  opened to  competition.  In particular  this 
concerns  terms  and  conditions  of access  and interconnection as  well  as 
the control,  more  generally,  of anti-competitive pricing behaviour. 
The  same  cases  I  just mentioned  are also  relevant here.  In  the Atlas 
and  Unisource  cases  we  are  imposing  conditions  not  just on  governments 
but  also  on  the parties  in terms  of  non-discriminatory treatment  of 
their competitors  and  downstream service providers  vis  a  vis  access  to 
their  networks.  Just  so  in the  Italian GSM  case,  the  compensation 
package  also  involved  commitments  on  the  part  of  Telecom  Italia 
regarding  favourable  interconnection conditions  for  the  second mobile 
operator. 
The  other important  case  I  am  thinking of is the  recent  concern  over  new 
tariff schemes  proposed by  DT.  It looked like the  German  operator  could 
be  using its market  power  and monopoly profits in  order to target  just 
those business  customers  where it  faced  new  competition,  with discounts 
and  bundled  packages  which  the  new  entrants,  however  innovative  and 
efficient they  might  be,  could  not  reasonably match.  In  fact  we  also 
received  a  formal  complaint  from  the latter  on  exactly these  grounds. 
The  concern,  to be  more  precise,  was  threefold:  cross  subsidy,  predatory 
pricing and  bundling.  Having  investigated the problem,  we  came  to  an 
agreement  with the  German  authorities  on  the  minimum  conditions,  or 
competitive  safeguards,  under  which  the  proposed  discounts  could  be 
allowed. 
The  most  important  of these were  that: 





new  agreements  allowing  competitors  fair ~ccess DT's  public network 
must  be  concluded 
clear  and  transparent  accounting separation  must  be  put  in place 
between  DT's  monopoly voice  telephony  business  and  the  liberalised 
corporate business  ' 
rebates  must  be  more  generalised,  ie  they must  also be  granted to 
domestic  customers 
This  case  again  shows  how  application of  EU  competition  rules  can  be 
used  as  a  stimulus  and  engine  for  governments  to push  through  reforms 
which  are  really effective  "on  the  ground",  to the  benefit of both  a 
sustainable competitive market  and  the  end  consumers. 
It  also highlights  a  general  issue of  concern which  should be  stressed: 
as  the  1998  deadline  draws  in incumbent  operators  may  well  attempt  to 
gain  advantage  from  their  remaining  time  as  monopolists  to  improve  their 
strategic and pricing position in ways  which  could  include  cross  subsidy 
and predatory  behaviour.  Commercial  behaviour which  may  appear  to 
result  in attractive discounts  or  tailor made  products  may  in reality be 
defensive strategies which  are ultimately unsustainable in  a  competitive 
environment.  Close  scrutiny by  competition  rules  is  essential  to  ensure 
that in  this period of  flux  between  monopoly  and  competition,  pricing 
and  marketing  strategies  are  sustainable  and  are  designed  to  win 
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customers  not  lock  them in. 
II  The  changing  landscape  calls  for  new  streamlined procedures 
Having  brought  you  up  to date  on  our  record  to date  concerning use  of 
competition policy  let me  go  on  to outline  how  I  see  the  future  role of 
competition  rules  developing in the  telecoms  market: 
Most  importantly  the  full  and effective  use  of  these Treaty  articles 
must  be  maximised in the  coming  months.  As  I  have  just outlined,  they 
are  the most  important  and  successful  tool  the  Commission  has  at its 
disposal  for  turning liberalising goals  into  reality.  For  this  reason 
we  must  maintain  and  enhance  competition  controls  in the areas  for  which 
they were  designed.  There  are  four  important  strands  here: 
First,  we  will be  targeting increased  resources  and  energy at  ensuring 
effective  implementation.  This  will  include  streamlining  the 
infringement process  where  problems  occur.  The  competition policy  focus 
vis  a  vis  telecoms  legislation has  now  shifted from policy  development 
to  ensuring its application on  the  ground.  This  needs  to be  a  two  way 
process  between  the  competition  services  of  the  Commission  and  the 
market  "out  there".  Alongside  our  own  investigative powers,  we  hope  to 
be  increasingly receiving and  reacting to  feedback  from  competitors,  new 
entrants  and  users  as  to  what  is  working  in terms  of  competition,  and 
what·  is not  and  why.  Once  it  is  clear  there  is  a  problem  with 
implementation  the  new  streamlined  and  simplified  infringement 
procedures  will  be  put into  gear  to  ensure  the  earliest  possible 
satisfaction  for  aggrieved  parties.  I  also  want  to  stress  the 
importance  of  the  "direct  application"  of  the  Article  90  I 
liberalisation directives.  I  expect  to  see  much  greater  use  in  the 
coming  years  of  the  national  courts  for  complaints  regarding 
discrepancies  between  our  directives  and  the  de  facto  or  de  jure 
situation in the national market. 
Second,  is our planned 
of alliances  and  joint 
sector  this will  mean 
quickly,  coherently and 
revision  of  the merger  regulation.  With  the  wave 
ventures  in  the  communications  and  information 
that  more  agreements  can  be  scrutinised,  more 
effectively. 
III  Development  of  competition  policy  regarding 
dominance  in liberalised markets 
bottlenecks  and 
The  third  strand of  enhancement  of  competition  rules  in the  telecoms 
environment  concerns  the  development  of  clear guidelines  regarding  the 
commercial  relations  between  the  dominant  incumbents  and  their  new 
competitors  and  wholesale  customers.  Basically  I  am  talking  about 
access  and interconnect  agreements: 
We  will  soon  be  publishing  an  important Notice  giving  general  and 
advance  guidance  as  to  the  application  of  the  Treaty  competition 
articles  in this  area.  This  should  represent  a  clear indication  to 
market  players  as  to  the  way  complaints,  regarding  abuse  of  dominant 
position,  discrimination and/or  collusive behaviour,  between  operators, 
will  be  decided.  In this  way,  and  with  a  few  precedent setting 
decisions,  we  hope  to discourage  anti-competitive  practices  from  the 
outset.  Thus  neither market  players  nor  the  Commission  services  need 
face  the  untenable  situation of having  each  and  every interconnection or 
access  agreement  scrutinised on  a  case by  case basis. 
The  other  strand  concerning  bottlenecks  and  dominance  is  the 
increasingly important  role  of  EU  competition  rules  in applying to  the 
converging  sectors  of  the  information  economy:  that  is  between 
telecommunications,  broadcasting  and  computing.  I  am  talking  about,  of 
course,  the  development  of multi-media  networks,  multi-media  ventures 
and  ot  L~ourse multi-media  products. 
In  the  same  way  as 
competition  rules 
I  have  already outlined  above,  our  application 
here  also  involves  tapping  the  potential  of 
of 
the 
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parallel  application  of  pro-competitive  policy  and  some 
decisions  and  investigations.  In.  particular  this  concerns 
dominant  network  operators  into the  converged markets. 
key  case 
entry  of 
The  original versions  of  the Media  Services  Group  (MSG)  in  Germany,  and 
Nordic  Satellite Distribution  (NSD)  agreement in  the Nordic market  had 
to  be  blocked because  they  involved,  amongst  other things,  network 
operators,  enjoying essentially gatekeeper  functions  extending dominance 
into  related broadcasting  and  content  markets.  With  the  same  basic 
concerns  in mind  we  have  launched initial investigations  into  the plans 
of  national  telecorn operators  in  counties  like Spain  and  Italy  to 
venture into the  cable  TV  market. 
In parallel,  the  whole  question  of  joint provision of  telecoms  and  cable 
TV  networks  by dominant  operators is  being addressed  from  the  policy 
perspective by  the  twin  reviews  announced  in our  Cable  Directive  (1995) 
and  the  Full  Competition Directive  (1996). 
We  have  recently announced  a  major  study in  this  area which  will assess 
different policy  options  based  on  results  of  the  an  intensive  analysis 
of  the market  itself and of  actual  and potential policy  impact  on  the 
developing  multi-media  market  structure.  In  particular  we  will 
concentrating on  the  following policy options: 
*  maintenance  of the  status  quo 
*  lifting of  existing  constraints  on  telecorn  operators  to  provide 
cable  TV  capacity to their customers 
*  divestiture of cable operations  of dominant  telecorn operators. 
The  main  underlying  issue in all  this is  the need  to leave  open  the 
potential  for  development  of  a  viable infrastructure  platform for  real 
competition at the customer  access  level.  On  the other hand  we  must  not 
stand  in  the  way  of  the  realisation  of  real  synergies  from  the 
perspective of either of the three  converging sectors. 
The  results  of  the policy  review based  on  the  study results  will be 
issued for  consultation by the start of next  year. 
Lastly in  the  multi-media  field  I  have  to  mention  the  spate of  new 
partnerships  and  agreements  corning  together across  Europe  for  the offer 
of digital satellite  TV  services  and  conditional access  systems.  Until 
the  commercial  negotiations  between the  likes  of  Bertelsrnann,  Vebacorn, 
Canal  +,  CLT  and  Kirch,  finally  settle  down  to result  in  notified 
agreements  it rather difficult for me  to give  a  clear indication of  my 
attitude to  such potentially  powerful  systems.  Let  me  just say at this 
point  that  where  ventures  draw  together  content  provision  and 
transmission  systems  we  will  be  keeping  a  very  close  eye  on  the 
competition implications.  On  the  other,  to  the  extent that there  are 
now  major projects developing in parallel their market  power  may  be  seen 
to  counterbalance each other. 
In  this brief  run  down  of  our  track  record to date  and  the major  strands 
of  the  development  and  future  of the  Commission's  competition  powers  in 
telecoms,  I  hope  some  clear messages  have  come  to the  fore: 
The  use  of  EU  competition policy has  played  a  key  role,  it  is proving to 
be  a  particularly effective tool,  and it is  going  to  be  enhanced  further 
in the  corning  years,  both in the  run period to.1998  and its aftermath. 
IV  The  role  for  a  European  Telecoms  Agency? 
I  would  like now  to  leave  competition policy for  a  moment  and  focus  on 
some  institutional  questions  thrown  up  by  key  areas  of  telecoms 
regulation  which  represent  a  critical  underpinning  to  effective 
liberalisation  and  the  development  of  the  EU-wide  market  in 
communications  services.  Competition  rules  can  only really  work  and 
make  sense  in  this  environment  within  an  appropriate  and  coordinated  EU 
regulatory  tramework.  It is  all very  well  to  open  markets  and lift 
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restrictions,  and  even  to  manage  and  control  dominant  players  where 
necessary,  but  new market  entrants  need more  than this. 
It is not  yet clear whether  a  European  Telecoms  Regulatory  Agency will 
finally be  considered  a  desirable  development,  as  concerns  certain 
specific  technical  tasks  for  the  telecoms  market,  areas  where  progress 
in coordination and  a  clear  EU  perspective is being urgently called for. 
The  EU's  ONP  framework  is  now  of  course spelling  out  clear  areas  of 
responsibility and  guiding  principles  for  the  telecoms  regulators  in 
each  Member  State.  However,  the pressure  on  these  national authorities 
will be  dramatically  increasing over  the next  year,  especially  in terms 
of  their  resources,  their  independence  and  their  effectiveness  in 
correctly implementing  EU  harmonisation  legislation.  The  accelerated 
pace  called  for,  coming  up  at  the  same  as  many  countries  are  going 
through privati$ation reforms  is likely to  cause  considerable  tension. 
On  top  of this  the  challenge  of true  .cooperation  and  coordination 
between  the national  regimes  is clearly intensifying.  This  is becoming 
most  urgent  in  fields  such  as  numbering,  frequencies  and  spectrum 
management  and  technical  specifications.  Not  only  do  we  need  EU 
coherence  in these matters  for  our  own  internal market,  but  we  also  need 
to be  in  a  position to truly speak with  one  voice  in  international  fora. 
I  am  particularly thinking here  of the  International  Telecommunications 
Union. 
As  regards  numbering  the most  important weaknesse$  currently concern  the 
lack  of  a  unified  numbering  space  and  Europe-wide  numbering  plan. 
Competitors  throughout  the  EU  will need  much  greater access  to numbers, 
they need  more  numbers  and ultimately  number portability which  must  be 
planned out at  EU  level. 
My  concern  about  technical  standards  and  specifications  is  that 
essentially global  markets  such  as  mobile  communications  are  still in 
danger  of  being tied up  regionally with  a  limited range  of technologies. 
Technical  restrictions  and  consequent divisions  of markets  help  no  one, 
least of  all our  telecoms  equipment  industries.  Even  though  we  did 
achieve  successful  internal  coordination  through  framework  bodies  such 
as  the  CEPT,  and  now  ETSI  and  ERO,  to  agree  upon  the  EU  wide  GSM 
standard,  our  .market  now  faces  the  challenge  of  competing  mobile 
standards  on  the  other side of  the Atlantic. 
The  need  for  effective  forward  planning and  negotiation at 
level will test  our  current  coordination  mechanisms,  and 
national  regulatory  bodies  will need to  cooperate closely 
to deal  with  the problems  satisfactorily. 
a  more  global 
certainly the 
if they  wish 
The  allocation of  frequencies,  management  of  spectrum  and  granting  of 
orbital slots  for satellite systems  are likewise problematic  areas  vis  a 
vis  the  current  coordination mechanisms  between  the  member  states.  I 
believe the  EU  market  and  pan-European  services may  increasingly suffer 
from  the  lack of  direct  EU  mechanisms,  in particular the  absence  .of  a 
joint  EU  representation  in decisive  international talks,  particularly 
the  ITU.  This  has  negative  repercussions,  both  for  our  own  internal 
policies  and  the efficacy of global  coordination as  a  whole. 
As  general  restrictions are  lifted,  both  by the  EU  timetable  and, 
assuming  success  next  February,  in  the  WTO  context,  divergencies  in 
national policies  in  these  technical  areas  pose  increasingly significant 
obstacles  to market  entry. 
We  will  have  to  see if  the  need  for  consistency and  coordination and  the 
need  for  a  clear  EU  perspective  leads  us  to  think  that institutional 
reform  is  necessary.  There  are  of  course  already  many  existing 
coordination bodies  drawing  together national  regulations  and  fostering 
cooperation.  There  is  no  shortage of  acronyms  to  draw  upon  such  as 
CEPT,  ECTRA,  ERO,  ETO,  EUTC,  but  however  many  there are it is becoming 
increasingly apparent  that these are  not  sufficient. 
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The  main point  I  want  to make  is that  we  should  focus  upon  exactly and 
only those  areas  where it is truly called  for.  In order to be  a  viable 
idea  and  a  workable  reality  a  European  Telecommunications  Agency  should 
have  a  mandate  of  clearly defined  and mainly  technical tasks  such  as 
numbering  and  spectrum management. 
Naturally I  am  contrasting this with  the tasks  which  competition policy 
is  concerned with  in the  telecoms  market:  here  the·  EU  perspective is 
strong and  the tools  are working well. 
V  WTO  and  the  External  Dimension  to  EU  Competition  Policy in telecoms 
So,  I  have  now  underlined  the increasing  importance  of  the  external 
dimension  of  certain  regulatory aspects  in telecoms  due,  inter  alia,  to 
the  global  implications  of  technical  impediments  and  restrictions.  It 
is clearly in everyone's interest that  we  maximise  our potential here  to 
coordinate internally and  speak with  one  voice. 
But  this  now  leads  me  on  to another very important  aspect highlighted by 
telecoms  liberalisation - this  concerns  an  external dimension  to  EU 
competition policy: 
the  telecoms  market  is more  and  more  no  longer  essentially an  EU 
one,  it becomes  a  global  one 
the most  important  alliances  notified  to  me  are  fundamentally 
international not  just European 
the  customers  and  companies  served by  this  market  want  direct 
access  to increasingly global  services  - whether  this  may  be  a  web 
site  in  Australia,  or  a  corporate  communications  network  for  a 
multinational 
I  have  already mentioned  the  extent to  which  joint ventures  involving 
international  partners  allow  me  to  set  down  certain  conditions 
concerning market  access  and  competitive  conditions  in  these partners' 
home  countries.  So  this is one  way in which  we  are already developing  a 
certain  external dimension  to  the  competition rules  regarding mergers 
and alliances. 
As  such  ventures  increasingly and  more·  intensively link in to  existing 
and  expanding international  networks  of  partnerships  around  the  world 
(eg  AT&T  World  Partners)  the  scope of this instrument is growing. 
Other important  aspects  of 
for  an  external dimension 
dealing with unnecessarily 
position. 
competition  policy,  however,  are also calling 
in the  telecoms  sector:  that  is,  the aspects 
restrictive regulations  and  abuse  of dominant 
As  we  have  learned generally  from development  of  Community  single market 
policy over  the  years,  elimination of trade barriers  and  application of 
competition  law need  to  go  hand in  hand,  especially where  the  newly 
opened markets  are still dominated by  incumbent monopolies.  We  can  say 
broadly  that  significant  international  market  access  barriers  are 
created by  both  restrictive  regulations  (and  these  do  not  need to  be 
discriminatory against  foreign  entrants  to  represent barriers);  as  well 
as  anti-competitive practices  of  dominant  players.  The  latter includes 
behaviour  such  as  hindering  access  to  essential facilities,  tying  and 
bundling,  excessive or  predatory pricing and vertical arrangements  often 
involving  cross  subsidies. 
At  this  general  level  I  have,  together with  my  colleague Sir  Leon 
Brittan,  put  forward  recently a  Communication  aiming  to move  us  toward 
an  international  framework  for  competition  rules  in  particular 
proposing that  the  WTO  ministerial meeting  in Singapore  this  December 
establish a  working party on  the issue. 
But  what  direct relevance  does  this  have  to  the  European  telecoms 
market?  Telecommunications  represents  the  first  and  most  important  test 
bed  for  this  new  international  convergence  of trade  issues,  domestic 
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regulatory  issues  and  competition  issues.  The  WTO  group  now 
negotiating  for  an  agreement  on  access  to  basic telecoms  markets  will 
also  adopt  a  framework  of  common  regulatory  principles  to  support 
effective competition.  These will  and must  go  hand  in hand with  the 
market  access  offers  on  the  table,  otherwise  the  offers  may  be 
relatively  meaningless.  The  common  principles  include  some  very 
important  competition  safeguards  which  essentially  reflect  our  own 
internal  application of  articles  90  and  86  to  the  telecoms  sector. 
Amongst  other things  these  concern:  cross  subsidies,  interconnection and 
network  access,  licensing  procedures,  independence  of  the  regulatory 
authority and  transparent international accounting  rates. 
It is important  to  emphasise  that the  EU's  external  voice  vis  a  vis  our 
competition policy  and  the  application of  the  competition  rules  of  the 
Treaty is,  I  believe,  proving  to be  increasingly successful. 
VI  EU  telecoms  liberalisation in  the  framework  of the  information 
society 
Of  course  all  these  words  on  the  future  shape  of  the  European 
Telecommunications  market  and its regulation  make  little  sense without 
orienting them  within  the  umbrella  of  goals  and  expectation which  we 
call the information society. 
The  information society  is for  me  first  and  foremost  about  creating 
wealth  for  citizens,  employees  and business  alike.  By  wealth,  I  do  not 
mean  simply more  ECU  in  our pockets.  Creating  wealth means  creating 
more  jobs,  it  means  creating more  knowledge  and  more  education,  and it 
also  means  more  pleasures  and  entertainment.  On  the  one  hand  European 
employees  are  relying upon  healthy  growing  competitive  economies,  and  on 
the  other  European  citizens  must  be  guaranteed  access  to  increasingly 
rich  and  universal  networks  of  communication  and  information.  The  basic 
infrastructure of all  this is  telecommunications  networks.  To  make  get 
maximum potential  from  this infrastructure  we  must  consistently  take 
decisions  which  encourage  greater  and  greater  opportunities  for 
increasing access  and bandwidth. 
Too  often in member  countries  which  have  not  yet  reaped the benefits  of 
open  and  competitive markets,  it was  assumed that  competition policy was 
somehow antithetical  to public service  and  the interests  of unions  and 
employees.  Or  at  least.that there  was  some  sort of trade  off to·be  had 
between  them.  Of  course  this is muddled  thinking.  Competition is not 
in fact  an  end  or goal  in itself.  It is simply  the most  effective and 
least  risky  strategy  we  have  for  achieving  our  real  policy  goals 
concerning  economic  growth  and  satisfactory  and  efficient  public 
service.  The  real  question  we  need  to  tackle  is  not,  of  course 
competition  or public service.  They  are  two  sides  of the  same  coin.  It 
is,  rather,  how  and  where  can  we  best use  the tool of competition policy 
to  further  public service and  economic  objectives. 
Let  us  re-focus  for  a  moment  on 
useful  to spilt  our  approach 
progressive 
the  issue of universal  service:  It 
into  two  parts:  one  protective and 
is 
one 
A  guaranteed level 
against  risk  in 
safE>guards 
of universal  service must  be  completely 
a  competitive  environment  with  solid 
"protected" 
regulatory 
However  the  improvement  and  expansion  of universal  service is  itself 
enhanced,  even  ensured,  by .the  competitive  environment.  As  I  mentioned 
before,  the  broader  concept  of developing  universal  service is  about 
greater and  greater access  to  more  and  more  bandwidth.  It relies  upon 
competition  and  could  actually  be  stifled  by  excessive  regulatory 
restrictions 
The  European  Commission  has  already set  certain basic principles at  EU 
level  for  the  scope  of the  guaranteed level of universal  service and its 
funding.  This  is in order to  ensure  that different national  regimes  do 
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not  create  barriers to trade.  This  is 
not  create  unnecessary  distortions 
liberalised markets. 
also to ensure that the  rules  do 
of  competition  in  the  newly 
At  the  end of  the  day my  fundamental  concern is  to  encourage  competition 
and  choice at  the  customer  access  level:  Access  to  the  end  user  for 
service  providers  on  the  one  hand;  and  access  for  the  end user  to  a 
growing  range  of services,  on  the other. 
What  sort  of  access?  What  sort of  terminal?  It doesn't  matter. 
Internet access  provided by Internet  Access  Providers  over local telecom 
networks;  broadband  cable access  provided by cable  operators  or  PTOs; 
satellite  and  wireless  access  provided  by  broadcasters  and  mobile 
operators?  We  can  certainly  see  the  growth  potential  and  the 
possibilities of  Europe's  telecommunications  market  but  we  can  not,  we 
must  not,  predict or pre-empt its exact  shape.  I  see my  job as  simply 
ensuring  that as  many  possibilities are left open  as  possible  so  as  to 
allow consumer  demand,  innovation and creativity in the  market  to decide 
the  future. 
*** 
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At  the proposal  of  Mr  Karel  van  Miert,  Commissioner  in  charge  of  EU 
competition policy,  the  European  Commission  gave its authorisation today  to 
the  European  telecommunications  alliance between  France  Telecom  (FT)  and 
Deutsche  Telekom AG  (DT),  known  as Atlas,  and to the  global  alliance between 
Atlas  and  Sprint Corporation,  recently  renamed  GlobalOne. 
However,  the  Commission's  decision  ties the potential  inclusion of various 
services  and  networks  in the  joint  venture  to  regulatory  reform at  the 
national  level.  Once  the  new  French  and  German  telecom liberalisation  laws 
are  fully  implemented  and  operative,  DT  and  FT  may  request  that  the 
Commission  review  specific  restrictions  attached  to  the  decision.  The 
Commission  will  then  decide  depending  on  the  competitive nature  of  the 
markets.  Moreover,  the  Commission  approves  Atlas  for  a  relatively  short 
period of  5  years.  The  alliance will  come  up  for  review in 2001,  at  the  same 
time  as  the  review of  BT  and MCI's  Concert  joint venture  which  was  approved 
in  1994. 
The  European  Commission  only  agreed to  initiate  the  formal  authorisation 
procedure  (on  17  October  1995)  once  the  French  and  German  ministers  in 
charge  of  telecommunications  had  committed  to  early  alternative 
infrastructure liberalisation in  1996,  and,  furthermore,  once  FT  and  DT's 
CEOs  had  substantially changed  the  commercial  structure of  the  proposed 
alliance. 
The  final  Atlas  and  GlobalOne  agreements  signed  on  22  January  1996  are  a 
further  step  towards  a  positive  restructuring  of  the  European 
telecommunications  industry,  which  must  reposition in the  wake  of increasing 
globalisation  of  demand  and  given the prospect of full  competition in the  EU 
markets  by  1998.  To  ensure  dominance  is not abused,  nor markets  foreclosed 
in the  sensitive  run  up  period  to effective competition,  strict  conditions 
on  agreements  and alliances  of  the  dominant  operators  are  vital.  The 
Commission  foresees  a  gradual  phase-out  of  restrictions  alongside  the 
establishment  of  a  fully competitive  regulatory  framework  at national  and  EU 
level.  Further  liberalisation  as  regards  regulation  of  international 
services  in  France,  Germany  and  the  US  in  the  context  of  the  WTO 
negotiations  in this  area,  may  also have  an  impact  on  the  future  conditions 
surrounding  the  global  venture. 
This  flexib!e  and  dynamic  approach,  tying authorisation  of the  agreements  to 
implementation of general policy  opening  the  relevant markets,  .received the 
support  of  the Advisory  Committee  of Member  State competition authorities  in 
June  1996. 
The  Commission  decisions  set out  a  two-tier approval: 
i  Atlas/GlobalOne's  European  and  global  services  as  well  as  most  value-
added  services  in  France  and  Germany  are  authorised  from  the  date  on 
which  France  and  Germany  grant  the  first  two  alternative 
telecommunications  infrastructure  licences.  This  should be  imminent 
since  French  and  German  Telecom  laws  have  now  been  adopted  which 
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implement  the  EU  timetable  for lifting  restrictions  (i.e.  July  1  1996 
for  alternative  infrastructure).  These  infrastructure  licences  must 
allow  the provision  of liberalised  telecommunications  services  (i.e. 
they may  exclude basic public voice  telephony until 1998). 
ii  At  a  second stage,  FT  and  DT  may  include.within the Atlas  venture their 
national public switched  data networks,  Transpac  and  T-Data.  This  may 
be  authorised  only  when  France  and  Germany  liberalise  fully  all 
telecommunications  services,  including  public voice,  and all  network 
infrastructure.  The  granting  of  the  first  of  such  licences  is 
envisaged,  by both  French  and  German  legislation,  by  1  January  1998. 
The  Commission  attaches· the  following  conditions  to Atlas/GlobalOne: 
*** 
FT  and  DT  must  establish and maintain  access  to their domestic  public 
switched  data  networks  in  France  and  Germany,  even  after  their 
integration into  Atlas,  on  a  non-discriminatory,  open  and  transparent 
basis  to  all service  providers  offering low-level  data  services  (i.e. 
using protocols  such  as  X.25,  Frame  Relay,  Internet or  SNA);  to ensure 
continued non-discriminatory  access  in  the  future,  they  must  also 
implement  any  generally applied  standardised interconnection  standard 
that may  modify,  replace  or  co-exist with,  the  current standard; 
FT  and  DT  must  treat Atlas/GlobalOne  and all third  party competitors  in 
a  non-discriminatory  way  in  relation  to  their  facilities;  this 
condition extends  to the  availability of facilities-related  services, 
to  the  terms  and  conditiohs  of  service provision  and  to  relevant 
information  on  such services; 
FT  and  DT  are  -prohibited  from  any cross-subsidisation;  to  prevent 
cross-subsidies,  all  entities  formed  pursuant  to  the  Atlas  and 
GlobalOne  ventures  are established  as distinct entities,  separate  from 
the parent  companies;  FT,  DT  and  their joint entities must  implement  an 
analytical accounting  system,  subject  to  regular external auditing,  to 
ensure that these entities deal  with  FT  or  DT  on  an  arm's  length basis 
at all times; 
FT  and  DT  acting  as  Atlas/GlobalOne's  distributors  in  France  and 
Germany  must  conclude  separate  one  separate  contract  for  their  own 
services  and  one  for  the  distributed  Atlas/GlobalOne  services 
respectively;  each of the  two  contracts must  identify the price  and  the 
rebate,  if any,  of each individual service provided; 
FT  must sell  INFO  AG,  an  important  competitor  of T-Data  on  the  German 
data  network  services market,  before  a  specified deadline. 
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THE COMMISSION TAKES ACTION TO PREVENT ANTI-COMPETITIVE 
PRACTICES IN THE MOBILE PHONES SECTOR 




The  Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV)  has  written to  GSMIDCS1800 
handset manufacturers  and  network  operators  in the  EEA  limiting the  use  of 
the  "SIM  Lock"  feature  in mobile  phone  handsets:  the  fea~ure  effectively 
ties  the  customer  to  one  GSM  operator or service  provider.  The  handset  must 
be  able  to be  unlocked  upon  demand  by  the  consumer.  This  will prevent  the 
anti-competitive effects of  the  feature vis-a-vis  existing or  new  operators, 
and  avoid  a  reinforcement  of the division of  the mobile  phone market  along 
national  lines. 
The  benefit o!  the  SIM  Lock,  for both  consumers  and  operators,  is  that it 
helps  to deter  theft of  handsets,  but at  the  same  time  it "locks"  the 
particular  handset  (phone)  to  a  particular  operator or  service provider. 
This  raised serious  concerns  as it  would prevent  consumers  who  had purchased 
a  mobile  phone  handset  from later  choosing which mobile  phone  service best 
suited their  needs.  The  SIM  Lock  can in  fact  be  deactivated in order  to 
allow a  customer  to  switch to another network  or  service provider  once .they 
have  bought  a  handset,  but this  sometimes  requires  the  return of the  handset 
to  the  operator or service provider.  A  more  common  form of the  "lock"  does 
allow deactvation by  the  customer him/herself but  operators  often  charge  the 
latter a  significant  sum before they will provide  the  information necessary 
to  unlock  the phone. 
On  30  May  1996,  the  Commission  wrote  a  "warning letter" to all  GSMIDCS1800 
network  operators  and all manufacturers  of  handsets  in the  EEA  alerting them 
to  the anti-competitive effects of the  SIMLock  feature.  The  Commission  also 
wrote  to  ETSI,  the  European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute,  which 
was  proposing to  standardise this  feature  as  part of the  GSM  standard.  A 
large  number  of  responses  were  received,  and  it became  clear that  most 
operators  do  not  feel it  necessary to  use  the  SIM  Lock  feature,  and  in 
certain  countries  notably  France  and  Denmark  the  risk  of  anti-
competitiye  uses  of the  feature  had been  forseen  and  would be  avoided by  the 
establishment  of  special rules  overseeing  its use.  This  was,  however,  not 
the  case in all countries. 
The  Commission  has  now  written to  the manufacturers  to  ensure  that  they only 
supply  SIM  Locked  handsets  which  can be  unlocked by  consumers  themselves. 
DG  IV has  also indicated to  ETSI  that  this  should be  taken  into account  in 
determining  how  the  SIM  Lock  feature  should be  standardised. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  has  also  written to  operators  indicating  that 
SIM  Lock  should  only be  used if the handset  can be  unlocked by  the  consumer 
on  demand.  In particular: 
The  end-user  should be  made  aware  at  the  time  of  purchase  of  the  handset 
whether  that handset  is locked to  a  particular network  operator  I  service 
provider. 
A  form  of  SIM  Locking  which  allows  the  end-user to  unlock  the handset,  on 
the  basis  of  information  provided  by  the  network  operator  I  service 
provider,  gives  the  Commission  s  services  no  difficulties. 
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Network  operators  or  service  providers  should  inform  end-users  of  the 
possibility of  unlocking the handset,  or provide the information  necessary 
to unlock  the  handset  to all end-users  on  request. 
In  circumstances  where  the  sale  of  the  handset 
provision  of  a  telephony  service,  and  the sale  of 
subsidised by  the  network operator I  service provider: 
is  combined 
th'e  handset 
with  the 
has  been 
The  existence  and  amount  of  any  subsidy,  and the  conditions  for  repayment  of 
all monies  due  under  the  contract  should be  made  clear  to  the end-user  at 
the  time  of purchase. 
Network  operators  or service  providers  may  need to  withhold the  relevant 
unlocking  information  from  end-users  until  one  billing  cycle  has  been 
completed,  thus  ensuring that  a  subscription has  been properly  set up  in 
respect of the handset. 
The  handset  need not  be  unlocked  (and  the information required  to  unlock  it 
need not  be  pr.ovided)  until the  outstanding  amount  of the  subsidy has  been 
repaid by  the  end-user. 
The  practical effect  of  this will  be  that  consumers  will  no  longer  be 
charged  what  were  often significant amounts  of money  for  the privilege of 
linking  their own  handset  to the  services of  another operator  I  service 
provider. 
*** 
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At  its  meeting  this  week  in  Strasbourg,  the  Commission  examined 
field 
the 
of  derogations  available  to  some  Member  States  in  the 
telecommunications  liberalization. 
Mr  Van  Miert  gave  several  reasons  why  the  number  of  such  derogations  should 
be ·reduced to  a  minimum: 
under  the directives  concerned,  such  transitional periods  could  be 
granted only in the light of network  developments; 
the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  European  Council  and  the  Commission  had, 
on  several  occasions,  asserted the  importance  of  rapid  liberalization 
as  a  means  of promoting  economic  growth  and  developing  the  information 
society.  The  date of  1998  played  a  key  role in this  respect; 
lastly,  it  was  important  for  the  countries  concerned to  integrate 
themselves  as  quickly  as  possible into the  European  telecommunications 
market  in  order to  benefit  from  the  corresponding  investments  and 
services. 
The  liberalization of telecommunications  within  the  European  Union  can  also 
have  a  major  impact  on  the  international telecommunications  negotiations 
taking  place  within the  World  Trade Organization.  The  European  Union's 
deadline must  be  as  close  a  possible  to  1998  in  most  Member  States  since 
that year  is also  the target date  for  global  liberalization.  This  would 
allow  an  improved  European offer  to be  made,  if  possible before  the  WTO 
summit  in Singapore,  i.e.  within  a  matter of weeks. 
Special  attention was  paid to  recent developments  in Spain.  In line  with 
the  approach  taken  in  the  Atlas/Global  One  case  (France 
Telecom/Deutsche  Telekom),  Mr  Van  Miert  made  the  point  that an  alliance 
between' dominant  operators  was  not  acceptable in  the  context  of  a  market 
still closed to  competition.  Spain  is also particularly  important  in  the 
context  of  the  WTO  negotiations  given  the size  of its domestic  market  and 
the presence  of its dominant  operator in several  countries  of  Latin America. 
For  this  reason,  Mr  Van  Miert  would  like to  see  Spain  rapidly confirm  that 
it was  prepared  to dispense  with  a  derogation  and  thus  to  give  its  formal 
commitment  to  the date  of  1  January  1998  for  full liberalization  (services 
and  infrastructures).  He  stressed the  importance  of  such  a  commitment  if 
licences  were  to be  awarded  to  new  operators  in Spain  in the  first half of 
1998. 
*** 
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COMMISSIONER  VAN  MIERT  LINKS  DT'S  NEW  BUSINESS  USERS  TARIFFS  TO 
COMPREHENS!VE  NETWORK  ACCESS 
2/11 
Mr  Karel  van  Miert,  Commissioner  in charge  of  EU  competition policy,  has 
agreed  that  the  German  Federal  Ministry of  Posts  and  Telecommunications 
(BMPT)  grant  Deutsche  Telekom's  application  for  certain  new  business 
customer tariffs  by  1  November  1996.  His  agreement  is conditional  on  the 
conclusion of  retroactive  network  access  agreements  between  DT  and  its 
competitors  by  31  December  1996  and  on  the  BMPT  taking additional  regulatory 
steps  required ·for competitive  network  access  in  the  German  market  before 
that date. 
Tbe  terms  and  conditions  of these  agreements  shall  be  retroactive to  1 
November  1996.  The  settlement  follows  an  application by  six  of  DT's  largest 
competitors  that  the  Commission  adopt  interim  measures  (i.e.  take  immediate 
action)  against  the  new  tariffs.  Under  its  powers  the  Commission  can 
substantially  accelerate  the  adoption  and  enforcement  of  preliminary 
decisions  to avert  serious  and irreparable  harm  to  competitors.  Mr  Van  Miert 
agreed  to stay proceedings  for  two  months,  but  warned  that  the  Commission 
would  act  swiftly if  DT's  competitors  were  denied  network  access  on  fair 
terms  by  the  31  December  deadline. 
The  Commission  challenged  DT's  new  ta~iff scheme,  which  requires  prior  BMPT 
approval,  earlier this  year.  The  BMPT  and the  Commission  agreed in June  that 
DT  may  implement  some  of its  proposed tariffs once  the  BMPT  had  granted at 
least  two  alternative infrastructure  licences  and  provided  DT  satisfied 
certain conditions  (see  IP/96/543).  Most  importantly,  DT  had  to start trials 
of  residential  customer  rebate  schemes  and  conclude  network  access 
agreements  with its  competitors  for  traffic either  'breaking  in'  to  the 
competitors'  network  from  DT's  public  switched  telephone  network  (PSTN)  or 
'breaking out'  of  the  competitors'  network  into the  PSTN. 
III 63 The  BMPT  and  DT  have  satisfied five  out  of six conditions  set  out  in June. 
Moreover,  DT  introduced  special  volume  rebates  on  end  user  tariffs  for 
'break in'  and  'break  out'  traffic of closed  user group  (CUG)  networks.  Mr 
Van  Miert  informed the  German  Minister,  Dr  Wolfgang  Botsch,  that  mere  volume 
rebates  for  DT's  competitors  do  not  fully  satisfy the  remaining  condition 
under  which  the  Commission  halted its  investigation  in June,  i.e.  fair 
access  to  DT's  network without  infringing the  fundamental  principle  of non-
discrimination.  He  recalled  that  comprehensive  network  access  was  the 
cornerstone  of  telecommunications  market  liberalisation  in  Germany  and, 
accordingly,  a  condition attached to the  Commission's  authorisation of  DT's 
Atlas  and  GlobalOne  joint ventures  on  17  July. 
Messrs  Van  Miert  and  Botsch  agree  that  CUG  operators  need  comprehensive 
network access  on  fair  terms  to  compete  with  DT.  However,  negotiation  of 
appropriate  arrangements  requires 
terms  of  the  agreement  between 
following: 
prior  regulatory action.  Therefore,  the 
Messrs  Van  Miert  and  Botsch  provide  the 
1)  Before  31  December  1996  the  BMPT  shall allot  special  network  access 
numbers  to  applicants  and  change  current  regulations  allowing  DT  to 
charge  third-party network operators  by the  second. 
2) 
*** 
DT  shall  conclude  comprehensive  network  access 
December  1996,  which  must  integrate the  BMPT's  above 
and  include  certain  commercial  arrangements  (e.g. 
agreements  by  31 
regulatory action 
certain  tariff 
condition)  and  technical  features  (e.g.  provision  of  the  signalling 
system  #7). 
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MOBILE PHONES: NO EVIDENCE FOR HEALTH RISKS, BUT FURTHER 
RESEARCH ACTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION 




"There is  no  evidence  of any  health risk emerging  from mobile phones,  but 
the results  of present research are  inadequate  to draw  firm  conclusions  on 
this  issue.  Further  research  is  therefore  required."  This  is  the  main 
conclusion of  a  report drafted  by an  expert  group  which  was  asked by  the 
Commission  to  prepare  an  action plan  for  comprehensive  research into  the 
effects  of  radio  frequency  radiation on  health.  The  Commission  intends  to 
decide  before the  end of  this  year  how  the proposed  action plan  can  be 
integrated in the  European  research and  development  programmes. 
On  3  October  1995  the  Commission  asked  a  group  of  ten experts  (see Annex)  in 
biology,  neurophysiology,  epidemiology,  physics,  radiation  protection and 
telecommunications  engineering  to prepare  an  action  plan  for  research into 
the possible  health effects  related  ~o  the use  of  mobile  telephony.  The 
group's  mandate  was  not  to  conduct  any  research,  but  to  review the  available 
results  of  the  research  conducted world-wide. 
Today  the  Commissioners  Martin  Bangemann,  in  charge  of  Information 
Technology  and  Telecommunications,  and  Padraig  Flynn,  in charge  of  Public 
Health,  presented the  findings  of the expert  group  to the  Commission. 
Having  examined.the  technology  of mobile  phones,  the  exposure  levels  to 
which  people  may  be  currently exposed  and  relevant published  biophysical, 
biological  and  epidemiological  research,  the expert  group  concluded that  on 
the  basis  of studies  conducted  to  date,  there  is no  evidence  of  any 
increased  health  risk.  However  the  results  of  existing  research  are 
inadequate  to draw  firm conclusions  in either a  positive or negative  sense. 
The  expert  group  makes  concrete  recommendations  for  further  research, 
focused  on  the  specifics of mobile  communications  and  co-ordinated at  the 
European level.  The  recommendations  include  a  call for  research studies  on 
possible mechanisms  of interaction of  radiotelephone  emissions  with  living 
tissues,  genetics,  cancer  induction,  immune  and  nervous  system  related 
effects  and  epidemiology. 
The  Commission will  examine  how  the  research plan  proposed by  the  expert 
group  could be  implemented  and  intends  to take  a  decision  on  this later this 
year. 
European  Commission  Expert  Group 
Chairman  and  editor 
Dr  A  F  McKinlay 
National  Radiological  Protection  Board,  United  Kingdom 
Members 
Professor  J  B Andersen 
Center  for  Personkommunikation,  Aalborg University,  Denmark 
Professor  J  H  Bernhardt 
Bundesamt  fUr  Strahlenschutz,  Institut  fUr  Strahlenhygiene,  Germany 
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Professor  M Grandolfo 
Institute Superiore di  Sanita,  Italy 
Professor  K-A  Hossmann 
Max-Planck-Institut  fUr  Neurologische  Forschung,  Germany 
Dr  F  E  van  Leeuwen 
The  Netherlands  Cancer  Institute,  The  Netherlands 
Dr.  K  H Mild 
National  Institute for Working  Life,  Sweden 
Dr  A  J  Swerdlow 
London  School  of Hygiene  & Tropical Medicine,  United  Kingdom 
Dr  L  Verschaeve 
Vlaamse  Instelling voor  Technologisch Onderzoek,  Belgium 
Dr  B  Veyret 
Universite  de  Bordeaux,  France 
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THE COMMISSION APPROVES TIMETABLE FOR FULL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALISATION IN IRELAND 




The  European  Commission  has  today  approved  a  timetable  for  the  full 
liberalisation  of  telecommunications  in  Ireland.  This  will  give  the 
opport~nity for  infrastructure competitors  to enter  the  Irish market  from 
the  middle  of  next  year.  Indeed,  alternative infrastructure providers will 
be permitted  from  1  July 1997.  Full liberalisation will  take place  from  the 
beginning of  2 000.  In  the meantime,  direct international  conne.ctions  for  GSM 
mobile  phone  providers will  be liberalised from  1  January  1999  and  voice 
telephony  will be  completely  liberalised from  1  January  2000.  Under  the 
liberalisation  directives,  Ireland  was  entitled  to  request  a  derogation 
period up  to  2003. 
In  reaching its decision,  the  Commission  investigated the Irish  government's 
argument  that  Ireland  has  been  carrying  out  major  development  of  the 
telecommunications  ~etworks.  This  required significant  capital investment, 
involving  high levels  of  debt  and Telecom  Eireann has  been  constrained in 
its ability  to achieve  the necessary  structural adjustments,  particularly 
tariff rebalancing,  because  of the high  costs  in  several areas,  including 
debt  levels,  the  delivery of  telecommunications  services  in Ireland  and 
Telecom Eireann's  high  cost structure. 
The  Commission  considered  each  of the  three 
account  of  comments  from  14  companies  as  well  as 
Unions.  All  except  the  latter  were  opposed 
derogations. 
requests  carefully  and  took 
the  Irish Congress  of Trade 
to  the  granting  of  the 
This  decision has  also  to  be  seen  in  the  context of  the 
concerning  the  opening  up  of  telecommunications  in  the 
Organisation.  T~is  decision  forms  part of  the  EU's  improved 
trading partners. 
Voice  telephony 
negotiations 
World  Trade 
offer to  its 
The  voice  telephony  date was  granted because  Telecom Eireann  had  a  need  to 
rebalance tariffs  and increase  telephone penetration  before  the  introduction 
of  full  competition. 
Alternative infrastructure 
The  Irish  request  for  the liberalisation  of alternative infrastructures  was 
not  granted beyond  the middle  of  1997.  The  reason put  forward  by the  Irish 
Government  was  that the alternative  infrastructures  could be  used  to  bypass 
the  voice  telephony monopoly.  The  Commission believed that there  were  other 
methods  of enforcing  the  voice monopoly  and  that the  extension to  July  1999 
which  the Irish government  had  requested was  unjustified. 
International  GSM  connection 
The  Commission  has  partially  accepted the  request  concerning  the  direct 
international  interconnection of  GSM  operators.  The  Irish  Government  argued 
that  the prohibition  on  direct  interconnection should  continue  until  voice 
telephony  was  liberalised as  the  second  GSM  operator  could  compete  using its 
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international tariffs  with  those  of  the  fixed  voice  service  of  Telecom 
Eireann.  The  Commission  could only accept  this prohibition  until  1  January 
1999  as  Telecom  Eireann will have  rebalanced  its tariffs in advance  of the 
voice  telephony liberalisation. 
The  obligation and  dates  requested  and  granted  are  summarised in the  table 
below. 
obligation  concerned  date  foreseen  in 
the  Directives 
liberalisation of voice  1  January  1998 
telephony and  underlying 
networks 
liberalisation of  the  use  1  July  1996 
of own/alternative 




interconnection of mobile 
networks  with  other 
mobile  or  fixed  networks 
Background 
World  trade negotiations 
February  1996 




1  Jan.  2000  1  January  2000 
1  July  1999  1  July  1997 
1  Jan.  2000  1  January  1999 
The  reduction  of  the  Irish  derogation  is  also  relevant  to  ongoing 
negotiations  on  telecommunications  at the World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  in 
Geneva.  Thanks  to  this  internal  liberalisation schedule,  and  to  other 
changes  concerning Spain  and  Belgium,  it was  possible  for  the  EU  to  improve 
its offer to  other trading partners.  This  show  of  EU  leadership,  coordinated 
with  an  improvement  in the  US  offer,  was  very positively received.  It will 
help develop  a  positive momentum at the  WTO  Ministerial  Summit  in Singapore, 
in December.  This  should contribute to  a  better telecommunications  agreement 
by  the  end  of  negotiations,  in  February  1997,  and  more  generally  to 
constructive talks  on  the  other agenda  items  of interest  to  the  EU,  such  as 
future discussions  on  competition and  trade. 
Telecom Eireann  - strategic alliance 
The  Commission  is  currently investigating  the  strategic  alliance  which 
Telecom  Eireann is  entering into with  PTT  Telecom  of the  Netherlands  and 
Telia of  Sweden.  PTT  Telecom and  Telia are expected to  strengthen Telecom 
Eireann  both  financially and  technically to  operate  on  liberaliseq markets. 
This  investigation  is  taking  place  under  the  Merger  Regulation.  The 
Commission  must  make  a  decision about  whether  the  operation raises  serious 
doubts  about  its compatibility  with  the  common  market  by  18  December. 
Comments  from  third parties  are being  sought  by  the  Commission. 
Cable  link 
Telecont  Eireann holds  a  majority  stake in Cablelink,  the  cable  TV  operator 
for  Dublin,  Waterford  and  Galway  City.  This  stake  will be  examined in  the 
context of  the investigation  under  the  Merger  Regulation  procedure.  The 
Commission  is also  conducting  a  more  general  review into the  issue of  cable 
TV  companies.  The  issue of  Telecom Eireann's  shareholding in Cablelink  will 
also  have  to  be  seen  in the  context of  that  review. 
Other  derogations 
Portugal,  Greece  and  Luxembourg  have  also  submitted  requests  for 
derogations.  The  public consultation period  on  these derogations  has  almost 
finished  and  the  Commission is  in the process  of preparing  further  decisions 
III  68 Rapid Text File  http://www.cc.cec/rapidlcgilrapcgi.ksh?p ... n.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/96/1089101RAPID&lg=EN 
regarding  these  countries. 
*** 
III  69 
.\ nf ,\ Rapid Text File  http:/  /www.cc.eeclrapid/cgi/rapcgi.ksh?p ... n.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/96/1152IOIRAPID&lg= EN 
I of2 
·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·'?.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.•.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.·.•.•.•.•,o.•,•.·,·.···················-·.·.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.·.·.·.·.·  .....  ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.•.·.·.·.·.·.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'·'·'•'•'•'.'.',','•'•'·'•'•'•'·'·'·'·'·'·'·'·'•'············-·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·. 
THE COMMISSION ADOPTS DRAFT NOTICE ON ACCESS TO 
TELECOMS NETWORKS AND INVITES FOR COMMENTS 
DN: IP/96/1152  Date: 1996-12-10 
TXT: FR EN DE Dl\. ES PT NL IT 
PDF: DE DA PT NL IT 
Word Processed: DE PA ES PT NL IT 
The  European  Commission  today  decided to  adopt  a  draft  notice  on  access 
agreements  in the  telecoms  sector.  This  Notice,  which  forms  pax·t  of  the 
Commission's  Action  Plan  for  the  Information Society,  clarifies the  role 
that the  competition  rules  will  play in resolving  such  access  prcblems.  It 
does  not  establish new principles  of  competition law,  but  demonstrates  how 
the principles ·existing in current  case  law  of the  Commission  and  the  Court 
of Justice  will  be  applied  to  a  new  type  of  problems  occurring in  the 
context of  the liberalisation of  the  telecoms  sector. 
The  Notice  aims  to  do  three  things.  First,  to set  out access  principles 
stemming  from  EU  competition  law in order to  create greater market  certainty 
and  more  stable conditions  for  investment  and  commercial  initiative in the 
telecoms  and  mu1timedia  sectors.  Second,  to  define  and  clarify  the 
relationship between  competition  law  and  sector specific legislation.  And, 
thirdly,  to explain  how  competition  rules will be  applied in a  consistent 
way  across  the  converging  sectors  involved  in  the  provision  of  new 
multimedia  services  especially to access  issues  and  gateways.The notice  is 
being published in draft  form  for  comment. 
The draft Notice deals,  in its first part,  with the  relationship between  the 
applications  of the  competition rules  and  sector-specific regulation.  In 
particular,  this  refers  to  the  ONP  directives  issued  under  the  EC's  Open 
Network  Provision  framework  and  national  regulations.  This  section  also 
covers  procedural  issues in the  area  of access  agreements.  This  part  sets 
out  the  principle  that  priority  should  be  given  to  sector-specific 
regulation,  where  practicable  and  subject to  the  rights  of  companies  to 
complain  under  the  competition  rules.  The  second part  defines  in  general 
terms  relevant  markets  in the  context of  access  agreements.  In  the  third 
part,  some  principles  regarding  the application of  Articles  85  and  86  to 
access  agreements  are  developed. 
In the  telecoms  sector,  access  agreements  are central  in  allowin~  market 
participants  to  reap  the  benefits  of liberalization.  Interconnectio~  to  the 
public switched telecoms  network is  one  typical  example  of  such  acc,~ss.  Once 
telecoms  markets  are  fully  opened,  Community  competition  rules  also  apply to 
the sector  and will  grow  in  importance.  This  notice is  vital to  e:~sure the 
success  of  the  liberalisation  of  telecoms  markets  in  the  Union  from  the 
beginning  of  1998.  It will  provide  a  rulebook  to  help  telecoms  services 
companies  to  gain access  to  existing telecoms  networks,  in  competition with 
the existing providers. 
Comments  should  be  made  within  two  months  of  the publication of  t:~e  draft 
notice  in the Official  Journal.  In practice,  they  will be  accepted at  any 
time  up  to  the  end of  February.  Comments  can  be  sent by mail,  fax  or  E  mail 
to  the  following  addresses. 
Mail 
European  Commission 
Directorate-General  for  Competition  (DG  IV) 
Directorate  C 
c  158  3/48 
III  70 Rapid Text File 
2 of2 
Rue··de  la Loi  200/Wetstraat  200 
B-1049  Brussels 
E  mail 
access.notice@dg4.cec.be 
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SECOND GSM OPERATOR IN SPAIN: THE COMMISSION REQUESTS 
CLARIFICATION FROM THE SPANISH AUTHORITIES 




The  European  Commission  has  decided to  request  the  Spanish authorities  to 
provide  clarifications  on  the initial licence  fee  imposed  on Airtel  M6vil 
for  the  grant  of  a  second  concession  of  GSM  services in  Spain.  The  second 
operator which  started operating in  October  1995  was  selected  on  the basis 
of  a  tender  process  which  resulted in  Airtel having  to pay  Ptas  85  billion 
whereas  the public  telecommunications  operator,  Telef6nica,  was  granted its 
GSM  licence without  an initial licence  fee.  The  Commission  considers  that 
the initial  fee distorts  competition in  favour  of Telef6nica  and  gives  the 
Spanish  Government  three months  to  inform  the  Commission  on  the  steps  it 
will  take  to  secure  equal  conditions  for  GSM  operators  on  the market. 
On  23  April  1996,  the  Commission  requested  the  Spanish  Government  to  refund 
the  Ptas  85  billion  paid  by the  second operator  or to  adopt  equivalent 
corrective measures.  The  Spanish authorities proposed then  to  transfer,  from 
the principal  public operator  to  a  100%  subsidiary  which  operates  mobile 
telephone  services  for  the  public operator,  the  cost of  providing  fixed 
cellular  connections  to  the  public network  in scarcely  populated  remote 
areas  (TRAC-project),  this  cost  being  previously  borne  by  Telef6nica. 
However,  the  Spanish  Government  did not provide sufficient  data to allow the 
Commission  to  consider  the  project  equivalent  to  the  initial  payment. 
Therefore,  the  Commission  decided  to ask  clarifications  on  the  corrective 
measures  the  Spanish  authorities  intend to  take  in order  to  remove  the 
distortion of  competition. 
Under  the  terms  of  the  concession granted to  Telef6nica in 1991,  the public 
operator  would  obtain  a  GSM  concession  without  any  further  payment.  The 
Commission  considers  therefore that  the public  operator has  a  competitive 
advantage  allowing  it to  strengthen its  dominant  position  to the detriment 
of the  second  GSM  operator.  The  Commission  adds  that  any  strengthening  of 
Telef6nica  's  dominant position  as  well  as  any  limitation of  production, 
markets  or  technical  development  in relation to  GSM  are likely to delay the 
process  of steadily reducing  tariffs for  GSM  telephony.  In  the  absence  of 
the  licence  fee  imposed  on  Airtel,  price  competition  would  have  been 
stronger and  GSM  tariffs would  have  fallen more  quickly. 
Four  other  Member  States  granted  their  second  mobile  licence  under  a 
procedure  which  had  anti-competitive effects  :  Italy,  Belgium,  Ireland  and 
Austria.  Subsequent  to  the  intervention of the  Commission,  Belgium,  Ireland 
and Austria  decided to  impose  a  similar payment  on  the public  operator.  The 
Italian  Government  proposed  a  package  of  corrective  measures  which  was 
agreed  by  the  Commission.  Second operators  started operating  commercially at 
the  following  times  :  Omnitel  Pronto  Italia  (Italy)  December  1995,  Maxmobil 
(Austria)  July  1996,  Libertel  (Netherlands)  :  September  1996,  Mobistar 
(Belgium)  :  October  1996  and  Esat  Digifone  (Ireland):  December  1996. 
*** 
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COMMISSION CLEARS UK CABLE TELEVISON AND TELECOMS 
MERGER 




The  Commission  has  cleared a  merger  which will bring together  the  current  UK 
cable-tv interests  of Videotron,  Cable  &  Wireless,  Nynex  and  BCE,  with those 
of Mercury  Communications  to  form  a  new  cable  television/telecommunications 
group.  The  new  venture will be  known  as  Cable  and Wireless  Communications. 
The  operation will  be  done  in two  main  stages.  In the first,  Bell  Cable 
Media  will  acquire Videotron,  and  Cable  & Wireless  and  BCE  will  assume  joint 
control  of  Bell  Cable  Media.  In  a  second,  t~e  interests  of  BCM,  Nynex 
CableComms  Inc  and  Nynex  CableComms  plc will be  brought  together  under  the 
umbrella  of  a  new  company,  Cable  & Wireless  Communications. 
The  new  company  will be  active  in pay  television,  cable  networks,  and 
telecommunications  services  and  networks.  In the  UK  currently  BSkyB  is 
dominant  in  pay  television.  British  Telecom  is  dominant  in 
telecommunications  services  and  networks.  The  new  group will have  access  to 
Mercury's  existing trunk lines,  as  well as  to the  cable  companies  local  loop 
connections.  It  will provide  the stimulus  for  the  development  of  further 
competition in these areas. 
Because  of  the  structure of the transaction,  two  separate notifications  were 
received by  the  Commission  under  Council  Regulation  No  4064/89  (the  Merger 
Regulation) .  After examination,  the  Commission  issued one  decision  recording 
its conclusion that  the transactions described in each of  the notifications 
are  compatible with the  common  market. 
*** 
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THE COMMISSION CLEARS THE CREATION OF IRIDIUM, A FUTURE 
PROVIDER OF WORLDWIDE SATELLITE PERSONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (S-PCS) 
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The  European  Commission  has  given its formal  green  light to the creation of 
Iridium,  a  company  led by  the  US  corporation Motorola,  which  intends  to 
provide  as  from  the  last  quarter  of  1998,  global  digital  wireless 
communications  services  using  a  constellation  of  66  low earth  orbit  (LEO[l] 
)  satellites.  Services  will  include  mobile  voice  telephony,  paging  and 
basic  data  services  (such  as  facsimile)  and  will be  provided via portable 
hand-held  (dual  mode  or  single mode)  telephones,  vehicle mounted  telephones, 
pagers  and  other  subscriber equipment.  Because  Iridium  will  not  restrict 
competition,  its  creation has  been  concluded to  fall  outside the  scope  of 
both Article  85(1)  of  the  EC  Treaty and Article 53(1)  of  the  EEA  Agreement. 
Indeed,  none  of  the  strategic investors  could  be  reasonably  expected to 
separately  assume  the very high level  of  investments  required  (nearly USD  5 
billion)  and  the  very  high  risk  of  technical  and  commercial  failure 
associated with  such  a  new  system.  In addition,  no  investor  has  all  the 
necessary licences  to operate  such  a  system. 
Apart  from Motorola,  Iridium is  owned  by  16  strategic investors  including  a 
number  of telecommunication  services providers  and  equipment manufacturers 
from  around  the world.  Two  European  companies  figure  among  those strategic 
investors:  Stet  (Italy;  3.8%)  and Vebacom  (Germany;  10%).  Each  of  the  two 
has  its own  gateway service territory covering different parts  of  Europe  and 
the  associated exclusive  right to construct and  operate  a  gateway within its 
respective territory. 
Satellite systems,  like Iridium  (commonly  referred to  as  S-PCS  systems[2]  ) 
are  expected to  complement  wireless  terrestrial  mobile  technologies  (such  as 
GSM)  in areas  where  those  terrestrial technologies  have  failed  to penetrate 
(i.e.  rural parts  of the  developed world  and both  urban  and  rural parts  of 
lower  income  countries)  or  where  terrestrial  roaming  is  not  available 
because  of  incompatible  technologies.  In  addition,  S-PCS  systems  are 
expected  to act  as  a  complement  and  even  a  substitute for  the  public 
switched  fixed  telephone  network,  enhancing service coverage  in  remote  areas 
of  low population  density and/or  where  the terrestrial  infrastructure is 
very poor. 
The  same  conclusion as  to  the inapplicability. of  the  competition  rules  of 
both  the  EC  Treaty  and  the  EEA  Agreement  has  been  reached  in respect  of 
several  ancillary  restraints;  namely  as  regards  the  distribution of  the 
Iridium  services  and  the pricing  policies  which  Iridium  may  suggest  as 
guidelines  to  gateways  investor operators.  The  distribution  of  Iridium 
services will be  organised around,  first  gateway operators,  which  are  the 
strategic investors  in  Iridium and  which  have  exclusive  rights  over  their 
respective territories  to install  and  operate  the  gateways  and  to  act  or 
designate  others  to  act  as  services providers  within the territory;  second, 
service providers  nominated  by  gateway  operators,  in  general  on  a  non-
exclusive  basis,  which  are  responsible  for  customer  relationships;  and, 
finally,  Iridium,  which  as  "producer"  of  the  services  will  keep  some 
strategic central  functions  to ensure  coherence  of the  system.  Taking into 
account  the  very high  risks  entailed by  the  Iridium  system and  the  need  to 
attract  gateway  operators  covering all parts  of  the  world,  the exclusivity 
Ill  74 Rapid Text File  http://www.cc.eec/rapid/cgi/rapcgi.ksh?p ... n.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/96/1215101RAPID&lg=EN 
2 of2 
granted to  gateway operators,  as  further described in the  Decision,  has  been 
concluded to be  a  necess.ary incentive for investors  to  assume  these  risks. 
Nevertheless;  in view  of  the  very  strong  position of  STET  in  Italy  as 
regards  the  provision of  satellites services,  the  Commission  requested  an 
additional  safeguard  in respect of Italy.  Thus,  the  parties  have  confirmed 
that the  Iridium agreements  will not affect the  ability of  any  other  company 
or person to  gain access  to  the  telecommunications  infrastructure of  STET. 
other  than  those  STET  facilities specifically  developed  for  the  Iridium 
system.  In addition,  the  Commission  has  explicitly indicated in the decision 
that the  ancillary  nature  of  the  exclusive  rights  granted  to  gateway 
operator investors,  could be  revisited  should the particular  circumstances 
of the  case  change  in  a  substantial  manner.  In  particular should  Iridium 
acquire  a  dominant  position in  respect  of  the actual  provision of  S-PCS 
services. 
Iridium may  suggest  pricing policies  as  guidelines  to its gateway operators. 
The  contents  of  such  guidelines  has  been  described to the  Commission.  They 
would  refer  basically to  rules  for .  the  repartition  of  charges  between 
gateways  in  calls  that use  multiple  gateways,  currency  requirements  and 
exchange  rates.  Each  gateway operator would be  expected to  comply with  these 
guidelines  to  the extent  permitted by  applicable  law  and  regulation,  but 
will otherwise be  free  to set their own  tariffs. 
The  guidelines  are  basically  aimed  at  maintaining  the  coherence  and  the 
integrality  of  the  worldwide  service  that  Iridium  will  provide.  Such 
coherence is particularly important  for  potential users  of the  system.  They 
will most  of  the  time  be moving  in  different areas  of  the world but  they 
will nevertheless  want  to  receive  a  single bill in  a  single  currency.  In  the 
Decision,  the  Commission  has  accepted,  as  recognized in the  "International 
Private  Satellite Partners"  Decision[3]  ,  that  the  principle of  uniform 
prices  in  different  territories,  together  with  the  implementation  of 
marketing  practices in  a  decentralized manner,  seems  appropriate  to fulfil 
customers'  needs. 
[1]  780  km.  above  the earth's surface. 
[2]  The  Commission  cleared also the  Inmarsat-P/ICO  S-PCS.  For  details  ot 
the  Inmarsat-P  system,  see Article 19(3)  Notice  published in OJ  noCJ04 
of  15.11.96,  p.6. 
[3]  OJ  noL354/75  of  31.12.94,  at paragraph  55. 
*** 
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THE COMMISSION CLEARS JOINT VENTURE IN THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR IN IRELAND 




The  European  Commission  has  decided to  clear the  proposed  concentration by 
which  PTT  Telecom  BV,  a  full  subsidiary of  Royal  PTT  Nederland  NV,  ·and Telia 
AB  publ,  a  company  owned  by  the  Swedish  State,  acting  together  through  a 
joint venture  company  called Comsource,  and  the  Irish  State,  will  acquire 
joint control  of Telecom Eireann. 
The  concentration involves  the  establishment  of  a  consortium  between  PTT 
Telecom  and Telia,  named  Comsource,  and  the acquisition by  Comsource  of  20% 
of  the issued share  capital of Telecom Eireann.  Comsource  shall act solely 
as  a  holding  company  to perform the  role  of shareholder of Telecom Eireann. 
As  a  consequence  of  this  acquisition of  2cr%  of  the  shares  of  Telecom 
Eireann,  Comsource  will  acquire  control,  jointly  with the  Irish State,  of 
Telecom Eireann. 
The  operation  relates  to  telecommunications'  infrastructure, 
telecommunications'  services  and  cable  television.  Value-added 
telecommunication  services  are liberalised and  subject  to licence.  Presently 
38  licensed service providers  including  main  European  operators  are present 
in Ireland.  A  second  GSM  operator  will start soon  to  operate.  PTT  Telecom 
and Telia are not presently active in the  Irish market  an~ the  concentration 
does  not  result in  a  direct  change  in  market  shares.  For non-liberalised 
services,  in  the light  of the  ongoing liberalisation  process  in  Ireland, 
Telecom Eireann will not  strengthen its present market position. 
In this  respect  the  Commission  has  taken into account  the  approved  timetable 
for  full  liberalisation  in  Ireland:  alternative infrastructures  will  be 
liberalised by  July 1997,  international  GSM  ~onnection by  January  1999  and 
voice  telephony  by  January  2000.  Ireland  was  entitled  to  request  a 
derogation  period up  to  2003.  In  addition,  the access  to  the  cablelink 
network  for  telecommunication  will  be  open  to  third  parties  on  a  non-
discriminatory basis. 
Telecom  Eireann,  owned  by  the  Irish  State,  is  the  national 
telecommunications  operator  in  Ireland.  Through  a  75%  shareholding  in 
Cablelink  Limited  Telecom Eireann is also  active in the provision  of  cable 
television  services  in  Ireland.  PTT  Telecom  is  a  full  subsidiary of  Royal 
PTT  Nt~derland  NV.  Telia is  company  owned  by  the  Swedish  State.  They  are, 
respectively,  the  main  telecommunications  operators  in The  Netherlands  and 
in  Sweden. 
*** 
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COMMISSION INDICATES A FA  \'OURABLE POSITION IN RESPECT OF 
UNISOURCE - TELEFONICA AND UNIWORLD AND INVITES COMMENTS 




M.  Karel  Van  Miert,  European  Commissioner  in  charge  of  competition  policy, 
has  decided to  publish  two  notices  which  indicate  the intention  of  the 
Commission  to  take  a  favourable  view  of  the  Unisource/Telef6nica  and 
Uniworld  cases,  subject. to  the  comments  of  interested  third  parties. 
Unisource is an  alliance of  PTT  Telecom of the Netherlands,  Teli~ of  Sweden 
and  Swiss  PTT,  which  is being  joined by  Telef6nica  of Spain.  The  Uniworld 
transaction is  an  alliance  between  Unisource  and AT&T.  The  Commission's 
favourable  view  follows  discussions with all the  companies  concerned  as  well 
as  the  governments  of Spain,  Sweden,  the Netherlands  and  Switzerland.  In 
each · case,  interested  third  parties  have  one  month  to  send  their 
observations. 
Both  notices  explain in  detail  changes  to  the  original  agreements  and 
undertakings  given by  the parties  to make  the  transactions  acceptable  under 
EU  competition  law.  In addition,  the Unisource-Telef6nica  Notice  explains 
discussions  with the  Governments  of the  four  countries directly  involved in 
Unisource  (Sweden,  the Netherlands,  Spain and Switzerland) . 
The  main  features  of the  outcome  of the discussions  are  as  follows: 
the full  liberalisation of the  telecoms  market ·  in Spain by  30  November 
1998,  with  three licences  being granted by  1  January  1998  plus  limited 
licences  for  the  cable  TV  companies  to offer telecoms  within their areas; 
the  full  liberalisation of telecoms  in  Switzerland  from  1  January  1998; 
and 
in respect  of the Uniworld  transaction  a  series of undertakings  have  been 
offered  by AT&T  in  respect of its conduct  on  interconnection,  access  and 
accounting  rates. 
l.Full liberalisation of telecommunications  services  and  networks  in Spain: 
The  Spanish  telecommunications  market  will  be  fully  liberalised by  30 
November  1998.  By  that date,  further  licenses  for  voice  telephony  services 
and  public infrastructure  will be  granted,  in  addition  to  those  granted 
before  that  date.  Such  further  licenses will  be  requested  from  1  August 
1998.  For  so  doing,  a  new  General  Law  on  Telecommunications  will be  adopted 
and  enacted  before  the  end  ~f  1997.  Furthermore,  all  necessary 
implementation measures  will be  adopted before  31  July 1998. 
In addition,  the  Royal-Decree  Law  6/96  of  7  June  1996  established a  second 
operator  -Retevisi6n- for  the entire  range  of  telecommunications  services 
and  infrastructures.  80%  of its share  capital will be  sold  by tender  to  be 
awarded  during  the  first  quarter  of  1997.  A  third  licence  for  the 
provision of  voice  telephony and  public  infrastructures. with  nation-wide 
coverage will be  granted by  the beginning of  January  1998.  By  the  same  date, 
cable  television  operators will  start offering  voice  telephony  and public 
infrastructures  within their  respective areas.  On  that basis,  the  Commission 
has  considered  that  the  degree  of  actual  competition  in  the  Spanish 
telecommunications  market  by  the  beginning  of  1998  will  be  comparable  to 
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that of most  Member  States which  will abide 'by the liberalisation date  of  1 
January 1998. 
2.  Full  liberalisation  of  telecommunications  services  and  networks  in 
Switzerland: 
Telecommunications  in  Switzerland will  be 
1998  in parallel to  the  EU.  A  new  Law  will 
remaining  restrictions. 
fully liberalised  by  1  January 
be  enacted shortly  eliminating 
Regarding  alternative infrastructure  liberalisation,  the  Swiss  Government 
indicated that  from  1  May  1995,  15  pilot licences  have  been  granted  (the 
majority to  cable tv operators).  Such  pilot licences  allow the provision  of 
some  telecommunications  services  to  subscribers  (Internet  access,  data 
transmission,  multimedia  and  telephony within  closed users  groups).  The 
contents  of  such  licences  will be  extended before  the  end  of  1996  to  offer 
the possibility  to  owners  of alternative  infrastructures  in  Switzerland  to 
carry out  commercial activities,  in particular  for  the provision over  them 
of  corporate  telecommunications  services.  Competitors  to  Swiss  PTT  for  the 
provision of  such  corporate telecommunications  services will be  allowed  to 
use  such alternative infrastructures. 
3.  AT&T  offerings: 
In  the  framework  of the Uniworld  case,  AT&T  offered  to  the  Commission  the 
following: 
(a)  AT&T  undertakes  to  advise  the Competition  Directorate General  of  the 
European  Competition  (DG  IV)  promptly of any  complaint  filed with  the  US 
Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC)  regarding  access  to  or 
interconnection  with  AT&T's  international facilities,  including  any 
complaint  filed  with  the  FCC  regarding  bilateral  correspondent 
arrangements,  by  telecommunications  operators  or  service providers  from 
the  EEA  or Switzerland.  AT&T  further undertakes  to  inform  DG  IV of  any 
final  decision taken  by  the  FCC  in  regard to  any  such  complaint. 
(b)  With  respect to operators  with international facilities  licences  in  EEA 
and  Switzerland with  whom  AT&T  today has  an  accounting  rate agreement, 
and  for traffic  sent in  the  context of  the  bilateral correspondent 
regime,  AT&T  undertakes  to offer  cost-based accounting  rates  that,  in 
all  cases,  would  be  no  higher  than  the  lowest  accounting  rate 
established between AT&T  and  any Unisource  shareholder. 
(c)  With  respect to  operators  with international facilities  licenses  in  EEA 
and  Switzerland with  whom  AT&T  may  in the  future  establish an  accounting 
rate  agreement,  AT&T  undertakes  to offer  cost-based accounting  rates 
that,  in all cases,  would  be  no  higher  than the  lowest  accounting  rate 
then in effect between AT&T  and  any Unisource  shareholder. 
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'fhe Commission initiates second phase proceedings on BT  -MCI merger 
ON: IP/97/76  Date: 1997-01-31 
TXT:EREN 
PDF: FREN 
Word Processed: ER EN 
ip/97/76 
Brussels, 30th January 1997 
\ 
The Commission initiates second phase proceedings on BT-MCI merger 
The European Commission has decided to open second-phase proceedings in the BT (British 
Telecommunications pic) and MCI (MCI Communications Corporation) merger notification. The 
merger would take place against a background of  rapid change in the telecommunications sector, and 
in particular the granting of  44 new international facilities licences in the UK. And although many of 
the parties' .activities are complementary, the Commission's enquiries suggest a certain number of 
areas in which further investigations are required. 
These include whether the merger might have the capability of  impairing the competitive positiou 
of  it~· major competitors on the UK-US route by reducing their net settlement revenues; wlzetller 
the new entity could divert US-European traffic through the UK in a way not currently open to its 
European competitors, and whether the merger would have any impact on the availability of 
transatlantic cable capacity to n~w  entrants. The impact of  the merger on the teleconferencing 
market will also need to be carefully examined, given the parties' current position. The 
Commission will also examine any other relevant issues which come to light as a result of  the 
investigation into these  fast-changing markets. 
BT is aUK-based supplier of  telecommunications services and equipment. Its main services and 
products are local and long distance telephone exchange lines to homes and businesses, international 
telephone calls to and from the United Kingdom, and the supply of  telecommunications equipment 
for customers' premises. 
MCI is a US-based diversified communications company, offering consumers and businesses a 
portfolio of  integrated services, including long distance, wireless, local, paging, messaging, Internet, 
information services, outsourcing and advanced global communications_. BT and MCI also operate 
jointly a venture known as Concert, which supplies value-added and enhanced services to 
multi-national business customers. 
The Commission now has a maximum of  a further 4 months (until  11  June 1997) in which to 
complete its enquiries and take a final decision on the case. 
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The Commission approves timetable for full telecommunications liberalisation in 
Portugal 
DN: IP/97/118  Date: 1997-02-12 
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ip/97/118 
Brussels, 12 February 1997 
The Commission approves timetable for full telecommunications liberalisation in 
Portugal 
Upon request from the Portuguese Government, the European Commission has today approved a 
timetable for the fullliberalisation of  telecommunications in Portugal from I January 2000. Voice 
telephony will be completely liberalised from that date. In the meantime, direct international 
connections for GSM mobile phone providers will be liberalised from I January 1999. 
As  far as infrastructures are concerned, the opportunity will be given for competitors to enter the 
Portuguese market  from the middle of  this year. Alternative infrastructure providers for already 
liberalised services will be  permitted  from 1 July 1997 and Portugal must liberalise without delay 
the market  for GSM  mobile phone alternative infrastructure. Under the liberalisation directi•'es, 
Portugal was entitled to request a derogation period up to 2003. 
Voice telephony 
On request of  the Portuguese Government, the voice telephony deadline of I January 2000 was 
granted because Portugal Telecom needed to rebalance tariffs and increase telephone penetration 
further before the introduction of  full competition. 
Alternative infrastructure for already liberalised services 
The Portuguese request for the liberalisation of  alternative infrastructures for already Iiberati sed 
services (such as telephone services for Closed User Groups) was not granted beyond the middle of 
1997. The Commission believed that any potential r~duction in revenues on the provision of  leased 
circuits would be compensated by growth in the market and that the development of  the network 
could be continued with the additional implementation period granted for voice telephony. The 
Commission stated that an extension to July 1999 which the Portuguese Government had requested 
could not be justified. 
International GSM connection 
The Commission has accepted the request in full concerning the direct international interconnection of 
GSM operators. This was because there was a realistic risk of  substitution between international GSM 
and international fixed telephony which would threaten the development of  the telecommpnications 
network in Portugal. 
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Alternative infrastructure for GSM  services 
The Commission rejected Portugal's request to postpone the lifting of  restrictions on the provision of 
alternative infrastructure for mobile and personal communications services. The Commission believed 
that the liberalisation of  this section of  the market without delay did not pose a threat to Portugal 
Telecom's revenues and hence to the necessary structural adjustments and development of  the 
network. 
The obligation and dates requested and grantea are summarised in the table below. 
1·; ... ;;;.; ..... ;.;;.;;.;.;;;.;;;·; .. ;; ...  ;.;.;;;·;;;;·,,,,,,.,_,,,.,,_·;;;;;;;;;;;;;;l·n~;~~,~;~;~~~~~;;;;~:l:Additi~~~~;;·;~·;;·;;;·;;;·;;;;;:r;;;;i~;;,·'''''·'''";;j 
j Obligation concerned  1 in the  jjperiod requested i!  j 
1  j Directives  11by Portugal  11granted  1 
:························································································································"  ... ············································································ 
1 Liberalisation of  voice  1  II  :!1 January  1 
l  telephony and underlying  ~  1 January 1998  111  January 2000  lllOOO  j 
1  networks  :  :1  :  ~  1  i  "iib~~~"ii·~~ti~~--~fth~'·~~-~;·~;-··········j ;.: ... ;  ... ;.:.:.;;.;  ..  ;;;;;.;;;·;:;;.·;;·;·:.it•::::;·;·;·;·  •• ·;;·;·;·;·;.·;·;;;;·;·;;;·;·;;;;·;;.;;; •••••• il"""""';.; ...................... l 
j own/alternativ~  net~orks for  11  Jul  1996  lit Jul  1999  :11 Jul  19971 
:other already hberahsed  1  y  li  y  ji  ~  1 
:e~:~i~===t==+="='"c'='=i 
interconnection of  mobile  j F  b  1996  jj1 J  1999  jj1 January  i.: 
k  · h  h  b"l  :  e  mary  ··  anuary  ·=1999  ·  networ  s wtt  ot er mo  1 e or :  11  H  1 
fixed networks  l  :1  1  i  :  ................................................................................................................................ :: ............................................  ;. .................................  . 
~~;~~~;t~~~~.::.~:~  ..  ll~~~-~~~~?~.l~.~~~~-~~~~-~~~~~~-·······11 
Background 
The Full Competition directive (Directive 96/19/EC) which provided for the introduction of  full 
competition the telecommunications sector on 1 January 1998 entitled five member states (Ireland, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain) t9 submit requests for derogations from that deadline to 
the Commission. The Decision concerning Ireland was taken on 27 November 1996 and provided for 
a date offullliberalisation by 1 January 2000. Greece and Luxembourg have also submitted requests 
for derogations. Spain will not apply for a full derogation and its request has been recently published 
(IP/96/1231). 
This decision creates certainty for the rapidly developing Portuguese market. It also provides a 
positive environment for national and global alliances which may be shaped in that market. 
World tratle negotiations 
The agreement of  the Portuguese derogation is also relevant to the negotiations on 
telecommunications at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), in Geneva. Thanks to this internal 
liberalisation schedule, and to other changes concerning Spain and Belgium, it was possible in 
December for the EU to improve its offer to other trading partners. This show of  EU leadership, 
coordinated with an improvement in the US offer, was very positively received. This should contribute 
to a better basic telecommunications agreement by the end of  negotiations at the end of  this week, and 
more generally to constructive talks on outstanding agenda items of  interest to the EU. 
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Bruxelles, le 17 fevrier 1997. 
NOTE BIO AUX BUREAUX NATIONAUX 
cc. aux Membres du Service du Porte-Parole 
WTO Telecoms ·Agreement 
Press conference by Sir Leon Brittan, Geneva, Feb 15 
(P. Guilford) 
This agreement is of  historic importance to the future of  the world trading system as well as to the 
world economy, not just in telecommunications. Estimated to cover over $600 billion years of 
telecoms business, it will boost sales and investment in the· telecoms sector, cut costs for business and 
ultimately improve the cost and quality of  communications for ordinary people. It  will also remove 
further obstacles to the development of  the information society. Taken together with the IT  A (due to 
be finalised in April), which removes tariffs on telecoms equipment among other things, the WTO deal 
on telecoms services will give a powerful lift to the globalisation of  telecoms markets across the 
board. 
It will also inject momentum into talks in other services sectors, notably financial services, due to 
begin in April and finish at the end of  this year. "The omens are good" for the conclusion of  financial 
services, Sir Leon said, for the telecoms accord had created the right climate for negotiations. 
The telecoms deal has shown that the WTO was capable of  concluding negotiations successfully in 
individual sectors. Furthermore, it reinforces the case for a Millenium Round of  global trade talks at 
the end of  the century, revealing a thirst for further liberalisation of  the world,economy. "Telecoms 
has shown that the world is not suffering from negotiating fatigue or an excess ofliberalisation", he 
said. We are already committed to further negotiations on agricultu~e, services and other areas, and 
Sir Leon predicted these and other issues would come together into a new trade round. 
The EU led the negotiations from the front for the last I  1/2 years, convinced from its own internal 
liberalisation process that open telecoms markets are good for business. America's last-minute request 
for an MFN exemption for direct-to-home services and digital broadcasting by satellite (DBS) was 
described by Sir Leon as an "unfortunate blemish" on the overall package. He dismissed it as illegal, 
and in breach of  US commitments on broadcasting made at the time of  the Uruguay Round, and said 
the EU reserved all its rights to challenge the exemption, although the US haq ll)ade it abundantly and 
publicly clear that such an exemption would not be applied to the EU. 
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Helms-Burton 
The EU Council of  Ministers, gathered in Geneva for the telecoms talks, also.  ~iscussed 
Helms-Burton. Sir Leon said the EU was actively negotiating a resolution of  the dispute· with the 
United States, and had deferred the date for the composition of  a disputes Panel until this coming 
Thursday, February 20. The Council unanimously supported this stance at Saturday's meeting. Sir 
Leon said the EU was only asking the United States for something that was lawful under US law -
which would not need an act of  Congress to achieve - and which was moderate and reasonable. He 
cautioned that in the absence of  a better offer than had so far made by the US, a Panel would be 
named by Director-General Ruggiero on February 20. The Council was unanimous in the view that if 
no such offer is received, a Panel will be named. 
Best regards, 
N.  G.  van der Pas 
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Commission services clear the Global European Network agreement to create high 
quality trans-European telecommunications networks. 
The European Commission's competition services have given clearence to the Global European 
Network (GEN) agreement to provide high quality digital links between Member States. This 
agreement amongst the major European telecommunications operators will considerably improve the 
quality of  trans-European network telecommunications services. The European Commission's 
competition services have secured amendments to the agreement in order to preserve competition 
between the companies involved and ensure free and fair access for third parties. 
The main amendments are : 
(a)  Each signatory will refrain from entering into a collective concerted pricing arrangement and will 
negotiate on a bilateral basis the conditions under which it will give access to its GEN capacity. 
(b)  Each signatory will offer in its public tariff access to GEN capacity on a non-discriminatory basis 
to third parties. These will thus be able to access GEN capacity on the same basis as to the signatories. 
The GEN agreement was signed by British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, Telecom 
Italia, Telefonica de Espana. It will create a 2 Mbit/s fibre optics telecommunications network 
between the signatories' nodes using so-called PDH (Plesiosyncbronous Digital Hierarchy) 
technology. The network will improve the speed of  circuit provision, the network availability and 
quality and reliability of  service. 
Although they take a favourable approach towards the improvements trans-European 
telecommunications networks can bring, the European Commission's competition services have stated 
that at the same time they will closely scrutinise such agreements which involvt:( dominant operators in 
order to ensure the development of  pro-competitive structures. 
In particular, the conditions under which third parties can access European leased lines remain a 
strong concern for the European Commission. For that reason, the European Coqunission services 
have warned the parties that the negative clearance of  the agreement does not mean tbat signatories  • 
may abuse their strong if  not dominant positions in this market. At the same time, the European 
Commission is, in the context of  the ONP leased line Directive, examining the application of  th.e ONP 
principle in Member States.  a 
Should a complaint be made regarding access to European leased line capacities, or should the 
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European Commission become aware that the conditions under which access is provided are 
discriminatory or excessive, individual cases pursuant Article 86 EC will be opened against the 
telecommunications operators in question  . 
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